176326_moldova brief.doc

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Moldova

Key Political Organizations:

Communist Party of Moldova

o The Communists made a strong comeback in the country in 2001 after a

decade of absence. The Communists gained ~0! of "arliament and theirleader #ladimir #oronin became President.

o $n the 200% elections& the Communists still made out 'ith ()! of the

"arliamentary seats 'ith the ne*t closest "arty only holding 1+!, this 'as'hen the four ne*t small "arties banded together in a fragile coalition in orderto kee" the Communists out of full "o'er. -ut the coalitions move hasbackfired and the Communists are set to make a large comeback in u"coming

elections in /ovembero The Communist Party still has strong ties to the ussian Communist Party& but

has a more faulty relationshi" 'ith Putins nited ussia. The Communistsare considered "roussian& but have had "roblems in negotiations 'ith theussians over Transdniestria and trade.

o The ussians are currently urging the Communists to strike a deal 'ith one of

the 34$ "arties to form a coalition to ensure a ma5ority. The ussians havesuggested both 6ilats 7iberal 8emocratic Party and 7u"us 8emocratic Party.

3lliance for 4uro"ean $ntegration 934$:

o 34$ is a ne' "olitical coalition of four smaller 9but still im"ortant: "olitical

"arties 'ho banded together not because they share the same goals& but 5ust to

ensure the Communists did not retain "o'er in the last elections.o 34$ has fractured a do;en times since the 200% elections and each "artys

leaders have flirted 'ith 5oining the Communists or going out on their o'n. $tsleaders "ersonally do not get along and continually sabotage each other andtheir "arties.

o 34$ is made u" of


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7iberal 8emocratic Party centerright "arty led by #lad 6ilat 'ho is

current Prime Minister of Moldova 7iberal Party centerright "arty led by Mihai =him"u 'ho is acting

President of Moldova 8emocratic Party social democratic "arty led by Marian 7u"u 'ho is

one of the countrys most "o'erful "oliticians. 8emocratic Party hasrecently become the >sister? "arty to Putins nited ussia as of@e"tember 9more on that below:

Aur Moldova 3lliance a liberal "olitical "arty led by @erafim

rechean& former mayor of the ca"ital Chisinau.

Key Personalities:

#ladimir #oronin former President of Moldova and leader of the Communist Party.

#oronin is still the most influential "olitician in the country es"ecially in thecountryside. Bis follo'ers are highly organi;ed and loyal. Be ties his "arty to ussia&

though as a fe' disagreements 9mainly over Transdniestria: 'ith Mosco'. Mihai =him"u Current $nterim President of Moldova and leader of the 7iberal

Party. =him"u is the only "olitician in "o'er left that is antiussian and is out'ardly"roomanian something that has caused a lot of backlash in the country.

#lad 6ilat Current Prime Minister of Moldova and leader of the 7iberal 8emocratic

Party. 6ilat is considered an o""ortunist. $n 200% after 34$ "ushed the Communistsinto o""osition& he reached out to /3TA and the 4. Bo'ever& as his coalition beganto falter& he disregarded many of those ties and has been s"ending most of his timetraveling to Mosco'. 6ilat 'as the first "olitician to break the 34$ coalition& strikingout on his o'n 'ith "olitical and social reforms. 6ilat and his "arty are currentlytoying 'ith a "ossible coalition 'ith the Communists to ensure a strong government

after the elections. Marian 7u"u 7eader of the 8emocratic Party and former "resident of "arliament.

7u"u is considered one of the "olitical heavy'eights in the country. 7u"u 'as neverreally "ro4uro"ean but 5oined the 34$ coalition out of o""ortunity rather than ideals.7u"u use to hel" run the Communist "arty and 'as #oronins right hand before a"ersonal fallout. $n @e"tember& 7u"us 8emocratic Party became the >sister? "arty toPutins nited ussiasolidifying his grou"s leanings to'ards Mosco' even morethan the Communists.

Hot Topics and Current Issues:

Transdniestria Transdniestria& the eastern sliver of the country along the krainianborder& is mainly "o"ulated by ethnic ussians and krainians and is Moldovasindustrial center, 'ithout Transdniestria& Moldova is left 'ith an almost com"letelyagrarian economy& 'hich has struggled since the colla"se of the @oviet nion.Transdniestria declared its inde"endence in 1%%D after a brief 'ar and e*ists as a self"roclaimed re"ublic 'ith strong ussian su""ort. @ince 200D& the small enclave has beensub5ect to economic measures from Moldova that have amounted to a blockade. ussia


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currently has )00 troo"s stationed in Transdniestria to 'ork 'ith the )00 Transdniestriatroo"sa ma5or to"ic of debate bet'een Moldova& 4uro"e and ussia.

Internal Politics & the Players outside(I had to set this up as a timeline of internalissues and how it plays out with external influence because it is impossible to distinguish

them from each other. It was the only way to make this understandable.)

The Election & Current Stalemate

$n 3"ril 200%& Moldova held "arliamentary elections in 'hich the Communists took

() "ercent& giving it a minority victory. The ne*t "arty only had 1+ "ercent of thevote. -et'een 10&000 and D0&000 "rotestors took to the streets in 'hat is no' calledthe >T'itter evolution?& calling for an end of the Communist Partys rule in thecountry. President #oronin 'as already at the end of his 2ndterm at this time& so he'as about to leave "o'er any'ay. There 'ere accusations at that time that Eesternand omanian intelligence net'orks incited and organi;ed the T'itter evolution.

Coming out of the nearcolorrevolution 'as an agreement bet'een the four other

"olitical "arties other than the Communists the 3lliance for 4uro"ean $ntegrationCoalition 934$& see above:. -ut none of the four "arties in the 34$ Coalition hadanything in common. 8es"ite the coalitions name& most didnt even 'ant to deal 'ith4uro"e. Ane "arty took the interim "residency& one the "remiershi"& a third the headof "arliament and the last 'as and the last 'as left out of the to" s"ots.

@o the country has been in a 1%month stalemate 'ith a semibroken coalition and an

interim "resident. 8uring that time the Communists F #oronin have been heavilycam"aigning against the broken system led by the coalition& 'hile "re"aring for theelections in /ovember. The latest "olling numbers have the Communists leading theelections& but "ossibly not gaining a ma5oritymeaning they 'ill need a coalition"artner out of the 34$ coalitionsomething ussia has set u" over 3ugustActober

deals for the Communists to form a coalition 'ith either 6ilat or 7u"us "arties. /e*t sto" is elections on /ov. 2G and then coalition building bet'een either the four

34$ "arties or 9more likely: the Communists H some 34$ members.

Foreign Influence and Intervention

Russia

8uring the "ast year& the only real "ro4uro"ean "olitician in "o'er $nterim

President =him"u has led controversial cam"aigns against ussia. Mosco' hasres"onded 'ith a 'ine and mineral 'ater embargo.

-ut ussia has also struck a series of deals 'ith the other "olitical "layers in the 34$

Coalitionall e*ce"t =him"u. ussia struck a deal in @e"t to make nited ussiaand 8emocratic Party of Moldova 9led by 7u"u: sisters. ussia has started 'orkingon a coalition bet'een the Communists and 7iberal 8emocratic "arty 9led by 6ilat:.-oth 7u"u and 6ilat have made multi"le tri"s in the last fe' months to Mosco'.ussia consolidated its influence in every "arty in Moldova e*ce"t =him"us7iberal Party& 'hich is too tied into omania.


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$n order to get 7u"u and 6ilat under their 'ing& ussia gave small gestures of good

'ill& such as cutting off some of its aid to Transdniestria. /o' that ussia has deals'ith both "olitical grou"s& that aid has resumed to Transdniestria.

Romania & !raine

omania is by far the largest Eestern "layer in Moldova "retty much the only

Eestern country really still interested.

The "roblem is that omania hasnt s"ent enough time establishing enough resources

9/=A F media: on the ground to s'ay "ublic o"inion before the elections. omaniahas also allo'ed =him"u to run his mouth "roclaiming Moldova sisters 'ithomania'hich has hurt =him"us credibility.

$n 3ugust& Ianukvich and Medvedev held a bilateral in Jiev in 'hich they said that

ussia and kraine 'ould 'ork together on stabili;ing the future of Moldova andTransdniestria. omanian President -asescu res"onded to that statement >the t'o

omanians"eaking territories should be reunited& and that& should kraine make amove for Transdniestria or Moldova& omania 'ould use the omanian "o"ulationsin 'estern kraine mainly -ucovina to challenge Jiev.?

@ince the krainian elections& there has been a large increase in chatter "ublicly that

Mosco' 'ill use Jiev to hel" "ull Moldova back into the ussian fold.

$n 3ugust there 'as also a s"y scandal in 'hich ussia discovered a omanian s"y in

Mosco' 'ho 'as gathering information on Moldova. ussia e5ected the s"y andomania reacted in kind by e5ecting a ussian s"y in its country.

Moldovan former "resident and leader of the Communists #oronin& accused

omanias agreement to "ossibly let the @ have its bmd facility in omania >similarto agreements bet'een 3ntonescu and Bitler?K in short& #oronin is not close toomania& so if the Communists come back to "o'er& he 'ill decrease ties.

"ermany

=ermany has been an interesting "layer in Moldovan affairs recently.

There has been a discussion in the media and from our sources on 'hether -erlin

'ould be against Mosco's moves in Moldova. Could it be the red line bet'eenussia and =ermany on the ussian resurgenceL

$n both une and 3ugust& Merkel initiated a resolution that a Moldovan

Transdniestrian solution 'ould be a focus for any ussia4 @ecurity Pact or Councilset u" in the ne*t year.

3ccording to multi"le @tratfor sources in ussia and Moldova& =ermanysre"resentative& Patricia 6lor& 'ent to Mosco' in @e"tember and e*"lained that -erlinnot be against ussia consolidating Moldova back into its s"here& as long as ussia"ushed for a real resolution bet'een Moldova and Transdniestria.

3fter the troika meeting bet'een @arko;y& Merkel and Medvedev on Act 1%& a very

"eculiar 5oint "ress release 'as made in 'hich the three 'ill seek >closer coo"eration&a"t to contribute in a most tangible 'ay to mutual confidence and collective actionson conflict "revention and conflict management& o"ening the 'ay for settling ancient


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NsicO conflicts& such as that in Transdniestria? 'hat is fascinating about thisstatement is that neither 6rance or =ermany have ever called it >Transdniestria?& butinstead call it >The Transnistria region of Moldova?. This is ussias 'ording&alluding to 6rance and =ermany going along 'ith ussias "lan for the country.

#uropean nion

Moldova does have a 4uro"ean 4astern Partnershi" agreement& but has not had any

ma" to e*"and that into something more 'ithin the 4 s"here.

3fter the elections in 200% there 'as much talk about moving Moldova into the

4uro"ean s"here& but the coalition could never agree to 'hat that meant. /one of thesu""osedly "ro4uroe"an "arties are "ro4uro"ean& e*ce"t for =him"us 7iberalParty.

$t came do'n to =erman su""ort& to 'here the Moldovans assumed the =ermans

'ould hel" usher them into the 4 and -erlin has stalled.

nited $tates

There have been no visits and very little "ress releases on Moldova from the @.

$n a s"eech Act 10 by @ 8e"uty @ecretary of @tate on 4urasia& Phil =ordon& he

referenced Moldova in conte*t of @4 relations. >$n the second area& e*tending the4uro"ean ;one of "eace& "ros"erity& and democracy 'e have had some im"ortantsuccesses but eually im"ortant challenges remain. 3s $ said at the outset& the 'ork of>com"leting? 4uro"e is not finished. Ehat $ think is most notable about efforts no'under the Abama 3dministration is ho' closely as "art of a deliberate strategy 'eare 'orking together 'ith 4uro"e to achieve this goal. Take& for instance& kraine&-elarus& Moldova& =eorgia& 3;erbai5an& and 3rmenia. These are the countries of the

4s 4astern Partnershi"& an initiative that the nited @tates strongly su""orts and'orks 'ith to e*tend democracy& stability& and security to this "art of the 'orld. Eeshare the same strategy because 'e share the same goals.?

Aur Moldovan sources in Eashington tell us that they have not been able to get any

meetings 'ith any government member of conseuence for over a year. The Moldovadesk and the state de"artment is ignored most of the time. There is ;ero direct @3$8no' going to Moldova and the Millennium 6unds have been decreased to Q2+2million 9com"ared to billions to other countries: from the @.

3ccording to our Moldovan sources& @3$8 is su""ose to start funding a "ro5ect to

teach "olitical "arties ho' to get funding. @3$8 is trying to get a omanianthinktank to coo"erate on this.

Anly =him"us 7iberal Party is 'illing to consider /3TA membershi"& but even

=him"u is 'ary to mention this as there is very little su""ort for /3TA in thecountry.

Perception & Re%erences too% $trat%or:

Perce"tion


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6a1$rom)s hosta%e &e lose millions" ;bla-bla $assa%e on the articles that need nocomments in his o$inion considerin% the clear titles< Most interestin% is the fact thatboth these articles are based on a study reali1ed by the I@IS association that is$resented also by the $ro-Romanian media as bein% one of the best And by the &ayI@IS director &as a$$ointed by the current %overnment ambassador to the 4S !he%ht over Moldova is continuin% and the nal result is %iven not by analysts but by

&hat the $eo$le &ants, even if this is somethin% $arado7ical to the analysts !hefailure of the referendum is a $roof for that"

Romania.i(er paraphrased our articles on Moldova saying 'my rough

translation*:

Stratfor: Romania has consolidated its position in relations with Chisinau

Failed to Romania to Moldova?

October 11, 2010

Failed to Romania to Moldova

U.S. Analysis Centre, Stratfor, says that the U.S. urged Romania to Moldova to

establish NGOs, media institutions and investment instruments. Stratfor believesthat Bucharest had the expected success and failed to consolidate their position in

relations with Moldova - a conclusion rejected by politicians from Chisinau.

According to anonymous sources cited by Stratfor Analysis Centre, the United

States asked Romania to establish non-governmental organizations, media

institutions and instruments to facilitate investment in Moldova, but Bucharest has

not been successful in doing so - partly because of economic crisis affected

Romania, but also because of internal political crisis.

Moldova has the attention of foreign powers because of strategic position, Stratfor

notes, stressing that the region was an object of historical disputes between Russia

and the powers of the south-eastern Europe, which now means Romania and, byextension, the European Union. "With parliamentary elections approaching in

Moldova, former Soviet state became a battleground between pro-Russian and

pro-Western elements. Russia is trying to reach a vantage point, given that it has

strong links with the older generation of Moldova and managed to divide the pro-

Western alliance of Chisinau. But long term, the question is whether Russia will

be able to influence a younger generation who identify more with the West,

"explains the center of analysis, known in international diplomatic circles" private

CIA ".

According to sources cited by Stratfor, Russia asked former Communist PresidentVladimir Voronin after the November elections is to support the Democratic Party

(DP), Marian Lupu (who resigned from the Communist Party to create the party)

or to build a coalition with the Liberal Democrat leader, Filat. Both cases would be

fatal blow to the pro-European coalition: "In both cases, who will lose will

probably be pro-Western President (especially proromn) Ghimpu, whose

popularity is declining," according to Stratfor analysts. One reasons for this,


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consider the reflection group, is that "although the IEA has ruled the country in the

last 18 months, the interim government was weak and had great success." "The

main supporter of the Government, Romania has failed to create a movement able

to strengthen its position in Moldova, like analysis center based in Houston,

Texas.

Presidential Administration in Bucharest refused to make any comment on the

Stratfor analysis, noting that the center of analysis "does not attribute information

to sources, while the Romanian Foreign Ministry announced that the Stratfor

should consider before making any assessment.

Observers geographically closest to the subject see things differently but analysts

Stratfor. Oazu Nantoi, a member of parliament from the Democratic Republic of

Moldova, considered "bizarre" the assumption that investors could come to

Moldova at the request of the Romanian state and considers that Romania is

present substantially assist in Chisinau. Former director of projects at the Institute

for Policy Public before entering politics, reminds Nantoi argued that diplomaticsupport Romania grants Moldova within the EU, but also help financial

100 million granted by the Romanian government, "despite the financial crisis." In

the political strategies of the Democratic Party raised by Stratfor sources, Nantoi

said that, although "not exclude" any post-electoral scenario, "it is highly unlikely

that the Party Democrats respond favorably to a post-election alliance offers

coming from the communists. "

Romanian "lo(al -e)s

Peter Bogatu:

Why Romania

matter?

Chisinau, Eastern Romania (Bessarabia) / Romanian Global News

Friday, October 22, 2010

Russian President, by his statements made after drinking summit in Deauville, provoked a storm ofemotions in Kyiv and Tiraspol. Perplexity experts and politicians is the fact that the Kremlin leadersaid the success of negotiations aimed at Transnistrian settlement "depends on the Romania,ithout mentioning in this context !kraine.

The road passes through Bucharest Transnistrian settlement

round of #ealousy, some analysts and political actors in the $ast no accuses sufficiency Dmitry%edvedev, as claiming that he ould not kno hat ould be the actual situation in the region andaround them. "&ithout !kraine, any negotiations on Transnistria's status change, or ithdraal ofRussian troops are impossible," says, for example, the Party of Regions deputy, (ice )oreign

*ffairs +ommittee, eonid Ko-hara, uoted by the agency Regnum./f course, the key is the Transnistrian settlement and in Kiev, not only in %osco, 0erlin or Paris.1ettlement of multiple conflict reuires international cooperation. 2oever, this time the Russianpresident knos hat he says. The road passes through 0ucharest Transnistrian settlement.The nespaper 3e-avisimaya a-eta, for instance, "conflict resolution reuires ithdraal ofRussian troops from the Transnistrian region, then Romania ould back the mission to get rid of
http://void%280%29/http://www.rgnpress.ro/index2.php?option=com_content&task=emailform&id=45799&itemid=27http://www.rgnpress.ro/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45799&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=27http://void%280%29/


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some conventional eapons." 4t is possible to put the uestion and such. 4 though 4 doubt it.1omething else, hoever, is in the middle.&hat matters most of all Romania's military poer is not, but her strength and political impact on%oldova mentally. 4t is this fact, moreover, has so far been neglected both in Russia and the &estthat ere removed from the negotiation process 0ucharest. 0ut it seems that the %oldovanpolitical developments have brought all grounded.

A change of optical3ot incidentally, *ngela %erkel has recently come to 0ucharest to negotiate ith Traian 0asescuTransnistria. *nd not idly, in %osco discussing burned for some time about the significance ofRomanian factor in the area. &e are seeing a revised role of Romania in %oldova on both $astand &est.

*nd not only is the border treaty hich the erman +hancellor spoke recently in 0ucharest.3either of scholarships for young people in Romania of 0essarabia and offered passports to%oldovan citi-ens. *nd any attempt by %osco, as suggested by some experts to 0ucharestforced to abandon the formula "to states, one people." Things are more complex.Romania could, at that, to drop a political goal. 0ut 0essarabians5 0ut young people feelRomanian5 Romanian factor not only 0ucharest, 4asi and +lu#, but +hisinau. 4t is part of %oldova'snational fiber. The mood left the Prut. Not for nothing that the American agency analysts"Stratfor" have recently reiterated that "Moldova has become a battleground between pro-Russian and pro-estern elements!"

Romanian factor that internal reality3ever mind that many peasants from 0essarabia, ash your head under the 1oviets, but also in(oronin, the %oldovan 6limb7 continues to say "instead of" Romanian language ". *s part of therural population is still manipulated by the +ommunists. 3ational fiber, as described in an excellentessay riter /vid 4vancu, is not among the capitals ith hay. The identity of a nation is crystalli-edin the common culture and history.Therefore, training and education are merely forgotten to remove dust from the essence of theRomanian 0essarabia. *nd this, making every day more and more felt, can not be denied byanyone. Romanian factor, before being a foreign policy issue, is an internal reality in %oldova.Romania counts, so in games Russians, ermans and )rench in the Transnistrian conflict aroundthe time not because of his attitude toards the officials in +hisinau, but that is mostly Romanian

0essarabia. That is clear. 3o political solution is possible here ithout taking into account%oldova's Romanian identity.

Romanian (log: Cotidianul

Communists denounce the EU involvement in the campaign of Moldova Romania

Moldovan Communists have published a letter accusing President Traian Basescu prooccidentalilor

statements of support from Chisinau, stating that they call into question the "sincerity of the availability of

European observers to contribute to a democratic electoral process, free" , informs Mediafax. PCRM warns

on 'direct involvement and highly committed to the leadership of the EU Member State of the Republic of

Moldova in the electoral process. "

Communist Party of Moldova published Tuesday, the official site, "an appeal" to the attention of the

European Commission, European Union Delegation in Moldova, the EU Special Representative andamabsadorilor Member States.

"We point out that Romania's President Traian Basescu, in a TV interview recently granted, Sunday,

October 17, 2010, stated publicly and openly that Romania supports the early parliamentary elections AEI,

represented by parties led The Ghimpu Lupu Filat Urechean "reads the" address "Moldovan Communists.

Basescu added that the Communists made the statement immediately after the publication of information

on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on state funding from Romania, over many years,

publications and other media Republic of Moldova, well known for their political and policy information

directly. "


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These are publications like "Time in the morning" and "Jurnal de Chisinau", which appear on the list of

publications funded by the Department of Romanians from Everywhere. Recently, the agency Stratfor

reported that the U.S. asked the Romanian government to create more NGOs and media

organizations in Moldova, but hampered by the economic crisis action.

PCRM believes that "such statements can be refuted only by public condemnation of these statements by

the President of Romania, Mr. Traian Basescu by reprezetanii European Union officials in Moldova, as

well as the European Commission.President Traian Basescu said on Sunday ProTV, that conclusion does not preclude pro-European power in

Chisinau of an agreement regulating the traffic at border with Moldova, "the Communists to take their

argument" Romania wants Moldova to take over '. "

"Romanian foreign policy, I, we rely on the Alliance for Europe, the alliance now in power (editor's note. -

AEI, AEI), because she made a policy that allowed the realization of our effort to bring R. Moldova and the

EU. And I can tell you that we are willing to strengthen the credibility of the alliance, diplomatic efforts to

do even public transit that is an agreement, regulating the mode of movement across borders, "the president

said.

"ermany/s 0eutsche 1elle commented on our Moldova piece2 )hich Romanian

media too! the 0eutsche 1elle article+ 'could only access e3cerpt*

Republic of Moldova, polygon between

West and EastAuthor:Deutsche Welle

U.S. agency analysts "Stratfor" notes that "the Republic of Moldova became a battleground between

pro-Russian and pro-Western elements."

Breakaway Transnistrian problem is that, at some stage, may block access of Moldova in the European

Union. Chisinau is why attempts to solve the Transnistrian conflict in close parallel with the EU.

For 18 years, the Transnistrian conflict simmers and is maintained by Eastern blast. It transpires including

negotiation format - unbalanced and disadvantageous for Chisinau.
http://www.evz.ro/de-acelasi-autor/autor/deutsche-welle.htmlhttp://www.evz.ro/de-acelasi-autor/autor/deutsche-welle.htmlhttp://www.evz.ro/de-acelasi-autor/autor/deutsche-welle.html


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@tratfor 3rticles

The Outlook for Russian Influence in

MoldovaOctober 8, 2010 | 1150 GMT

Summary

As Moldovas parliamentary elections approach, the former Soviet state is becoming a key battleground

between pro-Russian and pro-Western elements and their respective supporters. Russia looks to have the

advantage, as it has strong ties to the older Moldovan generation and has successfully divided Chisinaus

pro-Western bloc. But the long-term question is whether Russia will be able to influence a younger

generation that identifies more with the West.

Analysis

With Moldovas parliamentary elections approaching in November, the tiny but strategically significant

former Soviet country has become a key battleground between pro-Russian and pro-Western elements and

their respective backers in Moscow and the West. Russia has maintained the upper hand in this struggle forinfluence by strengthening its own allies in the country and dividing the pro-European bloc. But the real

question beyond the elections is whether Russia will be able to influence the younger generation,

which does not identify itself nearly as much with Moscow as does the older generation. This will serve as

an important test for Russias hold over Moldova in the future.

Moldova draws the attention of outside powers due to its strategic location between the Carpathian

Mountains and the Black Sea. This region has historically been a battleground between Russia and powers

in southeastern Europe, which today meansRomaniaand by extension the wider European Union.

Romania has deep cultural and traditional links to Moldova and has enhanced its political and security

relationship, while Russia has troops stationed in Moldovas breakaway territory of Transdniestria.

Germany has weighed in, isolating Transdniestria as a key issue for the ongoing negotiations on theEU-

Russia security pact,which is an element of the nascent EU-Russia Political and Security Committee.

Germany called for Russia to remove its troops from Transdniestria as a prerequisite for this security

format, and more broadly as a test for whether the new forum would succeed.The larger geopolitical questions about Moldovas future follow 18 months of internal political paralysis. A

series of elections in 2009 failed to produce a large-enough majority (61 seats out of 100) in the parliament

for either of the two major parties/blocs the pro-Russian Communists and the four pro-European parties

that make up the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) to name a president. Because of this, Moldova

has been without a true head of state throughout this 18-month stalemate. Since the AEI gained more seats

in the elections than the Communists in absolute terms, the prime ministry was given to the head of the

AEI, Vlad Filat, and the acting presidency was assumed by another pro-European, Mihai Ghimpu. But
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090415_geopolitical_diaryhttp://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090415_geopolitical_diaryhttp://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090415_geopolitical_diaryhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090603_moldova_new_elections_set_after_parliament_fails_elect_presidenthttp://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090415_geopolitical_diaryhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090603_moldova_new_elections_set_after_parliament_fails_elect_president


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without the majority and its associated political legitimacy, the pro-European bloc has had a very weak

mandate to rule the country.

With the political situation in Chisinau stalemated, the struggle for influence in the country is heating up. In

just the past few months, Moldovas pro-Western leadership has publicly called for Russia to remove its

troops from Transdniestria, while Ghimpu made a controversial decree establishing June 28 as Soviet

Occupation Day in the country (a move which has since been reversed by Moldovas Constitutional

Court). For its part, Russia temporarily banned Moldovan wineand mineral water exports and enlisted itsnewly regained partner, Ukraine,to assist in pressuring Moldova. The pro-Western Moldovan leadership

responded by further reaching out to Romania. The AEI then sponsored a referendum that called for the

direct election of the president in order to break the deadlock in the parliament, but this referendum failed

due to low voter turnout, undoubtedly influenced by Russian and Communist party calls to boycott the

vote.

Following the failed referendum, Moscow has gone even further with its strategy to consolidate influence

in Moldova by dividing the pro-European coalition and making sure it has sway with every major coalition

player. It has helped Russia that this coalition is fractured to begin with, as several of the leaders, including

Filat, are more concerned with advancing their own personal and party interests ahead of those of the

coalition. Russia also signed a party agreementwith another coalition leader, Marian Lupu, a former

Communist leader who switched sides to the European coalition for political gains but never got the desired

results thus essentially becoming a free agent willing to work for the highest bidder. According to

STRATFOR sources, Russia has asked former president and Communist leader Vladimir Voronin to throwhis weight either behind Lupu or to build a coalition with Filat after the elections, which could deliver a

fatal blow to the pro-European coalition. Either way, the loser in all of this will likely be the countrys

acting and ardently pro-Western (specifically pro-Romanian) president, Ghimpu, whose popularity has

been in decline.

But while Russia is setting the stage to resurge in Moldova, the truth is that on the ground, Russian

influence never left. Though the AEI has governed the country for the past 18 months, it has been a weak

interim government and has had relatively little success. The governments primary backer, Romania, has

not set up a grassroots movement capable of significantly boosting its position on the ground in Moldova.

According to STRATFOR sources, the United States asked Romania to set up nongovernmental

organizations, media outlets and investment funds in the country, but Romania has not been successful in

its pursuits in large part because of an ongoing economic and political crisis within its own borders.

Germany, which as the most important player in the European Union ostensibly shares the aims of the pro-

European coalition, had previously said Russia must remove its troops from Transdniestria in order for the

prospective EU-Russian Political and Security Committee to proceed. However, because of Berlins

growing ties with Moscow in other fields, this is proving not to be the redline it had appeared to be.

STRATFOR sources report that Germanys representative on the issue, Patricia Flor, told Russia that if

Moscow could get a resolution between Transdniestria and Moldova started then Germany would be more

acquiescent to Russias renewed influence in the country. Germany also said that if Russia could get such a

resolution started then the rest of the European Union would see it as a positive step in security assurances

to Europe, strengthening the EU-Russian Political and Security Committee and potentially allowing Berlin

to get more support from fellow EU member states on the Russian proposal for a new European Security

Treaty. And the United States simply has not shown any direct interest in the country, distracted by its

involvement in the Middle East.

That Russia will continue to be the dominant external power in Moldova is all but a given. But while

Russia has deep ties with the older Moldovan generation who lived through the Soviet era, the importantquestion is whether Russia can start to influence the new generation, which considers itself much more pro-

Western or actually tied to Romanian identity (in terms of culture, rather than the Romanian state). This

younger generation does not identify with the Soviet past. Concentrated though not exclusively based in the

capital, this group is also tech-savvy, (as demonstrated by the Twitter revolution in Chisinaulast year

following elections). Russia has tried to influence this younger population, as can be seen by Moscow

expanding its ties with non-Communist parties, but this is an area where Russia has only recently begun its

efforts. Ultimately, the degree to which Moscow will focus its resurgence on winning over this generation

will determine its influence in Moldova well beyond the upcoming elections.
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An Agreement Between Russian,

Moldovan Political PartiesSeptember 16, 2010 | 2201 GMTDemocratic Party of Moldova leader Marian Lupu at a parliamentary session in Chisinau

Marian Lupu, head of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), visited Moscow Sept. 16 and met with

Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Administration of the President of Russia, and State Duma speaker Boris

Gryzlov. Lupu and Gryzlov and signed a cooperation agreement between the PDM, which is a member of

Moldovas ruling pro-European coalition, and United Russia, the ruling party of Russia.

Akin to the old Soviet tactic of linking other countries parties to the Communist Party, the agreement calls

for consultations between the two parties and regular exchanges of party delegations. It will also enhance

Russias influence in Moldova and give the Kremlin a strategic foothold to undermine the countrys pro-

European elements.

The cooperation agreement comes at a critical time for Moldova. The country recently held a referendum,

supported by the pro-European coalition, to directly elect the president. The referendum failed, resulting in

a call for parliamentary elections, likely to be held in late November. The Moldovan Parliament has been

split between the pro-European coalition, supported by Romania,and the Communists, supported by

Russia. Neither side has been able to decisively outmaneuver the other for power in the country, and the

result so far has been 18 months ofpolitical deadlock.

The upcoming elections present an opportunity for either pro-Russian or pro-Western elements to break

this deadlock and solidify power in Moldova. Moscow recently intensified movesto increase its influence

in the tiny country, ranging from pressuring the government by banning wine and fruit exports to enlisting

neighboring Ukraine to help Russia in its mediation efforts over the breakaway republic of Transdniestria.

Russia has effectively consolidated the Communists and pro-Russian elements in the country but has faced

stiff competition from the pro-Europeans and their backers.

Now, with the signing of the cooperation agreement with Lupus pro-European PDM, Moscow has gone

straight to the core of the competition. What makes Lupu important is that he was a leader in the

Communist Party until he broke with party boss and former president Vladimir Voronin in 2009. Russia

reportedly has been trying to push Lupu to leave the pro-European coalition and form a bloc with theCommunist Party when new elections are held.

Whether Russia is able to accomplish this remains to be seen, but Russia could have more power if Lupu

and his party stayed in the European coalition in order to sabotage the bloc until the elections.

Nevertheless, the cooperation agreement alone weakens the unity of the pro-Europeans in the run-up to

elections and could shift the balance of power in Moldova significantly toward Moscow.

Moldova: Russia's Next Target?August 9, 2010 | 2151 GMT

Summary

The head of one of the parties in Moldovas pro-European ruling coalition said Aug. 9 that the coalition de

facto no longer exists. This is just the latest in a series of events indicating rifts within the ruling

Moldovan coalition rifts that Russia could use as a way to increase its influence in Chisinau.Analysis

The leader of the Democratic Party one of four parties in Moldovas ruling Alliance for European

Integration (AEI) said Aug. 9 that the ruling coalition de facto no longer exists. Democratic Party

chief Marian Lupu said that although the coalition officially has held together, he was ashamed to belong

to the same coalition as Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and acting President Mihai Ghimpu, and that

he would stand as a candidate in the countrys upcoming presidential elections.
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Lupus statements are only the latest sign of rifts within Moldovas ruling coalition of pro-European

parties. Russia sees these rifts as an opportunity to assess just how much effort as well as risk it is

willing to take in increasing its influence in Chisinau at the pro-European elements expense.

According to STRATFOR sources in Moscow, Moldova could be the next former Soviet country where

Russia will target pro-European political elements. This follows a key development in May, when Russian

President Dmitri Medvedev and his newly elected pro-Russian counterpart in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich,

issued ajoint declarationthat their countries would work together to address the ongoing dispute over thebreakaway province ofTransdniestria.There are two ways that Russia with Ukraines help could

address the Moldovan issue in the short term. One is to attempt to bring Transdniestria under control along

with the rest of Moldova, and the other is to maintain hegemony over just Transdniestria and settle for a

split country, without controlling Moldova proper.

Circumstances in Moldova could make the country vulnerable to Russias designs. The government is weak

and splitamong the AEI member parties and faces constant challenges from the pro-Russian Communists,

who are now in the opposition. The pro-European Ghimpu has made some extremely controversial moves

like issuing a decree to mark June 28 as Soviet Occupation Day (which has since been overturned by the

countrys Constitutional Court). This not only angered Transdniestria and caused Russia to retaliate by

targeting the countrys wine exports,but polarized the pragmatic pro-European elements within Moldova

as well, as evidenced by Lupus recent statements. This has caused the pro-European blocs popularity to

fall and the Communists to make a comeback in the polls, and sets the stage for a referendum scheduled for

September that could see a new set of general elections, likely in November. The Communists could thenretake power from the fragile AEI.

Russia is not the only outside power vying for influence in Moldova; another more traditional suitor is

Romania, which has cultural and ethnic ties to the country. Romania, seeing the course of recent events in

Ukraine,has been pursuing Moldova aggressively, thinking it could be the next former Soviet state to fall

to Moscow. Romanian President Traian Basescu recently stated that the two Romanian-speaking territories

should be reunited, and that, should Ukraine make a move for Transdniestria or Moldova, Romania would

use the Romanian populations in western Ukraine mainly Bucovina to challenge Kiev. Ukraine and

Russia have taken Basescus comments quite seriously. Basescus comments were also controversial within

Moldova, where many citizens are against being split between Ukraine and Romania and instead want

Moldova to remain its own independent country.

The Transdniestria issue is also a key topic that Germany specifically suggested Berlin and Moscow work

on as they seek tostrengthen their ties via the Russia-EU Security Council. German Chancellor Angela

Merkel said Transdniestria should be a priority for Russian-EU talks, and the issue was at the top of the

agenda for Merkels meeting with Medvedev in June. Germany drafted a proposal for negotiations on the

issue, but this included Russia removing its troops from Transdniestria something Moscow has said it

would not do. As Russia and Germany increase cooperation in the economic and energy sectors, the

Transdniestria issue could slow this warming of relations. Russia expanding its influence in Ukraine is one

thing, but Moldova may be a little too far into Europe for even Russia-friendly Germany to be comfortable

with. Russias overtures in Moldova therefore could ripple across the rest of Europe, depending on how far

Moscow decides to go to increase its influence in Chisinau.

Russia's Growing Influence in Ukraine

and Moldova@e"tember G& 2010 S 1%1G =MT
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@ummaryA referendum to hold direct presidential elections in Moldova failed to attract the necessary voter turnout to

be binding. The referendums defeat is a victory for the opposition Communists, who called for a boycott

of the vote. It also illustrates how Russias influence in Moldova is growing. Russias progress in

consolidating its influence in Moldova was made possible by the speed with which Moscow was able to

bring Ukraine back into its fold.

3nalysisA constitutional referendum in Moldova on Sept. 5 that called for the direct election of the president failed

to garner the necessary 33 percent voter turnout to be binding (turnout was less than 30 percent). This is a

defeat for the ruling pro-European coalition that initiated the referendum and a victory for the opposition

Communists, who called for a boycott of the referendum. It also putsMoldova back into the deadlockthat

has dominated the political scene in Chisinau for 18 months. According to the Moldovan Constitution,

parliament must now be dissolved. The ruling coalition proposed Sept. 8 to hold snap parliamentary

elections Nov. 21.

The importance of the Moldova referendum goes beyond the tiny countrys internal politics; it is

representative of Moldovas importance as a battleground country between the West and Russia. The

referendums defeat shows Moscows growing influence in the country and is directly tied to Russias

consolidation of another nearby former Soviet country: Ukraine.

Russia Reshapes UkraineRussia has made a priority of securing its southwestern flank in Europe ever since the pro-Western OrangeRevolution swept Ukraine in 2004. Of all the former Soviet countries, Ukraine is the most strategic to

Russia: Its industrial and agricultural sectors are virtually integrated into Russias own economic heartland,

and 80 percent of the energy supplies Russia sends to Europe transit through Ukraine. The Orange

Revolution and the pro-Western movements consideration of membership in Western blocs like NATO

were a threat to Russias very survival. Pro-Western forces takeover in Kiev marked a turning point for

Russia that would lead Moscow to focus all its efforts onexpunging Western influence in its peripheryand

re-establishing its own.

A little more than five years later, Russia has both turned Ukraine back toward Moscow and solidified its

presence in the country. Under the Orange Coalition, Ukraine had a dysfunctional government perennially

stuck between the competing interests and ambitions of then-President Viktor Yushchenko and then-Prime

Minister Yulia Timoshenko. However, under current pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich (who lost

the election in the Orange Revolution), this deadlock has been all but broken. Yanukovich appointed aloyalist and fellow pro-Russian, Nikolai Azarov, as prime minister and created a majority in parliament for

his Party of Regions through some crafty constitutional maneuvers.With an ally who has no grand political

ambitions of his own as prime minister and a noncontentious parliament, Yanukovich has been able to

consolidate much of the rest of Ukraines political apparatus, ranging from regional heads to Cabinet

ministries.

The level of political control that Yanukovich has gained has translated into consolidations in other areas

particularly the military and security services. Russia has been the primary beneficiary of this change.

Months after his inauguration, Yanukovich signed a landmark dealthat extended Russias lease for its

Black Sea Fleet in Ukraines Crimean peninsula by 25 years in exchange for lower gas prices from Russia.

This was a significant reversal from the approach taken by Yushchenko, who not only did not support an

extension of the lease on the fleets base in Sevastopol but also periodically called for its removal. For the

population in Crimea, which has historical and cultural ties to Russia and sees the Black Sea Fleet as a

symbol of Moscows protection of the region from Kiev, Yanukovichs approach is much more favorableand realistic than Yushchenkos.

In terms of the security services, Yanukovich has dismissed many of the pro-Western Yushchenko

appointees and, according to STRATFOR sources in Kiev, has enacted a full reconciliation between

Ukraines intelligence service, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Russias Federal Security

Service (FSB). In a meeting between SBU head Valery Khoroshkovsky and FSB chief Alexander

Bortnikov in May, an agreement was reached that will allow FSB officers to work in Sevastopol to protect

the Black Sea Fleet from Western operations. Under the agreement, the SBUs top counterespionage

department has made the United States, rather than Russia, its principal target (along with the United
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Kingdoms MI6). Essentially, Ukraine has realigned its military and security apparatus so that it is similar

to what it was during the Soviet era.

Shifting Attention to MoldovaBecause Russia consolidated Ukraine relatively quickly, it has been able to move on to the next state on its

southwestern flank: Moldova. While Ukraine is critical for Russias survival, Moldova situated just

between the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea represents the last piece of territory (historically

known as the Bessarabian Gap) that Russia needs to control in order to secure itself from the southwest.Russia already has de factocontrol over Transdniestria, the breakaway sliver of territory in eastern

Moldova, but this does not offer the protection from encroaching Southeastern European powers that

Moldova proper does. Threats from Southeastern Europe historically were embodied by such foes as the

Ottoman Empire; today, the main threat is from Romania,which has strong cultural and historic links to

Moldova.

Although Romania certainly cannot rival Russias military or economic power, its membership in the

Western blocs like the European Union and NATO particularly its alliance with the United States

poses the true threat to Russia through the Moldovan corridor. Romania has actively supported Moldovas

pro-European parties and the countrys NATO membership bid, and acting Moldovan President Mihai

Ghimpu has called for Russia to remove all its troops from Transdniestria. Ghimpu also passed a

controversial decree establishing June 28 as Soviet Occupation Day, though this has since been

overturned.

Russia has created its own pressure on the Western elements in Chisinau by banning Moldovas wineexportsand backing the opposition Communists. Russia has also enlisted Ukraines help in tackling the

Transdniestria issue; the two countries formed a strategic partnership to find a solution, and Ukraine has

used its own ethnic ties in Moldovato support Russias overtures. This shows that Ukraine is back in

Russias camp and that Moscow has enlisted Kiev to help reach the Kremlins foreign policy goals.

The failed constitutional referendum, which had been put forth by pro-European elements in Chisinau to

entrench their rule, is a clear signal that Russias approach is working thus far. Moldova has by no means

definitively shifted back toward Russia as a result of the referendum, but Russia has proven that it has

enough influence to block the pro-Europeans and their backers. And if Ukraine is a telling example, Russia

could have the blueprint to pull another strategic former Soviet country on its southwestern flank away

from the West and toward Moscow.

Geopolitical Diary: Glimmers of

Greater Romania?April 16, 2009 | 0053 GMT

Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin on Wednesday said that talk of issuing Romanian passports to

Moldovan citizens was the best and clearest proof that Romania wants to annex Moldova.

Voronin was referring to Romanian President Traian Basescus remarks to the parliament in Bucharest,

where he said he had asked for a legal change that would speed up the process of regaining citizenship for

those Romanians and their families who lost it abusively. Such a change essentially would give Romanian

citizenship to Moldovans who have at least one Romanian grandparent a criterion that would apply to upto 1 million people, or a quarter of Moldovas population.

For Romania, Moldova presents both strategic value and security liabilities. Its strategic value lies in

geography and the fact that it buffers Romania against Russia. Romania, which shares its eastern borders

with Ukraine and Moldova, joined NATO in 2004 putting it squarely in the middle of the wider

Russian-Western contest over Moscows sphere of influence. The Russians have troops and significant

political influence in territories claimed by both Ukraine and Moldova. The troop presence in Moldovas

breakaway Transdniestria region is particularly significant, since it places the frozen conflict in Moldova at
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Analysis

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev arrived in Kiev on May 17 for a two-day visit. He chaired a meeting of

the interstate commission and held talks with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. The leaders made

several joint statements during the meeting the latest in a series of visits and consultations since the pro-

Russian Yanukovich was elected in February that could end up producing several agreements between

the two countries.

Energy and military deals have gained the most attention as Russia and Ukraine have begun strengtheningtheir ties under Yanukovich. However, there could be an even more comprehensive deal in the works

involving another former Soviet republic Moldova which would put crucial components of Ukraines

foreign policy under Russian control.

Energy has been one of the most significant areas of cooperation between Moscow and Kiev since

Yanukovich was sworn in as president. Russia and Ukraine signed acomprehensive deal on April 21that

lowered the price Kiev pays Moscow for natural gas by 30 percent, allegedly in return for another

agreement which saw Russias lease in the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea extended by 25 years to 2042.

After this deal, Russian officials called for the merger of Russian energy giant Gazprom and Ukraines

state-owned energy firm Naftogaz. Indeed, Medvedev reiterated this position during his current visit,

saying that such a merger was possible on a mutually beneficial basis and that it would be a pragmatic

move.

The idea has met resistance and created controversy in Ukraine. Certain officials, including Ukrainian

Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov, have acknowledged that the merger is being considered, but others, likeleading opposition figure and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, have flatly rejected such an

agreement. Even Yanukovich has been careful not to endorse the merger, saying that no such deal would be

made without the protection of Ukraines national interests.

But Yanukovichs lack of endorsement of the Gazprom-Naftogaz merger does not necessarily mean the

unification will never materialize; rather, it represents Yanukovich playing a delicate rhetorical game for

public and political purposes while negotiations are under way. Ukraine is still a politically divided

country. Much of the public particularly in western Ukraine, which is more oriented toward Europe than

toward Russia would be infuriated if a merger occurred suddenly. The furor would threaten the strong

mandate to rulethat Yanukovich has gained since his election. Yanukovich also wants to wait to move on

the Gazprom-Naftogaz issue because he is focused on trying to sideline his primary political foe,

Timoshenko, by getting her charged with judicial tampering during the presidential election.

Furthermore, if Yanukovich immediately endorsed the deal, it would send a message to Europe that

Ukraine has become nothing more than a Russian lackey. Yanukovich who has pledged to be non-

aligned between Russia and Europe and to pursue a dual-vector foreign policy has a strategic interest

in not making large moves too suddenly. But this does not mean he will condemn the deal. Such large

energy mergers are technical and the two parties involved will have many issues to work out; Russia even

said the deal will not be finalized until October at the earliest. And with the current pace of visits and

meetings between Russia and Ukraine, it is likely that momentum could build albeit slowly toward

the Gazprom-Naftogaz merger.

Energy deals are not the only important agreements Medvedev and Yanukovich are discussing.

STRATFOR sources in Kiev report that Medvedev and Yanukovich will declare a coordinated effort for

conflict resolution in Moldovas breakaway province of Transdniestria. Mediation efforts over

Transdniestria with participants including Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe as official members, and the European Union and United States as observers will

thus be given a renewed focus and energy, but with a twist.This agreement is meant to make Ukraine feel like it is a strategic part of the mediation and foreign policy

decision-making process in Moldova. Ukraine is important: It borders Moldova proper and the

Transdniestria region, and roughly 100,000 Ukrainians reside in the country. Add to this the presence of

150,000 Russians in the country, as well as the 5,000 Russian troops stationed in Transdniestria, and the

two countries form a formidable force in Moldova.

While this agreement nominally will fulfill Ukraines desire to become a bigger part of the negotiation

process in Moldova, it is likely more of a Russian attempt to entrench its influence in both countries. Kiev

will now fully support Russian troops remaining in Transdniestria an issue on which former Ukrainian
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President Viktor Yushchenkos administration held a skeptical view. That regime also was prone to border

closings with Transdniestria, but under Yanukovich, this could change to more positive relations as Russia

attempts to integrate the region more closely with Ukraine and by extension, Russia.

But such attempts will face resistance from Moldova proper. Though the country is in political deadlock

and has been without a true president for more than a year, the government is led by a coalition that favors

European integration and has reached out to EU countries, particularly Romania, which holds influence in

Moldova via cultural and linguistic ties. But the Europeans are mired in their own political and financialproblems and do not have much energy to spend on Moldova at the moment. That opens the door for

Russia, which has enlisted the Ukrainians help.

If the agreement on Moldova between Kiev and Moscow does materialize, this will represent Ukraines

transition to a formal Russian foreign policy tool. While energy deals are significant, Ukraine could be

moving into roles beyond pipeline politics, marking a different and deeper level of reintegration with

Moscow.

Russia: Will the Customs Union Partners

Cooperate?July 30, 2010 | 2119 GMT

VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images

Workers from the Georgian Wines and Spirits company picking grapes near the town of Telavi

Gennady Onishchenko, head of Russias Federal Service for Consumer Rights Protection, asked Belarus

and Kazakhstan on July 30 to not allow wine and mineral water imports from Moldova and Georgia into

Russia. Onishchenko said this request did not mean that Russia is imposing its will on Belarus and

Kazakhstan to restrict their rights to use these products, but that Moscow has exercised its right as a

member of the customs unionbetween Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to demand that they take

exhaustive measures so as not to allow these products into Russian territory.Although Russias demands are focused on these specific goods, this is significant because wine exports

are a substantial part of the Moldovan and Georgian economies. Wine and water exports made up 4.8

percent of Georgias total exports in 2009, and water and wine exports to the customs union countries made

up 2 percent of total exports in 2009. Moldova exports an insignificant amount of water, but wine makes up

10 percent of total exports, and 80 percent of those wine exports go to Russia.

On a more strategic level, this is the first time Russia has attempted to use the customs union as a political

weapon against non-member countries. This move could set a precedent for Russia targeting other

countries particularly those in the former Soviet sphere that rely on Russia as their export market to

achieve its strategic goals with the help of its customs union partners.

But Belarus and Kazakhstans cooperation is not guaranteed. It is key to watch how both countries

especiallyBelarus will respond to Russias request. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko not

only has had very public disputeswith Russia over natural gas and the customs union relationship recently,

he has also met with Russias arch-nemesis in the region, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, andcould be meeting soon with Moldovan acting President Mihai Ghimpu, who has also publicly spoken

against Russia on theTransdniestria issue.

Russias call for Belarus and Kazakhstan to help it enforce the wine and water embargo, therefore, will

serve as a key test of the strength of the customs union relationship, and relations in general between

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. That this request comes so quickly after Lukashenkos obstinacy toward

Russia reached a new peak could indicate that Moscow is testing the Belarusian leader.
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Russia: Targeting Moldova's Wine

Industry?June 30, 2010 | 1637 GMTRussias chief medical officer and head of the Federal Consumer Protection Service Gennady Onishchenko

said June 30 that Russia will tighten control of Moldovan wine exports to Russia after several batches of

wine failed to meet Russian safety standards. Russia will monitor imports of Moldovan wine more closely,

and the process of opening new points of entry for Moldovan wine in places like St. Petersburg could be

suspended, though Russia does not plan to ban Moldovan wine altogether, Onishchenko said.

This move could be a pressure tactic, as relations between Russia and Moldova soured after acting

Moldovan President Mihai Ghimpu issued a decree establishing June 28 as Soviet Occupation Day and

called for Russia to remove all its troopsfrom the breakaway region of Transdniestria. Moscow has proven

that it is willing to target specific industries in countries that have been unfriendly toward Russia; it placed

a temporary ban on Georgian wine in 2006 and on Belarusian dairy products in 2009. Now, Moscow could

be targeting Moldovas wine industry, a significant part of the countrys economy.

Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of around $5.4

billion. The former Soviet countrys economy is heavily dependent on Russia, withremittancesfrom

Moldovan workers (most of whom work in Russia) totaling around 30 percent of GDP in 2008. The wine

industry is an important part of Moldovas economy; in 2005, wine exports accounted for nearly 10 percent

of Moldovas GDP and wine exports to Russia made up nearly 20 percent of Moldovas total exports.

These figures have declined since Russia began cutting some of these exports after a temporary ban in

2006. Still, Russia remains the largest single market for Moldovas wine exports; in 2009, wine exports to

Russia made up more than 3.1 percent of Moldovas total exports, and the wine industry equaled nearly 2.4

percent of Moldovas GDP. In short, a cut in Moldovas wine exports to Russia would surely affect the tiny

countrys economy.

In addition to having a weak and Russia-dependent economy, Moldova has been mired in political issues.

The country is split between a coalition of pro-European parties geared toward integration with the

European Union and the pro-Russian Communist Party. This split has created a political deadlock, with

neither group able to muster enough support for a presidential candidate (the president is elected directly bythe parliament). This led to two failed electionsin 2009 and has left the country in a state of flux under

Ghimpu.

Ghimpu, with support from Moldovas primary European backer, Romania,has been particularly bellicose

recently in calling for the expunging of Russian influence, even though Moldova and the Transdniestria

issue is one on which Russia and Germany have pledged to cooperate under the EU-Russia Security

Councilproposal. By targeting Moldovas wine industry, Russia might be displaying its own levers against

the country. Moscow likely will not hesitate to take further action if Moldovas pro-European elements

grow too bold.

Moldova: Seeking NATO Membership?August 20, 2009 | 2052 GMT

Summary

Vlad Filat, head of the Moldovan Liberal Democratic Party, said Aug. 20 that he wants to hold a

referendum on integrating Moldova into NATO. The move threatens to tear apart Moldovas ruling pro-

European coalition and draw unwelcome attention from Russia.

Analysis

The president of the Moldovan Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM), Vlad Filat, said Aug. 20 that he is

working on a plan to hold a referendum on integrating Moldova into NATO. This is the first time in several
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years that a senior member of the Moldovan government has mentioned such a plan. Not only could such a

plan rip the government apart, it could also attract unwanted attention from outside powers, like Russia.

Moldova, the poorest nation in Europe, is a small country sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine along

what was the southwestern frontier of the Soviet Union. Currently, there are 500 Russian troops in

Transdniestria, Moldovas secessionist region. The country has been a longtime arena for the tug-of-war

between Russiaand the West.Knowing that any shift in its foreign policy would make the country a target

of either the West or Russia, Moldova wrote into its constitution in 1994 that it is a politically neutralcountry.

But Moldovas ability to remain neutral has been put to the test after the countrys disputed April elections

and fresh elections in July.The elections gave rise toviolent demonstrationsacross the country and ousted

the Communist Party from the majority for the first time since 2001.

A four-party pro-European coalition called the Alliance for European Integration took the Communist

Partys place. The coalition comprises Filats PLDM, the Liberal Party (PL), the Democratic Party of

Moldova (PDM) and the Alliance Our Moldova (AMN). The coalitions stated goal is to create a balance

for Moldova between the West and Russia while it forges a closer relationship with the European Union

a risky move for the new government, especially since the pro-European coalition has majority in the

parliament but is eight seats shy of the 61 needed to elect a presidentwithout an agreement with the

Communists. (The new parliament will convene Aug. 28 to try to agree on a new president, though the

election is expected to end in deadlock, as the two most recent presidential elections did.)

Though the majority coalition is pro-European, that is not the same as being pro-NATO. Moreover, the fourparties in the coalition have their own agendas regarding relations with Europe, which makes any move

toward a NATO membership bid a possible powder keg.

Following the July election, the coalition agreed that it made sense for Moldova to work toward further

social and economic integration with Europe since it borders Romania, a large EU member. But as far as a

bid for NATO membership, Filats PLDM is the only member of the coalition that has said it is ready for

such an alliance. Two of the other coalition members the PL and PDM are committed to Moldovas

neutrality, while the AMN is technically pro-Western but still has strong ties to Russian powers within

Moldova.

Also, the other three coalition members know that any referendum on the issue could very well fail and

create an enormous backlash from a large portion of the Moldovan population. Chisinaus striving for

NATO membership could also restart the pro-Russian secessionist region of Transdniestrias struggle for

independence and could make Moldova a target for Russia, which has deep social, economic and political

ties to the country.

If Filat is serious about backing a NATO bid, it could be the end of the coalition. If the other coalition

members back out, it could bring another round of demonstrations and possibly even new elections, giving

the Communists another chance to retake the government.

Moldova: New Elections Set After

Parliament Fails to Elect PresidentJune 3, 2009 | 1623 GMT

Moldovas parliament failed to elect a president June 3, with leading candidate acting Prime Minister

Zinaida Greceanii coming up one vote short of the 61 votes needed to win the post. This is the second time

in three weeks that Greceanii the Communist party candidate and outgoing President Vladimir

Voronins personal choice failed to win by a single vote. As a result, Voronin must dissolve the
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Communist-led parliament, which was just elected in April, and new general elections will be held 45 days

after the dissolution.

Moldova has been in a state of political chaos ever since the ruling Communist party won parliamentary

elections held April 5. The opposition and several thousand demonstrators claimed the election was rigged,

and took to the streets and damaged several government buildings in protests that turned violent. Though

international election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said

the elections were held fairly, the protests continued for several days until Voronin ordered a recount,which confirmed the Communist partys victory.

Voronin was quick to blame Romaniafor the uprising, claiming that Romanian intelligence services

organized the protests as part of an attempt to pull Moldova into Romanias sphere of influence and into the

Western institutional systemin general. Russia watched the protests closely, as it has a large presence in

the country. Several thousand Russian troops are stationed in the Moldovan breakaway province of

Transdniestria,and Moscow has many assets at its disposal (including firm ties to Greceanii though

Russia has closer relations with another candidate who was up for consideration, former Moldovan

Ambassador to Russia Andrei Negutsa) to make sure that it retains its influence in the region.

The opposition parties have since boycotted both presidential votes, leaving the political system in a state

of stalemate and giving the opposition a chance to regroup and consolidate its influence at the expense of

the incumbent Communists.

The stage is now set for a more heated battle between the Communists and the opposition. Whereas OSCE

monitors said the last elections were for the most part fair, the results of the latest presidential vote coulddrive both the Communists and the opposition parties to cheat. Ultimately, it will come down to who has

more resources to use in manipulating the system. This means that the Romanian and Russian intelligence

services could end up in a sort of proxy political contest over the coming weeks as each tries to help its side

win.

STRATFOR will keep close watch as the situation develops. The protests that plagued Moldova in April

could well reappear (even if only for campaigning purposes) and could well become violent again.

Whoever wins the upcoming elections, it is clear that more than two forces are at work in Moldova, and the

stakes are high.

Moldova: Protests Continue in the

CapitalApril 8, 2009 | 1821 GMT

Protests continued in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on April 8 as President Vladimir Voronin accused

neighboring Romania of instigating the violence through intelligence activities. Voronin claimed that

Bucharest is acting on a long-held desire to incorporate Moldova into Romania. He expelled Romanian

Ambassador Filip Teodorescu and declared that Moldova will institute a visa regime for Romanian

citizens. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry said, Judging by the slogans shouted in the squares,

plenty of Romanian flags in the hands of organizers of these outrages, their aim is to discredit the

achievements in strengthening the sovereignty of Moldova.

The protests in Chisinau began April 6, after elections in which Voronins Communist Party were

victorious. Although Voronin must step down after two terms, he said he would stay in the government insome capacity. This fueled anger among student groups and the opposition. Protesters claim the elections

were fraudulent, even though observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

reported that the elections met international standards and that election day was peaceful and well-

organized. Moldovan Interior Ministry spokeswoman Ala Meleca said since the protests began, police have

arrested 193 people on charges of hooliganism and robbery.

The events in Moldova are moving to the forefront of the confrontationbetween the resurgent Russia and

the West.
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