1929-1949 the great depression i the great depression i t was around noon on october 24, 1929, when...

1929-1949

The Great Depression

It was around noon on October 24, 1929, when the stockmarket began to crumble. By 2:30 p.m. the ticker tape wasalmost two hours late, and five days later, on October 29, it was all over. The stock market had crashed and the

Great Depression was soon to follow.Almost immediately, unemployment began to mount at the

rate of 4,000 workers per week, and then the ranks of the job-less seemed to have no limits. Four million were unemployedin 1930, 11 million in 1932, nearly 13 million by 1933.Thousands upon thousands of workers—unable to meet mort-gage payments or pay rent—lost their homes. Many of thenewly poor built homes of scrap metal and egg crates in citydumps. Bread and soup lines stretched endlessly through thenation’s cities. Some lived on bread and coffee; others pickedover garbage cans to feed their families.

William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor,told a congressional committee in 1930 that in Detroit, Michigan,“the men are sitting in the parks all day long and all night long,hundreds and thousands of them—muttering to themselves, ‘outof work, seeking work.’” And in the summer of 1932, people weremarching in Washington, DC’s Anacostia Flats singing:

Mellon* pulled the whistle Hoover rang the bell Wall Street gave the signal—And the country went to Hell.

Carriers in a Common Cause � 36

_______________

*Andrew Mellon, a powerful banker and industrialist,

was Secretary of the Treasury at the time.

Letter carriers and other postalemployees found themselves in astrange situation during the early daysof the Depression. Before theDepression, most Americans consid-ered the average pay of a letter carrier—$2,064 per year—a mediocre salary.But during the Depression, it was anenviable amount of money. And in anation of 13 million unemployed, thesecurity of postal jobs made such posi-tions even more attractive. In 1933, aletter carrier from Oregon describedthis ironic reversal:

All my neighbors are out of work, and ifI go to them and cry about my condi-tion they think I am crazier now than Iwas five years ago when they used totell me to throw away that mail sackand get a decent job. Now, any one ofthem would be glad to carry mail for adollar a day.…

Under these circumstances, it is notsurprising that letter carrier and postalclerk positions attracted some of thecountry’s best educated people—whoin easier times might have becomelawyers, doctors or teachers. Jerome J.Keating, president of the NALC from1962 to 1968, was a notable example ofthis phenomenon. Keating became asubstitute carrier in March 1924 tohelp pay his way through college. Aftergraduating from the University ofMinnesota in 1930, he had the oppor-tunity to become an instructor andlater a professor. But Keating decidedto remain a letter carrier because a let-ter carrier’s job offered more securityduring the Great Depression than thatof a college teacher.

If, like Keating, letter carriers wererelatively fortunate compared to manyother workers, the Depressionnonetheless affected them in very significant and often devastating ways.As the Depression deepened, a drive toslash the wages of all governmentemployees gained momentum, grewsteadily, and culminated in Hoover’s

Economy Act of 1932. This law author-ized the first wage reductions in thehistory of the federal service: onemonth’s furlough per year for everygovernment employee. For letter carri-ers, this meant an 81/3 percent decreasein wages.

The election of Franklin D. Rooseveltin late 1932 only aggravated the situa-tion for letter carriers. Most peopleremember Roosevelt as a president whotried to alleviate widespread sufferingand revive the American economythrough “New Deal” legislation.However, on the campaign trail in 1932, he espoused a far differentpolitical philosophy. Roosevelt hadcampaigned against Hoover on a plat-form of government economy, and heeven had gone so far as to promise tocut government spending to the boneand balance the national budget—cam-paign promises that did not bode wellfor any government worker. True to his


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word, on March 20, 1933—just 16 daysafter taking office—Roosevelt replacedHoover’s furloughs with a straight 15 per-cent salary cut. This drastic cut, com-bined with a subsequent nine-day fur-lough for postal workers, reduced lettercarriers’ wages to their 1916 level.

What effect did these reductions haveon letter carriers and their families? Afew quotations from a questionnaire theNALC sent out to its members in 1933illustrate some of the hardship:

Had to call the doctor last month onaccount of sickness and he claims all thechildren [7] are undernourished and [yet]I am spending all my salary on food andthe barest of necessities.

I certainly hope we get back to full payvery soon, for I for one cannot hold outmuch longer. The Federal man has beenabout the only one with a job the pasttwo years and all his relations andfriends look to him for assistance. I donot believe there is a man in our officethat is not helping friends and relatives...

Unless some relief is given, we will beforced to take our boys out of school.

For village carriers, whose pay was$750 a year less than city carriers, lifewas even harder:

My wife lost her job clerking in a storefor $12 per week, because the publicthought that both of us were not entitledto a job. Within the last year my fatherand sister have lost their jobs and thatputs three more for me to feed, clotheand keep warm.

Hardest hit by the Depression, how-ever, were substitute carriers. City subsearned 65 cents an hour and village subs earned as little as 50 cents anhour—meager wages even before the 15 percent wage reduction. The steepdecline in postal business forced theDepartment to reduce deliveries andother services, making it impossible forsubs to work enough hours to survive.For example, in many large city officessubstitutes earned as little as $6 a week.Finally, Hoover’s Economy Act of 1932prohibited the filling of most regularvacancies in the postal service—a crueland devastating setback for subs whosevery livelihoods were dependent uponadvancement.


When free city delivery was established in 1863, the first lettercarriers were not required to wear uniforms. Five years later,however, Congress authorized the use of uniforms and

Postmaster General Alexander W. Randall issued an order prescribing amandatory uniform for letter carriers:

A single-breasted Sack Coat … with five brass buttons … pants of same material with fine broadcloth stripe one half inch wide down each leg.…

In those early days, letter carriers were forced to pay for their own uniforms, a large expense considering their meager salaries. And while uniform styles have changed with the times, the burden of purchasinguniforms remained with letter carriers for another 86 years. Finally, in1954, Congress passed a Uniform Allowance Act, providing letter carrierswith $100 per year to purchase their uniforms. Since the advent of collec-tive bargaining in 1971, the union has negotiated the amount of the allowance. As a result, the allowance has increased over the years in aneffort to keep pace with rising uniform costs and the larger selection ofapproved items carriers are authorized to wear.

Uniform Allowance

Deeply concerned about the plightof the subs, regular carriers came totheir assistance. In Oklahoma City,regular letter carriers announcedtheir willingness to take leave withoutpay, and in Glendale, California, theyagreed to go on vacation—in bothcases so that subs would have somework. The Glendale scribe wrote in a1934 Postal Record:

Regular carriers are not having such agood time or making too much, but weare not starving and we should bewilling to give a day’s work per monthto aid a brother.

In Wichita, Kansas, the branchformed a special sub-relief organiza-tion to supply funds to needy subsand their families.

Substitutes tried to help them-selves, too. A committee of subs from Cleveland, Ohio, traveled to Washington in 1933 to present their plight to the RooseveltAdministration. Subs in several largecities joined with other substitutepostal workers to form their ownorganization, the NationalAssociation of Substitute PostalEmployees, because they thought theestablished unions were neglectingtheir problems. Although the claimwas not true, their impatience withthe NALC’s and other postal unions’progress was understandable.Desperate and undoubtedly influ-enced by the large number of strikesand demonstrations all acrossAmerica, these subs decided to voicetheir complaints. They marched onWashington, DC in 1934 demanding a“job for every substitute.”

In the face of the government’smassive attack on their members’livelihoods, NALC President Edward J. Gainor and National SecretaryMichael T. Finnan lobbied continuous-ly for wage restoration for all govern-ment workers and relief for substi-tutes. In a 1934 “Memorial to

Congress,” the NALC presentedimpressive documentation that carriers’ wages were already inade-quate before the wage reductions, andthat the hardship caused by the reduc-tions far outweighed any possible ben-efits. The wage reductions, the NALCfurther argued, were having no appre-ciable effect on balancing the budget.

Ultimately, yet unintentionally, theRoosevelt administration aided theNALC in its fight for pay restoration.During 1933 and 1934 Roosevelt wasurging civilian employers to maintainhigh wages and shorten the workinghours of their employees to get theeconomy moving again. At the sametime the administration insisted oncontinuing the 15 percent salaryreduction for all government employ-ees. The NALC called this policy“insincere and inconsistent.” A lettercarrier highlighted the contradictionin a 1934 Postal Record:

Is the government going to have onepolicy for industry and another fortheir own employees? How long canthe administrationurge industry toincrease wages andshorten hours andforce their ownemployees to do theopposite? What willbe the fate of thefight for wagerestoration?

The NALC andother postal and fed-eral organizationsfinally won the fight.The wages of all gov-ernment employeeswere completelyrestored by April1935. And by the endof the decade, substi-tute carriers obtainedsome relief when abill giving them their


1929-1949

The 15 percentsalary cut,combined witha subsequentnine-day furlough forpostal workers,reduced lettercarriers’ wagesto their 1916 level.

first annual and sick leave benefits waspassed on July 18, 1939.

A PowerStruggle Emerges

For the American labor movement,the Great Depression was a periodof turmoil and change. At the

beginning, the number of union mem-bers plunged as more and more workersjoined the ranks of the unemployed. By1933, however, hundreds of thousands ofindustrial workers were knocking at thedoors of AFL unions seeking the benefitsof organization. Yet many AFL unionswere unable or unwilling to let them in.Then, in the middle of the decade, agroup of unions committed to organiz-ing industrial workers bolted from theAFL to form the Congress of IndustrialOrganizations (CIO). These CIO unionsquickly mounted successful organizingcampaigns in auto, steel and other massproduction industries.

In contrast, the NALC maintained itsaffiliation with the AFL and survived theperiod largely insulated from the cross-currents that buffeted many other unions.This is not to say, how ever, that the leader-ship of the NALC came out of this experi-


He goes around from house to houseAnd rings the bell or knocksWhen there is something to be slippedInside the letter box.

His pouch is filled with messagesOf happiness and cheerAnd also those that draw a frownOr possibly a tear.

He brings the blanks for income taxAnd statements by the score,As well as word from Uncle SamThat it’s time to go to war.

He carries papers, magazines,And ads of every sort,Besides the V-mail letters fromThe farthest foreign port.

He is the messenger of love,Surprise and tragedy,He is the constant carrierOf time and memory.

So while I’m over here fightingAnd going through all this hell,You just keep on delivering lettersTo Mrs. Paul L.

—S/Sgt. Paul L. Scheliam

ence unscathed. For Edward J. Gainor,president of the NALC since 1914, theGreat Depression precipitated the begin-ning of the end of his administration.

Although trouble for Gainor andother officers of the NALC did notbecome serious until 1938, signs of dis-content within the membership wereevident earlier. In 1933, a small numberof carriers—unhappy with the wagereductions—began to criticize theunion leadership in The Postal Record,and the NALC convention in AtlanticCity that year was combative.Restoration of wages in 1935, however,helped mollify some of the discontentedmembers. Then, in the late 1930s, aswar broke out in Europe and the cost ofliving began to rise, letter carriers grewmore and more dissatisfied with their1925 wages. Not surprisingly, a call fornew leadership and more militant tac-tics at the national level was heard.

The first overt step in the power strug-gle between the established leadership—the “Old Guard,” as they were called—andyounger, more militant members withinthe NALC was ironically taken in PresidentGainor’s home state of Indiana. In 1938,Indianapolis Branch 39 and 27 otherbranches petitioned for a national referendum to amend the NALCConstitution. The so-called HoosierAmendment, which called for the electionof national officers by direct mail ballotingrather than by convention delegates, wasaimed directly at the Old Guard. Seventy-two percent of the membership voted inthe referendum, and the proposedamendment was defeated on April 15,

The Mailman

National Postal Museum Library

1939 by a 31/2-to-l majority. Gainor hadwon the first round.

The scene of the next stage in thestruggle for power was the NALC’sGolden Anniversary Convention, heldin the city of its birth, Milwaukee, onSeptember 4, 1939. From the momentthe convention opened, tension filledthe air. The “Hoosier Amendment” mayhave been defeated five months earlier,but the incident was not forgotten byGainor or the delegates in attendance.In addition, Great Britain and Francehad declared war on Germany the daybefore the convention opened—asobering event which, as one can imag-ine, increased delegates’ anxiety.

The convention opened on anuproarious note when a rowdy groupof letter carriers who were not officialdelegates attempted to speak. A cross-fire of cheers and calls to “throw themout!” immediately erupted. Only afterPresident Gainor threatened to havethe police haul the dissidents from theroom was the convention able to con-tinue with its normal business.

The afternoon of the third day,when the Committee of Resolutionsread Resolution 70 to the delegates,was the moment of highest drama.Resolution 70 proposed to amend the

NALC Constitution to prohibit anynational officer from standing forreelection upon reaching the age of65. If adopted, the resolution wouldhave blocked four of the top NALCofficers, including Gainor, from run-ning for office in 1941. The conven-tion floor exploded into an uproarover this proposal, and after a noisyand often acrimonious debate, a voicevote defeated Resolution 70. Gainorhad once again prevailed.

His troubles, however, did not endon that tumultuous afternoon in1939. In the months following theconvention, there was no progress onthe legislative front, and dissatisfac-tion within the rank and file was ram-pant. Fourteen years without a wageincrease was far too long. Then, as the1941 convention approached, Gainorchose to run for re-election, insteadof retiring as many people hoped hewould do. There was a feeling that theorganization was reaching a point ofcrisis, and a way out had to be found.

Two key events then happenedback-to-back. InDecember 1940,more than 200branches, led byBranch 1 in

Edward Gainor, NALC president from 1914through 1941, led the long struggle to reduce letter carriers’ hours of work from 48 to 40

hours. His eventual success earned him tribute asthe “Father of the Shorter Work Week.”

Under Gainor’s leadership, the NALC secured legislation in 1931 creating a 44-hour work week forcarriers, and then a 40-hour week in 1935. Gainoralso brought his campaign for shorter working hoursto all American workers as vice president of the American Federation of Labor.

Edward Gainor


father of the shorter work week

1929-1949

Detroit, signed a petition for a referen-dum to amend the NALC Constitution.The amendment—another version ofResolution 70—provided that no oneover 65 could run for national office.One month later, William C. Doherty ofCincinnati’s Branch 43, a young memberof the Executive Board, chose to makehis move. At the semi-annual meeting ofthe National Executive Board in January1941, Doherty announced that he wasrunning for president of the NALC. Sixof the 21 members of the Board walkedout of the room with him, joining theDoherty team.

The next few months were difficultones for the NALC as the referendumbecame the battle ground on which theGainor and Doherty forces fought.Anyone who was for the amendment wasagainst Gainor, and vice versa. There wasno middle ground. A carrier from GrandRapids, Michigan, illustrated the pointwith his partisan remarks in the February1941 Postal Record:

Let us not try to straddle the fence. Eitheryou are for this dastardly piece of legislationor you are against this vicious attackagainst our national officers.

On April 5, 1941, the power struggleeffectively ended. With almost 90 percent of the members voting, theamendment won by an extremely narrow margin: 26,583 to 23,838. And onSeptember 6, 1941, with no one oppos-ing him, William C. Doherty was electedpresident of the NALC at the Los Angelesconvention.

The NALC Mobilizes

Sixteen years without a pay raise—that was the situation letter carriers faced in 1941 and that

was why they elected William C. Doherty.Although Congress had arbitrarilyslashed their wages during the GreatDepression, the cost of living had

declined and carriers were financiallybetter off than many other workers. Butthe job that had seemed enviable duringthe Depression once again becameundesirable as the economy revived. By1941, when the economy was expanding,city letter carriers were earning a maxi-mum of $2,100 while workers in ship-yards and other defense industries werenow making two to three times more,and many other workers were also earn-ing good wages. Nonetheless, the gov-ernment greeted letter carriers’ requestsfor a pay increase with stoical indiffer-ence. In response, letter carriers weremore than frustrated—they were angryat being treated like second-class citizens by their employer, the U.S.Government. A Michigan carrier articu-lated the majority’s feelings in The PostalRecord when he wrote:

They all talk about the wonderful workthe postal employees are doing all overthe country, but we have heard that, for...years. That don’t help us to buy our foodand clothing, that’s just a lot of waterover the dam; what we want is a raiseright now.

In response to this treatment, dele-gates to the 1941 convention instructedBill Doherty and the rest of the officersto obtain a $900 increase, pushing topletter carrier wages to $3,000 a year. But before Doherty could initiate amajor salary campaign, the Japaneseattacked Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, and America entered World WarII. In the next six to eight months, theentire nation mobilized to support thewar effort.

Over 15,000 letter carriers joined thearmed services to fight for their coun-try. The rest continued to carry thenation’s mail, as essential a job in waras in peace. Temporary replacementswere sought to fill vacancies, but withwages so low it was difficult to findworkers. Many carriers simplyabsorbed their absent co-workers’duties. In addition, postal employees


were asked to perform extra wartimetasks, such as the distribution of over120,000,000 ration books. Letter carriersworked long and hard during World War IIand they did so willingly, with no com-plaints, except one: They were having anextremely difficult time feeding their families on 1925 wages.

In 1942, with mobilization of the coun-try’s war resources well underway, theyoung, aggressive Bill Doherty began acampaign for a temporary wartime bonusof $300 a year. This salary drive was thefirst in a series of electrifying campaignsthat channeled the anger of the member-ship into a single voice demanding justice.

Doherty’s leadership was dynamic andinnovative. He seized the offensive imme-diately. On Saturday night, August 8, 1942,in a “Labor for Victory” broadcast spon-sored by the American Federation ofLabor, Bill Doherty carried the NALC’smessage directly to the American people:

1929-1949


G.I. Mailman —Louis J. SankerHe can march! What of it? The tramp of his feetBack home had been wearing a trail in the street.His shoulders that square now to pull off his packHad sagged to a load for many years back.He had hurried along with a militant stride,for a uniform always was part of his hide—And the service he gave repaid him in pride.

Heat was a hammer, and cold was a claw;Wind was a razor rasping him raw;And rain was a deluge drowning desire…But, stung by the storm, he sheltered his fire;Elbowed the wind, taunted the rain,Derided discomfort, made light of his pain—For a duty well-done was adequate gain.

The folks he had served might have measured his worth:He solaced in death, was joyous in birth;Kept tight the courage of mother and dad,Till he knocked on the door with word from the lad.He treasured their thanks, took pride in their praise—But it’s strange that nobody thought of a raise,For nigh twenty years never thought of a raise.

I think I should explain that the NALCis different from most other unions. Wecan’t strike. In fact, we have no desire tostrike, even when conditions are astough as they are now. That’s becausethe letter carriers are working for UncleSam and for you, the people of theUnited States.… You, the people of theUnited States, are our boss. We knowyou want to treat us right. That’s whywe hate to remind you that you havefallen down on us.

After explaining the dire financialcircumstances letter carriers were in,Doherty made his pitch:

I’m speaking tonight to the people wholive on every city street and countryroad in America. I’m speaking to youfor the letter carrier who comes yourway every day. Your letter carrier hasasked me to enlist your help. All youhave to do is to write a letter or post-card to your Congressmen.

Local NALC branches repeated andexpanded on the same message inbroadcasts from their communityradio stations. Letter carriers and

women in the National LadiesAuxiliary sent letters to their congres-sional representatives, communitynewspapers and labor newspapers,and also sought endorsements fromstate and central bodies of the AFL.Finally, on April 9, 1943, the salarycampaign achieved success, as letter carriers received a $300-a-yearwartime bonus, effective until June 30, 1945.

Bill Doherty, however, did not stop. The wartime bonus was only ashort-term solution to an 18-year-old problem. In 1944, he called for another salary campaign to obtain apermanent $400-a-year pay increase.Needing little prodding from nationalheadquarters, letter carriers respond-ed enthusiastically to his call in awidespread outburst of local actions.In fact, Doherty derived many of hisideas directly from the membership.After Chicago’s Branch 11 and a num-ber of branches held large salary ral-lies, he called for a National SalaryRally Week during October 22-28,


Convention delegates

parade in Denver during

the 1943 convention.

National Postal Museum Library

1944. When carriers from Branch 36in New York distributed tens of thou-sands of handbills after work hours toeducate the public on the salaryissue, the handbill was published inThe Postal Record and Dohertyencouraged other branches to takesimilar action. No stone was leftunturned in this long, arduous, andwell-organized campaign. And onceagain, Doherty and the carriers werevictorious: On July 6, 1945, PresidentHarry S. Truman signed a bill givingletter carriers their first permanentpay increase in 20 years.

This victory, important as it was,brought the top salary of letter carri-ers to only $2,500—still an inadequatewage and still short of the 1941 NALC convention mandate for a $900 increase.

On August 14, 1945, the Japanesesurrendered and the war ended. BillDoherty again seized the initiative byarguing that the war could no longerbe used by Congress as an excuse forinaction. On August 29—just sixweeks after the last pay increase—hecalled for another campaign to raisewages. His dramatic strategy paid off.With Congress now able to direct itsattention to domestic matters, thesalary bill sailed through bothHouses, and on May 21, 1946President Truman approved another$400 a year increase for letter carriers.

Strengthened by these successes,Doherty led the NALC to even greatervictories in the immediate post-waryears. The union secured passage of10 important pieces of legislationbetween 1946 and 1948, includingtwo more pay increases for city carri-ers. And one of the original objectivesof the NALC—equalization of wagesfor all letter carriers—was finallyachieved on October 29, 1949, when alaw abolishing village delivery servicewas enacted, giving city delivery sta-tus to all village carriers. For the first

time since July 1, 1863, when 449modern carriers began to walk thestreets of America, city delivery carri-ers received the same wages regard-less of the size of the community inwhich they worked.

Naturally, letter carrierswere ecstatic over their leg-islative victories. By the endof the 1940s, the job of a let-ter carrier was beginning tocompare favorably with jobsin private industry. Lettercarriers’ anger and frustra-tion over past congressionaldelays and inaction dis-solved with each victory. Notsurprisingly, however, thespectacular campaigns con-ducted by the NALC antago-nized some of the popula-tion. An article entitled“Postman Voodoo” in theOctober 10, 1949 issue ofNewsweek had this to say:

Congress suffers from a strangeoccupational ailment. Postmanitis ismarked by a high fever and a flut-tery stomach; although not fatal, itnevertheless is terrifying. It recurswhenever the legislators start think-ing about what might conceivablyhappen if they ever did anything tomake the nation’s mail carriersangry. The only cure for it, as far asCongress knows, is simply to vote foreverything the postal employees’lobby wants.

These attacks did not faze BillDoherty. His position was unassail-able: Since the NALC was prohibitedfrom collective bargaining and deniedthe power to strike by its employer,the Congress of the United States, it was the responsibility of Congressto listen and respond to the NALC’s petitions. The NALC was not a pressure or special interest group—it was a union.

1929-1949


For the first timesince July 1, 1863,when 449 moderncarriers began towalk the streets ofAmerica, city deliv-ery carriers receivedthe same wagesregardless of the sizeof the community inwhich they worked.

1929-1949 the great depression i the great depression i t was around noon on october 24, 1929, when...

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