1AC – NSA 702 Reform

1AC – Inherency

The recent USA Freedom Act, did not reform the NSA’s the mass collection of domestic communication under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.Goitein 15, Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reformThe USA Freedom Act will end the bulk collection of phone metadata and prohibit similar programs for any type of business records under foreign intelligence collection authorities. For phone records, the government may obtain metadata on an ongoing basis only for suspected terrorists and those in contact with them. For other types of records, the government must tie its request for records to a “specific selection term,” such as a person, address, or account. Given the surge in surveillance since 9/11, the USA Freedom Act’s imposition of constraints on collection is historic. Indeed, the USA Freedom Act is the most significant limitation on foreign intelligence surveillance since the 1970s. If faithfully implemented – a critical caveat, to be sure – the law will meaningfully curtail the

overbroad collection of business records. Even under USA Freedom, however, the government is still able to pull in a great deal of information about innocent Americans. Needless to say, not everyone in contact with a suspected terrorist is guilty of a crime; even terrorists call for pizza delivery. Intelligence officials also may need to obtain records – like flight manifests – that include information about multiple people, most of whom have nothing to do with terrorism. Some of this “overcollection” may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated. For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally, bulk collection of

business records is only one of the many intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized suspicion approach after 9/11. Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners, it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333, which governs the NSA’s activities when it conducts surveillance overseas,

the standards are even more lax. The result is mass surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they “incidentally” sweep in massive amounts of Americans’ data, including the content of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights too, and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order

12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any individualized showing of wrongdoing. Privacy advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy

advocates who supported it. The answer to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, the NSA has massively expanded its surveillance since 2008, American internet communication have been intercepted by NSA surveillance operations far more often than the intended surveillance targets. Gellman, 2014Barton Gellman, Washington Post national staff. Contributed to three Pulitzer Prizes for The Washington Post, 7-5-2014, "In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are,"

Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/

Ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally targeted foreigners in the communications intercepted by the National Security Agency from U.S. digital networks, according to a

four-month investigation by The Washington Post. Nine of 10 account holders found in a large cache of intercepted conversations, which former NSA contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not the intended surveillance targets but were caught in a net the agency had cast for somebody else. Many of them were Americans. Nearly half of the surveillance files, a strikingly high proportion, contained names, e-mail addresses or other details that the NSA marked as belonging to U.S. citizens or residents. NSA analysts masked, or “minimized,” more than 65,000 such references to protect Americans’ privacy, but The Post found nearly 900 additional e-mail addresses, unmasked in the files, that could be strongly linked to U.S.

citizens or U.S.residents. The surveillance files highlight a policy dilemma that has been aired only abstractly in public. There are discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the intercepted messages — and collateral harm to privacy on a scale that the Obama administration has not been willing to address. Among the most valuable contents — which The Post will not describe in detail, to avoid interfering with ongoing operations — are fresh revelations about a secret overseas nuclear project, double-dealing by an ostensible ally, a military calamity that befell an unfriendly power, and the identities of aggressive intruders into U.S. computer networks. Months of tracking communications across more than 50 alias accounts, the files show, led directly to the 2011 capture in Abbottabad of Muhammad Tahir Shahzad, a Pakistan-based bomb builder, and Umar Patek, a suspect in a 2002 terrorist bombing on the Indonesian island of Bali. At the request of CIA officials, The

Post is withholding other examples that officials said would compromise ongoing operations. Many other files, described as useless by the analysts but nonetheless retained, have a startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic quality. They tell stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises, political and religious conversions, financial anxieties and disappointed hopes. The daily lives of more than 10,000 account holders who were not targeted are catalogued and recorded nevertheless. In order to allow time for analysis and outside reporting, neither

Snowden nor The Post has disclosed until now that he obtained and shared the content of intercepted communications. The cache Snowden provided came from domestic NSA operations under the broad authority granted by Congress in 2008 with amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA content is generally stored in closely controlled data repositories, and for more than a year, senior government officials have depicted it as beyond Snowden’s reach.The Post reviewed roughly 160,000 intercepted e-mail and instant-message conversations, some of them hundreds of pages long, and 7,900 documents taken from more than 11,000 online accounts. The material

spans President Obama’s first term, from 2009 to 2012, a period of exponential growth for the NSA’s domestic collection. Taken together, the files offer an unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which enabled the NSA to make freer use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and a warrant from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content stored in user accounts at Yahoo,

Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other leading Internet companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts data on the move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks. No government oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, intelligence committees in Congress or the president’s Privacy

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample of what the NSA actually collects — not only from its targets but also from people who may cross a target’s path.

Privacy1AC – Privacy Rights

Advantage One is Privacy

First, surveillance under Section 702 is a substantial invasive of privacy because of the broad targetting guidelines in the FISA Amendments Act.Laperruque, 2014, Jake, Center for Democracy and Tehcnology Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Section 702 Surveillance Is Fundamentally More InvasiveWhile incidental collection of the communications of a person who communicates with a target is an inevitable feature of communications

surveillance, it is tolerated when the reason for the surveillance is compelling and adequate procedural checks are in place. In other instances of communications surveillance conducted in the US, surveillance requires court approval of a target, and that target must be a suspected wrongdoer or spy, a terrorist, or another agent of a foreign power. Section 702 requires neither of these elements. Under Section 702, targeting can occur for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information even though there is no court review of any particular target. Instead, the super secret FISA court merely determines whether the guidelines under which the surveillance is conducted are reasonably designed to result in the targeting of non-Americans abroad

and that “minimization guidelines” are reasonable. This means incidental surveillance may occur purely because someone communicated with an individual engaged in activities that may have broadly defined “foreign intelligence” value. For example, the communications of someone who communicates with a person abroad whose activities might relate to the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs can be collected, absent any independent assessment of necessity or accuracy.As another example, under traditional FISA – for intelligence surveillance in the U.S. of people in the U.S. – your communications could be incidentally collected only if you were in direct contact with a suspected agent of a foreign power, and additionally if the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court had affirmed this suspicion based on probable cause. Under Section 702, your personal information could be scooped up by the NSA simply because your attorney, doctor, lover, or accountant was a person abroad who engaged in peaceful political activity such as protesting a G8 summit.

And, these invasions are magnified because the data is the full content of the communication.Goitein 15, Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program., 6-5-2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform

Some of this “overcollection” may be inevitable, but its effects could be mitigated. For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally, bulk collection of business records is only one of the many

intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized suspicion approach after 9/11. Until a few years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United States, wished to obtain communications between Americans and foreigners, it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign power or its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target any foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans without obtaining any individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333,

which governs the NSA’s activities when it conducts surveillance overseas, the standards are even more lax. The result is mass surveillance programs that make the phone metadata program seem dainty in comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners, they “incidentally” sweep in massive amounts of Americans’ data, including the content of calls, e-mails, text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover, foreign targets are not limited to suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama administration recently acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights

too, and the ability to eavesdrop on any foreigner overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom because they hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order 12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any individualized showing of wrongdoing. Privacy advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of individualized suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the

full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy advocates who supported it. The answer to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the law, but in the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, indiscriminate wide-scale NSA Surveillance erodes privacy rights and violates the constitutionSinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

The United States government today is implementing a wide variety of surveillance programs that, thanks to

developments in its technological capacity, allow it to scoop up personal information and the content of personal communications on an unprecedented scale. Media reports based on revelations by former National Security

Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden have recently shed light on many of these programs. They have revealed,

for example, that the US collects vast quantities of information—known as “metadata”—about phone calls made to, from, and within the US. It also routinely collects the content of international chats, emails, and voice calls. It has engaged in the large-scale collection of massive amounts of cell phone location data. Reports have also revealed a since-discontinued effort to track internet usage and email patterns in the US; the comprehensive interception of all of phone calls made within, into, and out of Afghanistan and the Bahamas; the daily collection of millions of images so the NSA can run facial recognition programs; the acquisition of hundreds of millions of email and

chat contact lists around the world; and the NSA’s deliberate weakening of global encryption standards. In response to public concern over the programs’ intrusion on the privacy of millions of people in the US and around the world, the US government has at times acknowledged the need for reform. However, it has taken few meaningful steps in that direction. On the contrary, the US—particularly the intelligence community—has forcefully defended the surveillance programs as essential to protecting US national security. In a world of constantly shifting global threats, officials argue that the US simply cannot know in advance which global communications may be relevant to its intelligence activities, and that as a result, it needs the authority to collect and monitor a broad swath of communications. In our interviews with them, US officials argued that the programs are effective, plugging operational gaps that used to exist, and providing the US with valuable intelligence. They also insisted the programs are lawful and subject to rigorous and multi-layered oversight, as well as rules about how the information obtained through them is used. The government has

emphasized that it does not use the information gleaned from these programs for illegitimate purposes, such as persecuting political

opponents. The questions raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end.

At the same time, international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating internationally for internet

freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign policy objective since at least 2010.As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

And, these privacy violations are more dangerous than any risk of terrorism, which is magnified by the fact that surveillance fails to prevent attacks. Schneier, 2014Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc.,1-6-2014, "Essays: How the NSA Threatens National Security," Schneier On Security, https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/how_the_nsa_threaten.html

We have no evidence that any of this surveillance makes us safer. NSA Director General Keith Alexander responded to these stories in June by claiming that he disrupted 54 terrorist plots. In October, he revised that number downward to 13, and then to "one or

two." At this point, the only "plot" prevented was that of a San Diego man sending $8,500 to support a Somali militant group. We have been repeatedly told that these surveillance programs would have been able to stop 9/11, yet the NSA didn't detect the Boston bombings—even though one of the two terrorists was on the watch list and the other had a sloppy

social media trail. Bulk collection of data and metadata is an ineffective counterterrorism tool. Not only is ubiquitous surveillance ineffective, it is extraordinarily costly. I don't mean just the budgets, which will continue to skyrocket. Or the diplomatic costs, as country after country learns of our surveillance programs against their citizens. I'm also talking about the

cost to our society. It breaks so much of what our society has built. It breaks our political systems, as Congress is unable to provide any meaningful oversight and citizens are kept in the dark about what government does. It breaks our legal systems, as laws

are ignored or reinterpreted, and people are unable to challenge government actions in court. It breaks our commercial systems, as U.S. computer products and services are no longer trusted worldwide. It breaks our technical systems, as the very protocols of the

Internet become untrusted. And it breaks our social systems; the loss of privacy, freedom, and liberty is much more damaging to our society than the occasional act of random violence. And finally, these systems are susceptible to abuse. This is not just a hypothetical problem. Recent history illustrates many episodes where this information was, or would have been, abused: Hoover and his FBI spying, McCarthy, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement, anti-war Vietnam

protesters, and—more recently—the Occupy movement. Outside the U.S., there are even more extreme examples. Building the surveillance state makes it too easy for people and organizations to slip over the line into abuse.

The First impact is the loss of personal autonomy and agency. Privacy is a gateway right, it enables all of our other freedoms. PoKempne 2014, Dinah, General Counsel at Human Rights Watch, “The Right Whose Time Has Come (Again): Privacy in the Age of Surveillance” 1/21/14 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/essays/privacy-in-age-of-surveillance

Technology has invaded the sacred precincts of private life, and unwarranted exposure has imperiled our security, dignity, and most basic values. The law must rise to the occasion and protect our rights. Does

this sound familiar? So argued Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article announcing “The Right to Privacy.” We are again at such a juncture. The technological developments they saw as menacing—photography and the rise of the mass circulation press—appear rather quaint to us now. But the harms to emotional, psychological,

and even physical security from unwanted exposure seem just as vivid in our digital age.Our renewed sense of vulnerability comes as almost all aspects of daily social life migrate online. At the same time, corporations and governments have acquired frightening abilities to amass and search these endless digital records, giving them the power to “know” us in extraordinary detail.

In a world where we share our lives on social media and trade immense amounts of personal information for the ease and

convenience of online living, some have questioned whether privacy is a relevant concept. It is not just relevant, but crucial.Indeed, privacy is a gateway right that affects our ability to exercise almost every other right, not least our freedom to speak and associate with those we choose, make political choices, practice our religious beliefs, seek medical help, access education, figure out whom we love, and create our family life. It is nothing less than the shelter in which we work out what we think and who we are; a fulcrum of our autonomy as individuals.The importance of privacy, a right we often take for granted, was thrown into sharp relief in 2013 by the steady stream

of revelations from United States government files released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden,

and published in the Guardian and other major newspapers around the world. These revelations, supported by highly classified

documents, showed the US, the UK, and other governments engaged in global indiscriminate data interception, largely unchecked by any meaningful legal constraint or oversight, without regard for the rights of millions of people who were not suspected of wrongdoing.

The Second impact is Totalitarianism, the loss of autonomy due to surveillance enables “turnkey totalitarianism,” destroying democracy.

Haggerty, 2015Kevin D. Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, “What’s Wrong with Privacy Protections?” in A World Without Privacy: What Law Can and Should Do? Edited by Austin Sarat p. 230

Still others will say I am being alarmist. My emphasis on the threat of authoritarian forms of rule inherent in populations

open to detailed institutional scrutiny will be portrayed as overblown and over dramatic, suggesting I veer towards the

lunatic fringe of unhinged conspiracy theorists.66 But one does not have to believe secret forces are operating behind

the scenes to recognize that our declining private realm presents alarming dangers. Someone as conservative and

deeply embedded in the security establishment as William Binney – a former NSA senior executive – says the security surveillance infrastructure he helped build now puts us on the verge of “turnkey totalitarianism.”67 The contemporary expansion of surveillance, where monitoring becomes an ever-more routine part of our lives, represents a

tremendous shift in the balance of power between citizens and organizations. Perhaps the greatest danger

of this situation is how our existing surveillance practices can be turned to oppressive uses. From this point forward our expanding surveillance infrastructure stands as a resource to be inherited by future generations of

politicians, corporate actors, or even messianic leaders. Given sufficient political will this surveillance infrastructure can be re-purposed to monitor – in unparalleled detail – people who some might see as undesirable due to their political opinions, religion, skin color, gender, birthplace, physical abilities, medical history, or any number of an almost limitless list of factors used to pit people against one another. The twentieth century provides notorious examples of such repressive uses of surveillance. Crucially, those tyrannical states exercised fine-grained political control by relying on surveillance infrastructures that today seem laughably rudimentary, comprised as they were of paper files, index cards, and elementary telephone tapping.68 It is no more alarmist to acknowledge such risks are germane to our own societies than it is to recognize the future will see wars, terrorist attacks, or environmental disasters – events that could themselves prompt surveillance structures to be re-calibrated towards more coercive ends. Those who think this massive surveillance infrastructure will not, in the fullness of time, be turned to repressive purposes are either innocent as to the realities of power, or whistling past a graveyard. But one does not have to dwell on the most extreme possibilities to be unnerved by how enhanced surveillance

capabilities invest tremendous powers in organizations. Surveillance capacity gives organizations unprecedented abilities to manipulate human behaviors, desires, and subjectivities towards organizational ends – ends

that are too often focused on profit, personal aggrandizement, and institutional self-interest rather than human betterment.

Freedom and dignity are ethically prior to security. Cohen, 2014Elliot D. Ph.D., ethicist and political analyst. He is the editor in chief of the International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Technology of Oppression: Preserving Freedom and Dignity in an Age of Mass, Warrantless Surveillance.. DOI: 10.1057/9781137408211.0011. The threat posed by mass, warrantless surveillance technologies Presently, such a threat to human freedom and dignity lies in the technological erosion of human privacy through the ever-evolving development and deployment of a global, government system of mass, warrantless surveillance. Taken to its logical conclusion, this is a systematic means of spying on, and ultimately manipulating and controlling, virtually every aspect of everybody's private life—a thoroughgoing,

global dissolution of personal space, which is supposed to be legally protected. In such a governmental state of "total (or virtually

total) information awareness," the potential for government control and manipulation of the people's deepest and most personal beliefs, feelings, and values can transform into an Orwellian reality—and nightmare. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the technology that has the potential to remove such scenarios from the realm of science fiction to that of true

science is currently being developed. This is not to deny the legitimate government interest in "national security"; however, the exceptional disruption of privacy for legitimate state reasons cannot and should not be mistaken for a usual and customary rule of mass invasion of people's private lives without their informed consent. Benjamin Franklin wisely and succinctly expressed the point: "Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one." In relinquishing our privacy to government, we also lose the freedom to control, and act on, our personal information, which is what defines us individually, and collectively, as free agents and a free nation. In a world devoid of freedom to control who we are, proclaiming that we are "secure" is an empty platitude.

Economy1AC – Economy Advantage

Advantage Two is the Economy.

NSA surveillance has put the US ecomony and competive advantage at risk because of losses in the technology sector. The USA freedom act won’t solve the problem. Mindock 2015 Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times – Internally quoting The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan research and educational institute – a think tank “NSA Surveillance Could Cost Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden Revelations” - International Business Times - June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-surveillance-could-cost-billions-us-internet-companies-after-edward-snowden-1959737Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward Snowden could be more economically taxing than previously thought, says a new study published by the Information Technology and Innovation

Foundation Tuesday. The study suggests the programs could be affecting the technology sector as a whole, not just the cloud-computing sector, and that the costs could soar much higher than previously expected. Even modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed surveillance programs, according to a

previous report, would cost between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016. New estimates show that the toll “will likely far exceed ITIF’s

initial $35 billion estimate.” “The U.S. government’s failure to reform many of the NSA’s surveillance programs has damaged the competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global market share,” a summary of the report said. Revelations by defense contractor Snowden in June 2013 exposed massive U.S. government

surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American phone records in bulk, and without a warrant. The bulk phone-record

revelations, and many others in the same vein, including the required complacency of American telecom and Internet companies in

providing the data, raised questions about the transparency of American surveillance programs and prompted outrage from privacy advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the American government can vigorously reform how NSA surveillance is regulated and overseen, U.S. companies will lose contracts and, ultimately, their competitive edge in a global market as consumers around the world choose cloud computing and technology options that do not have potential ties to American surveillance programs. The report comes amid a debate in Congress on what to do with the Patriot Act, the law that provides much of the

authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1, authority to collect American phone data en masse expired, though questions remain as to whether letting that authority expire is enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the

programs argue that they provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight terrorism abroad. A further reform made the phone records collection process illegal for the government, and instead gave that responsibility to the telecom companies.

Reform is necessary to regain US leadership in the global marketplace.Castro and Mcquinn 2015Daniel Castro is the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation; Alan McQuinn is a Research Assistant with The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Prior to joining ITIF, he was a telecommunications fellow for

Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, an Honorary Co-Chair of ITIF, 6/9/15, “Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness” “Information Technology & Innovation Foundation” http://www.itif.org/publications/2015/06/09/beyond-usa-freedom-act-how-us-surveillance-still-subverts-us-competitiveness

When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could very well be that one of the themes will be how the United States lost its global technology leadership to other nations. And clearly one of the factors they would point to is the long-standing privileging of U.S. national security interests over U.S. industrial and commercial interests when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. This has occurred over the last few years as the U.S. government has done relatively little to address the rising commercial challenge to U.S. technology companies, all the

while putting intelligence gathering first and foremost. Indeed, policy decisions by the U.S. intelligence community have reverberated throughout the global economy. If the U.S. tech industry is to remain the leader in the global marketplace, then the U.S. government will need to set a new course that balances economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is not only short-term economic losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist policies that will systematically weaken U.S. technology competiveness in years to come, with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and national security through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its digital surveillance activities will the U.S. government enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the global market.

The US is the driving force behind global economic recoveryEconomist 2015“American shopper,” 2-14, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643188-world-once-again-relying-too-much-american-consumers-power-growth-american-shopper

A Global economy running on a single engine is better than one that needs jump leads. The American economy is motoring again, to the relief of exporters from Hamburg to Hangzhou. Firms added more than 1m net new jobs in the past three months, the best showing since 1997 (see article). Buoyed up by cheap petrol, Americans are spending; in

January consumer sentiment jumped to its highest in more than a decade. The IMF reckons that American growth will hit 3.6% in 2015, faster than the world economy as a whole. All this is good. But growing dependence on the American economy—and on consumers in particular—has unwelcome echoes. A decade ago American consumers borrowed heavily and recklessly. They filled their ever-larger houses with goods from China; they fuelled gas-guzzling cars with imported oil. Big exporters recycled their earnings back to America, pushing down interest rates which in turn helped to feed further borrowing. Europe was not that different. There, frugal Germans financed debt binges around the euro area’s periphery.After the financial crisis, the hope was of an end to these imbalances. Debt-addicted Americans and Spaniards would chip away at their obligations; thrifty German and Chinese consumers would start to enjoy life for once. At first,

this seemed to be happening. America’s trade deficit, which was about 6% of GDP in 2006, had more than halved by 2009. But now the world is slipping back into some nasty habits. Hair grows faster than the euro zone, and what growth there is depends heavily on exports. The countries of the single currency are running a current-account surplus of about 2.6% of GDP, thanks largely to exports to America. At 7.4% of GDP, Germany’s trade surplus is as large as it has ever been. China’s growth, meanwhile, is slowing—and once again relying heavily on spending elsewhere. It notched up its own record trade surplus in January. China’s exports have actually begun to drop, but imports are down by more. And over the past year the renminbi, which rose by more than 10% against the dollar in 2010-13, has begun

slipping again, to the annoyance of American politicians. America’s economy is warping as a result. Consumption’s contribution to growth in the fourth quarter of 2014 was the largest since 2006. The trade deficit is widening.

Strip out oil, and America’s trade deficit grew to more than 3% of GDP in 2014, and is approaching its pre-recession peak of about 4%. The world’s reliance on America is likely to deepen. Germans are more interested in shipping savings abroad than investing at home (see article). Households and firms in Europe’s periphery are overburdened with debt, workers’ wages squeezed and banks in no mood to

lend. Like Germany, Europe as a whole is relying on exports. China is rebalancing, but not fast enough: services have yet to account for more than half of annual Chinese output.

Additionally, NSA surveillance has created a global move towards “data nationalisation” which threatens to fragment the internet.

Omtzigt 15, Pieter Herman Omtzigt is a Dutch politician. As a member of the Christian Democratic Appeal he was an MP from June 3, 2003 to June 17, 2010 and is currently an MP since October 26, 2010. He focuses on matters of taxes, pensions and additions. “Explanatory memorandum by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, rapporteur” Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mass surveillance Report, 1/26/2015, http://website-pace.net/documents/19838/1085720/20150126-MassSurveillance-EN.pdf

108. In response to growing discontent with US surveillance, one political response has been to push for more “technological sovereignty” and “data nationalisation”. The Snowden disclosures have therefore had serious implications on the development of the Internet and hastened trends to “balkanize” the Internet to the detriment of the development of a wide, vast and easily accessible online network. The Internet as we knew it, or believed we knew it, is a global platform for exchange of information, open and free debate, and commerce. But Brazil and the European Union, for example, announced plans to lay a $185 million undersea fibre-optic cable between them to thwart US surveillance. German politicians also called for the development of a “German internet” for German customers’ data to circumvent foreign servers and the information to stay on networks that

would fully be under Germany’s control. 159 Russia passed a law obliging internet companies to store the data of Russian users on servers in Russia.160 After a six-month inquiry following the Snowden disclosures, the European Parliament adopted a report on the NSA surveillance programme in February 2014 161, which argues that the EU should suspend bank data and ‘Safe Harbour’ agreements on data privacy (voluntary data protection standards for non-EU companies transferring EU citizens’ personal data to the US) with the United States. MEPs added that the European Parliament should only give its consent to the EU-US free trade deal (TTIP) that is

being negotiated, if the US fully respects EU citizens’ fundamental rights. The European Parliament seeks tough new data protection rules that would place US companies in the difficult situation of having to check with EU authorities before complying with mandatory requests made by US authorities. The European Parliament’s LIBE Committee also advocated the creation of a “European data cloud” that would require all data from European consumers to be stored or

processed within Europe, or even within the individual country of the consumer concerned. Some nations, such as Australia, France, South Korea, and India, have already implemented a patchwork of data-localisation requirements according to two legal scholars.162

This regional fragmentation of the internet would collapse the global economy and create the necessary conditions for global instability.Jardine, 2014Eric CIGI Research Fellow, Global Security & Politics, 9-19-2014, "Should the Average Internet User in a Liberal Democracy Care About Internet Fragmentation? ," Cigi, https://www.cigionline.org/blogs/reimagining-internet/should-average-internet-user-liberal-democracy-care-about-internet-fragmeEven though your average liberal democratic Internet user wouldn’t see it, at least at the content level, the fragmentation of the Internet would matter a great deal. If the Internet was to break apart into regional or even national blocks, there would be large economic costs in terms of lost future potential for global GDP growth. As a recent McKinsey & Company report illustrates, upwards of 15 to 25 percent of Global GDP is currently determined by the movement of goods, money, people and data. These global flows (which admittedly include more than just data flows) contribute yearly between 250 to 400 billion

dollars to global GDP growth. The contribution of global flows to global GDP growth is only likely to grow in the future, provided that the Internet remains a functionally universal system that works extraordinarily well as a platform for e-commerce. Missing out on lost GDP growth harms people economically in liberal democratic countries and elsewhere. Average users in the liberal democracies should care, therefore, about the fragmentation of the broader Internet because it will cost them dollars and cents, even if the fragmentation of the Internet would not really affect the content that they themselves access.Additionally, the same Mckinsey & Company report notes that countries that are well connected to the global system have GDP growth that is up to 40 percent higher than those countries that have fewer connections to the wider world. Like interest rates, annual GDP growth compounds itself, meaning that early gains grow exponentially. If the non-Western portions of the Internet wall themselves off from the rest (or even if parts of what we could call the liberal democratic Internet do the same), the result over the long term will be slower growth and a smaller GDP per capita in less well-connected nations. Some people might look at this situation and be convinced that excluding people in non-liberal democracies from the economic potential of the Internet is not right. In normative terms, these people might deserve to be connected, at the very least so that they can benefit from the same economic boon as those in more well connected advanced liberal democracies. In other words, average Internet users in liberal democracies should care about Internet fragmentation because it is essentially an issue of equality of opportunity.Other people might only be convinced by the idea that poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation, while by no means sufficient causes of terrorism, insurgency, aggression and unrest, are likely to contribute to the potential for an increasingly conflictual world. Most average Internet users in Liberal democracies would likely agree that preventing flashes of unrest (like the current ISIL conflict in Iraq and Syria) is better than having to expend blood and treasure to try and fix them after they have broken out. Preventive measures can include ensuring solid GDP growth through global interconnection in every country, even if this is not, as I mentioned before, going to be enough to fix every problem every time. Overall, the dangers of a fragmented Internet are real and the average user in liberal democracies should care. With truly global forces at play, it is daunting to think of what the average user might do to combat fragmentation. Really only one step is realistic. Users need to recognize that the system works best and contributes most to the content and material well-being of all Internet users when it approaches its ideal technical design of universal interoperability. Societies will rightly determine that some things need to be walled off, blocked or filtered because this digital content has physical world implications that are not acceptable (child pornography, vitriolic hate speech, death threats, underage bullying on social media, etc.). However, in general, citizens should resist Internet fragmentation efforts in any form by putting pressure on their national politicians, Internet Service Providers, and content intermediaries, like Google, to respect the fundamental (and fundamentally beneficial) universally interoperable structure of the Internet. To do otherwise is to accept the loss of potential future global prosperity and to encourage a world that is unequal and prone to conflict and hardship.

The impact of economic decline is great power war.James, 2014Harold, Princeton history professor,“Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?”, 7-2, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/

Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an economically declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China –

according to some calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar

Trap.” Geo-politics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias

of the existing (American-based) agencies. The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of

Europe and America. The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one that mirrors the decisive feature of the crisis of the summer of 1914 . At that time, no one could really know whether clashes would escalate or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the

1960s, when the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate. The idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice, even though the game may be fatal.

Internet Freedom1AC – Internet Freedom

NSA spying has undermined American foreign policy. It undercut any credibility to push for democratic freedom in repressive regimes, repressive surveillance is growing worldwide as a result.Schneier 15 Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc 3/2/15, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. P. 106

In 2010, then secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave a speech declaring Internet freedom a major US foreign policy goal. To this end, the US State Department funds and supports a variety of programs worldwide, working to counter censorship,

promote encryption, and enable anonymity, all designed "to ensure that any child, born anywhere in the world, has access to the global Internet as an open platform on which to innovate, learn, organize, and express herself free from undue interference or censorship." This agenda has been torpedoed by the awkward realization that the US and other democratic governments conducted the same types of surveillance they have criticized in more repressive countries. Those repressive countries are seizing on the opportunity, pointing to US surveillance as a justification for their own more draconian Internet policies: more surveillance, more censorship, and a more isolationist Internet that gives individual countries more control over what their citizens see and say. For example, one of the defenses the government of Egypt offered for its plans to monitor social media was that "the US listens in to phone calls, and supervises anyone who could threaten its national security." Indians are worried that their government will cite the US's actions to justify

surveillance in that country. Both China and Russia publicly called out US hypocrisy. This affects Internet freedom worldwide.

Historically, Internet governance—what little there was—was largely left to the United States, because everyone

more or less believed that we were working for the security of the Internet instead of against it. But now that the US has lost much of its credibility, Internet governance is in turmoil. Many of the regulatory bodies that influence the Internet are trying to figure out what sort of leadership model to adopt. Older international standards organizations like the International Telecommunications Union

are trying to increase their influence in Internet governance and develop a more nationalist set of rules. This is the cyber sovereignty movement, and it threatens to fundamentally fragment the Internet. It's not new, but it has been given an enormous boost from the revelations of NSA spying. Countries like Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia are pushing for much more autonomous control over the portions of the Internet within their borders. That, in short, would be a disaster. The Internet is fundamentally a global platform. While countries continue to censor and control, today people in repressive regimes can still read information from and exchange ideas with the rest of the world. Internet freedom is a human rights issue, and one that the US should support.

Further, this hypocrisy has created the conditions that will accelerate the global rise of authoritarianism.Chenoweth & Stephan 2015Erica Chenoweth, political scientist at the University of Denver.& Maria J. Stephan, Senior Policy Fellow

at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.7-7-2015, "How Can States and Non-State Actors Respond to Authoritarian Resurgence?," Political Violence @ a Glance, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/07/how-can-states-and-non-state-actors-respond-to-authoritarian-resurgence/

Chenoweth: Why is authoritarianism making a comeback? Stephan: There’s obviously no single answer to this. But part of

the answer is that democracy is losing its allure in parts of the world. When people don’t see the economic and governance

benefits of democratic transitions, they lose hope. Then there’s the compelling “stability first” argument. Regimes around the world, including China and Russia, have readily cited the “chaos” of the Arab Spring to justify heavy-handed policies and consolidating their grip on power. The “color revolutions” that toppled autocratic regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and

Ukraine inspired similar dictatorial retrenchment. There is nothing new about authoritarian regimes adapting to changing circumstances. Their resilience is reinforced by a combination of violent and non-coercive measures. But authoritarian paranoia seems to have grown more piqued over the past decade. Regimes have

figured out that “people power” endangers their grip on power and they are cracking down. There’s no better evidence of the effectiveness of civil resistance than the measures that governments take to suppress it—something you detail

in your chapter from my new book. Finally, and importantly, democracy in this country and elsewhere has taken a hit lately. Authoritarian regimes mockingly cite images of torture, mass surveillance, and the catering to the radical fringes

happening in the US political system to refute pressures to democratize themselves. The financial crisis here and in Europe did not inspire much confidence in democracy and we are seeing political extremism on the rise in places like Greece and Hungary.

Here in the US we need to get our own house in order if we hope to inspire confidence in democracy abroad.

American surveillance is the primary driver behind this authoritarian accelleration. The plan is necessary to restore US credibility.Jackson, 2015 Dean Jackson is an assistant program officer at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. He holds an M.A. from the University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations, 7-14-2015, "The Authoritarian Surge into Cyberspace," International Forum For Democratic Studies, http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-authoritarian-surge-into-cyberspace/

This still leaves open the question of what is driving authoritarian innovation in cyberspace. Deibert identifies increased government emphasis on cybersecurity as one driver: cybercrime and terrorism are serious concerns, and governments

have a legitimate interest in combatting them. Unfortunately, when democratic governments use mass surveillance and other tools to police cyberspace, it can have the effect of providing cover for authoritarian regimes to use similar techniques for repressive purposes—especially, as Deibert notes, since former NSA contractor Edward

Snowden’s disclosure of US mass surveillance programs. Second, Deibert observes that authoritarian demand for cybersecurity technology is often met by private firms based in the democratic world—a group that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls the “Corporate Enemies of the Internet.” Hacking Team, an Italian firm mentioned in the RSF report, is just one example: The Guardian reports that leaked internal documents suggest Hacking Team’s clients include the governments of “Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.” Deibert writes that “in a world where ‘Big Brother’ and ‘Big Data’ share so many of the same needs, the political economy of cybersecurity must be singled out as a major driver of resurgent authoritarianism in cyberspace.” Given these powerful forces, it will be difficult to reverse the authoritarian surge in cyberspace. Deibert offers some possible solutions: for starters, he writes that the “political economy of cybersecurity” can be altered through stronger export controls, “smart sanctions,” and a monitoring system to detect abuses. Further, he recommends that cybersecurity trade fairs open their doors to civil society watchdogs who can help hold governments and the private sector accountable. Similarly, Deibert suggests that opening regional cybersecurity initiatives to civil society participation could mitigate violations of user rights. This might seem unlikely to occur within some authoritarian-led intergovernmental organizations, but setting a

normative expectation of civil society participation might help discredit the efforts of bad actors. Deibert concludes with a final recommendation that society develop “models of cyberspace security that can show us how to prevent disruptions or threats to life and property without sacrificing liberties and rights.” This might restore

democratic states to the moral high ground and remove oppressive regimes’ rhetorical cover, but developing such models will require confronting powerful vested interests and seriously examining the tradeoff between cybersecurity and Internet freedom. Doing so would be worth it: the Internet is far too important to cede to authoritarian control.

The impact – the failure of global democratic consolidation causes extinction.Diamond, 1995 Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of

tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional

threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers

important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and

enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their

environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,

property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

1AC – Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a tangible threat to national security.

Solvency

1AC – Solvency

The plan solves, limiting the purposes of 702 collection to a “tangible threat to national security” is critical to solve overcollection.Sinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364Narrow the purposes for which all foreign intelligence surveillance may be conducted and limit such surveillance to individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security or a

comparable state interest. o Among other steps, Congress should pass legislation amending Section 702 of FISA and

related surveillance authorities to narrow the scope of what can be acquired as “foreign intelligence information,” which is now defined broadly to encompass, among other things, information related to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” It should be restricted to what is necessary and proportionate to protect

legitimate aims identified in the ICCPR, such as national security. In practice, this should mean that the government may acquire information only from individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security narrowly defined, or a comparable compelling state interest.

And, this limit solves without damaging counterterrorism.Laperruque 2014, Jake, CDT’s Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Where Do We Go From Here? There are sensible reforms that can significant limit the collateral damage to privacy caused by Section 702 without impeding national security. Limiting the purposes for which Section 702 can be conducted will narrow the degree to which communications are monitored between individuals not suspected of wrongdoing or connected to national security threats. Closing retention loopholes present in the Minimization Guidelines governing that surveillance will ensure that when Americans’ communications are incidentally collected, they are not kept absent national security needs. And closing the backdoor search loophole would ensure that when Americans’ communications are retained because they communicated with a target of Section 702 surveillance, they couldn’t be searched unless the standards for domestic surveillance of the American are met.

And, the plan eliminates the collection of communication “about” targets -that solves upstream collection.Nojeim, 2014Greg, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology Comments To The Privacy And Civil Liberties Oversight Board Regarding Reforms To Surveillance Conducted Pursuant To Section 702 Of Fisa April 11, 2014 https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/04/CDT_PCLOB-702-Comments_4.11.13.pdf

C. Collection of communications “about” targets that are neither to nor from targets should be prohibited. The Government takes the position that Section 702 permits it to collect not only communications that are to or from a foreign intelligence target, but also communications that are “about” the target because they mention an identifier associated with the target.17 The practice directs the focus of surveillance away from suspected wrongdoers and permits the NSA to target communications between individuals

with no link to national security investigations. Because this is inconsistent with the legislative history of the statute, and raises profound constitutional and operational problems, PCLOB should recommend that “about” collection be ended, and that Section 702 surveillance be limited to communications to and from targets. Section 702 authorizes the government to target the communications of persons reasonably believed to be abroad, but it never defines the term “target.” However, throughout Section 702, the term is used to refer to the targeting of an individual rather content of a communication.18 Further, the entire congressional debate on Section 702 includes no reference to collecting communications “about” a

foreign target, and significant debate about collecting communications to or from a target.19 To collect “about” communications, the NSA engages in “upstream” surveillance on the Internet backbone,20 meaning “on fiber cables and infrastructure

as data flows past,”21 temporarily copying the content of the entire data stream so it can be searched for the same “selectors” used for the downstream or “PRISM” surveillance. As a result, the NSA has the capability to search

any Internet communication going into or out of the U.S.22 without particularized intervention by a provider. Direct access creates direct opportunity for abuse, and should not be permitted to a military intelligence agency. This dragnet scanning also results in the collection of “multi-communication transactions,” (MCTs) which include tens of thousands wholly domestic communications each year.23 The FISC required creation of new minimization rules for MCTs in 2011, but did not limit their collection.24 The mass searching of communications content inside the United States, knowing that it the communications searched include tens of thousands of

wholly domestic communications each year, raises profound constitutional questions. Abandoning collection of communications “about” targets would remove any justification for upstream collection, eliminate the serious problems posed by direct government access to the Internet infrastructure, eliminate the collection of tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications in contravention of the statute, an make surveillance under Section 702 consistent with the congressional intent.

And, these limits restore US leadership. Edgar, 2015 Timothy H. Edgar is a visiting scholar at the Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies. He was the first-ever director of privacy and civil liberties for the White House National Security Staff. Under George W. Bush, he was the first deputy for civil liberties for the director of national intelligence, from 2006 to 2009. He was the national security counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union from 2001 to 2006. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Dartmouth College, 4-13-2015, "The Good News About Spying," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying

The United States should also pivot from its defensive position and take the lead on global privacy. The United States has an impressive array of privacy safeguards, and it has even imposed new ones that protect citizens of every country.

Despite their weaknesses, these safeguards are still the strongest in the world. The U.S. government should not be shy about trumpeting them, and should urge other countries to follow its lead. It could begin by engaging with close allies, like the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European countries,

urging them to increase transparency and judicial supervision of their own communications surveillance activities.

Finally, the plan is a critical step to fight the politics of fear and regain privacy rights.Snowden, 2015, Edward J. Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and National Security Agency contractor, is a director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. 6-4-2015, "Edward Snowden: The World Says No to Surveillance," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-world-says-no-to-surveillance.htmlThough we have come a long way, the right to privacy — the foundation of the freedoms enshrined in the United States Bill

of Rights — remains under threat. Some of the world’s most popular online services have been enlisted as partners in the N.S.A.’s mass surveillance programs, and technology companies are being pressured by governments around

the world to work against their customers rather than for them. Billions of cellphone location records are still being intercepted without regard for the guilt or innocence of those affected. We have learned that our government

intentionally weakens the fundamental security of the Internet with “back doors” that transform private lives into open books. Metadata revealing the personal associations and interests of ordinary Internet users is still being intercepted and monitored on a scale unprecedented in history: As you read this online, the United States government makes a note. Spymasters in Australia, Canada and France have exploited recent tragedies to seek intrusive new powers despite evidence such programs would not have prevented attacks. Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain recently mused, “Do we want to allow a means of communication between people which we cannot read?” He soon found his answer, proclaiming that “for too long, we have been a passively

tolerant society, saying to our citizens: As long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone.” At the turning of the millennium, few imagined that citizens of developed democracies would soon be required to defend the concept of an open society against their own leaders. Yet the balance of power is beginning to shift. We are witnessing the emergence of a post-terror generation, one that rejects a worldview defined by a singular tragedy. For the first time since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, we see the outline of a politics that turns away from reaction and fear in favor of resilience and reason. With each court victory, with every change in the law, we demonstrate facts are more convincing than fear. As a society, we rediscover that the value of a right is not in what it hides, but in what it protects.