G.R.No.160689. March26,2014.*

RAUL H. SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA(SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA COROMINA, ELIZABETHCOROMINAandROSIEMARIECOROMINA),VICENTEE.GARCIA(SUBSTITUTEDBYEDGARJOHNGARCIA),FELIPE CONSTANTINO, RONALD ARCILLA,NORBETO ABELLANA, DEMETRIO BALICHA,ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, ANDVISAYANELECTRICCOMPANY(VECO),respondents.

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The constitutional

guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a

restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law

enforcement.—The constitutional guaranty against unlawfulsearches and seizures is intended as a restraint against theGovernmentanditsagentstaskedwithlawenforcement.Itistobeinvoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonableexercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in itspronouncements,includingthatmadeinPeople v. Marti,193SCRA57 (1991) viz.: If the search is made upon the request of lawenforcers,awarrantmustgenerallybe firstsecured if it is topassthe test of constitutionality.However, if the search is made atthe behest or initiative of the proprietor of a privateestablishment for its own and private purposes, as in thecase at bar, and without the intervention of policeauthorities, the right against unreasonable search andseizure cannot be invoked for only the act of privateindividual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, theprotection against unreasonable searches and seizurescannot be extended to acts committed by privateindividuals so as to bring it within the ambit of allegedunlawful intrusion by the government.

Civil Law; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; The concept of

abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right

unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who

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*FIRSTDIVISION.

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suffers injury.—Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim fordamages if the respondentswere not guilty of abuse of rights. Tostress,theconceptofabuseofrightsprescribesthatapersonshouldnot use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may beliabletoanotherwhosuffersinjury.Therationalefortheconceptisto present some basic principles to be followed for the rightfulrelationshipbetweenhumanbeingsandthestabilityofsocialorder.Moreover, according to a commentator, “the exercise of right endswhen the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,especially to the prejudice of others[;] [i]t cannot be said that apersonexercisesarightwhenheunnecessarilyprejudicesanother.”Article19oftheCivil Codesetsthestandardstobeobservedintheexercise of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties,namely:(a)toactwithjustice;(b)togiveeveryonehisdue;and(c)toobservehonestyandgoodfaith.The lawtherebyrecognizestheprimordial limitation on all rights — that in the exercise of therights,thestandardsunderArticle19mustbeobserved.

Same; Same; Same; In order that liability may attach under the

concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present, to

wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised

in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring

another.—Althoughtheactisnotillegal, liabilityfordamagesmayarise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act isperformedwithoutprudenceor inbad faith. Inorder that liabilitymay attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the followingelementsmustbepresent,towit:(a)theexistenceofalegalrightorduty,(b)whichisexercisedinbadfaith,and(c) forthesoleintentof prejudicing or injuring another. There is no hard and fast rulethat can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle ofabuseofrightsistobeinvoked.Theresolutionoftheissuedependsonthecircumstancesofeachcase.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A review that may

tend to supplant the findings of the trial court that had the first­

hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses

themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent

hesitation.—TheassertionofSesbreñoisimproperforconsiderationin this appeal. The RTC and the CA unanimously found thetestimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because ofinconsistenciesonmaterialpoints;andevendeclaredthatthenon­presentation of Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect.Consideringthatsuchfindingsre­

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lated to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, theCourtcannotreviewandundothemnowbecauseitisnotatrieroffacts,and isnot also tasked to analyze orweigh evidence all overagain.Verily, a review thatmay tend to supplant the findings ofthe trial court that had the first­hand opportunity to observe thedemeanorofthewitnessesthemselvesshouldbeundertakenbytheCourtwithprudenthesitation.OnlywhenSesbreño couldmakeaclear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence andrecordsbythetrialandtheappellatecourtsshouldtheCourtdotheunusual review of the factual findings of the trial and appellatecourts.Alas,thatshowingwasnotmadehere.

Administrative Law; Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition

of Judges; Although the trial judge had issued an order for his

voluntary inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in

compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose

exercise of her administrative authority on the matter of the

inhibition should be respected.—Nor should the Court hold thatSesbreñowasdenieddueprocessbytherefusalofthetrialjudgetoinhibitfromthecase.Althoughthetrialjudgehadissuedanorderfor his voluntary inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in theend in compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge,whoseexerciseofheradministrativeauthorityonthematteroftheinhibitionshouldberespected.Inthisconnection,wefindtobeaptthe following observation of the CA, to wit: x x x. Both JudgeParedes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Courtandaretherefore of co­equal rank.The latterhasno authority toreverse or modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in orderingJudgeParedestocontinuehearing the case,JudgeAganadidnotviolate their co­equal status or unilaterally increased herjurisdiction.ItismerelypartofheradministrativeresponsibilitiesasExecutiveJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuCity,ofwhich

JudgeParedesisalsoamember.

Same; Same; Same; The motion for her inhibition was

grounded on suspicion of her bias and prejudice, but suspicion of

bias and prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition.—TheCourt finds nothingwrong if thewriter of the decision in theCArefusedtoinhibitfromparticipatingintheresolutionofthemotionforreconsiderationfiledbySesbreño.Themotionforherinhibitionwasgroundedonsuspicionofherbiasandprejudice,butsuspicionof bias and prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition.Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication thatevensuggested

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that the Associate Justices of the CA who participated in thepromulgationofthedecisionweretaintedwithbiasagainsthim.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.Lorete Duranoforrespondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the claim for damages of petitionerRaul H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreñoaccused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection teamdispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) tocheck his electricmeterwith conducting an unreasonablesearch inhis residential premises.But theRegionalTrialCourt (RTC),Branch13, inCebuCityrendered judgmentonAugust19,1994dismissingtheclaim;1andtheCourtofAppeals(CA)affirmedthedismissalonMarch10,2003.2

Hence,thisappealbySesbreño.Antecedents

Atthetimematerialtothepetition,VECOwasapublicutilitycorporationorganizedandexistingunderthelawsofthePhilippines.VECOengagedinthesaleanddistributionofelectricitywithinMetropolitanCebu.SesbreñowasoneofVECO’scustomersunderthemeteredservicecontracttheyhadenteredintoonMarch2,1982.3RespondentVicenteE.

GarciawasVECO’sPresident,GeneralManagerandChair­

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1CARollo,pp.234­285.

2Rollo,pp.26­42;pennedbyAssociateJusticeRemediosA.Salazar­

Fernando,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticeRubenT.Reyes(later

Presiding Justice, and Member of the Court/retired) and Associate

JusticeEdgardoF.Sundiam(retired/deceased).

3Records,Vol.2,p.1186.

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man of its Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. GarciawasVECO’sVicePresident,TreasurerandaMemberofitsBoard of Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier wasanotherMemberofVECO’sBoardofDirectors.RespondentJuan Coromina was VECO’s Assistant Treasurer, whilerespondent Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO’sBillingSectionwhosemain functionwas to compute backbillingsofcustomersfoundtohaveviolatedtheircontracts.

To ensure that its electric meters were properlyfunctioning,andthatnoneofitmetershadbeentamperedwith, VECO employed respondents Engr. FelipeConstantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation of contract(VOC)inspectors.4RespondentSgt.DemetrioBalicha,whobelonged to the 341st Constabulary Company, CebuMetropolitanCommand,CampSoteroCabahug,CebuCity,accompaniedandescortedtheVOCinspectorsduringtheirinspection of the households of its customers on May 11,1989pursuanttoamissionorderissuedtohim.5

TheCAsummarizedtheantecedentfactsasfollows:

xxx.Reducedtoitsessentials,however,thefactsofthiscaseareactually simple enough, although the voluminous records mightindicateotherwise.Itallhastodowithanincidentthatoccurredataround4:00o’clockintheafternoonofMay11,1989.Onthatday,the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of defendants­appelleesConstantino andArcilla and theirPC escort,Balicha, conducted aroutine inspection of the houses at La PalomaVillage, Labangon,CebuCity,includingthatofplaintiff­appellantSesbreño,forillegalconnections,metertampering,seals,conduitpipes, jumpers,wiringconnections, andmeter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff­

appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected theelectric meter and found that it had been turned upside down.Defendant­appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturnedelectricmeter.WithChuchieGarcia,PeterSesbreñoandoneofthemaidspresent,theyremovedsaidmeterandreplaceditwithanewone.At

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4Id.,atp.1185.

5Id.,atpp.1185­1186,1198.

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thattime,plaintiff­appellantSesbreñowasinhisofficeandnoonecalled to informhimof the inspection.TheVOCTeam thenaskedfor and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the houseitself to examine the kind and number of appliances and lightfixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.Afterwards,ChuchieGarciasignedthe InspectionDivisionReport,which showed the conditionof theelectricmeter onMay11,1989when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would besubjectedtoalaboratorytest.ShealsosignedaLoadSurveySheetthatshowedtheelectricalloadofplaintiff­appellantSesbreño.

Butaccordingtoplaintiff­appellantSesbreñotherewasnothingroutineor proper at allwithwhat theVOCTeamdid onMay11,1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surroundingpremiseswaseffectedwithouthispermissionandovertheobjectionsofhismaids.Theythreatened, forcedorcoercedtheirway intohishouse. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside downand took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a newelectricmeter. They searched the house and its roomswithout hispermission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign twodocuments, making her appear to be his representative or agent.Afterwards,hefoundthatsomeofhispersonaleffectsweremissing,apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched thehouse.6

Judgment of the RTC

On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgmentdismissingthecomplaint.7Itdidnotaccordcredencetothe

testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses, Bebe Baledio, hishousemaid,andRobertoLopez,apart­timesalesman,duetoinconsistencies on material points in their respectivetestimonies.ItobservedthatBalediocouldnotmakeuphermindas towhetherSesbreño’s childrenwere in thehousewhentheVOCinspectionteamdetachedandreplacedtheelectric meter. Likewise, it considered unbelievable thatLopez should hear the exchanges between Constantino,ArcillaandBalicha,ononehand,andBaledio,ontheother,consideringthatLopez

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6Rollo,pp.37­38.

7Supranote1.

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couldnotevenheartheconversationbetweentwopersonssix feet away from where he was seated during thesimulationdoneincourt,thesamedistancehesupposedlyhadfromthegateofSesbreño’shouseduringtheincident.Itpointed out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during theincident was even contradicted by his own testimonyindicatingthatanelderlywomanhadopenedthegate fortheVECOpersonnel,becauseitwasBaledio,aladyinher20s, who had repeatedly stated on her direct and crossexaminations that she had let theVECOpersonnel in. ItconcludedthatforLopeztodonothingatalluponseeingaperson being threatened by another in the manner hedescribedwassimplycontrarytohumanexperience.

In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of therespondents showing that the VOC inspection team hadfound the electric meter in Sesbreño’s residence turnedupside down to prevent the accurate registering of theelectricity consumption of the household, causing them todetachandreplacethemeter.Itheldasunbelievablethatthe team forcibly entered the house through threats andintimidation;thattheythemselvesturnedtheelectricmeterupside down in order to incriminate him for theft ofelectricity,becausethefactthattheteamandSesbreñohadnotknowneachotherbefore then rendered itunlikely forthe team to fabricate charges against him; and that

Sesbreño’s non­presentation of Chuchie Garcia left herallegationofherbeingforcedtosignthetwodocumentsbytheteamunsubstantiated.

Decision of the CASesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on

March10,2003,8holdingthusly:

x x x. plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply tooimplausible or far­fetched to be believed. For one thing, theinspection

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8Id.

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onhishouseholdwas justoneofmanyothersthattheVOCTeamhadconductedinthatsubdivision.Yet,nonebutplaintiff­appellantSesbreño complained of the alleged acts of the VOC Team.Considering that there is no proof that they also perpetrated thesame illegal acts on other customers in the guise of conducting aViolation of Contracts inspection, plaintiff­appellant Sesbreñolikewise failed to show why he alone was singled out. It is alsodifficult tobelievethattheVOCTeamwouldbebrazenenoughtowant to antagonize a person such as plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño.ThereisnoevidencethattheVOCTeamharboredanyevilmotiveor grudge against plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño, who is a totalstrangertothem.Untilhecamealong,theydidnothaveanypriorcriminal records to speak of, or at least, no evidence thereof waspresented.Itisequallydifficulttobelievethattheirsuperiorswouldauthorize or condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially so sincethere is no indication that prior to the incident onMay 11, 1989,there was already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to warrant such amalevolent response. In fact, since availing of defendant­appelleeVECO’s power services, the relationship between them appears tohavebeenuneventful.

Itbecomesallthemoreapparentthatthechargesstemmingfromthe May 11, 1989 incident were fabricated when taken togetherwith the lower court’s evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated that on August 8,1989, plaintiff­appellant Sesbreño wrote the barangay captain ofPunta Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria Villarta

aliasVictoriaRocamoraoftheftofsomeofhisthingsthatearlierheclaimedhad been stolen bymembers of theVOCTeam.Whenhewas confronted with these facts, plaintiff­appellant Sesbreñofurther claimed that the items allegedly stolen byChuchieGarciawere part of the loot taken by defendants­appellees ConstantinoandArcilla.Yetnotoncedidplaintiff­appellantSesbreñooranyofhis witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between thesepeople.Clearly,much likehis otherallegations, it isnothingmorethananafterthoughtbyplaintiff­appellantSesbreño.

Allinall,theallegationsagainstdefendants­appelleesappeartobenothingmorethanaput­ontosaveface.Forthesimpletruthisthat the inspectionexposedplaintiff­appellantSesbreñoasa likelycheatandthief.

xxxx

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Neither is thisCourt swayed by the testimonies of Baledio andLopez.Thelowercourtrightlydescribedtheirtestimoniesasfraughtby discrepancies and inconsistencies on material points and evencalledLopezaperjuredwitness.On the otherhand, it is odd thatplaintiff­appellantSesbreñochosenottopresentthewitnesswhosetestimonywasverycrucial.ButeventhoughChuchieGarcianevertestified, her absence speaks volumes.Whereas plaintiff­appellantSesbreño claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign twodocuments that made her appear to be his authorized agent orrepresentative,thelatterclaimedotherwiseandthatshealsogavethem permission to enter and search the house. The personmostqualifiedtorefutetheVOCTeam’sclaimisChuchieGarciaherself.Itisaxiomaticthathewhoassertsafactorclaimmustproveit.Hecannottransferthatburdentothepersonagainstwhomheassertssuch fact or claim. When certain evidence is suppressed, thepresumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the partysuppressingit,shoulditcometolight.xxx9

Upondenialofhismotionforreconsideration,10Sesbreñoappealed.

IssueWasSesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of

rights?Ruling

Theappealhasnomerit.Sesbreño’smaincontention is that the inspectionofhis

residencebytheVOCteamwasanunreasonablesearchforbeingcarriedoutwithoutawarrantandforbeingallegedlydonewithmaliceorbadfaith.

Beforedealingwiththecontention,wehavetonotethattwodistinctportionsofSesbreño’sresidencewereinspectedbytheVOSteam—thegaragewheretheelectricmeterwas

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9Id.,atpp.39­41.

10CARollo,pp.446­460.

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installed,andthemainpremiseswherethefourbedrooms,livingrooms,diningroomandkitchenwerelocated.

Anenttheinspectionofthegaragewherethemeterwasinstalled,therespondentsassertthattheVOCteamhadthecontinuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer toenter his premises at all reasonable hours to conduct aninspectionofthemeterwithoutbeingliablefortrespasstodwelling.Theauthorityemanatedfromparagraph9ofthemetered service contract entered into betweenVECO andeachofitsconsumers,whichprovidedasfollows:

9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorizedemployeesorrepresentativesoftheCOMPANYtoenterhispremisesatallreasonablehourswithoutbeing liabletotrespasstodwellingforthepurposeofinspecting,installing,reading,removing,testing,replacingorotherwisedisposingofitsproperty,and/orremovingtheCOMPANY’S property in the event of the termination of thecontractforanycause.11

Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did notgiveConstantino,ArcillaandBalichatheblanketauthoritytoenteratwillbecausetheonlypropertyVECOownedinhispremiseswasthemeter;hence,ConstantinoandArcillashouldenteronlythegarage.Hedeniesthattheyhadtherighttoenterthemainportionofthehouseandinspectthevarious rooms and the appliances therein because thosewere not the properties of VECO.He posits that Balicha,

who was not an employee of VECO, had no authoritywhatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. Heconcludesthattheirsearchwasunreasonable,andentitledhim to damages in light of their admission that they hadentered and inspected his premises without a searchwarrant.12

We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion. Paragraph 9clothed theentireVOCteamwithunquestionedauthorityto

_______________11Supranote4,atp.1199.

12Id.,atpp.12­17,81.

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enter the garage to inspect themeter.Themembers ofthe team obviously met the conditions imposed byparagraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entryhadtheobjectiveofconductingtheroutineinspectionofthemeter.13Secondly,theentryandinspectionwereconfinedtothe garage where the meter was installed.14 Thirdly, theentry was effected at around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonablehour.15And,fourthly,thepersonswhoinspectedthemeterweredulyauthorizedforthepurposebyVECO.

Although Balicha was not himself an employee ofVECO,16hisparticipationwastorenderpoliceassistancetoensure the personal security of Constantino and Arcilladuringtheinspection,renderinghimanecessarypartoftheteam as an authorized representative. Under thecircumstances,hewasauthorizedtoenterconsideringthatparagraph9expresslyextendedsuchauthorityto“properlyauthorizedemployeesorrepresentatives”ofVECO.

It is true, asSesbreñourges, that paragraph9 didnotcovertheentryintothemainpremisesoftheresidence.DidthisnecessarilymeanthatanyentrybytheVOSteamintothe main premises required a search warrant to be firstsecured?

Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of

every individual against unreasonable searches andseizures,viz.:

Section 2. Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,andnosearchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterex­

13TSN,Vol.9,September12,1990,pp.24­25;Vol.8,September13,1990,

pp.56­57,63,65.

14TSN,Vol.3,June5,1990,pp.27,36.

15TSN,Vol.7,April30,1990,p.4;Vol.9,September12,1990,pp.35­36;

Vol.8,September13,1990,p.57.

16Rollo,pp.14­15.

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amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

HestatesthataviolationofthisconstitutionalguarantyrenderedVECOanditsVOSteamliabletohimfordamagesby virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, whichpertinentlyprovides:

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any privateindividual,whodirectlyorindirectlyobstructs,defeats,violatesorinany manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights andlibertiesofanotherpersonshallbeliabletothelatterfordamages:

xxxx(9) Therighttobesecuredinone’sperson,house,papers,and

effectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures;xxxx.

Sesbreño’sinsistencehasnolegalandfactualbasis.The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches

and seizures is intended as a restraint against theGovernmentanditsagentstaskedwithlawenforcement.Itistobeinvokedonlytoensurefreedomfromarbitraryand

unreasonableexerciseofStatepower.TheCourthasmadethis clear in its pronouncements, including that made inPeople v. Marti,17viz.:

Ifthesearchismadeupontherequestoflawenforcers,awarrantmustgenerallybe firstsecured if it is topassthetestofconstitutionality.However, if the search is madeat the behest or initiative of the proprietor of aprivate establishment for its own and privatepurposes, as in the case at bar, and without theintervention of police authorities, the right againstunreasonable search and seizure cannot be invokedfor only the act of private individual, not the lawenforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection againstunreasonable searches and

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17G.R.No.81561,January18,1991,193SCRA57,67.

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seizures cannot be extended to acts committed byprivate individuals so as to bring it within theambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by thegovernment.18

It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided toenter the main premises only after finding the meter ofSesbreño turned upside down, hanging and its disc notrotating.Theirdoingsowouldenablethemtodeterminetheunbilled electricity consumed by his household. Thecircumstances justified theirdecision, and their inspectionofthemainpremiseswasacontinuationoftheauthorizedentry. There was no question then that their ability todeterminetheunbilledelectricitycalledforthemtoseeforthemselvestheusageofelectricityinside.Notbeingagentsof the State, they did not have to first obtain a searchwarranttodoso.

Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did notmake the inspection a search by an agent of the Statewithin the ambit of the guaranty. As alreadymentioned,Balichawaspartoftheteambyvirtueofhismissionorderauthorizing him to assist and escort the team during its

routineinspection.19Consequently,theentryintothemainpremisesofthehousebytheVOCteamdidnotconstituteaviolationoftheguaranty.

OurholdingcouldbedifferenthadSesbreñopersuasivelydemonstratedtheinterventionofmaliceorbadfaithonthepart ofConstantino andArcilla during their inspection ofthemainpremises,oranyexcessivenesscommittedbytheminthecourseoftheinspection.ButSesbreñodidnot.Ontheotherhand, theCA correctly observed that the inspectiondid not zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because the otherhouses within the area were similarly subjected to theroutinein­

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18 Id., at pp. 67­68 (bold emphasis supplied). See also People v.

Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 525, 531;

Tolentino v. Mendoza,Adm.CaseNo.5151,October19,2004,440SCRA

519,530­531.

19Supranote5atp.1187.

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spection.20This,wethink,eliminatedanynotionofmaliceorbadfaith.

Clearly,Sesbreñodidnotestablishhisclaimfordamagesif the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. Tostress,theconceptofabuseofrightsprescribesthatapersonshouldnotusehisrightunjustlyorinbadfaith;otherwise,he may be liable to another who suffers injury. Therationalefortheconceptistopresentsomebasicprinciplestobefollowedfortherightfulrelationshipbetweenhumanbeings and the stability of social order.21 Moreover,according to a commentator,22 “the exercise of right endswhen the right disappears, and it disappears when it isabused,especiallytotheprejudiceofothers[;][i]tcannotbesaidthatapersonexercisesarightwhenheunnecessarilyprejudicesanother.”Article19of theCivil Code

23 sets thestandardstobeobservedintheexerciseofone’srightsandin theperformanceof one’sduties,namely: (a) to actwithjustice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe

honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes theprimordiallimitationonallrights—thatintheexerciseofthe rights, the standards under Article 19 must beobserved.24

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20Supranote13.

21Paras,Persons and Family Relations,2013,p.122.

22Pineda,Persons and Human Relations,2010,p.76.

23Article 19. Everypersonmust, in theexerciseofhisrightsand

intheperformanceofhisduties,actwithjustice,giveeveryonehisdue,

andobservehonestyandgoodfaith.

24AccordingtoAlbenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals (G.R.

No.88694, January 11, 1993, 217SCRA16, 25),Article 20 of theCivil

Code,whichprescribesthateverypersonwho,contrarytolaw,wilfully

ornegligently causesdamage toanother shall indemnify the latter for

the same, speaks of a general sanction for violation of all other

provisionsof law that do not provide their own sanction. Article 21 of

theCivil Codedealswithactscontra bonus mores,andhasthefollowing

elements,towit; (1) there isanact that is legal; (2)but is contrary to

morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done

withintenttoinjure.ThecommonelementunderArticle19andArticle

21isthat

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Althoughtheactisnotillegal,liabilityfordamagesmayariseshouldtherebeanabuseofrights,likewhentheactisperformedwithoutprudenceor inbad faith. Inorder thatliabilitymayattachundertheconceptofabuseofrights,thefollowingelementsmustbepresent,towit:(a)theexistenceofalegalrightorduty,(b)whichisexercisedinbadfaith,and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuringanother.25Thereisnohardandfastrulethatcanbeappliedtoascertainwhetherornottheprincipleofabuseofrightsisto be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on thecircumstancesofeachcase.

Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio orChuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his residence in hisabsence; and that Baledio herself confirmed that themembersoftheVOCteamhadintimidatedherintolettingthemin.

TheassertionofSesbreñoisimproperforconsiderationinthisappeal.TheRTCand theCAunanimously found thetestimonies of Sesbreño’switnesses implausible because ofinconsistencies onmaterialpoints; andevendeclared thatthenon­presentationofGarciaasawitnesswasodd ifnotsuspect. Considering that such findings related to thecredibilityofthewitnessesandtheirtestimonies,theCourtcannotreviewandundothemnowbecauseitisnotatrieroffacts,andisnotalsotaskedtoanalyzeorweighevidencealloveragain.26Verily,areviewthatmaytendtosupplantthefindings of the trial court that had the first­handopportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnessesthemselves should be undertaken by the Court withprudenthesitation.OnlywhenSesbreñocouldmakeaclearshowingofabuseintheirappre­

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theact is intentional.ButArticle20doesnotdistinguishwhetherthe

actiswillfulornegligent.Underanyofthethreeprovisionsof law,an

actthatcausesinjurytoanothermaybemadethebasisforanawardof

damages.

25 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan Jr., G.R. No.

157314,July29,2005,465SCRA372,382.

26Heirs of Margarito Pabaus v. Heirs of Amanda Yutiamco,G.R.No.

164356,July27,2011,654SCRA521,531­532.

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Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals

ciationof theevidenceandrecordsbythetrialandtheappellatecourtsshouldtheCourtdotheunusualreviewofthefactualfindingsofthetrialandappellatecourts.27Alas,thatshowingwasnotmadehere.

NorshouldtheCourtholdthatSesbreñowasdenieddueprocessbytherefusalofthetrialjudgetoinhibitfromthecase.Although the trial judgehad issuedanorder forhisvoluntaryinhibition,hestillrenderedthejudgmentintheend in compliance with the instruction of the ExecutiveJudge, whose exercise of her administrative authority onthematter of the inhibition should be respected.28 In thisconnection,wefindtobeaptthefollowingobservationofthe

CA,towit:

xxx.BothJudgeParedesandJudgePriscilaAganaserve theRegionalTrialCourtandarethereforeofco­equalrank.ThelatterhasnoauthoritytoreverseormodifytheordersofJudgeParedes.ButinorderingJudgeParedestocontinuehearingthecase,JudgeAganadidnotviolatetheirco­equalstatusorunilaterallyincreasedherjurisdiction.Itismerelypartofheradministrativeresponsibili­

_______________

27ThereareseveralexceptionstotheruleagainsttheCourtnotreviewing

thefactualfindingsoftheCA,namely:(1)whenthefactualfindingsoftheCA

andthoseofthetrialcourtarecontradictory;(2)whenthefindingsaregrounded

entirelyonspeculation,surmises,orconjectures;(3)whentheinferencemadeby

theCAfromitsfindingsoffactismanifestlymistaken,absurd,orimpossible;

(4)whenthereisgraveabuseofdiscretionintheappreciationoffacts;(5)when

theCA, inmaking its findings,wentbeyond the issuesof thecase,andsuch

findingswere contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6)

whenthejudgmentoftheCAwaspremisedonamisapprehensionoffacts;(7)

whentheCAfailedtonoticecertainrelevantfactsthat,ifproperlyconsidered,

would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of facts are

themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without

citation of the specific evidence onwhich they are based; and (10) when the

findingsof factof theCAwerepremisedontheabsenceofevidencebutsuch

findingsarecontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord(E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v.

Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd.,G.R.No.184850,October20,2010,

634SCRA363,382).

28Records,Vol.5,p.2479(OrderdatedOctober18,1990).

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Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals

tiesasExecutiveJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuCity,ofwhichJudgeParedesisalsoamember.29

Lastly,theCourtfindsnothingwrongifthewriterofthedecision in theCArefusedto inhibit fromparticipating inthe resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed bySesbreño. Themotion for her inhibitionwas grounded onsuspicionofherbiasandprejudice,30but suspicionofbiasand prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition.31

Sufficeittosaythattherecordsarebereftofanyindication

that even suggested that theAssociateJustices of theCAwhoparticipated in thepromulgation of thedecisionweretaintedwithbiasagainsthim.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition forreview on certiorari;AFFIRMS the decision promulgatedonMarch10,2003;andDIRECTSthepetitionertopaythecostsofsuit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo­De Castro,

Villarama, Jr. and Perez,**

JJ.,concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Airport frisking isanauthorized formof searchandseizure.(People vs. Cadidia,707SCRA494[2013])

——o0o——

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29Rollo,p.41.

30Id.,atpp.20,72­73.

31 See Dumo v. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006, 480

SCRA53,65­66;Barnes v. Reyes,G.R.No.179583,September3,2009,

598SCRA107,112;Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc.,

G.R.No.160966,October11,2005,472SCRA355,362.

** Vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who inhibited from

participation,pertheraffleofMarch10,2014.

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