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America or Europe?

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Also by Jeremy Black and published by UCL Press

European warfare , 1660 – 1815

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America or Europe?British foreign policy,

1739 – 63

Jeremy Black

University of Exeter

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© Jeremy Black, 1998

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.No reproduction without permission.

All rights reserved.

First published in 1998 by UCL Press

UCL Press Limited1 Gunpowder SquareLondon EC4A 3DE

UK

and

1900 Frost Road, Suite 101

BristolPennsylvania 19007–1598

USA

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

The name of University College London (UCL) is a registeredtrade mark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are available

ISBN 0-203-49947-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-80771-5 (Adobe eReader Format)ISBN: 1-85728-185-3 (Print Edition)

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v

Contents

Preface viiAbbreviations ixMaps xi

1 Introduction 1

2 International developments 8

3 Britain and the War of the Austrian Succession 29

4 Anglo-French relations, 1740–56 45

5 The crown and Hanover 81

6 Parliament 104

7 Diplomats and ministers 131

8 Pitt and moves towards new strategies,1755–63 144

9 Defence, foreign policy and strategy 164

10 Conclusion: Europe or America? 175

Notes 185

Index 213

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For

Bill Gibson, Robert Harris

and Murray Pittock

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vi i

Preface

I began working on a sequel to my British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole

(Edinburgh, 1985) soon after i t was published. The book has been

longdelayed, however, because of the complexity of the period, the range of

sources I had to consult, and my own interest in other projects. I am most

grateful to Steven Gerrard for his patience. The passage of time has made the

book more topical. This reflects both greater historical interest in the

development of Britain’s imperial power and also modern awareness of the

importance, complexity and contentious nature of foreign policy andinternational relations. I am most grateful to the British Academy and the

University of Durham for their support of the research on which much of

this book is based, to Merton College, Oxford, for electing me to a visiting

fellowship in 1986, enabling me to read relevant pamphlet material in the

Bodleian Library, to the Huntington Library for appointing me to a visiting

fellowship in 1988, which permitted me to work in relevant collections,

including Grenville, Loudoun and Montagu papers, and to the Beinecke

Library for giving me a visiting fellowship in 1991, which enabled me to

work on the Weston papers at Farmington. I am most grateful to Her Majestythe Queen for permission to work on the Cumberland and Stuart papers in

the Royal Archives, to the late Duke of Northumberland for permission to

work on the Alnwick papers, the Marquess of Bute for permission to work

on the papers of the 3rd Earl, to the late Earl Waldegrave for permission to

work on the papers of the 1st Earl, to the Earl of Malmesbury for permission

to work on the papers of James Harris, to Lady Lucas for permission to work

on the Lucas papers in Bedfordshire Record Office, to John Weston-

Underwood for permission to work on the papers of Edward Weston, to the

Trustees of the Bedford Estate for permission to work on the papers of the4th Duke, and to Robert Smith for granting me early access to the Bowood

and Wolterton collections after their deposit in the British Library. I am very

grateful to two anonymous readers for their reports and to Wendy Duery for

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viii

her secretarial support. I have benefited from the opportunity to advance

some of the ideas in this work in lectures at the University of Cambridge and

the Institute of Historical Research. This book is dedicated to three other

eighteenth-century specialists whose scholarship I greatly respect and whose

friendship I value.

PREFACE

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ix

Abbreviations

Add. Additional Manuscr ipts

AE Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris

AN Archives Nationales, Par is

Ang. Angleterre

AST, LM, Ing. Turin, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Lettere Ministr i,

Inghilterra

Aylesbury Buckinghamshire Record Office, Aylesbury

Bayr. Ges. Bayerische GesandtschaftenBL British Library, London

Bod. Bodleian Library, Oxford

Bowood Papers of the 1st Marquess of Lansdowne, originally

held in Bowood

BVC Bibliotheque Victor Cousin, Paris

Chewton Waldegrave Papers, papers of James, 1st Earl

Waldegrave, Chewton Hall, Chewton Mendip

Cobbett W.Cobbett (ed.), Parliamentary History of England

[36 volumes] (London, 1806–20)CP Correspondance Politique

CRO County Record Office

Cumb. P. Cumberland Papers

Dresden Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Kabinett, Gesandtschaften,

Dresden

Eg. Egerton manuscripts

EHR English Historical Review

EK Englische Korrespondenz

Farmington Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington, ConnecticutHHStA Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung, Vienna

HL Huntington Library, San Marino, California

HP History of Parliament Transcripts, London

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KS Kastan Schwarz

Leeds, Vyner Vyner MSS., Archive Office, Leeds

Marburg Staatsarchiv, Bestand 4: Politische Akten nach Philipp

d. Gr., Marburg

MD Mémoires et DocumentsMunich Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich

NeC Clumber Papers, University Library, Nottingham

NLS National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh

NSTA Niedersachsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hanover

Pol . Corr . R.Koser (ed.), Politische Conespondenz Friedrichs des

Grossen [46 volumes] (Berlin, 1879–1939)

PRO, SP Public Record Office, State Papers, London

RA Royal Archives, Windsor Castle

SRO Scottish Record Office, Edinburghsup. supplément

Trevor Trevor Papers

WW Wentworth Woodhouse MSS., Archives, Sheffield

Note on dates

All dates given are new style aside from those indicated as old style by (os).

Old style dates were eleven days behind.

ABBREVIATIONS

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1

Chapter OneIntroduction

For several decades the study of international relations has not been at thecentre of historical inquiry, the position it once enjoyed, or, as in Britain,shared with constitutional history. As a consequence, the perspectives that thestudy of foreign policy can offer to those interested in other aspects of politicalhistory have been generally neglected, while the scholarship, suppositions andreceived wisdom of the great age of the subject, 1870–1930, are reiterated withlittle refinement. Whereas once every scholar of eighteenth-century Europe

had a view on the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, now few, if any,know them and students are referred to the musty pages of Sir RichardLodge’s epic of erudition, though not insight. The foreign policy of the periodis seen largely in terms of tedious and inconsequential diplomacy, whileinterest in international relations has been replaced with social, economic andcultural concerns. Britain, particularly England, is generally regarded as a“polite and commercial” society, not a bellicose one, and the ties that boundher to the Continent are neglected in line with the common tendency to treather as distinct, a country separated from Europe by more than the dictates of

syllabuses, those mute sustainers of outdated intellectual baggage.And yet, foreign policy was crucially important in the eighteenth century,especially in its middle decades. Between 1739 and 1763 Britain was involvedin two major wars. In 1739 British ministers had gone to war with Spainunwillingly, fearing that Spain’s ally France would intervene to decisive effectand that Britain would be exposed to defeat and possibly invasion on behalf of “James III”, the Stuart claimant to the throne. Western Europe appeared to bedominated by France, and Britain was widely seen as unstable, or, at least, anundesirable alliance partner. The Champion, an influential London opposition

newspaper, railed at British impotence in 1741: When I compare our present deplorable plight with the august figure wemade in the last general war [War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–13] —

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1739–63

When I look back and see France, so lately at our mercy, a miserablesuppliant, and now behold her enthroned among the stars, with almost allthe princes of Europe kneeling at her footstool. When I behold GreatBritain, on the other hand, who was then a queen among the nations,

with fortune, victory, and empire in her train, when I behold her, nowwithout interest, without importance, without allies…scarce the shadowof what once she was, I am tempted to think our triumphs wereimaginary, our glory a dream, and our very power itself but a castle in theclouds, which melted with the first breeze that blew… The universalmonarchy we have so long dreaded, thanks to our own supineness, isnearer being accomplished than ever.

And yet, by 1763, France and Spain had been defeated in European waters

and in the colonies. Jacobitism had been crushed and French attempts toexploit it had been unsuccessful. The naval struggle between Britain and theBourbons had been settled twice, in 1747 and 1759, in successive wars, infavour of the former. Britannia really did rule the waves. Thanks to this navalsuccess, Bourbon colonies had been vulnerable to attack, forced to rely for their defence on British logistical problems and the strong grasp of silentdiseases, such as malaria and yellow fever, rather than on reinforcements fromEurope. British gains in the War of Jenkins’ Ear with Spain, which had begunin 1739 and broadened out in 1743, when fighting began between Britain

and Spain’s ally France, into an aspect of the multi-faceted War of theAustrian Succession (1740–48), had been modest: Porto Bello, an importantport on the Caribbean shore of the Isthmus of Panama, had been seizedtemporarily from Spain in 1739; Louisbourg, the fortress guarding the mouthof the St Lawrence, had been captured from France in 1745 and retained for the rest of the war. And yet these acquisitions had demonstrated that,although the commitment of British forces to conflict on the Continent withFrance could be as unsuccessful and costly as domestic critics claimed, it wasnevertheless possible to use Br itish naval strength in order to make a decisive

contribution to the trans-oceanic struggle for mastery. This had not been thecase in previous British conflicts with France (1689–97, 1702–13) and Spain(1718–20).

The following war was for Britain the inappropriately named Seven Years’War (1756–63): fighting with the French in North America in fact began in1754, while hostilities with Spain did not commence until 1762. In theconflict, British naval power could not save the British-ruled Mediterraneanisland of Minorca from French capture in 1756, but it was decisive elsewhere.French plans to invade Britain were smashed in naval defeat in 1759, while

maritime hegemony enabled British amphibious forces to shatter Frenchpower in Canada, the West Indies and West Africa. In the brief war with Spain,Havana and Manila, the two major island centres of the Spanish overseasempire, were both captured, while a seaborne British army saved Portugal,

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INTRODUCTION

Britain’s vulnerable but economically crucial ally, from being overrun by Spainin 1762. At the close of the war, Britain had avoided subordination to Franceand had defeated her in the maritime and colonial struggle. Britain was themajor European power in both India and North America, the most powerful

European state on the world scale.The causes and consequences of these events are contentious and involvecomplex questions about both the nature and capabilities of the British staterelative to other powers, and developments in international relations. As suchthey indicate the multifaceted nature of the study of foreign policy, its positionat the crux of a number of crucial and interrelated questions. Among those thatwill be examined in this book are how far and why did Britain becomeincreasingly concerned with colonial questions and how far thiscomplemented or clashed with issues of continental diplomacy and national

secur-ity and, in wartime, with a distinct Euro-centric strategy? In short, inpeace and war was it a question of Europe or America, or Europe andAmerica?

Secondly, what were the most influential pressures and ideas in theformulation and execution of foreign policy and how far did they alter duringthis period? These questions obviously raise important points about the natureof the British government and state, and the functioning of the politicalcommunity in this period. How were different ideas and pressures reconciled?Did they clash, and, if so, why, to what effect and with what changes through

time? How far did political practice accord with constitutional theory? Howinfluential was the public discussion over foreign policy and what light can aconsideration of public opinion throw on the openness of government toexternal ideas? What did public opinion mean?

Foreign policy is a crucial sphere for the discussion of these and other questions, not only because it was important but because it was believed tobe so. Foreign policy was a sphere in which monarchs and ministers had bothconsiderable interest and ideas of their own and, in so far as this led to clashesover policy, it provides an opportunity for assessing the nature of power and

influence within the political community. However, views were far fromstatic, and the causes and impact of changes in ideas concerning foreignpolicy are themselves important questions. This is especially so in consideringthe extent to which, first, views within Britain were based on a shrewdassessment of the situation abroad, and, secondly, the extent to which theextent and nature of changes on the Continent were appreciated. Therelationship between foreign and domestic problems and pressures was adynamic one. The extent to which there was an informed debate withinBritain requires examination, as does its relationship with ministerial and

partisan politics, but so does the whole question of the development andinfluence of a “Patriotic” discourse in the field of foreign policy. This isrelated to wider questions of the nature and growth of nationalism and theimpact of xenophobia. Rule Britannia was political slogan as much as

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patriotic exhortation. Foreigners kicked into the filthy gutters of Londonwere aware of the vigour of British xenophobia.

Xenophobia did not win wars. The third issue that must be faced is whyBritain won her struggle with France. Political, governmental and financial

considerations are clearly central, but so also were diplomatic and strategicissues. The two powers were not alone in the international “system”, and therelationship between British foreign policy and the Anglo-French struggleneeds to be stressed. It is related to the fourth question, namely, why hostilitiesbegan between the two powers. If Britain is assumed to have been on aninevitable course for maritime hegemony, a power fuelled by commercialgrowth and bellicose nationalism, then this question might appear unnecessary,as indeed is any serious discussion of foreign policy, for the course, if not thetiming of conflict with the Bourbons, seems clear. In short, Britain and France

were bound to be adversaries in both peace and war in a struggle inspired bymercantilist goals.However, any serious examination of the period reveals the central role of

policy options and governmental choice. Ministries might appear inconsequential: Britain and Spain began war in 1739, Britain and Francefought from 1754, although, in both cases, most of their ministers sought thecontinuation of peace. This has to be discussed in the context of the origins of eighteenth-century wars and, more generally, in light of the nature of theinternational relations of the period. Here, a stress on system and predictability

appears inappropriate, and, instead, the insecure and often kaleidoscopic natureof diplomatic alignments can be related to the insecure and frequently volatilecharacter of court policies. The extent to which British policy should be seenin this light requires examination and raises the contentious question of parallels and contrasts between Britain and the Continent and the related,largely overlooked, issue of convergence or divergence. Given the importanceof foreign policy to all the states of the period, this question can be raisedprofitably and discussed in terms of both the formulation of policy and itsexecution.

Both British politics and European international relations changedsubstantially in this period. Britain witnessed the triumph of stability in the1740s, a decisive decade in which the Whig “Old Corps” survived bothunpopularity and the toppling of its leading political figure, Sir RobertWalpole, while a modus vivendi between monarch and ministers was successfullysketched out and Jacobitism was crushed. After the turmoil of the 1741 generalelection and the subsequent fall of Walpole in 1742, the Whigs triumphed inthe elections of 1747 and 1754, and, although Jacobite intr igues continued, theministerial crisis of 1754–7 did not raise fundamental questions of political

stability.On the Continent the period witnessed the Austro-French “DiplomaticRevolution” of 1756, a diplomatic realignment whose importance has beensomewhat exaggerated, and, conversely, in the earlier War of the Austrian

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INTRODUCTION

Succession, an attempt to recast the territorial situation in central Europefundamentally by partitioning the Austrian dominions. The significance of boththe attempt and its failure has been somewhat overlooked. Britain’s role inboth the War of the Austrian Succession and the “Diplomatic Revolution”

requires re-examination, not least in order to prevent too insular aninterpretation of the development of her foreign policy. The last is a danger if attention is centred on colonial struggle and the discourse of patriotism.Instead, it is appropriate today to consider the nature of change in a pastmultipolar international “system” dominated by r ivalry.

The study of mid-eighteenth-century British foreign policy therefore offersa number of perspectives. They are held together by the issue of the politicalrelationships between the government of Britain and that of other states (anabstraction that frequently dissolves under scrutiny into the often arbitrary and

changeable views of unpredictable monarchs), and the factors that influencedthese relationships. It is surprisingly difficult to establish these. The sense thatsomehow diplomatic history must have been “done” in the past, that acomplete and comprehensive narrative exists that simply requiresreexamination in light of the priorities of succeeding generations, is misplaced.The sequence of events is often unclear, let alone their cause. Although somesubjects have been studied in detail, many were not and much is still obscure.For example, Britain’s continental policies in the last years of Walpole’sministry require examination, and there is no decent study of either Lord

Carteret, who effectively directed foreign policy in 1742–4, or his foreignpolicy. The question of George II’s role during the War of the AustrianSuccession underlines the pressing need for a scholarly biography of the king.British policy towards Italy and in the confused Baltic politics of the mid-1740s, the tenuous but significant contacts between Britain and France in1742–6 and the abortive Anglo-Spanish discussions after the death of Philip Vin 1746 are all lacking in clarity.

In the postwar period (1748–54), the Imperial Election Scheme and Anglo-French colonial disputes have been studied in detail, but they have not been set

within the context of a comprehensive study of British policy, of whichimportant aspects, such as Britain’s role in the Baltic crisis of 1747–51, remainunclear. The outbreak of war with France and Britain’s continental diplomacyin 1755–6 have been extensively studied, as have been Anglo-Prussian relationsduring the Seven Years’ War, but the seriousness of the crisis in British foreignpolicy of 1756–7 has been generally underrated and the policies and attitudesof George III and the Bute ministry (1762–3) not placed in the context of along-lasting debate over Britain’s continental policy.

If particular aspects of policy remain obscure, the same is also true of much

of the public debate. There is need for more detailed attention to the content,development and impact of Tory and “Patriot” views and for study of parliamentary debates. However, as with politics and government moregenerally in this period, there are significant problems with the surviving

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sources. First, the “official” sources, the diplomatic and other governmentalcorrespondence, are concerned rather with the execution of policy than itsformulation. Diplomatic instructions are often infrequent, elliptical or bland,and conciliar records are relatively rare and generally provide little indication

of the discussion that took place. There is no equivalent of the French Mémoireset Documents series in the records of British foreign policy. In a small politicalsociety, in which government took place in the context of the royal court andits ethos and methods, policy was frequently decided orally, not by an exchangeof memoranda.

Secondly, the surviving records of individual ministers and other politiciansare very patchy. Wary of governmental interception of the post, politicians inopposition preferred to rely on face-to-face discussion, which, anyway, was theobvious medium for everyone during the parliamentary session, the most

sustained period of political activity, when everyone who counted was inLondon. The preservation of the papers of those who held important office ispatchy. If it is very extensive for Newcastle, Holdernesse and Hardwicke, this isnot the case for Carteret and, still more, Harrington, a long-serving Secretaryof State. Very little correspondence survives for George II, a man whopreferred hunting and reviewing soldiers to writing memoranda.

The nature of the surviving evidence ensures that in many cases the scholar should advance his or her views with caution. To be definite is often to basetoo much on a small selection of sources and to overlook their limited value, if

not ambiguity. Any assessment of cause and influence is necessarily indefinite, acentral part of the educational value of history. This study will reveal thatapproaching the major questions from a number of perspectives can lead tosubtly differing conclusions. That is scarcely surprising. Contemporarycommentators were divided in their analyses, they were not fools, and it isinappropriate for the historian to assert certainties. They are certainly not areflection of the surviving sources.

The crucial questions are approached more than once in this text, preciselybecause they yield different interpretations in particular contexts. This explains

the structure of the book. A series of chapters that are organized in achronological fashion are followed by several organized around themes, beforeanother chapter moves on to consider the somewhat different situation duringthe closing conflict of the period. The advantage of adopting this approach isthat it ensures that what may appear clear-cut from one angle, for example therole of Parliament, is revealed as more complex, and sometimes therefore moreimportant or a more fruitful way of approaching the subject.

The structure of the work also seeks to suggest another variety of approach.The book is designed to be read as a whole and it is best to do so, but it is also

organized so that those wishing to approach particular topics or periods can do sowithout having to read the remainder of the work. This approach, followed also inBritish Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole , may make the book appear as a series of essays, but it reflects the manner in which books frequently are read or used.

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INTRODUCTION

The structure of a book guides its readers; the terms employed by historiansalso necessarily influence them. The use of national units, such as France or Spain, or of institutional groups, such as the French government, entailimplications of consistency, stability and unity that are misleading. Similarly, the

language of growth and decline suggests a rhythmic, even predictable, flow of affairs. “Policy” suggests consistency, “decisions” choice. The use of suchphrases as aggressive or expansionist also imply judgements that have notalways been demonstrated. It is simple to state these points, less easy to suggesthow they should be confronted. To discuss, each time policy or decisions arereferred to, the nature of the group that took the decision is not possible in anyproject that seeks to range widely. Vocabulary is limited, no word withoutconnotations. Inevitably the old phrases and words recur. Nevertheless, whenthey do so, it is necessary to remain on guard against the implications that too

easily flow. In addition, periodization always involves difficulties. Historicalfigures do not all conveniently die or discern new problems and opportunitiesor respond to a new context at the same moment. The balance of change andcontinuity that all were aware of is difficult to delimit.

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Chapter TwoInternational developments

…he who will judge rightly of the conduct of affairs, must not judge of this or that particular part alone, but must consider the general principleon which our conduct proceeds, what the effects of it have been andwill be.

—Viscount Bolingbroke, former Secretary of State, 17361

…the Parties are so jumbled together, and the one rule, which is left to

judge by I mean that of interest, is become so perplexed and doubtful,that I should be sorry to be obliged to give my opinion where we oughtto be.

—Edward Weston, former Under Secretary, 17482

Politics must change with the situation of things…

—Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the NorthernDepartment, and effectively British Foreign Minister, 17493

A brief account of international relations and the course of British foreignpolicy is an essential preliminary to any analysis of this policy. British policy hasto be understood in the context of the wider developments that providedchallenges and opportunities. It is also appropriate to judge the relevance andsuccess of policy in this context, although, equally, it is crucial not to lose sightof the domestic context and the resulting requirements and expectations uponpolicy.

However, brevity can be misleading, especially given the complexity of developments in this period. The danger of any summary is the tendency to

create a schematic impression. Major events, or rather those that appear fullof importance and consequence in hindsight, necessarily provide thechronological structure of such a summary, dictate the emphases and thusappear to occur as a result of preceding such events. Issues and developments

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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

that greatly concerned contemporaries, for example, in 1736–40 the Jülich-Berg question or in 1749–50 Russo-Swedish relations, are omitted or understated because they did not appear to have direct consequences, or atleast those anticipated at the time. Even those that were important in their

consequences, for example, the “diplomatic revolution” of 1752, thesettlement of differences between Ferdinand VI of Spain and Maria Theresaof Austria, are slighted because the standard schematic interpretation placesmore weight on other developments, in this case the more famous“Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756, the new Austro-French alignment. Yet thesettlement of Austro-Spanish differences was an important prelude to theimprovement of Austro-French relations. It was also to be important toBritain, ensuring that the divisiveness that had provided her with a major entrée into the politics of Southern Europe, and also provided an

opportunity for securing the alliance of Austria or Spain, was no more.Furthermore, a shortage of space and a desire for clarity and explanationproduce an emphasis on order and policy, causes and results, as opposed todisorder and confusion. This is matched by the tendency to simplifydecisionmaking processes and to see policies as arising directly from pressures.The ambiguity of influence is replaced by the need and desire to attributecause briefly. Policy, the government, mercantile influence, Parliament, thearistocracy, the court, the army, are all presented as clear and distinct activities,influences and bodies whose conscious interaction determined events, for

example, the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739.Moreover, there is a strong tendency to simplify, consolidate and reifyattitudes or ideas, whether, in the case of Britain, assumptions that can bedescribed as isolationist or interventionist, “blue water” or continental, or,more generally, moods and policies, ranging from aggressive to pro-Prussian.Chronological shifts in emphasis are often neglected. The whole problemculminates in the understandable use of countries or monarchs as a shorthandterm for complex processes of decision-making. There is comparable stylisticpressure to prefer the staccatos of active assertion to the more balanced

equivocations of subordinate clauses and the passive tense.All these drawbacks can be found in the following survey. The statementsmade could be clarified and qualified at length, just as individual footnotescould easily stretch to page length. The survey should therefore be seen as ashort introduction, some aspects of which will be discussed subsequently, thatserves to present the protagonists and to offer only the briefest of accounts of their motives and policies. Brevity makes this introduction excessivelymechanistic, and, at all times, it is necessary to appreciate the fluidity of “policies”, the existence of debate and dissension and the prevalence of choice

in uncertainty rather than system and predictability.In the period 1683–1789 there were three decisive confrontations inEuropean international relations. The first was the defeat of the Turks in 1683– 99, a defeat that was consolidated by Austrian victories in the war of 1716–18.

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Though the Turks were not driven from the Balkans, as was hoped, their defeatat Vienna (1683) and their subsequent loss of the kingdom of Hungary markeda dramatic alteration in the European relationship between Christendom andIslam, one that subsequent Austrian failures in 1737–9 and 1788 were not to

reverse. The second decisive confrontation was between Peter I of Russia andhis enemies in the Great Northern War (1700–21). Peter not only decisivelydefeated Charles XII of Sweden and conquered the eastern Baltic provinces of the Swedish empire, but he also both destroyed the Swedo-Polish-Ukrainian-Tatar alliance that Charles had sought to create in 1707–9, and repelled in1719–20 an Anglo-French attempt to organize a European coalition that wouldforce him to return his Swedish conquests. Challenged unsuccessfully bySweden in 1741–2, the effect of Peter’s triumph was farreaching. The buffersbetween Russia and the German states had been fatally weakened, and Russia

was thereafter to dominate eastern Europe until confronted by western or central European powers. Economically directly linked to the west throughPeter’s Baltic conquests, such as Reval and Riga, Russia developedconsiderably in ways that would have surprised Peter’s predecessors.

The third decisive confrontation was more drawn out. It was betweenBritain and France, and, though it involved both conflict and rivalry in Europe,not least in the British Isles, through France’s sponsorship of the Jacobites, itsmost decisive consequences were in the colonial and maritime sphere. In 1740Britain and France were both important colonial and maritime powers, though

neither ruled the extent of territory or number of people that Spain possessed.By 1815 Britain was clearly the leading European commercial, colonial andmaritime power. Her success owed much to the course of the Revolutionaryand Napoleonic wars (1792–1815): the successes of British naval power, thepressure of French commitments and demands, and vulnerability to Britainthat the conflicts placed on Spain, the United Provinces and Denmark, and thelongevity of the wars that allowed Britain to mount numerous amphibiousoperations once the maritime structure of the French empire had beendestroyed.

However, British predominance had already been clearly established in theperiod covered by this book, especially during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63).This maritime predominance was reflected in Britain’s conquests during theconflict, the position of strength from which she negotiated and the ability of her naval power to intimidate France and Spain in the immediate postwar years. This success was to be challenged during the War of AmericanIndependence (1775–83), though the effectiveness of the maritime threatposed then by the Bourbons (France and Spain) has generally beenexaggerated. The situation in 1778–9 was definitely one of the Bourbons

challenging Britain and seeking to take advantage of her American difficulties.It was not initially a conflict between powers in an equal position, and, for theBourbons, success was to be measured in forcing Britain to return past gains, anaspiration reflected in the determination of Vergennes, the French foreign

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minister, that the Peace of Paris of 1763 should not serve as the basis of theeventual negotiations.

The period 1739–63 saw two major wars in the European world, andBritain played a major role in both.4 The conflicts are generally known as the

War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War, and the dates usuallygiven are 1740–48 and 1756–63, but these titles and dates suggest a falsecoherence, a deceptively united European international “system”. Britain, for example, went to war with Spain in 1739–the War of Jenkins’ Ear—but did notbegin hostilities with France until 1743.

The War of the Austrian Succession takes its name from the struggle over the Habsburg inheritance that followed the death of Emperor Charles VI on20 October 1740, and the succession of his elder daughter, Maria Theresa.The Habsburgs ruled a number of territories that are collectively, though

somewhat inaccurately, referred to as Austria. They included most of modernAustria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Silesia (modern south-west Poland),Transylvania (north-west Rumania), Slovenia, Croatia, the AustrianNetherlands (Belgium and Luxemburg), the Duchies of Milan, Mantua,Parma and Piacenza in northern Italy and a number of small territories insouth-west Germany.

In addition, since 1438 the elected position of Holy Roman Emperor hadbeen held by a Habsburg. By the early eighteenth century this post was asource of prestige and a measure of judicial authority rather than of power in

the Empire (essentially modern Germany and Austria), but, as it was held bymen, its fate became uncertain with the death of Charles, for he left twodaughters but no sons. In 1713 Charles had promulgated the PragmaticSanction, by which he stipulated the indivisibility of his inheritance, thereversion to female in the absence of male descendants and the succession of his children rather than Maria Josepha and Maria Amalia, the daughters of hiselder brother and predecessor Joseph I.Maria Josepha married the heir to aleading German ruler, the Elector of Saxony, the future Augustus III of Saxony-Poland in 1719, and Maria Amalia married Charles Albert, the heir to

another, the Elector of Bavaria, in 1722. Though Charles ensured that themarriages were accompanied by solemn renunciations of all claims to thesuccession, Augustus and Charles, who succeeded in 1733 and 1726respectively, were eager to press claims. Maria Theresa married Duke Francis of Lorraine, who in 1737 became Grand Duke of Tuscany, a consolation for theloss of Lorraine to the father-in-law of Louis XV of France.

They were not alone in casting eyes on the Habsburg inheritance. CharlesEmmanuel III, king of Sardinia (1730–73), and ruler of Savoy and Piedmont aswell as that island, sought gains at the expense of the Milanese and of the

republic of Genoa, an Austrian ally. Philip V of Spain (1700–46) wantedAustr ian Italy, including the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, for his sons by his secondmarriage to the Parmesan princess Elisabeth Farnese. The eldest son, DonCarlos, had in 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, conquered the

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kingdom of Naples from the Austrians, but the second son, Don Philip, was stillunprovided for.

German, Italian and Spanish ambitions had to wait for a suitableopportunity. That was provided not so much by the death of Charles VI but by

the willingness of France to abandon the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanctionshe had accepted in 1738 as part of the Third Treaty of Vienna, and thus todestroy the entente between France and Austria that had followed their conflictin the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5). Initially the pacific octogenar ianCardinal Fleury, who had been first minister to his former charge Louis XV of France (1715–74) since 1726, had intended simply to deny the Imperialelection to Francis, rather than to support claims on the Habsburg succession.Edward Finch, the British envoy to Russia, observed that “the fate of Europemay greatly depend on his faith or ambition” and “that guarantys like young

beauties with small blemishes in their character have now a fine opportunity toreestablish their reputation”. It was and is unclear whether Fleury would havedied as the peacemaker who goes to see God, as Finch wondered,5 because theunexpected invasion of Silesia on 16 December 1740 by Frederick II (theGreat, 1740–86), the young new ruler of Prussia, dramatically altered thesituation by substituting action for negotiation and by forcing other powers,including France and Britain, to define their position.6

The state known as Prussia stretched from the Rhine to the Niemen. Itincluded Brandenburg, one of the eight Electorates of the Holy Roman

Empire, with its capital at Berlin; the actual kingdom of Prussia, otherwiseknown as ducal or East Prussia, with its capital at Königsberg; most of Pomerania; the Hohenzollern share of the Jülich-Cleve succession: theRhenish Duchy of Cleve and the counties of Mark and Ravensberg; and anumber of Westphalian territories, including the secularized prince-bishopricof Minden. Under Frederick William I (1713–40), the army had risen to80,000, the second biggest, after that of Austria, of any German state. The statewas internally stable and the nobility were accustomed to the idea of stateservice, especially in the army.

However, although the growth of Prussian power had been a marked featureof the previous century, Prussia was not unique in this respect. AustrianHabsburg territorial expansion had been considerable; it centred on Italy andHungary. Russian power expanded east, south and, crucially for Europe, west.The efforts of Tsar Alexis in the Thirteen Years’ War (1654–67) to gain a Balticcoastline by driving the Swedes from Livonia and to dominate Poland hadbeen thwarted by both powers, but they had been overcome by Alexis’s son,Peter I, the Great (1682–1725) in the Great Northern War (1700–21).Thereafter, Prussian rulers were uneasily conscious of Russian strength, and

those who wished to put pressure on Prussia, for example George II in 1733– 4, turned to Russia.7

Austria and Russia had been allied since 1726, but the Tsarina Anna (1730– 40) died three days before her ally Charles VI, to be succeeded by her great-

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nephew, the two-month-old Ivan VI (1740–1), and a weak and divided regency.When Guy Dickens, the Br itish envoy in Berlin, stressed Prussian vulnerabilityin February 1741 and thus the need for caution, Frederick replied that he wascertain of Russia and therefore not worried about his other frontiers,8 which

included that with Hanover. Frederick’s invasion of Silesia, on parts of whichthere was a long-standing Hohenzollern claim, was successful. However, initialattempts to force Maria Theresa to accept territorial losses failed, despiteBritish pressure on Austria to end the conflict by making concessions to Prussiabefore other powers, principally France, took the opportunity to attack.

As a result, Frederick signed the Treaty of Breslau with France on 5 June1741, renouncing his claim to Jülich-Berg (the succession to which by theWittelsbach claimant was supported by France) and agreeing to supportCharles Albert of Bavaria in the Imperial election. In return the French

guaranteed Prussian possession of Lower Silesia, and promised militaryassistance for Bavaria and diplomatic pressure on her ally Sweden to attackRussia. The Swedes did so in July 1741. On 15 August 1741, French troopsbegan to cross the Rhine. In addition, France and Frederick successfullyencouraged other powers to join the attack on Mar ia Theresa. A grand strategy,both military and diplomatic, was being put in place. A French advance towardsHanover forced George II to abandon his attempt to create an opposingcoalition, and on 25 September 1741 he was obliged to promise neutrality andhis support for Charles Albert as Emperor.

The designation of the conflict as the War of the Austrian Successiontherefore appears well founded, although the initial attempt to reconfiguremuch of central Europe was unsuccessful. In late 1741 the Austrian empireappeared close to dissolution, Linz falling on 14 September, Prague on 26November. There seemed to be only one issue in international relations: theredrawing of the map of the Empire in order to destroy the chance of anyrevival of the Anglo-Dutch Austrian alliances of 1689–97 and 1702–13 andthus to give France diplomatic hegemony. In October 1741, Sir Charles Wager,the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote angrily of the German princes, “what

destruction is coming upon them; if they tamely submit to be pissed upon byan insolent nation; to whom they are superior in all things, could they but jointogether”.9 With French backing, Charles Albert of Bavaria was crowned atFrankfurt as the Emperor Charles VII on 12 February 1742.

However, the possibility of achieving decisive victory had been exaggerated,while Austrian military resilience had been underrated. The Austriansrecaptured Linz in late January 1742, seized Munich on 12 February and inJuly began to besiege Prague, which the French abandoned on 16 December.Arthur Villettes, British envoy in Turin, had complained on Christmas Day

1741 that “the general system of politics at present reaches no farther withmost princes, than to come in for a share of the spoil”,10 but, by the followingyear, it was no longer clear who would be able to allocate gains.

As alliances dissolved, the war became less focused. From 1742 the war was

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more clearly a number of confrontations and conflicts, with different causes,chronologies and consequences, interacting to a considerable extent but far lessthan was hoped by those who sought to benefit from such interaction. LouisXV was abandoned by some of his allies, Frederick II in June 1742, Augustus

III in July 1742, Sweden in August 1743, and the new Elector of Bavaria,Maximilian Joseph, in April 1745, although Frederick attacked Austria again inthe Second Silesian War (August 1744–December 1745). Spain fought onalongside France, but other powers came to the assistance of Maria Theresa.British troops landed in the Austrian Netherlands on 20 May 1742, and bothmarched into the Empire and began fighting with the French in 1743,although war was not declared until the following year. In order to fightFrance, the British government effectively abandoned the pursuit of theconflict with Spain over Caribbean trade, the War of Jenkins’ Ear, that they had

begun in 1739.Under the pressure of rapidly altering diplomatic and military situations,rulers and ministers changed their policies or emphasized different aspects andapproaches. This was not simply a necessity for the weaker powers, forced torespond to developments that it was difficult to control. Indeed, Frederick IIcomplained in October 1745 that so many unexpected events occurred that hecould not judge anything with certainty. Andrew Mitchell, British envoy inBerlin, wrote to a fellow diplomat in 1763 “I think in great affairs and betweengreat princes, whilst anything remains unsettled, nothing can be said to be

done”.11

A lack of consistency was also apparent at the level of the strongestpowers. Despite the tendency among foreign commentators to misunderstandRussian policy as largely a matter of responses to financial inducements and toact accordingly, it was far from constant. It is easy to appreciate why a scholar of Russian policy wrote, more generally, of Europe in this period that

the conduct of diplomacy between battles is a phantasmagoric frenzy of confusion. It poses the serious problem of separating traditionalobjectives from expedient bargains, and cleaving doctrine concepts from

empirical moves…entering the pirouette spirit prevailing in most cabinetcouncils, one finds it exceedingly inappropriate to render those dogmaticstatements on such terms as inevitable partnerships, long-time historicaltrends and immutable drives.12

Nevertheless, although there is much that is still unclear, and modern researchhad cast new light, for example, on Austro-French negotiations during thewar,13 it would be inappropriate to see only confusion. Instead, an inability toachieve and secure objectives was the dominant theme, an understandable

consequence of the multipolar nature of international relations and thedifficulty of achieving decisive victory. A window of opportunity for a major shift had been lost in late 1741. British mediation helped to produce the secretAustro-Prussian Convention of Kleinschnellendorf, by which the ground was

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laid for a separate peace. Though Frederick’s path thence to the Austro-Prussian Peace of Breslau of 11 June 1742, by which he gained most of Silesia,was far from straight, his betrayal of France fatally weakened her cause. TheBavarian envoy in Paris complained that Frederick, in violating everything that

had been established to ensure the fulfilment of their promises, had disgracedmankind.14 The successful Russian invasion of Swedish-ruled Finland in 1742and the determination of the new British ministry led by Lord Carteret tosupport Austria were also important.

However, it was not only French plans that were thwarted. The prospect thatAustria would follow up her successes in 1742–3 by dominating the Empireand seeking to regain Silesia was ended when Frederick defeated her again inthe Second Silesian War (1744–5) and forced Maria Theresa once more torecognize the loss of Silesia in the Treaty of Dresden (25 December 1745).

Similarly, British hopes that they would be able to follow up the landing of troops in the Austrian Netherlands in 1742 and the victory of Dettingen over the French the following year by decisively pushing back France’s easternfrontier, possibly forcing her to accept the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, thusreversing the gains of nearly a century, proved illusory. French schemes for aretaliatory invasion of Britain in support of the Jacobite (Stuart) claimant tothe throne, both in early 1744 and in the winter of 1745–6, were thwarted bypoor weather and the British navy respectively, while the Jacobite rising of 1745 was defeated the following year at Culloden. With Francis of Lorraine’s

election as Emperor in 1745, the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Füssen and theTreaty of Dresden, hostilities largely ceased in Germany.The war in Italy was far from static, although the ambitious plans of both

sides, including the Austrian attempt to drive Carlos from Naples and theSpanish plan to conquer Milan, Parma and Piacenza for Don Philip with theassistance of France, proved abortive. British pressure on Maria Theresaobtained the promise of Piacenza and part of the Milanese for CharlesEmmanuel III in the Treaty of Worms of September 1743, and, although theking signed a secret armistice with the Bourbons in February 1746, he swiftly

repudiated it, and the Austro-Sardinian victory at Piacenza on 16 June 1746crushed Bourbon hopes in northern Italy. The attempt to exploit the victoryby invading Provence at the end of the year was a failure, and the Austrianswere expelled from captured Genoa by a popular revolt in December 1746.

North of the Alps, the centre of attention had shifted from Germany to theAustrian Netherlands, which had been neutral in 1741–3, as earlier whenFrance attacked Austria in the War of the Polish Succession in 1733–5.Hostilities began there in 1744, but the Anglo-Dutch-German forces werehindered by quarrels over strategy and financing and by serious failures to

maintain the stipulated size of their contingent, or to produce it on time on thepart of the Austrians. These problems helped to ensure that, after anunsuccessful offensive in 1744, the allies were generally on the defensive. TheFrench, under the most distinguished member of Augustus II’s large

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illegitimate progeny, Marshal Saxe, scored a number of successes and weremore successful than Louis XIV had been. After winning the battle of Fontenoy on 11 May 1745, Saxe obtained the capitulations of Ghent (15 July),Bruges (19 July) and Ostend (23 August). In 1746 most of the Austrian

Netherlands fell to France, Brussels on 21 February, Mons on 10 July, Charleroion 2 August, and Namur on 1 October. Saxe defeated the Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II, at Roucox in 1746 and at Laffeldt in1747, a year which also saw the overrunning of Dutch Flanders and the fall of the great Dutch fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, while Maastricht fell in 1748.

These failures exposed the folly of assuming that it would be possible torevive the successes of John, 1st Duke of Marlborough at the head of an Anglo-Dutch-Austrian alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13).Defeat helped to lead to an Orangist coup in the United Provinces in 1747,

William IV reviving the authority once enjoyed by William III after 45 years of republican control. This was encouraged, abetted and applauded by the Br itish,Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Southern Department, being surethat it “must give more weight to the king, and more stability to the affairs of Europe than any event that has happened this century”, except the Hanoveriansuccession. William was George IV’s son-in-law and the British had supportedhis coup. Their hopes were to be cruelly disabused. There was no Dutchrevival,15 and by 1748 the prospect of the French conquest of more of theUnited Provinces helped to lead the Dutch and the British to push through

peace with France, despite the unwillingness of their Austrian ally.The preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were signed on 30 April,the definitive treaty on 18 October 1748. Given the extent of Frenchconquests—far greater in the Low Countries than at the end of any previouswar—the terms they accepted were surprisingly favourable for their opponents. The French were concerned at the movement of a British-subsidized Russian army towards the Rhine, and they needed peace. TheFrench economy had been hit by a poor harvest, her finances by the costly war and her foreign trade by British naval victories in 1747.

The peace stipulated the return of all conquests, which included, besidesFrench gains in the Low Countries, Madras in India, captured by the Frenchfrom the British East India Company, and Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island,seized by the British from France in 1745. In comparison to the peacesettlements that had ended the wars of the Spanish and Polish successions, andthe bolder plans of the combatants in the early stages of the conflict, relativelylittle land changed hands. Despite Austrian reluctance, Charles Emmanuel IIIreceived the lands he had been ceded at Worms, bar Piacenza, which DonPhilip gained with Parma. Louis XV had to agree to recognize the Protestant

succession in Britain and to expel Charles Edward Stuart (Bonnie PrinceCharlie), the elder son of the Jacobite claimant James “III”. Disputes over thefrontier between the French colony of Québec and the British NorthAmerican colonies were referred to commissioners.16

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The diplomatic alignments of the postwar world had already beenestablished. The Austro-Russian alliance of 1746, and its Swedo-Prussian andSwedo-French counterparts of the following year, cemented two conflictingblocs that confronted each other until 1756. As a result, British hopes in 1748

of recruiting Frederick II to the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment weremisplaced. The Russian Chancellor Alexis Bestuzhev-Riumin planned war tooverthrow the hostile Swedish government in 1749. However, Danish,Austrian and British unwillingness to support Russian action, which in lightof French and Prussian backing for Sweden would have caused a major war,led the Russians to desist from the scheme. The “Hats”, the anti-Russianparty that controlled the Swedish government, in turn abandoned changesthat might strengthen royal authority, a course Russia feared, and tensionbetween the two powers, and between Sweden and Denmark, slackened

considerably in 1749–51. The situation in Sweden demonstrated theinterrelationship of foreign policy and domestic political developments in astate like Britain with a powerful constitutional assembly and a developedpublic politics.17

International hostility also diminished in Italy, although without the seriouscrisis that had characterized Baltic affairs in 1749, and in line with the 1748peace settlement. A treaty of defensive alliance, based on the settlement andguaranteeing each other’s Italian possessions, was signed at Aranjuez on 14 June1752 by representatives of Maria Theresa, Francis I, Charles Emmanuel III and

Ferdinand VI, Philip V’s successor as King of Spain. This settlement ended theItalian question and ensured that Italy was mostly peaceful until 1792. The longperiod of peace reflected the acceptable division between Spanish and Austrianspheres of influence established in 1748 and the crucial shift in Spanish policyfollowing the succession of the pacific Ferdinand VI (1746–59). He had littlesympathy for his half-brothers, Don Carlos and Don Philip, and was lessquixotic than his father, Philip V.Ferdinand was in turn succeeded by Carlos, asCharles III (1759–88). He was more interested in colonial than Italianquestions, an interest that was to lead him to war with Britain in 1762 and

1779.The element of compromise present in the Baltic and Italian settlementswas lacking in that devised for Germany and the Low Countries by Newcastle,who, after he succeeded Carteret as the most influential Secretary of State in1744, was in effect Britain’s foreign minister. Rather than negotiating withFrance or her ally Prussia, whose alliance with France was not as solid as wasfeared,18 Newcastle sought to strengthen what he called the “Old System”, thealliance of Britain, Austria and the United Provinces. Newcastle believed thatwhat he saw as the French challenge could be contained only by such a

system.19

He did so in a consciously anti-French and anti-Prussian fashion.Under the Barrier Treaty of 1715, Dutch garrisons had been accepted in anumber of fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands in order to defend the LowCountries from France. The Barrier had failed the challenge in 1744–6, the

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Earl of Sandwich, one of the British Plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle,writing to Newcastle in October 1747 that “the great point of France duringthe whole war, has been the destruction of the Barrier…we shall then beentirely open to their attack, whereas they will have a chain of fortresses that

will render their frontiers impenetrable”.20

The resultant French advance onlymade Newcastle more determined to rebuild and strengthen the system and toobtain Austrian assistance to that end.

Newcastle also actively sponsored the Imperial Election Scheme, a plan for the election as King of the Romans, and therefore next Emperor, of MariaTheresa’s eldest son Joseph, the future Joseph II.21 This was not a new plan.George II had advocated the idea in January 1745, after the death of CharlesVII,22 but it was not taken up until after the war. Then the support of most of the Electors was obtained as a result of major British diplomatic efforts and, in

part, through the payment of British subsidies. However, a lack of Austrianenthusiasm ensured that propitious circumstances in 1749 were not exploitedand, thereafter, French, Palatine and, in particular, Prussian opposition, thedifficulty of keeping the willing Electors in line and a lack of determination onthe part of the Austrians, who objected to the idea of obtaining Electoral votesby concessions, led to the failure of the scheme. A much disappointedNewcastle, who had put a great deal of effort into the scheme, blamed theAustrians for its failure.23 Newcastle really needed Frederick’s support, butAustro-Prussian animosity rendered that unlikely, and the collective security

system the British supported helped to exacerbate Frederick’s hostility towardsBritain and make him hope unrealistically that a counter-league could becreated.

Frederick was reduced in 1752 to asking for French pressure on the Turks todeclare war on Austria and Russia. While the French government wasdistracted by domestic, constitutional and religious disputes, especiallycontroversies over Jansenism, Frederick felt that he was having to respond toapparent threats, such as the Imperial Election Scheme or in 1752–3 theprospect that Maria Theresa’s brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, would

become next king of Poland and make it a hereditary kingdom to the greatbenefit of Austria.24

Although the Anglo-Austro-Russian alignment had serious weaknesses, itsapparent strength intimidated Frederick and therefore offered Hanover somesecurity against Prussian attack, which was indeed feared in 1753. The ImperialElection Scheme had not achieved its purpose, the nullification of theconsequences of the Franco-Prussian alliance, in part because the Austrians feltit unnecessary. British support for the “Old System” can be seen asanachronistic, a repetition of ideas made outdated by the rising importance of

Austro-Prussian competition and the decline in French interest in continentalterritorial expansion. If the Austrian government, especially under theinfluence of Count Kaunitz, envoy in Paris 1750–3 and chancellor from 1753,is seen as actively seeking French backing for the reconquest of Silesia, a

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dynastic, religious, economic and geopolitical duty for the Austrians, thenBritish hopes of keeping the Anglo-Austrian alliance alive appear futile.25

However, Kaunitz sought British support for action against Frederick, and,far from getting steadily worse, Anglo-Austrian relations were actually better in

1754 than in 1748.26

In addition, although the British found Russian financialconditions for any alliance exorbitant, both powers remained interested instrengthening their links. Tsarina Elizabeth (1741–62) was bitterly opposed toFrederick, who had thwarted her on a number of occasions, and her enmitycoincided with Maria Theresa’s desire to regain Silesia and George II’s wish toprotect Hanover.

Thus, British talk of shared interests and the “Old System” was notredundant, although they placed excessive weight on the benefits to be gainedfrom the support of the United Provinces. In fact it was divided politically,

especially after the death of William IV in 1751, and increasingly weak inmilitary strength and government finances. Nevertheless, in any likely futureconflict with France and Prussia, the Dutch would be of strategic importance,their army and navy were not inconsiderable, and the country, if not the federalgovernment, was still wealthy. Frederick II appeared the likeliest cause of conflict in 1753–4, and the shared animosity of George II, Maria Theresa andElizabeth towards him offered a strong and stable response.27

The breakdown of these shared views helped to precipitate the “DiplomaticRevolution” of 1756. The crucial new developments that constituted this

revolution were alliances between Britain and Prussia, and France and Austria,both negotiated in 1756: the Convention of Westminster of 16 January and theFirst Treaty of Versailles of 1 May. These treaties can be traced to skirmishesover the Anglo-French frontier in the Ohio valley in 1754. There is no reasonto believe that the “revolution” would have occurred in the form it did but for the chain of events that began with the flaring up of what had hitherto been aninconclusive dispute over a distant frontier. Had Maria Theresa and Elizabethattacked Frederick anyway, as they had intended to do, George II wouldprobably not have joined them (unless Frederick staged a pre-emptive stroke as

he was to do in 1756), but he would certainly not have allied with Prussia.Similarly, Louis XV would probably have felt obliged to support his allyFrederick. Kaunitz did not want to break with George II, and in 1755 he wasstill devoting considerable attention to the alliance with him, because he fearedthat attempts to improve relations with Louis XV, at whose court anti-Austrianattitudes were well-established, would fail.

The Commissioners instructed to settle Anglo-French disputes over NorthAmerican frontiers had failed. Tension increased as the British encouraged theMiami and Huron Native Americans to trade with them and the French

responded vigorously, while the British feared that French plans to link their colonies of Canada and Louisiana by a series of forts would create a barrier against British expansion. Concern increased in 1753 when the French beganto establish new posts in the upper Ohio valley, and Robert Dinwiddie, the

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Governor of Virginia, was ordered to use force to defend British claims.28 InJuly 1754, a force of Virginia militia under George Washington sent to resistFrench moves was defeated, and the British ministry responded by sendingtroops to North America. Newcastle wanted only limited action, but pressure

from bellicose colleagues led to an expansion of plans into a major attack onFrench America.29 This reflected a political atmosphere in which NorthAmerica seemed of growing direct interest to Britain, her economy, her maritime and global strength and the balance of her power with France.

The French government did not want war but felt obliged to respond toBritish preparations by, in turn, preparing an expedition to reinforce FrenchNorth America. Negotiations in early 1755 were hampered by mutual distrustand it proved impossible to devise a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute.British ministers stressed the strength of bellicose domestic pressure.30 Rouillé,

the French foreign minister, argued correctly that the chance of successfulnegotiations was really ended by the British refusal to suspend military steps. 31

On 21 April 1755 Admiral Boscawen sailed for American waters, ordered toprevent French reinforcements from reaching Canada. On 3 May the Frenchfleet sailed from Brest and on 10 June they were attacked by Boscawen,although he failed to inflict ser ious losses, a failure that left the French stronger in Canada and was thus to be important in the subsequent course of thestruggle in North America.32 This led to a breach in diplomatic relations,Mirepoix being recalled from London and Bussy from Hanover on 18 July.

War was not declared by Britain until 17 May 1756 and by France until 9June 1756, and contacts continued until then in a vain attempt to maintain thepeace that has received insufficient attention. Other rulers, such as Frederick IIand Maria Theresa, were inclined to doubt the possibility of war.33 However,both governments turned their attention to diplomatic and militarypreparations for conflict. In 1755–6 the possibility of a French attack onHanover, the Low Countries or mainland Britain, and of supporting Prussianaction against Hanover, obliged the British ministry to seek firm commitmentsof support from their allies. Fear of French attack and a lack of sympathy for

the British position in America made the Dutch unwilling to offer help,34

while Kaunitz had no intention of being dragged into war for the sake of Britain. Refusing to reinforce the Austrian Netherlands, and thus cover theUnited Provinces from French attack, he made only vague offers to protectHanoverian neutrality.35

The British government had more success with Elizabeth of Russia, whowas not exposed to French attack and for whom much-needed Britishsubsidies would be useful in preparing for war with Frederick. Negotiations,begun in 1753 under the pressure of fears of a Prussian attack on Hanover, had

flagged due to disputes over the size of the subsidy and over the causes thatwould oblige Russia to deploy troops outside her frontiers. They were revivedby the new envoy, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, who reached St Petersburgin June 1755.36 Bribes, the promise of larger subsidies and Elizabeth’s

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willingness to grasp the opportunity led to the conclusion of an agreement on30 September 1755. This renewed the treaty of defensive alliance of December 1742 and provided for a British subsidy of £ 100,000 per annum in return for Russia maintaining an army of 55,000 men in Livonia, from which East Prussia

could be threatened.37

The British ministry hoped that the agreement wouldhave a favourable impact on Austrian policy.38

The agreed terms reflected the standard goal of British negotiations withRussia since 1741–acquiring the support of the Russian army in anyconfrontation with Frederick II and, more generally, the major role of Russiain European affairs in the eyes of outsiders, namely as opponent to France’sallies, usually Sweden, Poland and Turkey, but also and indeed principallyFrederick since 1741. As Elizabeth and her Chancellor, Bestuzhev-Riumin,wanted to seize East Prussia in order to exchange it with Augustus III of

Saxony-Poland for Courland, the agreement was welcome to her.However, George II and his ministers saw Russia as a means to a differentend—the security of Hanover—and, unexpectedly, in late 1755 a chance of supplementing this by gaining the support of Frederick was offered.Concerned about improving Anglo-Russian relations, Frederick approachedGeorge II through the Duke of Brunswick39 in June 1755.40 Still bound toFrance and unwilling to provide a unilateral guarantee for Hanover, Frederickwas cautious, until he received in December a copy of the Anglo-Russianagreement and British proposals for better relations with Prussia. The British

sought a Prussian guarantee for Hanover.41

Alliance with George II wouldapparently free Frederick from the Russian threat, whereas he would beexposed to a British-subsidized Russian attack if he provided Louis XV withassistance. As a result, Frederick responded favourably to the British approachand, by the Convention of Westminster of 16 January 1756, Britain and Prussiaguaranteed their respective possessions and agreed to maintain peace in theEmpire by jointly opposing the entry of foreign forces.

Neither Frederick nor the British saw the Convention as the cause of anyfundamental change in international relations or as incompatible with their

existing alliances. For the British, it simply strengthened the existing collectivesecurity system, achieving what had been hoped for in 1740 and 1748. For Frederick, it made Russian attack less likely. However, the new agreement ledto major changes, although not a complete change round or “revolution” ininternational relations, for Austria and Russia remained close allies untilElizabeth’s death in 1762. The Convention helped drive Louis XV towardsAustria. Despite Kaunitz’s efforts, relations between the two had hitherto notimproved significantly. On 10 August 1755 Count Starhemberg, the Austrianenvoy in Paris, reported that he was certain France would attack Austria. Three

days later his opposite number, Aubeterre, responded sceptically to Kaunitz’sassurances of good wishes, suggested that Austria would act if France attackedHanover and added that Maria Theresa would never abandon George II.Rouillé was sceptical about Austrian promises that they would not take part in

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any Anglo-French conflict.42 Kaunitz also approached Louis through hisinfluential mistress, Madame de Pompadour. Louis found Frederick anirritating and presumptuous ally and was tempted by the idea of dividingBritain from her traditional ally, but it was not clear that Austria would be a

reliable ally for France, and strengthening her by accepting a reconquest of Silesia contradicted traditional French assumptions.The situation was changed by the Convention of Westminster. The

Prussian envoy in Paris had warned Frederick in November 1755 that theFrench government was very worried by reports of Anglo-Prussiannegotiations, but Frederick does not appear to have appreciated the likelyreaction in Paris: on 20 January 1756 he told the French envoy Nivernais,who had been sent to renew the Franco-Russian treaty, that he was keen todo so.43 However, French anger led Louis’s council to decide on 4 February

not to renew the alliance with Prussia. The Convention also angered theAustrians, who still sought to regain Silesia. On 6 March Maria Theresaordered her envoy in Russia to hinder the implementation of the Anglo-Russian treaty, while Starhemberg was informed that she was prepared toaccept a French attack on Hanover. On 1 May France and Austria werelinked in a defensive alliance, the First Treaty of Versailles. It specificallyexcluded the Anglo-French war, which had passed its initial limited andsomewhat phoney stage on 18 April 1756, when French troops landed on theBritish-ruled Mediterranean island of Minorca. Maria Theresa was therefore

not obliged to take part in the war on the side of France, but her promise of her neutrality destroyed the “Old System”.44 When Robert Keith, the Britishenvoy, reproached her with this, Maria Theresa retorted that the British haddone so by the Convention of Westminster,

that the account of that treaty had struck her like a fit of an apoplexy…she would own freely to me, that she, and the king of Prussia, wereincompatible together, and that no consideration upon earth, should ever make her enter into an alliance where he was a party.

Keith replied that this attitude laid Frederick “under a necessity of endeavouring to secure himself, by the ruin of the House of Austria”.45

The new Austro-French alliance helped Russian plans for war with Prussia,as it appeared increasingly likely that such a conflict would benefit fromAustro-French support, not least crucial financial aid. On 26 March 1756 thenewly established “Conference at the Imperial [Russian] Court” produced anextensive plan for war.46 At the same time, the Russian government made itclear to Hanbury-Williams that they regarded the Anglo-Russian agreement of

the previous September as relating only to action against Prussia and wouldtherefore not provide assistance against any other power, an interpretation thathe rejected without effect. Elizabeth lent her support to her ViceChancellor,Count Voronzov, who favoured a French alignment and sought to overthrow

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Bestuzhev-Riumin and his anglophile policies.47 Frederick stressed theimportance of retaining the Russian alliance to the newly-arrived Britishenvoy in Berlin, Andrew Mitchell—“while Russia was secured the peace of Germany was safe”48—but it became increasingly clear that British influence in

St Petersburg had collapsed.49

Convinced, with reason, that Elizabeth and Maria Theresa were planningto attack him, Frederick decided on a pre-emptive stroke, despite Britishadvice that he remain on the defensive.50 Rather than attacking MariaTheresa, George II wanted Frederick to assemble a corps in his Rhenishterritories, Cleves and Mark, in order to block a possible French advancetowards Hanover.51 However, as so often, the British found that their allieshad a different agenda. Frederick was already withdrawing troops from theRhineland,52 and on 28 August 1756 he invaded Saxony in order to deny a

base to his opponents: Saxony was a sphere for manoeuvre between Prussiaand Austrian-ruled Bohemia.This was a dangerous move. Louis XV felt obliged to help Augustus III, his

heir’s father-in-law, and Frederick’s move helped to precipitate bothrapprochement between France and Russia, between whom relations had beencool since 1725, and a deepening of the Austro-French alliance. Elizabethacceded to the First Treaty of Versailles on 30 December 1756, and concludedan offensive alliance with Austria the following month. On 1 May 1757, by theSecond Treaty of Versailles, Louis XV promised Maria Theresa an army of

105,000 and a substantial subsidy to help effect a partition of Prussia.53

In so far as the British ministers had anticipated war with France in 1755,they had hoped that their continental allies would deter France fromcompensating for her colonial and maritime weaknesses by attacking Hanover and the Low Countries. In what was certainly a case of looking at the last war,George II and his ministers wished to avoid a repetition of French successes in1741 and 1745–8. However, thanks to Austrian and Dutch reluctance and tothe British failure to consider the problems of reconciling Elizabeth andFrederick, they had failed. In consequence, the continental and Anglo-Bourbon

conflicts in 1756–63 were more closely aligned than was necessary.Furthermore, this interaction worked to the disadvantage of Britain. Thenotion that Britain conquered America in Germany has been repeatedfrequently, and employed, in addition, to explain why an isolated Britain wasunsuccessful in the War of American Independence. However, this analysisignores both the extent to which the notion was advanced by contemporariesfor partisan reasons and the dangers that faced British policy as a result of thecontinental commitment. William Pitt the Elder, 1st Earl of Chatham, who wasidentified, both then and subsequently, with the policy of conquering America

in Germany, was in fact very hesitant about military and diplomaticintervention on the Continent. Justifying his views in 1756–7, Pitt told theHouse of Commons in December 1761 that he had then opposed the Anglo-Russian agreement “upon this principle: that the forwardness of this House to

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engage itself to defend the electoral dominions [Hanover] would bring on theinvasion of them as a certain consequence”. He added,

The German war proved a millstone, I say, as it was then managed , for

when I opposed the sending of British troops into Germany, your business was so far from being done then as it has been since in Americaand in the East Indies, that you had not even sufficiently provided for thepreservation of your own coasts or colonies anywhere.54

The loss of Hanover at any stage in the Seven Years’ War would have exposedthe British government to the politically hazardous task of regaining it at thesubsequent peace by making and then returning colonial gains; rather as CapeBreton had been returned in 1748. In addition, by being allied with Frederick,

in place of Elizabeth and Maria Theresa, George II had acquired both anunpredictable and a vulnerable ally. In 1743–8 George fought Louis XV as partof the stronger European bloc; in 1756–63 as part of a distinctly weaker one,and this contrast must be heeded in any discussion about the advisability of conquering America in Germany.

George and his ministers were swiftly made aware of their difficult situation.In 1756 Minorca was lost. British naval power was humiliated when, in theface of a French fleet, Admiral Byng failed to relieve the defenders on 20 May.Outnumbered, they surrendered on 29 June. The political consequences were

serious, helping to precipitate the fall of the Fox—Newcastle ministry. In 1757the victor of Minorca, the Duke of Richelieu, invaded Hanover. Thevulnerability of the Electorate had led to consideration of neutrality, but theFrench would only accept that if they were granted a right of transit for their troops, terms that were judged unacceptable.55 An outnumbered Army of Observation of Germans, mostly Hanoverians, Hessians and Brunswickers,under Cumberland, was defeated at Hastenbeck on 26 July 1757 and retreated.On 8 September Cumberland agreed to the dissolution of his army by theConvention of Klosterseven.56 Hanover had fallen. As British forces had failed

to seize Louisbourg as planned, there appeared no possibility of exchangingcolonial gains for Hanover. There was both despair and anger in London. TheEarl of Hardwicke, former Lord Chancellor and long friend and adviser toNewcastle, wrote to him that “to propose a peace to a victorious enemy under such a losing game is a most disagreeable disadvantageous thing, but amitigated ruin is better than a total one”.57

The Convention was to be disavowed, the bulk of the Electorate recaptured.Nevertheless, the events of the autumn of 1757 are a reminder both of therapid changes of fortune that characterized a conflict that is too often discussed

without sufficient stress on this volatility, and also of the difficulties facingBritish policy. The relationship between continental and colonial commitmentsposed major problems for the British government. The political storm over Klosterseven led to a greater British military, diplomatic, financial and political

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commitment to Germany. Under a subsidy treaty signed on 11 April 1758,Frederick and George agreed not to carry on separate negotiations, the Britishagreed to pay a subsidy of £ 670,000 and George II, as King and Elector,promised to maintain an army of 55,000 in Hanover to cover Frederick’s flank.

Under this treaty, renewed in 1759 and 1760, Britain provided valuablefinancial and military assistance to the outnumbered and financially exhaustedFrederick,58 absorbing the bulk of the French military effort.

Victories such as Minden (1 August 1759) and Wilhelmstah (24 June 1762)denied the French control of Hanover. Attacks on the French coast, designed todivert forces from the war with Frederick and actively pressed by Pitt, were lesssuccessful, though Cherbourg was temporarily seized in 1758 and itsfortifications destroyed, while the island of Belle Île off the Breton coast,captured in 1761, was held until the peace. A planned French invasion of

Britain in 1759 was thwarted by the British naval victories of Lagos (Portugal)on 19 August and Quiberon Bay on 25 November 1759.Trans-oceanic naval and army superiority, and growing success in the

handling of amphibious forces, led to the capture of all the major centres of theFrench empire bar New Orleans: Louisbourg and the West African slaving baseof Goree (1758), Québec and Guadeloupe, an important West Indian island,(1759), Montréal (1760), Pondicherry, the major French base in India (1761)and Martinique, another important island in the Caribbean (1762). Britishsuccess against France owed much to the neutrality of Spain, which had “been

nursed like a tender child” in the early 1750s.59

However, Charles III, who succeeded to the throne of Spain in 1759, was noanglophile, and he was concerned about a fundamental shift of maritime andcolonial power towards Britain. His attempt to mediate in the conflict wasunsuccessful, while Anglo-Spanish relations were embittered by a number of disputes, including that over the British presence on the Mosquito coast of Nicaragua, whence logwood was exported, an aspect of the long-standingSpanish concern over British breaches of the Spanish commercial andterritorial position in the New World.60

Charles’s attitude helped to encourage French firmness in the face of stiff British ter ritor ial demands during abortive Anglo-French peace negotiations inthe summer of 1761. Similarly, the French devoted major efforts to securingCharles’s alliance, the Duke of Choiseul, foreign minister 1758–61, writingthat he had applied most effort to this end.61 On 15 August 1761 the ThirdFamily Compact and a secret convention were finally concluded, obligingLouis to support Charles in his commercial and colonial disputes with Britain,and Charles to declare war on Britain by 1 May 1762 if peace had not beenconcluded.62 Attacks on Gibraltar, Ireland and Jamaica were discussed, as was

pressure on Portugal, a leading commercial partner of Britain, to abandon her alliance. The determination to hit British trade is especially interesting. Thiswas seen as a way to harm British public credit, and the Bourbons accordinglytried to put pressure on Portugal, Naples and Tuscany.63

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Pitt, the volatile and egocentric Secretary of State for the SouthernDepartment, responded to the new alliance by proposing a pre-emptive attackon Spain, resigning on 5 October 1761 when his plan was rejected. However,the failure of negotiations led to a British declaration of war on 2 January

1762. The Spaniards proved far worse prepared than they had assured theFrench and lost Havana and Manila to British amphibious attacks in 1762.Charles III hoped that gains in Portugal would compensate him for losseselsewhere, regaining colonial losses in Portugal, but his army was not in aposition to repeat Frederick II’s success in Silesia. The invading forces hadsome success in April and May, but a British expeditionary force helped tostiffen the Portuguese defence and thwart Charles.64

Anglo-French discussions through Sardinian intermediaries reflected thefinancial exhaustion of both powers, their desire for an end to the war and

their unhappiness with their allies. The last was especially acute betweenFrederick and both George III, who had succeeded to the throne on 25October 1760, and his leading minister, the third Earl of Bute, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, March 1761–2, and First Lord of theTreasury, May 1762–April 1763. Preliminaries of peace, signed atFontainebleau on 3 November 1762, led to the Peace of Paris (10 February1763).

The terms were better than any that Britain had hitherto received from theBourbons, reflecting her greater success in this war and the absence of any

need to make concessions for her allies. France agreed to restore lands capturedfrom Britain’s German allies: Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, but notfrom Prussia; to return Minorca and to recognize the British gains of Canada,Senegal in West Africa and the West Indian islands of Grenada, Tobago,Dominica and St Vincent. Britain returned several important conquests— Guadeloupe, Martinique, St Lucia, Goree, Belle Ile and Pondicherry—toFrance and left the French a part of the valuable Newfoundland fishery, whichwas believed to be a vital way of training sailors for royal navies. Havana andManila were restored to Spain, but she yielded East and West Florida to Britain,

receiving Louisiana from France in compensation.65

Though not free of controversy, the terms fortified the impression created by the war: that thecolonial and maritime balance of power had been destroyed and that Britanniaruled the waves.

Frederick had not been so fortunate, although, given the odds against him,he had done remarkably well. Whereas Britain was able to cope with her enemies separately, defeating France before fighting Spain, Frederick facedsimultaneously the enmity of Russia, Austria, France and, from 1757, Sweden.He received British financial and military support, but although of

considerable assistance against France, British, Hanoverian and Hessian forcesplayed no role against Frederick’s foremost military rivals, Austria and Russia,and the British refused to send to the Baltic the fleet that he demanded

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repeatedly. Indeed, although British relations with Austria, Russia and Swedenwere very poor, war was not declared.66

Frederick’s survival was the product of good fortune, determination andmilitary success, not only a number of stunning victories, such as Rossbach,

Leuthen, Zorndorf and Torgau, but also the advantage of fighting on interior lines against a strategically and politically divided alliance. Russian interestsentered on East Prussia and Poland, the Austrians were most concerned bySilesia, and, after Rossbach and the repudiation of Klosterseven in late 1757,the French devoted their efforts to the Westphalian conflict with theBritishfinanced and partly manned Army of Observation. Frederick’s task wasfar harder than in the First and Second Silesian Wars. He told Mitchell on 28June 1759 that “what chiefly distresses him is, the number of his enemies”.67

Russian enmity was crucial, but so also was that of Maria Theresa, because he

was very much the major target of Austrian action, as he had not been for mostof the 1740s. Thus the opportunistic diplomacy which Frederick had then usedso skilfully was of little value during the Seven Years’ War.

Although Frederick survived the war, he faced serious setbacks during theconflict. In 1756 he benefited from surprise and his opponents’ lack of preparations. The Saxon army was forced to capitulate on 16 October 1756.The summer and autumn of 1757 was a period of particular difficulty, with aRussian invasion of East Prussia, a Swedish invasion of Pomerania, the Frenchconquest of Hanover, the raising of the siege of Prague and the end of the

Prussian invasion of Bohemia after the Austrian victory at Kolin (18 June), andthe Austrian capture of Berlin and most of Silesia. There was despair at thePrussian court, Frederick’s eldest brother, August William, who was to bedisgraced for failure, writing to the former French envoy of the need for peaceand criticizing his brother.68 Frederick himself was driven to negotiations withthe French, seeking to bribe Madame de Pompadour, while he also pressed theBritish to stage a diversionary attack on the French coast.69 Concern was feltthroughout Britain, Richard Tucker wr iting to his MP brother from Weymouthabout how “greatly mortified” people were.70 Frederick urged the British to

negotiate with the French, adding “everything must be done to dissolve thistriumvirate of France, Austria, and Russia: while that lasts, there is no safety”, 71

a clear warning that the continental war could not be left to take care of itself while the British pursued the maritime struggle with France.

Frederick’s victories at Rossbach (5 November) and Leuthen (5 December 1757) stabilized the situation and encouraged the British to commit troops toGermany, rather as the American victory at Saratoga and their creditable effortat Germantown in 1777 were to encourage French intervention. Though theRussians conquered East Prussia in 1758, their invasion of Brandenburg was

blocked by Frederick at Zorndorf. Thereafter, Frederick was hard—pressedthroughout and desperate on many occasions, but an absence of co-ordinationby his opponents and Frederick’s determination to fight on prevented theoverthrow of Prussian power.

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Although Frederick survived, the Anglo-Prussian alliance did not. Tensionsin what had anyway been a weak link based largely on expedience could notbe contained when the growing desire for peace led both powers toconcentrate on their own interests and to consider alternative alliances. 72

Britain thus ended the war with the Bourbons defeated at sea and in thecolonies, and with the French system in disarray on the Continent. However,greater national confidence in Britain could not disguise Britain’s isolatedposition and the dangers of a Bourbon revanche warned of by critics of thePeace of Paris were to excite governmental attention.73 In the 1760s, however,this concern focused far more on the maritime and colonial dimension and far less on Europe than had been the case in the late 1730s.

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Chapter ThreeBritain and the War of the

Austrian Succession

Having provided an overview, it is necessary to turn back from the relativelywell-studied 1750s and 1760s, because British foreign policy in the 1740s is asubject that has received relatively little attention.1 Since Sir Richard Lodge’sStudies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740 – 1748 appeared in 1930 there hasbeen little of importance devoted to this subject. His book, although firmlybased on thorough research, was flawed on several counts. In a text of 411pages it was extraordinary that Lodge reached 1743 by page 4. His perfunctory

treatment of the events of 1740–42 and his neglect of trends in British foreignpolicy in the late 1730s led to an unbalanced account that suffered from itsfailure to assess elements of continuity and change. Those accustomed toLodge’s other works could not have been surprised by his failure to consultdiplomatic archives in other countries.2 This was an extremely unfortunateomission, as it is impossible to provide either an adequate narrative or anintelligent assessment of the foreign policy of a state if the archives of its alliesand opponents are neglected. Furthermore, it was by no means, uncommon inthe interwar years for scholars to consult archives in more than one country.

Paul Vaucher had done so to brilliant effect in his Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924) and Arthur Wilson was to do so in his French ForeignPolicy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury (1936). Given the role of Hanover in British foreign policy, it was unfortunate that Lodge did not chooseto work there, doubly so as the bombing and floods of the 1940s destroyedmost of the material that would have been so useful.3

Lodge’s account of foreign policy centred on British diplomacy. Foreignpolicy was the prerogative of a small group, and domestic pressures on theformulation and conduct of foreign policy were substantially discounted.

Lodge did not consider the extent and nature of parliamentary and mercantileinfluence, nor did he study the impact of public opinion. This largely reflectedthe prejudice that so many diplomatic historians of the period had in favour of their accustomed sources and their lack of interest in the workings of the

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British political system. More recently, Graham Gibbs has shown howeighteenth-century foreign policy can be better understood when diplomacy isplaced in the context of the politics of the period, and in particular the role of Parliament and of the press. There is a clear need for his lead to be followed in

order to examine the way in which foreign policy was influenced by the viewsand interests of the political nation.This is especially important in the case of the War of the Austrian

Succession, when domestic British politics were in turmoil and ministriesunstable. Foreign policy was a major element of political debate within theministries, in Parliament and in print. The conduct of foreign policy was notprotected from the impact of political strife. Secretaries of State and manydiplomats, such as Robert Trevor, were political figures subject to removal for political reasons. Foreign policy was not conceived or conducted by a large

bureaucracy, but by a small group of men, most of whom were parliamentariansand acutely aware of the sensitivity of the political nation to issues of foreignpolicy. The two Secretaries of State sat in the House of Lords and wereexpected to play a major role in defending ministerial policy, particularlyforeign policy, whilst several diplomats were MPs.

It is clear that Lodge’s approach is an unsatisfactory one, and that Britishforeign policy during this period is a field that requires research. This isapparent when general works on eighteenth-century British foreign policy areconsidered. They are forced to depend heavily on Lodge, and suffer as a

consequence. J.R.Jones produced the surprising comment that the causes of the War of the Austrian Succession “largely lay well outside the range of Br itishknowledge and interests”.4

The causes of the war were indeed complex, but they were closely relatedto some of the major preoccupations of British foreign policy in the 1730s,and, indeed, the 1740s as a whole provided an opportunity to test, during aperiod of crisis and war, assumptions and expectations engendered during theprevious period of peace. Between 1725 and 1735 British foreign policy in theage of Walpole has been well covered, but after 1735 there has been far less

attention, except in the important field of relations, principally colonial andcommercial with Spain. Vaucher’s study, mentioned above, devoted its sectionon Anglo-French relations in the late 1730s largely to the Spanish issue, asubject that was also covered ably by Richard Pares.5 There are no major workson relations with Austria and Prussia in the period.6 Lodge’s book oneighteenth-century Anglo-Prussian relations suffers from a failure to consider Prussian sources adequately and has little to say about this period. 7 Hanover inthe 1730s requires study, and there is nothing comparable to Uriel Dann’sinteresting work on the relationship between Hanover and Britain in the

period 1740–60.8

As a result it is difficult for histor ians to appreciate the relationship between,foreign policy in the late 1730s and during the War of the Austrian Succession.The supposedly pacific and isolationist policy of the late 1730s has been

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BRITAIN AND THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

associated with the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole (1721–42), while the moreaggressive and pugilistic policy of 1742–4 has been associated with LordCarteret, Secretary of State for the Northern Department in those years. As aresult, it is easy to suggest that the change in British policy corresponded with

and was a consequence of the change in the ministry. However, a considerationof the foreign policy of the late 1730s suggests that the conventional view of Walpole’s foreign policy requires cor rection.

The fact that Walpole was opposed to military intervention in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5) has been used to characterize him asisolationist. In fact, the British attempt to end the war by the use of goodoffices, and the active policy Britain followed during it, in encouraging statessuch as the United Provinces and Denmark to oppose the French, in staging amajor naval mobilization and in intervening actively to attempt to thwart

French schemes in Russia, Sweden and Turkey, would suggest that the situationwas more complex. Walpole was ready to send a substantial naval force to theTagus in 1735–7 to support Portugal against a threatened Spanish attack, and inthe late 1730s the British ministry took steps towards the development of analternative to the Anglo-Austrian alliance, which had collapsed in 1733.Approaches were made to Russia for an alliance, and interest was displayed inbetter relations with Prussia, where it was hoped that the eventual death of Frederick William I and the accession of Frederick II, George II’s nephew,would lead to an alliance. This interest in a northern alliance system, which

owed much to Walpole’s brother Horatio, indicates the extent to which foreignpolicy in the late 1730s was by no means stagnant, and calls into question theview, expressed by Stephen Baxter and, for a later period, Michael Roberts,that eighteenth-century British foreign policy was conservative, trapped in astraitjacket of past concepts and unable to innovate.9

By suggesting that foreign policy in the late 1730s was different to theaccepted interpretation, it becomes necessary to re-examine the diplomacy of both the last three years of the Walpole ministry and of Carteret.10 It is wrongto argue that Carteret’s policy of a strong alliance against France originated in

the spring of 1742 when Walpole fell. The opposition indeed condemnedWalpole for allegedly failing to halt French progress in Europe. Sir JamesLowther, an opposition MP, wrote to his Cumbrian agent in April 1742, “Thetroops are getting ready to embark immediately for Flanders. The French seemto be startled now, we should have [had] no chance of preserv-ing the libertiesof Europe, if Sir Robert had continued in the direction of foreign affairs.”

In fact, the Walpole ministry had set out to create such an alliance in late1739, when it became clear that war between Britain and Spain was inevitable.It was widely believed by the ministry, British diplomats and the press that

France would support Spain, and that a united Bourbon pact would prove aredoubtable opponent. In August 1739 Newcastle informed Hardwicke, “Wetake it for granted, that France will join Spain, and that we shall be attacked athome…” Frederick William I drew the attention of Dickens to the

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consequences of French intervention, “if France joined with Spain we [theBritish] should to be sure stand in need of land forces”. The British envoy inParis, James, 1st Earl Waldegrave, sought to persuade Fleury “that his sidingwith Spain in her unjust practices is the sure way to engage a general war,

which will probably end in a general alliance against France and Spain. I haveput him in mind of past times, and the distresses France was in the years 10 and11, [1710–11]…”11 Far from relying on the pacific instincts of Fleury, theministry feared war with France. Newcastle told the House of Lords inNovember 1739, in an interesting speech which throws light on the Britishperception of the French constitution,

…notwithstanding the great age of the present prime minister of thatKingdom, notwithstanding his present peaceable disposition we cannot

entirely trust to it: we know he can alter that disposition, when he findsit proper or necessary so to do; we know the animosity that has so longsubsisted between that nation and this: we know the regard the people of France have for the royal family of Spain; and therefore the primeminister of that Kingdom, notwithstanding the arbitrary form of their government, may, like the ministers in other countries, be forced tochime in with the general inclinations, perhaps the general whim, of hiscountrymen. Many things may induce the French to alter their presentmeasures, and as their king is absolute master within his dominions, the

effects of that alteration may, and probably will be instantaneous.12

The ministry believed that it would be impossible simply to fight a naval war against the Bourbons. France could threaten Hanover with ease and, bymenacing the United Provinces, could prevent them from offering Britain theassistance she considered herself entitled to by past agreements. Foreign troopsmight be needed to defeat an invasion, for, as Newcastle pointed out in thespeech above, “the coast of France lies more convenient for invading thiskingdom, than any other coast in Europe”.

Convinced that they would need military assistance, the British ministry soughtin late 1739 and in 1740 to construct an anti-French alliance. This policy was theproduct neither of the War of the Austrian Succession nor of Carteret.Furthermore, the Secretaries of State of this period, Newcastle and Harrington,were to hold that office throughout much of the War of Austrian Succession. Bythe spring of 1740 the diplomatic strategy that was to be associated with Carterethad been clearly enunciated, and in March Fleury told the Swedish envoy Tessin,“L’Angleterre voudrait voir toute l’Europe contre nous.” The despatch of a Frenchfleet to the West Indies to prevent Britain overthrowing the Spanish Empire

increased tension. The Lord Privy Seal, Lord Hervey wrote “so black a prospect Inever saw”. Hardwicke told the House of Lords that war with France was likely“unless His Majesty can form such a confederacy upon the continent, as will makeit dangerous for any power in Europe to disturb the tranquillity thereof”.13

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The search for an alliance system represented a rejection of pressure for apolicy of national self-sufficiency that had played a major role in the agitationfor a mar itime war with Spain in 1738–9. The notion that such a war could besuccessful was linked to a sense that Britain could abstract herself from

European diplomacy and its commitments, and, indeed, that it was desirable todo so. Sir William Keith wrote in the Citizen of 27 July (os) 1739:

every transaction of that kind during the last century, has operatedstrongly to the disadvantage of Britain, by draining her of her treasure,and encouraging other nations to become her rivals in trade; hejudiciously prefers a powerful armament by sea, and looks on a Britishadmiral, at the head of his fleet, to be by far the best ambassador andplenipotentiary, that can be made use of in a conjuncture such as the

present’. An emphasis on self-sufficiency was linked to a sense of the transience of international relations and the ingratitude of allies. Thus, Keith found

such an universal change in the face of public affairs throughout allEurope, from what it was thirty years ago: the political views of everystate seem to be inverted, and their former schemes wholly abandoned.Great Britain, which then made so glorious a figure at the head of a

grand and powerful alliance, in defence of the liberties of Europe… isnow insulted by some, and despised by others, of those very powers, whoat that time acknowledge themselves to have owed their preservation tothe benignity of her councils, and the force of her arms.

An anti-French alliance intended to intimidate France was not the same as analliance intended to fight France, but the French decision in 1741 to exploitMaria Theresa’s accession by attacking Austria produced this shift. The situationwas made more complex by the unexpected Prussian invasion of Silesia in

December 1740, and by the Hanoverian neutrality negotiated in September 1741 when Marshall Maillebois’s army threatened to invade Hanover. Duringthe Wars of the Spanish and Polish Successions, Hanover had been able to relyfor its defence on the army of the Empire, which had operated against Franceon the Rhine with a substantial Austrian contingent. In 1741, however, thatarmy did not exist. Charles-Albert of Bavaria, one of the French-supportedpretenders to a share in the Austrian inheritance, was elected Emperor asCharles VII in January 1742.

The impact of the double crisis of 1741–the apparent imminent collapse of

Austria and the vulnerability of Hanover—on British policy and on Britishpublic attitudes was serious. In late 1741 there was in Britain a collapse of credibility in ministerial foreign policy. The successful Spanish invasion of Italy,despite the presence in Spanish waters of a substantial British fleet, was blamed

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by the opposition on the Hanoverian neutrality, and ministerial denials hadlittle impact. Furthermore, the progress of the war with Spain in the Caribbeanhad failed to live up to initial British hopes. The deteriorating internationalsituation played a role both in the general election of 1741 and in the

parliamentary crisis of 1741–2 that led to the fall of the Walpole ministry.Of the opponents of Walpole who came to power in the 1740s, two,Carteret and Stair, greatly influenced foreign policy in 1742, whilst another two, Chesterfield and Sandwich, were to be very influential in the later stagesof the war. The manner in which those self-styled Patriots who came to power failed to implement Patriot plans for domestic reforms, such as triennialparliaments and place bills, is well known. There was also a process of compromise and adaptation in foreign policy, but, in fact, the Patriot positionwas less clear and consistent than is generally appreciated.

The positions of Stair and Carteret indicate some of the ambiguities of thePatriot legacy. Though Stair had served as envoy in Paris in 1715–20 during thenegotiation and first years of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, he had alwaysbeen critical and suspicious of the French, sufficiently so as to lead to ministerialreprimands and the eventual French demand for his recall.14 During the Walpoleministry there had been no doubt of Stair’s opposition to France and partiality for Austria.15 In March 1742 he was appointed envoy to The Hague, charged withbringing the Dutch into active measures against France, his appointment a clear sign of the desire for action. Until November 1743 Stair, both at The Hague and

in command of the Pragmatic army, the largely British force that was sent to helpthe Austrians, fervently urged the prosecution of the war with France with theutmost vigour. In August 1742 the well-informed, long-serving Sardinian envoy inLondon, Ossorio, referred to Stair as disposing of all the states of Europe as if hewas ruler, and in November Stair wrote to Trevor,

I am sure it is both the Interest and the Glory of the King our Master and of our Country, to remain firmly united, according to our Engagements, with the Queen of Hungary. If we continue to govern

ourselves by that plain and simple politick, we shall have all the weightthat we can desire to have in Europe, we shall be lookt upon by everyPrince and State as the disinterested restorers and Protectors of Liberty,and in a little time, we shall come to have a great deal of influence on theCounsels of the Republick [United Provinces], much more than we havehad for twenty years past, whilst we valued ourselves upon our skill of negotiating more than upon our good faith, in following the interest andhonour of the Nation.16

Stair’s vigour was applauded by the opposition press, but it fell foul of GeorgeII’s concern for Hanoverian interests and of the reality of betrayal, compromiseand difficulties which characterized the kaleidoscopic international relations of the 1740s.17

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Carteret’s vigorous espousal of the anti-French cause was marked by acertain degree of pragmatism. Secretary of State in 1721–4 during the periodof alliance with France, Carteret had been regarded as untrustworthy, if notpro-Austrian, by French diplomats, whilst he had proclaimed his support for

Austria to the Austrian diplomat Pentenriedter.18

An anonymous Frenchmemorandum of 1736 claimed that he was less pro-French than most Britishpoliticians, and this was to be proved correct.19 In the House of Lords in May1739 he argued that the recently signed treaty with Denmark was “only a goodbeginning. Not of use on the continent, unless you gain Prussia.” In 1741 hecalled in Parliament for help to be given to Austria, and wrote that Parliamentlooked upon it “as a national concern”.20

When Carteret took over the effective conduct of foreign policy, he soughtto implement ideas that have been subsequently praised by historians. More

pragmatic than Stair and the Opposition, he was prepared to accommodatehimself to George II’s Hanoverian interests. Therein probably lay the source of his influence over the king, for, as with Townshend in 1729–30, and Newcastlein the early 1750s, George II was happiest with Secretaries of State whoappreciated his Hanoverian concerns.21 These were not simply schemes for aggrandisement, as they were often portrayed by opposition spokesmen.George was primarily concerned with the security of Hanover, particularlyafter Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia drove home the power andunpredictability of Hanover’s Prussian neighbour.22

However, Carteret’s policies provide a classic instance of the significance of one of the most important but neglected fields of research in this period, therelationship between domestic and foreign policy. For an experiencedpolitician, a former holder of high ministerial office and a long-standingparliamentarian, Carteret’s neglect of the domestic context of foreign policywas remarkable. This was particularly so as the country where he had served asBritish envoy with considerable success, Sweden, was one where the closeinterrelationship of domestic politics and foreign policy was clear. Abroad withGeorge II in 1743, Carteret failed to keep his minister ial colleagues in London

informed of policy; “the Coffee House joke is that Ld C was looking over themap and by some accident the ink fell down and blotted out England, sincewhich he has never thought of it”. Carteret claimed that international relationsmoved too fast for consultation with the ministers in London.23

Carteret’s adventurous policies for an anti-French league led him to seek toarrange territorial settlements of disputes in Italy and the Empire, the boldnessof which was criticized in Britain. He was compared on several occasions withDon Quixote.24 Carteret’s alliance strategy would arguably have been harmlessenough during peacetime, not too different from the Anglo-French-Spanish

alliance he had been involved in during the early 1720s, or Newcastle’sImperial Election scheme of the early 1750s. However, his wide-ranging planswere far more dangerous because they were developed in war.

Like his former patron, James, Viscount Stanhope, whose intellectual ability

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and ambitious foreign policy played a major role in landing Britain in a war with Spain in 1718 that coincided with a domestic political crisis, Carterethelped to create a very dangerous situation. His vigorous anti-French policyled to war between Britain and France, and thus French support of the Jacobite

invasion plan of 1744, support that was more dangerous than the Spanishsupport for Jacobite schemes that Stanhope provoked in 1719. There hadalways been French sympathy for Jacobitism and a willingness to contemplatemilitary support for the Jacobites. It was the policies of the Carteret ministrythat turned the sympathy that had failed to produce action in 1733 and 1740,when the Jacobites urged the invasion of a divided Britain, into the supportthat led to French troops being assembled near Dunkirk for an invasion in thespring of 1744. If Carteret underestimated the Jacobite threat this was true of most of the ministers of the per iod, but not of Walpole. Furthermore, Carteret’s

policies were threatened by his failure to understand the danger posed byJacobitism and by French support for it.25

Carteret’s failure fully to appreciate the difficulties of alliance politics issurprising given his experience. He underestimated the difficulties of settlingdifferences between the two major pillars of his alliance strategy, Austria andSardinia, and also between Austria and Bavaria. Carteret also failed to grasp thedifficulties of bringing the United Provinces to escalate hostilities with France.In August 1743 the British envoy in Vienna, Thomas Robinson, remindedCarteret that he had repeatedly said,

that in a triple alliance it is not sufficient for one, or other, or two of theparties, to be of this or of that sentiment; and that notwithstanding thatthe greatest complaint of this Court is the want of a system at this timeof day, yet nothing more can be said, till the Courts of Vienna and Turinare upon such a footing, as to have a confidence in each other jointlywith the King, when, and when alone the only plan to be formed, maybe laid upon that true foundation.26

Parliamentary speakers and the press returned constantly to the theme of theFrench threat to the international system and discussed it in terms of thebalance of power and the liberties of Europe.27 Public and ministerial war aimsand discussion of international relations interacted. In 1744 Trevor wrote fromThe Hague that French support for the Jacobites

gives a flat lie to the boasted moderation, and innocence of her views;and must convince every subject of the Republick as well as of England,that not only the possessions of the House of Austria, and the Balance of

Power, but even our own liberties, and religion, are struck at by thatambitious power. The following year Harrington blamed French support for Jacobite efforts

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against George II on their “resentment for the generous stand he has made inthe defence of the Liberties of Europe”. The language used by contemporarieswas very ambiguous, doubtless part of its attraction. Phrases such as “Balance of Power” and “Liberties of Europe” were capable of many interpretations. In

1746 Frederick the Great told Thomas Villiers, then Minister Plenipotentiaryin Berlin, that he hoped the Austrians would lose territory in Italy. Villierscommented, “His Prussian Majesty acknowledged, that a Balance of Power should be maintained in Europe, but is jealous of, and dreads the great weightof Austria.” Villiers tried to persuade Count Heinrich von Podewils, thePrussian foreign minister, that French ambitions in the Austrian Netherlandsthreatened the whole of Europe “by representing in a true light the danger toall Europe, particularly to His Prussian Majesty, from the increasing power of the House of Bourbon, to prevail on him to persuade his master to save the

Low Countries from the ambition of France”. However, Podewils told Ginkel,the Dutch envoy in Berlin, that he disagreed “as he sincerely wished for thepreservation of a just Balance of Power in Europe; but would not allow, that alike equilibrium was endangered by the progress of the French arms in theLow Countries”. The ambiguity of the language employed was obvious, andVilliers himself told Podewils “that if we and His Prussian Majesty reallypursued different systems, no great service, no cordiality, whatever expressionsmight be employed, could be expected on either side”.28

Many of the key parliamentary debates of the early 1740s were devoted to

foreign policy. Only a minority of the MPs and peers spoke in the debates, andit is unclear how far the language used in the debates was an attempt topersuade undecided parliamentarians. Clearly there were constraints created bythe royal prerogative in foreign policy, but the record of debates suggests thatmost topics were touched on and that the opposition displayed very littlerespect for the royal prerogative. The information available to parliamentarianswas of high quality, given the difficulties of procuring reliable informationconcerning the plans of other states. It was not too different from theinformation available to the ministry. Foreign envoys sought to keep

parliamentarians sympathetic to their cause by providing them withinformation. In 1741 several MPs asked Haslang, the Bavarian envoy, for Bavarian memoranda, whilst Parliament could expect to receive informationfrom ex-diplomats.29 In the November 1745 debate on the navy, HoratioWalpole “went thro’ the whole state of Europe”.30 Ministers frequently usedanticipated parliamentary opposition as an excuse to refuse requests from other powers, but it is also clear from other correspondence between ministers that,even when the ministry possessed a workable majority, it was concerned aboutthe parliamentary implications of foreign policy and the likely views of

domestic critics. In 1740 Newcastle stressed, in a letter to Hardwicke, the need not to give any handle, by any engagements we should contract with Prussia,to the Court of France, to say they had, and always intended, to observe a

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perfect neutrality, with regard to our disputes with Spain; But that we hadforced them into the war, by entering into engagements with Prussia,directly contrary to those, we knew, they had contracted with the Court of Palatine; and this would be resounded here, much to our disadvantage.

In 1745 Harrington, a minister not noted for expressing concern aboutParliament, reported to Newcastle on talks he was conducting at Hanover withthe Bavarian envoy, Count Königsfeld: “I see no great prospect of our beingable to conclude anything with that Prince, which will be justifiable inParliament.”

In 1747 Henry Pelham, brother of Newcastle and from 1743 1st Lord of theTreasury, drew attention to the interrelationship of foreign affairs, ministerialstrife and parliamentary peace,

Our Parliament is undoubtedly a good one; and could the King’s servantsbut agree in what is proper to be offer’d to them, I am confident they wouldmeet with no negative. But the perplexed and dangerous situation of affairsabroad makes it very difficult to reconcile minds as to the proper remedy.

It was generally agreed that news of the situation abroad affected parliamentarybusiness.31 In addition, ministers were aware that foreign powers paid greatattention to parliamentary developments. In November 1740 Hardwicke made

this point in the House of Lords: the weight His Majesty’s councils may have at present with the severalcourts of Europe: and can anything add to this weight so much as aprevailing opinion abroad, that there subsists an entire harmony betweenHis Majesty and his Parliament; that his people place an entireconfidence in his wisdom and conduct, and that the whole power of theBritish nation will be applied as he shall think fit to direct it.

The following March Fleury and the French foreign minister Amelot discussedParliament with Anthony Thompson, Waldegrave’s chaplain, who wasresponsible for British representation in Paris from November 1740 until therupture of diplomatic relations in March 1744, his low rank indicating thepoor state of relations. In 1743 Carteret wrote to Newcastle from The Hagueand attributed the “happy change in this Country since I was here in October last” primarily to parliamentary developments,

They have a good opinion of the stability of our affairs in England,

which they had not when I was here last, but the great majority whichHis Majesty had in Parliament all the last session had an excellent effecthere, and the more because it was not expected; this they have franklyowned to me.

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Carteret returned to the theme of the impact of domestic support on theforeign perception of British strength and determination in 1762.32

It is clear from foreign diplomatic correspondence that European states didindeed place great weight on Parliament, though it is apparent that continental

rulers did not find it easy to appreciate the workings of the Britishparliamentary system or the issues at stake. They were also conscious of thesignificance of British ministerial instability. In March 1746 Villiers reportedfrom Berlin,

On the 2d inst. Count Podewils told me, that he was informed by acourier from M.Andrie, that many of His Majesty’s principal Ministersand high Officers of State had resigned their employments; whichextraordinary event he thought was very unfortunate, as it must retard

the dispatch of business in a most critical time, and might put our Alliesunder great difficulties and doubts, very pernicious to England. He askedwho could tell but what the Dutch, dispirited by the loss of Brussels,might now send orders to M.Twickel to sign immediately a peace, or aneutrality, with France.

To Podewils’s suggestion that the ministerial change might affect British policy,Villiers replied

that the noblemen, said to have flung up their posts, had ever been, andwere still I was convinced, so zealous for the present reigning family, thatit could in no respect relate to the unnatural rebellion in Great Britain,or occasion the least alteration in the principles of our government withregard to the King of Prussia.33

The impact of Parliament on the British ministry and on other states was themost important instance of the influence on policy of the British system of government. Another more nebulous sphere was that of the impact of the press

and of public opinion, especially in the major cities.34

There are importantconceptual problems in the discussion of public opinion. Public opinion onforeign policy intersected most obviously with dissension over domesticpolitics in the dispute over the role of Hanover and of Hanoverian troops, anissue that was raised in Parliament, the press and within the ministry.35

It is difficult to assess the effects of the agitation. Opposition politiciansclaimed that their moves to prevent a continuation of subsidies to Hanover were popular. George Bubb Dodington warned the Commons in December 1743:

If every man in this House were to be silent upon that head the peoplewithout doors would soon find out what tools they were made of; theywould soon perceive their being sacrificed to the interests and views of

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Hanover; and this would render every honest man in the nation not onlydiscontented with our public measures, but disaffected to the illustriousfamily now upon our throne; the necessary consequence of which wouldbe, that our present constitution must overturn our present establishment,

or our present establishment must overturn our present situation. The following month, Sandwich called upon the Lords to heed the generalvoice:

It may be hoped that these sentiments will be adopted, and theseresolutions formed by every man who hears, what is echoed through thenation, that the British have been considered as subordinate to their ownmercenaries, mercenaries whose service was never rated at so high a

price before, and who never deserved even the petty price at which their lives used to be valued; that foreign slaves were exalted above thefreemen of Great Britain, even by the King of Great Britain, and that onall occasions, on which one nation could be preferred to the other, thepreference was given to the darling Hanoverians.

In the same debate, the Duke of Marlborough declared:

It is not possible to mention Hanover, or its inhabitants, in any public

place, without putting the whole house into a flame, and hearing onevery hand expressions of resentment, threats of revenge, or clamours of detestation. Hanover is now become a name which cannot be mentionedwithout provoking rage and malignity, and interrupting the discourse bya digression of abhorrence.36

James, thirteenth Earl of Morton, a keen supporter of Sir Robert Walpole (bythis stage Earl of Orford), agreed that the people were opposed to thecontinuance of the Hanoverian subsidies, but argued that “the man who would

gain the people’s favour by injuring their interest, is not a friend, but asycophant”. The Swedish scholar Kalm, visiting England on his way to Americain 1748, went on a tr ip from London to the countryside near Little Gaddesdenand “saw a watermill at one place, which differed in nothing from ours morethan that here there were quartered a fr ightful number of large rats, which theycalled Hanoverian rats”. A sixpenny opposition ballad of 1744 claimed

Abroad our gallant Army fightsIn Austria’s Cause, for G-rm-n Rights

By English Treasure fedHessians and Hano— tooThe gainful Trade of War pursue,With C—T [Carteret] at their Head.37

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The Pelhams were probably encouraged in their opposition to Carteret’spolicies by the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary agitation, Chesterfield,in opposition, praised Newcastle for his opposition to the Hanoveriansubsidies. Newcastle, however, was careful to maintain the formalities of

ministerial advice. In June 1745 he wrote to Harrington, then with George IIin Hanover, that the ministers in London offered suggestions “from a sense of our duty to His Majesty, and a just concern for his service, and that of our country”. The following month, the ministers emphasized their “duty to theKing” when pressing the importance of detaching Frederick II from France. 38

The issue of Hanover is a good instance of the manner in whicheighteenth-century British foreign policy was debated widely. As royal concernwas most marked in the case of Hanoverian interests, the issue also provides anopportunity to assess the role of the King in foreign policy and his strength in

domestic politics. In recent years there has been a substantial reassessment of the role of the eighteenth-century British monarchy, with important work byBlanning, Clark, Gregg, Hatton and Mackesy. Light is thrown on George II’sinfluence in foreign affairs by work by Black, Dann and Owen.39 It could besuggested that the ministerial instability of 1742–6, although it exposedGeorge to defeats in the field of domestic politics, in particular his failure tosupport Carteret effectively in both 1744 and 1746, gave him more leeway inthe field of foreign policy than he would otherwise have possessed. It isinstructive to compare 1729, when the ministers in London sought to

influence George’s and Townshend’s negotiations in Hanover with theWittelsbachs, 1735 and 1741, when there was anxiety in London over George’snegotiations whilst in Hanover, and 1743, when the impotence of the Londonministers was seen clearly. The extent to which ministers were forced to defendthe Hanoverian subsidies in the sessions of the 1740s is an indication of thepower of George, for there is little doubt about their disquiet on the subject.The issue of Hanoverian subsidies was the public expression of much wider disquiet about the influence of Hanover on British foreign policy and the roleof Hanover in British public life. Subsidies were an issue that could be readily

grasped and on which a popular campaign could be mounted.It was, in contrast, far more difficult to debate the major impact of Hanover onpolicy, namely, the attempts in 1744–7 to create an alliance directed against Prussiathat in some forms included the idea of a partial partition of Prussia. Theseschemes, strongly supported by George II, could be defended on diplomaticgrounds. Prussia had shown that it was hostile to Britain and an unpredictableforce; her enmity to Austria distracted Austrian attention from the war withFrance. In 1741 it had been hoped that a lasting Austro-Prussian settlement couldbe negotiated. Horatio Walpole had written to Trevor of Frederick II, “Europe is

undone if he once joins heartily with France; and we must gain him as the onlyway of salvation.” Trevor himself had noted that the Dutch were “sensible howabsurd, and unnatural it was for the Maritime Powers, unless in a case of the lastnecessity, to come to any open breach with the House of Prussia”.40

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George II was less prepared to tolerate Prussian aggrandizement. Hislongstanding quarrel with Prussia was exacerbated by personal pique,specifically the rejection of his patronage by his nephew, Frederick II. On 6January 1741 George responded to the Prussian invasion of Silesia by telling

the Saxon envoy, Utterodt, that Frederick could not be trusted, that the flimsynature of his pretexts over Silesia meant that no one could feel secure in their German possessions, that Hanover was exposed and that Frederick was a ruler for whom ambition and aggrandizement were the sole guides. Opposition toPrussia became George’s leitmotif in the war, but it never became one of theBritish war aims, in so far as the latter were ever officially articulated. Frederickwas convinced, with reason, that George worked secretly to defeat his Britishministry’s efforts for better Anglo-Prussian relations.41

If ministerial speeches in Parliament can be taken as a source for war aims,

then it is clear that opposition to Prussia was never given the priority thatFrance enjoyed, although there is no doubt that many politicians and, inparticular, diplomats became very concerned about Prussian policy. Hardwickewrote of the 1744 Prussian invasion of Bohemia,

That your Ladyship may see Monsr. de Prusse’s reasons for disturbingboth the queen of Hungary’s repose and mine, I take the liberty to sendyou inclosed one of his authentic manifestos, printed at Berlin, which hehas dignified with the new affected title of Exposé. But new ways of

acting require new terms to justify them; and he must find out still more,before he will be able to convince the world that perfidy is Patriotism, or that an enterprize manifestly concerted in time and manner only to createa diversion in favour of France, was design’d merely to preserve therights of the Germanic Body and its head.

However, the London ministers urged the subordination of opposition to Prussiato the war with France, Newcastle writing in 1745, “We are sensible, that manyarguments may be used, to shew, how desirable it would be, for the good of

Europe, to reduce the power of the King of Prussia: But, as we humbly apprehend,there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all those argumentsare out of the question.”42 Flemming, the influential Saxon envoy in London,argued in 1745, in a dispatch intercepted and deciphered by the British ministry,that the only way to get Britain to act against Prussia, as the Saxons wished, was byco-operating behind a “mask” that stressed the French threat. Newcastle regardedmoves against Prussia as a dangerous diversion:

how little…was to be expected from France, if the King of Prussia was

not previously detached…We are sensible, that many arguments may beused to shew, how desirable it would be for the good of Europe, toreduce the power of the King of Prussia: But as we humbly apprehend,there cannot be shewed any possibility of doing it at present; all these

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arguments are out of the Question…the Question appears to us, not tobe, whether the King of Prussia shall retain Silesia, or not; But whether H.M. and the States should have the merit of obtaining it for him. 43

The ambiguity in British aims, which essentially put George II in oppositionto most of his ministers, was matched by one within the alliance. Austria wasmost concerned with Prussia, and, as Robinson had warned in August 1744,was ready to consider a unilateral peace with France in order to concentrateher efforts against Prussia.44 Uneasy about Austro-French peace feelers, theBritish ministry was very concerned about the military consequences of Austria’s priorities, the withdrawal of Charles of Lorraine from the Rhine in1744 in order to confront Frederick and the poor state of Austrian forces in theAustrian Netherlands.45 Austrian policy prefigured the “Diplomatic

Revolution” of 1756 and represented a continuation, to a certain degree, of thepreoccupation with east-central Europe that had played such a major role inAustrian policy in 1726–33, and of the Austro-French alliance of 1735–41.Newcastle complained in August 1745,

the behavior of the Queen of Hungary, in totally abandoning theNetherlands; and the refusal of the Court of Brussels to let the placesthere have the defence, which the nature of their situation gives them, bythe inundation; have raised here the utmost resentment against the Court

of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular, than it formerlyhad been. And when it shall be known, that the Court of Vienna hasformally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, at present sonumerous, by making up with the King of Prussia, and persist inpursuing their own particular views, and interests, at the expence of their allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any assistancefrom this country in the support of those measures.

Trevor hoped that the Austrians would send troops to the Austrian Netherlands

in order to “sweeten humours in England”. When in September 1747,Sandwich, British Minister Plenipotentiary at the peace talks at Breda, had along conversation with his French counterpart, Puyzieulx, he did not hideBritish anger at Austrian conduct. The following month George II told Ossoriothat he was totally fed up with the Austrians.46

Such attitudes were not new. In the late 1730s the British responded to theAustro-French alignment by hoping that relations with Prussia and Russiacould be improved and by talking of a Protestant alliance. As the Russians werenot Catholics, they could be incorporated into the idea of a Protestant alliance.

Frederick II’s policies made such a solution difficult during the 1740s, thoughthere was still considerable press support for the idea of a Prussian alliance. Therenewed efforts devoted to winning Russian support at the end of the war were a response to both suspicion of Prussia and anger with Austria.

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Part of the problem in assessing the 1740s is psychological. The War of theAustrian Succession lacked the heroic qualities and the successes of the War of the Spanish Succession and the Seven Years’ War. It appears to many to be of limited significance. Such a view is a false one. The conflict was of great

importance in European international relations, British policy and the Britishpublic debate about foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Indomestic British politics the war was of major significance, as is shown in thechapters on the Crown and on Parliament. It was a vital element in ministerialand parliamentary politics, and in the crucial issue of the relationship betweenthe Crown and the rest of the political system.

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Chapter Four Anglo-French relations,

1740 – 56

When it is once taken God knows what will be the consequence, but theleast bad must be bad enough.

—Chesterfield on impending fall of Bergen-op-Zoom, 17471

the taking the proper measures for maintaining and improving the OldAlliance…only solid system of Europe…I am afraid your Royal Highnesswill find this more difficult with our friends in England, than your Royal

Highness imagines, I doubt the great objection to me and my politics ismy known and firm resolution never to vary from that principle—Newcastle to Cumberland, November 17482

Any account of how Br itain achieved naval and colonial mastery by 1763 mustnecessarily include a discussion of such matters as naval strength andadministration, military planning, the neutrality of Spain until 1761 and thetoo-oft overlooked question of respective financial strengths.3 It is important toremember the role of chance, not least in the defeat of the French invasion

plans of 1759 at Lagos and Quiberon Bay. It is also necessary to look at theobjectives of British policy and power, not least the determination toconcentrate resources on North America. This constituted an obvious contrastwith Britain’s previous conflict, her participation in the War of the AustrianSuccession. Britain signalled her commitment to fight in 1742 by sendingtroops to the Austrian Netherlands, whereas in 1755 she ordered her ships toprevent the despatch of French reinforcements to Canada. In 1743 Britain’smilitary effort had centred on the western parts of the Empire, where GeorgeII fought an unexpected battle at Dettingen, in 1744–8 on the unsuccessful

defence of the Low Countries.In the Seven Years’ War, in contrast, there was no possibility of Britaindefending the Low Countries. The Austrian-ruled Netherlands were thenallied to France, while the United Provinces were neutral. As an ally of

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Frederick II and in order to protect Hanover, British troops did campaign inGermany from 1758,4 but the military commitment to the Continentwas relatively far less than in the previous war. This was due to the interwar shift in British views on foreign policy, and indeed on Britain’s place in the

world.Another shift was that in Anglo-French relations. The two powers hadbeen allied in 1713–14 and 1716–31. Thereafter relations were poor for adecade, but conflict was avoided, both during the War of the PolishSuccession (1733–5) and on account of the outbreak of the Anglo-SpanishWar of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739.5 However, from 1742 until 1763 relations weredominated by war and the threat of war. The cross-currents and ambiguitiesthat had affected British diplomacy and debate about foreign policy in 1713– 31, with Austria, Spain and Russia at times appear ing as serious threats, were

replaced from the early 1740s by a concentration on France that was to lastuntil after the Napoleonic wars despite international changes and aministerial anti-Russian interlude in 1789–91 during a period of Frenchweakness.6 Though not to the same extent, British enmity rose as a priorityfor French foreign policy.

Two other important topics can be discerned in a consideration of Anglo-French relations in 1740–55. The first is the causes of war, for Britain andFrance went to war twice in this period, though in the second case formalhostilities were not declared until the French invasion of Minorca in 1756.

Secondly, the period invites consideration of the relationship betweenshortterm developments in international relations and those in the longue dureé.It also invites discussion of the extent to which an international system existedand the relationship between that, the activities of particular states and theactions and views of individual monarchs and ministers.

There have been valuable studies of British public7 and ministerial8 attitudestowards mid-century foreign policy, including two centring on changingattitudes towards colonial commitments.9 However, there is room for a freshre-examination of the subject based both on a wide range of manuscript

sources and on the contemporary word of print, and by looking at the situationagainst the background of a period when hostility to France and concernabout the colonies had not been axiomatic.

Indeed the impetus behind British foreign policy in the years 1714–39 hadbeen distinctly continental rather than specifically anti-French. This owedmuch to a generally unwanted feature of the Protestant Succession, the defenceof Hanover, which had aroused considerable public debate.10 However, thoughthe Hanoverian Succession altered the political context of the debate aboutBritain’s relations with the Continent and specifically interventionalism, the

essential direction of British policy had been laid by William III following hisinvasion of 1688, the most successful early modern example of thecombination of domestic intrigue and external intervention.11 William hadensured that Britain would be concerned about continental developments,

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ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS, 1740–56

specifically French progress, though the negotiation with Louis XIV of thepartition treaties for the Spanish Succession in 1698 and 1700 demonstratedthat this did not have to be through conflict. This was to be underlined in1713–14, in the brief period of co-operation that followed the Peace of

Utrecht, in 1716–31 during the Anglo-French alliance, and in 1734–5, in thenegotiations at The Hague during the War of the Polish Succession. There wasno obvious reason why this pattern should not be maintained: rivalrymoderated or even diminished by negotiations, but such a pattern did notcharacterize Anglo-French relations during the period 1740–55, and when itwas next seriously attempted, in 1772–3, in response to the First Partition of Poland, it rapidly proved a non-starter.12

The failure to ease relations in mid-century was not due to the French. Asin 1772–3 and 1786, it was the French who launched the major attempt to

improve relations, that made by their foreign minister, Puysieulx, in theaftermath of the War of the Austrian Succession. There was no comparableeffort by the French in Walpole’s last years as minister or when he fell in1742, but the situation then was hardly auspicious. France trod a difficultcourse in 1739–40, neither seeking to tie her foreign policy to the interestsor quixotic policies of her ally, Philip V, by joining him in his war withBritain, nor wishing to needlessly antagonize Spain or, more dangerously,allow Britain to make major Caribbean gains by maintaining a strictneutrality. The message that France did not wish to see such gains was

delivered and backed up by the dispatch of Antin and a powerful French fleetto the West Indies in 1740.However, the British ministry, under the pressure of a bellicose public

opinion that had played a role, albeit not the sole one, in leading to war withSpain,13 was in no position to accept French guidance, let alone Frenchmediation. Waldegrave made it clear to Newcastle that French restraint owed alot to Fleury, “I can observe no disposition in him to quarrel with us, addingthey know, they cannot undertake anything against us, but at a great expenseand hazard; for they cannot depend upon any support from Spain.” Fleury told

Waldegrave that “he was under a sort of necessity of having everything doneunder his eye, hinting that he could not be sure any other way, that hisdirections would be followed”.14

Whether or not an understanding could have been reached with Franceover the Caribbean in 1740, there was no basis for one over the AustrianSuccession, once Fleury’s pacific inclinations had been swept aside. FrederickII’s invasion of Silesia suddenly and unexpectedly made international relationsmore volatile and abruptly increased the opportunities, the stakes and thedangers, not least the danger that, by not acting, France would not only be

unable to advance her own interests but would lose the possible support of other powers. This raised volatility increased the pressure for action on Fleury.Just as in Britain politicians had to consider the possibility that Walpole wouldnot survive the Parliament due to be elected in the elections of 1741, so the

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octogenarian Fleury appeared an inappropriate first minister for a period of opportunity.

As French policy moved towards war with Austria, the scope for anyAngloFrench understanding diminished. This was highlighted by the

domestic political situation in Britain. When in 1741 the threat of a Frenchinvasion of Westphalia led George II to sign a neutrality convention for Hanover, abandoning his attempts to create an anti-Prussian alliance andagreeing to vote for the French-supported Charles Albert of Bavaria as nextEmperor, in short accepting a French-inspired German settlement, thiscaused a political storm in Britain and was not welcomed by the Britishministry. Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II toHanover, informed Thompson that the Convention “is purely an Electoralaffair, and does not in the least tie up His Majesty’s hands, as King, or engage

him to anything relating to his future conduct, as such, or to the affairs of England”.15

This constitutional distinction convinced few in 1741; no more than it wasto do so at the time of the Fürstenbund (anti-Austrian League of Germanprinces) in 1785. Politically the episode was charged with significance. It wasbelieved to provide concrete demonstration of the way in which Hanover controlled British policy. The domestic storm over the episode, and the manner in which the new ministry that replaced that of Walpole in 1742 pressedsuccessfully for the abandonment of the Convention, set the tone for Anglo-

Hanoverian relations for the rest of George II’s reign. It was made clear thatBritain could not be bound publicly by a Hanoverian arrangement, and thateven the suggestion that such was a possibility had to be avoided. This was amarked contrast both to the period of George I’s diplomacy in the GreatNorthern War and to the episode in 1729 when British support had beenpromised against a threatened Prussian attack on Hanover.16 George II wasforced to conceal his anti-Prussian diplomacy in the latter stages of the War of the Austrian Succession. In addition, in 1757 the Convention of Klosterseven,by which Cumberland, commander of the Army of Observation that had failed

to defend Hanover against a superior French force, agreed to disband the army,was disowned by George II under pressure from his British ministers, despitethe fact that the army included no British troops.17

The reception of the neutrality convention of 1741, and later of Klosters-even, demonstrated that it would be impossible to arrange an understandingbetween Britain and France through Hanover or by threatening Hanover.British ministers were not open to suggestions or pressure this way, or at leastdid not wish to be, and most, but not all, British ministers were not interestedin centring Britain’s foreign policy on the defence of Hanover. This was a

marked contrast to the role of the Hanoverian minister Münchhausen in 1748in fostering the idea of British diplomatic intervention in the Empire in order to create a collective security system aimed against France and Prussia, an idea

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that was to serve as the basis of the Imperial Election Scheme but that wouldalso protect Hanover.18

The failure to maintain pressure on George II via Hanover served like thefall of Walpole to exacerbate Anglo-French relations in 1742. It would be

wrong to attribute this to France. She could no more control British politicsthan prevent Frederick II from settling with Austria, thus altering the militarybalance in the Empire, to the advantage of Hanover and the detriment of Bavaria. Louis XIV might have helped to bring down Charles II’s leadingminister Danby, but Britain in 1741–2 was a different political world to 1678– 9. In 1741 the French envoy Bussy denied reports that France had sought tofinance opposition electoral activity.19 While it was in France’s interest for Britain to be weak, and there was also much support for the Jacobites inFrench political circles, it was not in French interest for the Walpole ministry

to be replaced by the more bellicose opposition Whigs.If political attitudes made compromise with France difficult in 1740–42, itis reasonable to consider the source and strength of these attitudes, for anti-French feeling during the wars of 1689–1713 had not prevented asubsequent reconciliation. A major problem was that the Anglo-Frenchalliance of 1716–31 had not been based on empathy and had put down nopolitical roots. This was even more true of the attempts to improve relationsin the 1730s, and in not only The Hague conferences of 1734–5 but also thediscussions of 1736–7: the suggestions of co-operation over the Jülich-Berg

question, the replacement of the provocative French envoy Chavigny by themore conciliatory Cambis, the British attempt to bribe the French foreignminister Chauvelin—all had been part of the world of largely secretdiplomacy. There had been no ministerial defence of good relations withFrance, no attempt to explain the need for an understanding with her. Theministry’s public position had not been helped by divisions within thegovernment over neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession and by theneed to rely on essentially prudential reasons when defending Britishneutrality. As a result, the public debate over foreign policy in 1733–5 had

been largely surrendered to the opposition, as it was also to be at the time of the controversy over Spanish depredations on British trade in 1738–9; or atleast they had been able to take the initiative with their reiterated and relatedcharges of ministerial failure to defend national interests and a seriousdeterioration in international relations.

The French refusal to press their military and diplomatic advantages in the1730s20 had ensured that there was then no international crisis leading Britainclose to war in which the British ministry would be forced to take note of domestic political views, as it was obliged to do over Spanish depredations.

During the War of the Polish Succession, the neutrality of the AustrianNetherlands had been respected, and Belle-Isle’s successful campaign in theMoselle valley in 1734 had not been followed up by an invasion of northern

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Germany. In order to obtain peace with Austria in 1735, France had allowedher alliance with Spain to collapse.

In 1741, however, the situation was very different. In place of the distantthrone of Poland, the integrity of the Habsburg inheritance was at stake. The

French might respect the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands until 1744,thus denying the British the most obvious invasion route into France, but itwas not clear that this respect would last, while elsewhere a comprehensiverecasting of the European system appeared to be a prospect. This apparentlyvindicated hostile British views of France and made the task of suggesting anyaccommodation with her impossible, despite the fact that Britain was alreadyinvolved in a popular war with another power, Spain, and that, as was pointedout, opposition to France would necessarily reduce the effort made againstSpain. The Commons motion of 1741 for a subsidy to Maria Theresa saw both

government and opposition speakers in harmony. Walpole’s protégé Pelham,then Paymaster General, warned of

what may be expected from an emperor whose elevation was procuredby the forces of France…they may all conspire to dismember the empireinto petty kingdoms, and free themselves from the dread of a formidableneighbour, by erecting a number of diminutive sovereigns, who may bealways courting the assistance of their protectors…Thus will the House,by which Europe has been hitherto protected, sink into an empty name,

and we shall be left to stand alone against all the powers that profess adifferent religion, and whose interest is opposite to that of Great Britain. William Pulteney, the leader of the opposition Whigs in the Commons, replied,“I shall not delay, for a single moment, my consent to any measures that mayre-establish our interest on the continent, and rescue Germany once morefrom the jaws of France.”21

That May, however, Bussy sent a lengthy report to Amelot, explaining why itwas in the British interest to try to negotiate differences with France. He

pointed out British vulnerability to invasion, the financial strains of war andthe difficulties of relying on Austria, and suggested that it would be in Br itain’sinterest to settle the pretensions of the various claimants on the Austriansuccession jointly with France.22 This vision of Anglo-French cooperation wasto be offered on a number of occasions during the century, but, as in 1741, itignored not only British domestic political pressures but also the state of international relations. There was no basis of trust in Anglo-French relations, asituation exacerbated in 1741 by the suspicion that France was supporting theJacobites.23 Nevertheless, despite the absence of any AngloFrench co-operation,

Bussy argued that the fall of Walpole would be bad for France. He stressednational antipathy to France, in contrast to Chavigny, who had stressed popular hostility to Walpole in his reports in the 1730s. On 1 January 1742 Bussy wroteof the hostile views of the nation towards France and the black jealousy with

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which French superiority was seen, especially at sea, and doubted that Francecould find a more favourable ministry.24

It might therefore be asked whether the move towards Anglo-Frenchhostilities should be seen as inevitable, a necessary consequence of Walpole’s

fall in early 1742 and the rise of Carteret and of Stair, men who in 1723 hadbeen referred to as members of la cabale autrichienne by the French charged’affaires.25 In qualification of this view it should be pointed out that the twopowers did not formally declare war until 1744 and that eighteenth-centuryinternational conflicts included numerous instances of incomplete hostilities,combatants who were not at war with all their allies’ enemies or who werefighting as auxiliaries only. There was also the obvious points of political choiceand international circumstances. In 1742 the new ministry had the choice of escalating the war with Spain, over which Walpole had been criticized for not

prosecuting it vigorously enough, or of sending military forces to theContinent to oppose France in a commitment whose future extent it would bedifficult to envisage or control. International circumstances might not bepropitious for British intervention, though Austrian successes in the winter of 1741–2 helped to encourage a sense that the French might have beenoverambitious.

The unpredictable nature of the situation and the extent to which ameasure that might appear clear in its likely meaning and/or consequences wasnot necessarily so to contemporaries were suggested in a letter written by John

Drummond MP, an important figure in London mercantile circles who hadbeen a supporter of Walpole and was now one of the new government. Hementioned the British troops to be sent to the Austrian Netherlands, adding“this shows our readiness to do our duty to the Queen of Hungary and tosecure the Barrier of which our King is guarantee…this will rather prevent awar with France than bring it on”.26

Bussy promptly warned Paris that the new ministry intended to assistAustria,27 though the rumours that flourished in the volatile politicalatmosphere that accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole ensured that

contrary reports were received, including the inaccurate suggestion that anenvoy, possibly Chesterfield, would be sent to Paris to attempt to negotiate apeace favourable to Maria Theresa.28 The French ministry was, however, under no illusions about the intentions of the new ministers, Amelot writing to theFrench envoy in Madrid that the government was considering the state of itsfrontier defences.29

An important feature of the discussions about Anglo-French relations in thisperiod, especially at ministerial level, was that they centred on the state of continental affairs. There was scant consideration either of Anglo-French

relations in the colonies or the impact on them of conflict between the twopowers. Indeed, one consequence of the events of 1742 was a move away fromconcern with the colonies. Not only was the Caribbean war with Spainsubstantially abandoned, but the fact that Britain and France were not formally

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at war, but were instead involved as auxiliaries, limited the possibilities of trans-oceanic confrontation between them. As Thomas Anson pointed out in 1743,“We have been fighting all summer in Germany with the French, without awar.” At that stage, there was no conflict between the two powers in North

America, the West Indies or the Indian Ocean.Carteret set out the objectives of the new ministry clearly in a letter to Stair of May 1742,

His Majesty and this whole nation being fully convinced that it is uponthe preservation of the House of Austria in a condition to resist themischievous attempts of that of Bourbon, that the maintenance of thecommon liberties of Europe, the support of the Empire, the continuanceof the Protestant religion, and the secur ity and independence of both the

Maritime Powers [Britain and the Dutch] do chiefly depend.30

Thus British interests were to be identified with a particular state of continental affairs, one that in the circumstances of 1742 dictated conflict withFrance. This was a radical shift from Walpolean precepts and indeed fromWilliam III’s willingness to settle the Spanish Succession with Louis XIVwithout consulting the Austrians, although Carteret, in his successful pressureon the Austrians to yield terr itory to Prussia and Sardinia, was to reveal that hisview of the “preservation of the House of Austria” was not that held in Vienna.

Stair was also clear about his anti-French views, writing in June 1741, while inopposition,

I was always of opinion that it was absolutely necessary for the verybeing of this nation to support a balance of power in Europe, and that itwas the interest of this nation to be on the side of the House of Austria,both because the House of Austria was the weakest, and because theHouse of Austria was not our rivals in trade, nor could be our rivals inpoint of power at sea.

In office the following May, Stair wrote to Robinson,

I have never been nor understood to be a partisan of the House of Bourbon; I have almost always had occasion to consider that House astoo strong, and therefore I have been of opinion, that it was the interestof the king and of the nation of Great Britain, to put their weight intothe scale of the House of Austria; this doctrine I have preached at a timewhen it was neither safe nor fashionable so to do, I think so still.

In 1757 the Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the NorthernDepartment, described France as “the constant…enemy of England”.31 Suchremarks might suggest an immutable hatred of France located firmly in a longue

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dureé of attitudes that constituted an important factor in the structure of Britishforeign policy, but Carteret and Stair, like Newcastle, who was to organize acontinental anti-French diplomatic strategy of containment in 1748–55, hadheld responsible posts during the period of the Anglo-French alliance, Carteret

and Newcastle as Secretaries of State and Stair as envoy in Paris. Carteret andStair had eventually fallen in large part because of their views, while Newcastlehad keenly supported the reconciliation with Austria in 1731, but all had beenprepared to act in accordance with the alliance.

This willingness and the subsequent vigour and stridency of their antiFrench views can be considered from a number of aspects. In the 1720s and1730s France definitely became a more vigorous, powerful and diplomaticallyactive power, the contrast between her military forces at the time of the War of the Quadruple Alliance with Spain (1718–20) and during the War of the Polish

Succession (1733–5) being especially instructive. Thus, a rational explanation of views changing in response to alterations in international relations can beadvanced, though it scarcely testifies to the quasi-emotional force of thearguments advanced. It is also possible to locate a shift in the British politicalcontext. In its early days, the Anglo-French alliance had appeared to be closelylinked to the Hanoverian Succession, as indeed it was. The French had refusedto support Jacobite schemes and the Pretender had been unable to base himself near Paris, as he had done under Louis XIV. After the suppression of theJacobite Atterbury Plot of 1722 the Succession appeared to be less under

threat, a view confirmed by George II’s peaceful accession in 1727 and by theJacobite failure to benefit markedly from the Anglo-French breach of 1731.32

This encouraged a consideration of national interests that did not centre on thedefence of the Hanoverian Succession and thus, diplomatically, on themaintenance of the Anglo-French entente. That entente had not of course beensolely intended or maintained for that purpose, but royal and ministerialconcern about the defence both of Hanover and of the Hanoverian Successionhad given it an impetus and located it in the world of domestic politics.

The other important reason for a shift in consciousness was the

development and definition of opposition Whig views. There had beenopposition Whigs before 1725, both in 1717–20 and in the Cowper Group of the early 1720s.33 They had not, however, concentrated their attacks on foreignpolicy, largely because there were more tempting targets: the radical domesticprogramme of the Stanhope—Sunderland ministry and the attempt to “screen”the South Sea Company. The “new” opposition that began in 1725 devoted far more attention to foreign policy. This was a measure of Walpolean caution indomestic policy, the sense that policy could now be criticized withoutaccusations of Jacobitism and a growing concern about the implications of

British foreign policy. It was one thing to fight Spain and seek to resist theadvance of Russia in the late 1710s, quite another to appear ready in alliancewith France to attack Austria after the negotiation of the Treaty of Hanover in1725. Support for Austria was to be the central theme of opposition Whig

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thinking on foreign policy. It was glanced at in the pseudonymous name of theauthor of the Craftsman, the most influential opposition newspaper, Calebd’Anvers (of Antwerp, a leading town in the Austrian Netherlands), andrepeated in press and Parliament.

As a cause, support for Austria lacked the immediacy, emotional fervour andpopulist possibilities of the Spanish depredations on British trade, which wereto create political difficulties for Walpole in 1729 and 1738–9, but it did offer a means to analyze international relations and British foreign policy whileproviding a historical framework that linked the opposition critique to theanti-French Whig heroes, William III and Marlborough. These views weredeveloped in 1725–42 without having to confront the reality of difficulties inAnglo-Austrian relations.34 They were to guide foreign policy from 1742 until1755, providing the crucial politically acceptable or plausible continental

anchor for an interventionalist diplomacy that support for Hanover andopposition to Prussia could not offer, as George II was made to realize.Carteret and Stair, therefore, acted with the vigour of men who had been

preaching in the political wilderness for a long time a policy that suddenlyseemed to be both really necessary and possible, thanks to a happy combinationof domestic and international circumstances. In such a situation, talk of Anglo-French arrangements and negotiations appeared both dangerous andsuperfluous, and Carteret failed to follow up discussions with Bussy in March1742.35 This was to remain the case until difficulties and failure in war and

growing problems with allies lent urgency to the possibility of peacenegotiations. It was believed that France could not afford a long war,36 and theFrench were well aware of the determination of the new ministry. In June 1742Amelot wrote to Fénelon, the French envoy at The Hague, that France wantedpeace, but did not doubt that the principal opposition would arise from theBritish, who, he wrote, wanted “rétablir la Cour de Vienne dans son anciennesplendeur, mais qui de plus sont animés contre la France d’une fureur qui vajusqu’ au fanatisme”. Fénelon, employing language similar to that which theBritish opposition had used against France for several years, wrote that Britain

wished “se rendre arbitre despotique des affaires de l’Europe”.37

The mood in Britain in the summer of 1742 was optimistic. Drummondwrote in June, “our present great comfort is the King of Prussia’saccommodation with…the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa] and her Hungarian Majesty’s forces good success against the French and their allies inthe Empire …our army which is shipping off with all expedition…will beincreased if necessary”. George Harbin added in August,

If our politicians have good intelligence, the French are to be driven out

of Germany: confined to their own country: Germany to be parcelledout to confederate princes: The new works of Dunkirk entirely to bedemolished: and the ambition of France rendered incapable of disturbingthe peace of Europe for some ages.38

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This optimism flew in the face of the recent experience of the war with Spain,namely deflated hopes, but reflected the hopes of a new government and anapparently propitious international situation.

Optimism was to last until late 1743, when the failure to exploit Dettingen,

the realization that the issue of favour for Hanover would cause aparliamentary storm and growing divisions within the ministry over Carteret’sfailure to consult his colleagues all led to an appreciation of the domesticpolitical implications of the war. The following year, the international situationdeteriorated when France supported the Jacobites openly, Britain became aprincipal in the conflict and Frederick II’s attack on Austria fatallyhandicapped her war effort against France and, therefore, her ability to further Britain’s goals.

The British found, as the French had earlier done, both in the War of

Spanish Succession and in that of the Austrian Succession, that the window of opportunity created by favourable diplomatic and domestic circumstances inthe early stages of a conflict could not survive the problems and exigencies of alliance politics and the pressure of failure. The British lost the ability todetermine how far they should intervene because interests they judged vitalwere directly affected by French support for the Jacobites and by successfulFrench military action in the Austrian Netherlands. In October 1743 theveteran diplomat Horatio Walpole sent his former protégé Trevor, now envoyin The Hague, the accurate prediction that the ministry would survive

parliamentary attacks “but yet I don’t see so clearly as I could wish how weshall make a good end of this war”. Carteret was needlessly optimistic aboutthe value of Britain’s alliances and her relative diplomatic strength vis-à-visFrance, although necessarily so from his own point of view as his views aboutFrance had not diminished in their intensity and he argued that it was crucialto maintain a balance of power against her. Carteret told the House of Lords inDecember 1743

there is an enemy at once nearer and more powerful, an enemy which

equally in peace and war endeavours our destruction, and whose tradeand armies are equally to be dreaded; an enemy so artful, that even theutmost friendship which can subsist between us, is only an intermissionof open hostilities.39

However attractive this view might be for a domestic audience, especially at atime when Carteret was trying to restore his domestic credentials in the face of criticism for apparently favouring Hanover, it was one that was to causeconsiderable difficulties for British foreign policy. The argument that France

could not be trusted limited Britain’s room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis both her allies and France, and that at a time both when wars generally ended as a resultof unilateral negotiations and when such negotiations were common during awar.40 British intransigence also made subsequent compromise at a time of

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peace politically less palatable, and encouraged the French to concentrate their efforts against Britain, in particular by supporting the Jacobites in 1744–6.41

French support for the Jacobites was the immediate cause of the formaloutbreak of war in 1744, just as the French attack on Minorca was to be in

1756. In neither case were these immediate causes the first instance of fighting,let alone of confrontation or hostility between the two powers. In both cases,they were of importance, however, because there was no sharp divide betweenwar and peace in this period, but rather a continuum, including states of undeclared war, that could enable powers to retain a degree of freedom of choice about their commitment to the struggle. A formal declaration of war lessened this dramatically, as well as ensuring that a conflict would have to bewaged in order to obtain the best peace terms. French support for the Jacobiteswas an unambiguous declaration of hostility, and one that caused Britain very

considerable problems in 1744–6. It marked the culmination of Jacobiteaspirations and the French recognition that their conflict with Britain was nota limited war subject to limitations and compromise. By supporting theJacobites, the French were seeking a radical solution, a total victory bothdiplomatically and militarily, in stark contrast to the usual portrayal of ancienrégime warfare and international relations as limited in their aim.

The 1744 war was a failure, a French invasion attempt thwarted more byChannel storms than by the British navy, but French successes in the AustrianNetherlands the following year offered the prospect of a militar ily more secure

road to victory. Rather than relying on the vagaries of wind and naval success,as in 1744, or on the unpredictable nature of the relationship between GeorgeII and his British ministers by threatening Hanover, as in 1741, and as wassuggested again in May 1745,42 it was clearly possible for the French to achievesuccess in the Low Countries. Chesterfield reflected in July 1745,

I look upon Flanders now as gone and whatever else the French have amind to, as going. Where then are we? What will our fr iend Louis XV sayto us? I fear he will think himself in a situation to dictate, rather than

propose. The only way therefore in my opinion to converse withhim upon equal terms is first to whisper and agree with Antimac[Frederick II].

Newcastle was struck by the melancholy and almost desperate situation of things in every part of Europe.43

In that situation the government was willing to negotiate with France,though the ministers in London expressed a clear preference for settling withPrussia first, Newcastle writing in July 1745,

were it possible to flatter ourselves with the hopes of making a tolerablegeneral peace under these disadvantageous circumstances, it would,undoubtedly, be best of all; and as we consider the detaching of France, in

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no other light, than that of making a general peace; it is from thedifficulty, or impossibility, of doing this, at present, upon tolerable terms,that we give the preference to that which we think may be obtained, viztan accommodation with the King of Prussia.44

The context, ministerial correspondence in a period of anxiety about adeteriorating military situation rather than a parliamentary statement designedto elicit support, was different, but Newcastle’s language was not that of Carteret, who had indeed been forced out in February 1744 by oppositionfrom his fellow ministers. Newcastle’s language was that of prudentialassessment, of finding the best time for successful negotiations. He was willingto support talks through Bussy, while writing “no kind of judgment can beformed either as to the real intentions of the court of France, to come to an

accommodation at all; or, if they were so disposed, as to the conditions uponwhich that accommodation was to be made”.45 However, the prospect of exploratory talks was swept aside by the ‘45, the landing of Bonnie PrinceCharlie in Scotland and his subsequent invasion of England. There is noscholarly account of Anglo-French discussions or negotiations during the war,with the exception of Lodge’s book, which concentrates on the last years of the war and omits French and many British sources.46 The very infrequency of earlier direct contacts suggests that hostility between the two powers hadbecome one of the most pronounced elements in international relations.

The events of 1745–6 set the tone for the rest of the war. The French-supported Jacobites were unable to challenge the Hanoverian Successionsuccessfully, although the British government remained concerned aboutJacobite schemes for the remainder of the war. Conversely, the British and their allies were unable to defeat the French in the Low Countries, and by 1747 theFrench had successfully invaded the United Provinces, an ample demonstrationof the strength and success of the French military machine. Hopes that theBritish-supported Orangist takeover of Holland and Zeeland in 1747 wouldlead to a great strengthening of the Dutch state, closer relations with Britain

and a revival of the anti-French alliance, proved misplaced.The French success further exacerbated the security situation in Britain.Newcastle’s private secretary, Andrew Stone, wrote from Whitehall in August1745,

We hope we shall soon have a pretty strong squadron in the Channel: ButI know too well, the great delays and uncertaintys that service is liable to,to depend very much upon it. When Ostend is gone (as it will soon be)I tremble to think of the constant alarms we shall be subject to; and of

the effects those alarms will naturally produce.47

Indeed Ostend, a possible invasion base, fell to the French soon after.

Any peace would have to be a compromise. The dream of a dictated peace,

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such as Louis XIV had nearly been brought to accept in 1709–10, was clearlyno longer on the agenda. However, the realization that peace would have toentail compromise helped to awaken divisions within Britain over foreignpolicy. These centred on what should be the top priority in the peace

negotiations. Essentially the clash was one of America versus the Continent (of Europe), national interests versus those of allies and the maintenance of acollective security system. Such a contrast in Anglo-French relations was new,although there was a significant precedent in Anglo-Spanish relations. By theTreaty of Seville in 1729 the Walpole ministry had agreed to support Philip V’sinterests in Italy, against the wishes of Austria and her British supporters, inorder both to seal the dissolution of the Austro-Spanish alliance of 1725 (theTreaty of Vienna) and to obtain a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanishdifferences, particularly over Caribbean trade. However, this was not a case of

the British government prefering maritime to continental interests, because thelogic of the British alliance system, especially the alliance with France, dictatedan effort to win over Spain and such an effort required a settlement of commercial and colonial differences.

In contrast, Anglo-French colonial disputes had played little role inAngloFrench relations, either in the wars of 1689–1713 or in the creation,course and collapse of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31. The oppositionattempt to inspire a parliamentary storm in 1730 over French aggression in StLucia had failed. Concern over French schemes in the West Indies lacked the

political resonance and popular interest aroused by Spanish policies there or, in1730, by French works at Dunkirk.The situation was to be very different by the late 1740s. The retention of

Cape Breton Island and the French base of Louisbourg on the island was to bea major political issue in 1745–8. The capture of Louisbourg, the leadingFrench fortress guarding the approaches to Canada, was popular in Britain,Philip Yorke writing to his brother Joseph in August 1745 “the surrender of Cape Breton has put our merchants in high spirits…being the best managedexpedition of any that has been undertaken during the whole course of the

war”. Its capture had been suggested to the Privy Council in 1740.48

Asidefrom the intrinsic importance of the gain, the political climate was propitiousfor a new stress on the value of colonial conquests. By 1745 both public andministerial disenchantment with Britain’s allies, continental commitments andthe role of Hanover were all far advanced. The hope that the fall of Carteret in1744 would both ease these concerns over Britain’s continental policy andwould lessen George II’s zeal for both Hanover and anti-Prussian policies wasnot realized. Old England , a leading London opposition newspaper, painted adire picture in August 1745,

we may soon expect to see England the wretched appendix of adespicable corner of Germany; we may expect to see the Hanoveriansergeants beating up for recruits on the streets of London, and a bill

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brought in for cancelling the few articles of the Act of Settlement still inforce…a Broad-bottomed ministry, whose sole merit in the oppositionwas to oppose the encroachments of Hanover, and whose merit in theadministration has been to encourage them.49

The Opposition press was obliged to concentrate on Hanover, because it wasnot informed of the details of Britain’s troubled relations with her allies, butministers who were also complained about them. Newcastle drew attention tothe role of political opinion in his complaints about the failure to defend theAustrian Netherlands adequately,

the behaviour of the Queen of Hungary [Maria Theresa], in totallyabandoning the Netherlands; and the refusal of the court of Brussels [the

government of the Austrian Netherlands], to let the places there have thedefence, which the nature of their situation gives them, by theinundation [opening dykes]; have raised here the utmost resentmentagainst the Court of Vienna, and rendered their cause much less popular,that it formerly has been. And when it shall be known, that the court of Vienna has formally refused to lessen the number of their enemies, atpresent so numerous, by making up with the king of Prussia, and persistin pursuing their own particular views and interests, at the expense of their allies, there will be very little room for them to hope for any

assistance from this country in the support of those measures. And yet, Newcastle also asserted the strategic need for the support of continental states that he felt Britain had “in all events, the recovery of Flanders is so capital a point for this country, that we cannot but humbly hope,that it will take place of all other considerations”.50 This view was shared byStair, who wrote the same month that he was not afraid “of the Pretender nor of an invasion on any part of Great Britain but if the machine of the allianceshould happen to fall to the ground I’m afraid the affairs of this nation will be

found to be in a very dangerous situation whatever some people have been inuse to say”.51

Thus, the guidelines of a future clash were already evident. Whatever theproblems with Britain’s allies, ministers held that they were needed. Themaintenance both of these alliances and of the strategic situation in the LowCountries threatened to compete with overseas priorities. This was to becomea pressing diplomatic and political problem, because of the failure to reverseFrance’s gains in 1745 and also her subsequent success in making further gains.This owed something to the diversion of Br itish troops to fight the Jacobites in

1745–6, more to the Austrian failure to meet their quotas, and much to Frenchmilitary skill, especially that of Saxe.The French attempt to regain Cape Breton by a naval expedition fell victim

to Atlantic storms and disease in 1746, but they were to succeed in their goal as

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a result of their campaigning in the Low Countries. Furthermore, British hopesof an expedition to Canada in 1746 were abandoned. Indeed, the followingyear the President of the French Council of Marine suggested that Frenchpressure in the Low Countries would prevent the British from sending troops

to North America, that, in short, the French could hold Canada in Europe.52

The peace negotiations of 1748 served to reconcile the different politicalexpectations and contrasting military successes of the combatants. Francereturned her acquisitions in the Low Countries, Britain Cape Breton. This wascriticized in Britain, where the propaganda and polemic of naval strengthagainst Spain in 1738–9 was now employed against France. Thus, any stress ona shift in British attitudes towards France and a newfound emphasis on trans-oceanic rivalry has to be contextualized by reference to a continuation in themaritime and colonial discourse of British power and interests.

This striking shift reflected, first, naval and colonial success against France in1745–8, a contrast to the situation during the last war with France, that of theSpanish Succession, which had been essentially characterized by victories onland; secondly, the compromising of the only major victory on land— Dettingen (1743)–by accusations of royal favour for Hanover; and, thirdly, thegrowing importance of maritime and colonial affairs in the British perceptionof France. The power that in 1733 and 1741 had appeared poised to repeatLouis XIV’s triumphs on the Continent was, by 1748, increasingly seen as amaritime rival; and whereas the warfare of 1743–8, particularly 1745–8, had

shown that Britain could not resist France’s power on the Continent, this hadnot been the case at sea. Typical of the jingoistic propaganda was a ballad of early 1748 that was dubious about the likely results of the peace negotiations atAix-la-Chapelle, preferring to rely on naval strength

If Britain’s sons all Gallic arts despise,Why listen we at Aix to Gallic lies?If on our navy Heaven confers success,Why this long quibbling, and this fine address? …

Why not our wooden world in motion keep?Say, is not Britain regent of the deep?Superior force invincible is ours. …If the Grand Monarch will insist on thingsBeneath the dignity of generous kings;Let him insist—and if he’s e’er so stiff Man well the fleet.53

Such arguments ignored the practical problems of employing naval power to

achieve diplomatic ends,54

and therefore played no part in the Britishministerial debate of 1747–8 over the peace negotiations, but they helped toshape public attitudes towards France. The extension of the application of suchviews from Spain to France was arguably the most important shift in public

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consciousness in the 1740s. The public was eager to see Britain as a successfulnaval power. The authorized account of Anson’s circumnavigation of the worldin 1740–44, in which the latterday Francis Drake successfully and profitablyattacked the Spaniards in the Pacific, appeared in 1748 and went through five

printings.The extent of the public under discussion is difficult to assess. It wasessentially urban,55 and the notion of there being only one public opinion is of course misleading, although the public culture of the period emphasized ahomogeneity of proper opinion as of proper conduct. Furthermore, just as thevoices of those who did not want conflict with France, such as most Catholicsand those who traded with her, were muted, so the public voice of those whowere opposed to aggressive policies and war was less obvious than those whostridently proclaimed a definition of national interests in terms of hostility to

France. Opposition to high taxes and concern about the size of the nationaldebt could be a coded or not so implicit call for peace, but they were notdominant themes in the public debate, though they were importantconsiderations for Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury from 1743 until his deathin 1754, as they had been earlier for Walpole.

Carteret, now Earl Granville, told the Sardinian envoy in December 1751that Nova Scotia might be a second Jenkins’ Ear, an issue over which thenation drove the government to war. Mirepoix reported that Newcastlesincerely wished to settle the issue, but would be more affected by other

pressures, such as parliamentary opinion.56

Yet it would be wrong to place toomuch weight on the public debate and the role of public opinion. They are toooften employed as explanatory devices when the structure of the politicalsystem and the detailed development of affairs have not been adequatelyprobed. Hostility to France and the call for “blue water” policies against her neither prevented the government from negotiating peace in 1748 and,subsequently, successfully defending its terms in Parliament, nor stoppedNewcastle from developing and following an agenda for British foreign policyin 1748–53 that centred on continental affairs. Newcastle was able to

concentrate in 1748–53 on planning means to prevent a repetition of thevaried strategic problems of 1745–8, ranging from the weak state of the Barrier in the Austrian Netherlands to the need to confront the possibility that bothFrance and Prussia would be hostile. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggestthat altering perceptions played an important role in explaining the differencebetween the Anglo-French conflict that began in 1754 in North America andescalated to a full-scale war and earlier conflicts whose origins, course andconsequences were essentially European. However, the causes of the conflict of 1754 should be related to the background of recent Anglo-French relations, in

particular efforts to ease tensions in Europe.Eighteenth-century wars commonly ended as a result of collapses of alliances, and the coming of peace, in turn, further exacerbated this situation.Thus the Franco-Spanish alliance that had challenged Austria for control of

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Italy during the war of the Austrian Succession was replaced by an Austro-Spanish understanding that excluded France, while Spanish neutrality for muchof the Seven Years’ War crucially helped to swing the balance of maritimeadvantage against France.

Puysieulx, French foreign minister at the end of the War of the AustrianSuccession, hoped to improve relations with Britain. Hardwicke’s son, JosephYorke, Cumberland’s aide-de-camp at Culloden, who was sent to Paris in early1749 as Secretary of Embassy, wrote to his influential father, a key ally andconfidant of Newcastle and Pelham, in March 1749

to convince your lordship how much the French ministry have deceivedthemselves with false hopes of drawing England into a connection withthem, since first the negotiation was begun at Aix-la-Chapelle, that St.

Severin, their plenipotentiary there, had returned from the Congresssaying that he founded his glory on having sowed the seeds of dissensionbetween the courts of London and Vienna, and having made anirreparable breach between them and that from this notion came Frenchoffers to unite with us, in pacifying the rest of Europe.

Later that month Yorke reported his discussions with Puysieulx:

that minister is not displeased with what I told him, though he certainly

wished a little more readiness to connect with them; however I hope thisway of proceeding will take away those violent jealousies, he certainlyhad conceived of the designs of England in the North [the Baltic], and Ireally believe he is satisfied, at present, of the king’s desire to maintainthe public tranquillity.

Yorke added the following month that Puysieulx had told him both thatAustria would draw Britain into a war and that she had approached France atAix-la-Chapelle:

it appears to me very plain, that Mr. Puysieulx wants to persuade us, toenter into some defensive, if not offensive engagements with hiscourt…he went even so far as to say, he thought that England and Franceshould tell the rest of Europe, that they would unite their force againstwhoever should attempt to disturb the peace; that we should always findthem ready to oblige us, in everything, and he hinted, though they wereonly hints, at some marine disputes, which he gave me to understand,they should be ready to determine amicably, and in our favour.

Yorke regarded the approach as dangerous, informing his father, “I am reallyalways alarmed, when anything is said to me that tends to separate us from our allies.”57

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French good wishes were to be demonstrated by their efforts to keep thepeace in the contemporary Baltic crisis caused by the prospect of an attack byRussia, a British ally, on France’s ally Sweden, although Puysieulx wasconcerned about the British failure to consult France adequately in the crisis. 58

Puysieulx’s views are of considerable interest in the prehistory of the“Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. They indicate a conviction that diplomaticlinks were not immutable, an equally correct assessment that the Anglo-Austrian alliance, which had essentially revived from 1741 under the pressureof war, was weak, and a belief that France could best defend her interests in achanging international system by co-operating with Britain. This analysis wasfacilitated by the strains in France’s alliance with Frederick II. Furthermore,Frederick’s relations with George II had not improved after the war and thusdid not represent an impediment to better Anglo-French relations.59

Puysieulx’s attitude suggests that the eventual French acceptance of theAustrian approaches that led to the First Treaty of Versailles of 1 May 1756should not be seen as revolutionary as it is sometimes presented. Indeed, in July1748 Richelieu wrote to Puysieulx proposing an Austro-French rapprochement.Furthermore, the discussions and suggestions of new alignments in 1748–9,which included possible agreements between Britain and Prussia, Austria andFrance and Britain and France, throw a new light on the somewhat schematicarguments used to explain the events of 1756 from a systemic perspective.60 Itis clear both that different arrangements were envisaged once peace had been

negotiated and that the order of realignments that occurred in 1755–6 was notthe sole possible one. The extent to which opportunities were missed in 1748– 9 is open to discussion, but the role of chance in 1755–6 is worth underliningbecause it encourages caution in adopting too forthright an approach to thequestions of 1748–9. It was the unexpected Anglo-French North Americancrisis of 1754–5 that led Britain to turn to Prussia in 1755 when hopes thatAustria would agree to protect Hanover proved misplaced. Had this crisis notoccurred then the British ministry would probably have maintained its hopesabout Austria. That would not have prevented the planned Austro-Russian

attack of Prussia, but such an attack would not have led Britain to come toFrederick’s assistance, though she would not have assisted Austria either, unlesspossibly France had attacked the Austrian Netherlands.

If chance played a major role in 1755–6, it is inappropriate to mimic theDuke of Newcastle in his certainties about British national interests in 1748– 54. Newcastle did not subscribe to a view of international relations as fixed,although he clearly felt that they ought to be. He put so much effort intofostering Anglo-Austrian relations61 precisely because he believed that if Austria was mishandled the alliance would not survive. Newcastle wrote to

Cumberland in October 1748, I can see the follies, and the vanity of the court of Vienna, but I see thedanger and ruin of being dependent upon France. I was once catched in

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the year 1725 when the Hanover treaty was made. I got out of it in theyear 1730 [sic for 1731] by the [Second] Treaty of Vienna …noconsiderations shall ever catch me again. Whenever it will go no longer upon the old foot I shall not help its going at all. 62

His commitment was shared by Cumberland, and in July 1748 Pelham wrotethat both had a

very commendable partiality for that power [Austria], founded uponprinciples of the truest policy, and most extensive good to Europe, but Iflatter myself I shall not offend, when I suggest that you have met withbut unequal returns. They [the Austrians] have never come up to their engagements in any one particular.63

Newcastle’s commitment to what he termed the “Old System” was personal,but he also had specific, pragmatic reasons for querying suggestions of better relations with Prussia and France. The former he feared would endanger Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Russian links, while he was also concerned aboutthe strength of “the military party in France”.64 The threat of improvedrelations with France and a peace signed without Austria could be used by theBritish to push Austria into accepting the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle,65 butsuspicion of France remained strong. On that ground Newcastle opposed

George II’s suggestion that France be asked to make a promise not to opposehis views on Osnabrück, telling Münchhausen, the head of the Hanoverianadministration, of

the difficulties that from the experience of above twenty years together both in the present and late reign, had arose to the King, as King andElector, from applications of this sort to the court of France, who hadnever failed to give into them, in order to embarrass affairs, and influencethe King’s conduct with regard to the great system of Europe, and that

the same experience had also showed us, that these facilities in the partof France had never been of any service to the Electorate, but to distressand confound them.66

The matter was not pursued, and Newcastle’s attitude revealed the wishfulthinking in Puysieulx’s suggestions of better Anglo-French relations andimplied that as the Imperial Election Scheme was defined and developed byBritain it would not be in association or even co-operation with France.

While it might be possible for the British government to make transitory

use of France, as in setting peace terms or easing the Baltic crisis, difficulties inAnglo-Austrian relations were also seen by the government as temporary.Sandwich wrote in 1748 to Keith, the newly-appointed minister at Vienna, “inthe sort of scene that you and I are engaged in fluctuations will frequently

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happen, but where people mean the same thing at the bottom, and pursue asystem, matters generally subside in the end, which I flatter myself is thepresent case”. The press recalled problems with allies during the recent war,Henry Fielding writing in February 1748 that, when the “Broad Bottom”

ministers had joined the government in November 1744, they had found “thatof our allies, all of whom were weak, some of them indifferent, and those whowere most in earnest, were pursuing interests separate from that of thecommon cause”. Yet this criticism of Carteret’s policies did not prevent hissuccessors from seeking to maintain his alliance system, both during the war and subsequently.67

It could be argued that Anglo-Austrian differences over the following sevenyears were to prove Sandwich wrong, but, equally, it could be said that thealliance served Britain’s purpose until the crisis of 1754–5 pushed the defence

of Hanover to the forefront of ministerial attention. The assessment hinges onthe questions of whether Britain had any viable alternatives, and what wouldhave happened had she not had her Austrian alliance. That, of course, wouldhave depended on the degree of royal and ministerial commitments to theContinent, but, given that these were strong, it is reasonable to point out thatthe British position would have been weaker but for the Austrian alliance,however imperfect that might have been. Hanover would certainly have beenmore vulnerable to the Prussian attack that was feared in 1753.

The notion floated in late 1748 of a German collective security system

without Austria was not credible. It was proposed by the Ansbach envoy, BaronSeckendorf, to Münchhausen, Newcastle commenting,

The immediate business is to preserve the Margraviates of Bareith andAnsbach from falling into the King of Prussia’s hands, but he has openeda very extensive scheme to His Majesty’s German ministers, of creating aparty in the Empire, which I am afraid might give some umbrage to theEmperor and the Court of Vienna, as if the Imperial authority wasinfringed.

Münchhausen was told by Newcastle very plainly that “we had spent twentymillions for the support of the House of Austria this war and that I hoped thatwould not be all set aside by a coup de plume”. He put much effort into easingMünchhausen’s suspicions of the Austrians and indeed claimed the credit for bringing the minister “off from all his resentment to the Court of Vienna andprejudice against a King of the Romans”.68 In contrast, in 1756–7 the Britishgovernment, by then leaning towards Prussia, was concerned to block linksbetween Austria and Hanover.

Policy was different in the early 1750s. A German alliance system withoutAustria could only be credible if Prussia was a member, but an alignment withFrederick would bring the enmity of Austria and Russia, and, without analliance with Austria, it would be impossible to win Russia over. As France was

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allied to Prussia and Sweden, the danger of heeding her suggestions of co-operation was that Britain might lose her freedom of manoeuvre and becomecommitted in the Baltic crisis to hostility to Russia and thus Austria.

In July 1750 Puysieulx argued that if only Britain and France could develop

mutual confidence they would realize the futility of their alliances, which,according to him, were both valueless and costly.69 Indeed, the British failure toalign with France later in the century has been criticized and there has beenreference to “the series of sterile confrontations with Britain’s colonial rivals,France and Spain”.70

However, though it may seem attractive and plausible to portray the twotraditional rivals co-operating against the rising powers of eastern Europe, thepracticalities of this prospectus appear to have been largely overlooked. HadBritain accepted French leadership, then she would have been obliged to

support France’s traditional protégés, Sweden, Poland and Turkey, powers thatit would have been difficult to assist other than by what had already appearedin Peter I’s reign and was to appear again in 1791 as the overrated factor of naval power. Co-operation with France in 1748–9 would also have entailedsupport for Frederick II, a course that was scarcely likely to recommend itself to those who envisaged a stable collective security system, for Fredrick was stillseen, with much reason, as an aggressive and unpredictable ruler.

The failure to reach an understanding with France did not lead to a rapiddeterioration in relations. The French government was absorbed in domestic

problems and, to the irritation of Frederick, averse to taking an assertive role ininternational relations. Prepared to defend their diplomatic interests andunenthusiastic about the Imperial Exchange Scheme, the French werenevertheless not the active force in diplomacy they had been in the late 1730s,nor were they seeking to assemble a coalition of allies that would stand them ingood stead in an imminent or developing crisis, as they had been in 1732–3and 1741. In Europe, France acted as a satisfied power, not one seekingterritorial expansion. Indeed, the French settled their frontier differences witha number of weaker powers, including Geneva (1749), Salm (1751) and

Württemberg (1753).It was not surprising that the principal panic to affect British foreign policyin the per iod 1749–53 arose, in 1753, from suspicion of Prussian actions rather than French. Prussia appeared more of a problem than France to George II andhis ministers in this period. Valory, the French envoy in Hanover, reported inJune 1750 that Newcastle believed, or seemed to believe, that Frederick was adangerous ruler determined to animate other powers against each other inorder to be able to fish in troubled waters.71 The collective security systemdeveloped by Newcastle had thus overcome what had been a major political

problem during the War of the Austrian Succession, the contrasting concerns of George II and his ministers about Prussia and France respectively. Hanover now seemed secured by British policy. In April 1751 the Austrian and Russianenvoys gave Newcastle Austrian and Russian declarations containing a guaranty

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of Hanover in case it was attacked on account of George II’s accession to the1746 Austro-Russian treaty, and all three agreed that the declarations “wereconsidered as part of the treaty of accession and equally binding with thattreaty”.72

As the likeliest attacker of Hanover was Frederick II,73

this agreement, andindeed the entire thrust of British policy, could be seen as serving to protectHanover, without implying that that was the sole purpose. As such it could beseen as part of the gradual process of reconciliation between George II and thePelhams that included such moves as accepting the appointment of Carteret,now Earl Granville, as Lord President of the Council in June 1751. This processwas one in which the Pelhams had made much of the running, and indeed theyhad been criticised from 1744 for continuing the broad direction of Carteret’sforeign policy. Newcastle saw the Imperial Election Scheme and the other

policies he fostered as designed against both France and Prussia, but much of the impetus behind the policies derived from the anti-Prussian attitudes of George, Cumberland and the Münchhausens. The policies were essentiallyformulated in 1748 when George and Newcastle visited Hanover, and major efforts to forward them were made on the subsequent visits in 1750 and 1752.These visits served to provide a context of policy-making in which theimmediate focus of concern with Hanover and German politics then detractedfrom other issues.

The stress on the Imperial Election Scheme helped to exacerbate relations

with France and Prussia, both of which sought to prevent the Electors fromlending their support. In July 1752 Newcastle wrote from Hanover to hisfellow Secretary of State, Holdernesse,

the King is far from thinking that the Court of France has acted withthat fairness and sincerity which His Majesty’s behaviour towards them(particularly in this last negotiation), has deserved: in which the King hasperformed every part, that was to be expected from him; and the court of France have done the reverse, throughout the whole…this behaviour in

the Court of France, this departure from their most solemn promises, is,in a great measure, owing to that ascendance, which the King of Prussiahas gained over their councils…There is too much reason to fear, that,however justified His Majesty’s conduct will undoubtedly be, in theopinion of all the world; the disappointment of this measure will, andmust, tend to increase his Prussian Majesty’s credit, and influence over the French councils; and, jointly, create such a power, as may not onlyaffect the independency of the Empire; but, in its consequences, that of all Europe. And the Court of France have sufficiently show’d, by the

return which they have made, in this instance, to the King’s confidenceand communication with them, the little dependence, that is to be hadupon them; and, consequently, how dangerous and impracticable, anysystem, to be formed with them, must prove in the event.

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The letter also included a reference to royal support for a firm stance towardsthe French in West Africa.74 Yet less attention was devoted to such disputes thanthey merited.

The Imperial Election Scheme, a project that did not command wide

support within the British ministry, thus served to provide instances thatapparently demonstrated the accuracy of Newcastle’s fears of Frenchintentions. Had Britain not supported the scheme it is possible that her continental foreign policy would not have given rise to such occasions, but,equally, the alignment with Austria and Russia and the link with Hanover would have served to maintain tense relations with Prussia and, therefore, her ally France, while Anglo-Russian relations would have led to tension withFrance’s other allies, Sweden and Turkey.

It might appear paradoxical to argue, on the eve of an Anglo-French war

that was to break out as a result of colonial differences, that it was Britain’scontinental policy that principally served to exacerbate relations. There wereimportant colonial disputes, in North America over the Canadian border andNova Scotia, in the West Indies over Tobago, in West Africa and India, and theyfeatured in Anglo-French diplomacy in 1749–53.75 The British governmentpressed for satisfaction on contested colonial issues, especially in 1749 over Tobago. That year, the government founded Halifax in order to strengthen theBritish presence in Nova Scotia. The recent peace treaty had confirmed thecession of Acadia to Britain, but had not specified its boundaries, and this

proved a basis for dissension. It would be possible to paint a dire picture of mutual mounting concern, especially in North America, that appears to pointtowards inevitable conflict.76

However, it is worth noting that ministerial attention in both Britain andFrance was directed rather to European affairs and that there were signs of arelative absence of anxiety on colonial matters, Newcastle writing to acolleague in July 1750 “our late enemies seem disposed to be quiet, and… todo us justice in America, which is a great point”.77 Yorke, writing to his brother the following month from Paris, was less optimistic, but also less alarmist than

William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, an influential advocate of aforward policy in America, who argued, in Yorke’s words, that the fate of

North America and indeed of our marine depends on the success of Nova Scotia. I believe it is of great consequence, but I can’t imagine it isso nice an affair as he represents it. We continue to say here that we desirepeace, and so we do I believe, but we shall not be so ready to give up anypretensions we may have in the New World, of which England is sojealous.78

Newcastle did not want war with France, and he argued that, by strengtheningBritain’s continental position, he would make France less likely to challengeher:

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I was always of opinion that the more we strengthened ourselves, and our system upon the continent, by measures, and alliances, pacific andjustifiable in themselves, (provided as the same time, that we adheredstrictly and religiously to the terms of our Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle), the

more France would covet our friendship, and be more disposed topreserve the peace, and this, the present experience shows to be thecase.79

Thus, Britain could maintain her position in America through alliances inGermany. This analysis overlooked the role of developments within France andfailed to give any weight to the possibility of what actually occurred, anescalating trans-oceanic crisis that neither government wanted. Indeed,Newcastle’s policy of deterrence through strength, both in Anglo-French

relations in general, and in continental international relations, was to failprecisely because the mechanistic, systemic approach he adopted wasinadequate. It was unable to cope with the strains and ambiguities of alliancepolitics seeking to reconcile different interests and to comprehend adequatelythe possibility of an unwanted crisis in which both governments felt itimpossible to back down. The French were not to be deterred from reinforcingCanada in 1755 by Britain’s European alliances, although they helped toprevent France from attacking Hanover. In the meantime, the tension that ledto the development and strengthening of the alliance system, and was created

by it, did not create an atmosphere in Anglo-French relations that would beconductive to their peaceful settlement. This argument can be pushed too far.Newcastle was not the hawk in Anglo-French North American disputes, whilenegotiations over the North American border were conducted in Paris. Yorkewrote in September 1750 about Nova Scotia, “I hope as this Court seemsreally desirous of living at peace with us, that we shall be able to settle thesepoints amicably, I dare not flatter myself that it will be speedily.” 80

However, while proclaiming that they were fulfilling their obligations, for example, over the demolition of the works at Dunkirk,81 the French saw no

basis for trust in Anglo-French relations. Puysieulx complained in December 1750 that British policy since the signature of peace scarcely suggested anydesire to develop good relations. Instead, he claimed that Britain negotiatedalliances as if on the eve of war, pursued the Imperial Election Scheme in anoffensive fashion and treated French support for Prussia as a crime. Puysieulxadded that Britain appeared to be preparing an invasion of Canada. 82 Theoptimistic hope of better relations, of a new international order, had thereforebeen replaced by 1750 by French resentment at Britain’s continentaldiplomatic strategy and by anxiety about her American plans. It was this

anxiety that helped to lead to French projects that were viewed in turn asaggressive by Britain, and that led to confrontation in the Ohio river valley.However, conflict did not come for several years, and indeed, in December

1750 Mirepoix, the French Ambassador, sought to reassure Puysieulx about

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British intentions. He argued that Britain was not in a state for war and stressedthe role of George II’s concern about Hanoverian vulnerability to Prussianattack as the basis for British diplomacy. This diplomacy was thus presented asessentially defensive, despite the suspicions it gave rise to. Mirepoix also argued

correctly that Britain had no offensive plans in Canada, but he warned thatdomestic factors might affect her policy towards Nova Scotia and other problems, specifically that concern about parliamentary criticism wouldprevent any acceptable settlement.

Mirepoix argued that of the four most influential ministers, Bedford,Hardwicke and Pelham sought peace, while only Newcastle would supportGeorge II’s desire to take a major European role. He added, nevertheless, that,although British policy was essentially defensive, it might lead to offensiveaction by Britain or her allies.83 Mirepoix’s analysis was a perceptive one, but it

was not to guide French actions in North America.Arguably, had France had more confidence in the extent and purpose of British intentions, provocative moves and, ultimately, war would have beenavoided and France would not have lost Canada. However, British policyappeared especially transitory in this period, because of the advanced years of George II, born in 1683, and the opposition of his heirs, Frederick, Prince of Wales, and, later, Frederick’s son, George, to his ministers. More to the point,yielding pretensions was regarded as a dishonourable step, and moreover onethat was imprudent, because it would encourage further demands for

concessions. The tradition in Europe was of long-standing legalistic disputes,especially in the Empire and Italy, while colonial controversies, for example,that over Sacramento, the Portuguese colony on the north shore of the Plateestuary, could be both long-lasting and conducted without leading to hostilitiesin Europe. This was also the experience of Britain and France. Conflict in Indiain the early 1750s between their East India Companies played little part indiplomatic relations between the two powers, and did not lead to war betweenthem. Newcastle noted in June 1753 of negotiations concerning India, “Thisnegotiation was purely between company and company; though the East India

Company would (as became them) do nothing without His Majesty’spermission.”The French were concerned that the pressure of Br itish westward expansion

in North America would undermine the security of their colonies there.84

They saw no reason to yield points that would assist this process, and wereanyway aware that the central concern of British policy in 1749–53 wasEuropean. Despite Puysieulx’s fears in late 1753, there was no reason toanticipate a British attack on Canada, and the number of reports andinstructions devoted to American affairs in the French diplomatic series

Correspondance Politique Angleterre does not jump until 1754. Other colonialquarrels in the years before were settled or conducted without the outbreak of war, Yorke writing in September 1752, “I am very easy about the coast of Africa. France will never attack us where we are strongest, and therefore we are

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mad, if we are not so everywhere, where we can.”85 In the winter of 1752–3the British appealed for French pressure on Frederick II to moderate histhreats to Saxony and Hanover, action that did not stem from any trust inFrench intentions, but that would hardly have been taken had negotiations over

America been so tense that the ministry feared to show any weakness.86

IndeedNewcastle argued that there was a relationship between Britain’s colonial andcontinental strength, that America could be endangered if Hanover was lost,when in February 1753 he expressed the hope that France would interposewith Prussia.87 Yet Newcastle did not trust the French. He feared that Frenchmilitary encampments might be connected with those of Prussia,88 and thatFrederick II would press for French support over the eventual succession to thecrown of Poland, “though perhaps, this may be too strong, and too uncertain ameasure, for France to come into at present; there is, however great reason to

believe, that the court of France are preparing measures so, as to be able tostrike, and with effect, whenever the case shall happen”.89 Given that a major war had broken out when the Polish throne was last contested in 1733, it wassensible for rulers and ministers to anticipate that another conflict might thusarise, and it was reasonable for Newcastle to anticipate that Britain might notbe neutral as she had been during the last Polish succession war.

Allegations of French works at Dunkirk in clear breach of treaty obligationsalso aroused distrust. Yorke thought them worth fighting over, while theLondon press discussed the issue, the opposition Protester bitterly criticizing,

the government.90

There is no doubt from Newcastle’s correspondence that hedistrusted France, even though he appreciated that her government was lessaggressive that that of Prussia:

The late letters from Mylord Albemarle [envoy in Paris], have broughtnothing, that can give any room to guess, what may be the finalresolution of the court of France, upon the two material points, nowdepending; the election of the King of the Romans; and the particular disputes with the King of Prussia. Mor. de St. Contest [French foreign

minister] varies his manner of talking almost in every conversation.Sometimes he talks plausibly, and pretty satisfactory upon both points;and afterwards, in the next conversation, appears as difficult, and asunreasonable as ever. I think, their present view is, not to break thepeace; but the King of Prussia will certainly carry them great lengths, if he shall think proper to insist upon it; and, therefore, we should alwaysendeavour to prepare for the worst.91

This was scarcely an optimistic assessment, and it helps to explain both why

Newcastle continued his attempt to breathe life into the Anglo-Austro-Russiansystem and why he was to be filled with foreboding when the situation inAmerica deteriorated. However, as Anglo-French hostility still revolved aroundcontinental issues in 1753, it was not surprising that Newcastle, who had been

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more interventionalist than his ministerial colleagues for a number of years,especially over the issue of subsidies for possible allies, should inform theSardinian envoy, Perron, in August 1753 that he was alone in his view thatBritain should adopt a firmer view in order to make France more tractable

while his colleagues feared war.92

As 1754 opened, Mirepoix was not greatly concerned about British policy.He reported that the British government had no plans which could threatenpeace, that Pelham was too occupied with domestic and financial problems tosupport Austrian and Russian schemes and that George II’s concern aboutHanover, and the need for possible Austrian and Russian pressure on Prussia,had not led to ministerial support for these schemes.93 Mirepoix did however touch on British domestic sensitivity to colonial issues, though the problem inquestion was not North American. He reported that news of French naval

moves led the British government to press for the despatch of help to theIndies, principally in order to end criticism in London. Mirepoix neverthelesswarned that, although the British government wished to settle disputes, Franceshould take precautions, while St Contest wrote that Britain would be unableto intimidate France over the Indies.94 Mirepoix’s confidence in Britishpassivity was somewhat hit by Pelham’s unexpected death, 95 but he washopeful that domestic political problems would dissuade the government fromtaking a more forceful role abroad.96 Rather than suspecting colonial trouble,Mirepoix reported that Newcastle sought good relations, and that the only

danger came from his complaisance towards George II’s pro-Austriansentiments, an analysis whose stress on the Continent accorded withNewcastle’s views of the previous September.97 Bar the affairs of India, therewas little diplomatic activity in Anglo-French relations in May or early June1754, and Mirepoix took leave of absence as a result of this lull. St Contest wasunhappy about this, but because of his concern about developments in India,not America.98

North America had been a cause of diplomatic activity and ministerialconcern for a number of years, but its sudden rise to prominence in the

summer of 1754, with the outbreak of fighting in the Ohio valley, was asurprise. Nova Scotia had not been a serious point in dispute since 1751.Horatio Walpole, a diplomatic veteran of the Anglo-French alliance, was awareof the importance attached to the issues at stake but hopeful that they could besettled without war. He wrote in July 1754 to Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, of his

concern at the unjust attempts of the French upon the boundaries of our colonies; if they go on in the project they seem to have in view, they will

encompass all our northern colonies in the back by a chain of communication between the rivers Canada, and Mississippi, and comemasters of all the Indians, and the trade on that continent, which requireour utmost attention, and exertion of strength to prevent it, but as it is a

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common cause to all our northern colonies…they might I am fullypersuaded, considering their connection and the number of their inhabitants, soon disperse the French and their Indians, and disappointtheir dangerous schemes, which at the beginning may be done, if

cordially undertaken, without any great expense, and they might think fitto retire at once; before the councils of France shall have openly owed it,and made it a matter of state; but if they are suffered to make a strongsettlement there and get together forces enough to support it, it mayoccasion troubles between the two nations of such expense and extent asmay make it difficult to put an end to.99

North American differences were not, however, as easy to overlook as problemsin India. St Contest’s replacement, Rouillé, certain that the French had only

maintained their rights and repelled force by force, argued that border problems could be dealt with by the commissioners already empowered to doso, but added ominously, but accurately, that once clashes had begun their consequences would be difficult to contain. He stressed French moderation,100

but in late September 1754 the British decided to send two regiments toAmerica in order to conduct offensive operations. The most recent discussionof the subject has concluded that this was due to the bellicose views of Cumberland and two ministers, the Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of Trade, and Henry Fox, the Secretary-at-War. Halifax, a keen supporter of a

British presence in Nova Scotia, had pressed in 1751 for the permanentstationing of British warships there.101 Weakened by the death of Pelham,Newcastle was unsettled by the difficulties created by an increasinglycontentious political situation.

Foreign diplomats less well-informed about ministerial disputes stressed thedanger of parliamentary opposition.102 The session was imminent, problems of management considerable in the volatile political world created by Pelham’sdeath and, as over policy towards Spain in 1739, the prospect of parliamentarydifficulties interacted with ministerial disputes. The imminence of the session

obliged the ministry to have a policy, though it would be misleading to suggestthat Cumberland and Halifax were primarily swayed by parliamentaryconsiderations. Halifax had long been associated with Nova Scotia, while Foxwas Cumberland’s ally. Knowing that military matters were under the sway of George II and Cumberland, Newcastle gave way to Cumberland, ensuring that“from mid October American issues suddenly ceased to matter in the strugglefor the leadership”. Furthermore, Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote of the first day of debates in the Commons that the opposition “expostulated …chiefly upon theAmerican affairs, but declared they would not directly oppose it, as the

appearance of unanimity was at present very necessary with regard to our foreign affairs”.103

The decision to send reinforcements to America and to adopt an aggressiveplan of operations made war with France more likely, though Newcastle hoped

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that an escalation in stages would leave room for negotiations.104 There was anelement of wishful thinking, comparable to his hope in 1731 that Francewould accept the Anglo-Austrian Second Treaty of Vienna, but Newcastle hadno choice in light of George’s support for Cumberland. Whereas in 1744 and

1746 it had proved possible for the Pelhams to drive George into parting withCarteret, in 1754 Newcastle was not supported by a united ministry, while thepoint at dispute, opposition to apparent French aggression in North America,was one that was popular. The specific political impact of the shift in publicconsciousness over colonial disputes, especially North America, was limited,but there seems little doubt that in late 1754 the prevalent opinion in politicalcircles was of a need to stand up to France, and that this was not really relatedto the more general problems of Britain’s diplomatic standing towards Franceand other European powers. The fall of Cape Breton in 1745 and naval

victories over France in the War of the Austrian Succession had encouraged anoptimistic assessment of Britain’s chances in a future conflict, one that was fullyreflected in the press.105 A front-page essay in the opposition Londonnewspaper Old England on 15 December 1750 (os) began,

The all-grasping views of the House of Bourbon have been so manifestfor half a century past, that it is equally the duty of politicians to watchover and expose, and of princes to obstruct and restrain them…The twoheads of France and Spain are continually aiming at new

encroachments…The practices now on foot to wrest from us the bestpart of Nova Scotia, and establish French colonies in defiance of our better right, and a mutual agreement to leave them in a neutral state, inthe islands of Tobago, St. Lucia, and others, cannot but raise theindignation of every Briton at this time.106

The French had indeed occupied Tobago and St. Lucia. The French ministrywas kept fully informed of this agitation. One set of newspaper versessurviving in the French archives ended with a call for naval action against

France: To settle this point send out forty good sail,With Warren or Hawke [leading admirals] to inspect each minutia:They’ll teach us to whom shall belong without failTobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia,107

the last a reference to a dispute in the West Indies. Such items carried noreference to the cost of conflict, the difficulty of keeping hostilities local, the

possibility of French pressure on Hanover and the Low Countries and thedanger of invasion of Britain. The experience of 1739, when the UnitedProvinces had refused to provide assistance to Britain against Spain, was awarning of possible isolation, and in March 1754 the French envoy in Vienna

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reported Austrian displeasure with British naval preparations, on the groundsthat Britain might be thus distracted from European affairs and that hostilities,once begun, would spread to Europe.108 Yorke wrote from The Hague thatFrance “feels too strongly her own force in this part of the world, where the

false politics of the Court of Vienna leaves us naked and defenceless”, areference to the weakness of the Barrier fortresses and the vulnerability of theAustrian Netherlands and, therefore, the United Provinces. Europeancommitments would also entail a level of expense that would test the ministry’sparliamentary strength, as the Bavarian envoy warned in October 1754.109

The French, however, as Newcastle correctly told Perron, did not wish tofight. Rouillé could not imagine that the British would use open force and hedecided to send Mirepoix back to London, whence Boutel, however,meanwhile warned that the British reinforcements sent to America and the

terms of the royal speech suggested that George would not keep the peace.110

Mirepoix arrived in London on 8 January 1755, his mission made moreimportant by the death of the Earl of Albemarle, the British envoy in Paris, theprevious month.

In his audience with George II on 10 January, the King told Mirepoix thathe sought peace but was determined to protect his subjects, goals that theambassador unsurprisingly declared were shared by Louis XV. The same dayNewcastle told Mirepoix of his desire for peace, but he added, untruthfully,that the troops being sent to America would only be used for defence, and that

they were destined less against France than to contain the colonists who for long had shown scant obedience to the orders of the British government. Thebetter-informed Robinson, now Secretary of State for the SouthernDepartment, drew attention to the differences between British and Frenchmaps of the interior of America.111 Newcastle and Robinson told Mirepoix,and Newcastle and Holdernesse told Perron that the ministry was affected bythe domestic pressure for action,112 and Mirepoix stressed the need for Franceto take precautions.

Naval armaments by both powers increased tension and distrust. Robinson

wrote to Benjamin Keene, the envoy in Madrid, “We have, on one side, politeand handsome professions, from M. de Mirepoix, of His Master’s sincere desirefor peace; on the other hand, every letter from Paris, and other ports, bringsadvice of the great armaments making at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort…. Weshall not, we must not, be behind with them.”113 While Mirepoix stressed theneed for speedy action to stem the developing crisis, the French ministry wasunwilling to make the sort of concessions that were necessary. Rouillécorrectly argued that the British were not telling the truth about thereinforcements they were sending to America, suggested that Britain would

accept an armistice only in order to reinforce her American colonies andclaimed that the French position on the Ohio was no threat to these colonies.He pointed out that the Appalachians were a considerable obstacle.114

However, such remarks were no longer appropriate. Robinson pressed

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Mirepoix on the need for a quick and definite settlement, citing the positionof the ministry “vis a vis la nation”, while Mirepoix wrote of the need for bothspeed and precautions. He argued that the British nation was strongly animatedagainst France and the government weak.115 Rouillé however replied in terms

of distrust and argued that George II should assure Parliament of France’ssincerity.116 Conferences between Mirepoix and the British ministers failed toprovide a satisfactory solution to the Ohio dispute, while Rouillé pressed theneed for the government to oppose popular agitation for war.117

On 25 February 1755 Rouillé sent a long instruction to the Due de Duras,the French envoy in Madrid, which revealed his opinion of the role of Britishdomestic pressures. He noted that the British ministry cited the clamours of the nation to justify their considerable armaments, but he argued that it wasonly a pretext and that Britain sought war. Rouillé claimed that the king’s

speech to Parliament, and “indecent wr itings” the government made no effortto suppress, were responsible for inciting the hostility of the people to France,and he stated that the ministry could stop this agitation, which had noreasonable foundation. Rouillé’s mistaken assumptions about the nature of British politics and the degree of control the government could exert ensuredthat he failed to appreciate the pressures under which the British ministry feltit was operating.

Rouillé continued by arguing that the Spanish colonies were the trueBritish objective and that French America was simply a preliminary barrier for

them, an obvious plea for Spanish support that also testified to concern aboutthe likely scale of British intentions. More generally, the French consistentlyargued that British support for the balance of power was a sham, as the Britishsought no such balance outside Europe, but, instead, maritime hegemony andcolonial conquest. Bonnac reported from The Hague that Yorke had said thatBritain would never yield over the Ohio, while Yorke clearly laid out a major obstacle to successful negotiations when he reported being told by Bonnac

that what had alarmed his court, was, the refusal we made to send orders

to the governors in America, to suspend hostilities, which we avoided byoffering to treat upon those orders, whilst our succours would have anopportunity to arrive in those parts, and perhaps obtain a superiority,which would render the negotiation more difficult and complicated; Headded the most pacific declarations

In short, the resort to force ensured that the need for an armistice was as muchan issue as the points at dispute. Yorke replied

that what seemed to me to have given rise to the expressions which hadalarmed his court, was the idea that France meant to continue inpossession during the negotiation, of what their governors had unjustlypossessed themselves of.118

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The French had already decided to send reinforcements to Canada, a decisionthat accorded with Mirepoix’s warning of the need to prepare the defence of Cape Breton and of the despatch of British reinforcements,119 but that madethe success of negotiations unlikely. Though certain of Mirepoix’s desire for

peace, the British ministry had already concluded that France was unwilling tooffer acceptable terms. Robinson noted that France sought “to confine thepresent negotiation to a bare provisional cessation des voyes de fait [anarmistice], in order to find the means afterwards, for an amicable conciliation”,while Britain sought a definitive settlement, adding, “The pretext of the war will be, la Gloire du Roi. The truth will be, their desire to keep les pretentionset droits, founded upon Mr. de la Salle’s discoveries, eternally undecided; andmore particularly to have an opening into the Bay of Fundy.”120 Six days later,on 17 March 1755, Rouillé ordered Mirepoix to make no overture and

informed him that Louis XV regarded the negotiations as completely brokenoff, unless, as seemed unlikely, the British proposed more reasonable conditions.He also argued that there was a danger that Britain would take Frenchmoderation as timidity. Rouillé was sceptical about the position of Newcastleand Robinson, being convinced that they sought to justify to the nation theheavy costs of their armaments, and unimpressed by the value of anyministerial pacific intentions that “could not defeat popular clamour”.121

Perron reported that both Mirepoix and the British government thought war inevitable and that Newcastle was being swept along by a bellicose torrent.122

Negotiations continued in London between Mirepoix and Robinson,123

at thesame time as both powers prepared their forces.Preparations and public hostility themselves did not have to lead to war, as

the Anglo-Bourbon crises over the Falklands (1770) and Nootka Sound (1790)were to illustrate, but in both those cases it proved possible to negotiate anagreement before there had been any clashes, other than the initial precipitantsof the crises. In 1755, in contrast, as Rouillé pointed out, the chance of successful negotiations was really removed by the British refusal to suspendmilitary steps.124

Whereas the initial check to distant British interests in 1770 and 1790 didnot expose other British possessions to attack, concern about the Americanfrontier in 1754 was rapidly transmitted to the centres of colonial life in NorthAmerica. A military response by the British army seemed more necessary, if only to lend support to, and control, the likely actions of colonial forces.

On 5 May 1755, two days after the French fleet had sailed from Brest for Canada, Mirepoix reported that Boscawen, who had sailed on 21 April, hadbeen ordered to attack it, orders that the British ministry denied havinggiven.125 The London negotiations served to reveal the incompatibility of the

two governments’ views on America, at the same time that Mirepoix remainedconvinced that George II and Newcastle wanted peace.126 Holdernesse, whoaccompanied George to Hanover as Secretary of State, wrote thence on 20May, referring to the Mirepoix—Robinson negotiations, “You will see His

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Majesty is still willing, if possible, to bring these matters to an amicableconclusion and to prevent the melancholy effects of a general war,” but, havingmentioned the sailing of the Brest fleet, he added that “as far as humanforesight can reach, every measure has been taken that may enable His Majesty

to resist the efforts of the French in that part of the world, and to recover suchof His Majesty’s possessions, as have been unjustly invaded”. Later that month,Holdernesse added,

the operations at land, on the continent of America, will probably havebeen begun by His Majesty’s troops during the course of the month of April; and I will not take it upon me to prophecy, whether the Frenchwill, or will not, look upon voyes de fait in that part, as justifiable causesof a declaration of war on their side, against His Majesty, or of their

taking violent measures against his allies in Europe, or against hisdominions upon the continent.127

Any idea of a predictable international system had clearly broken down, while,as towards Spain in 1739, the British were having to consider the consequencesof continuing negotiations and preparing for war at the same time. Robinsonwrote on 16 June:

we have not been amused; every thing is in motion, to recover

selfevident encroachments in America. Our colonists, with the fewregular troops there, will be beginning to beat up the French quarters, infive or six places, at a time, where they have been silently creeping inupon us. What may happen at sea, God knows. We look upon our American colonies in the north, as blocked, if not besieged; We haveindeed thrown some few troops into them, but shall hardly be in adisposition to let the French reinforce the troops they are besieging uswith. We have acted steadily and uniformly…If France is willing to do usjustice; she may do it with honour, by doing it at once, before she knows,

that we have done it for ourselves in North America. If she only waits toknow what is done there, in order to revenge herself here—alors commealors.128

This was the language of one of the more pacific members of the Britishministry, but, by June 1755, it was difficult to envisage successful Anglo-Frenchnegotiations and, therefore, from the British point of view, it was necessary toact swiftly against French encroachments. Rouillé argued that French policywould be determined by British action.129 On 10 June 1755 Boscawen attacked

the French ships sailing to Canada, although the main fleet was not sighted.Before the news reached the French court at Compiégne on 17 July, Mirepoixhad already been ordered to tell the British government that he would onlyremain in London if serious negotiations began. On 18 July he was recalled, as

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was Bussy from Hanover. Robinson had told Mirepoix that it was impossibleEngland could see with indifference so great a reinforcement of French troopssent to North America, and assured him that Boscawen had misinterpreted hisinstructions, but unsurprisingly the French were unimpressed. Holdernesse

refused to give Bussy the explicit answer he demanded that Boscawen had notreceived orders to attack the French ships.130

Contacts continued after the breaking off of Anglo-French diplomaticrelations, an example of negotiations on the brink of full-scale war.131 However,both governments turned their attention to diplomatic and militarypreparations for war. The diplomatic moves were to provide an instructivelesson in the fragility of international links. Not only were the French to bedisappointed by the response of their Prussian and Spanish allies, but theBritish were to find that their Austrian and Russian alliances collapsed. The

diplomatic realignments of this period, commonly summarized by the phrase“Diplomatic Revolution”, have been discussed in terms of long-term shifts inthe international system.132 These were clearly of considerable importance, butit would be foolish to ignore the role of chance and of short-term problems inthis period. Just as British diplomatic strategy in the post-war period had beenconcerned with continental problems, especially the Imperial succession andthe security of Hanover, and had not considered adequately the possibility of acolonial war, so Austria and Russia had seen Britain in terms of continentalrelations, as indeed had Frederick II France.

Given the immediacy of diplomatic activity over continental issues, and theapparent success in 1749–53 in solving colonial disputes or letting themcontinue without apparently serious consequences, this was not surprising.Britain and France could present themselves as “satisfied” powers, with noaspirations for Continental conquests (though France sought gains in theAustr ian Netherlands during the Seven Years’ War),133 but this did not describetheir colonial position, and it was difficult to relate colonial aspirations to thedesire of eastern European allies for greater power. It was not surprising thatalliances based on essentially European problems and issues failed in 1755–6 to

meet requirements resulting from an unwanted and unexpected colonial war.Equally, it was not surprising that Newcastle, the British minister mostconcerned with continental diplomacy, should have been disinclined tosupport a forward policy in America.

However, his anxiety about possible European consequences was not sharedby the bulk of the British political nation. There had been a definite shift inconsciousness towards knowledge of and interest in the situation in NovaScotia or west of the Appalachians, rather than in Flanders or the Rhineland. Itis unclear how strong the latter had been in the 1740s: the apparently

remorseless pressure of Louis XIV and the wars fought against him in whichBritain had played a prominent role had arguably raised interest earlier, onlyfor it to be dissipated after 1713, as attention switched to the Baltic, theMediterranean and the Caribbean and as concern about France declined.

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Nevertheless, North America had not been a key political issue in the early1740s, as it was to become a decade later. Then, North America served to focusconcern about Anglo-French colonial rivalry at a time that public anxietyabout their respective continental positions had diminished.

This had little effect on the ministry during the years 1749–53, a period of relative diplomatic and domestic quiescence, and its impact on governmentpolicy in 1754–5 should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the political worldin London influenced the British response in North America, even if years of diplomatic distrust were also of great importance, as was the intractable natureof the particular points in dispute. However, had war broken out in the Balticin 1747 or over Hanover in 1753, it is difficult to see the same alignments thatwere to develop in 1756 existing earlier in these very different situations.

The role of chance and short-term problems should not be discounted in

discussing the “Diplomatic Revolution”. If that was true of Anglo-Frenchrelations, it was also true of those between other powers. One does not need todwell solely on the role of monarchs, for example, an earlier accession by thepro-Prussian Peter III of Russia. Much of the diplomatic agenda, thoughpresented in terms of immutable long-term interests, was more transient, either in its importance or in the extent to which particular views were pressed atspecific junctures. As it was those junctures that led to war, the reasons for specific concurrences of events are of considerable scholarly interest.

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person of their joint sovereign and in his court, further increased theimportance of monarchs, because it was only in foreign policy that theseentities truly acted as one “state”.

It is important to consider Britain-Hanover in this light. Prior to the Union

of 1707 England and Scotland had acted as one in foreign policy, althoughthere had been tensions between the two Parliaments. However, the positioninvolving Hanover was far more complex and was to be one of the leadingpolitical problems in the mid-eighteenth century, one that threw the role of the monarch into prominence. Given the contentious nature of the Hanoverianconnection, especially in the 1740s and 1750s, it is impracticable to separatethe issue of royal influence in the formulation of foreign policy from that of Hanoverian concerns, for the latter gave force and direction to royal initiativesand concern.

The Electorate of Hanover was geographically part of the north-west of modern Germany and was constitutionally one of the eight Electorates in theHoly Roman Empire, the loosely united assemblage of territories thatcomprised modern Germany and Austria and some bordering areas and waspresided over by an elected Emperor, a post filled for over two centuries by theruler of the Habsburg territories. As with most German principalities,Hanover’s frontiers were established by feudal, not geographical,considerations, but most of the Electorate was between the Elbe and the Weser,the North Sea and the Harz mountains. However, there were also important

sections between the Elbe, Mecklenburg, Holstein and the Baltic, and also westof the Weser. These frontiers lacked strong natural defences and had not beensupplemented by any system of fortifications. As a result, Hanover wasvulnerable to attack, and dependent for its defence on the size of its army. Thiswas, like that of most German principalities, modest in size, 21,000 strong in1739, 26,400 in April 1742.1 Such a force did not place too heavy a burden ona primarily agrarian economy that was not particularly advanced, by thestandards of the age, and it was sufficient for pursuing small-scale quarrels withweak neighbours, such as the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin or the Prince-

Bishop of Hildesheim.However, other, and more powerful, German rulers could intervene in suchquarrels and Hanover suffered from its military weakness. The Hanoverianarmy offered no real protection against attack by powerful rulers, whileHanover’s geographical and international position made it liable to pressure.The Electorate’s trans-Elbean territory, the Duchy of Saxe-Lauenburg,occupied in 1689, made Hanover particularly sensitive to developments in theBaltic, especially in Mecklenburg and the Schleswig-Holstein isthmus. Her western possessions made her concerned about events in the Westphalian

Circle. Hanover lay astride any Russian advance into northern Germany, anyDanish moves south into Lower Saxony, any French attack on the westernfrontier of Brandenburg, and any attempt by the Electors of Brandenburg

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THE CROWN AND HANOVER

(Kings in Prussia) to amalgamate or otherwise link up their widely separatedterritories in Westphalia and the Lower Rhineland with Brandenburg.

Some rulers wished to create geographical links between their territories.Augustus I of Saxony, who became Augustus II of Poland in 1697, and his son

Augustus II/III (1733–63) both wished to create a land bridge across theAustrian-ruled Duchy of Silesia, between Saxony and Poland. Irrespective of such aspirations, it was clearly worrying for the Electors of Hanover that therewere Danish possessions not only to the north of Hanover but also to its west:Oldenburg and Delmenhorst; Prussian territories to both east and west.

If Hanoverian security dictated a search for allies, it was by no means clear whom to turn to. The usual pattern was two-fold: alliances with neighbouringsecond-rank powers—Denmark, Hesse-Cassel and Sweden—and the search for a more substantial friend. In 1741 the Danes were pressed to send assistance

against a threatened invasion. However, the first group was simply not powerfulenough. Bereft of a major ally in 1741, George was forced to accept anignominious neutrality convention. Only four states were powerful enough tooffer convincing assistance—France, Prussia, Austria and Russia—and much of the course of British foreign policy in 1714–56 arose from the efforts to winsuch assistance and their implications. After the end of the Anglo-Frenchalliance in 1731, Austria was the obvious choice, but by 1732 it was clear thatAustria would not endanger her Prussian alliance for the sake of Hanover.Austrian military defeats in 1733–4, 1737–9 and 1741 underlined a diplomatic

failure that was apparent before the Austro-French reconciliation in late 1735and, more obviously, their alliance in 1756.Hanoverian vulnerability in the face of continued Prussian antagonism in

the 1730s led George II to plan for the accession of Frederick II and to seekRussian support. The concomitant of the latter was a downplaying of Anglo-Swedish relations. The British were fortunate that French attempts to wooRussia, as in 1733 and 1741, were less persistent than those of Britain: in thelate 1730s the French preferred to seek the alliance of Sweden.

The British search for Russian assistance not only helped Hanover. Russia

was a useful partner for Britain, as it could act in a variety of spheres. It wasalso vital to prevent Russia from joining Britain’s enemies. The Russian refusalto join the powers attacking Austria in the early stages of the War of theAustrian Succession was crucial to Austrian survival. As France made gainsduring the war, so British ministers and diplomats became more anxious for Russian intervention. In 1742 Carteret hoped that the Russians would make asecure peace with Sweden “that they may have their hands free to act in agreater, more useful and more salutary manner”. Five years later, Cumberland’ssecretary, Sir Everard Fawkener, noted, “We should never negotiate anything

for good without a force. That from Petersburg will be an essential one, if wecan have it.” Hanbury-Williams also sought Russian intervention: “We havetoo long fought with the French upon unequal terms. Shall we never comeinto the field with equal numbers.”2 A Russian alliance was seen by the mid–

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1740s not only as a protection of Hanover, but also as vital for the Europeanbalance of power. As a result, British relations with Denmark and Sweden,especially the vexed question of the Swedish succession, became substantiallyan extension of Anglo-Russian relations. The pivotal nature of Russia in both

British policy towards the Baltic and Hanoverian secur ity was now established.Geographically exposed, Hanover was also threatened as a consequence of the dynastic link with Britain in 1714. An attack on or threat to the Electoratewas an obvious pre-emption of or response to unwelcome British moves, anapparently safe way to influence the conduct of Britain by intimidating theKing-Elector. Conversely, the dynastic link provided a dynamic to British-Hanoverian policy that posed both opportunities and threats. Throughout theunion there were always two distinct international realities. It was always clear,when a formal treaty was signed with other powers, which country was

committed by its King or Elector, and separate treaties were signed onoccasions when the head of state committed both countries at the same time.The administration of the two units was also separate.

Nevertheless, too much can be made of these distinctions, and it is wrong tosee the designation of the successive Georges as His Royal and ElectoralMajesty as mere etiquette.3 Although British ministers struggled to maintainthe distinction, both in discussion with foreign envoys and when faced withdomestic criticism,4 it is not surprising that their arguments were greeted withgeneral scepticism, and such issues as marital links with other ruling families

eroded the distinction.5

Furthermore, at times ministers sought to stress thecommon interests and bonds of Britain and Hanover. In 1751, when Newcastlecomplained of Prussian conduct, he wrote “one sees the affectation of distinguishing the King from the Elector”. Six years later, the British ministrypressed its hostility to a Hanoverian neutrality, although constitutional nicetieswere observed:

this transaction, which His Majesty has, in the most gracious manner,condescended to communicate to his English servants, who, though they

did not dare to presume to offer their humble advice to the King, inregard to the affairs of his Electorate, yet they thought it their duty to layat His Majesty’s feet their opinion, as to the support England ought togive the King, if His Majesty should be advised, by his Electoral servants,no longer to understand a Convention made under the circumstances of that of the 10th September, and already broke by the enemy, to bebinding upon the King.6

The personal union of Britain and Hanover was but one instance of a common

pattern in the period 1680–1770. William III of Orange had ruled Britain andbeen stadhouder of most of the Dutch provinces between 1689 and 1702.Saxony and Poland were ruled by the same man between 1697 and 1704, 1709and 1763; Sweden and another German territory, the Langraviate of Hesse-

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Cassel, by Frederick I of Sweden between 1730 and 1751. None of these linkswas sustained, but, in contrast, the dynastic link between England and Scotlandin 1603 led to the union of the two crowns and to that of their parliaments in1707, while the Electorate of Hanover was itself the recent product of the

fusion of the inheritances of several branches of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg and did not subsequently divide. Dynastic accretion was the classicroute to growth in the early modern period, as the history of Spain, Austria,and seventeenth-century Prussia, or rather of the Habsburg and Hohenzollernfamilies, demonstrated.

However, territorial amalgamation through dynastic means posed seriouspolitical problems, in terms of management as much as policy, and it is in thislight that much of the debate over foreign policy in Hanoverian Britain canbest be understood. Though George I in his will stipulated an eventual division

of Britain and Hanover after the death of his then sole grandson, Frederick,later Frederick, Prince of Wales, the electorate going to Frederick’s second son,if he had one, and, failing that, to the Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel branch of thehouse of Brunswick, he had, in the meantime, essentially created a new state. Incommon with the general European trend, this did not lead, however, to novelconstitutional, political or administrative arrangements.

Instead, it was a personal union, a territor ial agglomeration, given commonpurpose at the international level by the dynastic concerns of the ruler. Thiswas recognized by foreign diplomats, impatient with the attempts of their

British counterparts to differentiate between the two dominions. In January1742 Hardenberg, the Hanoverian envoy in Paris, assured Fleury of the Elector of Hanover’s good intentions, but refused to answer questions about the Kingof Britain. Amelot commented in a letter intercepted by the excellent Britishdeciphering department, that Fleury made it clear that pushing the idea of oneperson having two roles created an impression of bad faith. Faced by Austro-Hanoverian moves in 1745, Frederick II asked his envoy in London whether he should regard the King of England as one or two people,7 in short whether Britain was not, through the King, a party to these moves.

Hanoverian ministers were aware that their views were judged abroad in thelight of responses to British policy and interests. They were faced in 1727,1729, 1730, 1741, 1753, 1757 and 1772 with threatened attacks designed toinfluence British conduct. The monarchs appreciated the consequences of thepersonal union, but the bulk of the British political nation, understandably, didnot, and this provided a basis for political discord. The rule of the Hanoveriansposed not simply a question of dynastic legitimacy, but also one of politicalintention. Intended to stabilize the Protestant Succession after the failure of William III and Anne to produce direct heirs, Hanoverian dynasticism was a

destabilizing force in British politics. As the modus operandi of this dynasticismwas foreign policy, it is scarcely surprising that the latter constituted a major topic of political debate.

The royal role in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, a

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characteristic of all monarchical states in this period, and a long-standingsource of controversy in Britain, was thus given point as an issue in Britishpolitics by the diplomatic and domestic consequences of royal interventionarising from the interests of the personal union. It is this that dynasticism really

denoted, but in British political debate it was commonly misunderstood asHanoverianism. However, the charge of Hanoverian counsels failed to dojustice to the divisions within the government of the Electorate, divisions thatwere at times quite marked. It also neglected the extent to which dynasticinterests were often different from those of the Electorate, as understood byHanoverian ministers, and also the degree to which the royal conception of Hanoverian interests was different from the ministerial conception, not leastbecause it was often subsumed within these dynastic views.

It has been argued that on occasion Hanover suffered as a result of the

connection with Britain,8

and this was certainly a view held at the time.Harrington, the Secretary of State who accompanied George II to Hanover in1741, claimed that “there is no manner of doubt but that the measures HisMajesty shall pursue, as King, will be revenged upon him, as Elector, unlesstimely care be taken to prevent it”. He was correct. The advance of a Frencharmy towards Hanover forced George to agree to support the French candidatefor Emperor. To a certain extent, however, the question of how far Hanover suffered as a result of the connection is poorly posed, because the Electorate’sdifficulties arose as a result of the personal union and the interests and views

that this represented, as interpreted by the successive Georges.The period 1739–63 saw fresh challenges to the position of the Electors of Hanover in northern Germany after a decade when the situation had generallynot seemed too alarming. Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia in December 1740launched a period of instability in Germany and war across much of Europe,and Hanover was affected both directly and indirectly. Although peace came in1748, Hanover’s position remained precarious, thanks to the recent growth of Prussian strength, and it was also seen in this light as Frederick II was believedto be unpredictable and was allied to France. When Frederick William I of

Prussia had threatened to invade Hanover in 1726–7 and 1730, Georges I andII had been able to turn to French support, but the collapse of the Anglo-French alliance in 1731 had meant the end of such assistance and reassurance.However, although Prussian invasion of Hanover was feared in 1752 and 1753,it was French troops that were to invade, in 1757 during the Seven Years’ War.North-west Germany remained a sphere of operations for the remainder of theconflict, the Electorate’s position strategic because it covered Prussia’s westernfrontier, and part of the Electorate was still occupied by the French at the closeof hostilities.

Given these challenges, it was not surprising that George II took an activerole in continental diplomacy, but until the mid–1750s this looked back to theposition in 1714–30. Then Hanoverian concerns had been pushed to the top of the agenda of British diplomacy by the later stages of the Great Northern War

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(1700–21), the rise of Russian power in the Baltic and its direct impact inGermany in 1716–17, and the attendant conquest and distribution of much of the Swedish empire. A stress on Hanover had subsequently arisen from theBritish confrontation with Austria in 1725–31 and with Prussia in 1726–31.

This emphasis was domestically controversial. Particular diplomatic andmilitary moves, such as the confrontation with Austria, were judged unwise bysome. Furthermore, the pursuit of interests and acceptance of commitmentsthat did not accord with traditional British ones and that could be presented asHanoverian provided critics of successive Whig ministries with an opportunityfor arguing that they were betraying both national interests and their supposedrole as balancers of royal power.

These arguments were to be repeated in the 1740s, and, indeed,opposition writers of the period, such as James Ralph, as well as speakers in

Parliament, directly referred to the events of 1714–30 when discussingcurrent issues in foreign policy.10 In part, the controversy was familiar, but itwas also different, looking back in one respect to the disputes over WilliamIll’s foreign policy, but also suggesting a new agenda for debate with therising prominence of the contrasting of continental and oceaniccommitments. Whereas in 1714–30 the response to the growing power of Russia and Austria was the central issue in British diplomacy, and one thatdid not str ike any favourable resonance in terms of Br itish public debate over foreign policy, in the 1740s and 1750s a traditional theme was dominant: how

best to respond diplomatically and militarily to French power. This had beena central question during William Ill’s reign and, in one respect, relationswith Hanover were simply a more acute form of the commonplace problemof co-operating with allies and defending the exigencies of alliancediplomacy from domestic criticism. However, in the 1740s and 1750s theproblems of French power and the response to it were increasingly seen morein global terms and less in European.

Frederick II’s invasion of Silesia was made without the support of France,and George II’s hostile response to his nephew and one-time hoped-for

protégé threatened to open a gap between his own policy and that of theBritish, then at war with Spain and fear ing the entry of her ally France. Georgetook a major role as Elector in trying to create an anti-Prussian coalition, but,although he threatened the use of Hanoverian troops, 11 such activity couldonly be convincing if supported by Britain. On 26 December (os) 1740 Trevor was ordered to stir up the Dutch against Prussia and to ascertain from their leading ministers whether, if George II acted in support of Austria and “HisGerman Dominions should be attacked, as they lie by their neighbourhood tothose of Prussia, so much exposed, in resentment”, the Dutch would provide

assistance. In April 1741 Parliament offered support to Hanover, as part of aplan designed to help Maria Theresa against her Prussian assailant, thusprefiguring Pitt’s support from 1758 for the despatch of British troops toWestphalia to support Frederick II in the Seven Years’ War. As on the latter

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occasion, this approach was seen as a means to help Hanover without inspiringserious controversy.

In 1741 Parliament provided a vote of credit to enable George as king tofulfil his obligations to Maria Theresa, and assured him of support in the event

of an attack on Hanover. Moving the Address in the Commons, ThomasClutterbuck, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, declared that “we ought topronounce that the territories of Hanover will be considered on this occasionas the dominions of Great Britain, and that any attack on one or the other willbe equally resented”. Pulteney, however, sought to separate the issues of Austriaand Hanover in order to provide a focus for attacks on the government. Hesupported aid to Austria, but was opposed to giving any guarantee for Hanover.Pulteney referred to the Act of Settlement of 1701, the constitutional basis of the Hanoverian succession, which stipulated that the monarch should not enter

into a war for the sake of foreign dominions not belonging to the Britishcrown.12

Nevertheless, support for Austria covered the gap between George’s viewsand British hostility to the Bourbons. Furthermore, the Franco-Prussianalliance of 1741 and British success in 1742 in breaking this and in reconcilingPrussia and Austria, albeit temporarily, helped to lessen tension over disparateaims. A somewhat far-fetched parallel was provided by the French entry intothe War of American Independence in 1778. That lessened domestic politicalopposition to the British government’s use of force in America.

However, from the outset in the 1740s there were clearly differences inemphasis, if not policy, between ruler and ministers. It is necessary, first, toconsider how and to what extent George II was able to advance his views andwhat the political consequences were. Subsequently, attention will be devotedto George III, who came to the throne in 1760, and for whom Hanoverianconcerns were not foremost, at least in his early years as monarch.

George II had two different sets of ministers and diplomats whom he coulduse to advance his views, and he was also able to do so through his frequentmeetings with foreign envoys. Although his opportunities for personal

diplomacy with other monarchs were slight—none came to London, and onhis frequent trips to Hanover, unlike his father, he was never invited toBerlin—George II’s continental trips did provide opportunities for meetingforeign ministers and senior diplomats and gave him a chance for taking a freshlook at affairs. Furthermore, both in Hanover and en route, George could meetBritish diplomats, especially those accredited to The Hague. British envoys atnearby courts, especially Berlin and Dresden, travelled to Hanover when theking was there. As king, George was also able in Britain to discuss diplomaticrelations with British ministers other than the relevant Secretary of State and

thus at times to undermine the position of that minister. George also sawforeign diplomats in London. In January 1750 he told the Sardinian envoy hewas furious with Austria, but, at the same time, he sought to lessen Austro-Sardinian differences.13

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The importance of Hanoverian diplomatic representation has beenunderestimated. Although no longer regularly represented in, for example,France and Russia, Hanoverian diplomats were present at crucial moments, for example, in Paris during the winter of 1741–2, while the regular representation

in Vienna and Regensburg underlined the continued importance of Germandisputes and matters of Imperial jurisdiction. Hanoverian diplomats providedGeorge II with sources of information and channels of communication thatwere outside the control of the Secretaries of State. This ensured that it wasimportant for British ministries to win the co-operation of their Hanoveriancounterparts. British diplomats encountered difficulties as a result of theactions of their Hanoverian colleagues; although it was also convenient toblame them for problems that were not their fault. Thus, in 1739, at a time of poor Anglo-Austrian relations, Robinson complained about the consequences

of the pursuit of one of George II’s favourite goals, the succession to EastFriesland, over which he was in dispute with the Hohenzollerns,

the Electoral Minister has had orders to desire of this court [Vienna] theconfirmation of the Electoral Pacta Conventa about the succession of Ostfrise, which both for the timing of it, and the manner of doing it…and that too when this court thought that all had been asked of themthat was wanting at present, gives a real concern to those here who wishwell to us, and a pretext to others to countercarry us in everything else.

The following January Robinson was concerned about Hanoverian policy inthe forthcoming election of a new Emperor. He wrote to one of Harrington’sUnder Secretaries,

You will easily imagine why I trust with you for Lord Harrington’s use,rather than to a dispatch, the inclosed papers. One a letter from theRegency at Hanover without the King’s order, to the Elector of Mainz…The King our master has not yet declared his personal view, not even,

as appears by the letter, to his own Regency, which makes it the moreextraordinary that they should so hastily adopt a doctrine, that for whatthey may know or foresee may thwart his Majesty in quite differentviews…what you will easily perceive is, that the Elector’s Minister veryoften comes across the King’s. This is and has been so much the case thatI have often seen by one blind and random shot overturned

his own best endeavours. In September 1741, Frederick II drew attention toserious discrepancies between what he was told by the royal and Electoral

envoys, telling the British envoy, the Earl of Hyndford, “when you My lord calla thing white that Sweicheldt calls it black, and when you call it black he callsit white”.14 The following spring, Hardenberg continued to act in accordancewith the Hanoverian neutrality until the new British ministry was able to

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persuade George II to abandon the policy.15 Although sympathetic towardsMaria Theresa,16 Hanoverian ministers had been greatly affected by theElectorate’s vulnerability. Horatio Walpole commented on the Hanoverianresponse to the Prussian invasion of Silesia in December 1740,

our master is divided between resentment and fears; he cannot bear tothink of augmenting the territories of his Electoral neighbour [Brandenburg-Prussia] on one side, and he justly apprehends that his owndominions should fall first a sacrifice should be stir on the other. Hisservants I think are all here of one opinion, blame and abhor theextravagant step, but see no remedy but palliating and accommodatingremedies.

Exposure to possible French and Prussian attack in the summer of 1741 had aserious effect on Hanoverian self-confidence, leading to support for neutralityand its maintenance. Ernst, Freiherr von Steinberg, head of the HanoverianChancery in London in 1737–48, spoke with regret of British efforts in the lastdays of the Walpole government to encourage the Austrians and theconsequent delay in negotiating peace.17

Significant differences between, and a sense of a clear clash between, Britishand Hanoverian objectives were not restricted to 1740–2, but can be foundthroughout the period.18 They were most acute in the case of relations with

Prussia and most serious during the War of the Austrian Succession and againin 1756–7, when the issue of Hanoverian neutrality again became prominent.Differences were least serious during 1748–53, when the close relationshipbetween Newcastle and the most influential Hanoverian minister, GerlachAdolph, Freiherr von Münchhausen,19 and their shared interest in the ImperialElection Scheme and in giving an anti-Prussian direction to British policyreduced tension.

George II continued to entrust his Hanoverian envoys with confidentialtasks. George was also, however, able to instruct British diplomats to further

Electoral goals, a situation that helped, as much as clashes with Hanoveriandiplomacy, to sustain criticism by British envoys. In addition, his views were of considerable importance in the composition of the British diplomatic corps, allappointed by him, in theory his choice, and all paid out of the king’s civil list,which accounted for George’s reluctance to promote diplomats to more senior and expensive ranks.

Diplomats could find it time-consuming and irritating to be instructed tosupport Electoral interests. In October 1747 Hanbury-Williams reported, “Ihave the Hanover affairs at this court [Dresden] put into my hands,” adding,

next month, that it had obliged him to postpone a journey to Vienna.20

Thesame year, Sandwich successfully pressed the Dutch to hire a German regimentin accordance with George’s wishes.21 The attempt in 1747–8 to persuadeSpain to pay money it owed to Hanover was more time-consuming and led

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Horace Walpole, an MP as well as a letter writer, to complain that the ministrywas seeking repayment of this debt rather than reparation for attacks on Britishtrade.22 It would be mistaken, however, to suggest either that relations in thisperiod were invariably poor or that the British ministry necessarily yielded to

Electoral demands. In 1748 Newcastle encouraged Sandwich to ignore ordersabout preventing Frederick II from obtaining any guarantee from the peacenegotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle for his possession of East Friesland. Frederickhad seized East Fr iesland in 1744 on the death of the last duke, to the impotentfury of George.23

And yet, co-operation between British and Hanoverian ministers was thedominant theme in 1748, one to which George II contributed, and which setthe scene for close relations between Newcastle and Münchhausen in thefollowing years. After six days “wading through the mud of Westphalia” to

Hanover, on his way to Berlin, Henry Legge was given very useful informationabout the situation there by Münchhausen. In July George sent Bussche, hisenvoy in Vienna, to the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. Newcastle was not shownhis instructions, but was informed that they related to the Elector’s interests inOsnabrück and East Friesland. However, George clearly did not wish tocomplicate Sandwich’s negotiations with the French Plenipotentiary, StSeverin, Newcastle writing to the Earl,

‘I am persuaded you will give Mor. Busch all the assistance you can in

carrying it through. But as it is a very nice and delicate affair and oughtto be conducted with great prudence and discretion; I have thesatisfaction to assure you that Mor. Busch is directed to take no step, nor make any application to Mor. St. Severin, but in concert with you and byyour advice: And therefore, at the same time, that I am very earnestly torecommend to you, to give Mor. Busch all the assistance in your power; Iam persuaded, you will take great care not to give Mor. St. Severin anyadvantage over you, nor to put it into his power to make any ill use of the confidence reposed in him: For His Majesty has the immediate

conclusion of the general pacification so much at heart; and is sodesirous, that the negotiation should not be obstructed. By 1748 Hanoverian ministers could be praised. Aside from Newcastle’s highopinion of Münchhausen, he also found “Mor. Busch a very sensible anddiscreet man…with the rightest notions…for supporting the true system, thatought to be observed and followed by the Maritime Powers”. Pelham was“sorry to lose” Steinberg when he resigned his London post, because “he wasa good natured innocent man”.24

The implicit bargain between king and British ministers that had helped tobring governmental stability in the latter stages of the War of the AustrianSuccession was to be sustained in the post-war years: a degree of mutualunderstanding and co-operation to which Newcastle’s willingness to play an

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active role as standard-bearer of continental interventionism and opponent of Prussia was crucial. Horace Walpole complained in 1749 that Newcastle“Hanoverizes more and more every day”,25 but, once a German league wasseen as important and the Imperial Election Scheme centred on just such a

league, Hanoverian advice and assistance was valuable, to an extent that had notbeen the case for the British ministry for many years.However, there was an undisclosed tension between Electoral goals and

those of Newcastle in 1748–56. This tension was to have serious impact in1756–7, under the strain of a deteriorating international system and a breakdown of co-operation between the British and Hanoverian ministries. TheHanoverian ministers were most concerned about the security of theElectorate, and, to that end, supported better Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Russian relations and a league of German princes. In contrast, Newcastle’s

prime purpose was creating an alliance system aimed against France. Theposition of Prussia was crucial. Newcastle was angered by Prussian conduct ina number of disputes with Britain, especially over financial and commercialissues—the Silesian debts and the Emden Company, but was essentiallyconcerned about her as an ally of France, to him the pr incipal threat, while theHanoverians considered Prussia as the major challenge to their position.

Evidence for George II’s views is less than complete. The political history of monarchical attitudes and the royal courts is rarely easy to study, but theproblem of sources is more serious for the first half of the eighteenth century

than for the second. For a variety of reasons that are unclear, thecorrespondence of European monarchs in the later period was more extensiveand has been printed at length, in contrast to that of their predecessors in thefirst half . This contrast is particularly marked in the case of Frederick II (1740– 86), when contrasted with his father, Frederick William I (1713–40), though itis also true of those of Catherine II, “the Great” (1762–96), Joseph II (1765– 90) and Gustavus III (1771–92). Possibly it owed something to the differingstyles of eighteenth-century kingship, as Enlightened Despotism replaced late-Baroque monarchy, and to the interest of late nineteenth-century historians in

what then appeared to be a heroic period of national monarchy, only a centurydistant.In the case of Britain, the heroism was attributed to the opponents of

George III, but the position with regard to sources was similar. George III’scorrespondence runs to eleven fat volumes although they include letters to theking. The surviving letters of George I and George II are very scanty. Their preference for reviewing troops and hunting rather than the convenience of future “history bigots”, as Hervey termed them,26 ensured not only that it isdifficult to provide a standard against which the supposed novelty of George

III’s attitude towards his position as king and consequent policies could bejudged, but also that the role of the two monarchs in foreign policy, as in muchelse, is obscure. Even that expert champion of continental sources, RagnhildHatton, made little of the last six years of George I’s reign, summarized very

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cursorily in her biography, and it remains one of the most obscure periods ineighteenth-century British political history.

The few surviving items of correspondence in the hand of George II arevery brief, and consist largely of scribbled comments on pieces submitted to

him for approval.27

It is ironic that the Royal Archives in Windsor Castlecontain more material on the Jacobites than the Hanoverians for the reigns of George I and George II. Little survives for Frederick, Prince of Wales, and theCumberland Papers at Windsor are substantially devoted to military matters.They appear to have been weeded for political items, although there are twoother reasons why Cumberland’s papers are more plentiful for 1747 or 1757than 1750 or 1753. First, he was away from London in 1743, 1745–8 and 1757,and, secondly he held important official positions in 1745–8 and 1757, andthese produced institutional correspondence.

Absence of monarchs and ministers from the centre of governmentgenerally led to an increase in correspondence, of both institutional andpersonal nature. Thus, there are usually more letters surviving between Br itishpoliticians for the summer months, especially the late summer, when manywere away from London, than for the early months of the year, when all whowere fit were generally in London for the parliamentary session. In this respect,the fact that George II, like his father and like George III in his early years asking, rarely travelled far in Britain is important. The monarchs might movebetween the royal seats in the Thames Valley, but none was far from London,

unlike Compiégne, where Louis XV went on a number of occasions, whichwas some distance from Paris. When in England, George I and George II wereusually to be found at St James’s or, in the spring and summer, KensingtonPalace and Hampton Court. Neither visited the north of England, theMidlands or the West Country; let alone Scotland, Wales or Ireland, which didnot see a British monarch at any time during the century. In contrast, GeorgeII visited Hanover while Elector in 1729, 1732, 1735, 1736, 1740, 1741, 1743,1748, 1750, 1752 and 1755. Each trip lasted several months. George wasaccompanied by a British Secretary of State, Townshend in 1729, Harrington in

1732, 1735, 1740 and 1741, Carteret in 1743, Newcastle in 1748, 1750 and1752, and Holdernesse in 1755. In 1736 Walpolean distrust of Harrington ledto Horatio Walpole accompanying George as acting Secretary.

Although George II’s absence from London did not lead to his writingletters to ministers there, the Secretary of State accompanying himcorresponded with his opposite number in London, as indeed did the Under Secretaries and these papers have survived in State Papers Regencies.28 Theyprovide a valuable guide to policy-making, while the Secretary in Hanover frequently commented on the views of the monarch. In addition, the Secret-

ary in Hanover corresponded, separately from his London counterpart, withBritish diplomats, the correspondence surviving in State Papers Foreign butbound in separate volumes. State Papers Regencies can be supplemented byconfidential correspondence between the Secretary in Hanover (and others

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with him) and politicians in Britain. This is especially valuable for the yearswhen Newcastle went, for he was a man devoted to self-justification and had amistaken belief in his ability to persuade others. Holdernesse’s correspondenceis also helpful, Harrington’s less so, while Carteret’s refusal to explain what was

going on aroused fury in London. The wartime destruction of Hanoverianmaterial, especially the series Hanover 9, the post–1705 foreign policydocuments, exacerbates the problem for the modern scholar. Governmentpapers were also destroyed in a fire at the palace in Hanover in 1741.29 Theselosses increase the importance of British sources for understanding the impactof Hanover, although that also ensures that Hanover as an issue is overly seenin, and from, a British perspective.

The survival and importance of State Papers Regencies directs attention tothe role of institutional practice, in this case the correspondence between

Secretaries of State, in providing records for royal activity. However, the factthat the king settled matters in discussions with his ministers and the oralnature of court politics creates serious problems. Military and diplomaticcorrespondence were generally handled outside the cabinet. There are accountsof what George II said in meetings. Newcastle often told Hardwicke andPelham what the king had said, and foreign diplomats who were grantedaudience would report at length on what they were told, but these accountswere dependent on memory, not note-taking, and were not made by the king.They can be supplemented by comments about royal attitudes, but these have

to be used with care, especially those in well-known sources, such as theMemoirs of Hervey and of Horace Walpole. It is going too far to claim, as hasbeen done, that “such wr itings are on the whole vindictive nonsense” and that“contemporary memoirs and letters can only be used occasionally in the studyof administrative history of this period”.30

The surviving sources for the “administrative history” of foreign policy,the diplomatic correspondence, do not suffice as a source for the study of foreign policy. It has been argued that the very nature of diplomaticdocuments is not helpful in ascertaining the link between diplomacy and

“profound causes”, because diplomatic correspondence is most likely toemphasize the immediate and tactical, while the language employedreinforces the assumption that non-diplomatic calculations are of little useand throws no light on unspoken assumptions.31 There is much truth in this,although, in fact, the instructions sent to British envoys often included alengthy discussion of the central themes of Br itish foreign policy. These werenecessary because the nature of eighteenth-century communications ensuredthat it was not sensible to emphasize the immediate and tactical. Diplomats,especially those at some distance from London, had to be given discretion to

discuss and negotiate.However, the value of these instructions to historians has to be questioned.First, the explanations of British policy were often intended for communication to foreign monarchs or ministers, and thus tended to

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emphasize good intentions and common diplomatic interests. Secondly, theyprovide little guidance as to the priorities of British policy. Thirdly, they offer few suggestions as to the process by which policy was formulated. Fourthly,they were often designed to be understood in the light of supplementary

private instructions, which do not always survive, or not always with them.In addition, the value of diplomatic correspondence in general was limitedby the reluctance to commit material to paper, especially in secret negotiations.Sir Cyril Wych reported from Russia in 1742 “of the danger of givinganything in writing to this court, so liable to revolutions, and of namingpersons, who by a sudden change may rise from nothing to the head of affairs”.Carteret replied by instructing him to avoid written communications.32 Thefollowing year, Count Finckenstein, Prussian envoy in Hanover, found itimpossible to get anything in writing from Carteret about possible measures to

negotiate a peace for Charles VII (Charles Albert of Bavaria as Holy RomanEmperor). Advocating negotiations with Prussia in August 1740, Sir RobertWalpole and the Lord President of the Council, the Earl of Wilmington, bothexperienced politicians, proposed discussions rather than the exchange of memoranda, as the former method was better “for opening and explaining thesentiments on both sides”. Nine years later, Keene reported,

I shall punctually observe His Majesty’s injunctions to be cautious intreating by formal offers in writing, and being apprised of the

inconveniencies that method is subject to, I never intended to follow it,but in commercial affairs where it is necessary because memorials of thatnature are usually remitted to other places.33

One important cause of reluctance was fear of loss of secrecy on the part of allies, the Austrians being hesitant about confiding in the Dutch for that reasonin 1743,34 and the danger either that the threat of compromising materialwould be used in order to exert pressure or that it would be exposed in order to create embarrassment.35 In early 1743 the British government discovered

from postal interception that their domestic opponents were seeking copies of documents about the 1741 Hanoverian neutrality from the French, and thatthe latter were willing to agree provided that their revelation would helpFrance.36

On the other hand, Frederick II was worried about the imprecision of oralnegotiations, in terms both of precision of thought and accuracy in reporting,and in 1752 instructed his envoy in Paris to ensure that memoranda were usedby both powers.37 Frederick’s comments are an instructive qualification of many sources, for much correspondence consists of subsequent accounts of

audiences, council meetings and conversations. However, these are still useful,like contemporary letters and memoirs in general, because they can beevaluated, whereas much that might have been of value was either never commented upon in writing or the accounts have been destroyed, at the time

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or subsequently. Knowledge of the government’s postal interception system ledto hesitation about committing ideas to paper. In the 1730s Townshend noted,

I never write anything but what I desire the ministry may see. There is

no great skill nor dexterity in opening of letters, but such is the fate of this administration that they have managed this affair in such a manner asto lose all the advantage of it. Sir Robert having complained to a friendwhen he was last in these parts, that they had lost all the intelligence theyused to get by the Post-Office which was owning plainly that peoplewere grown wiser than to write anything of consequence by the post.38

Not all injunctions to destroy letters were heeded, many letters surviving withsuch instructions on them, but an unknown number were observed. Newcastle

wrote to Sandwich in January 1748, “I will begin with giving you thesatisfaction of knowing, that the moment I had read your letter twice over, Iburnt it myself; so that affair is safe.”39 Much material was destroyedsubsequently, in order to avoid possible political retribution or inconvenience.Keene’s papers were burned in 1739, Sir Robert Walpole’s hastily weededwhen he fell in 1742, Cumberland’s when he died in 1765. The accidents thata civilization vulnerable to fire suffered frequently could also be fatal,40 whileheirs could destroy papers that they felt it would be inconvenient to have kept.After the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales in 1751 his papers were burned.

When William Pulteney, 1st Earl of Bath, died in 1764 his brother, GeneralPulteney, destroyed all his papers, thus preventing Bath’s chaplain, JohnDouglas, from writing his biography. This was particularly unfortunate because,certainly in the 1740s, Bath had kept significant records:

Lord Bath is wonderful angry at the disgrace of his friends, complains of the perfidy of the Pelhams, says he kept a journal of all that passedbetween the Duke of Newcastle and him in the spring of 1742…as tothe journal I am assured he has kept one these ten years, setting down

each night the day’s conversation.41

As a result, while surviving papers of the per iod can give us in all cases only animperfect account, for many individuals we have mostly only the imprint inthe rock.

Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss George II’s attitudes and thus to probethe problems that they created for his British ministers. In the Commonsdebate of 6 December (os) 1743 on continuing Hanoverian troops in Britishpay, Dodington, a former diplomat and Lord of the Treasury, argued that

a good minister considers only the true interest of his master, andendeavours to make his passions and affections subservient to his interest;whereas a parasitical and bad minister considers only the governing

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passion of his master, and in order to gain personal favour applies himself solely to the indulgence of that passion.42

Dodington’s argument helps to explain the continued political importance of

the monarch, while Hanover was the “governing passion” he referred to.At the outset of the period, the position of the Electorate was apparentlyrelatively favourable. The Emperor Charles VI had abandoned his attempt of the late 1710s and 1720s to enforce and extend Imperial authority andchallenge the Protestant princes and was deeply involved in an unsuccessfulwar with the Turks (1737–9). Although George II had very poor relations withFrederick William I, he hoped that the accession of the latter’s son Frederick,George’s nephew and second cousin, whom he had secretly provided withmoney, would lead to an alliance, a hope shared by British ministers. It was also

hoped to win the alliance of Russia. Such a pact would guarantee Hanoveriansecurity, while hopefully leaving George free as Elector to maintain his interestin aggrandisement, specifically East Friesland, which he very much wanted togain.43

Conflict involving Hanoverian troops broke out not over East Friesland, butover the territory of Steinhorst on the frontier of Saxe-Lauenburg andHolstein, which was disputed between George and Christian VI of Denmark.Rejecting George’s suggestion of negotiations, the Danes sent troops tooccupy Steinhorst in late 1738, but they were driven out with casualties by a

larger Hanoverian force. George used Trevor to obtain Dutch pressure onChristian, Trevor being instructed by Harrington, who was given informationon George’s orders by Steinberg.44 Although there were military moves andtalk of war, including hopes in Sweden that a conflict might enable the Swedesto regain Bremen and Verden, which had been lost to Hanover in the later stages of the Great Northern War,45 a settlement was reached. The major German rulers, Charles VI and Frederick William I, had both urged peace,46

which was arranged through Christian’s cousin and friend, Count Stolberg of Wernigerode.47

The significance of the episode was twofold. First, as pointed out in thepress, it had threatened the attempt to thwart French approaches and to renewthe Anglo-Danish treaty of 1734,48 which was now of greater importancebecause of Sweden’s move into the French camp in 1738. Thus, the pursuit of Hanoverian ends had compromised British foreign policy. Secondly, the crisisclearly indicated that George’s success in defending, let alone advancing,Electoral interests would depend on the position of Hanover vis-a-visinternational alignments. He was fortunate that Charles VI, then relatively closeto France, and Frederick William I, who was being approached by her, did not

seek to exploit the crisis. Aside from the Rhineland, the Empire had beenpeaceful for the 1730s: Frederick William had followed a cautious policy in theWar of the Polish Succession (1733–5), and the conflict anticipated over thesuccession to the Rhenish duchies of Jülich and Berg, contested by Frederick

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William and the heir to the Elector Palatine, had been averted. This relativecalm had allowed princes without much military power, such as George asElector, to overlook their weaknesses, although there had been Prussian threatsto invade Hanover during a Jülich-Berg cr isis in 1738. The situation was to be

less favourable after Frederick II brought war to northern Germany andgreater uncertainty to George and Hanover.In 1739 British foreign policy was dominated, not by developments on the

Continent but, by deteriorating relations with Spain; and these related to theNew World, not the Mediterranean. As was invariably the case, George took far less of an interest in maritime and colonial affairs than in their continentalcounterparts. The potential clash between, on the one hand, his determinationto defend Electoral pretensions over East Friesland and his opposition toPrussian gains from Jülich-Berg, and, on the other, hopes for a Prussian alliance

among his British ministers, was postponed by a general sense that nothingcould be expected from the splenetic and unpredictable Frederick William.Although five years younger than George II, his health was poor, and hisimminent death had been widely anticipated since 1734, when he had had asevere illness. Furthermore, as Karl Philipp, Elector Palatine, whose apparentlyimminent death was expected to trigger the Jülich-Berg crisis, did not dieuntil 1742, the Empire remained deceptively calm.

The Hanoverian ministry was worried about French diplomatic moves inDenmark and Sweden,49 but it was only the prospect of France joining Spain

in war with Britain and attacking Britain’s continental dependencies— Hanover and the Dutch—that really excited concern in London about thesituation in Europe. Furthermore, this was less urgent in early 1740 than thethreat of French naval intervention in the Caribbean. Indeed that summer thebalance of military need was suggested by discussion of the possibility of Britain purchasing arms from Hanover, although the idea was rejected by theLords Justices, the ministers left with responsibility for government in Britainwhile George II was abroad, because they were “afraid of impertinencies hereupon it”.50

The death of Frederick William in 1740 appeared to offer George anopportunity to escape from his isolation and initially provided no threat toHanover. At first, there was optimism about the chance of better relations, andin June 1740 Münchhausen went to Berlin in order to win Frederick II’ssupport.51 However, difficulties were soon anticipated on account of Electoralinterests. In July Harr ington sent a private letter in his own hand from Hanover to Newcastle:

I will venture in great confidence to acquaint you there are certain

disputes and pretensions subsisting betwixt the Houses of Hanover andPrussia, which though they may appear to the rest of the world not todeserve so immediate an attention as other matters of a more generalnature I fear however that till those are adjusted, in which I foresee great

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difficultys like to arise, the general matters will go on but lamely and thisis one principal reason why I am not overfond of a journey to Berlin asyet.

Four months later Count Osterman, the Russian foreign minister, himself aGerman by birth, told the British envoy, Edward Finch, that he was veryworried that “there might be a difference of interest between the twoElectorates which might have some influence on the counsels of the twokings”.52 These comments echoed those made earlier about East Friesland byHoratio Walpole, and might suggest that a clear case could be made out of Hanoverian concerns preventing alliance with Prussia, yet another example of the Electorate preventing British attempts to win the support of the powers of eastern and central Europe.

The situation was in fact more complex. There is little sign of pressure for aggrandizement from the Hanoverian government,53 and, far from there beinga simple question of arranging the terms for a reconciliation between GeorgeII and the Hohenzollerns, Frederick was in fact seeking the best terms for hisalliance from both George and Louis XV. The crucial issue was the Jülich-Berginheritance, towards which France was best placed to help Prussia.Furthermore, far from there being a clear contrast between British ministerialenthusiasm for winning Frederick by making concessions and reluctance onthe part of George unless he won equal concessions, as has been argued,54 the

British ministry was itself split. Fears were expressed that Frederick wouldexpect too much and that supporting him over Jülich-Berg would lead to war with France in the interests of Prussia and Hanover.55

George II, like his ministers, hoped to win Frederick’s support, but wasconcerned about the extent and implications of his demands. Long-held vagueviews about how Prussia could join in to support the balance and “liberties” of Europe, repeated to Frederick in August 1740 by the British envoy, appearedredundant in light of Frederick’s stress on the interests of rulers. His demandsfor British support over Jülich-Berg, Mecklenburg and East Friesland56

threatened not only Electoral interests, but also British relations with other powers. To build up the strength of a ruler who could not be relied upon wasdangerous, and, in part, unnecessary, because, although it is not clear how far the connection was made by contemporaries, there were signs of a possiblemajor improvement in Austrian relations with both Britain57 and Hanover,58 aswell as the successful negotiation of an AngloRussian alliance.59 The last wasseen as an important deterrent to any Prussian pact with France.60

As conflict with France in the West Indies appeared more likely inSeptember 1740, however, the ministers in London became more interested in

the idea of winning Frederick’s alliance.61

However, given the extent of Prussian expectations, this was unrealistic, and criticism of George II for hisattitude towards Frederick62 is misplaced. The situation changed on 20 October 1740 with the death of Charles VI. George was a guarantor of the Pragmatic

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Sanction. Co-operation with Frederick on this basis was sought,63 but hisinvasion of Silesia was to compromise such hopes.

The complex differing interests, cross-currents and tensions of 1740 were tobe repeated on other occasions in the period; indeed, in 1741 George II’s

negotiation of a neutrality for Hanover undercut attempts to create a league tosupport Maria Theresa. Towards the end of the War of the Austrian Succession,Horatio Walpole made a major effort to regain influence and to press the casefor a Prussian alliance and for Britain refusing to allow Austrian opposition toPrussia to prevent such an alliance. George II, however, proved a formidableopponent. Horatio wrote to Pelham in August 1747 that “the master will nothear of Prussia, and the servants, partly will not, and partly dare not proposeit”.64

Later, the tensions within the “Old System” can in part be considered

against the background of the ambiguous Hanoverian response to Imperialauthority, the difficulties of reconciling German patriotism, loyalty to theEmperor, confessional feeling and particular interests. The “System” servedroyal and Hanoverian ends by essentially acting as a deterrent of Prussia, whileappearing also as an anti-French step, thus being acceptable to British opinion.The coming of peace in 1748 enabled the shelving of differences betweenanti-French and anti-Prussian goals. Indeed the position was eased from thepoint of view of the British ministry, for accusations of a subordination toHanoverian ends were less publicly convincing in the period 1748–55 as a

result of an agenda of Anglo-Prussian differences, including the EmdenCompany (a Prussian East India Company), Silesian debts and mar itime prizes.Hanoverian commitments focused the issue of royal control, and did so in a

fashion that was often contentious within both the formal mechanisms of politics and the wider public political world. If only for that reason, GeorgeIII’s public distancing from his grandfather’s Hanoverian commitments helpedto “depoliticize” the issue of the royal role in foreign policy, although thisowed more to the rise of the king’s domestic political position and views as asource and issue of contention. Furthermore, foreign and domestic policy were

in part joined in that George III’s favour for Bute was blamed by many for thereplacement of Pitt in 1761 and for the peace negotiations in 1762–3.Nevertheless, it proved easier to sustain a critique of Bute’s supposed influenceon domestic matters rather than his role in foreign policy.

Foreign policy and the Electorate of Hanover clearly contributed to royalunpopularity in mid-century, especially in 1743–4, but it may be asked how far they weakened the crown. Certainly the contention arising from Hanoverianissues made it unlikely that British resources could be extensively used to serveHanoverian ends. If that is seen as the prime objective of the monarchs then

they failed. The period was one in which the gap between Hanoverian andPrussian power widened, and was brutally displayed with the fate of EastFriesland. Yet, Britain-Hanover was not like England-Normandy in the lateeleventh century: circumstances and political cultures were totally different. If

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George II adapted with difficulty to the rise and manifestations of Prussianpower and to Frederick the Great’s wilfulness, he was guided to that end bythe majority of his British advisers, and those who viewed Prussia unkindlywere convinced that they did so for Br itish ends. Clearly such ends were open

to multiple interpretation and to contention, but it is striking how clear ministers were on the need to advance Hanoverian interests only if theycorresponded with those of Britain.

George II was certainly weakened in the successive domestic political crisesthat accompanied and followed the fall of Walpole by the degree to whichHanover was both involved in European power politics in a period of war andchange, and vulnerable. This made it far less likely that he could sustain abreach with politicians, in or out of office, who enjoyed the confidence of Parliament. Carteret failed to cope with the compromises and nuances that the

situation called for. He understood the implications of the Hanoverian link indiplomatic, but not domestic, terms.Yet it may be argued that both monarchs and monarchy were less weakened

by the Hanoverian connection than might otherwise be anticipated. Indeedone consequence of greater political and public concern with the maritimeand trans-ocean world was that it became easier to pursue British foreignpolicy on the Continent in the early 1750s with less public contention.Nevertheless, Hanover was a cause of significant political and printed debate inboth 1755 and 1757 as Britain went to war again. Hanover remained a central

concern of George II in his less active last years, but this helped to define hisgrandson and heir’s hostility to Electoral considerations, a response, as with hisopposition to involvement in British general elections, that was at oncepragmatic and idealistic. As Prince of Wales, the future George III wrote toBute in 1759, “as to the affairs on the Weser they look worse and worse; I fear this is entirely owing to the partiality [George II] has for that horrid Electoratewhich has always lived upon the very vitals of this poor country”. As king,George III showed his determination to end Britain’s involvement in theGerman part of the Seven Years’ War:

though I have [Hanoverian] subjects who will suffer immenselywhenever this kingdom withdraws its protection from thence, yet sosuperior is my love to this my native country over any private interest of my own that I cannot help wishing that an end was put to that home …Ithink if the Duke of Newcastle will not hear reason concerning theGerman war that it would be better to let him quit than to go on withthat and to have myself and those who differ from him madeunpopular.65

George III’s largely indifferent attitude towards Hanover indeed worriedBritish ministers concerned about the policy and its political resonances.66

George III’s break with his grandfather’s ministers was intertwined with the

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break with the policies of the 1750s. It was not only that the alliance withPrussia was lost, but that the gap was not filled by an alliance with another major continental power. The motives for such an alliance—George II’sanxiety about Hanover, ministerial concern about this anxiety and the sense

that defensive arrangements for Hanover could and should serve as the basis for a British alliance system—had been largely lost, certainly in so far as activitywas required to mould circumstances. More generally, the interventionist habitof mind and the concomitant diplomatic assumptions had been lost as far asEurope was involved.67 George III might be very gracious to Carteret, nowEarl Granville, soon after his accession, but he had little interest in the viewsthat that minister had once stood for. Though Lord President of the Counciluntil 1763, Carteret was one of yesterday’s men.

In March 1761 Haslang pointed out that the prince-bishopric of

Hildesheim, which the neighbouring Electorate of Hanover had long sought,was both vacant and actually occupied by George III’s forces. George II hadwished to gain the territory, but George III did not share his grandfather’sviews. Three weeks after reporting that Hildesheim was vacant, Haslangobserved that the predilection for Hanover was no longer so strong andsuggested that there would be no territorial cessions elsewhere in order tomake gains for the Electorate. Three months later, when Bussy began peacenegotiations with the British ministry, he was told by Carteret that the Britishhad little interest in Hanoverian affairs. In July Haslang noted that whatever

happened in the Empire would have little effect on British government policy,adding, “It is no longer the times of George II.”68 Bute told the Sardinianenvoy, Count Viry, in October 1761 that France would not gain better terms if she captured Hanover, a statement given authority by its source, the royalfavourite. A month later, Newcastle referred to Bute and his supporters whenhe wrote to the Marquess of Rockingham, a political ally, “There are manywho are for abandoning the German war, and giving up Hanover, and our allies. That is what I can never consent to, nor, I believe, any of our friends. Ihave talked very plainly to the King, and My Lord Bute upon it.”69

Although Hanover did not play a major role in British diplomacy or publicdebate in the 1760s, the very role of the king in ensuring this indicated thecontinued importance of the crown in the field of foreign policy. In somerespects, the shift was as abrupt and striking as that of France from hostilitytowards alliance with Austria in 1756 or that of Russia similarly toward Prussiain 1762. Yet this shift was both accomplished by a monarch whoseconstitutional and political positions were more circumscribed than those of most of his continental counterparts and also led to far less unpopularity thanthat resulting from Louis XV’s change of policy. Whatever his supposed naïveté

in domestic political management in the 1760s, George III was personallyresponsible for a shift in foreign policy that was both to contribute to therevival of royal popularity during his reign and to ease the situationconfronting British diplomacy.

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An emphasis on the position and policies of the monarch offers animportant link between foreign policy and political history. It widens our understanding of the former and, by making clear the continued role of themonarch in a crucial sphere, underlines the significance of foreign policy for

both the political history and debates of the period and contemporaryassessments of the constitution. In 1753 Frederick II, whose central concernwith Britain was its foreign policy, wrote to his envoy in London that “whenyou say that such a thing could make an impression on the nation I regard theword nation as inappropriate, as I know that at present the king gives whatever impression he pleases to the nation which he governs absolutely”. Two yearsearlier, Frederick had been convinced that Britain would not be able to sustainits alliance system, both because of its financial problems—the national debt— and because the death of George II would lead to a minority. In 1753 Yorke

wrote to his brother from The Hague, I am convinced that the constitution of no country is so little known asthat of England, half the world imagine that all government is confusionwith us; and the other half that our kings are as arbitrary as any other, andthat all they do in a view to satisfy the nation is pure grimace.70

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Chapter SixParliament

The country, which supplies the crown with the sinews of war, has aright to inspect into the conduct, and to demand satisfaction, of thosewho either in the field, fleet or Cabinet abuse their trust. The sovereign,no doubt, has the right in himself to make peace, and to declare war; butthe subject has reserved the power to try and to punish those, who dareto give him bad advice: by which the blood and treasure of the nationshall be misapplied or squandered away; and the glory and interest of the

crown and kingdom be diminished and injured.— Monitor , 15 October 1757 To turn from crown to Parliament, monarchs to parliamentarians, is to adoptanother perspective on foreign policy, and, again, one where theory andpractice did not always coincide. The influence of Parliament on theformulation and conduct of foreign policy was both direct and indirect.Parliament had responsibility in the field of finance, and, thus, of supportingthe military expenditure and subsidies to foreign powers that were judged

necessary for the pursuance of policies. In addition, foreign policy was debatedin both chambers of Parliament, being, generally, the single most importanttopic in the major parliamentary debates, such as those on the Addresses of Thanks at the crucial start of the session. Foreign policy also played a major role in debates over the size and funding of the armed forces. Thus, foreignpolicy posed in an acute form the serious problem of parliamentarymanagement.

Parliament’s indirect influence is difficult to gauge and was an issue over which contemporaries were divided. The extent to which British policy, and

the foreign response to British views that played such a large role in shapingBritish policy, was affected by the existence of Parliament, and the consequentneed for government to consider how best to win parliamentary support or reply to parliamentary criticisms, was unclear to contemporaries. Parliament

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was often cited in their discussion of foreign policy, whether by ministersstressing the need to settle matters before sessions, British diplomats concernedabout the detrimental consequences for their government’s image of parliamentary contentions, or foreign diplomats seeking to assess the stability

and intentions of the British ministry. Joseph Yorke observed in 1754 that itwas “very agreeable…to see the supply voted as it is…it puts a stop to alldisadvantageous reports in the foreign world, where it was imagined that somedifficulties would be thrown in the way of the administration”. The major set-piece occasions of the debate over foreign policy occurred in Parliament.Ministers emphasized the problems posed by parliamentary management,Holdernesse responding in 1749 to Dutch pressure for a subsidy to the Elector of Cologne by laying “great stress upon the difficulty I supposed His Majestywould be under from the nature of our constitution in granting subsidies to

foreign princes in time of peace”. Five years later, Holdernesse’s reasons for delaying talks for renewing the subsidy to Bavaria included “His Majesty,having called a new Parliament, is desirous of knowing the sense of his peoplebefore any final determination is taken upon any measures of expence”.Indeed, there was considerable public criticism of such subsidies. The verypractice was presented as alien to national interests. However, foreign envoyssometimes argued that British ministers encouraged parliamentary pressure inorder for the government to be able to use it as an argument to gain its ends.1

The Lords was more securely managed during this period than had been the

case, for example, during the reign of Queen Anne, and it was in the House of Commons that the government was most seriously assailed, especially over subsidies held to benefit Hanover in 1742, 1744 and 1755, or over peace withFrance in 1762; in the last, the Lords, unlike the Commons, did not divide. In1758 Hardwicke noted a limitation of the role of the Lords in a crucial spherewhen he suggested to Newcastle that there would not be any debate there over the issue of a subsidy to Prussia: “As this will be a message of supply, Your Grace knows better than anybody that the return of the House of Lords canonly consist of assurances of support.”2

As far as the political position of Parliament was concerned, there were nosignificant constitutional and institutional changes after the Septennial Act of 1716 established that general elections had to be held at least every seven years,instead of three as under the Triennial Act of 1694. The influence of Parliamentas a crucial institution and a sphere of politics, and in terms of its impact onpolicy at specific conjunctures, varied in response to domestic andinternational circumstances, but there were no fundamental changes.Parliament’s importance was greatest in periods of international crisis, for itwas then that it was necessary to demonstrate governmental strength and to

obtain specific acts of support, especially backing for treaties and grants for increased military expenditure or for subsidies to foreign allies. Thus, at theheight of the political crisis of early 1742, occasioned by Walpole’s fall, JohnDrummond MP assured Onslow Burrish, a British diplomat, “we voted

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unanimously I may say 35,000 land forces, above 10,000 marines andeverything else on the same foot as last year”.3 Four years later, the need toconsider parliamentary views was indicated by Trevor when he wrote toBurr ish about the latter’s negotiations with German rulers for troops to help in

the war with France: if you can anywise in the Title, Preamble, or [word obscure] hook in, thatthese troops are to be an accretion to the strength of the MaritimePowers [Britain and the Netherlands], though in fact paid by theRepublic [Netherlands], and to the Common Cause, rather than as it wasan augmentation of the National Militia of the States, it would have agood appearance, and effect in our Parliament.4

The political crisis that preceded, accompanied and followed the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War led to a renewed emphasis on the international value of parliamentary backing for the government, necessarily so in light of foreignconcern about the stability of the government, voiced by Frederick II amongothers. Thus, after the formation of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry in 1757,Holdernesse wrote to inform Burrish that the Addresses of Thanks had passedunanimously in both Commons and Lords, adding that it “cannot fail of havingthe best effects, by showing their steadiness and zeal, to enable His Majesty toact with the utmost vigour, in the prosecution of such just, and necessary

measures”. Parliamentary support could also appear useful for domestic reasons.In October 1762 the capture of Havana led to debate within Britain as towhether peace with Spain should be made without a territorial gain in returnfor the restitution of the conquest. Henry Fox argued that if the Cabinet

consisted of persons who had weight and courage, I would certainlypropose what I thought best for the King and his people and pursue itwithout previously consulting Parliament. But, besides what has latelyappeared of irresolution, the Cabinet is composed of persons who bring

no weight to the scale of government, either of authority or connections…I shall be glad then, in this ugly situation to have the senseof parliament. Not for security but to remove difficulties. The objectionof its letting down government is obviated by its having been donebefore, and in times when prerogative was carried high, and it wouldobviate the great difficulty because the greatest coward would sign whatthe Parliament authorised, without considering that he was not securedby it.

In addition, there was always interest in the composition of the parliamentaryopposition. Thus, in November 1761 Newcastle was concerned that speechesin the Commons indicated “that the measure of abandoning the continent isnot entirely the produce of these young hot heads”.5

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The constitutional possibilities of Parliament’s role in limiting governmentalplans could not, in general, be pushed because of the political fact of ministerial power. In 1751 Yorke wrote from Paris, “The Parisians say their Parliament [Parlement] is less corrupt than yours, for that their remonstrances

are different from your polite addresses.” However, in 1762 Bute felt itnecessary to warn that for Parliament to interfere “with respect to the manner in which the war is to be carried on” was a direct infringement of the royalprerogative. Ministerial control of parliamentary proceedings could not betaken for granted, and both parliamentary management and policy choiceswere important for this reason. In 1749 Newcastle referred to it costing him “agreat deal of pains to get” a payment for Maria Theresa through theCommons.6

Until the death of Charles VI, and more obviously the commencement of

the War of the Austrian Succession in December 1740, the parliamentarydebate in the field of foreign policy was dominated by the question of Anglo-Spanish relations, first in peace and then in war. Waldegrave was certain of theinterrelationship of the negotiations with Spain and the parliamentarysituation. In June 1739 he wrote to his counterpart in Madrid that the latter’sreports

I fear will bring our friends at home under great difficulties…thewarmth which has been expressed in the House of Lords upon the past

delay of the payment of the ninety five thousand pounds, will…leave noroom for future management in case this last dispatch arrives before theParliament be up.7

A common theme united the parliamentary discussions, namely, the extent towhich the government could be relied upon to defend national interests. Thedecision to go to war with Spain initially undercut the opposition, as it waswhat they had been pressing for. In the Commons’ debate on the Address inNovember 1739, Pulteney indicated

a dislike for the past measures, yet spoke warmly for the presentEstablishment and Royal family and for vigorously and unanimouslysupporting the King in the war, and letting every thing give way to thecommon national cause and the support of this Government. Heconcluded with saying I third the motion and when the question was putSir John Hynde Cotton8 gave the only negative.

Pulteney’s counterpart in the Lords, Carteret, told the house that “no war was

ever entered into with greater unanimity amongst all ranks and degrees of men”. The opposition leaders, however, had to try to maintain a distinctposition, and Pulteney said “he would not have it thought he was makingadvances to some Gentlemen (meaning the Ministry). He scorned it, and he

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also despised any unjust mean suspicions from any other quarter (meaning hisown party, or rather perhaps the Torys).”9

The marked divisions in opposition ranks prior to the shattering of their unity in 1742, divisions that helped to lead to the latter, were revealed in the

Lords’ debate on the Address in November 1739. The debate also indicated therange of information available to peers.

Lord Carteret spoke in the House of Lords in the same way that Mr.Pulteney spoke in our House and was not for dividing, but the Questionon which they divided, was moved by Lord Chesterfield and secondedby Lord Scarborough. Lord Talbot made a speech an hour long most of which he read out of a large paper like a lawyer’s brief, he went over allthe treaties that have been made, and all the forces and taxes that have

been raised for near twenty years. He voted with the Minority but hisspeech might have served many other occasions as well as this.10

The divisions within the opposition could however be papered over byattacking the ministry. After an initially quiescent start to the 1740 session, dueto poor weather delaying the return of many from the Christmas recess and asense that there would not be any major debates,11 the attack was mounted on“that old and stale question the place bill”.

The decision to focus initially on a well-established measure designed to

reduce the government’s influence in the Commons reflected the greater appeal of this issue once war with Spain had broken out, for domestic issueswere “safer” in political terms, less likely to be affected by unexpectedinternational developments. The government’s majority was smaller thanpredicted,12 attendance in the Commons at a high level,13 always a good signfor the opposition, and they then decided to raise the issue of the Conventionof the Pardo by which the government had mistakenly announced that it hadsettled differences with Spain in 1738. This reflected one of the principalproblems facing the opposition in their discussion of foreign policy, their

limited access to information about policy and the extent to which it wastherefore difficult to mount an informed critique. This accounts for their frequent request for papers, which served to demonstrate the restr ictions under which they operated, and the sense that the government had followed, and wasfollowing, secret, and thus suspect, policies.

On 21 February (os) 1740 Pulteney introduced a motion for an enquiry intothe conduct of the authors and advisers of the Convention of the Pardo. His pointthat “discontents at present lie smothering under the hopes of a successful war, butthey are far from being removed or extinguished” was both a confession of the

opposition’s difficulties and a warning to the ministry. Pulteney attacked theministry from the perspective of the Whig legacy by comparing the Conventionwith the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, a Tory measure abhorrent to Whigs, and hemade his motion in the very words of the first motion for an enquiry into the

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earlier peace. Sir Robert Walpole, in reply, addressed the question of theunpopularity of ministerial policy, offering a sceptical assessment of public opinionand a prudential defence of the government’s position. Walpole also cast doubt onthe value of popular views on war, defended his position over the Convention and

attacked Utrecht.14

By the last, he asserted ministerial commitment to the Whiglegacy and trying to unite the Whigs against the Tories, or, at least, to increasetension between opposition Whigs and Tories.

These arguments were to be deployed not only in reply to criticism of policy toward Spain in both peace and war, but also, later, in response to theagitation over Hanoverian subsidies in 1742–4. The latter was the highpoint of parliamentary agitation over foreign policy in the period, but it was one thattook place against a very different international background to that of 1739– 40. The conduct of the war with Spain provided opportunities for allegations

of a lack of ministerial effort and competence, attacks that did not appear stale,but that instead focused the events of the day on a continued critique of aministerial failure to defend national interests.

On the other hand, the outbreak of war on the Continent produced a lesscertain situation. In the Commons’ debate on 13 April (os) 1741 on a motionfor a subsidy to Maria Theresa, Pelham asked “how can we know what maydetermine the course of that flood of power, which is now in a state of fluctuation, or seems dr iven to different points by different impulses?” He alsocommented on the difficulty of discussing the situation, saying, “It is not to be

supposed that such members of this House as are not engaged in public affairs,should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of foreign powers.”In reply, Pulteney offered an ambitious but, in terms of domestic politics,

acceptable definition of national goals in which “we may become once morethe arbiters of Europe, and be counted by all the Protestant powers as their protectors; we may once more subdue the ambition of the aspiring French, andonce more deliver the house of Austria from the incessant pursuit of thoserestless enemies.” However, although he was correct to argue that it wasnecessary to reconcile the interests of Austria and Prussia, Pulteney can hardly

be blamed for failing to explain how this could be achieved. His assertion of British capabilities was more problematic:

our fleets are sufficient to keep their dominion of the ocean, andprescribe limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power remains unimpaired, while Great Britain retains her natural superiority,and asserts the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot becomedespicable, nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance.We may still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those

nations which we cannot invade.15

The repetition of such remarks indicated the problem of expectations thatconfronted all British ministries in this period. It also indicated how the fate of

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military operations could provide opposition politicians with a basis for criticism of the government that was far easier than that provided by thecomplexities and secrecy of diplomacy. It was easier to criticize in war than inpeace, easier to attack military operations than diplomatic negotiations,

although, in reply, in wartime ministerial supporters could press home thecharge of encouraging national enemies against critics.This was very much the case after the fall of the Walpole ministry of 1742. It

was not easy to grasp the details of Carteret’s interventionist diplomacy in 1742– 4, but it was possible to understand the argument that the payment of subsidies for Hanoverian troops, the terms of these subsidies and the conduct of George IIwhen in command of his Anglo-German army in 1743 all constituted proof of afailure to heed national interests. This took on added weight because of hostilitywithin the ministry to Carteret, not least on the grounds of his interventionist

policies. While ministers did not publicly oppose Carteret’s policies in Parliament,they benefited from the clear warnings being sent to George II about theweaknesses of his minister and the liabilities of his policies.

The discussion of Hanoverian subsidies led to the raising of broader issuesof foreign policy. In the Commons debate on the Address on 18 November (os) 1742, the issue of parliamentary authority was raised, a reflection of whathas been pointed out in another sphere, namely, the unsettled nature of constitutional conventions in this period.16 John Tucker recorded,

There were some warm expressions of a too dangerous use of the RoyalPrerogative and endeavours used to show those Ministers had not givenwholesome council who advised the King to prorogue the last session inthat precipitate manner while it was in the midst of an enquiry fromwhich the nation had very great expectations, or to order the Hanover troops to march in the manner and at the time these had done withoutpreviously mentioning it to the Parliament, that they were badprecedents and might be attended with the worst of consequences.

To quote only such arguments would suggest that the debate was somewhatabstract and uninformed by any knowledge of or reference to specificinternational developments. However, the same letter included an account of the speech of Sir John Barnard, an independent Whig who was a prominentLondon marine insurer and had been Lord Mayor. The notion of displacedeffort he advanced was not novel, but its use in the War of the AustrianSuccession was important and prefigured Pitt’s wider employment of the idea.

Sir John Barnard told us that though no other nation would give any

assistance, it was our interest to use single endeavours to prevent thegrowth of an exorbitant power in France and that this step His Majestyhad taken to cause this body of Hanoverians to march into the LowCountries was the wisest and best measure that could be followed and

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that our sending the English forces last summer into Flanders hadeffectually prevented the French from sending any succours to their distressed armies in the Empire and given the Queen of Hungary anopportunity of making that head against them which has brought her

into her present advantageous situation—he took notice as well as manyother people of the inconsistency of giving any opposition to thismeasure with the repeated desires of this Parliament last year to persecutethe war with vigour.

John Campbell, a member of the “Old Corps” of ministerial Whigs and a Lordof the Admiralty under Walpole, recorded Barnard making his point with ahomely image: “... said in supporting the Queen of Hungary we did not fightothers’ battles but our own, as we would exert ourselves to the utmost to

extinguish a fire in our neighbours’ house to prevent our own being burntnext.”17

One marked change in the political atmosphere in the early and mid–1740swas the growing sense of international crisis. Opposition writers had longsought to inculcate such a sense, but the immediate threats that had beendepicted had been largely domestic ones, dangers to the constitution. Therehad been dire warnings of the threat posed by French intentions and risingpower, but their immediacy had been lessened by the cautious nature of French policy, especially after 1735. More generally, it had been difficult to

sustain an atmosphere of threat in the 1710s, 1720s and 1730s except in so far as commentators were concerned about foreign support for Jacobitism and itsdomestic support. Alliance with France had lessened concern about bothFrench policy in Europe and Jacobitism. Spain and, even more, Austria weredifficult to prevent as serious threats to Britain on the Continent and withregard to Jacobitism, particularly after the failure of the Spanish invasion plansin 1719. There was no serious challenge to British naval dominance. Ministerialwriters had sought to rouse concern, especially during the confrontation withthe Austro-Spanish Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9, but there was nothing that

approximated to earlier fears of Louis XIV.Once the Anglo-French alliance collapsed in 1731 fears of France rose, butthey were lessened by Fleury’s cautious policies in both peace and war. As aconsequence, opposition commentators, having castigated the government for failing to act against France during the War of the Polish Succession, were ablefrom 1738 to present France as not sufficiently threatening to prevent war withSpain. Furthermore, once the war had broken out, these same commentatorsurged that all military resources ought to be employed against her. In contrast,ministerial spokesmen had pressed for caution, emphasizing the danger of

French intervention. Thus, in 1739, as Newcastle pointed out, it was thegovernment that warned of a dangerous international situation, while theopposition saw threats to British trade but, more vociferously, opportunities for imperial expansion at the expense of Spain.

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The situation altered dramatically in 1741 as Austria appeared near collapseunder the threat of French, Bavarian and Prussian power, thus making readilyapparent and accentuating what had hitherto been hypothetical dangers fromFrance. Opposition politicians continued to argue that Britain’s international

agenda should be dominated by Spain and continued to press for aconcentration of military effort against her, but their attitude appearedincreasingly inappropriate. Indeed, opposition views were to fracture with thereorganization of the ministry in 1742. Those who remained in oppositioncontinued to focus on the need for effort against Spain, while their former colleagues, led by Carteret and Pulteney, joined a ministry that had alreadyshifted its attentions to the situation on the Continent, regarding a war inwhich Britain was not involved as more important to her interests than one inwhich she was a key combatant.

This division in the opposition was not the central factor that explainedwhy only some of its members were willing to join the ministry. Domesticpolitical factors, specifically the treatment of Walpole and the extent of incorporation of the opposition within the government, were more important,and opposition views on foreign policy were to diverge along these alreadyexisting fault lines. Yet these differences were to provide important issues for dissension and debate once the new political alignment became clear: thosestill in the opposition, whether Tories or Whigs, criticized the ministry,including their former colleagues, for continental interventionism, support for

Hanover and the greatly diminished resources devoted to the “Blue Water” war with Spain. The political realignment therefore brought together all those whobelieved Britain should play an active role in continental diplomacy. Indeed,from 1742 commitment to such a view was an implicit condition of activemembership in the government at the senior level. This was one of the reasonswhy the demands of Pitt for senior office proved so contentious in the mid– 1740s and mid–1750s.

The belief that Britain should play an active role was linked to concernabout developments on the Continent. This was related to anxiety about the

security situation in Britain. Rising alarm on the part of ministerialparliamentarians was to reach two peaks, a short one at the time of the Frenchattempt to invade England in February 1744, and a more sustained one, fromthe landing of Bonnie Prince Charlie and the fall of Ostend in the summer of 1745 to the thwarting and defeat of the Franco-Jacobite threat to Britain earlythe following year. However, concern about the possibility of Bourbon actionon behalf of the Jacobites did not commence in 1744. It existed from theoutset of the war with Spain in 1739 and indeed played a major role from thenin naval strategy and in ministerial attention to Franco-Spanish relations.

By 1742 anxiety about the possibility of a Spanish invasion on behalf of theJacobites had abated, and it was clear that France was too busy in her new war with Austria to aid Spain against Britain, as had been feared in 1740–1. At thatpoint, there was little prospect of French support for the Jacobites. However,

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the raising of the Hanoverian issue in Parliament served to excite concernamong ministerial parliamentarians and to move the issue of the succession toa more central place in political debate. Thus the opposition parliamentarycampaign acted as a focus for constitutional, political and international fears

and expectations across the political spectrum. Campbell wrote to his son inDecember 1742,

I am well informed that the government know the Pretender’sinstructions are to run down Hanover as much as possible, and saynothing of him, which is no doubt the wisest counsel that ever was takenby his Court, for if the present settlement was overturned, he must comein; and it is a much easier task by false assertions and suggestions to setthe People against the Government they live under; than to raise a zeal

for him, in any but old women (whether in petticoats or breechs) uponthe old absurd notions of indefeasible hereditary right, and absolutepassive obedience to lawless tyranny…I have intended to write to Brettabout the garden ever since I came to town, but could never find leisure,as he is one of the Political Club, he will not wonder that public affairstake up all my time, and that I am more concerned to preserve theQueen of Hungary’s dominions than to improve my own.18

Rather than treating the Hanover agitation of 1742–4 and the response to the

Jacobite threat in 1744–6 as separate, it is appropriate to note that they wererelated problems as far as many parliamentarians, both “Old Corps” andJacobite, were concerned. The issue of the succession thus played a major rolein the public debate in 1742–6, one that was far more wide-ranging than anyconcentration on the immediate crisis of 1745–6 might suggest.

The resonances of the Hanoverian issue helped to decide, and thus weaken,the opposition, especially once Britain’s situation in the war deteriorated.When the Hanoverian issue had been raised in Parliament in late 1742, thesituation was not too bad, but by January 1744 it was clear that George II’s

victory over the French at Dettingen the previous year was not going to leadto a collapse of the French position, as had originally been hoped. Theworrying international situation helped divide the opposition. Pitt and GeorgeLyttelton, both still opposition Whigs, argued that the Hanoverian troops inBritish pay should be discarded, but that British troops should continue to bestationed in the Austrian Netherlands, a measure that was designed to servetactical political ends and yet also reflected the changing military situation. Pittwished to appeal to the Pelhams and to encourage them to act against Carteret,but he also felt that the Tories and other all-out opponents of the ministry were

failing to appreciate the need to abandon rigid views in face of changes inBritish policy and were unable to distinguish sufficiently between help toHanover and a national commitment to the anti-French cause on theContinent. The need for the latter also led Horatio Walpole to complain about

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the way in which British parliamentary news was being published in theAmsterdam press. He especially regretted the publication of a translation of theLords Protest about the subsidies paid for Hanoverian troops.19

Thus the parliamentary debate reflected international as well as domestic

changes. John Owen’s presentation of the political history of the period largelyin terms of domestic, factional manoeuvres is less than the complete picture.20

The Hanoverian issue in its broadest sense helped to dr ive the Whigs together.It made it clear that Carteret’s foreign policy was vulnerable in Parliament, thatthe Pelhams needed to recruit opposition Whig support if they were to feelsecure there, and that co-operation with the Tories in a dangerous internationalsituation was not without hazard for opposition Whigs. These relatedrealizations, driven forward in an atmosphere of growing crisis, lay behind theconsolidation of the Pelham ministry, based on widespread Whig support,

between 1744 and 1746, and they also helped to ensure the marked slackeningof the public debate that followed the consolidation. In February 1744 Haslangsent details of the very strong Lords protest over the Hanoverians, but addedthat it would have no consequences other than that of raising tension, becausethe ministry was certain to gain its point, thanks to its secure majority.21 Thenew policy of comprehension that the political crisis occasioned led inDecember 1744 to the inclusion of several Tories in the ministry under EarlGower, and consequent divisions among the Tories.22

Carteret’s fall in November 1744 was followed by a less tense parliamentary

atmosphere in the discussion of foreign policy. The reconstitution of theministry brought several prominent Opposition Whigs, including Bedford,Chesterfield, Pitt and Sandwich, into office. The direct payment of Hanoveriantroops was ended. George II was obliged to be more cautious in his unpopular plans for action against Prussia. These changes helped to ensure a differentagenda of parliamentary discussions, one in which dissension over foreignpolicy became less politically significant. This remained the case for theremainder of the decade, with the prime locus of conflict over foreign policybecoming the Council, not Parliament. Tucker noted in December 1746, “The

army was voted yesterday without opposition.”23

These political changes ensured that the parliamentary debate over thepeace terms was muted. There was to be no controversy akin to that over peaceterms in the last major struggle in which Britain had been engaged, the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13). The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was not tohave the resonance of the Treaty of Utrecht in terms of the British publicdebate, either then or subsequently. This owed much to the differing nature of the political alignments of the two periods, and also to the extent to which thesuccession was still apparently an open issue in 1713,24 while in 1748 that was

no longer the case. In addition, the sense of betrayal of purpose that underlaythe “No Peace Without Spain” argument in the War of the Spanish Successionhad been already exhausted in the War of the Austrian Succession, as the war against Spain, with its intoxicating prospect of Caribbean conquests, had been

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effectively abandoned without lasting gains from 1742. Furthermore, thesuccesses of the earlier conflict, which had made Utrecht seem such adisappointment to many, had not been matched in the War of the AustrianSuccession. There was therefore little sense that victory had been thrown away.

The government also helped to defuse a possible political crisis by callingthe next general election a year earlier than necessary. They did so because theyfeared the electoral and thus parliamentary consequences of a bad peace,Newcastle writing to Cumberland:

any final conclusion of the war, by almost any peace that can be obtained,would undoubtedly give strength to opposition, raise some flame in thenation, and render the choice of a Parliament more difficult…Thepresent New Opposition is yet unsupported, unconnected, and not in

high reputation; what the course of a year may produce nobody can tell;unfortunate public events, or private disappointments, and personalviews, may render that opposition formidable, what at present is far frombeing so.25

By 1748 it was generally, and indeed correctly, believed that peace wasnecessary and undesirable terms inevitable, and, in addition, Parliament posedfew problems of management. In November 1748 Newcastle wrote about thelikely parliamentary view, “I think we can have no opposition. There are few,

very few, who don’t seem pleased, and own how well, and how soon, our greataffair has been brought to a conclusion.” William Murray, the Solicitor General, later Earl of Mansfield, speaking in the debate on the Address on 20November 1748, claimed that peace had been necessary because of thevulnerability of Britain’s Dutch ally and the dangerous state of public credit,both reasonable claims:

we had for three years preceding met every year with a signal defeat, andevery defeat was attended with the loss of whole countries, and many

fortified towns. One of the Under Secretaries, John Potter, wrote that even “those who areconstantly inclined to grumble…were glad to find the affair so well over”.26

As from 1710 in the War of the Spanish Succession, and from 1761 in theSeven Years’ War, there had been a growing political and public desire for peace, and the interaction of the two created opportunities and difficulties for politicians. However, whereas there were major changes in ministry on theother two occasions, in 1710 and 1761–2, changes that were necessary in order

to push forward the peace process, in 1748 peace was obtained without anysuch alteration, and this helped to ensure political stability over the followingsix years. Pelham in particular was sensitive to public concerns. He wrote in1748 after a visit to his Surrey constituency, “we had a full meeting of

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gentlemen, and almost all in good humour. Our peace is popular with allparties.” This was not, of course, the case. There was criticism, although moreof the failures of the war than of the fact of peace. An Ode for the Thanksgiving Day by “Titus Antigallicus”, complained of “Britain’s eclipse and England’s

lost, lost glory”.Nevertheless, peace was widely sought.27 Pelham declared, “Peace youknow is my mistress; and war a rival I fear, as well as watch.”28 He was the manfor the moment, a minister who could see through peace without sowingpolitical discord, dividing the government or losing control of Parliament.

The relative quiescence of the parliamentary response therefore reflectedmore than just the strength of the ministry after the 1747 general election,although that was definitely important. Replying to Murray in the debate onthe Address in November 1748, Dr George Lee, who argued that there was not

“one English article” in the peace, explained the pessimism of the oppositionspeakers, “all questions must, in this House, be determined by numbers”.29

Whatever its internal disputes over foreign policy, the Pelham ministry was far from weak, and was therefore not vulnerable to opposition parliamentarycampaigns, especially as peace lessened the scope for attack.

The government did indeed face parliamentary criticism of its foreignpolicy over the next few years, but its solid control of both chamberscombined with the absence of any grave crisis, to leave the ministry in a strongposition. There was a significant difference between parliamentary attacks that

were unrelated to any urgent problem, the situation in 1748–53, and those thatinteracted with a grave crisis, as in 1739 or 1742–4. There was criticism of theterms of Aix-la-Chapelle, but foreign envoys of long standing were struck bythe absence of anything interesting in Parliament to report,30 and by thegovernment’s secure control of the Commons.31 Zamboni noted popular concern that Gibraltar would be exchanged with Spain for an equivalent, butargued that, even if the ministry sought to do so, they could count onParliament’s support.32 As no such plan was attempted, Zamboni’s assessmentwas not tested, but it indicated the apparent strength of the government’s

position, because the Walpole ministry’s belief that it would not be able topush through such a plan had been an issue in the 1720s.Given that one of the most important aspects of Parliament’s role in foreign

policy was the impression created either of the strength and stability of thegovernment, or of the opposite, the situation in 1747–53 was very notable. Thereports of foreign envoys in general presented a picture of a ministry securelyin control of Parliament and little subject to extraparliamentary pressure. Thiscontrasted not only with the situation in the obviously tumultuous years from1739 to 1746, but also with the preceding period of Walpolean stability, when

diplomats had frequently commented on newspaper and other criticism of thegovernment. The contrast is particularly apparent in the despatches of longserving envoys, such as Zamboni, who had sent reports from Britain since1723, Ossorio, who had arrived in 1730, and Alt. Indeed, a marked feature of

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the diplomatic reports on British politics in the period 1747–53 was their overwhelming concentration on struggles within the ministry rather than adiscussion of Parliament or extra-parliamentary developments comparable tothat earlier in the century.

Parliament was not neglected. In April 1749 Puysieulx ordered the Frenchenvoy, Durand, to be very attentive to what happened at the end of the session,as government policy was then often revealed. Puysieulx added that one of theprincipal objects of Durand’s mission was the acquisition of information aboutBritish domestic affairs, specifically divisions in the Council, the strength of thepolitical parties, the views of merchants and of public opinion, nationalresources, government finances and, in particular, the state of the nationaldebt.33

Thus, Parliament was of value to foreign governments because of the light it

could throw on British policy and the indications it could provide about thestrength and stability of the ministry, but by 1749 a more discriminatingassessment of its importance was being offered. The extent to which Parliamentwas not kept informed, but was instead managed, was more readily apparent.The various measures of ministerial strength and stability were better appreciated. Parliament, which had so long served as the central sphere inwhich these could be judged, an obvious product of its prominence and itshistorical and constitutional importance, was less obviously crucial during thePelhamite ministry. Cumberland’s assessment in April 1749 of “the weak and

virulent minority”, that it had “diverted themselves and teased us”, was of wider applicability than the particular issue he was referring to.34 The state of the nation’s finances, judged serious and therefore likely to lead to a pacificpolicy by Durand35 and of the ministry, seemed of greater consequence thanthe situation in Parliament.

Given George II’s age, it is not surprising that the reversionary interest wasof consequence. Frederick, Prince of Wales’s views were sought by foreignenvoys, and in February 1750 he promised Haslang that he would not opposesubsidies to Bavaria,36 in contrast to his usual opposition at this stage to

government policies. However, the parliamentary impact of the reversionaryinterest was lessened by the strength of the ministry and the absence of anyserious international or domestic crisis, a marked contrast to the situation in1717–20 during the Whig Split, when George II had been Prince of Wales andin opposition to his father. Dodington, who left the government to joinFrederick in 1749, soon complained to the Prince about the state of theopposition and thus helped to divide it further. He criticized

the impracticability of uniting any four efficient persons, upon any

principle, or plan that may serve, or save their country: The disregard Ihave met with in endeavouring to unite them; the want of concert in theLords, even in this great point: the total neglect of the Commons, in notso much as asking what we would do, or our opinion what was to be

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done: the impropriety, as well as total inutility of appearing in publick,alone, or with a very few, and those, of no consequence, nor followingthe same method and plan of reasoning.37

The opposition sought issues on which they could attack the ministry inParliament for failing to defend national interests. In February 1750, twentyyears after Walpole had been criticized on the same head, the oppositioncomplained that France had failed to fulfil her undertaking to destroy thedefences of Dunkirk, as agreed by the Peace of Utrecht and confirmed by theTreaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Pitt, as Paymaster General, replied on behalf of theministry that the sole alternative to negotiation was war, that Britain was in nostate for conflict, that the motion was dangerous as it would incite popular pressure, and, in reply to Egmont’s claim that Pitt had formerly adopted the

same position, added that it was necessary for nations to follow a prudentialcourse, a novel position for Pitt.38 The ministry won the division by 242 to 115.Mirepoix was sure that the parliamentary strength of the ministry would

encourage Newcastle to press for a more interventionist role for Britain.39

Indeed, the fact that, as Earl Granville (as Carteret now was) noted in January1750, “there is no appearance of any considerable matters to come on” inParliament40 can be seen as a condition of British support for the ImperialElection Scheme. It is doubtful that Newcastle would have been able to prevailover Pelham’s hostility to peacetime subsidies, a contentious policy, had there

been more parliamentary hostility to the ministry.Parliament provided an opportunity for attacking government policy, but itwas also the body to which the ministry had to bring financial requests.Whereas Walpole had followed the apparent conclusion of the internationalcrisis that had begun in 1725 and ended in 1731 with a new Anglo-Austro-Spanish alignment by ending the controversial subsidies to Hesse—Cassel,41

Newcastle did not abandon the expensive and controversial policy of subsidiesthat had been employed during the War of the Austrian Succession. Instead,these subsidies were now focused on the Imperial Election Scheme and

Parliament was asked to vote them.On 22 February (os) 1751 the Commons debated the subsidy to the Elector of Bavaria. It is clear from accounts of the debate that it was an informeddiscussion. Indeed, the debate can stand as an example of the nature of theparliamentary discussion of foreign policy. The surviving sources also offer awarning about the problem of the nature of the evidence. If the historian hadonly Horace Walpole’s brief account to rely upon, he would be able to say littleabout the content of the speeches, an all too common problem. The far longer account in Cobbett’s Parliamentary History is much more valuable, although it

offers no guidance as to the quality of the speeches, and thus of their impact.The report sent to Newcastle by his Under Secretary and general factotum,Andrew Stone, himself an MP, is also very important. It offers a lot of guidanceas to what was said in the debate.

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Mr. Pelham opened the Debate; He said, that he was no friend tosubsidies in time of peace and that he should not have been for thissubsidy, if it had not been of a different nature from most others. That thegreat object with him, was the preservation of the Peace, and that this

subsidy had an immediate tendency to that: that the uniting the Elector of Bavaria to the House of Austria (who had so often been theinstrument of France to embroil Europe) and the securing the Imperialdignity to the House of Austria, by the election of the Arch-Duke, wouldprobably be the effect of this treaty—that he neither knew nor believed,that there would be any other demands of this nature, and that, if thesegreat points could be secured, for so small an expense, as our quota of this subsidy; he could not but think, that they would be very cheaplypurchased. He entered into the particulars of the treaty—explained the

affair of Mirandola—and the transaction with the Court of Vienna for bringing them to contribute to the subsidy—and accounted for theEmpress Queen’s not being a party to the treaty—He said a great deal indefence of the measure—that he believed, France was, at present, sincerefor preserving the peace and that he was not at all apprehensive that thiswould make France alter their system. But possibly, that this great workmight, at last, be concluded by the general consent of all parties.

Samuel Martin, a follower of the Prince of Wales, made some sensible points in

return: He represented the success of the Election as doubtful—The ways, bywhich it was pursued, inconsistent with the Laws of the Empire; and theaggrandising the House of Austria, as an object, that might be dangerousto this country—But that, supposing it right, The Imperial Dignity wasnothing but a name—and the real strength of the House of Austriaconsisted in the Hereditary Dominions etc.

He was answered by Lyttelton, now a Lord of the Treasury, who revealed aknowledge of the Imperial constitution:

showed that the election was not inconsistent with the constitutions of the Empire, which he supported by good authorities—that it was a greatand useful measure, and that the expense was inconsiderable. Thatnobody would be more against a subsidiary system, than himself but thatthis was not to be considered in that light, but as a means of preservingthe peace of Europe, and establishing a system for that purpose.

Murray “seemed to give general satisfaction” with his speech, which, judgingby the account in Cobbett, showed a considerable knowledge of Germanhistory and the Imperial constitution. As Stone noted, “He went into the

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particulars, that had been mentioned relating to the laws of the Empire, aboutelections.” Egmont, in reply, raised some practical points and also the role of Parliament. He asked

how could we depend upon the Elector of Bavaria? Would not he still beFrench, in his heart, as his family had always been?…would not other Electors, Saxony, Palatine, Mayence, and Treves, expect to be paid also?and who could find money for that? that he acknowledged, there wouldbe some utility in this election, if it could be obtainedBut that, otherwisethis subsidy would be flung away. If we had subsidies to give, why did notwe give one to Denmark? But that his greatest objection to this Treatywas, that it was made without the consent of Parliament and that, (if Parliament could have concurred no other wise) it would have been

better, to have applied for a vote of credit, with a view to have applied itto this object, than to have taken no notice of Parliament at all. Egmont’s intelligent observations about international diplomacy werecountered by Pelham’s suggestion that Egmont was opportunistic, that thegovernment had tried, but failed, to gain the alliance of Denmark, “though hedoubted not, if it had been done, it would have found fault with”.42

Pelham’s claim was not without point, but it is also clear from Stone’saccount, and that in Cobbett, that the Commons was offered both a wide

range of information and a reasoned account of the advantages anddisadvantages of the proposal. This is worth stressing as there has been atendency to underrate the sophistication of parliamentary debates of foreignpolicy, and thus to present parliamentary pressure as essentially political inorigin but uninformed by any particular analysis of the problems facing thecountry.

This is misleading. It does less than justice to the knowledge of manyparliamentarians, which in part stemmed from their own experience. Anumber of Secretaries of State and diplomats, both serving and former, were

members of one or other house, and some took an active role in debate. Thiscan be seen in January 1752 in the debates over the subsidy to the Elector of Saxony. Two former experienced envoys, Walpole and Robinson, and one lessexperienced diplomat, Legge, spoke in the Commons on 22 January (os).Another speaker, Sir William Yonge, formerly a Lord of the Treasury, a Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of War, and then, for reasons of health, holder of the sinecure post of Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, was provided with copiesof the documents relating to the treaty by Newcastle. Another governmentspeaker, Murray, offered the Commons details of French subsidies. Horace

Walpole recorded that his uncle Horatio “showed how well he knew wherethe weakness of such treaties lay”. The government’s majority was verysubstantial, 236 to 54, Newcastle writing that the treaty was approved “by amajority of five to one in the House of Commons; and the arguments in favour

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of this measure were so strong, and so well supported, that I am persuaded, itwill meet with universal approbation throughout the whole kingdom”.43

Yonge’s account of the debate throws valuable light on the issues raised:

It was opened and the motion for the subsidy moved by Mr. Pelham:who spoke extreamly well, and urged the advantage of a King of theRomans very strongly, but I thought rather coolly of subsidy treaties ingeneral, but pressed the compliance with this as a consequential measureof the treaty with Bavaria, which had received the approbation andsanction of Parliament. He was answered by our old friend HoratioWalpole who spoke ¾ of an hour against the treaty and exhausted all thatcould be said on the subject. But I was sorry for his indiscretion, whenhe spoke against subsidy treaties in too extensive a manner, and put every

man in mind of the preventive measure of his brother, which includedmany such. But the weakest part of his speech, in my opinion, was hisexamining seriatim the articles of the treaty…However he ended withdeclaring he should vote for the question…His reasons were that as thetreaty was made he would not subject the King to any disgrace from hisParliament, nor lessen that influence which he actually had, and alwaysought to have with the powers of Europe.

He was answered by the Solicitor General who spoke well to thepoint…I got an opportunity of speaking, as I had been desired by the

Duke of Newcastle who had enabled me to do so, and in answer toanother gentleman who examined the value of the articles of the Treaty Isaid, that if we obtained nothing by it, but what was in the Treaty I wouldnot have given my vote for one farthing; but if in consequence we hadthe word of a king [Augustus III] for what was of the greatestconsequence to this nation, explicitly and free from all objectives, it wasworth double the sum, and the word of a sovereign prince so solemnlygiven, was as satisfactory to me, as any treaty, for that one was easilybroken as the other. And that I had confidence and reason for that

confidence, that such assurances were given. This I had foundation for saying, the Duke of Newcastle having put into my hands very kindly allthe letters and documents relating to this treaty, from beginning to endboth in and out of cypher. And I had a hint, that it was properer to comefrom one who was not a minister than from one who was. The debatewas concluded by Mr. Legge, who spoke short, but with great weight,who told us from his own knowledge, that all had been done that couldbe done to conciliate the King of Prussia, and particularly the obtainingthe guarantee of the Empire for his possessions in Silesia, in hopes it

might have produced a harmony between him and the House of Austria,without which it could not have been obtained; and which would nothave been obtained, but from the influence of our king on that court andon other princes of the Empire. That as the option, which was easy to

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make, between a very great and permanent power, and a great power indeed but very precarious, depending on the life of one able man[Frederick II], with the support of another great power of an oppositeinterest [France], and subject to be reduced by any one or two shocks

which time or accidents might produce…Upon the whole theopposition was trifling.44

Foreign envoys had correctly predicted large major ities, Alt arguing that unlesssome unexpected incident arrived the session would be very tranquil.45 Thegovernment was not seen as unstable.

When the Lords debated the treaty on 28 January (os) 1752, the oppositionwas opened by Bedford, until recently a Secretary of State, and other speakersincluded a current Secretary, Newcastle, another former Secretary, Granville,

and a former diplomat, Sandwich. Bedford spoke very well, offering a skilfulaccount of the international situation and Britain’s position. Newcastle’sspeech, in which he attacked reliance only on “our wooden walls”, wasmuddled, and Granville was criticized for displaying “much wit but noargument”. On the other hand, he pointed out with reason that guaranteeswere of limited value in international relations. Despite Bedford’s able speech,the motion was rejected without a division, a reflection of the government’sstrength in the Lords, while George II refused to speak to Bedford for sometime, itself a valuable help to the ministry.46 The following day the ministry

displayed its strength in the Commons, easily defeating a Tory motion for declaring against subsidy treaties in time of peace. The debate revealed Toryconcern about taxation.

Subsidy treaties continued to be an important focus of parliamentarydiscussion of foreign policy until the breach with Frederick II in 1762. Theyprovided the major occasion for such discussion, and served to raise bothgeneral questions of the purposes of British foreign policy and specific pointsabout the value or otherwise of particular alliances in different conjunctures.The need to win parliamentary approval for such treaties ensured that the

debate over foreign policy was often presented in terms that related to cost andvalue, but that also reflected a more general approach to the discussion of policy, one that was appropriate to a commercial society where national taxesplayed a major role. Old England, an opposition London newspaper, in its issueof 1 August 1752, referred to “that ridiculous balance of power, to maintainwhich we are at this juncture so solicitously lavishing away our time andtreasure”. A facetious essay in the issue of 8 February 1752 stated,

As the disapprobation of foreign subsidies has, we have seen, found itself

in the senses or understanding of Britain, it will demand our closestattention effectually to countervail these operations of nature, or, as Mr.Locke would say, these prejudices of education. The structure we are hereto raise for the public good, will therefore find its basis in that great

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man’s system of no innate ideas…the present purpose, which is to makeus approve foreign politics, demands no more than that all the bookswhich have been wrote, regarding the particular interests of thiskingdom, should be burnt. Polity, History, and Geography, are all the

offensive studies…all knowledge of men, of the trading interests, and of the advantage of our situation, are utterly lost and dead. The quality of the parliamentary debates was, as already indicated, reasonablebut varied. Precisely because the debates could serve to raise both general andspecific points, the content of speeches was very diverse. If it is assumed that allspeakers should have offered a detailed account of the international situation inorder to throw light on the diplomatic problems and choices facing Britain,then it is clearly possible to adopt a critical attitude. However, a uniformly

critical approach is inappropriate precisely because speakers presented thesituation in different lights, not least in order to make very disparate politicalpoints. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to judge Pitt, a speaker whoseoratory should not be treated as if it were a thesis.

Aside from the scanty nature of the sources, there is also the problem of biasin those that survive. It is likely that many sources, particularly the press,simplified the arguments in order to present two clear-cut positions, anddeliberately stressed rhetorical stances at the expense of cautious discussion andthe use of evidence. It has been argued that the legislative approach to foreign

affairs is more partisan and less intellectual than the executive approach.47

Thisis possibly the case, but it does not preclude intelligent discussion of foreignpolicy by a legislative assembly.

Alarmist sentiments were frequently voiced by opposition speakers, but notonly by them. In December 1743 Lord Raymond told the Lords that theopposition were “the favourers of France, and the betrayers of the great causeof universal liberty”.48 Other ministerial speakers also implied that their opponents helped France, either deliberately because they were Jacobites, or,without intention, because they were more concerned to weaken the

government than to consider the possible detrimental consequences of their criticisms.In judging opposition rhetoric it is necessary to consider the particular

problems opposition peers faced. As the Tory Earl of Lichfield correctly toldthe Lords in December 1743, “as this House has not of late years been let intoany secret relating to our foreign transactions…we can judge from nothing butpublic appearances”.49 It is therefore not surprising that, as Hardwicke pointedout, opposition speakers offered little proof in support of their arguments.50

Furthermore, criticism of the role of the monarch had to be indirect. The

opposition were also appealing to a wider public of the British public nation,European powers and posterity, and, in appealing to such an audience, it waspossibly felt best, either by the speakers or the reporters, to adopt a broad andrhetorical approach.

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The nature of the international system was part of the problem in discussingforeign affairs. Dynasticism provided the principal theme and idiom of thesystem, and the monarchical control of foreign policy in most states kept itsecretive. Given their volatility, it was difficult to assess, let alone predict, the

policies of other states. Dramatic reversals of policy produced an atmosphere of uncertainty in which rumour flourished and conspiracy was believed inbecause often true. In such a situation it was necessary to judge actions andpolicies that seemed contradictory, ambivalent and difficult to establish.

As a result, it was simpler to adopt a broad brush approach, and also todiscuss policy in terms of history and to assess intentions in the same terms.Thus, it was argued that the plans of France could be gauged by consideringher past policy, an analysis aided by the belief that for each state there was anobvious natural interest dictating a particular course of policy. Parliamentarians

who discussed international relations in such a fashion were simply sharing inthe common terminology and analytical methods of the day, devices employedby statesmen as well as journalists. The frequent discussion of past events wasalso a function of a political society where legitimacy derived from such events,for example, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, and the response to them.More generally, to suggest that parliamentary discussion of foreign policy wasdesigned to serve a political purpose does not imply that it was withoutstandards or quality.

Given the similarities between some of the crises facing Britain, it is also

inappropriate to criticize the speakers for returning to the same themes.Themes recurred, such as the extent to which foreign powers should besubsidized, and the respective importance and value of “Blue Water” andcontinental problems and strategies. On 10 December 1755, when Parliamentdebated the subsidy treaties with Hesse Cassel and Russia, Henry Fox, recentlyappointed Secretary of State for the Southern Department, attacked Pitt andsaid that “the fatal distinction, if it had prevailed, of Englishman andHanoverian…had been attempted again without success this summer”. TheCommons discussion on 10 December included references to the international

position in George I’s reign, that on 12 December to Edward III and ElizabethI’s use of German troops, evidence of the sense of continuity that was such afeature of the period. Pryse Campbell was in no doubt of the importance of the domestic political context of the debates. On 18 December he ascribed hisrecent faults as a correspondent to the “Hessians, Russians, Cossacks andCalmucks, [who] last Monday put the finishing strokes to the Treaties, whichlost several gentlemen their places, and gave places to others, I have gotnothing and only lost my dinner every day they came before us”.51 Thegovernment’s majorities were substantial, 318 to 126, 289 to 121, 263 to 69

and 259 to 72 in the Commons, 85 to 12 in Lords.The parliamentary weakness of the opposition in both chambers wastherefore readily apparent in December 1755. The political crisis that hadfollowed the death of Pelham on 6 March 1754, a major domestic

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discontinuity, did not offer the opposition opportunities comparable to thosepresent in 1741 after the general election and the failure to secure areconciliation of George II and the Prince of Wales. Nor should the necessaryparliamentary consequences of the parlous international position in 1756 and

early 1757 be overemphasized. The very difficult situation in 1747 and early1748 had not led to a collapse of the ministry’s position in Parliament. It wasinstead the crisis within the government that was so serious in 1756–7;although the creation of a viable leadership in the Commons was a key issue.Parliamentary debates were largely of consequence only in so far as theyinfluenced this crisis, providing opportunities for trials of strength.

Once the political crisis had been resolved in the shape of the stableNewcastle-Pitt ministry (1757–61), then Parliament became of less politicalconsequence, though it remained important as a crucial component of the

system of assured public finance that enabled the British government to fightthe Seven Years’ War with such persistence.52 Parliament might have been thescene for more serious attacks on the ministry had the limited military successof 1755–7 not been subsequently transformed into glorious victory, but, as aconsequence of both victory and ministerial stability, Parliament was quiescent,certainly compared to the situation during the Nine Years’ War, the War of theSpanish Succession and in 1741–5.

Government unity was only lost in 1761–2, with the crises that led to theresignations of first Pitt and then Newcastle, but, again, that was a crisis within

the ministry. Furthermore, their hesitation in attacking the new ministry, thegeneral desire for peace,53 the popularity of the new king and thegovernment’s success in both war and peace blunted the force of parliamentarycriticism. The Peace of Paris encountered more parliamentary attacks than thatof Aix-la-Chapelle had done, a measure of the loss of government unity andthe stronger sense that Britain had had a bad deal, but the situation wasessentially the same. The ministry carried the Address of Thanks in theCommons by 319 to 65. Claims that this majority was obtained by briberywere inaccurate. As so often in Hanoverian Britain, it was the parliamentary

strength of the government rather than the vigour of its critics that was moststrikingly apparent to observers, both domestic and foreign, and their view of ministerial power owed much to this strength. The government was sufficientlyconfident of its majority to discuss the terms of the Definitive Treaty beforeParliament had considered the Preliminary Articles.54

It is important not to present a crude contrast of parliamentary pressure andgovernment conduct of foreign policy, to exaggerate the difficulties of parliamentary pressure or to ignore the advantages that Parliament offered. In1747 Horatio Walpole noted governmental reliance on parliamentary support,

although the ability to win such support did not necessarily entail successabroad, a valuable qualification on any argument that presents domesticstructural features alone as responsible for Britain’s rise to great power status:“Our ministers in England have no plan for peace or war, but we shall depend

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upon a great majority in Parliament; for God’s sake what will that do, why votewhat you please; will votes without means and men extricate us from theseendless difficulties.”55

The decision in 1748 to return the popular gain of Cape Breton to France,

despite vociferous demands that it be retained, suggests that domesticopposition was far from being a determinant of policy, as also does the successin pushing through peacetime subsidies to allies in the early 1750s, despiteclaims that Parliament would never accept them. Government success atgeneral elections and the resources available for parliamentary management didnot prevent serious criticism of British foreign policy, but it lessened their impact. It is salutary to contrast the criticism of peacetime subsidies with their minor role in the general election of 1754.

In general, successive governments enjoyed the support of Parliament, and

foreign policy was no exception. This ensured a degree of financial support thatwas crucial. The British system of public finance rested on a parliamentary-securedpublic national debt, and this enabled successive governments to finance war expenditure by borrowing at a lower interest rate than that open to their rivals.Furthermore, British tax rates were higher than those in France, and the ability tosustain these was a consequence of both the strength of the economy and thedegree to which the role of Parliament facilitated consent. Parliament thus helpedto enlarge the power of government. “No Pelham, no money, was the City cry” in1746 when George II attempted to engineer Carteret’s return. With Pelham at the

Treasury, however, large sums were raised. When First Lord of the Treasury,Newcastle also took care to “talk to the most knowing people in the City …uponthe present state of credit”.56 The Monitor claimed on 6 September 1755 that “hewho has the longest purse will wear the longest sword”. On 15 July 1758 thepaper crowed

What a prodigious sum of money! No less than ten millions four hundred thousand pounds and upwards has been cheerfully andexpeditiously granted and raised for the service of the current year. Such

is the spirit of this nation, when they are satisfied with a minister, andapprove of the measures pursued by the Cabinet. By regarding Parliament partly as a sphere in which the disputes of politiciansin and out of favour could be contested, it can be seen as a stage for, rather than a source of, political difficulties. These difficulties were not unique toBritain, but were an essential feature of court-based political systems thatlacked the organization and attitudes of disciplined parties. Conversely,Parliament offered a solution to the most serious domestic problem of the

states of eighteenth-century Europe: public finance. It provided a means for linking government to the politically powerful throughout the country, ameans whose constitutional and institutional expression was the voting of substantial sums for approved policies.

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The contrast between Britain and her continental counterparts was notsolely a matter of sums raised and the speed with which they were voted andproduced. It was also a matter of lower rates of interest, flexible financialmethods, sources of revenue that could be anticipated without difficulty and

relatively low collection costs, in both administrative and political terms.Politically, this led to the voting and collection of large sums withoutsignificant levels of public disorder. Parliamentary financial arrangements andtaxation were accepted as legal even if they could produce criticism. Whilemany continental states, not least France, found it difficult to devise politicallyacceptable methods to raise taxation, largely because the politically and sociallypowerful were unwilling to increase their commitments, parliamentarytaxation and a parliamentary-funded national debt raised the substantial sumsthat funded Britain’s wars without creating political, regional and social

divides.More generally, the ability of the British state to provide subsidies to other powers57 was an indication of the fundamental strength provided by thecombination of parliamentary government and burgeoning commerce. In1757, before the period of repeated success in the Seven Years’ War, Newcastle,then First Lord of the Treasury, noted that there appeared to be no difficulty inmeeting the new commitment to provide greater support to Prussia, “towardsthat I have already been offered near six millions…and all this money will beborrowed (if necessary) something under 3½ per cent; when France gives 11

per cent and cannot fill the subscriptions”. He made the same point to foreignenvoys. The role of trade was such that in wartime great pain was taken toprotect British and attack enemy trade, and this policy was also pressed inParliament and print.58

Yet it is necessary to be cautious before assuming that British foreign policyserved the ends of commerce. Any stress on royal influence in foreign policy, onstrategic considerations and on the exigencies of alliance politics lessens therole of commerce. There is no doubt that the latter was of great importance,but its importance in foreign policy has been exaggerated. Commercial

interests often had contradictory views, for example, those of the Royal AfricaCompany and private traders over the regulation of the trade to West Africa. In1752 the Steadfast Society of Bristol agreed to spend up to £ 200 in lobbyingParliament against the monopoly of the Levant Company in the Turkey trade.59

Much lobbying was at cross—purposes. Furthermore, the vociferous and publicnature of lobbying should not lead to its impact being overemphasized.

It is true that British diplomats frequently intervened on behalf of their merchants. In 1748 the consul at the crucial Mediterranean port of Leghorn(Livorno) was ordered to preserve British commercial privileges from any

innovations whatever, and his efforts were supplemented by the envoy inFlorence. The following year, Bedford instructed Keene in Madrid to “insistthat the trade between the two nations should be on the same footing as it wasbefore the war”. Keene indeed sought to do so. His negotiations led to the

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commercial treaty of 1750. This both settled most outstanding differences andled to a reduction in tension that greatly helped trade.

This was not the limit of British governmental efforts. Newcastle movedin 1752 to protect the export of paper hangings to Russia and also discussed

with merchants the challenge posed by Frederick II’s plan for an East IndiaCompany: “Everybody here, and, particularly, the trading people of all kinds,are most zealous for taking all possible measures for discouraging, at once, thenew Emden Company, as far as the Law of Nations will justify us, in sodoing.” The following year he wrote to Keith in Vienna concerning thesituation in the Austrian Netherlands, “our manufacturers in Yorkshire arealready full of complaints upon their head; and if they were, by such aConvention, to be precluded from all hopes of redress, there would be nostanding their importunities”. Holdernesse observed in 1755, “I am too

sensible of the consequence of our trade to India to suffer it to bediminished”.60

Ministers were expected to heed commercial pressure, and frequently did so.In early 1749 Bedford was pressed by a general meeting of London merchantsengaged in the West Indies sugar trade over the position of certain Caribbeanislands, and received from Hardwicke “the third volume of the British Merchant,in which are contained the tracts concerning the Spanish duties”. Two yearslater, Newcastle instructed the envoy in The Hague “to follow the directions of the East India Company in helping them in their quarrel with the Dutch

company”. Requests from British merchants trading with Hamburg in 1762led to pressure on Denmark not to attack the city in order to pursue itsdemand for a loan.61

However, ministers could be resistant to mercantile pressures. In 1746Viscount Barrington, a Lord of the Admiralty who was to have a longministerial career, took part in a parliamentary debate on convoys and escortsin which he “spoke much of the disposition in merchants to complain of government—and abused insurers extremely”.62 Commercial tended to besubordinate to political interests. For example, complaints over Danish and

Swedish protectionist legislation did not lead to the serious reprisals that werethreatened.63 In 1742 the Swedish envoy in London was incorrect when hefeared that British mercantile complaints about Swedish privateering wouldlead to the despatch of a British fleet to the Baltic.64 Indeed, as far as the Balticwas concerned, although British envoys complained about commercialgrievances, the ministry rarely made then a central plank of policy, and mostcomplaints were far from effective. The Baltic was primarily a sphere of political interest for George II and his ministers, and that dictated Britishpolicy.

To that extent, British critics of the Hanoverian orientation of foreignpolicy were justified. This was not, however, an issue in commercial relationselsewhere in Europe, while, outside Europe, British ministries were morewilling to heed maritime and imperial interests. Considering how best to settle

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disputes with Spain over the British cutting of logwood in Central America,Keene could

not conceive any other method than that of calling for such people as

Alderman Baker and his friends who know by practical experience thewhole scope and nature of this logwood business, recommending tothem the form of as many proposals as they can prudently imagine or toserve instead of another in case the more advantageous ones can not pass.That these projects after being examined in Council may be remitted tome with proper instructions and authority.65

Baker was one of the leading London merchants trading with North Americaand bought much land in Georgia. He had been Chairman of the East India

Company and was then Deputy Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company aswell as a government supporter in Parliament. Although it was often difficult todetect, individuals like Baker wielded considerable influence, and thus fuelledcontemporary concerns about a “monied interest” dictating policy.

It was sometimes argued that a policy of continental interventionism wasnecessary for commercial reasons, although such an argument could serve todefend both a general line of policy and specific moves that could also beseen as detrimental towards trade. Criticizing Austrian conduct over theBarr ier, Newcastle wrote in 1753, “The power and influence of this country

depends upon the extent of our trade. It is that consideration that engages usin the support of the Continent, and it is for that reason that we are sostrictly and I hope ever shall be united to the House of Austria.” Theeconomist Josiah Tucker, author of The Important Question Concerning Invasions(1755), was another opponent of the notion of mar itime self-sufficiency. Thesupport given to Portugal in 1762 was justified on the grounds of itscommercial importance to Britain. In 1750 the prolific political writer JohnCampbell argued that

the reciprocal connections resulting from trade have quite altered thestate of things and produced within these two, or at most these threecenturies past, a kind of system in Europe, or in the Christian parts of Europe at least, by which every state is led to have a much greater concern than formerly for what may happen to another…we maytherefore safely say that the balance of power…was created by trade, andmust continue to be the object more especially of trading countries, solong as they preserve their commerce and their freedom.66

However, the argument that Britain’s continental trade should lead her tointervene in disputes there was rejected by some commentators, such as theLondon Chronicle of 26 January 1762. An anonymous contribution in the issueof 27 February 1762 asked whether “it is idle and absurd to think of exerting

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our power in the defence of the Portuguese, merely because they are our bestcustomers, and pay us annually a considerable balance in treasure”.

Parliament and Trade, the state in the mid-eighteenth-century world withthe most effective representative system and the growth in Britain’s global

power: the connections are seductive. Yet, as already suggested, the situation wasfar more complex than a schematic interpretation might suggest. It is necessaryto return these various factors to their several contexts, to rediscover the playof contingency, to recover narrative. In addition, it is important to appreciatethe role of choice, to understand that national interests were disputed andpolicies subject for controversy. The growth of Britain’s power was achieved ina competitive world in which policy choices were debated and frequently thecause of political contention. Foreign policy was a matter of process as well asstructure and individuals played a major role. The role of chance is frequently

presented in dynastic terms: What would have happened had such a monarchdied? However, the parliamentary process can also be seen in such a light. Pittwas the most famous mid-century parliamentarian but his rise owed much tothe death of a man of different capabilities and views, Henry Pelham. Thevariety of possible standards that existed is suggested by a letter of 1748 fromLegge to Pelham:

a minister with your intentions and possessed of the means, as you are,who will take every opportunity of retrenching expenses, reducing

interest, adding to the Sinking Fund and paying our debts as fast as is atall consistent with public safety, will in a few years deserve better of Great Britain and make a much greater future himself than all the heroeswhose ashes repose in Westminster Abbey have ever done.67

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Chapter SevenDiplomats and ministers

That ministers and men in power grow callous after a certain time, I amwell convinced, as that misers do, and will equally stand the laugh; nay,even laugh themselves first. Prints, pamphlets, caracaturas, burlesquesongs, and all the train of booksellers, or rather scribblers’ venom, is asindifferent to them as the hiss of an upper gallery to a very impudentplayer; who calls them canaille, fellows of no taste, spirit or genius.

— Centinel, 17 October 1757

Diplomats

In this period Britain became the most powerful maritime and trans-oceanicpower in the world, but her diplomacy remained centred on Europe.Diplomatic relations with non-European powers became more frequent, butthey were generally ad hoc and much less common than with European states.

Furthermore, they were often handled by military personnel or by the agentsof British commercial companies, particularly the East India Company in Asia,rather than by diplomats accredited by the crown. This reflected a lack of certainty about how best to handle relations with non-European powers. Thecalibre of diplomats is difficult to assess, especially if their necessary social skillsare considered: ability in negotiation was tested less continually than courtskills, for influence often reflected the ability to make the right impression atcourt. Rulers and ministers frequently complained that envoys exceededinstructions, for example, Legge in Berlin in 1748, but it was difficult to

provide orders that would comprehend all eventualities.In practice, any account of Br itish diplomacy in this period has to take noteof two aspects, first, permanent or “structural” factors that affected its conductand, secondly, specific political crises. Structural factors were of varying

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intensity. At the level of the individual diplomat, the most important was thefinancial. The private correspondence of diplomats was dominated by issues of pay and expenses. Both were commonly in arrears and each, especially thelatter, was regarded as insufficient. Such complaints were of course not unique

to the British, but they reflected several more general facets of the diplomacyof the per iod that are important. First, much of early modern government wasundercapitalized. It is of course true that most government in most periods hasbeen short of funds, but, in comparison to the nineteenth and twentiethcentury, governments did not benefit from an important industrial base, theinfrastructure of credit was less developed and their creditworthiness waslimited.

The financial problems of British diplomacy were however exacerbated byanother “structural” feature of British foreign policy: the role of Parliament.

After Henry VIII failed to use the despoliation of the monasteries permanentlyto increase the capital base of British monarchy, the crown was generallydependent, especially in per iods of warfare and international confrontation, onfinancial support from Parliament. This was rarely adequate, and fiscalexigencies therefore affected the operations of all areas of British government,including the diplomatic service; although such exigencies were scarcelyunique to Britain.

If Parliament is also taken as the symbol and fulcrum of public politics andpublic political pressures in the period, then it is important to consider the

impact on British diplomacy of the reluctance of the political nation tosupport a substantial standing army. There were of course other reasons whythe British army should be smaller than that of France. Britain had a smaller population, as an island, had both an important alternative of militarycommitment in the shape of the navy and was faced with the problems of amphibious operations. Nevertheless, the growing gap between British andFrench military capability on land in the seventeenth century is instructive, andthe same was true, after 1660, in comparison with Austria, Prussia and Russia.Whereas Henry VIII in the 1540s and Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s had been

able both to deploy substantial forces and to send them to the Continent, theBritish forces sent thereafter were increasingly effective only as part of coalition armies arrayed against France (as with the forces sent in the 1690s,1700s, 1740s and 1750s), were a smaller percentage of the French army andwere dependent on a favourable political environment in Britain. When thiswas lost, then the consistency and thus effectiveness of British diplomacyappeared compromised.

It is difficult to point to any change in the calibre of British diplomatsduring the period under consideration.1 Instead, variations in their importance

and success can be more directly ascribed to Britain’s relative power. Asidefrom direct representation by George I and George II when they travelledabroad, diplomats, whatever their merit, were most heeded when Britain wasseen as powerful: more important for example in 1750–2 than in the late

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1730s. The situation also of course reflected more general facets of thediplomacy of the period, especially the extent to which individual diplomatswere seen as representing the views of the crucial figures in the Britishgovernment. This issue remained a problem after the “Glor ious Revolution” of

1688, as first William III and later the Hanoverians sought to pursue their ownagendas in foreign policy and clashed accordingly with ministers andpoliticians. Nevertheless, despite serious clashes over the alleged role of Hanoverian interests, it proved easier to reconcile royal and parliamentarydifferences, or, looked at differently, to finesse royal views, than had been thecase under the Stuarts. In part, this was because the “Glorious Revolution” hadsettled the religious issue. It was no longer the case that a royal foreign policycould be presented as Catholic or crypto-Catholic, and this greatly lessened theseverity of disagreements over foreign policy, not least by weakening its

ideological dimension and by ensuring that it could not be placed so centrallyin domestic politics.As continental European commentators pointed out, the British had a

hypocritical notion of international relations. Successive governments soughtto create and sustain what they termed a balance of power in Europe, whileseeking unrestricted power in the oceanic and colonial spheres. In theory, thissubverted the logic of British diplomacy, but, in practice, there were morepressing reasons why continental states would not support British interests andrespond to British approaches. The most significant were, first, repeated British

refusals to make the commitments required by putative allies, indeed to seealliances as mutual and dynamic, and, secondly, and related to the first, thenature of European power politics. States such as Austria, Prussia, Russia andSavoy-Piedmont had little interest in Britain’s trans-oceanic policies and werenot outraged by British gains in this sphere. Indeed the major expansion of theBritish empire in mid-century aroused little response in much of Europe: therise of Prussia was of greater concern. This was not true of other major European colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, France and the Dutch—and, to aconsiderable extent, they formed a different diplomatic system alongside the

British.British diplomats had few problems in seeing Britain as part of a Europeansystem guided by common rules, rather than as separate from such a system.The value and beneficial nature of such a system was outlined by manycommentators, especially after the abatement of religious hostility at the levelof international relations led to a search for secular rationales of diplomaticpolicy. The maintenance of “the” (not a) balance of power became the end of diplomacy. The apparent precision and naturalness of image and language of balance greatly contributed to their popularity in an age in thrall to Newton

and mechanistic physics. Furthermore, balance served as an appropriate leitmotif for a culture that placed an emphasis on the values of moderation and restraint,and for an international system and diplomatic culture organized aroundprinciples of equality or at least the absence of hegemony. In 1769 the

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influential historian William Robertson, in his History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V , presented the balance as a product of

political science…the method of preventing any monarch from rising to

such a degree of power, as was inconsistent with the general liberty…that great secret in modern policy, the preservation of a proper distribution of power among all the members of the system into whichthe states of Europe are formed…From this aera [the Italian Wars of 1494–1516] we can trace the progress of that intercourse betweennations, which had linked the powers of Europe so closely together; andcan discern the operations of that provident policy, which, during peace,guards against remote and contingent dangers; which, in war, hathprevented rapid and destructive conquests.2

Robertson’s book provided empirical underpinning for the notion of contemporary Europe as a system that had devised a workable alternative tohegemonic power, and an alternative that was better, not only because itfacilitated internal development, but also because competitive, but restrained,emulation gave Europe an edge over non-European powers. Thus EdwardGibbon, who stood unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1761, subsequently arguedthat

the balance of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternatively exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our generalstate of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners, which soadvantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans andtheir colonies…The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutualinfluence of fear and shame…In peace, the progress of knowledge andindustry is accelerated by the emulation of so many active rivals; in war,the European forces are exercised by temperate and indecisive contests.3

This perspective, a European version of universalism particularly suited to aBritain that did not seek continental conquests, described the ideal vision of the diplomatic world of Europe between the Peace of Westphalia and theFrench Revolution. It was expressed in such diplomatic concepts and devicesas collective security and the congress system.

Yet, just as Gibbon’s account excluded the “barbar ians” from his “one greatrepublic” of Europe, so also the diplomatic world was very brittle. That itexcluded women and the bulk of the male population and reflected the world

of orders and privilege that dominated and manipulated society is scarcelysurprising, but was to ensure that revolution, nationalism, people’s warfare andpeople’s diplomacy all were to pose serious challenges. Simultaneously, thecombined effect of Eurocentric ideologies and a diplomacy of force and

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coercion was to ensure that it remained natural to resort to violence asEuropean horizons widened.

Mid-century diplomats

In European diplomacy the British followed similar practices to their continental counterparts. Issues such as appointment, control, remunerationand training were similar and handled essentially in a common fashion.However, foreigners in the service of the British crown became less commonin the diplomatic service. One major difference arose from Britain’s islandnature. This could lead to serious problems in communications. Adverse winds

could prevent messengers sailing or lead to them being blown off course. At acrucial moment, a courier from Berlin landed in Whitby not Harwich inNovember 1757. The following month, Mitchell found himself under “thegreatest perplexity” because contrary winds had detained Holdernesse’sinstruments and the “state of affairs” had recently changed considerably.4

Diplomacy was not taught, but was an adjunct of gentility, a consequence of breeding. Diplomats were the personal representatives of the sovereign andtheir readiness for office was seen as a product of their social rank. This wasoften closely related to the diplomatic rank of the official appointed, and thus

selection was an expression of regard, respect and reciprocity. Thus poor relations were reflected by George II being represented at Berlin only by aSecretary in 1745 and 1747, and by nobody from May 1747 until the followingApril, again from November 1748 until 1750, and from 1751 until May 1756,and at Paris by Antony Thompson, the former ambassador’s chaplain, fromOctober 1740 until the French declaration of war in March 1744.

Diplomatic representation in 1739–63 naturally divides into three periods,defined by war. In 1739–48 war led to the end of diplomatic relations withboth Spain and France and had effects on links with their allies. In contrast, as

the British government made a major effort to create and sustain antiBourbonalliances and to ensure that they had the desired military consequences, soBritish diplomacy became much more active, certainly in contrast to theposition in 1736–8.

Peace in 1748 brought a resumption of relations with France and Spain,but those with Prussia and Sweden remained cool. The active Britishdiplomacy of the interwar period, particularly the attempts to win Spanishsupport and to push through an Imperial Election Scheme in the Empire,placed considerable pressure on diplomats. Several, especially Keene (Madrid

1749–57), the Earl of Rochford (Turin 1749–55), Yorke (Paris 1749–51, TheHague 1751–80) and Keith (Vienna 1748–57), were impressive diplomats,though by no means always successful. In some respects, the interwar periodrepresented a peak in British diplomatic activity, but it ended in failure and

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isolation. Only a limited amount of the blame attaches to individualdiplomats, and indeed, with the possible exception of Hanbury-Williams andRussia, no British diplomat of the period was as responsible for thedeterioration of relations with a foreign state as, for example, St Saphorin had

been with Austria in the mid–1720s.The third per iod was that of the Seven Years’ War. Britain had few allies andmuch of Europe was opposed to her or unsympathetic. Diplomatic relationswere cut or diminished. Missions closed and much of the business of diplomacy was limited to wartime details, for example, the conduct of neutraltrade. Attempts to reawaken diplomatic links or to divide opponents weregenerally tackled by special missions. The very scale of diplomaticcorrespondence diminished and was certainly in no way comparable with theposition dur ing the War of the Austrian Succession.

Professionalism is an important theme in current studies of eighteenthcentury Britain, and it is appropriate to consider diplomacy in thislight, both because of its importance and because there were aspects of thecareer that required knowledge. It is certainly possible to detect elements of career progression and specialization in the records of some diplomats.Robinson served in a junior capacity in Paris (1723–30) before taking onresponsibility at Vienna (1730–48), being a Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle(1748) and serving as a Secretary of State (1754–5). Andrew Mitchellproceeded from Brussels (1752–5) to Berlin (1756–71). Rochford served at

Turin (1749–55), Madrid (1763–6) and Paris (1766–8) and became Secretaryof State (1768–75).5 Long tours of duty at particular posts encouraged a degreeof familiar ity with their problems and language. Appointed to Madr id in 1749,Keene had earlier served there in 1727–39. Walter Titley served at Copenhagenfrom 1729 until his death in 1768.

Such long tours created a danger that diplomats would “go native” andbecome overly sympathetic to the views of the court to which they wereaccredited. It was certainly the case that some diplomats became very popular at their posts: Titley was possibly the best example. In 1758, when Mitchell was

recalled in response to Pitt’s wishes, Frederick II made it clear that he wantedhim to keep his post. However, the danger was more complex. Whatever thelength of their mission, there was the possibility that diplomats would becomeoverly involved with a group or faction at their post and that this group wouldbe unsuccessful. The fault was most excusable if the group was pro-British, butdiplomats risked totally alienating other ministers or courtiers if they overlycommitted themselves to such a group. This proved a particular problem for British envoys in St Petersburg, Vienna and Stockholm, but less so for counterparts where government was less divided and where factions were

under greater control, for example, at Berlin. HanburyWilliams’s links at StPetersburg in 1757 to the young court of the heir, the future Peter III, and hiswife Catherine harmed Anglo-Russian relations: the reversionary interest inRussia had to wait until Elizabeth died in 1762.6

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In most spheres of public life, training was on the job. Some diplomatsacquired experience through posts on the staffs of envoys, such as Trevor withHoratio Walpole and Keith with Sandwich, though there were examples of aristocratic and non-aristocratic envoys appointed to responsible posts without

any such experience. Envoys were also briefed in London. En route for Viennain 1752, the Earl of Hyndford wrote to Onslow Burrish, then at Munich,“Before I left London I went through all your correspondence for aboveeighteen months past, with the Duke of Newcastle, and I admire your distinctness and punctuality.”7

That year Burrish had to select a secretary. The recommendations hereceived throw light on what was expected and on the role of personalconnections in filling posts. The eventual choice, William Money, was “verysober, honest…writing a very tolerable hand, which is capable of

improvement…having some knowledge both of the French and Germanlanguages, but, particularly, of the latter”. The son of a clerk in the office of theSouthern Secretary, Money was only 15, but he was recommended byNewcastle. Arthur Villettes, Minister in Switzerland and formerly firstSecretary and then Resident in Turin, wrote on behalf of a Mr Barbauld,

When he came to me at Turin, I already had a secretary who was everyway qualified for business and the entire trust I reposed in him, butcould not go through with the extensive correspondence and the

immense load then on my hands. Mr. Barbauld therefore came only asan assistant…My other secretary had the cyphering and decyphering of all the letters I trusted out of my own hands, and the copying over fair my dispatches to His Majesty’s ministers at hand. To Mr. Barbauld’sshare fell most of those I sent to the King’s ministers abroad, and to thefleet, together with the copies of them all for my own use…He writesa very fair hand, having been bred to trade; and was not slow incopying of my letters or other papers either in English or Frenchwhich he understands well.8

Language was less of a problem than might have been expected, as Frenchincreasingly became the diplomatic lingua franca. However, there were courtswhere this was not the case, and German, Italian and Spanish were importantdiplomatic languages: many British diplomats were insufficiently familiar withother languages than French.

The choice of envoys was not easy. Royal support was generally necessaryand envoys who fell foul of the monarch could lose their posts. In 1748 GeorgeII was furious with Legge’s conduct in Berlin. Confidence in envoys was

particularly important because the so-called “English plan” of conductingdiplomacy was for negotiations to be handled by Britain’s envoys rather thanby foreign diplomats in London. The latter were suspected as likely to intriguewith British opposition politicians, and at times their conduct could lead to

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serious tension, as with the collapse of Anglo-Prussian relations at the close of the Seven Years’ War: Michell, the Prussian envoy in London, actively intriguedagainst the government.

Most British diplomats appear to have discharged their tasks to the

satisfaction of the Secretaries of State. As several of the latter had beendiplomats, they were well aware of the problems of diplomacy. Diplomatic skilland influence are difficult to assess. Diplomats could be influential at courtswith which diplomatic correspondence was episodic, but there was also roomfor influence when instructions were more frequent and ministers in Londonmore concerned.

The emphasis placed by modern scholars on individual diplomats varies inpart in accordance with their conception of how the international systemoperated. Any stress on such impersonal factors as geopolitics or long cycle

theory can diminish the role allocated to individuals, but other approaches arepossible. It is sufficient to note that British diplomacy in mid-century was notobviously worse than that of other major powers. No major British diplomatprovided information for foreign powers as the French diplomat and foreignoffice official François de Bussy did for the British to whom from the 1730s hewas agent 101. A numerous Scottish contingent, particularly Keith andMitchell, was especially talented and energetic.9 British diplomats disagreedwith each other, but this was not unique to Britain and it ensured that differentexpert opinions were presented to the government.

Ministers

On my own account, I would not give three farthings to make one manSecretary of State rather than another. Lord Holdernesse is as agreeableto me as Sir Thomas Robinson, and Sir Thomas as Lord Holdernesse, or any other. I shall look upon you as the Foreign Minister in both cases,

and who writes the letters to the foreign courts is no concern of mine.—Pelham to Newcastle, 1750 Formal ministerial responsibility for foreign policy belonged to theSecretaries of State for the Northern and the Southern Departments, and wasdivided between them on geographical grounds. The Secretaries weregenerally talented and many had diplomatic experience, a ready contrast withBritish Foreign Secretaries in the twentieth century. In 1754–5 both theSecretaries had such experience and at least one had such experience until

1748 and from 1751 until 1761. This did not necessarily mean that theSecretary was therefore more competent. Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse,Secretary of State 1751–61, had not been a distinguished diplomat at Venice(1744–6) or The Hague (1749–51), and his secretarial position was largely

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due to his compliance with Newcastle’s views. Holdernesse wrote to Yorkefrom Hanover in 1755,

You will now see…why I have remained silent so long; I wanted to hear

from England…I did not know myself what to write or what to advise,till I knew how far our friends would authorize me to go; and I am sorryto tell you that I meet with little comfort from thence …I hope theDuke of Newcastle will let you know his thoughts upon the present verycritical situation of affairs, for my opinion is of little consequence.

Newcastle was certainly very pleased with the choice. Holdernesse was apliable peer without political weight, and Newcastle was disenchanted withsecretarial colleagues who thought for themselves: he had broken successively

with Townshend (1730), Carteret (1744), Harrington (1746), Chesterfield(1748) and Bedford (1751). Horatio Walpole commented on Newcastle’s“humours” in 1740. In 1749 Newcastle complained about Bedford both failingto consult him and sending absurd instructions, although he was later to claimthat the decision to dismiss him was taken by George II. The following year,Newcastle made clear his opposition to Halifax gaining the post: “He is soconceited of his parts, that he would not be there one month, without thinkinghe knew as much, or more, of the business than any one man; and I am sure itwould be impracticable to go on with him”. Pelham was convinced that

Newcastle was happy to receive Granville’s advice “provided he is not in officeto give him disturbance”.10 Yet pliability alone was not enough. Robinson,Secretary for the Northern Department in 1754–5, had had a distinguisheddiplomatic record and was close to Newcastle, but he was a poor House of Commons manager and did not hold his post for long. James, 2nd EarlWaldegrave, noted of Robinson, “Sir Thomas, tho’ a good Secretary of State, asfar as the Business of his Office, and that which related to foreign affairs, wasignorant even of the language of an House of Commons controversy.” 11

The last point was crucial. The particular problems facing the government

varied in nature and intensity and this led to different pressures on Secretariesof State, but the defence of the government’s position in Parliament was one of the most important tasks. This was less serious for an individual Secretary if hehad a more active colleague in the same House. While Newcastle was one of the Secretaries of State, his counterpart, if in the Lords, was liable to findhimself with limited political responsibilities. It was therefore possible for Harrington (1730–42, 1744–6) and Holdernesse (1751–61) to concentrate onforeign policy and play a relatively minor political role. Office was not the key.A pamphlet of 1756 referred to

those ingredients which compose the power a British statesman may aim at.It is not any peculiar office, rank, or station, but a secret energy andconfidence annexed to it, without which that office or station may not give

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the possessor that full sufficiency and content that may be the object of hisambition. Therefore be not surprized that a man with us may be Secretaryof State, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Paymaster of our Forces, or in anyother post to which you are used to annex the idea of our Premier, and yet

not possess that plenitude of power which constitutes a minister, and whichambition may think its due. Indeed the terms minister and ministry are sovague and ill-understood in our language, as well as constitution, that I findit difficult to form, much more to give a true idea of it.12

The Secretaries who were of greatest importance as policy-makers wereCarteret, Newcastle and Pitt. Each sought to dominate policy-making andNewcastle’s determination to have his way was in part responsible for the fallof several Secretaries: Carteret (1744), Chesterfield (1748) and Bedford (1751).

Newcastle continued to take a close interest in foreign policy when he movedto the Treasury in 1754.

The Duke of Newcastle

Carteret and Newcastle were both interventionists and were both obliged toadapt to the views and concerns of George II. There were significant

differences between them, but the similarities were more important. Havingsuccessfully displaced Carteret in 1744 and resisted his return in 1746, thePelhams continued both to concentrate successfully on the war with Francerather than Spain, and to confront France on the Continent.

However, though maintaining the main themes of Carteret’s anti-Frenchpolicy, the Pelhams discarded George II’s hostility to Prussia as a needlessdiversion of resources and efforts that should be directed against France. Thiswas to be a policy for peace as well as war. Frederick II noted in July 1748 thatwhen Newcastle had recently left London for Hanover he had said, “il fallait

aussi travailler a un concert dans l’Empire pour établir la tranquillité sur unpied solide en faveur de la reine de Hongrie”.13

Newcastle felt that the crisis of the Austrian Succession War, with all theproblems it had posed for Br itain, had ar isen from Austrian weakness. This hadbeen due to two developments—the particular problems that had affectedAustria, the crisis of Maria Theresa’s succession, which had revealed domesticpolitical and military weaknesses, and, arguably more serious, the failure of theAustrian alliance system in 1740–1.

Newcastle devised his diplomatic strategy to keep the peace by avoiding the

repetition of the crisis of 1740–1. This was to be achieved by two means. Mostimportantly, a strong collective security system was to be created that wouldassist any individual member if intimidated. Secondly, and this arose moreslowly, the Imperial Election Scheme would be supported.14

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Newcastle intended to subordinate other objectives to this plan, as he madeclear in response to the prospect of serious negotiations with Prussia in 1748.He wrote to Pelham that July,

My friend Legge [envoy in Berlin], is tempting us in his privatecorrespondence: But I do not think, that the bait will take. I really hope,and believe, everything will be done, that I think right: That is, that theKing of Prussia will have his guaranty, for Silesia, and Glatz; and, if,afterwards, he will concur with the Maritime Powers, and the House of Austria, in the support of the Old System; (in which, he ought to thinkhimself as much interested, as anybody,) he will be admitted. But, if nothing will satisfy him, but overturning the House of Austria; andentering into separate measures with the Maritime Powers, for that view;

the receiving him, upon that foot, would be destruction; and the givinghim the least expectation of it would create the greatest confusionimaginable…Don’t imagine, I say this, to make my court [to George II].It is my real opinion; and you know, it has always been so. 15

Two days earlier, Newcastle had told the Prussian envoy at Hanover that analliance of Austria, Britain and Prussia was a necessity,16 but it is clear that hewas only interested in such an alliance if, as Frederick was clearly not willingto do,17 Prussia was prepared to surrender her room for diplomatic manoeuvre

and became a staunch supporter of stability and the Anglo-Austrian axis.Newcastle wished to plan for eventualities, indeed believed it necessary inface of what he saw as nefarious French and Prussian schemes, but was averseto committing Britain and her allies to measures that might provoke the verythreats he feared. In a volatile international situation this approach was to proveunsuccessful in 1755–6.

A question mark can therefore be placed against the capacity of Newcastleand his ministerial colleagues to appreciate fully the problems of alliancediplomacy. It is necessary to be cautious before decrying the capacity of past

ministers, faced as they were by a great variety of problems and uncertain of the views of other powers. However, this very dynamic character of alliancesmade any rigid analysis of international relations unsatisfactory. Newcastle canbe criticized for advancing just such an analysis, although so long as theFranco-Prussian alliance continued the antagonism of Austria and Russiatowards Prussia and of Austria and Britain towards France appeared to make aneffective alliance between the three powers necessary and practical.

However, as with the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, such a collectivesecurity system operated best when the powers felt threatened and was

conversely prone to tension and to unilateral negotiations at other times. TheAustrian refusal to see the Imperial Election Scheme in the urgent andchallenging light that Newcastle saw it in led to their unwillingness to committhemselves to the degree that he considered essential.

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Similarly, the Russian refusal to dispense with subsidies as the price for their military preparedness against Prussia harmed Anglo-Russian relations. Thegovernment found the Russian proposals of 1753 for an alliance unsatisfactory.Newcastle, who was pressed hard by Pelham on the cost, explained that the

proposals departed from what was for him the central point of any alliance, apartnership of mutual interest:

That the interest of Russia is particularly concerned (independently of allother considerations) that the peace should be preserved and that nofurther encroachments or acquisitions should be made, in defiance of it,by the King of Prussia, sufficiently appears, by the solemn and unanimousopinion of the Russian Senate.

That that can be done, no way, but by having a strong force in Livonia,

must be notorious to everybody who knows the situation of thosecountries.That that was the measure generally followed by Russia, is also beyond

dispute…From these premises it is very surprising to the King, that asubsidy of £ 230,000 per annum should be demanded, singly for havingsuch a body of troops in those places, where the interest of Russiarequired they should be, and where from your accounts, His Majesty hadreason to think they actually were.18

Alas, from Newcastle’s point of view, his foreign policy was to fall foul, first, in1755–6 to the refusal of allies to subordinate their views to those of Britainand, more generally, to the kaleidoscopic nature of international relations,19

and, secondly, in 1761–2, to the collapse of domestic political support for interventionism and expense.20 These failures were all the more strikingbecause in each case the situation had appeared promising.

A pamphlet of 1755 that defended British commitments on the Continentclaimed “it would be no purpose to be constantly sending fresh reinforcements tothe New World, if we did not first appoint proper checks upon the power of

France in Europe”.21

Newcastle was optimistic at the outset of 1756. Heanticipated co-operation with Prussia if the French invaded Germany and wrotethat “all the good consequences which we proposed from the Russian treaty havealready in great measure happened”. The ministry hoped that the treaty withPrussia would effectually secure the “peace of Germany” and, indeed, saw noreason to renew the subsidy with Bavaria.22 However, the policy of “checks”failed and instead it was France that was to be allied with the strongest states onthe Continent. The Duke was bitterly criticized for his foreign policy bycontemporaries. One anonymous pamphlet of 1757 addressed to him, A Letter to

His Grace the D-of Ni-E , claimed of his administration that the Treaties concluded in it have shown neither knowledge in theinterests of England, of Europe, nor of human kind; it has been attended

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with endless expense, and incredible increase of debts, duringunsuccessful wars, unretrieved in times of perfect tranquillity…a generalcontempt for England, her politics and powers, has taken place of esteemin the minds of all the kings and potentates of Europe.23

It is dangerous to judge with the benefit of hindsight, but in 1755–6 Newcastlesuffered from his tendency to calculate the affairs of Europe as if they werethose of Parliament, and in 1761–2 he failed to understand and respond toshifts in domestic political opinion. A French visitor described him as veryvivacious and in perpetual motion, “the man in the world the most fertile inideas, but the most incapable of combining them, of establishing a policy andof executing it”.24 Similar criticisms were voiced by others. Old England of 1July (os) 1749 referred to “the over busy agitations that appeared in his mien”

and predicted that Bedford would be dismissed for failing to supportNewcastle.Owen’s Weekly Chronicle of 15 April 1758 emphasized “the perpetual

fluctuation of human affairs which makes it necessary to vary the regards of nations, according to the coincidence of repugnancy of their several interests”and commented on the short-lived nature of the alliance systems that followedthe War of the Austrian Succession, adding “how vain is all human policy!” TheWhiggish tendency to assume that it was possible to create a predictablesystem, and to improve it through intervention, reached a high point during

British diplomacy in mid-century. It was not a diplomacy that was to succeed.

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Chapter EightPitt and moves towards new

strategies, 1755–63

The failure of a system, 1755–56

Keeping the peace by, in Anglo-Hanoverian eyes, keeping France and Prussiain their places through a collective security system entailed two major linkedproblems. It made Britain dependent on her partners and it left unclear whichof France and Prussia was to be regarded as the major challenge. A similar difficulty had faced the Alliance of Hanover in its confrontation with Austria

and Spain in 1725–9, and had also affected British foreign policy during theWar of the Austrian Succession. However, rather than being able in somefashion to choose what should be seen as the major challenge, the British wereobliged in part to act with reference to their allies. Similarly, shifts in theattitude of Britain’s allies towards France and Prussia affected relations withthese allies.

This was to be crucially demonstrated in 1753–5, when a decisive shiftoccurred from regarding Prussia as the major challenge to seeing France in thatlight. In 1753 Austrian and Russian support had been sought to intimidate or

dissuade Prussia; by 1755 Britain was in effect at war with France and her concern with keeping the peace in Europe centred on the need to stop thewar spreading there. Britain thus sought Austrian support against France, a vitaldifference from her earlier anti-Prussian policy, which had accorded well withthe Austrian desire to reconquer Silesia.

All systems for keeping the peace naturally encompass different interests andaspirations, and their success is difficult to assess. Arguably, Frederick’s betrayalsof treaties, the shock of his invasion of Silesia in 1740 and his attack on Austriain 1744 led Britain and Hanover to exaggerate the threat Prussia posed to

international peace and to them in the post–1748 period. Frederick was clearlynot averse to further gains, but the Prussian strategic position had deterioratedmarkedly since 1740, for Prussia was now the principal enemy of theContinent’s two largest military powers, Austria and Russia, and both made

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PITT AND MOVES TOWARDS NEW STRATEGIES, 1755–63

major improvements in the effectiveness of their armies in the early 1750s. Itwas not obviously the case that this made it impossible for Frederick to riskother entanglements, but Anglo-Hanoverian fears of him can appear slightlyimplausible in the light of Prussian vulnerability. The effective ending of the

Italian question as a result of the settlement of Austro-Spanish differencesfurther strengthened the Austrian position, and was seen in this light by theBritish.1

Leaving aside the question of exaggeration, British concern for Hanover and the Low Countries appeared to dictate alliances with Austria and Russia,but what it did not do was clarify the terms upon which such alliances shouldbe based, nor did it suggest the direction in which they should develop.Essentially, Britain-Hanover sought reactive alliances that would maintain thepeace by responding to real and threatened breaches of it, but it was difficult to

bind allies to what might appear an essentially passive and fruitless diplomaticstrategy. Given Russian determination to influence developments in Polandand Sweden, and Austrian aspirations for the reconquest of Silesia, this peacestrategy was likely to collapse in the long term, even had the unexpectedoutbreak of hostilities in distant North America not led Britain to seekunilaterally a change in the direction of both her foreign policy and her understandings with other powers. The Austrians were assured in 1755 that“His Majesty adopts the general principle laid down by the Court of Vienna;that the assistance the allies are to give each other, ought to be mutual and

reciprocal, and not unilateral”,2

but, in practice, the British request that theAustrians help them to preserve the peace on the Continent was a unilateraldemand, for there was no real reason for an Austro-French conflict in 1755,unless Austria chose to attack Prussia.

The British ministry had been provided with plenty of warnings aboutAustrian concern with Prussia. In May 1755 Keith reported from Vienna,

this Court have always their eyes upon the King of Prussia;—they are inperpetual uneasiness about him, and his motions; and their measures are,

and always will be, determined by what they think their interest withregard to that Prince. Monsieur Kaunitz said the other day, that he hopedHis Majesty did not consider the Empress [Maria Theresa], as his allyonly against France, but likewise against the King of Prussia, who, thoughnot so powerful as the other was fully as dangerous. He observed that thisnew power had quite changed the old system of Europe; and thatnothing could set it to rights, but making ourselves sure of the Russians.

Kaunitz had been warned about domestic pressure for Britain to concentrate

on maritime and colonial disputes with the Bourbons, not on German affairs.3

He discerned correctly the major change that resulted from the rise of Prussiaand the consequent inappropriateness of the “Old System”. Whereas in theNine Years’, Spanish Succession and Austrian Succession wars it had been

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possible for Britain to treat France’s allies as essentially subordinate to her andtherefore a facet of the problem posed by France, as seen for example in thetreatment of Charles Albert of Bavaria in the 1740s,4 this was no longer plausible in the case of Prussia; for, although Britain might still regard her thus,

Austria and Russia saw her as an entirely different problem.The failure of British foreign policy was therefore related to a major shift inthe European system. The problems this shift created had been grasped byexponents of approaches to Prussia, such as Horatio Walpole. In seeking anunderstanding with Frederick in 1755 in order to preserve the peace of theEmpire and the security of Hanover, George II and his British and Hanoverianministers revealed flexibility, but it was flexibility that was circumscribed bythe policy of protecting Hanover and the Low Countries, and it was a policythat was to leave British foreign policy dangerously exposed in 1756. This crisis

was to provide Pitt with opportunities and problems.

Pitt and foreign policy

He was and is to be associated with a very different foreign policy than that of Newcastle. He was seen as the strategist of empire. His rise to office owedmuch to the apparent failure of the Pelhamite system. In 1751 and again in

1754 Pitt had been denied the Secretaryship of State he sought by George IIand the Pelhams. In December 1756, after the resignation of Newcastle inOctober, Pitt was appointed Secretary for the Southern Department. Thus, it isunderstandable that Pitt’s policies are seen as different from those of Newcastle.

That was true to a considerable extent, but Pitt had in fact been an officeholder in 1746–55. Although his post, Paymaster General, was not a leadingone and did not relate directly to foreign policy, Pitt was obliged to defendgovernment policy in the House of Commons. The shifts in his position duringthe 1750s reflect not only the pressures and expediencies of his own career, but

also the problems and uncertainties affecting British foreign policy.In February 1750 Pitt replied to charges of inconsistency arising from hisdefence of the government’s position over Dunkirk:

upon some former occasions I have been hurried by the heat of youth, andthe warmth of debate, into expressions which upon cool recollection, I havedeeply regretted…Nations, as well as individuals, must sometimes forbear from the rigorous exaction of what is due to them. Prudence may requirethem to tolerate a delay, or even a refusal of justice, especially when their

right can no way suffer by such acquiescence. In December 1759, responding to pressure for the retention of Louisbourg, Pittwas to argue, “he could not foresee what might happen, nor could anyone

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engage what might be the terms of a future peace which depended oncontingent events”.5 When, in January 1751, the opposition attacked theAnglo-Spanish commercial treaty of October 1750, in which the Spanish claimto a right to search British merchantmen in the West Indies had not been

explicitly denied, Pitt defended the treaty in the Commons. He argued that hehad been wrong to criticize Walpole in 1739 for failing to secure the samerepudiation: “I have considered public affairs more coolly and am convincedthat the claim of no search respecting British vessels near the coast of SpanishAmerica can never be obtained, unless Spain were so reduced as to consent toany terms her conqueror might think proper to impose.” Pitt defended thetreaty because of the favourable terms obtained for British trade and because itwould serve as a basis for better Anglo-Spanish relations, a departure fromstandard opposition views. It had been a commonplace that good relations

with France and/or Spain were impossible and that instead they were to beregarded as enemies. In contrast, for many decades, ministers had argued notonly that good relations, however difficult to obtain, were possible, but also thatthey were essential in order to keep France and Spain apart: diplomacy wasthus expected to compensate for the failure to keep the Bourbons from Spainin the War of the Spanish Succession and for the consequent danger of co-operation between the two leading naval powers after Britain. In 1751, as over Dunkirk the previous year, Pitt did not shirk the unpleasant task of explainingthe limits of national power, even if he knew he could rely on the solid

Pelhamite parliamentary majority. He also had to avoid the easy recourse of demagogy with its litany of historic hatreds and ancestral rivalries. This was notonly an issue for the British. Keene wrote from Spain in 1755 that “longhabitudes of being slaves to France and of hearing ill of the English createprejudices not easy to be eradicated”. He pressed for “much circumspectionand complaisance on the part of our officers towards Spaniards and Spain.Much depends upon it, and I hope they will be taught to forget the Spaniardsare our enemies.” Keene, however, had little time for Pitt. He referred to “thenoise and malice of the Pitts of Europe and the Pitts in America, with all their

abettors”.6

Pitt faced a more difficult task in defending the subsidies negotiated inorder to win German support for the Imperial Election Scheme. In January1751 he was described as making “a great panegyric on the Duke of Newcastle’s German negotiations”. The following month, Pitt defended thesubsidy to the Elector of Bavaria as necessary for the preservation of the peace.Pitt’s stance was criticized, both then and subsequently. Horace Walpolecriticized Pitt for praising Newcastle’s interventionism in German politics andpro-Hanoverian foreign policy, when he had condemned Carteret for the same

policies in the mid 1740s. In 1743 Pitt had told the Commons that, although itwas in Britain’s interest to preserve the balance of power, “as we are the mostremote from danger, we ought always to be the least susceptible of jealousy, andthe last to take the alarm”. In 1751 Pitt was to be attacked by Egmont: “How

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thus having thrown off all regard to former character or professions heremained an advocate for that lamentable Peace of Aix la Chapelle. Howstrenuous an advocate to subsidies to Saxony and to Bavaria in lieu of professedpeace.”7

It was easy, as Egmont did, during wartime to condemn the earlier compromises of peace, but Egmont also exaggerated Pitt’s influence. Pittcertainly indicated unhappiness with Newcastle’s policy. He wrote to HoratioWalpole, praising him for his Commons speech criticizing the Saxon subsidytreaty, which, Pitt claimed,

breathes the spirit of a man who loves his country. If your endeavourscontribute to the honest end you aim at, namely, to check foreignexpenses, and prevent entanglements abroad, under a situation burdened

and exhausted at present, and liable to may alarming apprehensions infuturity, you deserve the thanks of this generation, and will have those of the next.8

As so often in his career, Pitt was torn between the claims of posterity and thepressures of the present.

Pitt certainly gave indications of concern over the Bourbons. In 1750 hepressed on Newcastle his concern about French threats to Nova Scotia. InJanuary 1751 he attacked and voted with the opposition against Pelham’s

successful attempt to reduce the size of the naval establishment. In September 1753, although Pitt pressed for “some savings in the army in Scotland andGibraltar, in order to provide for the expense of” a projected subsidy to Russia,he also urged Newcastle “to adhere to our points with France, as to Dunkirkand the West Indies”. Pitt’s argument that a Russian army able to intimidateFrance’s ally Prussia would help achieve this aim9 accorded with Newcastle’sdiplomatic strategy, but his concern about France was instructive.

This concern was to interact with Pitt’s thwarted ambition and thedeteriorating international situation in 1754–6. The failure to appoint Pitt

Secretary of State when Pelham died in 1754 angered him, but the worseninginternational situation led to attempts to win him round in 1755. However, Pittmade clear views on foreign policy that did not accord with those of thegovernment, particularly George II. On 9 August 1755 Pitt outlined toHardwicke his views on

the support of the mar itime and American war, in which we were goingto be engaged, and the defence of the King’s German dominions if attacked on account of that English cause. The maritime and American

war he came roundly into, though very onerous, and allowed theprinciple, and the obligation of honour and justice as to the other, butargued strongly against the predictability of it; that subsidy treaties wouldnot go down, the nation would not bear them; that they were a chain and

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a connection, and would end in a general plan for the Continent, whichthis country could not possibly support.10

These views and his lack of parliamentary support, ensured that Henry Fox,

not Pitt, succeeded Robinson as Secretary of State in September 1755. Twomonths later, Pitt launched a bitter parliamentary attack on the subsidy treatiesand contrasted the defence of Hanover with that of Britain and America. Hisspeeches helped to make such a contrast a major public issue and also definedPitt’s position in totemic terms. The issue of Britain’s relationship with theContinent was not only intertwined with domestic politics; it was also, under the pressure of war, increasingly posed as a contrast with commitments toAmerica, and with a view of Britain’s present and future as an imperial power that was a trading, trans-oceanic, maritime polity. Power was increasingly seen

as a function and cause of wealth, maritime strength and colonial possessionsand trade.Thus the choice was no longer largely defined in terms of continental

interventionism versus a Tory, agrarian withdrawal from abroad, albeit one thatwas tempered by a degree of “blue water” raiding and cheap colonialism.Instead, “blue water” was transformed into Britain’s destiny. It was to be afeature in which the state invested heavily and took a major role. This was seenmost clearly in the dramatic shift in the despatch of regulars abroad. Prior tothe Seven Years’ War, very few regulars were sent to Canada and India, and in

military terms the direct trans-oceanic British impact was essentially naval. Thisaltered with the despatch of the regulars that conquered Canada, Bengal andthe Carnatic.

The reconceptualization of Britain, her role in the world and empire wasone of the major changes that took place in the mid-eighteenth century. It wasto be as far-reaching in its impact on British history as the long period of demographic growth that began in the early 1740s, and it was to be a shiftclosely linked to Pitt. When in October 1756 failure in the initial stages of theSeven Years’ War and a collapse of nerve within the ministry led to a

government offer of the Secretaryship to Pitt, he replied by demanding arejection of the past: Newcastle must resign and an inquiry be established intosetbacks in Minorca and North America. Foreign troops in British pay must bedismissed.

Pitt as Secretary of State

George II rejected the terms, but, convinced of the difficulty of the situation,Newcastle resigned anyway, leading to the creation of a ministry around Pittand the Duke of Devonshire, a Whig stalwart. In office there was to be acontrast between Pitt’s public position and the policies of the government. This

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was a frequent feature of his career that led to charges of hypocrisy andinconsistency. However, in part they reflected the exigencies of theinternational situation and, more particularly, the extent to which there wasnever a government of Pittites. The King’s speech to Parliament, written by

Pitt and delivered on 2 December 1756, promised that “the succour andpreservation of America cannot but constitute a main object of my attentionand solicitude”. Yet, alongside this, the government supported subsidies for anArmy of Observation composed mostly of Hanoverians and Hessians, designedto protect Hanover and to cover Prussia’s western frontier. The criticisms thisaroused reflected sensitivity to the Hanoverian issue and the extent to whichcommitment to the Continent was seen in those terms.

For tactical political reasons, Pitt sought to refute this assessment, but hisarguments also revealed the extent to which, as with his comments on Russia

in 1753, he was willing to see continental allies as a device to secure Britishinterests. Pitt did not offer a vision of Europe as a collective security system,but instead saw the Continent as a series of problems the solution to which hadto serve British interests. On 17 February 1757, on his first appearance in theCommons as Secretary of State, Pitt delivered a message calling for extraordinary supplies to meet the French threat “against His Majesty’sElectoral dominion, and those of his good ally the King of Prussia”. Supportfor an Army of Observation to protect Hanover was presented as a means toenable George to fulfil his engagements with Frederick II, and on the 18th

£ 200,000 was obtained without any opposing vote. Pitt’s tactics weresuccessful: Frederick was regarded very positively by many of those who hadviews on foreign policy, being widely seen as a Protestant hero.11

The consistent development of a domestic and foreign policy system was,however, swept aside by ministerial instability. This was due not to Pitt’sinconsistency, but to that of George II and Newcastle, both of whom wished toget rid of him. In addition, Cumberland was not happy at the prospect of goingto command the Army of Observation in Hanover while Pitt remained inoffice. On 6 April 1757 Pitt was dismissed.

This dismissal ushered in a period of acute confusion. As with the shortlivedappointment of Carteret in 1746, governmental change was flawed by theabsence of a stable and strong ministerial team that could be put in place.Furthermore, domestic opinion was volatile and divided. The press wascontentious, and, in addition, Pitt’s dismissal was followed by the so-called“rain” of gold boxes, the presentation to him of the freedom and complimentsof thirteen cities: an assertion that Pitt was popular.12

A stable and peaceful international system might have permitted thecreation of a ministry strong enough to resist Pitt and his discourse of

Patriotism, but the war that Britain was involved in was central to the crisis,not least because it ensured that there was no sense of predictability indevelopments. The deterioration in Britain’s position in 1755–6 had exposed aserious weakness in the political system, the limitations of parliamentary

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management, specifically the inability of Newcastle to lead the “Old Corps”Whigs through an acute crisis. The situation in 1757 was no better. That July,Charles Townshend wrote to his mother,

How do projectors, for all ministers are little more in times of so muchdanger and national weakness, propose to continue even adisadvantageous war for another year; when the siege of Prague shall beturned into a siege of Berlin; Hanover garrisoned by France; Ostend aFrench port; and England, sinking’ under its own debt and expences,shall be the only fund and purse for carrying on every other pr ince’s war in our alliance? Indeed, Lady Townshend we are undone.13

France was a member of a coalition that appeared to face the happy prospect of

continental invincibility, and there was no reason to believe that Cumberlandand the Army of Observation would be any more successful than George IIhad been in Hanover in 1741. Furthermore, the initial stages of the colonialwar had yielded little success. Aid to Hanover was George’s vulnerable point.He hoped that Frederick would send Cumberland assistance, but Frederickhimself was hard pressed. Success in obtaining parliamentary support on 18February 1757 did not lessen governmental vulnerability on this score.

George and Newcastle swiftly realized that the best solution was a ministryin which Pitt played a role but accepted most of their views, including a

central position for Newcastle. Pitt returned to the Secretaryship in June 1757in a ministry dominated by the Old Corps.This ministry was swiftly to face a serious crisis in foreign policy, in many

respects a repetition of that of 1741. Cumberland was defeated by a larger French force at Hastenbeck on 26 July, Hanover was overrun, and on 10September Cumberland agreed to the disbanding of the Army of Observationby the Convention of Klosterseven. This exposed Prussia’s flank, but Hanover also threatened to abandon Prussia as a result of George II’s interest innegotiations with Austria for a neutrality for the Electorate.

This was a crisis akin to that which Carteret had cut through in 1742. Pittdid likewise, demanding the repudiation of the Convention and theabandonment of the approach to Austria. Had Pitt been an isolationist, hemight have welcomed Hanoverian neutrality, as it would have freed Britainfrom a need to consider the Continent. In January 1758 the French foreignminister argued that if Britain no longer had to bear the cost of the defence of Hanover to send assistance to Prussia, she would be able to concentrate on her navy and on fighting France overseas, in short that Europe was an alternative toAmerica.14 A belief in Britain’s “blue water” destiny unconnected in any

fashion to Europe might have led to a willingness to consider theabandonment of Prussia. This had been the implications of Pitt’s public“Patriot” stance when in opposition, and it was one that was still advocated by“Patriot” newspapers. In its issue of 30 July 1757, the Pittite Monitor had

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warned against being involved “in a war on the Continent for the pretendedpreservation of the balance of power”.

Returned to office as a colleague of Newcastle, Pitt, however, was seekingto establish a different policy, to define an interventionism and an alliance

system that would serve British interests without the overreach associated withCarteret. Pitt sought to combine prudence abroad and acceptability at home,treating himself as the prime definer of both. Such a policy was difficult giventhe international system. Indeed, in August 1757 Pitt secretly adopted acontroversial policy earlier associated with his uncle, James, Vis-countStanhope, the return of Gibraltar. Pitt was ready to return the base if Spainprovided help in reconquering Minorca, and thus went to war with France.Ironically, he sent his instructions to Benjamin Keene, the perennial envoy inSpain, who had negotiated the Convention of the Pardo that Pitt had attacked

in the Commons in 1739. Pitt offered a pessimistic account of the situation,but also a defence of interventionism and the interests of Hanover:

the formidable progress of the arms of France, and the imminent dangersto Great Britain and her allies resulting from a total subversion of thesystem of Europe…it is impossible to pass in silence that affecting andcalamitous part of the subversion of Europe, namely the Frenchconquests and desolations in Lower Saxony, which affords the afflictingspectacle of His Majesty’s ancient patrimonial dominions, transmitted

down with glory in his most illustrious house through a long series of centuries, now lying prey to France…nothing can shake His Majesty’sfirmness, or abate…concern for…his crown, and the rights of hiskingdoms; nor can any events withdraw the necessary attention of hisconsummate wisdom from the proper interest of Europe, or divert hisgenerous cares from endeavouring to prevent the final overthrow of allsystem and independency among the powers of the Continent.

Despite governmental hopes about the possible results, especially an alliance

between the two powers, Pitt’s approach did not need to be followed through:the Spaniards were not interested and, in part, Pitt was trying to win their goodwishes. However, the proposal indicated the extent to which Pitt was willing tocompromise traditional Patriot opinions. Indeed the Monitor was reminding itsreaders about Spanish depredations on British trade.15

In the winter of 1757–8 Pitt played a major role in securing a politicalsettlement that tied the defence of Hanover to British direction and identifiedit with the Prussian alliance, a policy he had anticipated when earlier supporting the grant for the Army of Observation. This was crucial to the

disavowal of the Hanover neutrality convention and thus to the revival of acommitment to Prussia and the Continent that had in effect been surrendered.The alliance with Prussia served to legitimate the commitment to theContinent for Pitt and many others. It diverted attention from the issue of

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Hanover and provided a plausible basis for policies that would have beencondemned had they been linked only with the Electorate. The Monitor claimed on 22 April 1758 that

under the direction of Providence, this nation has after a course of sixtyyears bad policy in the support of the popish house of Austria, beenforcibly driven by her natural-enemies to an alliance with the onlypower upon earth that is capable of assisting us in the defence of theProtestant faith, and by his military capacity, to reduce the commonenemy…to an incapacity of disturbing the peace of his neighbours for the future. Such alliances are agreeable to the constitution and interest of these kingdoms. They are according to that model of sound politics,which were laid down by the ministers of our Elizabeth [I], who could

never be persuaded to take any further share in the troubles on thecontinent, than was necessary to facilitate the schemes of their owngovernment. But it is very wide of those continental measures, which of late years have loaded this nation with heavy debts for the support of armies in the time of peace, and for taking upon us the greatest burdenin every quarrel raised by the house of Austria.

Such comments might be regarded as an example of what Richard Rigby MP,the Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, referred to as “all the trite

nonsense of popularity”.16

However, they also demonstrate the extent to whichthe Prussian alliance provided the possibility for bridging the traditionalantithesis of pro-Hanoverian ministerial continental interventionism and“patriot” isolationism, a bridging that Pitt represented and helped topopularize.

At the cabinet on 7 October 1757, Pitt’s suggestion that Britain agree topay the entire cost of the Army of Observation provided the Convention wasdisavowed was adopted.17 A subsidy for Prussia was agreed, but Pitt rejectedFrederick’s pressure for the despatch of British troops to cover his western

front. This policy, agreed at the cabinet on 23 February 175818

was in turnreversed under the pressure of apparent military necessity when British troopswere committed to defend the Prussian North Sea port of Emden, a goalpressed by Frederick and by Ferdinand of Brunswick, Cumberland’sreplacement in Germany. Pitt presented the despatch of troops as a necessarystep that did not divert manpower from North America, and this was necessaryfor both himself and public opinion. In the summer he agreed to the despatchof substantial British reinforcements to Ferdinand’s army.

Yet this was a more limited commitment to continental warfare than that of

Britain in the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Succession. This reflected thediplomatic situation—the narrower base and more restricted range of Britain’salliance system, but, although that was substantially due to shifts in Europeanpower politics, it also in part accorded with developments in British political

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attitudes. In late 1758 George II and Pitt made sympathetic noises about better relations with Bavaria, and in January 1759 George went as far as to say toHaslang, the Bavarian envoy, that it was time to think of another Emperor, asthe present one, Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis I, was a threat to the

constitution of the Empire.19

This approach, which was without result, was ameasure of desperation at the alarming state of the war in Europe and alsoindicated the manner in which the Austro-French alliance made George searcharound for allies.

The commitment to Prussia and to Ferdinand’s army was the backdrop toBritain’s colonial conflict with France, a conflict that became the focus of public attention in a manner that had generally proved elusive in 1743–8.Louisbourg fell in 1758, followed by Québec in 1759 and Montréal in 1760.The French fleet was heavily defeated in two battles in 1759: Lagos and

Quiberon Bay.There was also success in India. Robert Clive’s victory over the Nawab of Bengal, Surajah Dowla, at Plassey on 23 June 1757 is well known, but was infact the culmination of a period of concerted land—sea operations thatreflected the effectiveness of the British military system and its range. TheNawab had stormed Fort William at Calcutta on 20 June 1756. Robert Clivewas sent from Madras with a relief expedition, but Fort William itself wasregained largely thanks to the guns of the British naval squadron under Vice-Admiral Charles Watson. Close-range fire from Watson’s warships was also

instrumental in the fall of the French fort at Chandernagore in March 1757.Pitt was not responsible for the initial build-up of Br itish strength there, but hesent reinforcements to India in 1759 and 1760, was more aware of theimportance of India than George II or Newcastle, and was rewarded whenFrance’s remaining possessions there fell in 1760 and early 1761. The Frenchbases in West Africa had already fallen.

There was nothing inevitable about the disposition of British troops: thethreat of French invasion until 1759 and the pressure of the French inGermany ensured that there were powerful alternative calls to those for

transoceanic deployment. Pitt was determined to maintain substantial forces inNorth America, and the British devoted far more military and financialresources to North America in 1755–60 than the French: British expenditureon the conquest of Canada has been estimated at £ 80 million. After the fall of Minorca to the French in 1756, Newcastle had hoped to regain it as part of apeace in which North American conquests gave the British a strong position.Pitt was even more convinced of the value of such conquests, not least becausehe was readier to grasp the value of Britain becoming a stronger imperialpower. Pitt’s priorities also reflected the direction of public attention. An

officer in North America was informed by a London correspondent that “thegreat and favourite object is your continent of North America”. 20 Pitt hadhelped to free Britain from the mesmerized state of 1756 when the prospect of French invasion had led to an essentially reactive strategy.

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The appropriate choice of military objectives and the winning of publicsupport for policy were both important because Br itain did not enjoy a lead inmilitary capability sufficient to guarantee success. Indeed, the British navy wasvery similar to its opponents in the weaponry it employed. Sir Thomas Slade,

Surveyor of the British Navy 1755–71, worked from Spanish and Frenchwarships captured in the 1740s to design a series of two-decker 74-gunwarships that were both manoeuvrable and capable of holding their own in thepunishing close-range artillery duels of line of battle engagements. Fourteenwere in service by 1759 and they played a major role in the British victories of the war. This was part of a system in which European powers copied eachother’s developments in weaponry and tactics. A gap in weaponry capabilitywas therefore not responsible for British success.

However, the British showed in the Seven Years’ War that they could be

more effective than their European opponents—France and, in 1762, Spain— in conflict outside Europe. The British revealed a greater capability to applyforce at particular points. The British navy was more effective than itsopponents. This was largely due to its extensive and effective administrativesystem, to the strength of public finances, to a more meritocratic promotionsystem and more unified naval tradition than that of France, to good navalleadership and to the greater commitment of national resources to naval rather than land warfare, the last two both encouraged by Pitt.

Commitment to naval and colonial warfare was a political choice that

reflected the nature of public culture and national self-image, but was not madeinevitable by them. Pitt played a major role in this choice. Essentially, he cutacross the monarchical emphasis on conventional land campaigning on theContinent. In the War of the Spanish Succession the focus of fame and heroismhad been the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns in Germany and the LowCountries. In the period 1739–48 there had been considerable public supportfor Vernon’s capture of Porto Bello in 1739 and Warren’s of Louisbourg in1745, but the centre of military attention in the later stages of the war hadbeen George II at Dettingen and then Cumberland’s campaigns in the Low

Countries.The Seven Years’ War was different. Cumberland was defeated atHastenbeck and thereafter played no military role. Britain was not withoutheroes on the Continent, and the Marquess of Granby’s fame and popularity isstill today reflected in pub signs, but the commander at the greatest “British”victory on the Continent, Minden (1759), was Ferdinand of Brunswick. Hewas popular in Britain, but his resonance in terms of British politics and publicculture was limited. The same was true of Frederick the Great, whose famesurpassed that of any British commander on the Continent.

Instead, on land it was Wolfe at Québec, a colonial conquest, and at seaBoscawen at Lagos and Hawke at Quiberon Bay, who came to personify andfocus British notions of heroism and leadership and thus to play a major role inBritish self-identification. Pitt was their political counterpart, his significance

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symbolic as much as to be found in his actions. Pitt was obviously flawed, buthe could serve as a hero in a way that George II and Newcastle could not.Thanks to his commitment to the Prussian alliance from 1758, Pitt was noisolationist, but he was determined to ensure that British policy was not

distorted for Hanoverian ends. When Bussy told Pitt in June 1761 that Francewould expect compensation for her Hanoverian conquests, on the grounds thatFrance had diverted resources from the defence of her colonies in order topursue her operations on the Continent, Pitt replied that the argument wouldhave had a great effect during the reign of George II, but that the situation hadchanged. This was a position that Choiseul, the French foreign minister, founddifficult to accept, though he had already commented in February 1760 that itwould not matter to Pitt if France devastated Hanover.

Bussy returned to the subject when he saw Pitt on 23 June 1761. He

claimed that the Electorate of Hanover should be regarded as a province of England, because George II, as King, had broken the 1757 Convention of Klosterseven for the disbandment of the Hanoverian Army of Occupation,and because the army commanded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick for thedefence of Hanover acted in accordance with George’s orders and for “thecause of England”. Bussy reiterated the charge that French losses in thecolonies were due partly to their operations on the Continent. Choiseul wasdetermined to establish the principles of compensation and equivalence. Pittwas willing to offer the return of Guadeloupe as compensation for the

French evacuation of occupied Hanoverian, Hessian and Prussianterritories,21 but that reflected his understanding that such territories had tobe regained and was part of a determined policy of retaining most colonialgains.

Success helped to redefine Britain. There had initially been no plan toconquer the French empire, still less that of Spain. Indeed, the British hadtaken pains not to anger Spain for most of the war. The East India Company’srise to dominance in Bengal and the Carnatic was also unexpected.

Yet once won, these gains appeared natural and necessary, so much so that in

the latter stages of the conflict there was a bitter debate about which conqueststo hand back at the close of a war 22 that few had earlier anticipated winning.By the close of 1759 Br itain really did rule the waves, and optimism about her naval capability and potential grew. “Constantia Fearnought” in the UnionJournal: or, Halifax Advertiser of 27 May 1760, urged the despatch of a fleet tothe Baltic “to act with vigour and spirit, and push the Empress of Russiahome”, a bold and foolish proposal that would have greatly extended Britain’scommitments, but that reflected the sense of potency that followed thevictories of 1759. In addition, Britain was also the most successful transoceanic

land power. Spain might rule more territory, but Britain was a dynamic andgrowing trans-oceanic power with extensive possessions in both Asia and theNew World.

The possible future need to make difficult choices had been anticipated as

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soon as conquests were made. The Monitor in its issue of 19 November 1757condemned the restoration of Cape Breton in 1748: that of 7 October 1758stressed the necessity of retaining Cape Breton at the even-tual peace whatever Prussia’s requirements then were; in short that Britain was to make peace on

the basis of the uti possidetis, not the status quo ante bellum. There was to be nocompromising exchange of gains as in 1748, and no return to an unsatisfactorypast. Victories, and the prospect of fresh success, led to calls for the retention of additional gains. Increasingly, these were presented as designed to prevent anyfuture Bourbon war of revanche from being likely to succeed. “Ibericus”,writing in the London Chronicle of 7 January 1762, pressed for the conquest of Spanish Florida and French Louisiana in order to complete the British empirein North America: “it will fix our colony’s security beyond the reach of rivalstates in future times to endanger”. In the London Evening Post of 25 May 1762,

“Anglicus” made the same point about Louisiana.The failure of the 1761 Anglo-French negotiations threw fresh pressures onBritish finances and military resources, and raises questions about theintentions of the ministry. In June 1761 the French government had offeredthe cession of all of Canada bar Cape Breton Isle. The latter was to be retainedso that French fishermen could dry their catches from the valuableNewfoundland fishery. It was to remain unfortified. Thus its proposed returnwould have been very different to that after the War of the Austrian Succession.In addition, the French offered to return Hanover and to exchange Minorca

for Guadeloupe and Goree. Pitt, however, did not wish to return Goree, avaluable slaving station, and was opposed to France retaining her fishing off Newfoundland, which was seen as a crucial training ground for sailors, andthus a vital source of naval manpower.

Pitt’s negotiating position was handicapped by differences of opinion over terms within the ministry and by the attempt to widen the situation to includeSpain. Bussy argued that a satisfactory settlement of Anglo-Spanish maritimeand colonial differences would have to be part of any Anglo-French agreement,an idea Pitt rejected in late July when he reiterated his view that France should

be totally excluded from the Newfoundland fishery.23

Despite this, the Frenchinsisted on the right to retain her Newfoundland fishery, and on 19 Augustthe British cabinet agreed, Pitt unwillingly concurring for the sake of unanimity.24

It was too late. On 15 August 1761 France and Spain had signed the ThirdFamily Compact.25 This was a serious blow for Britain. France and Spain werethe two strongest naval powers after Britain. Spain’s entry into the war alteredthe strategic situation in European and Caribbean waters. The separation of France and Spain had been a crucial goal of British policy since 1748, and on

many occasions earlier in the century, and, as Secretary of State, Pitt had strivento keep Spain out of the French camp. United, the two powers were both in astronger position to press their claims on Britain. Spain was committed tohelping France militarily after eight months, a period long enough to permit

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negotiations, but there was little incentive now for France to be conciliatory.Unlike in the War of Austrian Succession, Spain was not distracted by Italianinterest and ambitions.

In fact, Spain’s entry into the war was to make little difference: Britain was

to triumph in the subsequent conflict. Yet this was far from inevitable, andindeed the Monitor exaggerated what could be achieved at the expense of Spain. The British government did not want war with Spain, and in 1761 itfailed to prevent it. Part of the blame for the situation was directed at Pitt.Choiseul was offended by Pitt’s “hauteur” and his “shocking” projects, theSpanish envoy Fuentes blamed the war on Pitt, while Richard Wall, the Irish-born Spanish Secretary of State, was also angered by his “hauteur” anddescribed Pitt as a devil. Elizabeth Montagu, no friend of Pitt, made a differentcriticism when she wrote to her MP husband that “our pretty conquests in

America though they serve to make rejoicing and illuminations do not give uspower to control the Grand Monarque in his conduct towards Spain as theDuke of Marlborough’s victories did”.26

Pitt certainly lacked any mastery of the conciliatory diplomatic arts, andministerial colleagues, such as Newcastle, Hardwicke and Granville, thought hisinstructions to the British envoy in Paris, Hans Stanley, intemperate andoffensive. The public, demonstrative aspect of Pitt’s personality and politics andhis craving for popular support were seen as having much effect on hisministerial conduct.27 Pitt had no experience as a diplomat and his instinctual

distrust of the Bourbons exacerbated the consequences of his autocratictemperament.Yet, the Bourbons displayed a less than total commitment to peace. At the

ministerial meeting on 14 August the disagreement over Pitt’s strident draftwas interrupted when Bute read a letter from Choiseul to the French envoy inStockholm, a copy of which had been obtained by Britain’s excellent postalinterception system: Choiseul stated that France was determined to continuethe war, but would negotiate with Br itain in order to conceal her purpose. Thecentral question in 1761 was not whether Anglo-French differences could be

settled, but whether France would be able to win Spanish support and thus, itwas generally thought, fight on with more success and oblige Britain to bemore accommodating.

Pitt can be criticized for his failure to prevent a deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations, but, like Britain, Spanish policy had changed with a newmonarch. Charles III (1759–88) was more concerned with maritime andcolonial issues than his predecessor had been, and in 1760 Spanish policybecame less conciliatory. Spain claimed rights under the Peace of Utrecht tothe Newfoundland fishery and refused to accept any longer what she saw as

illegal British cutting of logwood in Honduras. Pitt was not accommodating oneither head, although he did seek to avoid provocations, pressing the Admiraltyto respect Spanish territorial waters and arranging for the release of a Spanishship held at Portsmouth. However, he felt the Newfoundland fishery important

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and Spanish claims in the matter undeserved. In addition, Pitt’s position wasundermined by the Spanish belief that his more pacific ministerial opponentswould overthrow him.

Pitt was to break with his colleagues in October 1761 over relations with

Spain, not the previous summer over negotiations with France. That reflectedhis willingness to settle with France if satisfactory terms could be obtained.Arguably Pitt overly delayed the offer of reasonable terms, but in 1762,without Pitt, a pacific ministry was still to find negotiations with the Bourbonsdifficult and divisive.

The failure of the negotiations forced the government to confront thepossibility of war with Spain. Pitt, supported by his brother-in-law Richard,2nd Earl Temple, the Lord Privy Seal, pressed for an immediate declaration of war, telling the cabinet on 18 September 1761 that “loss of time [is] loss of

opportunity. Whatever is dangerous will be more so 6 months hence; no safetybut acting with vigour…an immediate action gives us the best chance toextricate ourselves”. They had a clear sense of the danger posed by closer Franco-Spanish relations.

The other ministers disagreed. They did not want to widen the war, wereespecially concerned about the possible financial burdens, and hoped thatSpain would not take action against Britain. The exact details of the FamilyCompact were unknown, and the ministers doubted that Britain had sufficientgrounds to attack. Instead, they proposed pressing Spain to deliver a categorical

assurance of her friendly intentions. It was hoped that this would not driveSpain closer to France. Unwilling to agree with their colleagues, Pitt andTemple declared they would draw up a separate minute for George III, anunconventional step. This stated that the combination of France and Spain inenmity to Britain required “necessary and timely measures”, the breaking of diplomatic relations.

When the issue was debated anew on 21 September, Pitt pressed for therecall of the British envoy and then an immediate declaration of war, and madeit clear that he would not be bound by the collective decision, an attitude that

was seen as unreasonable. Pitt and Temple then signed their minute andwithdrew.28 On 2 October Pitt attended the cabinet for the last time prior tohis resignation. He argued that Britain must attack Spain while she wasunprepared for war, and then the other ministers reiterated their view that thiswould only drive Spain and France together. Newcastle voiced his fear thatwar with Spain “would render the present load of expense much moreinsupportable”.29

Pitt’s resignation on 5 October 1761 stemmed from his unwillingness tofollow a policy that he believed wrong. As was predicted, Pitt was in part

vindicated by the outbreak of war that winter. Lyttelton identified that as likelyto be the crucial element in the public response:

I want much to know whether it is probable that by Pitt’s going out we

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shall be saved from a war with Spain. The opinion of the public as to thewisdom of his conduct will greatly depend on that question. For, if it beinevitable, some will think he was in the right to desire to act a laPrussienne and strike first, while the enemy was unguarded and more

vulnerable than afterwards. Our people naturally love violent and spir itedmeasures, without troubling themselves much about forms. But if Spain isnot determined to make war upon us, few persons I believe will approveof our making it upon them.30

In both 1743 and 1755 the British had fought the French without being at war.However, Pitt’s attitude to the conduct of government in 1761 made itimpossible to hold the government together. In light of tensions within theministry, the hope of averting war with Spain and a growing desire for

peace with France, Pitt’s determination to force the pace for war wasinappropriate.Pitt resigned over war with Spain, rather than the continuance of subsidies

to Prussia and other aspects of continental interventionism. As a consequence,success in the war with France, with which Pitt was closely associated, was notcompromised as far as most contemporaries were concerned by continentalinterventionism. Instead, Pitt was associated in 1762 and, subsequently, not onlywith a war with Spain that appeared inevitable in hindsight, but also with a war that brought great success in 1762. This success, and continued victories over

France in 1762, especially the capture of Martinique, lessened public concernover the failure to secure peace in 1761.This was important in the anchoring of a public perception of Britain as a

necessarily imperial maritime power. The situation was in fact very dangerous.It was difficult to be optimistic about the position on the Continent. There waslittle reason for confidence that Frederick the Great would be able to hold off his assailants for ever or to negotiate a satisfactory peace. Spain was a major power whose energies had not been dissipated by recent conflict, and Portugalappeared a vulnerable British ally. Although France had been gravely weakened

as an imperial power by the collapse of her position in Canada and India, shehad felt able to reject British terms in 1761.For all these reasons, the failure to negotiate peace in 1761 was serious. It

was not of course simply or solely Pitt’s fault: French and Spanish policy andresponses were not dictated by the views of Britain, whatever many Britishpoliticians and commentators might imagine. Yet it was precisely this blinkeredattitude that ensured that the fortuitous success of 1762 was important inleading to an absence of any serious widespread critique of the commitmentsassumed to arise from Britain’s apparent maritime destiny.

The successes of 1762 might appear inevitable. The French navy had alreadybeen devastated, its British counterpart had been battle-hardened andconsiderable experience had been built up in amphibious operations. Britainwas far more prepared for war than had been the case in 1755–6 and far more

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ready for attacks on the Spanish empire than in 1739–42. Cartagenasuccessfully resisted British attack in 1741, but Havana fell in 1762. In 1739 theBritish government decided not to attack the Philippines; in 1762 Manila wascaptured. According to the Salisbury Journal of 4 October, the news of the

surrender of Havana arrived during a choral concert in the city’s annual musicfestival: to shouts of applause, the choir at once burst into the song “Britons,strike home”.

It is therefore easy to treat 1762 as a second “year of victories” that was aninevitable postscript to that of 1759, a necessary consequence of Pitt’s policiesand British naval dominance. This would be misleading. Havana proved adifficult objective and a third of the British force was lost to malar ia and yellowfever. The force sent against Manila was small and vulnerable to the weather,and it was necessary to rely upon a rapid attack rather than a protracted

siege.These and other problems were not made obvious to the British public; nomore than those created by the defence of Portugal. In the autumn of 1762 thePortuguese pressed for more British military support and Treasury backing for Portuguese borrowing in London. Hardwicke pointed out that Britain couldhardly conquer Peru or Mexico,31 but the jingoistic press suggested otherwise.The London Evening Post of 30 January 1762 contributed to a heady sense of potential when it reported:

As the Spanish colonies on the South-Sea [Pacific] are extremely illfortified and badly garrisoned, depending for their preservation moreupon their situation than strength, a company of merchants in Br istol andLiverpool are fitting out a large fleet of privateers, to sail immediatelyagainst them. There is scarce any risk but doubling Cape Horn, and,provided they choose the proper season, they may even clear thatwithout danger. This once effected, nothing can hinder them from layingthe whole coast under contribution, or taking possession of their settlement, if they find it convenient.

In the following issue, that of 2 February, the paper proposed the conquest of the isthmus of Darien.

It was easy in 1762–3, and subsequently, to adopt the position that peacewas appropriate because of the cost of war, but, also, thanks to British success.In such a context, it was reasonable to debate whether the peace terms wereoverly lenient to the Bourbons, but there was little public sense that the war had been a risk. The glow of success had shadowed the problems and failures of the early stages of the conflict with France. This attitude led to a post-war

confidence, indeed complacency, that was to have serious consequences for Britain’s international position.It is usual to trace the American Revolution in part to the Seven Years’ War,

specifically to the desire by the British government to address the financial

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strains created by the war,32 and to the lessened need of the colonies for Britishprotection once the French had been driven from Canada. The secur ity of thecolonies had been the British objective when troops were sent to NorthAmerica in 1755. There were additional factors that affected the British ability

to handle controversies with the colonies and the subsequent conflict. First, asense of confidence in Britain’s international position led successivegovernments to neglect the danger and dangers of such controversies.Alongside specific concerns about the danger of a war of revanche by theBourbons, not least in North America,33 there was a degree of confidenceresting on Britain’s recent success. This received powerful support from themarked reduction in interest in continental international relations and inconcern about Hanover that followed the accession of George III and thedecision to abandon the Prussian subsidy. This shift in attitude closed a major

source of vulnerability.Secondly, the British failed in the post-war period to match Bourbon navalconstruction. This was to have dire consequences in 1778–81, contributingdirectly to the failure at Yorktown in 1781.34 It may seem paradoxical to note afailure to match the naval schemes of opponents as part of an argument thatBritain became more clearly a maritime state with imperial aspirations andethos, but this failure owed much to the strong position of the British navy inthe early 1760s and to the Bourbon realization that it was necessary to beat theBritish at sea. It was clear from the Seven Years’ War that threatening Hanover

and Portugal was no substitute and that the Jacobite ploy was finished. It wasalso clear that a powerful Britain would be in a position to take more Bourboncolonies in any future conflict. It was far from clear that the next Anglo-Bourbon war would arise from a revolution within the British empire and thusfind Britain vulnerable, or, indeed, that the following war would see Britain aspart of an unsuccessful coalition challenged by the dynamism of RevolutionaryFrance.

Instead, it was possible that in any resumed Anglo-Bourbon conflict theBritish would retake the gains handed back in 1763 and continue by attacking

Louisiana and Latin America. In Britain, there was some concern about theexpansion of the British empire, especially on the grounds that it might lead toa weakening of the state by introducing a weakening craving for luxury or byemigration. George Bubb Dodington, a former Lord of the Treasury createdLord Melcombe in 1761 who had influence with Bute, sent him amemorandum that argued,

As to colonies, in general, it may be worth ser ious consideration whether the trading part of the world is, or is not, large enough to employ every

branch of trade which you can furnish, in its most ample extent? If it is,ought you to be over-fond of new settlements, unpeopled, or (which isfull as bad) peopled by savages, where you must furnish not onlymanufacturers, but hands to prepare the returns for them; and lose more,

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possibly, by the diminution of your people, than you gain by the returnsof your merchandise?35

This, however, was not a view that prevailed in the midst of war and victory.

Most commentators were only too delighted to see evidence of Britain’sstrength and imperial expansion. The Monitor saw the fall of Martinique as amark of providential support.36

Given the shift in Britain’s global position, it is not surprising that Britishpublic opinion did not look back on 1761 as a year of failure and mixedopportunities. As a result, the problems created that year by Pitt’s attitude bothtowards the Bourbons and to his relations with this ministerial colleagues werenot appreciated.

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Chapter NineDefence, foreign policy and strategy

how misguided and erroneous a notion…which has crept into the mindsof our people, and only of later years…that Britain can, with safety toherself, be wrapped up in her own natural and internal strength, however great, or be detached from every other part of the world; and particularlythat she can, without hazard, lose or renounce all connections with thecontinent.

—Anon., Occasional Reflections on the Importance of the War in America,

and the Reasonableness and Justice of supporting the King of Prussia(London, 1758), p. 48 Foreign policy must be approached from a number of different angles, but oneof the most important in this period was that of the national defence. Indeed, astress on this point helps to overcome the somewhat artificial distinctionbetween peacetime diplomacy and wartime planning and action. Muchpeacetime diplomacy was a preparation for, or, more commonly, against war,while the exigencies and options of wartime planning arose in part from the

successes, commitments and failures of earlier diplomacy. Britain was at or close to war for much of this period and her impact on the Continent was thenfelt most forcefully. It was also then that Britain’s relations with her allies andenemies had their greatest impact on British politics and public debate, on her economy and society. Large numbers of men served in the armed forces, boththe army and the navy. Many were sent abroad, but those who remained athome, both regulars and others specially mustered, such as the militia, stillfaced the threat of action. Large sums were raised in taxation, but war andmilitary preparations still had to be financed largely on credit. It was directly as

a result of war that the national debt rose from £ 50 million in 1720 to £76million in 1748 and £133 million in 1763. This debt, and other relatedfinancial problems, overhung the political system and played a major role in agovernment policy in peacetime.

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DEFENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY

War then had its consequences everywhere: they did not cease with the endof hostilities. From the price of every taxed good to the sight of crippled ex-soldiers seeking alms, the after-effects of conflict pressed home throughout thecountry. Crime rates rose as disbanded soldiers and sailors were cast adrift with

few resources.1

In wartime the impact was also universal: fewer farm hands for the harvest; an interruption of coastal trade bringing less coal to London; theanxiety for those who served that it too often overlooked in a societymistakenly defined as habituated to pain, loss and suffering.

And yet the costs of war did not prevent Britain from engaging in conflict,nor did they stop some politicians from urging a resort to hostilities.Sometimes the politicians were out of favour and seeking an opportunity toembarrass the government for essentially domestic reasons. This was animportant element in pressure for war with Spain in 1739 and with France in

1754. At other times, such pressure arose essentially from within the ministryand in general reflected international rather than domestic concerns. This wastrue of the decision to fight France in 1744. There was no ideological aversionfrom war in the British political system: it was always an option. In consideringconflict, British ministers tended, however, to see it largely in defensive andreactive terms; indeed, both diplomacy and war were seen largely in terms of the defence of national interests. This was a characteristic feature of Britishpolicy after the Glorious Revolution, and marked an abrupt shift from themore aggressive attitude that had characterized participation both in the three

Anglo-Dutch wars and in the Anglo-Spanish conflict of 1655–60.In contrast, governments after 1688 saw themselves as essentially concernedto defend national interests, not least as represented by the maintenance of current international boundaries, rather than as required to act in anyaggressive manner to that end. This stress on a reactive position was epitomizedin the treaties Britain signed. In peacetime, they were invariably defensive, notoffensive. Governments did not only think and negotiate in a defensiveframework; they also presented themselves in that light. For British policy tobe defensible, politically moral, it had to be defensive. That was the theme of

innumerable ministerial speakers in Parliament. It was also the theme of pro-government writing, such as the pamphlets produced to defend a peacefulsettlement to Anglo-Spanish differences in 1738–9, or Samuel Johnson’sThoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falkland’s Islands (1771).

Appeals to the national past presented England/Britain not as pacific but asresponding to foreign threats. Thus Elizabeth I, a heroine of theeighteenthcentury press, was seen as a robust assertor of national interests anddefender of Protestantism against Philip II. Her war with Spain was held up tothe Commons as a model by Pulteney in his speech in the debate on the

Address on 15 November (os) 1739.The press tended to offer an account in which defence rested on self-reliance, not alliances. This self-reliance was generally seen to centre on navalpower, but there was also support for a militia, for the people under arms,

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rather than a regular army under the control of the government. The Daily Post of 16 August (os) 1745 asked

When Charles the Great of France [Charlemagne] had conquered the

greatest part of Italy and made himself master of all Germany, whatnotions had the people of England of the balance of Europe? Theyundoubtedly thought themselves safe enough; everybody fit to bear armswas a soldier; and so they did not dream of making alliances with either the Greek Emperor, or the Saracens, to pull down the Emperor of theWest, lest he should, for want of other employment, pay this island a visit.

This defensive mentality was not restricted to British policy towards the affairsof the Continent; it also characterized trans-oceanic relations with European

powers. Thus, of her wars with Spain, the world’s leading colonial power, thatof 1718–20 arose from the apparent need to resist Philip V’s aggressive schemesin Italy, that of 1739–48 from pressure for action against Spanish restrictions onBritish trade in the Caribbean, and those of 1762–3 and 1779–83 in responseto a decision by Charles III to support his principal foreign ally, France, whichwas at war already with Britain. In 1770 and 1790 Britain and Spain nearlywent to war, in each case as a result of British anger about what appeared to bean act of aggression: the Spanish seizure, first, of Port Egmont, the Britishsettlement on the Falkland Islands, and later of British merchantmen in Nootka

Sound on Vancouver Island. Similarly, the conflict with France that broke outin 1754 and broadened into the Anglo-French aspect of the Seven Years’ War arose from British concern that her North American colonies would berestricted to the Atlantic littoral by French attempts to link their colonial basesin Canada and Louisiana.

Any presentation of policy as defensive faces the criticisms, first, that allpowers adopt that approach in order to put the best gloss possible on their policies and, secondly, that British policy, both in peace and in war, was notseen in that light by many contemporary commentators. There is considerable

force in the former argument, not least because such presentation wasnecessary in order to activate the defensive clauses of one’s own treaties andprevent opponents from doing the same. The need for a defensive presentationof foreign policy was readily apparent in states, such as Britain, Sweden and theUnited Provinces, where the constitutional need to explain foreign policy in arepresentative institution provided opportunities for domestic criticism.

The second point reflects both the extent to which there was an activepublic debate over international relations, in which the actions and apparentintentions of all participants were scrutinized and judged harshly, and the

alleged specific characteristics of British policy. She was attacked for seekingmaritime and commercial dominance, for extolling the balance of power onthe Continent of Europe, whilst destroying it on the oceans of the world. In1749 the Spanish government objected to British plans for an expedition to

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the Pacific and the establishment of a base on the Falkland Islands. Frenchenvoys in Spain argued that the British intended to attack the French coloniesfirst and then to move on against those of Spain, and therefore that theSpaniards should help preserve the French empire as “their barrier”. 2

The notion of a maritime balance was not new. Indeed, the Citizen, whichhad as a subtitle “The Weekly Conversation of a Society of London Merchantson Trade, and other Public Affairs”, in its issue of 9 February (os) 1739 warnedthat “The just balance of power amongst the European nations might aseventually be broken and destroyed, by an unjust and partial monopoly of themedium of commerce, as by any particular state engrossing to itself too large anextent of dominion, and other branches of power.” This was intended as awarning against France, as earlier in the seventeenth century such commentshad been directed against the Dutch, but in the eighteenth century it appeared

most appropriate to direct such remarks against the British.This criticism became of greater weight in the mid-eighteenth century.The force of the argument owed much to anger about the British treatmentof neutral trade during her wars. It also reflected two mid-century shifts inan international system that was far from constant, and that it is verymisleading to treat as such. First, Britain’s crushing defeats of French navalpower in 1747 and 1759 and her capture of most of the bases of the Frenchand two of the leading bases of the Spanish overseas empires in 1758–62seemed indeed to destroy any sense of a maritime balance and thus to justify

criticism of the British position. French trans-oceanic trade suffered greatly.The French Company of the Indies had a major loss of assets as its ships andcommercial installations were destroyed, incurred a heavy debt and collapsedin 1769. It was in no position to compete with the British East IndiaCompany.

Secondly, there was a shift both in France’s position in the European systemand in her foreign policy, one in which she came to play a smaller and lessassertive and aggressive role. As a result, the French challenge that had helpedto lead other powers, most obviously the Dutch and Austria, to look to

Britain for support, ceased to figure in international relations, other than for Britain.In addition, although individual British moves might arise in response to

hostile acts by others, as in 1754, 1770 and 1790, British policy can be seen asaggressive from two points of view. First, the actual response was bellicose,reflecting a clear determination to get her way by intimidation, if not force.Second, there was a more ambiguous sense that the expanding nature of Br itishtrade and settlement, the dynamic character of her empire, were themselvesaggressive in a world of competing empires and a close mercantilist

relationship between territory and trade. Thus, British interests with a degreeof governmental support pressed to open the Spanish empire to trade, legal or illicit, helping to lead to war in 1739, sought to open both the trans-Appalachian hinterland of North America and unsettled parts of Spanish

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America to trade and settlement, helping to lead to war in 1754 and nearly toconflict in 1770 and 1790, and sought to make the Pacific an ocean open for opportunity, not closed to all bar Spain.

These varying impressions complicated and at times confused the response

of contemporaries, who were anyway affected by the partisan pressures of specific domestic and international debates. In hindsight, the theme of aggression may appear apparent in a period in which more of the worldcame to be ruled by Britain. In 1688 the British empire was comparativelymodest. Aside from a few possessions in Sumatra, India, West Africa and theCaribbean, and the island bases that naval power helped to secure, such asBermuda, the Bahamas and St Helena, the empire was essentially restr icted toNorth America: barren wastes round Hudson’s Bay, and a thin str ip along theeastern seaboard. This inheritance was to grow by conquest and settlement.

The most dramatic growth was in North America. Georgia (1732) wasfounded, the frontier of settlement pushed often far from the coast, and newtowns included Baltimore (1729), Richmond (1733) and Savannah (1733).The claims of the Hudson’s Bay Company were recognized by the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, as was British possession of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.The Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and the subsequent Peace of Paris (1763)added Canada and Louisiana east of the Mississippi, both from France, andFlorida from Spain. Britain had clearly supplanted France as a NorthAmerican power, was best poised to profit from difficulties in the apparently

weak Spanish American empire, and now shared with Russia and Spain theposition of a major power on the frontier between European and non-European societies.

Thanks to her mid—century gains, Britain became clearly the strongest of the European maritime and colonial powers. Only thus was she able to resistNapoleonic France. In the long-term, it was this feature of Britain’sinternational history that was most distinctive and important. Aside from themyriad consequences for British society, economy and public culture of thiscolonial and maritime success, the impact of empire as a proof of providential

favour and a pointer to mission and purpose, themes that can readily besketched out throughout the following century, there were also theconsequences for the Continent. What has been recently termed theNapoleonic integration of Europe3 failed in large part due to Britishopposition. The political, cultural and social consequences were crucial: thedistinctive feature of European society was its division among a number of competing states, and this was to remain the case as industrialization,urbanization, mass literacy and mass politics spread.

If this opposition to Napoleon was the most important contribution that

pre-Reform Britain made to European history, it is all too easy to see it andher related imperial strength as the obvious theme of the previous century, anend planned and pursued. Such an interpretation is misleading, but it isappropriate in one respect to stress the long-term consequences of the wars

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being discussed. By indicating their central importance, both for Britain andfor Europe, it is easier to understand why foreign policy and war were soimportant to the politicians and political nation of the period, and why it is somisleading to marginalize them or to treat them essentially as an aspect of

apparently more significant autonomous developments, such as economicgrowth.Instead of focusing on maritime and colonial growth leading to an imperial

struggle with France that was to culminate in a major role in the defeat of thefirst serious modern attempt to conquer, or unify, depending on one’sviewpoint, Europe, it is possible to adopt a different perspective on Britishforeign policy. This analysis is centred more obviously on fear and defence, andon short-term responses to particular crises that in sum suggest a far weaker state, less clear in its objectives and less abstracted from shifts in European

power politics than the former interpretation implies.The need to defend what successive governments defined as vital nationalinterests arose from two related problems. The first was the recovery of Frenchpower under Louis XIV after just over a century (1559–1661) of domesticdivision and international weakness. By 1688 Louis XIV had the largest armyseen in western Europe since the days of Imperial Rome. He had alsodeveloped the strongest navy hitherto seen by France, a navy supported bygood logistical and manning systems. France, the most populous state inwestern Europe, was now reasonably united and her government relatively

prosperous. Foreign rulers sought the patronage and pay of Louis.This recovery, which was maintained under Louis XV, was made morethreatening for Britain by the direction of French interest. Whereas LouisXIV’s predecessors had concentrated on seeking Italian gains in 1494–1559,Louis XIV was more interested in the Low Countries. He wanted to dominate,though not acquire, the United Provinces (modern Netherlands), while theSpanish Netherlands (Belgium and Luxembourg, though with importantdifferences) were seen as a likely acquisition, either from territorial gains as aresult of war, or as a consequence of the French claim on the Spanish

succession on the death of the childless Carlos II. The French threat was not anidle one. The potential reach of French forces had been shown by the invasionof the United Provinces in 1672, French forces advancing to seize Utrecht andto threaten Holland.

This challenge, or variations thereon, was to remain a major problem for British foreign policy throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies. It played a major role in causing war between the two powers in1702 and 1793. The British were to devote much effort in both peace andwar to thwarting France. Spain’s inability to defend the Netherlands led the

British to support their acquisition by Charles VI, the ruler of Austria, at thePeace of Utrecht. The vulnerability of the region led Britain to support theBarrier, the Dutch-garrisoned fortresses near the French frontier. Theprotection of the Austrian Netherlands was seen by the British as the central

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task of the “Old Alliance”, the new defensive system of Britain, Austria andthe Dutch, created in 1689 and lasting, though with some very bumpypassages, until 1756.

And yet the region continued vulnerable. French forces advanced into it

during the Nine Years’ War (1689–97), occupied it at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, and in 1745–7 overran the Austrian Netherlands.Indeed the last conflict amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the AustrianNetherlands, and yet also its importance to Britain, for from there invasion of both Britain and Britain’s crucial Dutch ally could be threatened. In thesummer of 1745 Marshal Saxe took Ghent, Bruges and Ostend with littledifficulty. The following year Brussels, Antwerp, Mons and Namur followed. Far from being inconclusive, as often presented, ancien régime warfare was deliveringdecisive military victory to the French. In 1747 they invaded the United

Provinces, storming her principal fortress, Bergen—op—Zoom. Maastricht fellthe following year. Richard Rolt, a contemporary historian of the conflict,claimed in 1750 that France “could only promise Great Britain whatPolythemus did to Ulysses, ‘To be the last devoured’”.

French forces were not to mount a comparable challenge in the LowCountries until November 1792, although then, following their victory atJemappes, the Austrian Netherlands fell even faster. French success in 1745–8,however, served both to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Low Countriesand to focus attention on the deficiencies of the interventionist theme that had

characterized British policy towards the Continent since the GloriousRevolution. In the short term this led to major British efforts to strengthen theBarrier after the War of the Austrian Succession. To the British, this was acrucial aspect of the “Old System”. Sandwich and Robinson claimed in 1748that “the possession of the Low Countries by the House of Austriaconformable to the Barrier Treaty, is so absolutely connected with thenecessary dependence of the Maritime Powers, and of that family upon oneanother”.4 Unfortunately, the Austrians were disenchanted with their positionin the Austrian Netherlands, angry with being asked to accept a strategic

situation that essentially favoured others, while unable to enjoy the economicbenefits that they felt they deserved. Tripartite negotiations over the AustrianNetherlands, involving Austria, Britain and the Dutch, were to play a large rolein post–1748 diplomacy. They centred on trade5 and defence, specifically thestate of the Barrier fortifications, to the upkeep of which the Britishgovernment did not wish to contribute.6 It is easy to overlook the negotiationsin a period when historians search for intimations of the DiplomaticRevolution, because they did not lead to anything major, but, instead, theyplayed a role in the continuing process of frustration and tension that marked

relations within the ‘Old System’.Concern about the Austrian Netherlands also led in 1755, when war withFrance seemed imminent, to major attempts to secure the defence of the LowCountries. The failure of these attempts played a major role in the shift in

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British alignments that year towards first Russia and then Prussia, a shift thatwas an important part of the so-called Diplomatic Revolution of 1756.

In the long term, French successes in 1745–8 exposed the limitations of theentire thrust of British policy since the Glorious Revolution: the interlinked

creation of a European collective security system in which Britain played amajor role, and a definition of British national interests that include first thesomewhat nebulous preservation of the balance of power in Europe and,secondly, as an epitome of this, the exclusion of France from the LowCountries.

Paradoxically, France was to be excluded from the Low Countries not byBritain, but by a diplomatic development that was not welcomed by Britishministers and politicians: the Astro-French “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756.This neutralized French expansionism in French, Germany and northern Italy.

Indeed, it was a precondition of Br itish colonial gains, for a vulnerable AustrianNetherlands would otherwise have offered the French gains that could havebeen exchanged for British colonial conquests, as in 1748. This underlined therole of contingency and indeed served to prefigure a second chance event inEuropean international relations that facilitated the growth of British power:the failure of Napoleon and his continental opponents to agree terms in 1813or early 1814.7 In late 1757, at a moment of crisis in the Seven Years’ War,Mitchell reported from Prussia, “If the Empress of Russia should die, I hopenot a moment will be lost to improve an event that may still save the whole.

How melancholy it is to think that the fate of Europe should depend uponsuch accidents!”8

The mid-century defination of British interests and of the agenda for British policy was not abstracted from the bitterly partisan nature of Britishpolitics and public debate. Any association of specific views with particular political groupings invites qualification, understandably so in light of theamorphous nature of political parties and the shifts in international relations.Nevertheless, especially after the exclusion of Tories from office and thus theresponsibility of power in 1714, it is reasonable to discern a basic distinction

between an interventionism associated with Whigs and a more circumscribedsense of national interests held by the Tories. The latter was in part cause andconsequence of both Tory reluctance to see Britain take an active role incontinental affairs and their scepticism about the chances of a successfulresolution of international problems.9

The collapsing of Whig/Tory political distinctions that was particularlyassociated with George III began earlier. The Jacobite strain in Toryism, whichhad done much to sustain Whig/Tory distinctions and divisions, collapsed. ABritish pamphlet of 1756 addressed to Louis XV claimed that

The race of your old friends, whom you used to know by the name of Tories, is extinct and lost. If a love of liberty, zeal for the commerce andglory of Britain, and for that basis of it, the Protestant succession in the

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illustrious House of Hanover, are criterions of Whiggism; we are a nationof Whigs.

The decline in Whig/Tory distinctions was linked to shifts in attitudes towards

national interests and foreign policy. In 1748, Viscount Tyrconnel, a prominentLincolnshire landowner and long-serving Whig who had both supported andopposed the government as an MP in 1729–41, observed that “if a nation canever learn wisdom by past sufferings, we shall never more enter into aconsuming land war, we shall leave the balance of power upon the continent,and the liberties of Europe, a couple of cant words”. Criticism of interventionism and support for “blue water” policies within ministerialcircles, for example, by the 4th Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State for theSouthern Department 1748–51, was picked up by foreign envoys.10

In 1757 Cumberland complained, “I am very fully convinced that the Torydoctrine of a sea-war, which we are following, will be repeated by our childrens’ children.”11 He had opposed Pitt’s rise to power. Support for a “seawar” reflected not simply a view on strategy,12 but also a sense of identity andinterest. The sea was “our proper element”, according to an article in Old England of 1 June (os) 1751 attacking the conduct of the recent war.

The shift in political attitudes reflected in part the impact, both ongovernment and more generally, of Tory views via the intermediary of opposition Whig politicians and journalists. Many of the politicians entered

government in the 1740s and 1750s. George Grenville, an influential supporter of disengagement from war on the Continent, was an opposition Whig whohad gained office at the end of 1744. Newcastle resignedly wrote in April1762, “let Mr. Grenville carry on his maritime war as he pleases”. 13

Furthermore, there was a prudential as well as a polemical dimension to thisshift. Continental interventionism had not worked. It had not won the War of the Austrian Succession, nor fulfilled the expectations of the Britishgovernment during the subsequent peace. The alternative appeared morepromising, and not solely to British commentators. Bussy, who had a long

experience of British politics, reported in 1751 that a “blue water” policywould be favourable precisely because Britain would not need to concertoperations with allies.14

The terms of the domestic political debate and the constitutional andinstitutional limitations and problems created by the role of Parliament weredynamic features in the formation of Br itish foreign policy, not abstracted fromit and acting simply as negative constraints on an otherwise clear set of objectives and priorities. In their own way, they increased the sense of threatand danger referred to already. A paranoid sensibility has been discerned in

Anglo-American culture in the second half of the eighteenth century, and,without being fanciful, it can be extended throughout the whole period. Itdrew on both international and domestic sources, and its most potent impactwas in contributing to the anxiety that was characteristic of the discussion of

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foreign policy in the period. There was frequent emphasis on a threat fromFrance. “Camber” referred to the “encroaching ambition” of the French whenwarning of their moves in the West Indies in the London Evening Post of 27 May(os) 1749. He warned of the possible loss of the sugar trade and also drew

attention to the threat to the Newfoundland fishery posed by the Frenchrecovery of Cape Breton. Later that summer, Bedford responded to news of Spanish warships searching British merchantmen in the Caribbean off Nevis bywriting to Keene, “You know how extremely jealous this nation is of the leastencroachments of this nature…the least spark of this sort must, if not timelyprevented, kindle a flame.” Pressing for efforts to separate Spain from France,Old England claimed on 21 December (os) 1751 that “the exorbitant power of the House of Bourbon is a subject worn…threadbare by my indefatigablebrethren of the quill”. Such an emphasis could also serve domestic political

purposes by creating the impression that the government was failing to respondand was thus part of the threat.15

Widespread paranoia owed much to tension over the second set of vitalnational interests and related problems. In addition to concern over thesituation on the Continent already referred to, a separate issue was posed bythe British question, the struggle over who was to rule Britain and what therelation between the constituent parts of the British Isles was to be. Thisquestion brought a measure of unity to the period from the GloriousRevolution of 1688 to the effective crushing of Jacobitism as an indigenous

military option at the battle of Culloden in 1746 and in the subsequent“pacification” of the Scottish Highlands. After that, concern about Jacobitismmarkedly lessened, in part also thanks to the coming of peace in 1748.Nevertheless, the government maintained its surveillance, and Frederick II’sinterest in supporting Jacobitism gave rise to particular concern. Newcastlecommented in 1753, “As it is possible that some encouragement may be givento the Jacobites from thence, care is taken to have all the coast of Scotlandwatched and well guarded.”16

Thus, it is possible to present British strategic thinking and foreign policy in

the period 1739–63 from an essentially defensive viewpoint, certainly untilafter the defeat of the French Brest fleet at Quiberon Bay in 1759. In 1756Newcastle was concerned about the possibility and consequences of cooperation at sea between the two Bourbon powers. Indeed his question,“Where would have been our superiority at sea?” was justified. In 1746–55France and Spain launched warships with a total displacement of around aquarter million tons while Britain only launched about 90,000 tons. Navalpower was more than a matter of numbers of warships, but, on that head,Britain had lost her clear superiority. To that extent, critics of the government’s

concentration on continental affairs were justified.17

That the period was one of growing imperial power does not detract fromthis viewpoint, and to concentrate on this strength and power would be tomisunderstand the perspective and anxieties of contemporaries, both

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politicians and commentators. It was not clear to foreign commentators thatBritain could afford another war. Doubts about the stability of her financeswere voiced by Mirepoix and Frederick II.18 Furthermore, there was anxietywithin Britain about French plans and activities outside Europe, especially in

North America and India. In 1752 the British government was concernedabout French expansion at Br itain’s expense in West Africa. Newcastle wrotefrom Hanover that George II “extremely approves the directions for fittingout, with the greatest expedition, a stronger squadron for the coast of Africa,than the French will have there. In the present circumstances, there is noother certain way of doing with them, but by being stronger where wecan”.19

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Chapter TenConclusion: Europe or America?

I have had the honour of first pointing out to the public a deception,which had generally prevailed over the kingdom…your Lordship, uponthe present happy change [said] that I now saw the fruits of my work.

Israel Mauduit, author of the isolationist Considerationson the present German war (1760) to Bute, December 1762

America was the choice made in 1762–3. The Bute ministry negotiated the

Peace of Paris, its gains including Canada, from France, and Florida, fromSpain. It also abandoned the Prussian alliance, making little effort to keeprelations cordial with Frederick the Great.1 George III was closely identifiedwith a specific “Patriotic” agenda, the rejection of his grandfather’s traditionof intervention in German affairs for Hanoverian ends and, more generally, awish to limit Britain’s commitments to European allies.

The break with this tradition was dramatized by the controversy over thePeace and, in particular, the rejection of the Prussian alliance. Pitt and hissupporters, now in opposition, defended the alliance in Parliament and the

press. On 9 December 1761 Pitt refuted criticism of his subsidy treaties and“justified the German war, both as Hanover had been invaded on our account,and as a diversion—spoke of the burden it was to France…justified his phraseabout Hanover’s being a millstone round our necks, that it was now so roundthat of France—gave the highest encomiums of the King of Prussia and DukeFerdinand”.2

The following May, when the vote of credit for the war was debated, Pittinsisted that Britain could and should continue financing her German war atthe same time as she continued to fight elsewhere. He pressed for the

maintenance of good relations with Prussia and claimed that “Continentalmeasures had been practised by all our great princes”.3 Yet, no longer in office,Pitt was routinely in the minority. As in 1713, peace was popular and supportfor allies limited. War-weariness and the greater popularity of “blue-water”

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policies had sapped public support for the British commitment to Prussia.Pitt’s intransigence and the obvious preferences of George III reduced supportwithin political circles, and in so far as the cause of allies commandedfavourable attention it was that of Portugal, threatened by Spain, rather than

Prussia.The reassessment of the Prussian alliance was linked to renewed criticism of Hanover. Having served to distract attention from Hanover and to limitantagonism towards continental engagements, the disintegration of the alliancewas linked with both. However, in obvious contrast to earlier periods of marked hostility towards continental commitments, in 1762 Hanover playedonly a relatively minor role and the king was not criticized. The move torestrict British commitments and to limit policy to recognizably British goalscame from the monarch. Bute emphasized the role of George III and the

continuation between criticism of continental interventionism during thesuccessful last years of George II’s reign and the policy of the new government.In April 1762 he sent Mitchell, still envoy in Berlin, a letter stressing thefinancial costs of interventionism, a topic on which he had taken care toinform himself carefully,

There were not in the late reign wanting many worthy men, who thoughunable to stop the torrent, saw with great anxiety the vitals of thiscountry daily exhausting; without the least prospect of putting an end to

a war that however proper under certain limitation became frightfulwhen carried to the annual expense of 20 millions, and that part of italone regarding Germany above 8, a sum almost incredible whencompared to the utmost laid out in any one year of Queen Anne or KingWilliam’s wars; the King on mounting the throne beheld with theutmost horror the situation he was to act in.

Bedford complained in the Lords that Frederick II was paid “for fighting hisown battles against our natural allies”.4

Financial concerns were not new. Indeed, 13 years earlier, Newcastle hadlinked political reluctance to taxation with the problems facing his foreignpolicy when he told the Sardinian envoy that he was completely discouragedby the obstacles he encountered not from the opposition in Parliament, wherethe government had a massive majority, but within the majority itself, “becausemost of them only think of making themselves popular, and to that end onlyseek the means to cut taxes”.5 Such an attitude hindered, but did not prevent,Newcastle’s efforts to grant peacetime foreign subsidies; by 1762 hostility toexpenditure, specifically foreign subsidies, in both war and peace, had greater

public voice and had become government policy. This shift was part of aprocess in which cost became more central to the public discussion of foreignpolicy. In 1746 Trevor had expressed his concern: “What will, I fear render thisland war unpopular in England, and consequently impracticable, is our allies

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CONCLUSION: EUROPE OR AMERICA?

presumption upon our opulence; and expecting to be paid and prayed for fighting their own quarrels.” In the event, this had not proved crucial in thepublic debate in the latter stages of that war, but the situation was to bedifferent towards the close of the Seven Years’ War. Sir William Irby, who had

stood down as an MP and was about to be created Lord Boston, wrote toanother MP in March 1761 that “our expences to carry on the war are beyondconception, millions after millions must and will be raised …it is difficult toknow how we shall be able to carry on the war much longer or how to makea safe and honorable peace”.6

The Briton, a weekly newspaper established by Bute, admitted in July 1762that there was a danger of Hanover being invaded if Britain refused to assistPrussia, but added

it is the duty, the interest of the Germanic body to see justice done toany of its constituent members that shall be oppressed: but should theyneglect their duty and interest on such an occasion, I hope the elector of H.....r will never again have influence enough with the K?g of G…tB…?n, to engage him in a war for retrieving it, that shall cost hiskingdom annually, for a series of years, more than double the value of thecountry in dispute.

The paper calculated the annual cost of the “herculean task” of the defence of

Hanover as £ 6 million. The previous month, the paper had condemned theMonitor for using the “old hackneyed expressions of the balance of power, theProtestant religion, and the liberties of Europe”. Such criticism indicated theparadigm shift in attitudes towards foreign policy.7

At the same time as George III and the government sought to disentanglethemselves from the “German war”, they were willing to consider a revival of the search for allies. This was not intended to repeat the subsidy-offeringdiplomacy of Newcastle, but the major powers whose alliance was sought werethe same: Austria and Russia. An alliance with Austria offered the prospect of

Austrian attacks on Spanish interests in Italy. The Earl of Buckinghamshire wasappointed envoy to Russia, Viscount Stormont to Vienna and Steinberg, whohad represented Hanover at Vienna before the war, resumed his mission. Theseapproaches were in part a reaction to the end of the Anglo-Prussian alliance,and a natural response to the sense of reopened diplomatic possibilities that theprospect of every peace brought in this period.8

There was, however, no comparable attempt to use British diplomatic assistanceto support Hanoverian interests in north-west Germany. There, the death on 7February 1761 of the Wittelsbach pluralist Clement-Auguste, Archbishop-Elector

of Cologne and Prince-Bishop of Hildesheim, Münster, Osnabrück andPaderborn had produced a tremendous opportunity not only for ecclesiasticalplace-seekers and the advocates of secularization, but also for those who wished toenhance their influence in this region. However, George III made little attempt to

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intervene in the elections, in marked contrast to the position in the 1720s whenthey had last been conducted. Furthermore, despite reports of plans in 1761 and1764, George did not visit Hanover. As a result, his British ministers also did notgo there and Hanover ceased to be the episodic focus of British foreign policy.

The possible importance of royal visits was indicated by the role of Frederick,Duke of York and Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, George III’s second son, whowent to Hanover in the 1780s and then helped to improve relations withFrederick II. Moreover, the suggestion in September 1762 of the Hanoverianminister Baron Behr that a German league of at least the leading Electors beformed so that the participants were not always at risk of being invaded on theslightest pretext9 was not followed up.

Ironically, Pitt, a politician who had made his name by attacking Hanoveriancommitments, was in turn strongly criticized from 1761 for his support for

continental measures.10

This was not simply a matter of those in office beingcastigated by opponents, as was indeed in part the case with Pitt when troopswere sent to Germany in 1758. Instead, Pitt was being criticized by thegovernment and its supporters in Parliament and the press. Furthermore, thiscriticism aroused little response. Pitt’s supporters preferred to focus on thereturn of captured territories, such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, to theBourbons, rather than on the breakdown of Continental measures.

There had been a major shift in both attitude and policy. The shift in policywas an aspect of the sea-change in politics that followed George III’s accession

in 1760. There was a sea-change in generations: the political leaders of the1760s, such as George III, Bute and Grafton, were not men who looked backto, or indeed remembered, the crises and anxieties of the 1710s and 1720s, asGeorge II and Newcastle had done. To the new generation the succession wasnot and had not been in danger. Factious opposition and party rule were seenas threats, not Jacobitism.

This had a direct consequence in the field of foreign policy. There was nolonger any question of a Bourbon-supported Jacobite invasion or rising, andthus no need to win foreign support to thwart it. Equally, the ghost of Louis

XIV had been laid. France no longer appeared a great threat in Europe,although Newcastle conjured her up as such when, in January 1762, heemphasized the continued importance of the British commitment to theContinent:

the recalling our troops from Germany and abandoning the continententirely would now render the House of Bourbon absolute master of allEurope, enable them to oblige every neutral power to submit… Weshould be reduced to that miserable condition of defending ourselves at

home…excluded from all commerce abroad, and all connection with theother powers of Europe. This view was dated, and Newcastle complained of being ignored by Bute.11 It

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reflected geopolitical assumptions rendered anachronistic by the crushing of Jacobitism, the defeat of the French navy and the growth in British amphibiouscapability, and exaggerated the threat from France. She had emerged from theWar of the Austrian Succession without any gains or an alliance system that

served aggressive purposes, and was to do the same after the Seven Years’ War.The prestige of French armies, high after the victories of 1746–7 (which hadcompensated for earlier defeats in the War of the Spanish Succession), had beenshattered by Frederick the Great at Rossbach in 1757 and further damaged bythe British at Minden in 1759.

France now seemed a lesser power, and the rising states of central andeastern Europe did not appear a significant threat to British interests. In 1791,in the Ochakov Crisis, Britain was to come close to war with Russia in anattempt to force her to return gains from the Turks. There was no hint of any

such development three decades earlier. Europe no longer seemed a threat inthe early 1760s, certainly no longer a threat to Britain.Yet this was more than simply an exercise in calculation and realpolitik.

There had also been an important shift in emphasis. Interest in the notion of abalance and of a British-led and sustained alliance system determined tomaintain such a balance or, better still, to preside over a reality and process of collective security, had collapsed. Newcastle was certain there had been a major change of policy. In August 1762 he told Lyttelton that his

difference of opinion with My Lord Bute did not singly depend uponthe peace; for that I should be equally zealous after the peace, for establishing some plan of connection with, and support of the Continent;that that was contrary to My Lord Bute’s opinion, and that of those heconsulted, and was directed by.

Hardwicke was more specific when he told Bute the previous month thatNewcastle and

his friends adhered to the two grand points, upon which the greatdifference had broke out viz. the support of the German war and thepreserving of the connection with the King of Prussia, united as he is,with the Emperor of Russia [Peter III]; and England’s availing itself of both those powers in war and in peace.

However, in February 1763, Newcastle was more interested in a return to theGrand Alliance with Austria and the Dutch. He had indeed taken soundings of such a possibility in January 1762. The Austrian response had been

unfavourable.Though desirous of better relations with the major continental powers,George III and his new ministry were not willing to bind Britain to extensivediplomatic commitments. This was revealed clearly by the unwillingness to

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accept Russian demands for support in Poland and against the Turks. TheRussian minister, Count Panin, told Buckinghamshire in September 1763 that

when England proposed to enter into an alliance with Russia, it must be

with a view of interesting herself in the affairs of the North, and, in thatcase, the system of Europe could not be too comprehensive, for, unlesswe secured Russia against the attacks of her neighbours, she would bevery little able, upon any emergency to assist us.

Buckinghamshire, however, made it clear that in his view Turkey, withwhich Russia might go to war, had nothing to do with the affairs of northern Europe. That December, Sandwich, now Secretary of State, wrote tothe Earl,

Your Excellency will continue the same language with respect to their idea of receiving any pecuniary aid from Great Britain, which neither the present situation of affairs in Europe, nor the state of a country, just atthe end of a bloody and most expensive war, nor the necessities of alliance, given any room to expect or desire…nor does the situation of his kingdoms require that the King should purchase or solicit an alliance,in which the interests of Russia are at least as much connected as those of Great Britain.

This emphasis on reciprocity represented a return to the governmental andpublic language of the mid–1750s, but the context was now one of morecircumscribed and less active aspirations. A contributor to the Royal Magazine stated that he knew “of no alliance we have for some time made, that has beenof any essential service to our nation”.12

Hardwicke warned of the danger that “having pursued too violent a system,we should come to have no system at all”. Britain was perceived by foreigndiplomats as a state that did not wish to take an active role in continental

disputes.13

This view was fortified in 1763 by the British response to two issuesthat were to cause greater concern and local conflict within a decade, thefuture of Poland and of Corsica. Responding in July 1763 to the movement of Russian troops into Lithuania, Kaunitz suggested that Austria, Britain andFrance should co-operate in preventing Russia and Prussia from dominatingPoland, while the French envoy in London pressed Britain to take a stand.Sandwich told the Russian envoy that the British government was opposed toany partition of Poland, but it was clear that the government did not intend toact. In southern Europe, Sardinian hopes that Britain would take a more

forceful role after the Seven Years’ War were also soon shown to be withoutsubstance. The new Sardinian envoy, Count Marmora, pressed Sandwich on theimportance of keeping Corsica out of Bourbon hands, but Sandwich revealed alack of interest and Marmora suggested that the government was not really

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concerned about foreign affairs. The government had already issued an order inCouncil prohibiting contact with Corsican opponents of the island’s pro-French ruler, the republic of Genoa.14

A British-led interventionist alliance system was not to return until William

Pitt the Younger negotiated a triple alliance system with Prussia and theUnited Provinces in 1788. It collapsed in the Ochakov Crisis of 1791 at thefirst challenge: Russian obduracy. Subsequent attempts to create a leaguedirected against first Revolutionary and then Napoleonic France failed in the1790s and 1800s.

This shift in emphasis away from Europe was the other half of the processmore generally understood as a rise of interest in empire. It was in part amatter of decades, traceable back to the anti-Spanish agitation of the late1730s, but yet also the development of a brief period, the years 1754–61, a

parallel to Jonathan Clark’s emphasis on the importance of conjunctural shifts,in his study of domestic high politics in 1754–7.15

Earlier in the century, there had been concern about Catholic leagues and,more specifically, the alliance of powerful Catholic powers that threatened todominate the Continent, for example, the Alliance of Vienna in 1725–9 and theFranco-Austrian alignment of the late 1730s. These fears were alert to thecircumstances of the time, for example, to the growth of Austrian power under Charles VI, but they also looked back to a imaginative construction of a Europethat was dominated or in danger of dominance by international Catholicism

and, more specifically from the 1660s, Bourbon France. Transoceanic expansionby Britain was not antipathetical to this situation, but it was largely irrelevantin imaginative terms, although the global commercial opportunities tapped bysuch expansion were important to Britain’s ability to play a role in Europe,significantly so from the 1700s. Indeed, the War of the Spanish Succession wasin part a case of Germany and the Low Countries won through the trade of India.16

By the early 1760s Britain’s situation was seen very differently. The balanceof power ceased to play a prominent role in ministerial or public discussion of

foreign policy. Instead, now the crucial struggle was for maritime mastery, andthis mastery was central to both competing interests in North America, theWest Indies and the Indian Ocean, and trans-oceanic trade. By 1763 Britainwas the most powerful European state in the world. Between 1763 and 1793,whether at peace or war, she struggled to retain and strengthen this position.

However, ministers were determined to retain the ability to define whatpolicies should be followed in order to obtain these goals and refused to yieldto jingoistic pressure for war. The British stance might appear aggressive,especially to continental commentators who queried the existence of a

maritime balance of power and criticised wartime Britain’s policy towardsneutral traders, but there was no master plan to use naval power to drive theother European powers from their empires. No British government soughtunprovoked war for the sake of seizing new territories. Instead, the

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preservation and defence of existing territories were the central concern of government. In 1754–5 the government saw itself as responding to Frenchaggression in North America. In 1761 Bedford suggested to Bute that “wehave too much already, more than we know what to do with, and I very much

fear, that if we retain the greatest part of our conquests out of Europe we shallbe in danger of over-colonising and undoing ourselves by them, as theSpaniards have done”.17

Nevertheless, although governments saw themselves as responding toaggression, the sphere of interests they were supposed to protect had widenedgreatly. This was true both geographically and in terms of public assumptions.In late 1762 John Paterson claimed that

The general, almost universal, cry is that the great acquisitions we have

made, the flourishing condition of our trade, the spirit and experience of our troops by sea and land, and the distresses of our enemies entitles us tothe most advantageous terms of peace; of which an exclusive right to theFisheries, as the great source of trade and maritime power, is almostuniversally esteemed the most essential, and indeed the sine qua non.Whatever falls short of this will most certainly occasion clamour.18

Despite such claims, France retained a right to fish off Newfoundland in thePeace of Paris, and the terms were approved by Parliament. Yet, as more

generally with the heated debate whether Britain should retain her conquestsin Canada or the West Indies, it was the extension of the geography of concernand claim that was most striking. In 1748 members of the government hadbeen interested in gaining Ostend, seeing it “as some satisfaction for thecession of Cape Breton”, although this was not a view that enjoyed muchpolitical, still less public, resonance. Indeed a French agent who spent thewinter of 1746–7 in Britain reported public pressure for attacks on Frenchcolonies and commerce and widespread hostility to any return of Cape Breton.This was not a view restricted to London. It was disseminated throughout the

country by the press.19

At the same period, as earlier in the century, there hadalso been public concern about the state of Dunkirk,20 although far less than in1730.

By the mid–1750s, North America increasingly excited interest andconcern. Britain was presented even more clearly as a maritime power, but itsmaritime nature was seen as oceanic in concern and scope, not restricted to theNarrow Seas. From mid-century maritime mastery was seen not only inprudential terms, the support on which empire, security and trade rested, butalso as an imaginative imperative that had political consequences. Proposals

from Arthur Dobbs, Governor of North Carolina, sent to Bute by Dobbs’sbrother, provide one of the most powerful examples of this consciousness. Theyare particularly interesting as they look ahead to nineteenth-century notions of Britain’s global role. Instead of preserving liberties in Europe, Britain was to

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spread liberty in the world, using her constitution as a model. Prior to takingup his post in North Carolina in 1754, Dobbs had been an energetic Irishlandowner and parliamentarian concerned to improve the Irish economy anddiscover a north-west passage to the Orient. In 1762 he offered a scheme for

the improvement of the New World under the aegis of Britain and to her profit:

to publish manifestos in the Spanish tongue on landing…declaring theSpanish colonies free states to be governed by laws framed by themselvesafter the model of British liberty under the protection of Britain as aperpetual ally with a free trade most favourable to Britain …to retain, ascautionary pledges of the future friendship and fidelity of those colonies,Vera—Cruz, Havana, Portobello and the isthmus of Darien, Carthagena,

Hispaniola and the other Spanish islands. Spanish Florida to be entirelyceded to Britain…to send missionaries to civilize and Christianize thenatives where the Spaniards have no settlements and to form them intoregular polities under the direction of governors truly Christian andeducated for that purpose in Britain at the expense of the public. 21

Naval and colonial victories brought more of the world within Britain’s realand imaginative grasp. Greater interest was not restricted to mercantile andpolitical circles. The commemoration of Admiral Vernon’s success at Porto

Bello in 1739 and thereafter can be traced through society. In Durham, Doveand Booth increased attendance at their “mathematical lectures” by promisingto exhibit fireworks in honour of Vernon’s birthday immediately afterwards.Vernon ceramics constituted the most prolific output of commemorativepieces since the beginning of the century. One of the inexpensive Londonnewspapers, the Penny London Post, devoted several issues in March 1749 toprinting Vernon’s speech on the encouragement of naval service. Maritimemastery was increasingly seen as Britain’s destiny, part of the identity of bothstate and people, a process to which the victories and campaigns of the Seven

Years’ War contr ibuted greatly.22

Such a claim may seem overblown. The identity of Irish farm workers or Scottish colliers, to say nothing of many others, may seem to have had little todo with the actions of Hawke or Boscawen. In part, this is true, although, at thematerial level, the movement of coal along the east coast of Britain and thesupply of Irish foodstuffs to the British military both depended on navalhegemony. War affected the entire economy.23

The agricultural sector suffered when conflict with the Bourbons hit grainexports, although it did so less in the 1740s than in previous conflicts. The Bath

Chronicle of 12 February 1761 printed an article from a “country gentleman”pressing for peace, complaining about a lack of workers and stating that “cornis sunk below what our farmers call a living price, for want of export”.24 Theissue had become controversial in early 1748 as pressure mounted for a ban on

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exports.25 They were attacked in some papers, for example, the General Advertiser, and defended in others. The Jacobite’s Journal of 13 February (os) 1748ascribed the rise in the price of wheat to exports, “to the great joy of the poor farmers, whom some of their worthy countrymen wished to have deprived of

this providential benefit”. Soon after the end of the war, William Mildmay sawBritish grain ships in Marseille.26 Supporting peace, the Briton of 3 July 1762emphasized the fiscal strains of war and its detrimental impact on the labour market, although, in general, shortages of labour were met by the hiring of those previously unemployed. Other papers of the period, such as the LondonEvening Post, stressed the burden of the war on the “landed interest”. Moregenerally, war exacerbated inflation, affected patterns of demands and createdstrains in the commercial and financial systems. Trade was hit by foreignprivateers and the number of bankruptcies increased.

War also brought benefits. The needs of the army and navy led toexpenditure that stimulated demand across much of the economy, although it isdifficult to assess its extent and impact. In 1744 “all the ropers at Poole” weremaking cordage for the navy,27 while the price of wool rose in response todemand for uniforms.28 The imperial project, or at least projects, broughteconomic expansion in such areas as the fur trade.29 Exports rose dramaticallyduring the later years of the Seven Years’ War.

More generally, the notion of identity, of Britain as a global state andmilitary power, reached out into the country through the press and through the

foreign goods spread in an increasingly consumerist society, especially tea,coffee, sugar and cotton.30 If the notion did not encompass everyone, it did notexist against, and in opposition to, another notion of Britain’s identity as partof Europe, with corresponding political and military interests andcommitments. Instead, the notion faced a more local set of concerns andinterests and one that was not articulated at the national scale.

This shift in the conception of the national destiny was not understood byNewcastle and only partly grasped by Pitt. George III’s views were in accord,but that was largely due to his reaction to his grandfather and his Hanoverian

identity and commitments. Yet political leadership by Pitt in the mid–1750sand by George III in the early 1760s did play a role. Their determination tobreak with the systems they confronted was important. However, any singleexplanation of what was a complex and multifaceted shift must be suspect. Theimaginative recreation of Britain as a global state with a maritime destinyreflected an interaction of shifts in attitude and changes in political contextsand policies. The failure of Newcastle’s European collective security systemproject was crucial. That was also a failure not only of policy and of anunderstanding of European international relations, but also of Europe as a

definition of British identity and interest.

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Notes

Unless indicated, the place of publication for all books is London.

Chapter Two

1. Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, 5 Jan. (os) 1736, Petworth House

Archives, 23, p. 46.2. Weston to Thomas Robinson, envoy in Vienna, 2 July (os) 1748, BL, Add.23829, f. 16.

3. Newcastle to Philip, 1st Earl of Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor, 25 Aug. (os)1749, BL, Add. 35410, f. 127.

4. A recent brief introduction is provided by J.Black, Europe in the eighteenthcentury, 1700 – 1789 (1990), 289–94. A longer chronological account, as well asdiscussion of the mechanics of international relations and of their practice andtheory, can be found in Black, The rise of the European powers, 1679 – 1793(1990), 66–118, 149–207. Important recent work includes R.Browning, The

War of the Austrian Succession (New York, 1993) and M.S.Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740 – 1748 (Harlow, 1995).

5. Finch to Robert Trevor, envoy at The Hague, 15 Nov. 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor 24.

6. J.Black, “Mid-eighteenth century conflict”, in The origins of war in early modernEurope, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 225–7.

7. W.Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa: Der Aufstieg Russlands zum europäischenMachstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen (Brunswick, 1952).

8. Dickens to William, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the NorthernDepartment, 4 Feb. 1741, PRO, SP, 90/49; Pol. Con., i, 91; H.Branig, Preussland

und Russland wahrend Des Ersten Slesischen Krieges (Berlin, 1930).9. Wager to Trevor, 18 Oct. (os) 1741, Aylesbury, Trevor 29.

10. Villettes to Horace Mann, envoy in Florence, 25 Dec. 1741, PRO, SP, 105/282, f. 29.

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NOTES

11. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the secondquarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36;Pol. Corr., IV, 312; Mitchell to Earl of Buckinghamshire, 2 Feb. 1763, Norwich,Norfolk CRO. Hobart N.R.S. 21/22 74 xl.

12. S.Horowitz, Franco-Russian relations, 1740 – 1746, PhD thesis (New YorkUniversity, 1951), vi–vii.

13. R.Butler, Choiseul, vol. I (Oxford, 1980).14. Grimberghen to Haslang, Bavarian envoy in London, 30 June 1742, Munich,

Bayr. London 379.15. Newcastle to William, Duke of Cumberland, 22 Apr. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P.

21/314; H.L.A.Dunthorne, “Prince and republic: the House of Orange inDutch and Anglo— Dutch politics during the first half of the eighteenthcentury”, in Essays in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton, J.Black andK.W.Schweizer (eds) (Lennoxville, 1985), 28–32.

16. C.Baudi di Vesme, La pace di Aquisgran (Turin, 1969).17. J.R.Danielson, Die nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–51 (Helsingfors, 1888).18. R.N.Middleton, French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle,

1749–1753: a study of the pre-history of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, PhDthesis (Columbia, 1968).

19. H.M.Scott, “‘The True Pr inciples of the Revolution’: the Duke of Newcastleand the idea of the old system”, Knights errant and true Englishmen: Britishforeign Policy, 1660–1800, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1989), 60–77.

20. Sandwich to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 125.21. D.B.Horn, “The orig ins of a proposed election of a King of the Romans”,

EHR 52, 361–70, 1927; R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and theImperial Election Plan, 1749–54”, Journal of British Studies 7 (1967), 28–47.22. Harrington to Philip, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, envoy at The Hague, 29 Jan. (os)

1745, PRO, SP 84/408, f. 124.23. Newcastle to Robert, 4th Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the

Southern Department, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 138–9.24. Frederick, Mémoire sur les affaires de Pologne, Jan. 1753, AE, CP Prusse 171,

f. 112–13.25. H.Schlitter (ed.), Correspondance secréte entre le Comte A.W.Kaunitz-Rietberg… et

le Baron Ignaz de Koch, sécretaire de I’impératrice Marie-Thérèse, 1750–1752 (Paris,

1899); J.Strieder, “Maria Theresia, Kaunitz und die österreichische Politik von1748–1755”, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift 13 (1910), 494–504; W.J. McGill,“The roots of policy: Kaunitz in Vienna and Versailles”, Journal of ModernHistory 43, 1971; Joseph Yorke, envoy at The Hague, to Robert Keith, envoy atVienna, 13 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 194.

26. R.Browning, “The British orientation of Austrian foreign policy, 1749–1754”,Central European History 1 (1968), 299–323.

27. Keith to Newcastle, 31 July 1753, PRO, SP 80/192.28. Earlier scholarship can be approached through L.H.Gipson, Zones of

international friction: North America, south of the Great Lakes region, 1748–1754

(New York, 1939); G.F.G.Stanley, New France: the last phase, 1744–1760 (Toronto, 1968); W.J.Eccles, The Canadian frontier , 1534–1760 , 2nd edn(Albuquerque, 1983). For more recent work, R.White, The middle ground:Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650 – 1815 (Cambridge,

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NOTES

1991), 199–232; M.N.McConnell, A country between: the Upper Ohio valley and its peoples, 1724– 1774 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), 61–120; C.J.Balesi, The time of the French in the heart of North America, 1673– 1818 (Chicago, 1991).

29. T.R.Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the Americanorigins of the Seven Years’ War”, Historical Journal 24 (1981), 571–603;A.Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outre-mer. Koloniale Fragen in der französischen Aussenpolitik, 1700 – 1763 (Stuttgart, 1988), 249–89.

30. Mirepoix, French envoy in London, to Rouillé, French foreign minister, 16Jan., 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f 21–2, 116, 120; Perron, Sardinian envoyin London, to Charles Emmanuel III, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59.

31. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15.32. J.Aman, Une campagne navale meconnu à la veille de la Guerre de Sept Ans: l’escadre

de Brest en 1755 (Vincennes, 1986).33. They are briefly mentioned in P.Vaucher (ed.), Recueil des instructions données

aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France…Angleterre (Paris, 1965), III, 366–7,though there is more extensive archival material, for example thecorrespondence between Rouillé and Bonnac, the envoy in The Hague, in AN,KK, 1401; AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 385–6, 391; anon, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang.41, f. 28–43; Newcastle to William, 4th Duke of Devonshire, 2 Jan., Yorke toViscount Royston, 6 Jan., Fox to Rouillé, 13 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7;35364, f. 65–6; 34728, f. 40; Rouillé to Fox, 21 Dec., Yorke to Fox, 26 Dec.1755. Fox to Devonshre, 7, 8 Jan., 9 Mar. 1756, council memorandum, 14 Jan.1756, HP, Chatsworth transcripts; Pol. Corr ., XI, 346–7, 356.

34. Yorke to Newcastle, 3 June, Yorke to Royston, 14 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 35364,

f. 55, 32855, f. 312–13; A.C.Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the SevenYears War (1971), 31–44.35. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 28 May, Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11, 18 July,

Keith to Holdernesse, 27 Aug. 1755, BL, Add. 32855, f. 236, 32857, f. 1, 162– 4, 35480, f 56.

36. Instructions for Hanbury-Williams, 11 Apr. 1755, PRO, SP 91/60.37. C.Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, A collection of all the treaties of peace, alliance and

commerce between Great Britain and other powers [3 volumes] (1785), iii, 30–6.38. Holdernesse to Yorke, 22 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 164.39. As the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel is usually referred to from mid—

century.40. Holdernesse to Newcastle, 1, 7 June 1755, BL, Eg. 3428, f 208–9; BL, Add.32855, f. 375; Pol. Corr., XI, 286–7; Münchhausen to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1756,NSTA, Hanover 91v.

41. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11 July, Aug., Instructions for Holdernesse, 9 Aug.,Holdernesse to Newcastle, 21 Nov. 1755, BL, Add. 32857, f. 5, 506, 32858, f.150, 32861, f. 59.

42. J.C.Batzel, Austria and the first three Treaties of Versailles, 1755–1758, PhD thesis(Brown University, 1974), 72; Aubeterre to Rouillé, 13 Aug., 30 Nov. 1755,Rouillé to Aubeterre, 14 Sept., 17 Nov. 1755, AE, CP, Autriche 254, f. 254–7,

319, 279–81, 330.43. L.Perey, Un petit neveu de Mazarin, 3rd edn (Paris, 1890), 36; Pol. Corr., xii, 73;

Bonnac to Rouillé, 6 Feb. 1756, AN, KK 1402, p. 174.44. Batzel, Austria, 116–25; A.Schaefer, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen kriegs (Berlin,

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NOTES

1874), i, 584–5; Due de Broglie, L’alliance Autrichienne (Paris, 1895), 338–43,368–74.

45. Keith to Holdernesse, 16 May, Holdernesse to Keith, 23 Mar. 1756, PRO, SP80/197, f. 42–3, 104–5.

46. H.Kaplan, Russia and the outbreak of the Seven Years War (Berkeley, 1968), 47–56.47. Keith to Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, BL, Add. 35480, f. 181; Mitchell to

Holdernesse, 7 June 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 154–67; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 27 May, 9 July1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Mitchell to Hanbury-Williams, 3 June, 6 July 1756, BL,Add. 6804, f. 24, Newport, Hanbury-Williams papers.

48. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 22, 23, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse toMitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65; Holdernesse toMitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832, f. 80.

49. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.50. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13 July, 6, 10, 20 Aug. 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.51. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 13, 27 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65, BL, Add. 6832,

f. 80.52. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.53. Comte de Garden, Histoire generate des traités de Paix (Paris, 1903), III, 349–75.54. 9 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 38334, f. 33–4.55. Count Colloredo, Austrian envoy in London, to Stahremberg, 20 Apr. 1757,

AE, CP, Br. Han. 52, f. 97–106; Marshal Estrées to Lieutenant-GeneralSporcken, 7 May 1757, BL, Add. 35481, f. 200; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 8May 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.

56. Cumberland to Richelieu, 29 Aug. 1757, BVC, FR 58; W.Mediger,“Hastenbeck und Zeven. Der Eintritt Hannovers in den SiebenjahrigenKrieg”, Niedersachsisches Jahrbuch fur Landesgeschichte 56 (1984), 137–66.

57. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Aug. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 15.58. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian relations during the Seven Years War

(New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War (Lewiston, 1989).

59. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 9 July 1756, PRO, SP 90/65.60. A.Bourguet, Le Due de Choiseul et l’alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906).61. Choiseul to Ossun, envoy in Madrid, 12 May 1762, AE, CP, Espagne 532, f.

236.62. AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 270–85, 290–4.63. Ossun to Choiseul, 3, 17 Sept. 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 533, f. 362, 436–7.64. J.Black, “The British Expeditionary Force to Portugal in 1762: international

conflict and military problems”, British Historical Society of Portugal, Annual Report and Review 16 (1989).

65. Z.E.Rashed, The peace of Paris 1763 (Liverpool, 1961).66. J.Black, “Naval power and British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”,

in The British Navy and the use of naval power in the eighteenth century, J.Black &P.Woodfine (eds) (Leicester, 1988), 100–3.

67. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 29 June 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.68. August Wilhelm to Valory, 29 June 1757, AE, CP, Prusse 186, f. 65.69. Pol Corr., xv, 218; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 2 July 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.70. Richard to John Tucker, 4 July 1757, Bod, MS. Don. c.112.

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NOTES

71. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 9 July 1757, PRO, SP 90/69.72. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a re-

examination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; “The non-renewal of the AngloPrussiansubsidy treaty, 1761–1762: an historical revision”, Canadian Journal of History13 (19), 382–98; “Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Galitzin letter: areassessment”, Historical Journal 26 (1983), 531–56; and “Britain, Prussia andthe Prussian Territories on the Rhine 1762–1763”, Studies in History and Politics 4 (1985), 103–14.

73. The best study of the situation from 1763 is H.M.Scott, British foreign policy inthe age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990).

Chapter Three

1. There is a valuable account of the domestic debate in R.Harris, A patriot press:national politics and the London press in the 1740s (Oxford, 1993).

2. Lodge used material in the Public Record Office, the British Library and thefamily archive of the Earls of Sandwich, now deposited in the NationalMaritime Museum.

3. C.Haase, W.Deeters, E.Pitz, Ubersicht über die Bestade des NiedersächsischenStaatsarchivs in Hannover [2 volumes] (Göttingen, 1965, 1968).

4. G.C.Gibbs, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope andWalpole”, EHR 77 (1962), 18–37; and “Newspapers, Parliament and foreign

policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole’, Melanges offerts à G.Jacquemyns(Brussels, 1968), 293–315; J.R.Jones, Britain and the world, 1649–1815 (1982),203.

5. R.Pares, War and trade in the West Indies (Oxford, 1936); J.O.McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750 (Cambridge, 1940).

6. J.Black, “When ‘Natural Allies’ fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”,Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49.

7. R.Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923).8. U.Dann, Hannover und England 1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986); translated and

slightly revised as Hanover and Great Britain 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991).9. J.Black, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole”, in Britain in the age of Walpole

J.Black (ed.) (1984), 145–69; J.Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985); S.Baxter, “The myth of the grand alliance in theeighteenth century”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents, S.Baxter & P.Sellin (LosAngeles, 1976); M.Roberts, Splendid isolation, 1763–80 (Reading, 1970).

10. B.Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943) is the best introduction.11. Lowther to John Spedding, 20 Apr. (os) 1742, Carlisle, CRO, Lonsdale papers,

D/Lons/W; Newcastle to Hardwicke [c.ll Aug. (os) 1739], BL, Add. 35406, f.136; Dickens to Harrington, 5 Sept. 1739, PRO, SP 90/46; Waldegrave toHoratio Walpole, 7 Sept. 1739, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 1740,Chewton.

12. Cobbett, xi, 29, 15 Nov. (os); Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP78/223, f. 267.

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13. W.Hoist, Carl Gustaf Tessin (Lund, 1931), 417; Hervey to Stephen Fox, 9 Sept.(os) 1740, BL, Add. 51345; Cobbett XI, 677.

14. Destouches, French envoy in London, to Dubois, French foreign minister, 15Dec. 1718, AE, CP, Ang. 311; James Craggs, Secretary of State for the SouthernDepartment, to Stair, 25 Jan. (os) 1720, SRO, GD. 135/141/24.

15. Weekly Miscellany (Dublin), 9 May (os) 1734; Destouches to Dubois, 9 Apr.,Dubois to Destouches, 21 Apr. 1722, Chammorel, French envoy in London, toMorville, French foreign minister, 17 Feb. 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 341, sup. 7, 347;Ossorio, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 2 Apr. 1743, AST,LM, Ing. 48.

16. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 27 Aug. 1742, AST, LM, Ing. 48; Report by LeVille, French envoy at The Hague, 16 Oct. 1742, Vincennes, Archives de laGuerre, Al 2970 No. 265; Stair to Trevor, 2 Nov. 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor, 32.

17. The Oracle: or, Bristol Weekly Miscellany, 24 Apr. (os) 1742.18. Chavigny to Morville, 5 Sept., 21, 17 Nov., Morville to Chavigny, 18 Oct.

1723, Broglie to Morville, 20 July 1724, AE, CP, Ang. 346, 348; Carteret toPentenriedter, 3 Apr. (os) 1721, HHStA, Frankreich Varia, 11.

19. AE, MD, Ang. 6, f. 108.20. Parliamentary collections of Philip Yorke, BL, Add. 35875, f. 436; Haslang to

Charles Albert, 12 May 1741, Munich, KS 17211; Carteret to Dr Wetstein,travelling tutor of his son Robert, 30 Jan. (os) 1741, BL, Add. 32416.

21. Jones, Britain and the world, 203–4; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Apr.1744, AST, LM, Ing. 50.

22. W.Mediger, “Great Br itain, Hanover and the rise of Prussia”, in Studies in

diplomatic history: essays in memory of D.B.Horn, R .M.Hatton & M.S. Anderson(eds) (London, 1970), 199–213.23. Henry to Stephen Fox, 17 Aug. (os), Henry Pelham to Henry Fox, 27 Sept.

(os) 1743, BL, Add. 51417, 51379; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Jan.1744, 15 Jan. 1745, AST, LM, Ing. 50; Carteret to Newcastle, 15 Oct. 1743,PRO, SP 43/32.

24. Jacobites Journal, 6 Feb. (os), 5 Oct. (os) 1748; Westminster Journal, 13 Feb. (os)1748.

25. For the Jacobites and France, E.Cruickshanks, Political untouchables (1979);F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981).

26. Robinson to Carteret, 4, 27 (quote) Aug. 1743, 6 May 1744, Carteret toRobinson, 19 Aug. 1743, 8 May (os) 1744, PRO, SP 80/160, 163.27. York Courant, 13 Oct. (os) 1741.28. Trevor to Carteret, 14 Feb. 1744, Harrington to Newcastle, 26 July 1745,

Villiers to Harrington, 22 Feb., 1 Mar., 21 June, 2 July 1746, PRO, SP 84/402, 43/46, 88/68; J.Black, “The theory of the balance of power in the firsthalf of the eighteenth century: a note on sources”, Review of International Studies 9 (1983), 55–61.

29. Haslang, 21 Mar. 1741, Munich, KS 17211.30. Henry to Stephen Fox, 21 Nov. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 51417.

31. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 July (os) 1740, BL, Add. 35406; Harr ington toNewcastle, 29 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/31; Pelham to Philip Yorke, 15 Oct. (os)1747, BL, Add. 35424; Lady Hertford to Lord Beauchamp, 31 Jan. (os) 1743,Alnwick Castle, Alnwick papers 113, p. 166; Walpole to Trevor, 17 Sept. (os)

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NOTES

1743, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Robinson to his secretary Draper, 2 Sept. 1745, BL,Add. 23821, f. 7.

32. Cobbett, xi, 675–76; Thompson to Couraud, 8 Mar. 1741, Carteret toNewcastle, 19 May 1743, PRO, SP 78/225, 43/36; Egremont to Bute, 11 Oct.1762, Mount Stuart 7/170; Lord Raymond to Hardwicke, 24 Dec. (os) 1744,Newcastle to Pelham, 25 Oct. 1750, BL, Add. 35587, f. 327, 35411, f. 189.

33. Villiers to Harrington, 5 Mar. 1746, PRO 88/68; Amelot, French foreignminister, to Fénelon, French envoy at The Hague, 20 May 1743, AE, CP,Hollande 446, f. 328; E.von Wiese, Die Englische parlamentarische Opposition und ihre Stellung zur auswärtigen Politik des britischen Cabinets, 1740–1744, PhDthesis (Göttingen, 1883).

34. N.Rogers, “Resistance to oligarchy: the City opposition to Walpole and hissuccessors, 1725–1747”, in London in the age of reform, J.Stevenson (ed.)(Oxford, 1977), 1–29; and “The urban opposition to Whig oligarchy”, in The origins of Anglo-American radicalism, M. & J.Jacob (eds) (1984), 132–48.

35. Justus Alt, Hesse-Cassel envoy in London, to Frederick I of Sweden, 19 Nov.1743, Marburg 241.

36. Cobbett, xiii, 272, 562, 564–65.37. Cobbett, xiii, 617; Kalm’s account of his visit to England (1892), 300; A

congratulatory ode, most humbly inscribed to a certain very Great Man, on his becoming Greater (1744), 7; Matthew Decker to Morton 16 Dec. (os) 1742, NLS, GD150/3485, Lowther to Spedding, 11, 14, 16, 18 Dec. (os) 1742, 19 Jan. (os)1743, Carlisle, CRO, D/Lons/W.

38. Cobbett, xiii, 618–19; Newcastle to Har rington, 14 June (os), 19 July (os)

1745, PRO, SP 43/37.39. T.C.W.Blanning,” ‘That Horrid Electorate’ or ‘Ma Patrie Germanique’?George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785”, Historical Journal 20 (1977),311–44; J.C.D.Clark, The dynamics of change: the crisis of the 1750s and Englishparty systems (Cambridge, 1982); E.Gregg, Queen Anne (1980); R.M.Hatton,George I (1978); P.Mackesy, War without victory: the downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802(Oxford, 1984); J.Black, “George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’sinfluence in the conduct of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign”,Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 35 (1982), 35–56; J.B.Owen,“George II reconsidered”, in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants, A.Whiteman,

J.S.Bromley, P.G.M.Dickson (eds) (Oxford, 1973), 113–34.40. Walpole to Trevor, 12 July (os) 1741, Trevor, 27; Trevor to Harrington, 6 Jan.1741, PRO, SP 84/391.

41. Utterodt to Augustus III, 10 Jan. 1741, Dresden, 2677 III; Frederick II toAndrie, Prussian envoy in Hanover, 29 June 1745, Flemming, Saxon envoy inLondon, to Brühl, Saxon minister, 11 May 1745, PRO, SP 43/36, 107/61;E.O.Borkowsky, Die Englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre 1745 (Berlin, 1884),pp. 81, 92.

42. Hardwicke to Sophia Bentinck, 11 Aug. (os), Philip Yorke, later second Earl of Hardwicke, to wife, Marchioness Grey, 18 Aug. (os) 1744, Bedford, CRO,

Lucas papers 30/4/3/1, 30/9/113/10; Cope, envoy in Hamburg, to Carteret,20 Oct. 1744, Newcastle to Harrington 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 82/67,43/ 37; Pelham to Stair, 18 Mar. (os) 1743, Pelham to Hardwicke, 8 Aug. (os)1747, BL, Add. 35423, f. 9, 38–9.

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43. Flemming to Brühl, 11 May 1745, Newcastle to Harr ington, 12, 26 July (os),18 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 107/61, 43/114, 115; Lady Carpenter toMarchioness Grey, 26 Sept. (os) 1745, Bedford CRO, Lucas, 30/9/24/26.

44. Robinson to Carteret, 1 Aug., Robinson to Hyndford, 1 Aug. 1744, PRO, SP80/164.

45. Newcastle to Harrington, 21 May (os), 14, 28 June (os), 12, 26 July (os) 1745,PRO, SP 43/37, 114; Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 1 Aug. 1747,Marburg 245.

46. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 23821, f. 457, Trevor toRobinson, 31 Dec. 1745, PRO, SP 43/115; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 10Oct. 1747, AST, LM, Ing. 53; Pelham to Hardwicke, 12 June (os), 21 Aug. (os),undated, 7 Nov. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 35423, f. 42, 55, 75, 78.

Chapter Four

1. Chesterfield to Earl Gower, Lord Privy Seal, 6 Aug. (os) 1747, PRO 30/29/ 1/11, f. 307.

2. Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/143.3. R.Middleton, The bells of victory: the Pitt-Newcastle ministry and the conduct of the

Seven Years’ War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1985); J.C.Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the old regime in France: the economic and financial toll (Princeton, 1986);J.Brewer, The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688–1783

(1989).4. P.F.Doran, Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian diplomatic relations during the SevenYears’ War (New York, 1986); K.W.Schweizer, England, Prussia and the SevenYears’ War (Lewiston, 1989).

5. P.Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924); J.Black, Natural and necessary enemies: Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth century (London,1986), 21–35.

6. J.Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 1783–1793 ( Cambridge,1994).

7. M.Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen 1740–1763 (Freiburg,

1963).8. S.Baxter, “The myth of the Grand Alliance”, in Anglo-Dutch cross currents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, S.Baxter & P.R.Sellin (eds) (Los Angeles,1976), 43–59; H.M.Scott, “The ‘True Principles of the Revolution’: the Dukeof Newcastle and the idea of the Old System”, in Black, Knights Errant, 55–91.

9. G.Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der Britischen Weltpolitik 1738–1763 (Munich,1979); M.Mimler, Der Einfluss kolonialer Interessen in Nordamerika auf die Strategic und Diplomatic Grossbritanniens während des 18. Jahrhunderts(H ildesheim, 1983).

10. R.M.Hatton, The Anglo-Hanoverian connection 1714–1760 (1982); A.M.Birke

and K.Kluxen (eds), England und Hanover (Munich, 1986), 17–51, 127–44;J.Black, “The British state and foreign policy in the Eighteenth Century”,Trivium 23 (1988) 127–48; J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the ageof Walpole: the case of the Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54.

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11. G.C.Gibbs, “The revolution in foreign policy”, in Britain after the GloriousRevolution, G.S.Holmes (ed.), 59–79 (1969); J.Black, “The Revolution and theDevelopment of English Foreign Policy”, in E.Cruickshanks (ed.), By force or by default? The revolution of 1688 (Edinburgh, 1989), 135–58.

12. M.Roberts, “Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1771/2”, Historical

Journal 8 (1964), 146.13. P.L.Woodfine, “The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739”, in The origins of war in early

modern Europe, J.Black (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1987), 185–209.14. Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 78/223, f. 266–9; Walpole to

Trevor, 29 Sept. (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 14; Newcastle to Harrington, 12Aug. (os) 1739, BL, Add. 35406, f. 138.

15. Harrington to Thompson, 15 Oct. 1740, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 236–9.16. H.Schilling, Der Zwist Preussens und Hannovers 1729–30 (Halle, 1912); J.Black,

“Foreign inspiration of eighteenth–century British political material: anexample from 1730”, Trivium 21 (1986), 137–42; J.Black, The collapse of the

Anglo-French alliance, 1727–1731 (Gloucester, 1987), 141–2.17. Mediger, “Hastenbeck und Zeven”.18. On Anglo-Hanoverian relations in general, U.Dann, Hannover und England,

1740–1760 (Hildesheim, 1986).19. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE CP, Ang. 412, f. 63.20. J.Black, “British neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession, 1733–1735”,

International History Review 8 (1986), 345–66; J.Black, “French foreign policyin the age of Fleury reassessed”, EHR 103 (1988), 359–84.

21. Cobbett, xii, 176–8.22. Bussy to Amelot, 17 May 1741, AE, CP, Ang. 412, f. 52–61.

23. Harrington to Thompson, 3 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 123.24. Bussy to Amelot, 1 Jan. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 18, 26.25. Chammorel to Dubois, 5, 26, Apr. 1723, AE, CP, Ang. 344, f. 181–1, 234.26. Thompson to Onslow Burr ish, 22 Mar. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6.27. Bussy to Amelot, 19 Feb. 1742, AE, CP, Ang. 414, f. 141; Bussy memorandum,

1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 107.28. Givry, agent at Dunkirk, to Maurepas, naval minister, 28 Feb. 1742, Paris, AN,

Archives de la Marine B3 406, f. 21; Bussy to Amelot, 1 Mar. 1742, AE, CP,Ang. 414, f 163. This despatch, like many of the period, was intercepted by theBritish, PRO, SP 107/53.

29. Amelot to Bishop of Rennes, 27 Mar. 1742, AE, CP, Espagne 470, f. 183.30. Thomas to George Anson, 30 Nov. (os) 1743, BL, Add. 15955, f. 29; Carteretto Stair, 4 May (os) 1742, PRO, SP 87/8, f. 107.

31. Stair to Earl of Nottingham, 27 June 1741, Leicester, CRO, Finch MSS DG/7/4952; Stair to Robinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Holdernesseto Burrish, 18 Mar. 1757, PRO, SP 81/106.

32. J.Black, “Jacobitism and Br itish Foreign Policy, 1731–5”, in The Jacobite challenge, J.Black & E.Cruikshanks (eds) (Edinburgh, 1989), 142–40.

33. J.Black, “Parliament and the political and diplomatic crisis of 1717–18”,Parliamentary History 3 (1984), 77–101.

34. J.Black, “When natural allies fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations 1725–1740”,Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983), 120–49; J.Black,“AngloAustrian relations, 1725–1740: a study in failure”, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 12 (1989), 29–45.

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35. Bussy, memorandum, AE, MD, Ang. 8, f. 272–6, 40, f. 107–14; Thompson toNewcastle, 14 July 1742, PRO, SP 78/227, f. 276–82.

36. Thompson to Harrington, 26 Sept. 1741, PRO, SP 78/226, f. 169–71; Stair toRobinson, 30 May 1742, BL, Add. 23810, f. 492; Bussy to Amelot, 14 June1742, AE, CP, Ang. 415, f. 24.

37. Amelot to Fénelon, 25 June, Fénelon to Louis XV, 28 June 1742, AE, CP,Hollande 443, f. 69, 102.

38. Drummond to Burrish, 21 June (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6; George Harbin toThomas Carew MP, 28 Aug. (os) 1742, Taunton, Somerset CRO, Trollop-Bellew Papers DD/TB FT 18.

39. Walpole to Trevor, 22 Oct. (os) 1742, Aylesbury, Trevor 36; Finkenstein,Prussian envoy in Hanover, to Frederick II, 30 Oct. 1743, PRO, SP 43/32;Cobbett, xiii, 123, 125.

40. Material on Austro-French negotiations can be found in R.Butler, Choiseul (Oxford 1980), i, 327–683 passim.

41. J.Colin, Louis XV et les Jacobites: le projet de débarquement en Angleterre 1743–44(Paris, 1901); F.McLynn, France and the Jacobite rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981);J.Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud, 1990), 56–9.

42. Anon, memorandum, May 1745, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 122; for Hanoverian fears,Grote to Hyndford, 16 Apr. 1745, NSTA, Calenberg Brief Archiv 24 Nr. 6617,f. 44.

43. Chesterfield to Trevor, 6 July (os) 1745, Aylesbury, Trevor 49; Newcastle toHarrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/414.

44. Harrington to Newcastle, 4, 29 July 1745, BL, Add. 32704, 419, 510; Papiers

Raisonne to Harrington, 6, 8 July 1745, PRO, SP 43/36; Newcastle toHarrington, 12 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114.45. Newcastle to Harrington, 19 July (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/114.46. R.Lodge, Studies in eighteenth-century diplomacy 1740–1748 (1930).47. Stone to Weston, 2 Aug. (os) 1745, Farmington, Weston Papers, vol. 16.48. Philip to Joseph Yorke, 1 Aug. (os) 1745, BL, Add. 35363, f. 91; John Sharpe,

“Proposals for reducing Cape Breton and Canada”, received 7 Nov. (os) 1740,BL, Add. 33028, f. 374–5.

49. Old England, 3 Aug. (os) 1745.50. Newcastle to Harrington, 9 Aug. (os) 1745, PRO, SP 43/115.

51. Stair to Earl of Loudoun, 10 Aug. (os) 1745, HL, Loudoun papers 7609.52. G.S.Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: the maritime struggle for North America(Toronto, 1950), 132–5; President of Council of Marine to Roland-MichelBarrin de La Galissonière, Governor of Canada, 21 July 1747, AN, Colonies B 85.

53. A.H.Buffington, “The Canada expedition of 1746: its relation to Britishpolitics”, American Historical Review 45, 1940; The Monosyllable IF, (1748)Oxford, Bod. Firth c8 (61).

54. J.Black, “The British navy and British foreign policy in the first half of theeighteenth century”, in Studies in European history in honour of Ragnhild Hatton,J.Black & K.W.Schweizer (eds), (Lennoxville, 1985), 137–55; “Naval power and

British foreign policy in the age of Pitt the Elder”, in J.Black and P.L.Woodfme(eds), British Navy, 91–107; “British naval power and international commitments:political and strategic problems, 1688–1770”, in Parameters of British naval power 1650–1850, M.Duffy (ed.), (Exeter, 1992) 39–59.

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55. K.Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics in mid—Hanoverian Britain:the case of Admiral Vernon”, Past and Present 121 (1988), 74–109; M.Peters,Pitt and popularity: the patriot minister and London opinion during the Seven Years’War (Oxford, 1980).

56. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 9 Dec. 1751, AST, LM, Ing. 56; Mirepoix toPuysieulx, 18 Aug. 1751, AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 128.

57. Joseph Yorke to Hardwicke, 8, 22 Mar., 5 Apr. 1749, BL, Add. 35355, f. 22, 27,34; Yorke to Bedford, 29 Mar., Yorke to Keith, 31 Mar., Joseph to brother Philip Yorke, 16 Mar. 1749, BL, Add. 32816, f. 261, 35465, f. 154–5, 35363, f.232.

58. J.R.Danielson, Die Nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746–1751 (Helsinki, 1888);Puysieulx to Durand, envoy in London, 14 Mar. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 425, f.406.

59. R.N.Middleton, “French policy and Prussia after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1749–1753”; R.Lodge, “The mission of Henry Legge to Berlin”,Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 14 (1931), 1–38.

60. Richelieu to Puysieulx, 8 July 1748, AN, KK 1372; a highly intelligentaccount is offered by K.W.Schweizer, “The Seven Years’ War: a systemperspective”, in Black, Origins of War, 242–60.

61. R.Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749– 1754”, Journal of British Studies 1 (1967), 28–47.

62. Newcastle to Cumberland, 22 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/166.63. Pelham to Cumberland, 12 July (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/157.64. Newcastle to Earl of Sandwich, Plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle, 10, 11 July,

Sandwich to Newcastle, 14 July 1748, PRO, SP 43/48, f. 155, 209, 84/434, f.321.65. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311; Sandwich to

Newcastle, 11 Aug. 1748, PRO, SP 84/435, f. 229.66. Newcastle to Cumberland, 23 July 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 37/162.67. Sandwich to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f. 55; Jacobite’s Journal, 6

Feb. (os) 1748.68. Newcastle to Cumberland, 29 Oct. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 40/149; Newcastle to

Hardwicke, 14 July 1752, BL, Add. 35410, f. 253; Münchhausen to Austrianminister, Count Kevenhüller, 23 Mar. 1749, NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1740, f. 96.

69. Puysieulx to Marquis de Valory, envoy in Hanover, 2 July 1750, AE, CP,Brunswick-Hanover 50, f. 223.70. J.R.Dull, A diplomatic history of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985), 28.71. Valory to Puysieulx, 5 June 1750, AE, CP., Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 209.72. Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istorischkago obshchestvo [148 volumes] (St

Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 223.73. This period is not really considered in R.M.Hatton’s interesting “Frederick

the Great and the House of Hanover”, in Friederich der Grosse in seiner Zeit,O.Hauser (ed.) (Cologne, 1987), 151–64.

74. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO 36/119, f. 138–9, 143.

75. Puysieulx to Valory, 13 July, 10 Aug., 12 Sept., Valory to Puysieulx, 19 Sept.1750, AE, CP, Brunswick-Hanovre 50, f. 240–1, 256, 290–1, 299; AE, CP, Ang.430 passim.

76. Newcastle to Sandwich, 29 Mar. (os) 1748, John, 4th Duke of Bedford,

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Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Joseph Yorke, 23 Mar. (os),4 Apr. (os) 1749, BL, Add. 32811, f. 434, 32816, f. 276–8, 325–6; Durand,envoy in London, to Puysieulx, 13 July 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 15; Joseph toPhilip Yorke, 25 July 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 275; Perron to CharlesEmmanuel, 28 Oct. 1751, AST. LM. Ing. 56.

77. Newcastle to Gower, 15 July 1750, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 320.78. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 19 Aug. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 277.79. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 51–2.80. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35363, f. 279.81. Puysieulx to Durand, 29 Sept. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 192.82. Puysieulx to Mirepoix, 12 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 310–11, 315; Bussy,

Réflexions, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f.145.83. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 17 Dec. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 324–5, 334, 336–41.84. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 26 June 1753, PRO, SP 84/463; T.C.Pease (ed.),

Anglo-French boundary disputes in the west, 1749–1763 (Springfield, Illinois, 1936);K.P.Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the westward movement, 1748–1792(Glendale, California, 1939); M.Savelle, The diplomatic history of the Canadianboundary, 1749–1763 (New Haven, 1940); D.S.Graham, British intervention indefence of the American colonies, 1748–56, PhD thesis (London, 1969); J.E.Stagg,Protection and survival; Anglo-Indian relations, 1748–63, PhD thesis (Cambridge,1984); Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outremer, 249–73.

85. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 4 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308.86. Newcastle to William, 2nd Earl of Albemarle, Ambassador in Paris, 18, 29 Oct.,

Albemarle to Newcastle, 25 Oct. 1752, PRO, SP 78/245, f. 160, 170, 175;

Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 12 Jan., 6 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 84/ 462; Saint— Contest, French foreign minister, to La Touche, envoy in Berlin, 23 Mar., 19Apr. 1753, AE, CP, Prusse 171, f. 188, 225.

87. Newcastle to Yorke, 13 Feb. 1753, PRO, SP 84/462.88. Newcastle to Yorke, 6 Mar., Yorke to Newcastle, 10, 13, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP

84/462; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Apr. 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 326.89. Newcastle to Keith, 30 Mar. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191.90. Yorke to Newcastle, 11, 22 May, 3, 22 June, Newcastle to Yorke, 1 June 1753,

PRO, SP 84/463; Whitehall Evening Post, 14 June 1753; Joseph to Philip Yorke,3 July 1753, BL, Add. 35363, f. 332; Protester, 14 July 1753; Mirepoix to St

Contest, 1 Feb. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 49.91. Newcastle to Yorke, 17 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/463.92. D.B.Horn, “The cabinet controversy on subsidy treaties in time of peace,

1749–50”, EHR 45 (1930), 463–6; R.Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (NewHaven, 1975), 159–80; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Aug. 1753, AST, LM,Ing. 57.

93. Mirepoix to St Contest, 10 Jan. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 17–18.94. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Jan., St Contest to Mirepoix, 25 Jan. 1754, AE, CP,

Ang. 437, f 32–3, 35.95. Mirepoix to St Contest, 7, 14, 25 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 76, 85, 109.

96. Mirepoix to St Contest, 25 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 97, 109.97. Mirepoix to St Contest, 23 Apr. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 181.98. Mirepoix to St Contest, 6, 11 June, St Contest to Mirepoix, 14 June 1754, AE,

CP, Ang. 437, f. 220–1, 226, 228–9.

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99. Walpole to Dinwiddie, 15 July 1754, HL, HM 9406.100. St Contest to Boutel, French agent in charge in Mirepoix’s absence, 9 Sept.,

1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 296–7.101. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 592–403; Halifax to Newcastle, 6 Mar. (os)

1751, BL, Add. 32724, f. 165–8.102. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 10 Oct. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Haslang,

Bavarian envoy, to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 11 Oct. 1754, Munich,Bayr. London 229; Boutel to Rouillé, 24 Oct. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f.355–6.

103. Clark, The dynamics of change, 104; Elliot to his father, the Earl of Minto, 16Nov. 1754, NLS, MS 11001, f. 10.

104. Clayton, “Duke of Newcastle”, 593; D.S.Graham, “The planning of theBeauséjour operation and the approaches to war in 1755”, New England Quarterly 41 (1968), 551–66.

105. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750.106. Old England, 6 Oct (os), 3 Nov. (os) 1750; Newcastle Courant, 13 Oct. (os)

1750; R.Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe [4 volumes] (1749– 50), IV, 635.

107. AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 203.108. Aubeterre to St Contest, 2 Mar. 1754, AE, CP, Autr iche 253, f. 48–9.109. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 26 Nov. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 17; Haslang to

Preysing, 11 Oct. 1754, Bayr. London 229.110. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 5 Dec. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58; Rouillé to

Boutel, 6 Dec., Boutel to Rouillé, 19 Dec. 1754, AE, CP, Ang. 437, f. 399,

416–17.111. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 15–21; Old England,24 Feb. (os) 1750.

112. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 21–2; Perron toCharles Emmanuel, 23 Jan. 1755, AST, LM, Ing. 59.

113. Rouillé to Bonnac, 16 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 19; Mirepoix toRouillé, 16, 23, 30 Jan. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 27–8, 42, 54; Robinson toKeene, 27 Jan. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11834.

114. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 3 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 76–80.115. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 116, 120.

116. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 19 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 152–3, 163–87.117. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 28 Feb., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 5 Mar. 1755, AE, CP,Ang. 438, f. 238, 247–50.

118. Rouillé to Duras, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Espagne 517, f. 153–5; Bonnac toRouillé, 25 Feb. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 122–3; Yorke to Holdernesse,25 Feb. 1755, PRO, SP 84/468.

119. President of the Council of Marine to Marquis de Duquesne, governor of Canada, 17 Feb. 1755, AN, Colonies B 101; Mirepoix to Rouillé, 10, 13 Mar.1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 273, 279.

120. Robinson to Keene, 11 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11835.

121. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 17 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 280–2.122. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 20 Mar. 1755, AST, LM, Ang. 59; Bonnac to

Rouillé, 21, 27 Mar. 1755, AE, CP, Hollande 488, f. 147, 158.123. Memoranda of conferences on 22, 23 Mar., Rouillé to Mirepoix, 27 Mar.,

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British note to Mirepoix, 5 Apr. Leeds, Vyner 5725, 5727, 5728, Mirepoix toRouillé, 28 Mar., 1, 5, 6, 10, 16, 25 Apr., 6, 10, 15 May, Rouillé to Mirepoix,3, 13, 24 Apr., 9, 24 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 438, f. 339–40, 342, 344, 357,359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f. 351,357, 359, 362–6, 385–6, 406–7, 440–48; 439, f. 6–11, 66–71, 76–9; 438, f.351, 396, 401, 426–7; 439, f. 47–51, 96–7.

124. Rouillé to Mirepoix, 2 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 15.125. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 5, 10 May 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 25, 71–2;

Boscawen to John Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, 21 Apr. 1755, PRO,ADM 1/481; Rouillé to Bonnac, 18 May 1755, AE, CP 488, f. 263.

126. Newcastle to Lord Hartington, later 4th Duke of Devonshire, 17 May 1755,HP, Chatsworth Transcripts; Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner,11840.

127. Holdernesse to Keith, 20, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 3–5, 39.128. Robinson to Keene, 16 June 1755, Leeds, Vyner, 11840.129. Rouillé to Bonnac, 29 June 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, p. 534.130. Mirepoix to Rouillé, 16 July 1755, AE, CP, Ang. 439, f. 252; Robinson to

Holdernesse, 18 July 1755, BL, Add. 35480, f. 78–9; Rouillé to Bonnac, 20July 1755, Paris, AN, KK 1401, pp. 572–3; Holdernesse to Sir CharlesHanbury-Williams, envoy in Russia, 24 July 1755, Newport, South Wales,Public Library, Hanbury-Williams Papers; Holdernesse to Keith, 26 July1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 137–9; Bussy to Rouillé, 29 July 1755, AE, CP,Brunswick-Hanovre 52, f. 18–25.

131. On the likelihood of peace before spring, Lord Cathcart to the Earl of

Loudoun, 13 Sept. 1755, HL, Loudoun Papers 7087.132. Scott, “True Pr inciples”, 72–4; but see J.Black, Eighteenth century Europe,1700–89 (1990), 292–3.

133. Rouillé to Aubeterre, 17 July 1755, AE, CP, Autr iche 254, f. 226; Anon., The Crisis (1756), 44. In 1756 Holdernesse tried to argue that it was not inRussia’s interest to acquire more land or people as she already had sufficient,Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June 1756, PRO, SP 80/197, f. 179.

Chapter Five

1. Thomas Villiers, envoy in Dresden, to Trevor, 20 Dec. 1739, Aylesbury, Trevor 20; Guy Dickens, envoy in Berlin, to Harrington, 6 Dec. 1740, PRO, SP 90/48; Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 9 Jan., 6 Feb., 3 Apr. 1741, AST, LM,Ing. 47; State of army, Apr. 1742, AE, CP, Br-Han. 49, f. 283.

2. Car teret to Wych, 18 Sept. (os) 1742, PRO, SP, 91/32; Fawkener toRobinson, 7 Nov. 1747, Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 17 Nov. 1747, BL,Add. 23816.

3. Hatton, Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 3; I.B.Campbell, The international legal

relations between Great Britain and Hanover, 1714–1837, PhD thesis(Cambridge, 1966). On George II, see, recently, A.Newman, The world turned inside out: new views on George II (Leicester, 1988).

4. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 5 Jan. (os) 1750, PRO, SP 84/454.

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5. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions, 89–93. For marital diplomacysee, for example, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept. 1758, BL, Add. 35418, f.24; Walter Titley, envoy in Copenhagen, to Bute, 10 Apr. 1762, PRO, SP 75/114, f. 122.

6. Newcas tle to Hanbur y-Wil liams, 5 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 88/71;Holdernesse to Mitchell, 10 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.

7. Amelot to Bussy, 5 Jan., Valory to Bussy, 13 Jan. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52;Fénélon to Amelot, 26 Apr. 1743, AE, CP, Hollande 446; Pol. Corr., IV, 324.

8. G.C.Gibbs, “Britain and the Alliance of Hanover, April 1725–February 1726”,EHR 73 (1968), 428; R.M.Hatton, “New light on George I”, in England’s rise to greatness 1660–1763, S.Baxter (ed.) (Berkeley, 1983), 239; R.M.Hatton,Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 12.

9. Harrington to Newcastle, 2 Aug. 1741, PRO, SP 43/101.10. J.Ralph, Critical history of the administration of Sir Robert Walpole (1743).11. Haslang to Charles Albert of Bavaria, 12 May 1741, Munich KS 17211.12. Harrington to Trevor, 26 Dec. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 84/388, f. 180; Cobbett, xii,

157.13. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 15 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56. For George’s

interest in foreign news, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 28 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang.428, f. 243.

14. D.B.Horn underestimates the role of Hanoverian diplomats in The BritishDiplomatic Service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), 11; Robinson to Trevor, 20 May1739, Farmington, Weston 12; Robinson to Edward Weston, 18 Jan. 1741,PRO, SP 80/144; Hyndford to Harrington, 4 Oct. 1741, PRO, SP 90/52, f.

156; Törring, Bavarian envoy to Frederick, to his father Count Törring,Bavarian minister, 13 Sept. 1741, Munich, Bayr. Ges. Berlin 9.15. Hardenberg to George II, 17 Apr., 7 May 1742, NSTA, Cal. BR. 24 NR.

2006, f. 51, 58; Bussy to Amelot, 13 Aug. 1742, PRO, SP 107/54.16. Haslang to Charles Albert, 7 Apr. 1741, Munich, KS 17211.17. Walpole to Trevor, 19 Dec. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor 24; Mediger, Moskaus

Weg nach Europa, (Brunswick, 1952) 386–8; Blondel, French envoy at theImperial election, to Bussy, 3 Jan.; Wasenberg, Swedish envoy in London, toGyllenborg, Swedish Chancery President, 2 Feb. 1742, PRO, SP 107/52.

18. R.Przezdziecki, Diplomatic ventures and adventures: some experiences of British

envoys at the court of Poland (1953), 184.19. Steinberg to Newcastle, 17 Dec. 1748, BL, Add. 32815, f. 279.20. Hanbury-Williams to Robinson, 20 Oct., 17 Nov. 1747, BL, Add. 23826, f.

113, 188.21. Sandwich to Newcastle, 22 Dec. 1747, BL, Add. 32810, f. 324.22. Chesterf ield to Sandwich, 17 Feb. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 32807, f. 127;

Farmington, Horace Walpole’s Commonplace Book.23. Newcastle to Sandwich, 5 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32812, f. 19.24. Legge to Newcastle, 24 Apr., Newcastle to Sandwich, 13 July (os) 1748, BL,

Add. 32812, f. 41, 32813, f. 5–7; Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO.

30/29/1/11, f. 313.25. Walpole to Mann, 23 Mar. (os) 1749, Walpole-Mann, IV, 39.26. Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Lord Hervey and his friends (1950), 207.27. Newcastle to Villettes, 3 Dec. (os) 1741, PRO, SP 92/44.

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28. PRO, SP, ser ies 32, 44.29. Manuscript newsletter, 17 Apr. 1741, AST, LM, Ing. 47.30. S.Baxter, “The conduct of the Seven Years War”, in Baxter, England’s rise to

greatness 323–4.31. P.Kennedy, “A.J.P.Taylor and ‘profound forces’ in history”, in Warfare, diplomacy

and politics, C.Wrigley (ed.) (1986), 25.32. Wych to Carteret, 14 June, Carteret to Wych, 16 July (os) 1742, PRO, SP 917

31.33. Pol. Corr., II, 445 n.l; Andrew Stone, Under Secretary, to Harrington, 22 Aug.

(os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/98; Keene to Bedford, 30 June 1749, PRO, SP 947135, f. 303.

34. Fagel, Dutch foreign minister, to Hop, envoy in London, 7 May 1743, PRO,SP 107/58.

35. Haslang to Charles VII, 26 Mar. 1743, Munich, Bayr. London 208.36. Amelot to Bussy, 23 Feb. 1743, PRO, SP 107/55.37. Pol. Corr., ix, 251.38. Townshend to Samuel Buckley, 16 Sept. (os) [1730–38], Bod. MS. Eng. Lett, c.

144, f 267; George Quarme to Marquess of Rockingham, 18 Oct. 1757, WWRI-III.

39. Newcastle to Sandwich, 22 Jan. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 32811, f. 102.40. Memorials of…James Oswald (Edinburgh, 1825), xi.41. W.S.Lewis (ed.), The Yale edition of Horace Walpole’s correspondence [48 volumes]

(New Haven, 1937–83), xx, 239; W.Macdonald (ed.), Select works of JohnDouglas (Salisbury, 1820), 56; Henry to Stephen Fox, 27 Dec. (os) 1744, BL,

Add. 51417, f. 132.42. Cobbett, xiii, 265.43. Horatio Walpole to Trevor, 7 July (os) 1738, Aylesbury, Trevor 13; Hanoverian

government to von Lenthe, envoy in Vienna, 16, 26 Apr., 10 May, George II toHanoverian government, 2, 9 June, Hanoverian government to Lenthe, 4 June,George II to Hanoverian government, 14 July (os) 1739, NSTA, Cal. Br. 11 ElNo.410a, f. 80–81, 87–8, 94–100, 107, 117–19, 145–6.

44. Harrington to Trevor, 5 Jan. (os), Trevor to Harrington, 3 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP84/378, f. 40, 117; Remarques prealables sur 1’affaire de Steinhorst, no date,AE, CP, Br. Han. 49, f. 30–40.

45. Edward Finch, envoy in Stockholm, to Titley, 23 Feb. 1739, BL, Eg. 2685, f.244.46. Freder ick William I to Karl of Brunswick—Wölfenbuttel, 13 Jan. 1739,

Wölfenbuttel, Staatsarchiv, 1 At 22 Nr. 610, f. 200; Robinson to Harrington,25 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 80/133.

47. NSTA, Cal. Br. 24 Nr. 1475, 1477.48. York Courant 6 Feb. (os) 1739.49. Stolberg to Christian VI, 9 Jan. 1740, HMC, Weston-Underwood, 436.50. Newcastle to Harr ington, 24 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 411;

Harrington to Newcastle, 22 July 1740, PRO, SP 43/91.

51. Newcastle to Dickens, 3 June (os) 1740, PRO, SP 36/51, f. 10; Newcastle toHarrington, 24 June (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 29 June 1740, PRO, SP43/90; Pelham to Newcastle, 27 June (os) 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 417;F.Frensdorff (ed.), “G.A. von Münchhausen’s Berichte über seine Mission

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nach Berlin im Juni 1740”, Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen new series 8 (1904), 3–87.

52. Harrington to Newcastle, 13 July 1740, BL, Add. 32693, f. 436; Finch toHarrington, 12 Nov. 1740, PRO, SP 91/26; Newcastle Journal 4 Oct. (os) 1740.

53. Dann, Hannover und England, 26.54. Owen, “George II reconsidered”, 123.55. Harr ington to Newcastle, 27 July, Newcastle to Harrington, 29 July (os), 12

Aug. (os), Harrington to Newcastle, 21 Aug., 11 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 437 91,92, 93; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July (os) 1740, Hardwicke, 1, 243.

56. Dickens to Harr ington, 17 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 90/48.57. Newcastle to Harrington, 12, 29 Aug. (os), Harr ington to Newcastle, 14 Aug.,

4 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/92–3.58 Harr ington to Newcastle, 18 Sept. 1740, PRO, SP 43/93.59. Finch to Harrington, 6, 16 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24.60. Harrington to Finch, 25 Aug. 1740, PRO, SP 91/24.61. Newcastle to Harrington, 11 Sept. (os),—Sept. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 43/94, 36/

52, f. 145.62. Dann, Hannover und England, 27.63. Harrington to Dickens, 31 Oct. (os) 1740, PRO, SP 90/48.64. Walpole to Pelham, 25 July (os), 3, 12 Aug. (os), Walpole to Cumberland, 26

Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 485–8; Walpole to Cumberland, 18 Dec. (os) 1747, RA,Cumb. P. 30/146; Walpole to Newcastle, 28 Dec. (os) 1747, BL, Add. 9147, f.13–17.

65. R.R.Sedgwick (ed.), Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756–1766 (1939),

28–9, 78–9.66. Marquess of Rockingham to Sir George Saville, 30 Oct. 1760, Bod. MS. Eng.Lett. c. 144, f. 284.

67. J.Black, “The crown, Hanover and the shift in British foreign policy in the1760s”, in Black Knights Errant, 113–34.

68. Haslang to Baron Wachtendonck, Palatine foreign minister, 10, 31 Mar., 28July 1761, Munich, Bayr. Ges. London 238; draft to Yorke, 9 Apr. 1761,Farmington, Weston, 23; Bussy to Choiseul, 11 June 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 443, f.176; George Grenville, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, toMitchell, 31 Aug. 1762, HL, STG Box 16(7).

69. Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 23 Oct. 1761, AST, LM, Ing. 66; Newcastle toRockingham, 19 Nov. 1761, WW Rl–22.70. Pol Corr., x, 149–50, ix, 235; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Dec. 1753, BL, Add.

35363, f. 341.

Chapter Six

1. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 10 Dec. 1754, BL, Add. 35364, f. 23; Holdernesse toNewcastle, 8 July 1749, PRO, SP 84/449, f. 68; Holdernesse to Burrish, 1 Oct.1754, PRO, SP 81/104; Newcastle to Cumberland, 15 Mar. (os) 1748, RA,Cumb. P. 32/303; Newcastle Courant, 23 Jan. (os) 1748; Worcester Journal, 31 Aug.

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NOTES

(os) 1749; Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 22 Sept. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 86;London Evening Post, 23 Oct. (os) 1750; Old England, 8 Feb. (os) 1752; Perronto Charles Emmanuel, 21 Nov. 1754, AST, LM, Ing. 58.

2. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Apr. 1758, BL, Add. 32879, f. 27–8; D’Artagnanreport on visit to Britain, 7 Aug. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 429, f. 72.

3. Drummond to Burrish, 19 Feb. (os) 1742, PRO, SP 110/6.4. Trevor to Burrish, 1 June (os) 1746, PRO, SP 110/6. Reporting conversation

with Steinberg on need to win public support for foreign subsidies, Lascaris,Sardinian envoy in Hanover, to Sardinian Foreign Minister, 15 June 1752, AST,LM, Ing. 57.

5. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 24 Nov., Holdernesse to Burrish, 2 Dec. 1757, PRO,SP 90/67, 110/6; Fox to Shelburne, 4 Oct. 1762, BL Bowood, 15 f. 107;Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Nov. 1761, BL, Add. 32931, f. 47.

6. Joseph to Philip Yorke, 12 June 1751, BL, Add. 35363, f. 283; Bute, speech, 5Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/75; Newcastle to William Bentinck, 21 Mar. (os) 1749,BL, Add. 32816, f. 272.

7. Waldegrave to Keene, 22 June 1739, BL, Add. 32801, f. 59.8. Jacobite MP.9. John Campbell MP to Pryse Campbell, 15 Nov. (os) 1739, Carmarthen, Dyfed

Archive Service, Cawdor Muniments, Box 138 (hereafter Cawdor); Cobbett,xi, 12.

10. John to Pryse Campbell, 17 Nov. (os) 1739, Cawdor; Charles Coles to PleydellCourteen, 23 Nov. (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, Mackworth Papers,548.

11. Herbert Mackworth to Courteen, 7 Jan. (os) 1740, Swansea, Mackworth,1301; John Couraud, Under Secretary in the Southern Department, toWaldegrave, 14 Jan. (os) 1740, Chewton; Bishop of Chester to his son, 19 Jan.(os) 1740, HMC, Hare MSS., 254.

12. Walpole to Trevor, 29 Jan. (os) 1740, Aylesbury, Trevor vol. 20.13. Champion, London newspaper, 19 Feb. (os) 1740.14. Pulteney, Walpole, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cobbett, xi, 494, 497–9, 501, 503; John

to Pryse Campbell, 21 Feb. (os) 1740, Cawdor.15. Cobbett, xii, 177, 175–6, 181, 178–9.16. M.Peters, “Pitt as a foil to Bute: the public debate over minister ial

responsibility and the powers of the Crown”, in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord Bute: essays in re-interpretation (Leicester, 1988), 111.

17. John to Richard Tucker, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Bod. MS. Don. c. 105, f. 154–5;John to Pryse Campbell, 18 Nov. (os) 1742, Cawdor. For a similar argument in1757, Con-Test, 6 Aug.

18. John to Pryse Campbell, 9 Dec. (os) 1742, Cawdor.19. Walpole to Trevor, 28 Feb. (os) 1744, Aylesbury, Trevor 37.20. J.B.Owen, The rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957).21. Haslang to Seinsheim, 4 Feb. 1744, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 211.22. L.J.Colley, In defiance of oligarchy: the Tory Party 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 1982),

244; Chesterfield to Gower, 13 Apr. (os) 1745, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 290–1.23. A.W.Massie, Great Britain and the defence of the Low Countries, 1744–748, DPhil.

thesis (Oxford, 1988), 178; John to Richard Tucker, 6 Dec. (os) 1746, Bod. MS.Don. C. 109, f. 43.

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24. D.Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory politics, 1710–14 (Edinburgh, 1984); E.Gregg, The Protestant succession in international politics (New York, 1986).

25. Newcastle to Cumberland, 17 Mar. (os) 1747, RA, Cumb. P. 20/415.26. Newcastle to Cumberland, 25 Nov. 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 41/328; Cobbett, xiv,

333; Potter to Robinson, 24 Oct. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 23830, f. 98.27. Pelham to Gower, 18 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 313.28. Pelham to Gower, 9 Aug. (os) 1748, PRO 30/29/1/11, f. 311.29. Thomas Harris to James Harris, 3 Dec. 1748, Winchester, Hampshire CRO.

9M73 G 310/24; Cobbett, xiv, 338.30. Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel, 6 Jan. 1749, AST, LM, Ing. 55.31. Giovanni Zamboni, Hesse—Darmstadt agent in London, to Ludwig VIII of

Hesse-Darmstadt, 6 Dec. 1748, 4 Mar. 1749, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, El M10/6; Alt to William VIII, 7 Jan. 1749, Marburg 250; Abbé de La Ville, mémoire,1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 411.

32. Zamboni to Ludwig VIII, 21 Jan. 1749, Darmstadt, El M10/6.33. Puysieulx to Durand, 11 Apr. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 32–4. This instruction

is of some consequence because it contrasts with the stress on diplomaticissues in the instruction to Durand printed by Vaucher in his Recueil desinstructions, iii, 324–30.

34. Cumberland to Joseph Yorke, 10 Ap. (os) 1749, RA, Cumb. P. 43/191.35. Durand to Puysieulx, 15 May 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 426, f. 125.36. Haslang to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 25 Feb. 1750, Munich, Bayr.

Ges., London 224; Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 12 Mar. 1750, AST, LM, Ing.56.

37. Dodington to Francis Dashwood, no date, Bod. D.D.Dashwood (Bucks) B/11/1/12. On weakness of the opposition, Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 10 Jan. 1751,AE, CP, Ang. 431, f. 32.

38. Cobbett, xiv, 694.39. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 13 Mar. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 202.40. Granville to Marquis of Tweeddale, 11 Jan. (os) 1750, NLS, MS. 14420, f. 128.41. J.Black, “Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the

Hessians”, in Black, Knights Errant, 41–54.42. Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II, ed. Brooke [3 volumes] (New

Haven, 1985) 1, 33–4; Cobbett, xiv, 930–70; BL, Add, 32724, f. 129–34;

Haslang to Preysing, 8 Mar. 1751, Munich, KS 225.43. Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i, 166–7; Newcastle to Hanbury Williams, envoyto Augustus III of Saxony-Poland, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Newport, HanburyWilliams Papers; W.Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole (1802), 398–405;Cobbett, xiv, 1152.

44. Yonge to Hanbury Williams, 24 Jan. (os) 1752, Farmington, Hanbury WilliamsPapers 54, f. 252–3, a fuller account than that sent the same day by EdwardDigby, f. 244–7.

45. Alt’s reports, 18 Jan., 1 Feb. 1752, Marburg 253.46. John Dobson to John Mordaunt, 30 Jan. (os) 1752, undated notes, Warwick

CRO, CR 136 8/5/6, CR 136 B 3012/44; Walpole, Memoirs of George II, i,167–73; Newcastle to Yorke, 31 Jan. (os) 1752, PRO, SP 84/458.

47. J.N.Rosenau, “Private preference and political responsibilities: the relativepotency of individual and role variables in the behaviour of U.S. senators”, in

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Quantitative international politics: insights and evidence, J.D.Singer (ed.) (NewYork, 1968), 49.

48. Cobbett, xiii, 305.49. Ibid., xiii, 379.50. Ibid., xiii, 344.51. Fox to 4th Duke of Devonshire, 11 Dec. 1755, Chatsworth, HP; Campbell to

Mr White, 18 Dec. 1755, Cawdor.52. Monitor 13 May 1758.53. Hardwicke to Earl of Findlater, 16 Nov. 1762, Edinburgh, Scottish Record

Office, GD 248/572/8/17; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 28 Nov. 1762, 1 July1763, BL, Add. 32945, f. 176, 32949, f. 252.

54. Lord Sandys to Lord Northwick, 11 Dec. 1762, Worcester CRO 705–66, BA4221/26; Duke of Nivernais, French envoy, to Praslin, French foreign minister,13 Dec. 1762, AE, CP, Ang. 448, f. 305–9; J.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute,1762–3, PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988), 220–50.

55. Walpole to Pelham, 12 Aug. (os) 1747, NeC 487.56. Henry to Stephen Fox, 13 Feb. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f. 213–14;

Newcastle, memorandum, 18 Apr. 1759, BL, Add. 32890, f. 133; Con-Test, 2Apr. 1757; Anon., Letters to the estimator of the manners and principles of the times(1758), 41; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 14 Dec. 1759, PRO, SP 90/74; Newcastleto Yorke, 11 Dec., Yorke to Weston, 15 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32932, f 123,58213, f. 58; P.Mathias and P.O’Brien, “Taxation in England and France,1715–1810: a comparison of the social and economic incidence of taxes col-lected for the central government”, Journal of European Economic History 5

(1976), 601–50.57. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 17 July, Mitchell to Holdernesse, 31 Aug. 1757, PRO,SP 90/69; Newcastle to Rockingham, 27 Sept. 1757, WW Rl–103;C.W.Eldon, England’s subsidy policy towards the Continent during the Seven Years’War (Philadelphia, 1938); G.Brauer, Die hannoversch-englischen Subsidienvertrage 1702–1748 (Aalen, 1962); P.G.M.Dickson, Finance and government under MariaTheresia 1740–1780 [2 volumes] (Oxford, 1987), II, 158–69, 172–3, 391–3,395.

58. Newcastle to Mitchell, 8 Dec. 1757, BL, Add. 6832, f. 31; Haslang to Preysingand Wachtendonck, 9 Dec. 1757, Munich, Bayr. Ges., London 233;

Münchhausen to Prussian minister Podewils, 25 Dec. 1757, NSTA, Hannover Des 91 Nr. 38, f. 13–14; Anon., An appeal to the sense of the people (1756), 21– 2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757; North Briton, 20 Nov. 1762.

59. Michael Becher to Edward Southwell MP, 31 Mar. (os) 1744, Bristol, PublicLibrary, Southwell Papers, vol. 8; Bristol, Society of Merchant Venturers,Minutes of the Steadfast Society, pp. 56–7; Northampton Mercury, 4 June (os)1739; Anon., An Appeal, 21–2; Monitor, 20 Aug. 1757.

60. Bedford to Goldsworthy, 28 Nov. (os) 1748, PRO, SP 98/55, f. 96; Mann toBedford, 16 July 1748, BL, Add. 32813, f. 41–2; Bedford to Keene, 19 Jan. (os),Keene to Bedford, 24 Mar., 5 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 8, 123, 222–3;

R.Lodge (ed.), The private correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene (Cambridge,1933), 176, 243, 257–8, 271, 320; McLachlan, Trade and peace with Old Spain,133–45; Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestvo [148 volumes](St Petersburg, 1867–1916), CXLVIII, 399; Newcastle to Yorke, 4 Feb. (os)

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1752, Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 84/458, 80/191;Holdernesse to Robert Orme, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Eg. 3488, f. 96.

61. Meeting in Cornhill, 23 Jan. (os), Hardwicke to Bedford, 2 Feb. (os) 1749,London, Bedford Estate Office, papers of the 4th Duke; Newcastle to Dayrolle,13 Sept. 1751, PRO, SP 84/452, f. 136; Grenville to Bothmar, Danish minister,28 June, Grenville to Titley, 23 July 1762, PRO, SP 75/114, f. 236, 263–5;P.Clendenning, “The Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1766–an example of eighteenth-century power group interest”, Journal of European Economic History19 (1990), 475–520.

62. Henry to Stephen Fox, 18 Mar. (os) 1746, BL, Add. 51417, f 228.63. Finch to Harrington, 27 Feb. 1739, PRO, SP 95/84. See, more generally,

H.S.K.Kent, War and trade in northern seas: Anglo-Scandinavian economic relationsin the mid-eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1873).

64. Wasenberg to Ekeblad, 2 July 1742, PRO, SP 107/54.65. Keene to Robinson, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner 11850.66. Newcastle to Keith, 20 Apr. 1753, PRO, SP 80/191; G.Shelton, Dean Tucker:

eighteenth-century economic and political thought (1981), 46–7; North Briton, 20Nov. 1762; J.Campbell, The present state of Europe (1750), 24. On Campbell, seeG.Abbattista, Commercio, colonie e impero alla vigilia della Rivoluzione Americana:John Campbell pubblicista e storico nell’Inghilterra del sec. XVIII (Florence, 1990).For the argument, see also Anon., The conduct of the ministry impartially examined (1760), 38; Monitor, 26 Dec. 1761, 2 Oct. 1762; Newcastle, memorandum, 4Sept. 1762, BL, Add. 32942, f. 151.

67. Legge to Pelham, 24 May 1748, NeC 573. For praise f rom Newcastle,

Newcastle to Pelham, 18 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 125.

Chapter Seven

1. D.B.Horn, The British diplomatic service 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), is the bestintroduction, although it is somewhat dated.

2. W.Robertson, The history of the reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769; 1782 edn.),i, 134–5.

3. E.Gibbon, The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, J.B.Bury (ed.)(1896–1900), IV, 163–6.

4. Horn, Diplomatic Service, 112–14; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 1, 8, 22 Nov.,Mitchell to Holdernesse, 25 Dec. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.

5. G.W.Rice, The diplomatic career of the fourth Earl of Rochford at Turin, Madrid and Paris, 1749–1769, PhD thesis (University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 1973);“British consuls and diplomats in the mid-eighteenth century: an Italianexample”, EHR 92, 834–46, 1977; and “Lord Rochford at Turin, 1749–55: apivotal phase in Anglo-Italian relations in the eighteenth century”, in Black,Knights Errant, 92–112.

6. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 25 Feb., Joseph Yorke to Holdernesse, 11 Apr. 1758,PRO, SP 90/71; Earl of Ilchester and Mrs Langford-Brooke, The life of Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams (1929), 311–417.

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7. Hyndford to Burrish, 27 Feb. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6.8. Hugh Valence Jones, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, to Burr ish,

20 Aug. (os) 1752, Villettes to Burrish, 6 Sept. 1752, PRO, SP 110/6.9. Schweizer, “Scotsmen and the British diplomatic service, 1714–1789”, Scottish

Tradition 7–8 (1977–8), 115–36.10. Pelham to Newcastle, 28 Sept. (os) 1750, BL, Add. 35411, f. 171; M.A.

Thomson, The Secretaries of State 1681–1782 (Oxford, 1932); Newcastle toDevonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 7; Holdernesse to Yorke, 30 July1755, BL, Eg. 3446, f. 182; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Sept. (os) 1751, HoratioWalpole to Hardwicke, 16 June (os) 1740, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Mar.(os) 1749, Newcastle to Pelham, 13, 26 Sept. 1750, BL, Add. 35412, f. 19,35586, f. 241, 35410, f. 116, 35411, f. 95, 100, 133; Pelham to Devonshire, 20June (os) 1749, HP, Chatsworth.

11. J.C.D.Clark (ed.), The memoirs and speeches of James, 2nd Earl Waldegrave 1742– 1763 (Cambridge, 1988), 160–1.

12. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX (1756), 11–12.13. Pol. Corr., vi, 168. There is no systematic study of Newcastle’s views on foreign

policy. He can be approached via Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, and hiscorrespondence in P.C.Yorke (ed.), Life and correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke [3 volumes] (Cambridge, 1913) and T.J.McCann (ed.), The correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle 1724–1750 (Lewes, 1984).

14. D.B.Horn, “The Duke of Newcastle and the or igins of the diplomaticrevolution”, in The diversity of history, J.H.Elliott & H.G.Koenigsberger (eds)(1970), 247–68.

15. Newcastle to Pelham, 10 July 1748, NeC 638.16. Pol. Corr., vi, 174, cf. 175–6.17. Pol. Corr ., VI, 176, 179.18. Pelham, note on letter from Newcastle, 13 July 1753, Council memorandum,

21 Aug. 1753, BL, Add. 33201, f. 162, 32995, f. 27; Newcastle to Dickens, 2Oct. 1753, Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago, CXLVIII, 493–4.

19. Black, British foreign policy in an age of revolutions 1783–1793 (Cambridge,1994), 544–5.

20. P.Lawson, George Grenville: a political life (Oxford, 1984), 118–32; K.W.Schweizer and J.Bullion, “The vote of credit controversy, 1762”, British Journal

for Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175–88.21. Anon., An answer to a Pamphlet called a second letter to the people (1755), p. 14.22. Holdernesse to Burrish, 20 Feb. 1756, PRO, SP 81/105.23. Anon., A letter to his grace the D-of N-E, on the duty he owes himself… (1757), 2.24. Marquis d’Havrincourt, 25 Apr. 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 117.

Chapter Eight

1. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 49.2. Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 37.3. Keith to Holdernesse, 22 May 1755, PRO, SP 80/196, f. 32; Zamboni to.

Kaunitz, 7 Aug., 11 Sept. 1752, HHStA. England, Varia 10, f. 124, 140.

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4. J.Black, “The problems of the small state: Bavaria and Britain in the secondquarter of the eighteenth century”, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 5–36.

5. Cobbett, xiv, 694; Thomas Harris to James Harris, 14 Dec. 1759, Winchester,Hampshire CRO. 9M73/G311/7. For a similar warning by a pro-governmentpamphleteer against unrealistic expectations, Anon., An appeal to the sense of the

people (1756), 52–3.6. Cobbett, xiv, 801; Keene to Robinson, 30 July, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds, Vyner

11843, 11850.7. Walpole, Memoirs of…George II, i , 5–6, 34; Cobbett, xiii, 159, xiv, 963–70;

Egmont, BL, Add. 47012B, f. 177.8. W.S.Taylor and J.H.Pr ingle (eds), The correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of

Chatham (4 vols, 1838–40).9. “Mr. Pitt’s points”, memorandum, 21 Sept. 1753, BL, Add. 32995, f. 29–30;

J.Black, Pitt the Elder (Cambridge, 1992), 88–9.10. Ibid., 109; Joseph to Philip Yorke, 14 Oct. 1755, BL, Add. 35364, f. 53.11. Schlenke, England und das friderizianische Preussen, 230–49.12. P.Langford, “William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757”, EHR 88 (1973), 54–80;

N.Rogers, Whigs and cities: popular politics in the age of Walpole and Pitt (Oxford,1989), 106.

13. Charles to Lady Townshend, 13 July 1757, BL, Add. 63079, f. 46.14. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sept. 1757, BL, Add. 35417, f. 54; Bernis to

Aubeterre, envoy in Spain, 3 Jan. 1758, AE, CP, Espagne 523, f. 6.15. Pitt to Keene, 23 Aug. 1757, New Haven, Beinecke Library, Osborn Files, Pitt;

Holdernesse to Mitchell, 23 Sept. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70; Monitor, 24 Sept.

1757. For differing views on Gibraltar, Anon., National prejudice opposed to the national interest, candidly considered in the detention or yielding up Gibraltar and Cape-Breton by the ensuing treaty of peace: with some observations on the natural jealousy of the Spanish nation, and how far it may operate to the prejudice of the British commerce if not removed at this crisis. In a letter to Sir John Barnard (1748),Westminster Journal, 1 Apr. (os) 1749; Mirepoix to St Contest, 24 Dec. 1751,AE, CP, Ang. 432, f. 354–6.

16. Rigby to Sir Robert Wilmot, 20 Nov. 1759, Derby, Public Library, CattonCollection WH 3457; see also Monitor, 23 June 1759, 2 Jan. 1762.

17. Cabinet minute, PRO SP 90/70, 30/8/89, f. 52.

18. Schweizer, England, Prussia and the Seven Years War, 64.19. Haslang to Preysing, 13 Oct., 29 Oct., 29 Dec. 1758, 2, 16, 30 Jan., 2 Feb.1759, Preysing to Haslang, 18 Nov. 1758, 18 Jan. [late Jan.] 1759, Munich,Bayr. Ges., London 234–5; A. Schmid, Max III Joseph und die europäischenMächte: Die Aussenpolitik des Kurfürstentums Bayern 1745–1765 (Munich, 1987),415–20, 440–2.

20. W.J.Eccles, “The role of the American colonies in eighteenth-century Frenchforeign policy”, in Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Storia Americana (Genoa,1978), 165, 171; Newcastle to Fox, undated, Earl of Ilchester (ed.), Letters toHenry Fox, 86; George Ross to Brigadier John Forbes, 11 Mar. 1758,

Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office, GD 45/2/20/10.21. Bussy to Choiseul, 26 June, 9, 26 July, Choiseul to Bussy, 27 June 1761, AE,

CP, Ang. 443, f. 277, 339, 444, f. 67–8, 445, f. 17; Choiseul to Ossun, envoy inMadrid, 19 Feb. 1760, 30 July 1761, AE, CP, Espagne 527, f. 235, 533, f. 173;

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Viry, Sardinian envoy in London, to Charles Emmanuel, 30 June 1761, AST,LM, Ing. 66. On the negotiations, Rashed, The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool,1951).

22. W.L.Grant, “Pitt’s theory of empire”, Queen’s Quarterly (July-Sept. 1908), 32– 43 and “Canada vs. Guadaloupe: an episode in the Seven Years’ War”, American

Historical Review 17 (1912), 734–66; R.Hyam, “Imperial interests and thePeace of Paris”, in Reappraisals in British imperial history, R.Hyam & G.Martin(eds) (Toronto, 1975), 21–43. Marie Peters’s important works on Pitt include“The myth of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Great Imperialist. Part I: Pitt andimperial expansion 1738–1763”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History20, 1993, and Pitt the Elder (Harlow, 1997).

23. Bussy to Choiseul, 26 July 1761, AE, CP, Ang. 444, f. 62–70; J.K.Hiller, “TheNewfoundland fisheries issue in Anglo-French treaties, 1713–1904”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24 (1996), 5–8; North Briton, 11 Dec. 1762.

24. P.D.Brown and K.W.Schweizer (eds), The Devonshire diary (1982), 116.25. A.Soulange-Bodin, La diplomatic de Louis XV et le pacte defamille (Paris, 1894);

A.Bourguet, Le due de Choiseul et l ’ alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906).26. Choiseul to Bussy, 29 July, Ossun to Choiseul, 10, 13 Aug. 1761, AE, CP, Ang,

444, f 84, Espagne 533, f. 235, 259; Henry Fox to Shelburne, 29 Dec. 1761,BL.Bowood, 15, f. 65; Elizabeth to Edward Montagu, 11 Sept. 1760, HL,Montagu Papers 2394.

27. Yorke, Hardwicke, in, 318–21; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 111.28. Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 127–31, 135; W.J.Smith (ed.), The

Grenville Papers [4 volumes] (London, 1852–3), i, 386–7; Yorke to Sir John

Goodricke, 17 Oct. 1761, Bod. MS. Eng. Hist. C 62, f. 12.29. Minute of St James’s meeting, 2 Oct. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 18; Yorke,Hardwicke, III, 279–80; Brown & Schweizer, Devonshire Diary, 139.

30. Lyttelton to Elizabeth Montagu, 8 Oct. 1761, HL, Montagu Papers 1296.31. D.Syrett, The siege and capture of Havana (1970); N.Tracy, Manila ransomed: the

British assault on Manila in the Seven Years’ War (Exeter, 1995); PortugueseSecretary of State to Charles, 2nd Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State for theSouthern Department, 27 Sept. 1762, PRO 30/47/2; Hardwicke toNewcastle, 17 Oct. 1762, BL, Add. 32943, f. 258–9.

32. J.L.Bullion, A great and necessary measure: George Grenville and the genesis of the

Stamp Act, 1163–1165 (Columbia, 1982).33. J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and theorigins of the American Revolution”, in K.W.Schweizer, Lord Bute, 17–39;J.W.Shy, Toward Lexington: the role of the British army in the coming of the AmericanRevolution (Princeton, 1965), pp. 68–72.

34. N.Tracy, Navies, deterrence, and American independence: Britain and seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver, 1988).

35. Melcombe, memo., 10 July 1762, Mount Stuar t 2/93; memorandum byNewcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26;I.Hont, “The rhapsody of public debt: David Hume and voluntary state bank-

ruptcy”, in Political discourse in early modern Britain, N.Phillipson & Q.Skinner (eds) (Cambridge, 1993), 321–48.

36. Monitor, 28 Apr. 1762.

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NOTES

Chapter Nine

1. Sir James Kinloch to Lord Braco, 5 Jan. (os) 1749, Aberdeen, UniversityLibrary, 2727/1/2/4.

2. Keene to Bedford, 21 May 1749, PRO, SP 94/135, f. 265–8; Anon., “Mémoiresur les moyens de conserver par mer la paix retablie par le Traité d’Aix laChapelle ou projet d’union maritime entre la France, l’Espagne, la Suéde et leDanemark”, July 1749, AE, MD, Ang. 40, f. 164–7; Rouillé to Bonnac, 27 Mar.1755, AN, K 1351 no. 88; Earl of Bristol, envoy in Turin, to Holdernesse, 30Aug. 1755, PRO, SP 92/63, f. 152.

3. S.Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (1991).4. Rolt, The conduct of the several powers of Europe, iii, 1; Sandwich and Robinson

to Keith, 26 Sept. 1748, BL, Add. 35464, f 58.5. Dickson, “English commercial negotiations with Austria, 1737–1752”, in A.

Whiteman, J.S.Bromley and P.G.M.Dickson (eds), Statesmen, scholars and merchants, 80–9.6. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 8 Feb. (os) 1751, PRO, SP 84/457.7. P.W.Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763–1848 (Oxford,

1994), 485–91.8. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 15 Oct. 1757, PRO, SP 90/70.9. J.Black, “The Tory view of eighteenth-century Br itish foreign policy”,

Historical Journal 31 (1988), 475–6.10. Anon., A letter to the King of XXX, 5; Tyrconnel to Sir John Cust, 30 Apr. (os)

1748; L.Cust, Records of the Cust family, series 3 (1927), 129. For Bedford,

C.Baudi di Vesme, La politica Mediterranea inglese nelle relazioni degli inviati italiani a Londra durante la cosidetta Guerra di successione d’Austria ( Turin, 1952),117–18.

11. Cumberland to Fox, 23 Sept. 1757, Ilchester, Letters to Henry Fox, 120.12. Pares, “American versus continental warfare, 1739–63”, EHR 51 (1936), 429–

65; K.W.Schweizer, “The draft of a pamphlet by John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute”, Notes and Queries, (1981), 343–4; D.Baugh, “Great Britain’s ‘BlueWater’policy, 1689–1815”, International History Review 10 (1988) 33–58.

13. Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Apr. 1762, BL, Add 32937, f. 14.14. Réflexions de M.de Bussy, 19 Mar. 1751, AE, MD, Ang. 51, f. 141.

15. Bedford to Keene, 6 July (os) 1749, PRO, SP 94/136, f. 1; Mirepoix toPuysieulx, 23 Oct. 1749, AE, CP, Ang. 427, f. 176; Old England, 3 Feb. (os)1750.

16. Newcastle to Yorke, 9 Mar., Newcastle to Keith, 22 Oct. 1753, PRO, SP 84/462, 80/192; Pol. Corr., ix, 437–8, 457. For concern in 1755, Richard Blacowto Thomas Bray, no date, Exeter College Oxford, Bray Papers.

17. Newcastle to Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1756, BL, Add. 32862, f. 6; J.Glete, Navies and nations: warships, navies and state building in Europe and Ameria, 1500–1860 (Stockholm, 1993), 266.

18. Mirepoix to Puysieulx, 3 Jan. 1750, AE, CP, Ang. 428, f. 9–11; Pol. Corr., vii,

276, viii, 243.19. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 July 1752, PRO, SP 36/119, f. 143; Joseph to

Philip Yorke, 5 Sept. 1752, BL, Add. 35363, f. 308.

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NOTES

Chapter Ten

1. For Bute’s foreign policy, Schweizer’s work is crucial. It can be approachedthrough his contributions in K.W.Schweizer (ed.), Lord Bute: essays in re-interpretation (Leicester, 1988). J.D.Nicholas, The ministry of Lord Bute, 1762–3,PhD thesis (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988) is also very important. Heemphasizes the government’s continued desire for European allies.

2. Memorandum by James Harris MP, 9 Dec. 1761, HP, transcript of material inthe Malmesbury Papers.

3. Ibid., 12 May 1762.4. Bute to Mitchell, 9 Apr. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 6/143; Bedford’s

speech, 5 Feb. 1762, PRO 30/8/70/5; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 14 Apr. 1762,BL, Add. 32937, f. 103; K.W.Schweizer and J.L.Bullion, “The vote of creditcontroversy, 1762”, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies 15 (1992), 175–

88; and “The use of the private papers of politicians in the study of policyformulation during the eighteenth century: the Bute papers as a case study”,Archives 22 (1995), 39–43; Schweizer, “Foreign policy and the eighteenth-century English press: The case of Israel Mauduit’s ‘Considerations on thepresent German war’”, Publishing History 39 (1996), 45–53.

5. Perron to Charles Emmanuel, 1 Jan. 1750, AST, LM, Ing. 56.6. J.L.Bullion, “Securing the peace: Lord Bute, the plan for the army, and the

origins of the American Revolution”, in Schweizer Lord Bute, 30. Despite thetitle, Bullion’s essay includes much of importance on foreign policy; Trevor toRobinson, 26 Mar. 1746, BL, Add. 23822, f. 245; Irby to Humfrey Morice, 18

Mar. 1761, Gosforth, Northumberland CRO, ZSW 554/11. For an emphasison cost, Nathaniel Cole to James Brockman, 9 Apr. (os) 1748, BL, Add. 42591,f. 56; London Chronicle, 5 Jan. 1762; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 1 Apr. 1762, BL,Add. 33030, f. 260.

7. Briton, 26 June, 10, 24 July, 22 Oct., 4 Dec. 1762.8. K.W.Schweizer, “Lord Bute, Newcastle, Prussia and the Hague overtures: a re-

examination”, Albion 9 (1977), 72–97; Scott, British foreign policy, 46–7.9. Haslang to Wachtendonck and Preysing, 7 Sept. 1762, Munich, Bayr. Ges.,

London 239.10. K.W.Schweizer, “The Bedford motion and the House of Lords debate, 5 Feb.

1762”, Parliamentary History 5 (1986), 107–23.11. Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, 8 Jan. 1762, BL, Add. 32933, f. 113–14; Newcastle

to Hardwicke, 8 Oct. 1761, 18 Jan. 1762, Newcastle to Devonshire, 31 Oct.,26 Dec. 1761, BL, Add. 32929, f. 115–16, 32933, f. 364, 32930, f. 221, 32932,f. 363; Nicholas, Bute, 390.

12. Memorandum by Newcastle on discussion with Lyttelton, 24 Aug. 1762Hardwicke account of conference with Bute, 28 July 1762, Newcastle toCount William Bentinck, 24 Feb. 1763, BL, Add. 35422, f. 26, 32941, f. 87,32947, f. 81–2; Buckinghamshire to George, 2nd Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State, 20 Sept., Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 23 Sept., 20 Dec. 1763, PRO,

SP 91/ 72, 138, 109, 237–8; H.M.Scott, “Great Britain, Poland and theRussian Alliance, 1763–1767”, Historical Journal 19 (1976), 62–9; I.deMadariaga, Russia in the age of Catherine the Great (1981), 189–90; J.Black,

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NOTES

“Anglo—Russian relations after the Seven Years War”, Scottish Slavonic Review 9 (1987), 27–37; Holdernesse to Keith, 31 May 1755, Holdernesse to Mitchell,9 July 1756, PRO, SP 807 196, f. 37, 90/65; [Samuel Martyn], Deliberate thoughts on the system of our late treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia, in regard toHanover (1756), 49; [John Shebbeare], A sixth letter to the people of England

(1757), 4; Anon., Royal Magazine, Jan. 1761, IV, 12; London Evening Post, 1 May1762; St James’s Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1762.

13. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 25 Feb. 1762, BL, Add. 32935, f. 76–7; Nivernais,French envoy in London, to Choiseul, 24 Sept. 1762, Chatelet, French envoyin Vienna, to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug. 1763, AE, CP, Ang. 447, f. 146–8,Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2; Viry to Charles Emmanuel, 26 July 1763, AST,LM, Ing. 68.

14. Chatelet to Praslin, 16 July, 17 Aug., 21 Sept., Praslin to Chatelet, 28 Aug.1763, Count Guerchy, French envoy in London, to Praslin, 23, 28 Oct., 4Nov. 1763, AE, CP, Autriche 295, f. 67–71, 201–2, 326, Ang. 451, f. 456–8,473–7, 452, f 41; Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 28 Oct., Sandwich toStormont, 27 Dec. 1763, PRO, SP 91/72, f. 155–6, 80/119; Smith, The Grenville papers, II, 240; Marmora to Charles Emmanuel, 11, 15 Nov., 13 Dec.1763, 6, 24 Jan., 7 Feb., 20 Apr., 18 June 1764, AST, LM, Ing. 69; Annual Register (1763), 213.

15. Clark, The dynamics of change.16. D.W.Jones, War and political economy in the age of William III and Marlborough

(Oxford, 1988).17. Bedford to Bute, 13 June 1761, Mount Stuart, 1761 Papers, no. 458.

18. Paterson to Bute, 9 Oct. 1762, Mount Stuart, Cardiff Papers 5/4.19. Newcastle to Cumberland, 5 Ap. (os) 1748, RA, Cumb. P. 33/272; J.Black,“Territorial gain on the continent: an overlooked aspect of mid-eighteenthcentury British foreign policy”, Durham University Journal 86 (1994), 43–50;Vincent to Puysieulx, 5 Mar. 1747, AE, CP, Ang. 423, f. 86–7; Newcastle Courant, 20 Feb. (os), 5 Mar. (os), Old England, 7 May (os), London Evening Post,15 Sept. (os) 1748. For earlier lobbying on the importance of Cape Breton andNewfoundland, BL, Add. 13972, f. 2–7. For talk of Britain purchasing Leghorn(Livorno), Mann to Horace Walpole, 16 Jan. 1742, Lewis, Walpole’sCorrespondence, p. 267.

20. Horatio Walpole to Pelham, 3 Sept. 1747, NeC 489; Newcastle Courant, 22, 29Sept. (os) 1749; Old England, 17 Feb. (os) 1750.21. Richard Dobbs to Bute, 29 Jan., Arthur Dobbs to Bute, 2 June 1762, Mount

Stuart, 2/73–4. For a proposal for seizing leading Spanish bases in the NewWorld, J.Molesworth to Bute, 8 Oct. 1761, Mount Stuart, 4/121.

22. Wilson, “Empire, trade and popular politics”; The sense of the people: urbanpolitical culture in Urban England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1994); and “Empireof Virtue. The imperial project and Hanoverian culture c. 1720–1785”, inL.Stone (ed.), An imperial state at war: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (1994), 128– 64; Baugh, “Maritime strength and Atlantic Commerce”, in last, 210–11;

G.Jordan and Rogers, “Admirals as heroes: patriotism and liberty inHanoverian England”, Journal of British Studies 28 (1989), 201–24; B.Harris,”‘American idols’: empire, war and the middling ranks in mid-eighteenth-century”, Past and Present 150, 1996, 111–41.

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NOTES

23. J.Brewer, “Commercialization and Politics”, in The birth of a consumer society: the commercialization of eighteenth-century England, N.McKendrick, Brewer, J.H.Plumb (1982), 209, 229. On the coal trade, Herbert Mackworth MP toPleydell Courteen, 25 July (os) 1739, Swansea, University Library, MackworthPapers 1236, A recent summary is offered in H.V.Bowen, War and British

Society, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 1977) and another effective account is that byP.K. O’Brien, Power with profit: the State and the economy, 1688–1815, 1991.

24. J.Andrews, Geographical aspects of the maritime trade of Kent and Sussex, 1650– 1750, PhD thesis (London, 1954), 170.

25. Sandwich to Chesterfield, 12 Jan. 1748, PRO, SP 84/433, f. 49.26. Mildmay Journal, 1 Nov., 9 Dec. 1748, 1 Jan. 1749, Chelmsford, Essex Record

Office, D/DM 01/19.27. R.V.Jackson, “Government expenditure and British economic growth in the

eighteenth century: some problems of measurement”, Economic History Review second series, 43, 1990, 217–35; Richard to John Tucker, 11 Feb. (os) 1744,Bod. MS. Don. C 106, f. 186.

28. Rev. Henry Gilbert to Cust, -Jan. (os) 1744, Cust, Cust Family, ii, 202.29. W.J.Eccles, “The fur trade and eighteenth-century imperialism”, William and

Mary Quarterly 40 (1983), 341–62.30. J.Walvin, Fruits of empire. Exotic produce and British taste, 1660–1800

(Basingstoke, 1997). For a recent study of the role of economic interest inexpansionism, J.L.A.Webb, “The mid-eighteenth century gum arabic tradeand the British conquest of Saint-Louis du Sénégal, 1758”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 25 (1997), 37–58.

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213

Africa, West 25, 68, 70, 127, 154, 168,174

Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 1748 1, 16,60, 62, 64, 69, 91, 114, 116, 118,125, 148

Albemarle, William, 2nd Earl of 71, 75Alsace 15

Alt, Justus 117Amelot de Chaillou, Jean-Jacques 38,50, 54, 85

Anna (of Russia) 13Anne, Queen 85, 105, 176Anson, George, Admiral Lord 61Anson, Thomas 52Antin, Antoine-François, Marquis de

47Appalachians 75, 79, 168

army, British 40Army of Observation 24, 150–3, 156Atterbury Plot, 1722 53Aubeterre, Joseph-Henri, Marquis d’

22Augustus III of Saxony-Poland 11, 14,

21, 23, 83, 121Austria 9–11, 17–23, 65–6, 79, 83, 87,

140, 144–5, 153, 170, 177, 179Austrian Netherlands 11, 15, 18, 20,

43, 45–6, 49–51, 55–6, 59, 61, 68,75, 113, 128, 170

Austrian Succession, War of, 1740–8see War

Bahamas 168Baker, William 129balance of power 20, 133–4, 147, 152,

166–7, 171–2, 177Baltic 5, 17, 27, 62, 64–5, 79–80, 84,

128, 156Baltimore 168

Barnard, Sir John 110Barrier 18, 61, 75, 129, 169–70Bath, William, Earl of 50, 88, 96, 107–

9, 112, 114, 165Bath Chronicle 183Bavaria 49, 105, 112, 117–21, 142,

147–8, 153Bedford, John, 4th Duke of 70,

114, 122, 127, 139–40, 143, 172,181

Behr, Burchard Christian von 178Belle Ile 25–6Bergen-op-Zoom 16, 45Berlin 27Bermuda 168Bestuzhev-Riumin, Alexis 17, 21, 23Blanning, T.C.W. 41Blue Water Strategy 9, 61, 112, 124,

149, 151, 172, 176Bohemia 27, 42

Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount8

Bonnac, François-Armand d’Usson,Marquis de 76

Index

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214

INDEX

Boscawen, Admiral Edward 20, 77–9,155, 183

Bremen 97Breslau, Peace of, 1742 15Breslau, Treaty of, 1741 13Brest 20Bristol 127, 161Briton 177Broad Bottom ministry 59, 64Bruges 16, 170Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 26, 85Brussels 16, 170Buckinghamshire, John, 2nd Earl of

177, 179–80Burrish, Onslow 105–6, 137Bussche, Johann 91Bussy, François de 20, 49–50, 57, 78–9,

138, 156, 172Bute, John, 3rd Earl of 5, 26, 100–2,

107, 175–6, 178–9, 181–2Byng, John, Admiral 24 Cabinet 106, 159Cambis, Louis-Dominique, Count 49

Campbell, John, MP 111, 113Campbell, John, writer 129Campbell, Pryse 124Canada 20, 26, 58–60, 68–70, 72, 77,

149, 157, 160, 162, 166, 168, 175,182

Cape Breton 16, 58–60, 74, 77, 126,156–7, 173, 182

Caribbean 47, 51, 58, 79, 98, 166, 168,173

Carlos, Don, see Charles III (of Spain)Cartagena 161, 183Carteret, John, Lord, later Earl

Granville 5–6, 15, 17, 31–2, 34–6,38–41, 51–5, 57, 61, 65, 67, 74, 83,93–5, 102, 107–8, 110, 112, 118,122, 139–40, 150, 152, 158

Catherine II (of Russia) 136Centinel 131Champion 1–2

Charleroi 16Charles III (of Spain) 11–12, 17, 25,

158, 166

Charles VI (of Austria) 11–13, 97, 107,181

Charles XII (of Sweden) 10Charles Albert (of Bavaria), Charles VII

11, 13, 18, 33, 95, 146Charles Edward Stuart 17, 57, 112Charles Emmanuel III (of Sardinia) 11,

15, 17Chatham, Earl of, see Pitt, William, the

Elder Chavigny, Anne-Théodore Chevignard

de 49–50Cherbourg 25Chesterfield, Philip, 4th Earl of 40, 45,

51, 56, 108, 114, 139–40Choiseul, Etienne-François, Duke of

25, 156, 158Citizen 33, 167Clark, Jonathan 41, 181Clement-Auguste, Archbishop of

Cologne 177Cleves 12, 23Clive, Robert 154Clutterbuck, Thomas 88

Cologne 105colonial issues 25, 68, 72–4, 76–8, 129,133, 149, 155–8, 166–8, 173, 181–3

Corsica 180Cotton, Sir John Hynde 107Courland 21Craftsman 53–4Culloden, battle of, 1746 15, 62, 173Cumberland, William, Duke of 16, 24,

48, 62–3, 67, 73–4, 83, 93, 96, 115,

117, 150–1, 153, 155, 172 Daily Post 166Dann, Uriel 30, 41Denmark 17, 31, 35, 82–4, 98, 120,

128Dettingen, battle of, 1743 15, 45, 55,

60, 113, 155Devonshire, William, 4th Duke of 149Dickens, Guy 13, 32

Dinwiddie, Robert 20, 72Diplomatic Revolution, 1756 4–5, 9,

19, 63, 79–80, 171

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215

INDEX

diplomats 131–2, 135–8Dobbs, Arthur 182–3Dodington, George Bubb 39, 96–7,

117, 162Dominica 26, 74Douglas, John 96Dresden, Treaty of, 1745 15Drummond, John 51, 54, 105Dunkirk 36, 54, 58, 69, 71, 118, 146,

148Durand, François-Marie 117Duras, Emmanuel-Félicité, Duke de 76Durham 183

East Friesland 89, 91, 97–100East India Company, British 16, 70,128–9, 131, 156, 167

East Prussia 21, 27Egmont, John, 2nd Earl of 118, 120,

148elections 105, 115Elisabeth Farnese 11Elizabeth I of England 165Elizabeth, Tsarina of Russia 19–20, 23,

156, 171Elliot, Sir Gilbert 73Emden 153Emden Company 92, 100 Falkland Islands 77, 165–7Family Compact, Third, 1761 25, 157,

159Fawkener, Sir Everard 83Ferdinand VI (of Spain) 9, 17

Ferdinand of Brunswick 153–6, 175Fielding, Henry 64finance 26, 164–5, 176–7Finch, Edward 12, 99Finckenstein, Karl, Count 95Finland 15Flanders 16, 31, 56, 59Flemming, Karl, Count 42Fleury, André Hercule de 12, 32, 38,

47–8, 85, 111

Florida 26, 168, 175Fontenoy, battle of, 1745 16Fox, Henry 73, 106, 124, 149

Francis, Duke (of Lorraine and thenTuscany), later Emperor Francis I11, 17, 154

Frederick, Duke of York 178Frederick, Prince of Wales 70, 85, 93,

117, 125Frederick II, the Great (of Prussia) 1

2–15, 18–28, 31, 37, 41–2, 47, 49,55–6, 63, 66–7, 71, 79, 83, 85–92,95, 97–101, 122, 136, 140, 144–5,151, 160, 173–5

Frederick William I (of Prussia) 12,31–2, 86, 92, 97–8

Fuentes, Count 158Fürstenbund, 1785 48Füssen, Treaty of, 1746 15 General Advertiser 183Geneva 66Genoa 15, 180George I 48, 81, 85, 92–3, 132George II 5–6, 12, 18–19, 21, 25, 31,

34–5, 41–3, 45, 48–9, 53, 63–4,66–7, 70, 72, 75–7, 81, 83, 85–103,

110, 117, 122, 125, 132, 135, 137,139–41, 148–51, 155, 174, 184George III 26, 70, 81, 88, 92–3, 100–2,

159, 162, 175–9, 184Georgia 168Ghent 16, 170Gibbon, Edward 134Gibbs, Graham 30Gibraltar 26, 116, 152Glorious Revolution 124, 133, 165,

171Goree 25–6, 157Gower, John, 1st Earl 114Grafton, Augustus, 3rd Duke of 178grain exports 183Granby, John, Marquis of 155Great Northern War, 1700–21 10, 12,

87, 97Gregg, Edward 41Grenada 26

Grenville, George 172Guadeloupe 25–6, 156–7, 178Gustavus III (of Sweden) 92

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216

INDEX

Halifax, George, 2nd Earl of 73, 139Halifax, Nova Scotia 68Hamburg 128Hanbury-Williams, Sir Charles 21–2,

90, 135–6

Hanover 19–26, 29–30, 33, 39–41, 48,55–6, 58, 63, 65–8, 70–1, 74, 77,80–102, 144–6, 150–3, 156, 162,175–8, 184

Hardenberg, Count 85Hardwicke, Philip, 1st Earl 6, 24, 31–2,

37–8, 42, 70, 94, 105, 123, 128, 148,158

Harrington, William, Lord 6, 32, 36,38, 41, 48, 89, 93–4, 97–8, 139

Haslang, Joseph, Count 37, 102, 114,117, 154

Hastenbeck, battle of, 1757 24, 151,155

Hatton, Ragnhild 41, 93Havana 2, 26, 106, 161, 183Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward 74, 155,

183Hervey, John, Lord 32, 85, 92, 94Hesse-Cassel 26, 83, 85, 118, 124Hildesheim, Prince-Bishopric of 82,

102, 177Holdernesse, Robert, 4th Earl of 6, 52,

67, 75, 77–9, 93–4, 105–6, 128, 135,138–9

Hudson’s Bay Company 129, 168Hungary 10–11Hyndford, John, 3rd Earl of 90, 137

Imperial Election Scheme 5, 18, 35,49, 67–8, 90, 92, 118, 140–1, 147India 25, 68, 70, 72, 128, 149, 154,

156, 160, 168, 174, 181invasion 25, 56–7Irby, Sir William 177Ireland 26, 182Italy 145, 158, 177Ivan VI (of Russia) 13

Jacobites 2, 15, 36, 50, 53, 55–6,111–13, 171, 173, 178–9Jacobite’s Journal 183Jamaica 26

‘James III’ 1, 17, 53, 59Jemappes, battle of, 1792 170Jenkins’ Ear, War of see War of

Jenkins’ Ear Johnson, Samuel 165Joseph I (of Austria) 11Joseph II (of Austria) 18, 92Jülich-Berg 8, 49, 97–9 Kaunitz, Count Wenzel 19–22, 180Keene, Benjamin 75, 95–6, 127–9,

135–6, 147, 152Keith, Robert 22, 64, 135, 137–8,

145Keith, Sir William 33Kleinschnellendorf, Convention of 15Klosterseven, Convention of, 1757

24–5, 48, 151–2, 156Kolin, battle of, 1757 27 La Salle, René-Robert, Sieur de 77Laffeldt, battle of, 1747 16Lagos, battle of, 1759 25, 45, 154–5Lee, Dr George 116

Legge, Henry 120, 130–1, 137, 141Leghorn 127Leuthen, battle of, 1757 27Levant Company 127Lichfield, George, 3rd Earl of 123Linz 13Lithuania 180Liverpool 161Livonia 12, 21Locke, John 122

Lodge, Sir Richard 1, 29logwood 25, 158London 154, 161, 165, 183London Chronicle 129, 157London Evening Post 157, 161, 173,

184Lords, House of 105, 114, 122Lorraine 15Lorraine, Charles of 15, 18, 43Louis XIV of France 47, 49, 52–3, 57,

79, 169, 178Louis XV of France 11–12, 14, 17,

19, 21, 23, 25, 56, 75, 77, 93, 99,169, 171

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217

INDEX

Louisbourg 2, 16, 24–5, 58, 146,154–5

Louisiana 20, 26, 157, 162, 166, 168Lowther, Sir James 31Lyttleton, George 113, 119, 159, 179

Maastricht 16, 170Mackesy, Piers 41Madras 16Maillebois, Yves-Marie, Count de 33Manila 2, 26, 161Maria Theresa (ruler of Austria) 9, 11,

13, 17–20, 22, 27, 33, 50–1, 54, 59,88, 107, 109, 111

Marlborough, Charles, 3rd Duke of 40Marlborough, John, 1st Duke of 16,

54, 158Marmora, Count 180Marseille 184Martin, Samuel 119Martinique 25–6, 160, 163, 178Mauduit, Israel 175Maximilian Joseph (of Bavaria) 14Mecklenburg 99

Mediterranean 79Mexico 161Michell, Abrahm Louis 137Milanese 11, 15Mildmay, William 184Minden, battle of, 1759 25, 155, 179Minorca 2, 22, 24, 26, 46, 56, 149,

154, 157Mirepoix, Gaston, Duke de 20, 61,

69–70, 72, 75–8, 118, 174

Mitchell, Andrew 14, 23, 27, 135–6,138, 171, 176Money, William 137Monitor 104, 126, 151–3, 156–8, 163,

177Mons 16Montagu, Elizabeth 158Montréal 25, 154Morton, James, 13th Earl of 40Mosquito Coast 25

Münchhausen, Gerlach Adolph von 48,64–5, 67, 90–1, 198Munich 13Murray, William 115–16, 119–20

Namur 16, 170Naples 12, 15, 26Napoleon 168, 171National Debt 61, 126, 164navy 2, 24, 37, 148, 155, 160, 162, 167,

173–4, 184Nevis 173Newcastle, Thomas, 1st Duke of 6, 8,

17–18, 24, 31–2, 35, 37, 40–3, 45,52–3, 56–7, 59, 61–2, 64–6, 68–9,71–5, 84, 91, 93–4, 96, 98, 101–2,105–7, 111, 115, 120–1, 125–9,137–43, 146, 151–2, 154, 158–9,173, 176–9, 184

Newfoundland 26, 157–9, 168, 173,

182newspapers 165, 175Nivernais, Louis-Jules, Duke of 22Nootka Sound 77, 166North America 17, 19–20, 68, 70,

78–80, 129, 149, 153–4, 168, 174,181

Nova Scotia 61, 68, 70, 72–3, 79,148, 168

Ochakov Crisis, 1791 179, 181Ohio valley 19, 69, 72, 75–6‘Old Corps’ 4, 111, 113, 151Old England 58–9, 74, 122, 143,

172–3‘Old System’ 17–19, 64, 100, 141,

145, 170Osnabrück 64, 91, 177–8Ossorio, Giuseppe 34, 43, 116

Ostend 16, 57, 112, 151, 170, 182Owen, John 41, 114Owen’s Weekly Chronicle 143 Pacific Ocean 161, 167–8Panama, Isthmus of 2Panin, Count Nikita 179Pardo, Convention of the, 1738 108–9Pares, Richard 30Paris, Peace of, 1763 11, 26, 28, 125,

168, 175Parliament 6, 30, 37, 39, 48, 61,104–30, 132, 172, 175–6

Parma 11, 15, 17

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218

INDEX

Partition of Poland, First, 1772 47Paterson, John 182Patriots 3, 5, 153, 175Pelham, Henry 38, 50, 61–2, 72–4, 94,

100, 109, 115–16, 118–19, 121,124, 126, 130, 138–9, 141, 148

Penny London Post 183Perron, Count 72, 75, 77Peru 161Peter I, the Great (of Russia) 10, 12Peter III (of Russia) 80, 136, 179Philip II (of Spain) 165Philip V (of Spain) 5, 47, 166Philip, Don 12, 15, 17Philippines 161Piacenza 11, 15–17Piacenza, battle of, 1746 15Pitt, William, the Elder 23–6, 88, 100,

106, 112–14, 118, 123, 125, 130,136, 140, 146–60, 172, 175, 177–8,184

Pitt, William the Younger 180Plassey, battle of, 1757 154Podewils, Count Heinrich von 37–9

Poland 18, 27, 50, 66, 71, 179–80Polish Succession, War of the see War of the Polish Succession, 1733–5

Pomerania 12, 27Pompadour, Jeanne-Antoinette,

Marquise de 22, 27Pondicherry 25–6Poole 184Porto Bello 2, 155, 183Portugal 3, 26, 31, 70, 129, 160–1,

176postal interception 6, 42, 85, 95–6,158

Potter, John 115Pragmatic Sanction 11–12, 99–100Prague 13, 27Protestant alliance 43Protester 71Provence 15Prussia 12, 56, 61, 63–5, 67, 87, 137,

140, 142, 146, 148, 153, 160, 162,175–7, 180

public opinion 39, 47, 72, 115–16,125–6, 150, 153, 177

Pulteney, William, see Bath, William,Earl of

Puysieulx, Louis-Philogène Brulart,Marquis de 43, 47, 62–4, 66,69–70, 117

Québec 17, 25, 154Quiberon Bay, battle of, 1759 25, 45,

154–5, 173 Ralph, James 87Regensburg 89Reval 10Richelieu, Louis-François-Armand,

Duke de 24, 63Riga 10Rigby, Richard 153Roberts, Michael 31Robertson, William 134Robinson, Sir Thomas 36, 43, 75,

77–8, 89, 120, 136, 138–9, 149,170

Rochford, William, 4th Earl of 135–6Rockingham, Charles, 2nd Marquis of

102Rolt, Richard 170Rossbach, battle of, 1757 27, 179Roucoux, battle of, 1746 16Rouillé, Antoine-Louis 20, 73, 75,

77–8Royal Magazine 180Russia 9–10, 12–23, 63, 66, 68, 79,

83–4, 97, 99, 102, 124, 136, 141,145, 148, 177, 179

Saint-Contest, François-DominiqueBarberie de 71–3

Salisbury 161Salisbury Journal 161Salm 66Sandwich, John, 4th Earl of 18, 40,

43, 64–5, 91, 96, 114, 137, 170,180

Saratoga, battle of, 1777 27

Sardini?, kingdom of 11, 52Saxe, Maurice, Marshal 16, 59Saxony 23, 27, 71, 85, 148Scarborough, Richard, 2nd Earl of 108

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219

INDEX

Scotland 173Second Silesian War 14, 27, 138–40Secretaries of State 30, 35, 138–40Senegal 26Septennial Act, 1716 105Settlement, Act of, 1701 58, 88Seven Years War, 1756–63 2, 10–11,

62, 88, 106, 115, 155, 166, 168,171, 177, 184

Seville, Treaty of, 1729 58Shirley, William 68Silesia 11, 13, 19, 22, 26–7, 33, 42, 47,

86, 90, 100, 144–5Silesian debts 92, 100Slade, Sir Thomas 155sources 6, 95–6Spain 9, 14, 31–3, 36, 46–7, 58, 60, 62,

66, 91, 107, 111, 147, 152, 156–61,165–9

St. Helena 168St. Lawrence, river 2St. Lucia 26, 58, 74St. Saphorin, François, Seigneur de

136

St. Severin, Alphonse, Count de 91St. Vincent 26, 74Stair, John, 2nd Earl of 34, 51–3, 59Stanhope, James, Viscount 36, 152Stanley, Hans 158Starhemberg, George, Count 21–2Steadfast Society 127Steinberg, Ernst, Freiherr von 90–1,

177Steinhorst 97

Stone, Andrew 57, 118–20Stormont, David, Viscount 177subsidy treaties 41, 105, 118, 126, 160,

176Sumatra 168Sweden 9–10, 13–14, 17, 63, 65–6, 68,

83–4, 98, 128, 166 taxation 61, 126, 164, 176Temple, Richard, 2nd Earl 159

Thompson, Anthony 38, 48, 135Titley, Walter 136Tobago 26, 68, 74Tories 5, 107, 112–14, 122, 149, 171–2

Townshend, Charles 151Townshend, Charles, 2nd Viscount 35,

41, 93, 96, 139trade 26, 111, 127–30, 152, 166–7, 170Trevor, Robert 30, 34, 36, 41, 55, 87,

97, 106, 136, 177Triennial Act, 1694 105Tucker, John 110, 114Tucker, Josiah 129Tucker, Richard 27Turkey 9–10, 18, 66, 68, 179Tuscany 11, 26Tyrconnel, John, Viscount 172 Union Journal; or, Halifax Advertiser 156United Provinces, Dutch 16–17, 19,

31, 39, 41, 57, 74, 87, 106, 166,179, 181

Utrecht, Peace of, 1713 47, 108–9,114–15, 118, 158, 168–9

Valory, Louis-Guy-Henri, Marquis de

66Vaucher, Paul 29

Vergennes, Charles, Count of 10–11Vernon, Admiral Edward 155, 183Versailles, First Treaty of, 1756 19, 22,

63Versailles, Second Treaty of, 1757 23Vienna, battle of, 1683 10Vienna, First Treaty of, 1725 58, 111Vienna, Second Treaty of, 1731 64, 74Vienna, Third Treaty of, 1738 12Villettes, Arthur 13–14, 137

Villiers, Thomas 37, 39Virginia 20, 72Viry, Count 102 Wager, Sir Charles 13Waldegrave, James, 1st Earl 32, 38, 47,

107Waldegrave, James, 2nd Earl 139Wall, Richard 158Walpole, Horace, 4th Earl of Orford

91–2, 94, 120, 147–8Walpole, Horatio 31, 37, 41, 53, 72,

90, 93, 99–100, 113, 120, 125, 137,139, 146

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Walpole, Sir Robert 4–5, 30–1, 34, 40,47–50, 54, 61, 95–6, 101, 108–11,116, 118, 120, 147

War of American Independence 88,161

War of the Austrian Succession,1740–8 2, 5, 11, 29–30, 43–4, 62,83, 90–2, 107, 114–15, 136, 144,153, 158, 179

War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739–48 2, 11,14

W f th P li h S i 1733 5

Weston, Edward 8Westphalia 27, 48, 88Whig Split 117Whigs 4Whigs, Opposition 107–9, 112–14Wilhelmstah, battle of, 1762 25William III of Orange 16, 46–7, 52,

54, 81, 84–5, 87, 133, 176William IV of Orange 16, 19Wilmington, Spencer, 1st Earl of 95Wilson, Arthur 29W lf G l J 155