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    APPLIED   TACTIC!

    J A

     P

    A

     N

    ESE A R M Y

    TRANSLATION

    OF

    JAPANESE MANUAL

    REVISED 1938

    PACIFIC UNIT M ID.

    WARDEPARTMENT

    WASHINGTON,D.C.

    OCTOBER,

    1943

    3

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    APPLIED-TACTICS

    Translationof"OyoTenjutsuNoTanko",Revised1938,

    aReferenceManualonAppliedTacticsadoptedforusein

    theJapaneseMilitaryAcademy.

    Distributionincludes: No.

    o

    fCopies

    HQ,

    CPA 6

    PT

    7PAHT, 6

    HQ,IFAFIfPA 6

    JICA,NewDelhi 6

    HQ,CBINewDelhi(throughJICA) 6

    GHH,

    C

    EAC (throughJICA) 6

    GHO,

    India(throughJICA) 6

    HO,

    CBIChungking 6

    WarOffice,London 6

    NDHO,Ottawa 6

    ONI 6

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    TABLEOFCONTENTS

    Paragraphs Page

    Chapter

    I.

    COMPOSITIONANDEXAMPLES

    OF

    ,ESTIMATESANDDECISIONS

    SectionI. Composition

    --

    - 15 29

    DC.

    PlanforEmploymentofFire

    bya

    FieldArtilleryBattalion—

    16 30

    1

    X.

    PlanforEmployment

    of

    the

    Air

    Units

    ofan

    Army

    17 34

    XI.

    PlanofEmploymentofAirGroups

    18 35

    ChapterIII. EXAMPLES

    OF

    VARIOUSORDERS

    SectionI, General—~.-

    -r 19 36

    II.

    Reconnaissance-

    20 -25 36

    III.

    MarchandSecurity

    ,

    2 6 - 3 2

    44

    IV. MeetingEngagements^-r—-v

    — 33-44  55

    V. Attack

    ofan

    OrganizedPosition-

    45-55 65

    VI.

    Defense

    ofa

    Position

      ^ 56 -

    62

    64

    VII,

    Pursuit

    — 63 -70 100

    VIII.

    Withdrawal

    — — 71 -72 106

    IX.

    BilletingandSecurity

    -r73-79 109

    X. Transportation

    - 80 -83 119

    XI.

    RoutineOrders- 84-

    -85 125

    ChapterIV. FIELDSERVICE

    SectionI. Marches

      •.

    86 -93 127

    II.

    ComputationsPertaining

    to

    Messengers

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    Paragraphs Page

    TBAFFICROUTEShapterVII.

    SectionI. TemporaryMilitaryRoads 172 208

    II.

    Fording-*- - 173 208

    III.

    MovementonIce- — 174. 209

    IV. RiverCrossings— — — 175-180 21Q

    Chapter

    VIII.

    .CALENDARDAYSANDATMOSPHERIC

    PHENOMENA. — 181-186 224

    ChapterK . LABOR

    SectionI. DestructivePowerofProjectiles187-189 232

    II.

    FellingTrees , 190 ~193 234

    III.

    FieldFortificationsand

    Construction——! - 194- -197 238

    IV. MaterialsforField

    Fortifications • 198 259

    V. ExplosivesandDemolitions---—199-200 270

    ChapterX. MILITARYMLPS,LANDSCAPESKETCHES,

    MILITARYSYMBOLS

    SectionI

    #

    GeneralPrecautionstobeTaken

    t

    inDrawingaMilitaryMap— 201 275

    II.

    DetailedPrecautionstobeTaken

    inDrawingVariousTypesof

    MilitaryMaps 202-217 276

    III.

    LandscapeSketches 218-220 281

    IV. MilitarySymbols

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    ILLUSTRATIONS

    Page

    FIGUREI. TerrainEstimateforanAttack-—— 6a

    II.

    TerrainEstimateforDefense

    —• 7

    III, PlanofAttackof1stDivision— 15

    IV. Sketch

    of

    1stDivisionRouteMarch

    •* 133

    V. SketchShowingtheDivisionOrderofMarch——134

    VI . ChannelsforReplenishingRationsandForage-144

    VII.

    IronStove's——

    - —-152

    VIII, TypesofMessKits

    —- —154

    IX. ConstructionofCookstove^——™—.-—*—,.—156

    X, SettingupStoveforFieldCooking(oldtype)l57

    XIv SettingupStoveforFieldCooking(newtype)l59

    XII-XIII* ConstructionofTrenchforCookingwith

    MessKits——r ,-..--.-,

    *.—-—-*--l6l

    162

    XIV. Movement

    of

    Supplies

    to

    Outposts—

    -"167

    XV. BilletingDispositionofthe1stComposite

    Brigade

    •—- * 282

    XVI. Showing Distribution of theAdvance Guard

    of the1s t Division——•

      *

    283

    XVII. Positions

    and

    Distribution

    of

    Fire

    of the

    Field Arti l lery of the 1st Division——284

    XVIII. Landscape Sketch-- •>•

    —285

    XIX. LandscapeSketchofEnemyPositions

    in

    Vicinity

    of

    Shiratori-murar-t—.-

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    S C A L E

    /  ;:  O

    So c

    R .F

    - 1 : 10,000

    I t i i in t i i i iH i i i in l

    R .F .

    1 : 25,000

    A V V

      /»/

    ZJ

    l l t i l i l i l ]

    1

    R . F . 1 : 50,000

    |

    R F .

      t  1

    = 1 : 1 00 ,00 0

    lo

    i

      t

      i

     

    i

    r f 5'

    R . F .

    1 .:

    -+

    S 00 ,0 00

    1

    iTTTTtTTTTt

    R .F . - 1 : 500,000

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    APPLIED TACTICS

    JAPANESE ARMY"

    ;

    CHAPTER

    1

    COMPOSITION AND EXAMPLES OF'ESTIMATES A1TD.DECISIONS

    1

    .•• '•• Paragraphs

    SECTION I . COMPOSITION

    - ™ — — —

    .— — — — - 1

    I I . EXAMPLES — ^ - — — ™ - ^ . ™ — - — r - r - r — - 2 - 7

    SECTIONI

    COMPOSITION

    ''

    1. Althoughtherearenospeciallyprescribedmethodsinthe

    writingofdecisionsandthevarioustypesofestimates,theforms

    commonlyusedinthestudyof

    military'

    tacticsandsomeofthe

    precautionstobe

    taken,

    inwritingthemwillbestatedandex

    plained inthefollowingparagraphs:

    .a. In- statingadecisiontheexpressiontobeusedis,

    "ThedivisionwjilJLdosoandso,"butinstatingtherequire

    ments inanestimate,theexpressiontobeusedis,"Thedivi

    sionmustdo,soandso," accompanied inbothinstancesby

    'reasons"andlinesofaction. Inahestimateoftheenemysitua

    tion,

    usetheexpression,"Theenemywillprobablydosoandso,"

    givingthereasons. Inthiscas©itisunn'eVessaiytospecify

    thelinesofaction, , •

    b, Decisionsandrequirementsmustbesimple,clear,and

    concise.

    This isespeciallytruewhenthedecisionis

    indi

    cated inord3rsasthecommandersplanofaction. However,

    whenthelinesofaction

    which,

    accompanythedecisionorrequire

    mentarcnot calledfor,butarestillneoossaryforindicating

    theobjective oftho decision orrequirement,itisperti

    nenttoannexasummarylikothefollowing: •"Thedivisionwith

    XXasitsobjective .will- advancotowardXXlino;anelementcon

    sisting* ofXXInfantryBattalionandthebatterycommander's

    -partyofXXArtilleryBatterywillproceed-alongXX road's'and

    therjstofthemainforcowill'-proceedalongXXroad".

    c. Thereasonsforthbdecisionmustbewrittenconcisely

    and;

    withlogical'consistency.'-Whenthedecisionsandestimates

    aremadeinthelight ofthemission,theenemysituation,the

    terrain,andthecondition'"of

     •ourforces,ifwearetomakoclear

    thereasoningbehindtho.'linesofaction,it,-istoacertain

    extentpertinent forthispurposetocomparothedecisionsor

    estimateswithotherpossibleplans. However,whenotherplans

    .are;rejected,emphasismustbeplaceduponthereasonsforthis

    'rejection,andtheexplanationoffactorsgivingrisotothode

    cisionortotherequirement inanestimateshould-notboignored.

    Thesimplest,.formpfwritingdecisionsorestimates isa

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    singleparagraph. Tofacilitatethereadingandcomprehensionof

    lon&thy matjrial,divide.theparagraph. Forthispurposethe

    jnjmysituation,themission,andtheterrainmayboputin

    separateparagraphs,orthey'maybecombinedandthenseparated•

    intoparagraphsaccordingtosomelogicalplan.

    d. Inthelinosofactionwhichaccompanya decision,

    unitsmustbeclearlydesignatedandthemovementsofallunits

    rjcordod. In"thepossiblelinesofactionwhichaccompanythe

    varioustypesofestimates,itisbesttoindicatetheorderof

    battleofunitsinamootingengagement,pursuit,orwithdrawal

    andtodesignatetheunitswheneverthes3ctorhasagreatin

    fluenceuponth3-outcomooftheengagement. Inallothercasesj

    however,thedispositionoftroopswillboshownbythenumber

    ofunits, (TheInfantrywillbeshownbybattalions, other

    branchesbycompanies,batteriesortroops.) Intheestimates

    itisalsoacommonpracticetoindicateonlythemovementofthe

    mainforceofthecombatunit,omittingallinstructionsrelative

    tocommunication,supplyandsanitation,

    o. Inindicatingdecisionsandvarious typosofestimates

    ofthesituationonmilitarysketches,utmosteffortshouldbe

    madetoincludeallmatterswhichcanbodrawnonthemap. Mat

    terswhichcannotbeshownonthemapshouldbeexplainedin

    separatenotes. Decisionsandrequirementsareordinarilywrit

    tendistinctlyinindigocolorontherightsideofthemap.

    Usuallyreasonsarenotstatedunlessspecificallyrequested.

    SECTIONII

    EXAMPLES

    Thefollowingaremerelyexamplesitherefore,theyshouldnot

    betakentofital1situations.

    Z.

    EstimateoftheSituation,

    .

    .,ESTIMATEOF

    THE,

    SITUATIONOFCOMMANDER,1stDIVISION

    ASOF1430.

    A, Requirements ,Thepursuitelementofthedivisionmustcon

    tinuetopursuetheenemytoourfront,whilethemain

    forcechanges- its-directionofmovementtothesectorofthe

    left-columnandengagesthefreshenemytroopsthatappear

    fromthatdirection.

    B. £

    1. Freshenemyforcesarecomingtoattack-ourleftcolumn,

    whiletheenemymainstrengthto-ourfrontwill reorganize

    and-strikebackatanyopportunetime.:

    2.

    The

    enemy,

    mainstrength toourdirectfronthasescaped

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    totherightbankoftheG-empciRiver,andalthoughitis

    docirous,

    fromthestandpointoffulfillingourmission,

    tostrikehim

    again-,

    inordertodisableandpreventhin

    fromfightingfurther,it.isquestionablewhetherornot

    theleft.oolumncansecuretherearofthedivisionagainst

    froshononiytroops-whilethatactionisbeingcarriedout.

    Therefore,tn°divisionoutofnecessitymustfirstofall

    annihilatethefreshenemytroopsand,aftersecuringits

    flanksandrear,willopposethehostileelementsonthe

    right'bankoftheG-empoiRiver.

    3, Thedivisioninordertofulfillitsmission,must

    maintainafirmfootingontherightbankoftheG-ompoiRi

    ver,,

    andatthesametimetheplansofthedivisionmain

    strengthtohaltthepursuitmustboconcealed, Ther3fore,

    apursuitdetachmentmustcontinuethepursuittotheright

    bankoftheG-ompoiRiver, Becausetheonomyhas.retreated,

    itispossibletocrushhimwiththereso-luteattackofa

    singleelement. Moreover,ovoniftheenemycounterattacks

    theruggedterrainoftherightbankoftheGompoiRiver

    •willenablethepursuitforcetoholdtheen6mywhilethe

    mainelementsar3destroyingthefrosh iioctileforces.

    1. Thepursuitforcewillcontinuetopursuotheenemy

    whichisonitsfrontandthusprotecttheflanksandrear

    ofthodivision,

    2.

    TheUnitsoftholeftcolumnwillcontinuetheattack,

    3. The2ndInfantrywillmoverapidlytowardDoiunderthe

    commandofthe-loftcolumncommander,

    4. The4thInfantrywill.advancerapidlytowardOtakc,

    5. TheFieldArtillorywillquicklyoccupypositionsintho

    vicinityof

    lit.

    Bes.sho,andsupportthemainelementsoftho

    divisioninthecufctack.

    6. ThedivisioncommanderwillrttpidlyproceedtowardOtako,

    3. EstimateofEnemySituation.

    ESTIMATEOFTHEENEMYSITUATIONOFTHECOMMANDER,

    1stDIVISION,ASOF1600.

    A. Requirement^: Theenemywillprobablydefendstubbornlyhis

    preTSntposition*andwillawaitthoarrivalofreinforce

    mentsfromthorear.

    1. Thoonomyisnowforcodtorelinquishastrategicsec

    torofhis.positiontoourforces. However,heisexpected

    torolyonhisestablishedpositionattherearandoffer

    stiffresistance. Therefore,howillawaitthearrivalof

    reserveswhicharerapidlyapproaching

     .fromnearby,and

    willplantorecoverhislosses.

    2.

    Ifthoonomyretreatsatthispointfromhispresent

    position,itwillbopracticallyimpossibleforhimto

    -3

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    makeastandagaininthe.Yamagata-area.- Eventually,ho

    is'aptto

    ID

    oannihilated,along

    1

    withhisroservosinthe

    defilesoftheMt»Uenoarea. Notonlyisthistrue,but

    alsob©6ause

    "of"

    thefactthattheleftflankofthemain

    forcewillbecome-exposed*

    1

    evenifheshouldwithdraw,he

    muststrivetotheutmosttomaintainhispresentposition

    during

    the'

    dayand-towithdrawundercoyerofdarkness,

    4. TerrainEstimateforaMeetingEngagement.

    TERRA!!!ESTIMATEFORAMEETING.ENGAGEMENTOFTHE1stDIVISION,

    IN.THE-VICINITYOFXX.

    A, Requirement: Thedivisionmustengageindecisive-combat

    inthearea*ofXX,eastofXX,attackingtheenemyinsuch

    awayastoforcehimintothe.swampyareawestofXX,

    B, Reason:

    1, Asyetthereisnoinformation

    to-

    determine whether

    theunitequippedwithcannonwhich

    is,

    movinginthe

    vici

    nityofXXisthepoint oftheadvanceguardofthemain

    enemyforceoranadvancedetachedunit. However,itis

    definitelyknownthatthemainenemyforcehascrossedthe

    XX-RiverValleyandismovingsteadilyontheplateausouth

    of'theriver. Nomatterwheretheforwardelementof.the

    mainhostileforcois,theenemy,afterhavingfirstmade

    XXhillsecureandobtainedafirmfootinginthearoaon

    'thesouthbank

    of•

    XXRiver,willprobablyattackinthedi*»

    ractionofourl©ftwing,

    2.

    Initsplantoengageindecisivecombatintheareaof

    XXHill,ourmain

    ;

    force,after'occupyingthehill,isina

    positiontotakeadvantageofthemainenemyforce

    1

    scross

    ingofthoXXRivorValley. Butbecauseourmainforco

    mustmakeafrontalattackwhileitsloftwingisbeingre

    strictedbythoswampyarea,thosuccessoftheengagement

    willboslight." Moreover,ifthounitwhichismovingin

    thovicinityofXXisthopointofthoadvanceguardofthe

    mainhostile

    force,,

    we'mustbearinmindthatouradvantage

    overtheenemybyreasonofhisdelayincrossingtheriver

    valleyhasbeenreduced,andconsequentlywemustrevise

    ourestimateofthisadvantage*

    •Therefore,

    if"

    is'ofadvantageforthedivisiontoen

    gagei'hdecisivecombatintheareaofXX,eastofXX,to

    "drivethe*riainhostile,forceintotheswampyareawestof

    XX,andtoannihilatehimwithasingleattack. Inorder

    tocarrythisout'andthusaidtheexecutionof

    our,

    main

    plan,apowerfulelementmustattack.inthedirectionofthe

    XXHillsectoranddrivethemainhostileforceintothe

    westernsector,

    C, Possib1e;'LinesofAction:

    1. Therightcolumnwillimmediatelyattacktheenemyin

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    ,.'.t'hedirectionofXXandmoveinthedirectionofXX.

    2.

    Theadvanceguard

    of'

    theleftcolumnwillattackthe

    •"enemyinthedirectionofXXhills andattempttocheckthe

    mainhostileforceinthewestinordertogiveourmain

    force

    an.

    advantage. ThemainelementsoftheEngineerBat

    'talionwillfromnowonbounderthedirectcommandofthe

    divisioncommander,

    3. iTheArtilleryofthemainbodywillimmediatelymoveto'

    XX,inthevicinityofXX, Itwillsupporttherightco

    lumnandatthesametimewillhampertheenemydeployment*

    Two

    1

    airplaneswillcooperate,

    4-. TheEngineerBattalionxvillbolocatedatXXafterhaving

    assisted,intheoccupationofartillerypositions,

    5, Thomain.,elementsofthe'leftcolumnwilldivergeas

    follows:

    2ndInfantry

      ,,

    .XX,

    invieinity ofXX

    4thInfantry&mainelom'onts

    ofMedicalDetachment .,,,.XX,invicinityofXX

    6. Theattachsdairunit,besidescontinuingitsformer

    mission,willrecormoitorallmovementsofthemainhostile

    forco.

    Twopianoswillcooporate-y/iththe'-Artillery.

    7.

     'TheCavalrywillshifttowardsXXandenveloptheene

    myleftflank, .

    ;

    ••

    8, The'fieldtrainwillhaltwiththeheadofthecolumn

    -atXX.

    9, Thoadvancetransport(XZXX)willmovetowardsXX,and

    thoremainingtransportalomontswillhaltsouthofXX.

    10.

    ThedivisioncommanderwillproceedtoXX,

    5, TarrainEstimateforanAttack,(soeFigurel)

    6, TerrainEstimateforDefense,(secFigura2)

    7, WrittenDecision,

    DECISIONOPTHECOMMANDER,1stDIVISION,ASOF2100.

    A, Decisions Thodivisionwillleavethebilletingareaearly

    tomorrowmorn.ing,tho3rd,andmovotowardthelinecon

    nectingKawayoke,Midaregawa-mura,andMichimanwiththeob

    jectofattackingthoenomyintheYamagataarea.

    -5

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    TERRAINESTIMATEFORANATTACK

    Eigure1,Page6a,isaSketchShowingTerrain'EstimateForThe

    1stDivisionAttackOnThe-EnemyPositioninTheYokkaichi

    Area.

    Requirement8j Thedivisionwilldeployinthesectorextending

    fromtheTadaareathroughTamamotoandYokotatothe

    Tagawaarea*tfhemaineffortwill"bedirectedtowards

    Ko"barafromtheYoshitomiareainsuchawaytocutoffthe

    enemyroutesorretreat.

    Note:

    Ouradvancecavalrywillharasstheenemyleftflank

    fromthelowerreachesoftheMinagawa,

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      I

    IGURE

    TERRAIN ESTIMATE FOR AN ATTACK

    Scale

    3/4 1/2

    Statute Miles

    Kunaigatake

    Fig. 1

    Drawn in Cartographic Section. Dissemination Unit M. I. S.

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    4-

    TERRAIN ESTIMATE FOR DEFENSE

    FIGURE   I I

    Scale

    Statute Miles

    Fig. 2 SketchShowingTerra in Estimate for Defense oftheYamadaAreabythe1stDivision.

    Requirem ent: Thedivisionwilloccupytheposition's indicated onthe sketch. After neutralizing

    thehostile offensive fire power, itwillshift tothe offensive from its left wingarea insucha

    wayastoenveloptheenemyrightwing.

    semination Unit  M I. S.

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    B .

    Reasofei

    . .

    1, The Gnemy, having occupied the area in.the vicinity of

    Yamagata, is awaiting the arriva l, of reserves andw ill pro

    bably launch an attack.' The.main enemy pos ition is not

    cle ar, but, judging bythe relat ion between tho enemy.streng

    th and the terra in of the Yamagata area as well as the sec

    tors occupied by both main forces, i t i s l ike ly to be in

    the aroa south of Tendo and north of Yamagata, while a

    strong element w il l probably occupy the Tendo area,

    2, In view of i t s miss ion, the d iv is ion must quickly crush

    the enemy in the Yamagata area before he can be reinforced.

    Therefore, taking into accouiit the condition of its elements

    and the d is tance to i t s objective , the d iv is ion

      •

    nust leave

    the bi ll et in g area early tomorrowmorning,

    3, Since th e enemy s it ua ti on i s not yet c lea r, i t i s best

    for the d ivis ion , in order to fac i l i ta t e subsequent opera

    t i ons ,

    to take as i t s immediate objective a l ine connecting

    Kawayoke, Midaragawa-mura, and Michiman, There are three

    .roads which can be used for th is operation: the Kawashima

    Nagatoro-Hanyu-Narifu road, the Koshu Highway, and the

    Tateoka-Higashine-Harazaki road. In tho event of combat it

    would be advantageous to secure a foothold onthe h il l to

    -the, .east. Therefore, a strong force must be moved on the

    last named road; the main strength, of tho division, to keep

    its, movement unhampered, must move on the Koshu Highway,

    which is a good road5 and a small, element must move along

    . the f i rs t named road to protect our r ight

    :

    'flank,

    C, Linos^of Actionj_ .

    1, The a ttached a i r uni t .wil l use the advance a i r f ie ld a t

    Obanazawa from early tomorrow morning. Themain force w il l

    reconnoiter the enemy,position- in the area northeast of

    . Yamagata*  . •An element wil l reconnoiter the hosti le rear

    .echelon and maintain lia iso n between columns. Tivoplanes

    wil l be assigned to cooperate with the ar t i l le ry af ter 0600,

    2,

    The advance guard of the division (1st Cavalry Squadron

    less four squads of the 2nd Troopj 1st Battal ion, 4th In

    fantry) wil l maintain i ts present position and cover the

    movement of the division.. I ts main force wil l reconnoiter

    the enemy condition in the area northeast of Yamagata and

    the te rra in , especially that of Kuratsukawa, Sugawa, and

    Shirakawa

    t

    . An element wi l l reconnoiter the hos t i le rear

    echelon.

    3,

    The r ight column (1s t Batta lion, 2nd Infantry; one

    cavalry .squadj 1st Batter;/, 1st Mountain A rt ill er y; one

    platoon of 2nd iitagineor Company)w il l leavs the south end of

    Kawashima at 0330 and move on the Ka?rashima-Nagatoro-Hanyu-

    Narifu road towards Kawayojce.

     

    8 -

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    4. Theadvance guard of the center column (1st Infantry

    Brigade less 2nd Infantry; one cavalry platoon less two

    sect ions; 1st Battal ion ,' 1st F ie ld Ar t i l lery j 1st ftigineer

    Battal ion less three platoons; one-third of the Medical

    Detachment) wi ll leave the south end of Tateoka at 0400

    and move on the Koshu road tov/ards Midaregawa-mura,

    5. Themain body of the center columnw ill move approxi

    mately 1500meters behind the advance guard. Its forward

    elaments wi ll consist of the Division Communication Unit,

    the Radio Platoon, and the 1st Battery of the 1st Indepen

    dent Heavy Field Arti llery* I ts remaining elements wi l l

    follow in the order l isted? Division Headquarters , 2nd

    Infantry less 1st Battal ions one platoon of 1st Engineer

    Company; 1st Field Artil lery Ie6s 1st Battalion and,al l

    elements of 2nd Battalion except 6th Battery; 1st Battal ion,

    1st Mountain Ar t i l lery less 1st Bat tery ; 1st Battal ion , 1st

    Heavy Field Art i l lery ; 4th Infantry -less 1st Battaj ion;

    Field A rti llo ry Regimental .Ammunition Train; one platoon of

    Mountain A rt il le ry Regimental Ammunition Train; two pl a-•

    toons of Heavy Field A rt il le ry Regimental Ammunition

    Train; one-third of Medical Detachment3 1st Independent

    Balloon Company.

    6. The lef t column (2nd Infantry Brigade less 4th Infan

    t ry ; one 'cavalry squadj 2nd Battal ion , 1st F ie ld Ar t i l l ery ,

    less 6th Battaryj one platoon of 2nd Engineer Company;

    one-third of Medical Detachment) wi ll depart at 0400 from

    the three-road junction located 1000meters southeast of

    Tateoka and move on the Tatooka- Higashine-Harazaki road

    towards Michiman,

    7. The Mobile Anti -Aircraf t wi l l take the following pos i

    tions at 0500 and cover the divis ion's assembly and de

    parture:

    1st Mobile A nti-A ircraft Unit - N atori '

    2nd Mobile Anti-Aircraft Unit - .Southeastern end of

    Nagatoro.

    Thereafter , they wil l provide ai r protection to- the column

    bymoving from one positi on to another along the Koshu

    Highway,

    8. Thef ie ld trai n under i t s commanderw il l follow two

    kilometers behind the advance transp ort.

    9. TheAdvance Transport,' consistin g of one infantry ammunifcitt

    tr ai n, one ar ti ll er y ammunition tr ai n , and two field hos«*

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    8 P 1AH JOB D IV I SION BOUW MARCH

    P U B 0 7 MARCH, 1 ST D IV IS IOH , A PR IL I - 3

    DISTRIBUTION

    1s t Column

    2ndColumn

    3rd Column

    Uth Column

    1st Echelon

    2nd Ichelon

    Major GeneralX, Comdr.X

    Colonel XXInf., Coadr.

    Major General

    XX,

    Condr. Colonel

    XX,

    Coadr. Col. XX,Trans.,XX,CoBdr.

    1s t

    I nf .

    B r lg d es s

    2nd

    Infl

    DIT Hdqra.

    2nd I n f. Br ig.

    1s t

    T .A.

    ( le s s

    1st Bn)

    1

    p i . C ar.

    ( l es s

    1

    squad)

    2nd In f.

    t r .

    .A. Bagt  ABB Transport (les s

    Med

    W i l l

    1s t

    Bn. 1 s t  t. A.

    Conn. Unit 1 squad ofCar.

    1s t

    Xng.Bn

    ( l e s s2nd

    Detch.)

    2ndBng.

    Co.

    Car. Begt. f ie ld Tr.

    Co.)

    1/3 Med.

    Seteh. XSupplyelement

    ( s)

    XSupply element

    ( s)

    MedDetch. (le ss

    l / 3 )

    XSupply element ( s )

    XSupply element ( s) XSupplyelement ( s )

    tayozuml-Inazuml-Iehlkawa- Eofu-Usaguehi-OoBlya- Eofu-Toshlda-Sotenba-

    BOUTS

    Kofu- Suklzawa- Torotuiawa- Bakashuku- ShizuokaRoad

    Somon- Iwsxa-Hegamiki- Toahlhara-SnlzuokaRd.

    Duaatsu-Hara Road

    April 1 s t

    Point

    of

    Departuri V icin ity

    of

    southwestern extremity

      at

    l of u

    Vlclnity

    of

    southern extreme Tlela l ty

    of

    southern V ic in it y

    of

    eastern

    t r of Tayozunl

    e x t r a s i t y

    of

    Kofu

    extremity of east Kofu

    Tine of Departure

    0530

    0730

    Long r e st i ng p lac< Sou th of Suklzava

    Horth of Aoyagl

    Bi l l e t ing Area

    Between ShiaoyamaAXi rl ls hl

    Between HlehiJlBaA Sukiiawa

    Between Ichlnose AOchll

    Between

    ShoJIn

    *Usaguchl

    Between Funatsu

    A

    Tujlnokl

    Length of March

    9

    B l ( 2 2. 0

    miles) 6J

    Bl ( 15 .9

    mi l e .)

    S

    Rl (19 .5

    B iles) 6

    Bl (1U.7

    a l le s ) 8

    R l (19 .5

    Bi les)

    April 2nd

    Point of Departure

    B i l l e t ing area f or

    each echelon

    Vicini ty of southern

    extremity

    of

    Shiro

    Time

    of

    Departure

    0630

    0730

    Long resting place

    South of Hakano Horth of Koshlzawa

    Bi l l e t ing Area

    Between KoutaneATorotumwa

    Between Nambe AH ilcnrlgaza-

    Between Hagnnukl 4

    BetweenOoalya A BetweenOotenba A

    wa

    Uchlbune

    Kltnynma

    Subashlrl

    Length of March

    7$ HI(18.3 a i l e s )

    7 Rl ( 1 7. 1 B i l e s )

    8} B l (20 .7 B i l e s )

    9 i B l ( 23 .L Bi les)

    Si

    B l ( 2 0. 7

    a l l e s )

    April 3 rd

    Point

    of

    Departure B i l l e t ing Area

    f o r

    each echelon Vicinity

    of

    southern

    extremity

    of

    Shiro

    Departure

    0530

    O63O

    ! l

    "

    :

    1700

    A rr iv al

    LongBeating place

    South

    of

    Ogoehl

    Horth

    of

    Hilshihara

    Bi l le ting Area

    Between Irle AMine

    Between Tokosuna A Nakayada

    Between DoyuAKlta

    Between Eaiiizawa

    A

    Between Ipponmatsu A

    Susuklhara Buaattu

    8

    R l ( 1 8 .5

    B i l e s )

    9

    B l ( 22

    B i l e s )

    8

    R i ( 1 9 .5

    a i l e s )

    7R l (17 .1Bi les)

    10Rl (26.U Bi les)

    Length

    of

    March

    la d

    of

    columnw ill

    cou -

    March so a s to pa ss

    plets passing through

    Iv&-

    through Tujlgawa aft er

    The supply platoons assigned

    to the 1 s t and

    buchi before 1 200. AprilJrt

    1200

    on

    April

    3rd. How-

    B.—,ir.

    2 n d

    • ch» lo»«

    w 1 11

    • *• » * • * * • « ' "t!

    1

    »»*

    However aft er 1 000harethe

    everhave

    th e

    Prorlslo i

    **—*" Koji«a during t he • e rch on April 3 a nd b i l l e t

    supply platoon nass through

    andforage platoon

    there.

    Onakasuto v i e 0o>lya t o

    reaaln

    at

    Tothlhara anil

    Toshlhara

    and

    b i l l e t t he re b i l l e t t her e .

    Oaneral remarks:

    ( l )

    Qnarter lng

    of

    t roops w i l l

    b e b y

    b i l l e t i ng .

    Tor

    morning of Apri l 1 andbynight of Apri l 3•»•»l*n I t s main

    Cavalryi the l i Cavalry ( l « s« onep l a toon)w il l l eave Io fu early on the

    supply t h ediv is ion wi l l depend uponfie ld ratlone, butw i l l u t i l i z e l o -

    fore* t o t he area wast of Abegawa, establ ish l ia iso n with the

    cal resources as much as po ss ib l e . *h »u se o f l o ca l resources for the

    CavalryBrigad e, andreoonnolter t he eneay si tuation i n th e

    1st columnw ill be tunervlsed by thepersonnel o f t heDivision I n -

    Haaamatsuarea , d^end ing fo r suppl ies on the local resouroee.

    tendance Dwoartaent, sad for the other columnsby the respective ooluan

    commanders.

    (2) Replenishment

    of

    f i e l d t r ai n w i l l

    b e a t

    n i ght , except

    on

    April

    3 th e

    supply companies (except that

    o f theUth

    column) wi ll move

    with empty wagons.

    (3) the Division Intendanoe Departmentw ill assemble local

    resources

    I n t h e

    v i c i n i t y

    of

    X j lr l

    sa d

    Shizuoka.

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    CUAPTER 2

    "EXAMPLESOFPIANS

    Paragraphs

    SECTION I. PlanforaDivisionRoute

    March!

     •*- — 8

    II.

    DivisionPlanofAttack- -— •* —— — 9

    III,

    DivisionPlanofAttack(with

    BattleMap) - — ~ ----.— -,— 10

    IV. DivisionPlanforDefense- — - — - - — — 11

    V. DivisionPlanforRiverCrossing 12

    VI.

    CavalryBrigadeReconnaissancePlan — 13

    VII,

    PlanforEmploymentofDivision

    IX,

    PlanforEmploymentofFireofa

    Artillery • — « . * — 14

    VIII, PlanforEmploymentofArtilleryFire— 15

    FieldArtilleryBattalion 16

    X, PlanforEmploymentoftheAirUnits

    ofanArmy.——-- '--— • 17

    XI. PlanforEmploymentofAirGroups — 18

    SECTIONI

    PLAN FORA DIVISION.ROUTSMARCH

    8,

    :

    P la n f or t h e 1 st D iv is io n Route March (s ee C h ar t, p . 10)

    SECTION I I

    DIVISIONPIANOFATTACK

    9, ThePlanofAttackofthe1stDivision,

    A, Decisions Atdaybreaktomorrow,

    ^]date)_^

     f

    thedi

    visionwilllaunchanattackagainstthehostilemain

    position,breakrapidlythrough,drivetheenemytoward

    theXXRivsr,directingthemainattacktowardXX,

    3, Instructions;

    1. Beforedaybreaktomorrow^

    (date)

    thefront

    ,lineunitswillmovetoXX,followedbyanartillery

    preparationofapproximatelyXXhourstodestroyimpor

    tantsectionsofthehostilemainposition,especially

    theobstacles,andneutralizetheenemyartillery.

    2.

    At (timej ,theinfantrywillopentheattack

    andadvanceTtoXXline

    r

    A'majorpartoftheartillery

    firewillbenlacadonXX.sector.

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    3 . If th e h os ti le p os it io n i s p en etra te d, d r ive

    enemya t once .toward XXRiver. At th i s t ime , the main

    s tr en gth of t he a r t i l l e r y w i l l change i t s p o s it io n t o

    ""wards XX secto r*

    C, Troops',

    " '*!,*""CompositionofTactical.Components.

    AirUnit

    1st.Squadron

    Right'

    V

    J

    ing

    Commander:'MajorGeneralXX

    1st.InfantryBrigade (less2nd

    n

    Inf,)

    1squad

    of

    Cavalry

    1platoon

    ofEngineers

    LeftWing

    '•

    Commander: 'Ma'̂ orGeneralXX

    2ndInfantryBrigade

    2squadsofCavalry

    5thBatteryMountainArtillery

    2platoons

    of

    Engineers

    Cavalry

    1stCavalry (less .1platoon)

    Artillery

    Commander: ColonelXX

    1stFieldArtillery

    2ndMountainArtillery Battalion (less

    1

    battery)

    .andone

    platoon

    of

    RegimentalAmmunitionTrain

    1stHeavyFieldArtillery Battalionand1platoon

    pf.RegimentalAmmunitionTr&\in

    1st'BalloonCompany

    Engineers,.

    . •.

    •' .

    1st"'EngineersBattalion,(less-

    3

    platoons)

    Antiaircraft .  • .-••.

    1st

    and2nd

    Mobile-Antiaircraft

    .

    Reserves'

    2ndInfantry

    2.*

     '

    TacticalMissions

    of

    SubordinateUnits,

    AirUnits Tomorrow, (date) _,an

    elementwillcarry

    outliaison,missionswhile

    the

    mainforge-will support

    theartillery.

    a.Today, j^date) ,.beforesunset,anelementwill

    occupyXZ'line,wli3.rotonight,itwillcovarthemove

    mentofthemainforceofbothwingstothatarea. Move

    mentwillcommenceat_(time)̂ ,andadvancemadeto

    theline. By_^tjLmeJ^ preparationsfortheattack

    willbecompleted. Followingtheartillerypreparation

    theattackwillbeopenedalongthewholefrontandad

    vancemadeto.XXline.

    •<

    1 2

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    b

    #

    The boundary between the zones of action for

    bothwings wil l beXXline. (The area along this l ine

    wil l be the responsibil i ty of the Right Wing.)

    Ar t i l ler^ :

    a . Onear t i l l er y element andthe main s trength of

    XXwil l take posi tion in XXarea tonight , (date) ,

    and at daybreak tomorrow, (date)

      t

    wi l l begin prepa

    ratory f i r e . Ar t i l lery prepara tion wi l l be continued

    u n t i l approximately (timej according t o th e follow

    ing schedule;

    Xbattal ion(s) of Field Arti l lery to destroy obstacles

    in the front of the r ight wing and important targets

    in XXar ea .

    Xbattal ion(s) Field Arti l lery andXbattery(ies)

    of Mountain Arti llery to destroy the obstacles in front

    of the lof t wing and important targets onh il l on

    north side ofXX,

    Xbattali on( s) of 15 cmhowitzers andXb attal ion(s )

    of Field Artil lery for countorbattcry and destruction of

    other important targets in the hosti le posit ion,

    b

    #

    After the in fantry a tt ack beg ins, f i re w i ll bo

    massed as follows:

    Direct support of right wing

    Xbat ta l ion(s ) of F ie ld Ar t i llery

    Xbatter y(ic s) of 15 cmhowitzers

    Direct support of loft wing ,

    Xbattalio n(s) of Fiold (Mountain) Ar tillj ry

    Xbattalio n(s) of 15cmhowitzers

    Counterbattory

    Xbat tal ion(s ) of F ie ld Ar t i l lery

    Xbatta lion (s) of 15 cmhowitzers

    However, if necessity ar ise s, be prepared to increase the

    mass of f iro byXbattal ion(s) in front of the r ight wing

    and to increase the £i'ro power byX.batt 'alion(s) in the

    z.ono of action of the 2nd Division oast of XXline and

    in the zone of action of the'3rd Division west of XXlino,

    c. As soon as bothwings havemovedto the vicinity

    of XXlin e, the Field ArtiHoly wil l shif t posi tion a£

    once, one element to the'v ic in ity of XX,the main body

    to the vicini ty ofXX.

    d. Tho zones of action of the Corps Arti l lery and the

    Division Ar tille ry will bothe area bounded by tho lines

    X—X »X »A

    >

    o, 'The amount of ammunition to be expended in atta ck

    ing the main defensive zone wi ll be approximately five

    u ni ts of f i r e .

    Engineers: Theunit wi l l mainly cooperate with tho.ar ta

    Tlory lbi

    the occupation of positions and in changing po

    s i t ions with tho progress of the a t tack .

    Ant i -a i reraf t ; Thouni t wi l l occupy posi tions in the

    vicinity'"of"~XX andXXbefore dawntomorrow, (datej ,

    13

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    andfurnishairprotection.

    Reserves:

    Theunitwilltakepositioninthe,areaZX

    before*

    0400tomorrow

    ^(datej___

    andthereaftermove

    1

    towardsXXintherearof'theoe'nteroftheleftwingin

    accordancewiththeprogressofattaok.

    DivisionHeadquarters:'WillbeatXXat

    0400,

    tomorrow

    "~^ateV"

      •

    ""Thereafteritwillmovetothevicinity

    ofXX~"inaccordancewithchangesinthebattlesituation.

    3. Communication: Thecommunicationnetwillbeestab

    lishedasshowninthsannex(notattached),

    4,

    AdministrativeMattars,

    Medical:.

    a, "TheMadicalDetaonmentwillleaveXX linoat(time)

    tomorrow, (date) , By0430itwillsetupdressing

    stations,

    onebyanelementofthedetachment inXX

    areaandonebythemainstrengthinXXarea, »

    b,

    TheXXFieldHospitalwillleave

    XX,

    pointat.Jti

    tomorrow, (date) andwillbesetupatXXbefore

    dawn.

    pj_

    a. Theammunitionsupplypointwillbemovedforward

    tomorrow,_Xi^

    a

    ^

    v3

    J ^° ^

    Q

    followingplaces:

    InfantryammunitiondistributionpointsatXXandXX

    ArtilleryammunitiondistributionpointsatXX

    b. TheFieldTrainwill

    c. ThoTransportwill— . — — - » -——.,

    SECTIONIII

    DIVISIONPIANOFATTACK(with BattleMap)

    10.

    PlanofAttackof1stDivisionintheVicinityofUenoyama

    machi,

    August3,1,

    (Thisplaniswritten,followingJapanesearmypractice,in

    indigojinkontherightofthebattlemap showninFig. 3)..

    A, Decision: Tonightundercovorofdarkness,thedivision

    willapproachtheendmyanddeployalongthecrestline

    ofthohighlandwhichroughlyextendsfromtheeastern

    hillsofSugaridathroughXubotoandKanagamotothevi

    cinityofMinami.

    Tomorrow,atdaybreak,onthe11th,afterthepreparatory

    fireofthoartillerythoinfantrywilllaunchanattack.

    Thomainpointofattackwillbodiroctodtowardthehills

    northofUonoyama insuchav/ayastodrivothoenomyin

    thedirectionofKanayama

    Pass,

    southeastofUonbyama.

    -14

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    FIGURE IE

    PLAN OF ATTACK OF  FIRST  DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF UENOYAMA 11 AUGUST

    Scale

    Statute Miles

    o Yamagata^

    1ST FIELD HOSP

      FRONT E UNITSL

    L

    L

      I-KUNI

      LIN

    INt UNI lb

    WILL CROSS THIS LINE

      OF |

    DEPARTURE AT 2400 AUG

     10.

    KatayaikA RESERVES/

      /

    ^ W ? | | j

    1ST INF LESS 1ST BN(LESS

    LESESS

     1//2

     GUUN UNINIT

    N

    ST EN

    G

      BN

      LES

    ES

    S 1S

    S

    T CO

     

    //

      I -v

    Uchiyama

    FLANK DET

    1ST

      INF

     BN LESS

    3RD AND 4TH

      '

    1/2 GUN UNIT

    1ST INF

      (

    •1

      SQD CAV

    2ND MTN ARTY

    "waa

    Tanukimor

    To Mlyauch

    /

    THE RIGHT FLANK DETACHMENT

    WILL ATTACK THE ENEMY

     IN

    THE KODAKI HIGHWAY AREA.

    ADVANCE TO THE SECTOR WEST

    OF UENOYAMA AND   HARASS

    THE   REAR OF THE ENEMY MAIN

    FORCE.

    To Akayu

    To  Kanayama

    Drawn in Cartographic Section, Dissemination Unit,  M.I.O

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    B

    #

    Outl ine_ fpr_Att ackj_

    1# 1st Phase: (UD to the opening of infantrv attack on

    tho 11th).

    a . Onmidnight of tha 10th, the infantry wi l l s ta r t

    from tho present front line and by 0200 of tho 11th wi ll

    assemble along tho line indicated onthe ba ttle map,whore

    i t wi l l prepare for the a ttack that i s to follow.

    b. By0300 of tho 11th the ar t i l le ry wil l occupy posi

    t ions, prepare for action, and open fi re at daybreak. By

    0600 it will complete preparation for offectivo fire and

    carry out preparatory f i re for a ttack . I t s chief mission

    wil l be to destroy the obstacles direct ly in front of tho

    center and right wing and to neutralize the onemy a r t i l

    lery. Onoelement will endeavor ospocially to destroy

    tho defense instal lat ions of the hosti le flank in tho

    area of the positions southwest, of Kubote.

    2. 2ndPhase: (from the opening of infantry attaok to

    the preparation for the assau l t ) .

    a. Although the time for launching the attack bythe

    front l ine infantry unit wil l be determined by the in

    crease in ar t i l le ry f i re , i t i s expected to be roughly

    0600. However the detached force onthe right flank

    will attack at an opportune t ime.

    b. When the infantry launches i t s a ttack the ar t i l le ry

    w ill give direct support with approximately two battalions

    to the center and with'approximately one battalion to

    the left wing. The fire of approximately two battalions

    w ill be directed especially against the enemymoving out

    from the direction-of h il l 459.0

    3. 3rd Phase (the time for prepara tion of assaul t) ,

    a . The f i re of one addit ional ba ttal ion wi ll give

    direct

    r

    support to the center infan try. If necessary i t

    wi ll neutralize the enemyflank defenses in front of our

    center,

    4. 4th Phase: (from tha time of a ssau lt t o the exp lo i

    tatio n of advantages gained).

    a . When the assault begins, the ar t i l le ry wi l l shif t

    its' fire to the rear of-the enemyposition andmake

    special effort to check host ile counter-attacks in tho

    northern sector of Uenoyama-machi.

    b." Whenthe infantry penetrates the enemy position,

    the ar ti l l er y will at a suitable timo moveforward and

    cooperate in exploiting tho advantages gained.

    C. Notes;

    1. ThoCavalrywillbeintheMogamigawaRiverValley

    andwillcontinueformermissions.

    2. The

    1stIndependentAirSquadronwillattachthroe

    Dlanes

    to

    theartilleryunit,andthoremainder will

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    serve a& liais on between the division commander and

    subordinate un its•

    5 .

    TheMobilo Anti-airoraft Unit wil l occupy posit ions

    in th3 vicin ity of Matsubara andw ill provide? a ir cover

    for tho main force of tho divis ion.

    SECTIONIV

    .DIVISIONPIAFFORDEFENSE

    11, DefensePlanoftho1stDivision.

    A. Decision:

    Tho

    divisionwill.occupy

    a

    positionbetween

    XXarecTand

    XX

    area. Afterhavingoverpoweredtheenemy

    infront

    of

    thepositions,chieflywithfiropower,

    the

    division-willshift

    tothe

    offensivefromtheright

    sec

    tor. If

    theenemyshouldmake

    a

    turningmovementfrom

    themountainsectorwith

    a

    strongforcethedivision

    is

    expected

    to

    shift,to

    a

    decisiveoffensive

    by

    takingad

    vantage

    of

    theseparation

    of

    enemystrength.

    B.

    Instruct

    ions;

    TT

    TheXX~fbrwardelementwill

    be

    sent

    toXX

    area

    to

    delaytheenemyadvance.

    It

    willact

    as a

    covering;force

    whilethemainbodyofthedivisionoccupies

    a

    defensive

    position,

    2. In

    the

    XX

    sector,thedivisionflankswill

    be

    covered

    bythe

    XX

    detachment*

    &. Themainhostileattack

    is

    expected

    tobein

    the

    XX

    sector.

    At

    1

    thistimethe.enemy

    £n

    front

    of

    theposition

    may

    be

    overwhelmed

    by

    firepower. Afterthis

    is

    done,

    thedivisionwillshift

    to

    theoffensivefromtheright

    seotor,pushthemainhostileforceintotheobstacle

    ofthe

    XX

    Riverandthereannihilatethem*

    4. If

    theenemyshouldmake

    a

    turningmovementfromthe

    mountain

    sector,

    with

    a

    strongforce,the

    XX

    detachment

    willblockhim. Ourmaineffort,takingadvantage

    of

    the

    coparation

    of

    thohostile-forces,will.shift

    to a

    decisive

    offensive.anddestroybothgroups.

    C. Location^

    of̂ thê

    MainDefensiveZone,Disposition

    of

    Troops

    *Bthe,

    Occupation

    of

    DefensivePositions,andAssign-'

    'fadBjLp?....ObservationPosts.

    As

    shown

    on

    attachedsketch.

    (Emitted

    horej"

    D. ReconnaissanceandSecurityMoasures;

    1. TheattachedairunitwiiYj

    at

    thooutsot,

    be

    assigned

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    toreconnoitertheenemysituation,especiallyasto

    indicationsofaturningmovement. Thereafter,oneele

    mentwillbeassignedtotheartilleryandtheothersto

    establishliaisonbetweenthecommanderandotherunits.

    2,

    ThecavalryunitwillmovetowardsXX,reconnoitor

    theenemysituation,keepintouchwiththeforwardele

    ment,anddelaythehostileadvance. Ifitispressed

    hardbytheenemyitwillwithdrawtoXXsectorand

    securetheXflankofthedivision.

    3. TheXXDetachmentwilloccupytheareabetweenXX

    andXX,andwillcovertheXflankofthedivision.

    E. CounterattackandCounterOffensive;

    1. Thecounterattackwhichiscarriedouttomaintain

    ourpositionwillmainlybeentrustedtothefrontlino

    commander,andifnecessityarisestheartillerywill

    supporbit. Andwhenthofrontlinounitscarryouta

    localcounterattackatafavorableopportunity,tho

    divi

    sionwillshifttotheattackinanefforttoutilize

    theirsuccess,

    2.

    CounterOffensive.

    a. IfthehostilemainattackarrivesintheXXarea,

    theunitsintheloftsoctorwillbocomotheleftwing.

    Itwilldoalasevereblowagainsttheenemyfromits

    presentpositionandtherebysupportthedivisionoffen

    sive.

    x

    Atthefirstopportunityitwill jointheright

    wing,andbothwingswillholdthestrongpointsonthe

    rightandshifttotheoffensive. '

    Units intherightsectorwillbecometherightwing,

    maintainthestrongpointsinitssectoranddrivethe

    enemytothesouthwest. Mostofthedivisionreserves

    willbeaddedtotherightwing.

    Theartillerywillatfirstmassdestructivefirein

    frontofthedivisionmainpointofattack. Afterdes

    troyingtheenemyoffensivepower,itwillsupportthe

    attackoftheleftwing.

    b. Iftheonemyshouldmakeaturningmovementfrom

    thomountainsectorwithastrongforce,theXXdetach

    mentwillstubbornlyblocktheenemyandprotecttheX

    flankofthedivision.

    Thomainstrengthofthedivisionwillshifttothe

    offensivefromXXareaand,afterfirstrepulsingtho

    enemytop.tsfront,willattackthorearandflankof

    thedetachmentthatismakingtheturningmovement.

    F. CommunicationandLiaison:

    (omitted).

    G. ConstructionofPositions:'

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    1. Essentials )

    2.

    Dispositionoftroopsand...)

    distribution.ofmaterials )

    3. Amountoflaborroquirod ) (detailsomitted)

    4. "Method^of-workandorder )

    ofprocedure )

    5. MiseelIaneous )

    H. Supplying-ofAmmunition; (omitted)

    SECTIONV

    DIVISIONPIANFORRIVERCROSSING

    12. 1stDivisionPlanforRiverCrossing*

    A. Decision: AtnightonJanuary4th,thecavalrywillmove

    fromtheKyoboareatoharassthehostileflank

    s

    whilethe

    divisionforcesthe rivercrossing,oneelementmovingfrom

    theIokaidoRailwayline,andthemainbodyfromYasaku

    andpointsalone;thetributaries oftheFurukawa (rivor).

    Bydawn,bothgroupswilladvance,atleasttothe linecon

    nectingtheIkebataarea,Ogawa,andMeijiReservoir,and

    'annihilatetheonemyonthatfrontbeforethearrivalof

    resorvos.

    B,

    Inst ru e ti on s :

    1.

    The d iv is ion wi l l move into the zones of act ion des ig

    nated in ths nowdisposit ion of troop.s onthe night of tho •

    3rd and prjpo.ro for r ivor c ross ing. All un it s wi l l do tho i r

    utmost to guard tho socrjcy of th oi r a ct iv it ie s from onGray-

    land and air roconnaissanco. Preparation for r ivor cros

    sing w ill bo completed boforo 2300 of tho 4th.

    2.

    Alc-rgo dotachmont of tho dismounted troops w ill  oxo-

    cuto tho in i t i a l crossing byboat and thon construct a

    bridge in tho Shikino aroa. Tho simultaneous crossings

    w ill comimneo at midnight. Tho Cavalry, howovjr, w ill st ar t

    crossing tho rivor at an-opportune timo ontho night of tho

    4th. Thj tin;> to begin tho bridgo construction wil l ,bo

    te nta tiv ely sot c.t Q200. • •

    3.

    Aft .r tho simultaneous crossings have"boon ini t ia te d,

    tho Art i l lery wi l l , a t opportune t imes, support tho river

    crossing and tha' o'oeratTons tha t follow.

    4.

    Beforedaybreakoftho5th,thedivisionwillmoveto

    thelineconnectingtheIkebataarea,Ogawa,andMeiji

    Reservoir,andattackhostileforcesinthatarea,

    C. Troops:

    AirSquadron';

    1. Preparationforrivercrossing: Onthe3rdand4th,

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    theairsquadronwillreconnoitsrthehostiledisposition

    ontherightbankoftheYasakuRiver,especiallythe

    dispositionoftherearechelon.. Also,anelementwill

    reconnoiterthesituationofhostilereserves.

    2.

    Executionofrivercrossing: Thoairsquadronwill

    Continueitsformermission. Fromdaybreakofthe5th-,

    (3)airplaneswillbeattachedtotheArtillery, Liaison

    willbemaintainedwiththeCavalry,

    1stCavalry(lessoneplatoonandonesquad)

    1stBattalion,1stInfantry(less3rdand4th

    Companies)

    Onebatteryof1stMountainArtillery(separate)

    OnesquadofEngineers.

    1, Preparationforrivercrossing: Rivercrossingwill

    startatsunsetofthe3rdandby'dawnofthe4th will

    movetothebankowoositoKyobo. Ontho4th,preparation

    forrivorcrossingwillbomade.

    2,

    Executionofrivorcrossing: Rivorcrossingwillbe

    initiatedatanopportunetimoon  thonightofthe4th

    .andhostileforcestoIjlufrontannihilated. Harassing

    movementswillbemadeonthohostileroartorenderas

    sistancetothemainattack.

    RightWin&; 1stInfantryBrigade(lessallof1stBatta

    "

    lionoxcept3rdand4thCompaniesof1st

    Infantry,andlossallof2ndInfantryoxcopt

    1stCompany)

    Onecavalrysquad

    1stBattalionandl/3ofthoRegimentalAmmun

    itionTrainoftho1stFieldArtillery

    OnoplatoonofBridgingMaterialCompany

    22 localboats

    1. Boundarybetweenthozonesofactionoftherightwing

    andtheleftwing: LinoconnectingsouthondofWakama

    tsu,

    northondofZaika,northendofKamiaono,andsouth

    ondof"Anjo.

    2.

    Preparationforrivor crossingwillbomadeinpresent

    areaontho3rdand4th,andreconnaissanceoftheonemy

    situationandthoterrainwithinthezoneofactionwill

    becarriedout.  Aft orsunsetofthe4th,thisunitwill

    movotothoTompaku.aroaandcom.pl.ytothopreparationfor

    thoriv.rcrossingby

    2300.

    3. Executionofrivorcrossing: Atmidnight,thocrossing

    willbainitiatedaftorhostilerosistancohasboonro

    ducod. Hostile-forcosinthoSuwaaroawillbodrivon

    out,andthoruaftor,as

    v

    ourtroopsincroasoinnumber,tho

    oncountorwillbomoroandmoroexpanded. Bydaybroak,

    thisunitwilladvanceto YasakuandIkobataendattack

    thohostileforcosinthatarea,rondoringassistanceto

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    the main attack .

    Loft Wing: 2nd Infantry Brigade

    Ono cavalry platoon

    1st Battalion (lass ono company) of tho Ro

    gimontal Ammunition Train bolonging to an

    element of tho 1st Mountain Ar ti l lery (se

    parate)

    Onoplatoon of 2nd Company of 1st Engineers

    1 ..

    Sector boundaryi Sameas that of r ight wing.

    2. Preparation for r iver crossing wil l generally bemade

    in present area ontho 3rd and 4th, and enemy situatio n

    and terr ain of tho zone of action will be reconnciterod.

    After sunset of the 4th, thi s unit wi ll moveto the Koraku

    area and complete tho preparation for the river crossing

    by 2300

    3. Execution of r iver c ross ing: At midnight, the c ross

    ingw i l l bo in i t ia ted af te r hosti le r3s is tanco has boon ro

    ducod. Theuni t wil l dislodge tho host i le elements in

    front of i t and by daybreak wil l advance at least to the

    line connecting Ogaira and Meiji Reservoir, whore i t w ill

    attack the enemyalong that front.

    Art i l le ry^  ^

    s

    ^

    F ie ld Art il lory ( less 1st Batta lion and a

    frac tion of the Regimental Ammunition Train)

    1st Battalion, 1st Heavy Field Arti l lory and

    an element of the Regimental Ammunition Train,

    1.

    .P repara tion for r iver c ross ings S t r ic t ly guarding

    the secrecy of i t s ac t iv i t io s , the Ar t i ll e ry wi l l , during

    tho night of tho 3rd and on the 4th, carry out al l arrange

    ments for occupation of posi tions and for f i r ing. At

    sunset of tho 4th, operations will begin, and by 2300 posi

    tions in tho Ukaku and Umbosan areas w il l be occupied.

    There tho preparations to support tho river crossing and

    atta ck of tho Loft Wingwil l bomade'.

    2. Execution of r iver c ross ing; TheArt i l le ry wi l l com

    mence firin g at an opportune time to cooperate,with the

    Loft

    1!;r

    ir_g in tho crossing and in the encounter that fol

    lows the cross ing. Aftor daybreak of tho 5 th , (3) a i r -

    pianos will bo attaclud . Tho employment of fir e during-

    the

    c

    airs

    o

    cf tho engagement is as follows:

    a . In tho in i t i a l phase of tho r iver c ross ing, tho main

    strength wil l e liminate the hos t i l j infantry which direct

    ly obstructs our rivor crossing, and an element wi ll

    neutral ize tho host i le ar t i l lo ry in the Ogawa aroa.

    b.

    Thereaf ter, the ar t i l le ry wi l l support the occupation

    of key points of tho enemy, and then prepare to place

    interdiction fi re on tho. front of the occupied area.

    c . After tho lef t vdng has crossed tho r iver , the Ar t i l

    lory wil l echelon i ts uni ts forward to tho right bank.

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    River Crossing Detachment;

    1st Engineers (less 1st Companyand six squads of

    2nd Company)

    1st Battalion, 1stPO

    1st Bridging Material Company (le ss one platoon)

    2nd Bridging Material Company

    10 local boats

    1. P repara tion fo r r ive r c ross ing: Leaving a t sunset of

    the 3rd, the main force will advance to the Kojima area

    on the Sanada-Nakajima-Kojima road to reconnoiter, survey,

    and arrange bridging materials along the r iver . The 1st

    Bridging Mate rial Company, however, w il l leave at 1600 of

    the 3rd, and move to Makamiwhere one'.platoon wi ll be a t

    tached to the Right "Wing,while the remaining force w il l,

    a ft e r sunset, move ont o Nakajima on the Takajikara-Naka

    jima road and coiae under the command of the River Crossing

    Detachment. The 2nd Bridging Material Companywil l move

    afte r sunset alone;the route of the main force to Shikagoya,

    The commander of the Left Wing wi ll be consulted about

    guarding of bridging mate rials,

    2,

    Execution of the r ivsr cross ing: The detachment wi l l

    be assigned to ass is t in the r ivor crossing of the Left

    Wingand the division Reserve Ar tille ry,

    Furthermore, the unit will oonstruct â bridge in the vi

    cini ty of Shikiya- Although the time to bogin the con

    s t ruct ion is ten ta tively set a t 0200, the exact time wi l l

    be given on a separata order . During the crossing opera

    tion of tho Loft Win^j tho unit will beundor the Loft

    Wing command,

    Ant ia i roraft Ar t i l lery

    1, """Preparation for river crossing: Previous missions wil l

    bo continued.

    2, Execution of r ive r c rossing : At dawn of tho 5 th , the

    1st Mobile Antiaircraft Art ille ry wil l occupy a position

    in tho Yonano aroa .and tho 2ndMobile An tiair craf t Ar til lor y

    in the Shimoaono aroa, to provide a ir defense.

    Rosorvo: 2nd Infantry ( loss 1st Battal ion)

    IT Prepara tion for r ivor cross ing: The Rosorvowi l l re

    main in tho prosont aroa on tho 3rd, but af tor sunsot of

    tho 4th, wi ll leave Sanada and advancd to Kojima aroa,

    2,' Exocution of. r ivor crossing: Approaching tho r iver

    bank at an opportune time tho Ros.srvow ill .cross tho river

    following tho Loft

    rir

    ing and advance to F u j i i ,

    Division ^ q _ _ ^

    17" PropaVation forrivjrcrossing: Position6fthohoad

    quartors on'the3rdand4thwillboatthoeasternondof

    Pukuoka»

    2, Execution of r ivor c ross ing: At 2200 on tho 4 th , tho

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    headquarterswilladvanceto

    D

    - Communications: WithFukuokaasthecenter,theCommuni

    cationsUni/tTwillmaintaincommunicationsbetweenbothWings

     

    Artillery,Reserve,andtheRiverCrossingDetachment.

    OneradiosquadwillbeattachedtotheCavalry. Themes

    sageoenteratFukuokawill"bemovedtotheKojimaarea

    on-

    the4that

    2200.

    Theunitwilladvancetotheright

    bankoftherivertogetherwithmainstrengthoftheLeft

    Wing.

    E,

    Supply:

    1. Ammunition: Theinfantrywillcarryanadditional

    qupplyofcombatammunition. Afterreplenishment,the

    CombatTrainwillfollowtheunit. Beforedaybreakon

    the5th,oneinfantryammunitionbrttorywilltake

    posi

    tionatXXandoneartill3ryammunitioncompanywill

    takepositionatXX,

    2.

    Ration: Eachindividualwillcarryoneday'saddition

    alironration.. Afterthe5th,thefieldtrainwillre

    plenishatXX.,

    F. MedicalDetachment: Bynoononthe4th,theMedical

    DetachmentwillestablishdressingstationsatUewadawith

    X/zofitsstrength^andatShikagoyawith itsremaining

    strength. The1stFieldHospitalwillbeestablishedat

    Okazaki-muraandthe4thFieldHospitalatNakajima. Th©

    3rdField

    Hospital,

    atOkazaki-muraandthe2ndFieldHos

    pitalatKoiimawillpreparefordepartureaftsrmidnight

    onthe4th. Otherswillbeinformed.

    Note:

    Reliefofthefrontlineunitsinthenewcombatzone

    willbeginaftersunsetonthe3rd,andwillbecompleted

    atapproximatelymidnight.

    SECTIONVI

    CAVALRYBRIGADERECONNAISSANCE.PLAN

    13, 1stCavalryBrigadeReconnaissancePlan,

    A,

    1, Oneelementofthebrigadewillreconnoitertheenemy

    situationintheMitoarea,andthemainbody,in'the

    Utsunomiyaarea. Forthispurposethb-mainbodywill

    moveontheFuchu-OmiyaRoadtotheTonogawa line,where

    itwillseekoutthemainbodyofthehostilecavalry

    anddestroyit,

    2.

    Eventhough pros surafromasuperiorhostilefcrrcais

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    encountered,anelementwillContinueto reconnoiter. At

    tho sametime,themainbody,utilizingtheobstaclesof

    theTonegawaandtheArakawa (rivers)andobstructingthe

    movementsandthereconnaissance of

    the.

    enemy,willwith

    drawtothearea oftl?.erightbank oftheTamagawaend

    supporttheadvanceofthe5thDivisiontothemountains.

    B.

    Reason*

    1. Theenemy isnowconcentrating-intwoareas,.andfrom

    observationofthoterrainandothergeneralconditions,

    indicationsarethattheunit inUtsunomiya isthemain

    force. Themosturgent informationweareafteristhe

    activities ofthismain

    forcj,

    especiallythedisposition

    OftroopsforcrossingtheTonegawa (river). Thisre

    connaissancemustbeimmediatelycarriedout,sinceit

    hasgreatimportanceforthe operations oftheArmy, which

    isexpectinganengagementintheMusashiPlain. There

    fore,thebrigademust'movetowardsthebankoftheTone

    gawaonthe Fuchu-Omiya Road.

    The enemyforceintheMitoAroa isinferiortothat

    inthoUtsunomiyaarea,butsincetheOkazakiBeachHigh

    way andJobanrailway linoarevital routesloadingto

    the enemy,wemust recognizethefactthathewillmove

    a fairlystrongforcetothatarea. However,sincethe

    hostileforces inbothareaswillprobablymaintainclose

    collaboration vri.tli eachother,itisimportanttorecon

    noitertho.situation

    of.

    thoMitoareaatonceinorderto

    make itpossiblefo,rourarmyinthenorthto determine

    thedispositionoftroops. Consequently,instead ofmore

    patrols afairly strongelementmust"bedispatchedinto

    thatarea,

    2.

    Ifthemainstrengthofthebrigade,during itsad

    vance,

    encounterstheenemycavalryanddoesnotdestroy

    it,themovements ofthobrigadewillbegroatly restricted,

    andreconnaissancewillbeunsuccessful. Therefore,first

    ofall,thomainstrengthoftheenemycavalrymustbe

    destroyed.

    3. EvenifDressedbyasupjriorenemyforce,thebri

    gademust endeavortocheck itsadvanceandcovercurmain

    force. InordertomovetotheMusashiPlainourarmy

    musttravela longdistancethroughthemountainsaswell

    ascrops suchterrainobstaclesastheSagamigawaandthe

    Tamagawa (rivers). Furthorrnore,inord.jrtoch^ckthohos

    tileadvance,wemusttakeintoconsiderationthepos

    sibilityofutilizingthoterrain obstaclesofthe Tone

    gawaandtheArakawa (rivjrs)andtheterrainfeaturesof

    theTokorozawaarea. Ifthebrigade,becauseofthesitua

    tion,ispressedstillfurtherandcannotprevent being

    forcedback,itmustat leastoccupythehillnorthof

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    HinoontherightbankofTamagawaandondoavortoheld

    thispositioninordertosupporttheadvancethrough

    mountainous;terrainofth*35th'"Division,whichismoving

    on.

    -phoKoshuHighway..

    C. DistributionofH^cnmiBjo-no^Troogs^: (chart,p.26)

    ofAdvance^ (chart

    #

    p.27)

    E

    #

    Communications s

    :

    1. YfithMatsudaSoryoasthocenter,atelephoneline-

    willbesetup,followingtheroutepfadvanceofthe

    mainbodyofthebrigadeandutilizingasmuchaspossible

    theexistinglinesofcommunication. Forliaisonwiththe

    ArmyHeadquartersandtheattachedairunit,radiowill

    alsobe'used.

    2.

    Liaisonbetweenreconnaissanceandpatrolelementswith

    in tho ,brigadewillbebyradio,heliograph,telephone

    (usingtheexisting

    lines),

    mountedmessenger,andbicycle

    messenger. Ifconditionspermit,anadvancemessage

    centerwillbesotupatakeynosition. Liaisonwithair

    planeswillbebyradio,signalpanels,anddropandpick

    upmessages,

    3. Liaisonbetweenthebrigadeandtho5th Divisionwill

    bebyradio,existingtelephone linos,heliograph,runners,

    andbicycle messengers,

    4. Forcommunicationbetweenthebrigadeandthesupport

    inginfantrybattalion,existingtelephonelines,bicycle

    .messengers,mountedmessengers,andmotorcycleswillbo

    used.

    §HPPi£

    1. Asmuchammunitionaspossiblewill,botakenalongat

    thotimeofdeparture. Replenishments'willbesenttotho

    reconnaissanceelementsfromthemainbodyoftheBrigade.

    ThomainbodyoftheBrigadewillbosuppliedbythe

    BrigadeTransportUnitandifnecessarybythemotorized

    Unitfromtheadvancesupplydepot. ...

    2.

    Suppliesforreconnaissanceandpatrolelementswill

    comochieflyfromlocalsources. Althoughthemainbody

    ofthobrigadewillalsoendeavor

    to*

    utilize localmaterial,

    stilltheshipmentsofsupplieswillbemado,depending

    uponthetransportation.facilitiesoftho'.BrigadoTransport

    andMotorizedUnits,(from.Hachi'ojiAdvanceSupply Depot),

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    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

    C. DistributionofReconnaissanceTroops

    Disposi t ion

    Organization

    Parent Unit

    Time of

    departure

    Mission

    Pa tro l of Officer A

    Commander, 1 st L t. A

    1 platoon

    1 radio

    1 heliograph

    Telephone equipment

    13th

    March 1 at 1400

    To reconnoiter enemy

    si tua t ion in the d i

    rection of Mito on

    the Rikuzen beach

    highway from t h e

    western sector of

    Tokyo.

    -

    :

    ,-lst Recon. Party

    1 Company (less 2 platoons)

    (l office r pa tro l added)

    1 radio

    Telephone equipment

    5 bicycle messengers

    _

      Cavalry

    March 1 at 1500

    To reconnoiter the enemy

    si tuat io n in the d i rect ion

    of Mito from the are a ea st

    of a li n e connecting Tamura

    (5 miles south of A tsu ki),

    Chofu, Urawa, Ka sukab e,

    Toho,

      Shuka, Sh it azawa,

    Sh itad ate , and Iawase; that

    is roughly, from the area

    of the Ichinomiya-Futako

    Takaido-JIatogayq-St pugaya

    Noda-Suikaido-Doura road.

    2nd Recon." Party

    1 Company (1 officer

    patrol added)

    1 machine gun platoon

    1 radio

    Telephone equipment

    6 bicycle messengers

    14th

    March 1 a t 1500 '

    To reconn oiter th e

    enemy sit ua tio n in

    the di rect ion of

    Utsunomiya from the

    area irest of the

    line mentioned on

    the le ft ; roughly

    from the Toba High

    way a re a by way "of

    the

    At

     suki-Fuchu

    Omiya-Kuribashi road.

    Patrol of Officer B

    Commander̂ 1st L t. B

    1 NCO, 2 Superior

    Priv ates , 12 Pv ts.

    Telephone equipment

    1 heliograph

    Cavalry

    March 1 at 1400

    To recon noiter in the

    d ir ec ti o n of Ufcsuno

    miya from the Hachi

    o

     j i -0 gimach i ya-Yukid a

    Kanbayasni-Sano road

    area .

    Remarks:

    Employment ofaircraft on the3rd ,Hiileprimarilydependentup onthesituation,mustinclude

    reconnaissance ofthehostilecavalry

     on

    theMu.«3.shiplain southofTon egawa.

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    D . P la n of A dv an ce.

    Date B i l l e t i n g Area

    Remarks

    Troops

    March 1

    March 2

    1s t Ren party

    Yoda

    H a t o g a y a

    2nd R en p a r t y

    A t s u g i

    Qmiya

    Message Cente r

    Southern edge On t h e 2nd, an advance message c e n t e r w i l l be e s t a b

    o f H a ra g i

    l i she d betwe en 0800 and 1100 a t H a ra mac h ida, be tw e en

    1100 and 1500 a t F uc hu , end a f t e r 1500 a t Owada.

    Main body of

    P r es e nt a r ea

    Fuchu

    V /i ll l e av e Sono a t 0 6 00 .

    b r i ga de

    F i e l d T r a i n Fieldtrain-

    r e se n t a r e a

    and t r a n s p o r t

    Fuchu

    Transport-

    Sekido

    Support i ng

    P r e se n t a r ea

    Fuchinobe

    I n f a n t r y B n.

    R cra ark s: 1 . Movement a f t e r Iviarch 3 w i l l d ep en d on t h e s i t u a t i o n . 2 . The m essa ge c e n t e r fri.ll b e com posed

    o f a com mander, a f r a c t i o n of t h e c om m un ic atio ns d e t a i l i n cl u d in g 2 h e l io g r ap h s o t s , one p l at o o n

    o f c a v a lr y , 2 m o t o r cy c le s w i th s id e e- ir s a t t ac h e d , and 6 b i c y c l e s .

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    SECTIONVII

    PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT

    OF

    DIVISION ARTILLERY

    14 . P lan

    f or

    Employment

    o f 1 s t

    D i v i s io n A r t i l le r y

    i n a n

    At tack

    ona

    P o s i t io n .

    R i ght w ing e l emen t s

    L e ft w ing e l ement s

    XX Heavy F i e l d Ar t i l l e ry

    Troops

    Main Mission

    Zone of Action

    (prepared fire s)

    Occupation

    Position

    of

    Time of

    Position

    occupation

    of posit ions

    Topographi

    cal

    preparation

    FreparatIon

    of

    Preparation

    Fire

    of

    data

    Reconnaissance

    and

    Observation

    Execution

    of

    Preparations

    during

    the

    2NDPhasi

    various

    (From the

    phases

    Infantry ad-

    of infan-

    vance in

    try attack

    attack until

    the assault)

    Through

    1st

    Phase

    Ammunition

    2nd

    (units

    Phase

    of

    3rd

    fire)

    Phase

    Communication

    ommander

    Commander

    Commander

    • ield Art i llery . .

    Field Art il lery . .

    Field Art il lery . . .

    MountainA rtillery . .

    Mountain Artillery ..

    HeavyField Artil lery . . .

    Heavy Field Arti llery

    HeavyField Artille ry

    irect support of the

    Direct support of the

    Disruption of the formation of strong points,

    ight wing

    left wing

    counterbattery, destruction of key points&

    cooperation with the left sector supporting

    arti ller y as the occasion demands.

    .one of action of the

    7one of act ion of lef t

    right wing(east or rail-

    wing(west of line con-

    Division zone of operation

    roadl ine , within the 2nd

    necting XX

    &

    XXwith in

    )ivl6ion zone of action)

    the 3rd Division zone of

    action

    irea between XXX& XXX

    Area between XXXandXXX

    Areabetween XXX, XXX,

    &

    XXX; observation

    posts at XXXXXX

    All uni ts wi ll complete arrangements by sunset anda t 2000 commencemovement,

    occupying the newpo sitio ns by approximately 2400; however, a fraction of both

    left andright artil lery groups will be prepared at all times to furnish direct support

    Based onthe plan for survey operations prescribed in a separate regulation, the groups

    will carry out their preparatory survey in sucha v:ayas to tie it in with the general

    armysurvey. The various surveys will be completed by sunset of the 3rd, anda ll calcu

    lations and preparations bydawnof the 4th.

    1 .

    In the preparation of fire for effect, fire for adjustment aimedat direct targets and

    bracketing fire will be used Jointly. Generally, one battery of each battalion will carry out

    fire for adjustment anda ll necessary inspection fire for the battalion.

    2 . Preparation for effective firing will be completed by0600.

    3 .

    Zonesselected for f ire for adjustment areas fol lows: (a) Both left andright art i l lery

    groups will use their ownzones of action; (b) TheHeavyField Artillery will execute fire for

    adjustment, fir st against the enemya rtil lery , andthen against XXandXXHil ls. Tine and place

    will be determined by consultation with the left andright artil lery groups.

    1.

    Generally, ground reconnaissance andobservation wil l be carried out according to the

    plan for the 3rd.

    2. Air reconnaissance wil l be used to verify information as to the condition of hosti le

    arti ller y and of Hill s XX, XX, andXX.

    Main force to carry out Main force to carry out de-

    demolition of obstacles at molition of obstacles atXX

    Mainforce to neutralize enemy arti ller y

    XX, anelement the demoli- The  rx Mountain Artiller y

    and an element to destroy XX.

    t i on of cr i t i ca l point s in unit a ttached to the l e f t

    XXarea. TheXXMountain wingwill fire under the

    Artillery unit attached to commandof the unit comman

    the righ t wing w il l f ir e der o f the d irec t support

    underthe commandof the art i l lery.

    unit commander of the di

    rect support artil lery

    1. Todir ectly support the

    1. Todirectly support the

    1 .

    Counterbattery with at least XField

    right wing.

    left wing.

    Artillery Battalions.

    2 . To stop the enemycoun-

    2 . To stop the enemy coun- 2 . Neutraliz e XX, XXwith X155Howitzer

    teratta ck fromXXarea

    te rat ta ck fromXXar ea. b at ta li on s.

    3 .

    Execute accompanying fir e with X155

    Howitzer battalions for support of the

    right wing in the assault.

    Anelement to remain in the

    Anelement to remain in the

    present posi t ion and stop present posi tion andstop

    Toshift position to the vicinity ofXX

    the enemy counterattack.

    the enemy counterattack. The

    and XXand generally support the right

    Themain strength to shift

    main strength to shift posi

    wing Inthe exploitation of its gains.

    position to the XXarea&

    tion to the XX, XXarea and

    generally support the right

    generally support the lef t

    wingin the exploitation of

    wing in the exploitation of

    i t s gains.

    i t s gains

    Arti ll ery 155 Hotfitzer

    Artillery

    155

    Artillery

    155Howitzer

    (Artillery

    Mountain

    Howitzer

    Brig)

    Artillery

    By dawn, concentrate

    as

    much ammunition

    as

    possible

    inthe

    v i c in i ty

    of the

    posi tions.

    (Omitted)

    Remarks: 1. Twoplanes, or as the occasion demandsone plane, will cooperate with the HeavyField Artil lery

    during the attack.

    2 .

    Generall y, the demol it ion of obstacl es i s carri ed to I t s fu l les t extent.

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    SECTIONVIII "

    FOREMPLOYMENT.OFARTILLERYFIRE

    15. PlanforEmploymentofArtilleryFire.

    A.;" •

    Re'ei

    stration

    Fire

    1. Firingwill.commenceatdaybreakofthe9thandwill

    "becontinuedforapproximately 40minutes.

    2, Zonesforrangingfire:

    a. 1stMountainArtilleryBattalion (separate).....

    Thecombat zoneoftheRightWingtogivedirectsupport

    totheRightWing, " "'. " ''•\

    b. AntiaircraftArtillery, Thecombatzoneofthe

    rightRegimentoftheRightWing to".givedirect support

    totherightRegiment.

    c. 1stBattalion,1stFieldArtilleryand2ndBattalion,

    1stFieldArtillery....The combatzoneoftheleft

    Regimeni:oftheLeftWingtogivedirectsupporttothe

    leftRegiment.

    d. ordBattalion,1stFieldArtillery...„.Within the

    lineconnectingXX,-XX,andXXforcounterbatteryfire.

    AlsointhecombatzoneoftheleftRegiment ofthe

    Left'

    W:'.ngtogivedirectsupporttotheleftRegiment.

    e.

    1stBattalion,1stHeavyFieldArtillery....The

    combatzones,oftheRightandCenterWingsforcounter-

    batteryfire,,alsothecombatzoneoftheleftRegiment

    of-theLeftWingtogivedirectsupporttotheleft

    Regiment.

    f. UnitsgivingdirectsupporttotheleftRegiment

    oftheLeftWingwillusetheadjusteddataobtained

    by the2ndBattalion,1stFieldArtillerywhenopening

    fire.

    £,

    PreparatoryFire

    1, Followingregistration,preparatoryfirewillbe

    carriedoutforapproximately onehour.

    2, Counterbatterypriortodestructionofobstacles..

    a. 1stMountainArtilleryBattalion (separate)

    withinthe.combatzoneoftheRightWing.

    b. 1stBattalion,1stFieldArtilleryand1stBattery,

    1stBattalion,1stHeavyFieldArtillery-withinthe

    combatzoneoftheri'ghtRegimentoftheLeftWing.

    c. 2ndBattalion,1stFieldArtilleryand2ndBattery,

    1stbattalion,1stHeavyFieldArtillery-withinthe

    combatzoneoftheleftRegimentoftheLeftWing,

    d. 3rdBattalion,l&tFieldArtillery-withinits

    combatgone.

    3, Neutralizationofhostileartilleryduring the

    destructionofobstacles:

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    a. WithinthecombatzoneoftheRightWing-3rd.

    Battalion,1stFieldArtillery.

    ID. WithinthecombatzoneoftheLeftWing^1st

    Battalion,1stHeavyFieldArtillery.

    4.

    Destructionofobstacles:

    a. DirectfrontoftheRightWing-1stMountain

    ArtilleryBattalion (separate).

    "b.

    WithinthecombatzoneoftheLeftWing-1st

    Battalion,1stFieldArtillery.

    c. DirectfrontoftheleftRegiment.oftheLeft

    .Wing-2ndBattalion,1stFieldArtillery.

    C. DirectSu-p-portoftheAttack

    a. RightWing-1stMountainArtilleryBattalion

    (separate).

    b.

    RightRegimentoftheLeftWing-r1stBattalion,

    1stFieldArtillery. ^ :

    c. LeftRegimentoftheLeftWing -*2ndbattalion,

    1stFieldArtillery.'

    d. Counterbattery ~?sameasinthedestructionof

    obstacles.

    £•

    PreparationforAssault

    a.

    1/vrect

    supportoftheRightWing-1stMountain

    Artill

    £17-

    Bat-alion (separate).

    b.

    Lurect oupportoftherightRegimentoftheLeft

    Wing-1stBattalion,1stField,-irtilleiy.

    c. Enect supportoftheleftRegimentoftheLeft

    Wing-2ndBattalion,1stFieldArtillery (inchargeof

    plans),

    3rdBattalion,1stFieldArtillery and1st

    FieldArtilleryBattalion (separate)

    d. Counterbatteryr-sameunitsas

    1

    thosetakingcharge

    ofcounterbatteryprior tothedestruction of..obstacles.

    E» Counterpre-paration . .

    a. XX,XXsector^1stMountainArtillery.Battalion

    (separate)and1stBattalion,1stFieldArtillery(the

    formerinchargeof

    plans).

    • '

    b.

    XX,XXsector-1stBattalion,1stFieldArtillery'

    (inchargeofplans)and3rdBattalion,-1stFieldArtillery,

    SECTIONIX... , •. -. .

    PLAITFOREMPLOYMENT"OFFIRS

    BY"

    FIELD'A!&ILLERYBATTALION

    16, PlanforEmploymentofFirebyFieldArtilleryBattalion

    *

    (See.

    chart,pp.31-33)

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    16-,

    PlanforEmploymentofFireofaFieldArtillery Battalion

    .Phase

    Order '

    Fire

    Mission

    Typeof

    shelland

    fuze

    Numberof

    rounds

    Durationof

    fire

    Observation

    Liaisonwith

    infantry

    Remarks

    P re p ar at io n of F ir

    „ _ _

      ,-•>  A.

    i t

    Demolitionofobstaclesataand b;

    Disruptingcounterattackat

    c

    andes

    Neutralization offlankdefenseatdandh;

    Counterbatteryat.fand

    g.

    TimeshrapneltodisruptcounterattacksjHEshell

    withinstantaneousfuzeforothermissions.

    About20roundspartarget

    40minutes

    A e ri al o bs er va tio n f or d-and p

    )#

    For otii3 r, ground

    observation

    The Infan t ry regir&ental command pes t i s a t  7CL Liaison

    detachment; conaiuan'dor, 1st Lt . XX̂ 1 ECO, 10 pr iv at es .

    Equipment; general-JLXj telepi'iona-X-j radio-X; vi su al

    si

    gna

    11ing-]DC.

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    16.

      Plan for Employment of Fi rs of a Piald A rt il le ry B atta lion .(con t

    !

    d)

    Preparatory Fire for Attack

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    16. P lan

      f o r

    Employment

      of

    F ire

      of a

    F ie ld A r t i l le r y B att al io n ( c cn t 'd )

    Af ter

      t h e

    A ssau l t

    S'topoin.'c

      t h e

    C o un ts ra tt ac k

    *0

      i

    ll

    £

    06)

    Depth

      of

    zone

    •wN^^f c

    150'motors

    ««

    >"{

    3.  2

    Stopping

      t h e

    c c u n t9 r a tt a c k

    A nnih i l a t ion

    .(DartreQ

      or ax t ant of

    n e u t r a l i z a t i o n )

    HE s ha l l w i th ins t antanaons fuz?,

    Tim3 chra-onsl

    Cno per iod

      of

    f ir os

    120 rounds

      f o r

    each

      FA

    ba t t a ry

    120 rounds

      f o r

    sach b a tt e ry

    50 rounds

      f o r

    each hoavy

      FA

    ba t tory

    of zt?ao

      to b3

    covsrod

      as

    shcn

    ;

    ra. abova

    2 p e r io d s

      ( l

    p er io d

      of 3

    minutes

      and an

    i n t e r v a l

      of 4

    m in ut es ). Repeat

      i f

    4 m in ute s ( r ep e a t

      i f

    necessary

    Ground

    G-rcund

    •.Fire w i l l

      be

    oponad

      en

    c a l l from

      t h e

    f r on t

    l i ne ba t t a l io n coimnandor. Convor^.inr; f i r e ;

    Red  hanging star

      "Ri'

    b la c k d ra go n r oc k et

      "Fu".

    I n o rj c so

    ran^3:

    y jl los r d ragon rocke t

    !h

    >

    ;r

    o". Repeat:

    frr0en h an?in z. s t a r

      "Fu" .

    \

    Notes Th is oharb i s an -jxara:ol3 of a dawn a t tack . T-/o-;p;ra-ohical pre para

    ti o n s w il l be con solida ted rrith in each I^atballon. Tine uf f i r e ; Prapara

    t io n f i r e - dawn, Prepo .ratory fir .) fo r a tt ack - c.b...v.t lv hcu rs .

    Conversing f ir e - as required by inf an try , ubh^r fir in r; c.s in ba tta lio n

    orders.

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    •SECTIONX

    PIAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF'THE AIR UNITS OF ANARMY

    1 7 . P l a n f o r Employment' of t h e A i r U n i t e of t h e 1 s t A m y .

    •A, Decision:

    1.Duringtheconcentration'ofourtroops,themainair

    elementsdftheArmywilldestroytheenemyairpower,

    whileoneelementwillreconnoiterthehostileconcentra

    tionandcooperatewiththe1stCavalry.Brigade,obstruct

    inghostileconcentrationwhenever,possible.

    2.

    Withtheopeningofouroperation,theairelements

    willoneafteranothsrchangethemainpoint.ofactionto

    thedirectsupportofgroundoperations,andwhenthe

    troopsengageindecisivecombat,theywillsupportthe

    actionwithfullstrength.

    B•

    Instructions:

    1. Destructionofhostileairpower: Theorderofpre

    ferenceindestroyinghostileaircraftwillbe(l)bombers,

    (2)fighters,and(3).raconnaissancopianos.

    2.

    Reconnaissanceofhostileconcentrations: Themain ,

    ieffortwillboplacedonenomyrailroadtransportation

    especiallyonthoXXlino. Inrogardtohostileconcen

    trationanyindicationsofactivitywillbeobserved.

    3. Cooperationwiththe1stCavalryBrigade:. Onere

    connaissanceelementwillbeassignedtothismission,

    .-.anditsstrengthwillbeincreasedifndcossary,

    4.

    Obstructionofenemyconcentration: Ifthesituation'

    permits,

    theimportant,pointsalong'XXlinenorthofXX

    .will-bebomb©dtoobstructenomyconeantration.

    5. Directsupportofground operations  .Aftertheopen

    ingofanoperationbyourmainforce,thomainelements

    will,oneafteranother,shifttodirectsupportofground

    operations,

    butincasetheenemyhasair superiority,

    theywillcontinuetodestroytheenemyairpower. How

    ever,

    whenourmainforceisengagedindecisivecombat,the

    fullairstrengthwill,bedispatchedtothecombatarea

    fordirectsupport,

    C, Airfiold :̂ (Asindicatedonattached

    sketch).

    Asthe

    CavalryBrigademovesforward,anadvancefieldwillbe

    setupandutilizedinthovicinityofXX'andXX.

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    2istribution. of fo re Gs

    15^1117

    a.Atdawn,XXGroupandXXGroup(lossXXX)willattack

    XX

    airfieldandXXGroupandXXSquadronofXXGroupwill

    attack

    XXairfield. Ifthosituation

    psrmits,

    thoattack

    will

    borepeatedduringthosameday.

    b.XXSquadronofXXGroup,willrocormoiterenemycon

    centrations

    inXXaroaandXXarea,

    2 .

    £dat2.) .

    a

    #

    Thj main olomonts ^vill continue th3 at tack on tho

    onomy ai rf io ld , and decisions ' on such matters as target s

    and t ime of at tack wil l bo dotormin^d by tho si tuati on,

      JCL

    Squadron of  TJiGroup, in addition to continuing

    th.3 missions of tho previous day, wil l cooporat3 with tho

    1st Cavalry Brigad'j,

    3 . ( d a t o ) _ .

    a

    #

    Xh-3"distribution wi ll bo dotorrainod by tho sit uat ion .

    b .

    XXadvc.noo a i r f i j l d  vrill bi usod.

    1,

    Thoairdofonsoofthsconcentrationpointwillbo

    carriedoutbvZXXand

    XXI.

    Tluirmissionwillbe

    2 . Tho dis tri but ion of Mobile A;:itiaireraft Gun units

    wi l l b j as ind icated on the a tt ached mi l i ta ry ska tch.

    3 , ObsDrvaticn for a i rc raf t

    F.

    Coraaunications^ (omit ted)

    G

    #

    Supply; (omitted)

    SECTIONXI

    PIAH OFEMPLO ŜTT OFAIRGROUPS

    18. Plan of Smploymsnt of Air Groups.

    (Rafor tc section on tyoes of ordors us3d  by a i r uni ts ,) .

    - 3

      5 -

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    CHAPTER3

    EXAMPLESOFVARIOUS.ORDERS

    Paragraph

    SECTION I. General — — . -——..- ___» 19

    II. Reconnaissance

    -=_..., ._= -—._-- 20-25

    III.

    MarchandSecurity -= -=--—• 26-32

    IV. MeetingEngagements —r — — - 33-44

    V. AttackofaPosition 45-55

    VI. DefenseofaPosition 56-62

    VII. Pursuit ~ — 63-70

    VIII. Withdrawal — - 71-72

    IX, BilletingandSecurity— -— 73-79

    X. Transportation -•—

    8.0-83

    XI. RoutineOrders——-.--. ~ .84-85

    SECTIONI

    GENERAL•

    19. Thefollowingordersareillustrative. Theoutlinesof

    theordersandthesummaryoftheitemshavebeenmademerelyas

    referencesforthebeginner. Theorders,furthermore,areofvalue

    onlywhentheyareadaptedtothesituationofthemomentandto

    thementalcapacityandthedispositionofthereceiver. Therefore,

    whengivingorderstheaboveelementsmustbetakenintoconsidera

    tion, (Ordinarilyinthestudyoftacticsthereceiver'smental

    capacityanddispositioncannotbetakeninto

    consideration).

    Emphasis

    on

    conventionalformswith

    a

    subsequentdisregard

    for

    thesituationathandisnotthemainpurposeoftheseexamples.

    Therefore,thiswillcallforspecialattention.

    SECTIONII

    RECONNAISSANCE

    20. OrdersoftheCavalryBrigade

    Headquarters,1stCavalry Brigade

    AT

    XX

    11March,19 , 1700

    a. TheenemywhichhaspenetratedXXistheJCdivision.

    Theforoo-advancingonXXisapparentlyaunitattachedto

    theXdivision. Ithadadvancedinawestward direction

    beyondtheXX,YYlinethismorning. According.-toarecon

    naissance reportfromourairunit,alargefo^csofenemy

    cavalryhadpassedXXaboutnoontoday. Atthesamotinethe

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    advancepartyofalargeenemycolumnhadpassedXXandwas

    headingwestward.

    TherailtrafficbetweenXXareaandXXareaisbecom

    ingexceedinglyheavier.

    TheArmyAirforcecooperatingwithourbrigadewill

    withitsmainstrengthreconnoitertodeterminetheenemy

    situationatXXareaandXXarea

    and.willwithapartofits

    unitreconnoitertheconditionoftheenemyrailwaytranspor

    tation,

    b.

    The"brigadewilladvanceonXXtomorrow,the12th,

    todeterminethoenemysituationintheXXarea. Thefollow

    ingunitswillboundermycommandfromnowon:

    1stand3rdCavalry(eachlessa platoon)."

    2ndCavalry(iessatroop-lessa

    platoon).

    3rdBn.ofthe4th'Infantry,

    AplatoonoftheRadioUnit.

    c. 2ndTroop(loss2platoons)ofthe1stCavalryis

    designatedthe1stScoutingpcrtyandwilldepartat0300from

    thobilletingarea,advancingonXXtownviatheXX-XX-XX

    Road.

    d. The4thTroop,5thCavalryisdesignatedthesecond

    Scoutingpartyandwilldepartfromthebilletingareaat0300,

    advancingtowar