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STC

175 STCTTS 16 E rev. 1 finOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM:

THE RISE OF DAESH ANDFUTURE CHALLENGES

REPORT

Maria MARTENS (Netherlands)Rapporteur

Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security

www.nato-pa.int 20 novembre 2016

175 STCTTS 16 E rev. 1 fin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

II. POTENTIAL TERRORIST CBRN WEAPONS........................................................................2

III. THE CBRN EFFORTS OF DAESH.........................................................................................3

IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE TERRORIST CBRN THREAT..............................5A. KEY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS................................................................................6B. NATO EFFORTS...........................................................................................................8C. EU EFFORTS................................................................................................................9

V. CBRN SECURITY.................................................................................................................10

VI. EMERGING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND CBRN WEAPONS................................12A. CHEMICAL TRENDS..................................................................................................12B. BIOLOGICAL TRENDS...............................................................................................13C. NANOTECHNOLOGY.................................................................................................14D. UNMANNED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY......................................................................15E. CYBER TECHNOLOGIES...........................................................................................16F. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING....................................................................................16

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS...................................................................................................17

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................19

ACRONYMS

BWC Biological and Toxins Weapons ConventionCAS Chemical Abstract ServiceCBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and NuclearCWC Chemical Weapons ConventionEU European UnionIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyGP Global PartnershipOPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsUN United NationsWMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


I. INTRODUCTION

1. Two days after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, Prime Minister Manuel Valls told the French National Assembly: “I say this with obvious precaution but we know and are aware that there is also the threat of chemical or bacteriological weapons”. Similar words of caution were uttered by a number of other high ranking decision makers, including the former UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Indeed, the terrorist organisation Daesh1 employs military grade chemical weapons on the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, marking the first time in over 20 years that a non-state actor has done so (in 1995, the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo subway).

2. As the recent spate of terrorist attacks in NATO countries demonstrates, conventional arms and makeshift weapons remain the weapons of choice for terrorist groups. Terrorists face little difficulty in acquiring or manufacturing them and can employ them with ease to create significant damage – both in terms of casualties and psychological effects. Still, today’s most dangerous terrorist organisations have the stated intention of acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

3. History shows that only a small number of individuals and non-state actors have attempted to develop CBRN capabilities. Furthermore, those who had a certain level of capabilities most often failed in their attempts to manufacture a weapon, and those who did succeed in carrying out a CBRN attack caused few casualties compared to conventional attacks. Despite the historical record, two developments in particular make it imperative to increase the vigilance of the international community: first, the rise of Daesh in Iraq, Syria, and beyond presents difficult new CBRN challenges; second, both old and new science, technology, and material required for CBRN weapons is increasingly accessible and becoming cheaper and easier to employ. The international community must not be complacent in the face of these emerging CBRN challenges.

4. In a NATO context, Allies have been developing NATO’s capacity to protect against the threat of CBRN weapons – no matter if an attack comes from adversary states or non-state actors. NATO first acknowledged the risk of CBRN weapons falling into the hands of terrorists in the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance, which is the framework and political direction just below the Strategic Concept. In the current Strategic Concept from 2010, Allies note that “[e]xtremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities”. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Allies reiterated that “[t]he proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces”. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allies once again arrived at this assessment. They added, however, that “[c]ontinued use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, which we condemn, further underscores the evolving and increasing WMD threat to the Alliance.”

5. This report has been prepared to inform the transatlantic parliamentary debate on the risks of CBRN terrorism and the required responses. It does not claim to be exhaustive, but focuses on the most pressing current and future challenges. It analyses and discusses potential terrorist CBRN weapons; the CBRN efforts undertaken by Daesh; key international responses to the terrorist CBRN threat; CBRN security; and the potential impact of emerging science and technology on CBRN terrorism. The Science and Technology Committee (STC) discussed a first version of this report at the NATO PA Spring Session in Tirana, held on 29 May 2016. Since then,

1 Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”

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it has been updated, revised, and expanded for discussion. It was adopted at the STC meeting at the NATO PA Annual Session to be held on Sunday 20 November 2016.

II. POTENTIAL TERRORIST CBRN WEAPONS

6. Many of today’s principal terrorist groups – first and foremost al-Qaeda and Daesh – are attracted by the potential effects of CBRN attacks, including mass casualties, massive psychological impact, societal disruption, and financial losses. However, terrorist groups still face high hurdles to buying, stealing, or manufacturing CBRN weapons and subsequently finding the right opportunities and methods to employ them.

7. The term weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a term commonly used to describe CBRN weapons. However, the term can be misleading, as not all CBRN weapons cause mass destruction. Large amounts of chemicals are needed to do so. Hence, CBRN attacks may only lead to mass societal disruption or psychological effects. In addition, existing weapons with the potential to kill many people, such as high explosives and incendiary munitions, are normally excluded from definitions of WMD. For the sake of clarity, this report uses the term “CBRN weapons”.

8. CBRN weapons should not be treated as a monolithic or uniform category. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are very different from each other, and every category also has different subcategories. For example, CBRN weapons differ in terms of: complexity and cost of production; difficulty of acquisition, handling, and delivery or dispersal; likelihood of effectiveness; worst-case consequences; and types of effects – from tactical to strategic. In a March 2016 contribution to the Austrian government, the Austrian Advisory Board provided an analysis of 13 CBRN distinct threats along two main criteria – impact and plausibility – and eight subcriteria. In sum, CBRN threats should therefore be carefully disaggregated in analyses.

9. At the most basic level, four types of possible terrorist chemical attacks exist2. Terrorists could:

- deliver military-grade or civilian chemical agents in a weaponised way, for example in mortar shells or simply in barrels dropped from helicopters;

- attack or sabotage a chemical facility to release large amounts of chemical agents into the environment;

- use improvised methods of delivery such as perforated containers or contamination of the public’s water or food supplies; or

- employ chemical agents in a targeted way for assassinations.

10. In a biological attack, terrorists would intentionally release a pathogen, i.e. a disease-causing biological agent, or a biotoxin, i.e. a poisonous substance produced by living organisms3.

2 According to the definition enshrined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, chemical weapons means – together or separately: “(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b).”

3 The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention prohibits states to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or

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Biological weapons can either be manufactured in laboratories or found in nature. Some pathogens and biotoxins, like anthrax or botulinum toxin, only cause adverse effects in the targeted persons. Others, such as smallpox or Ebola, will make these persons contagious, leading to epidemics or even pandemics if the spread is not properly contained. A key difference with chemical, radiological and nuclear terrorism is that terrorists themselves can be the method of delivery. If terrorists are willing to die in a suicide attack, they could infect themselves with a pathogen and spread the disease in a targeted area.

11. In radiological weapons, conventional methods are used to disperse radiological material. In other words, a radiological attack involves the release of radiological material in ways other than with a nuclear weapon. While a radiological attack in itself is unlikely to cause many immediate fatalities, contamination and psychological effects could be severe. Three types of radiological weapons exist:

- Radiological dispersal devices: Often called a ‘dirty bomb’, a radiological dispersal device is a conventional or improvised explosive device (IED) packed with radiological material. Once detonated, radiological material will be dispersed over the targeted area.

- Radiation emitting devices: such a device simply emits radiation, and its deployment ranges from individual assassinations to advanced irradiation of an area.

- Radiological incendiary devices: this device couples explosives with incendiary and radiological material to complicate first responses.

12. In another form of radiological attack, albeit indirectly, terrorists could attack or sabotage a nuclear facility in order to affect a release of radiological material over a large area.

13. A nuclear weapon is a device that causes a nuclear explosion, produced either by nuclear fission or a combination of nuclear fission and fusion. Unlike radiological weapons, a nuclear attack could cause substantial fatalities and infrastructure damage in addition to causing potentially large-scale contamination and psychological impact. A nuclear attack by a terrorist group would involve the detonation of a nuclear weapon, i.e. with a warhead that uses the destructive forces of nuclear energy.

III. THE CBRN EFFORTS OF DAESH

14. Over the last two decades, al-Qaeda has been the main terrorist group interested in acquiring CBRN weapons. The group continues to harbour these ambitions, but for a number of years, it has been on the defensive. The CBRN threat posed by al-Qaeda should not be discounted – also because the terrorist group might feel it needs a spectacular success in its rivalry with Daesh. Still, the history of al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire CBRN weapons is well-illustrated in other reports and documents, including in previous STC reports, and little new information has emerged in the public realm since the last time the Committee examined the issue. Therefore, this section will focus on the CBRN efforts of Daesh – arguably the biggest CBRN threat for the Euro-Atlantic area at this point in time.

15. Ever since Daesh has looked beyond Iraq and Syria with attacks in Europe, the United States and Asia, it has demonstrated that it has become a clandestine network with the ability to carry out acts of terrorism with high numbers of casualties. By most accounts, over 1,000 people died in Daesh terrorist attacks in 2015, and in the first half of 2016 over 500 people have already been killed in such attacks worldwide. With such tragic success, conventional terrorist attacks, with considerable operational innovation, will likely remain its modus operandi.

other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

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16. Fundamentally, the risk of a CBRN attack by Daesh has risen due to a number of underlying factors. First, Daesh has a high recruitment rate of university-educated fighters, including some that have CBRN-related expertise. Second, a successful CBRN attack would cultivate Daesh’s brand as a ruthless actor and thus fit well with its media strategy. Third, despite recent setbacks, the group still has access to high levels of funding. Fourth, it controls significant swathes of territory with advanced industrial facilities, providing a safe haven to operate freely. Access to both CBRN material and facilities distinguishes Daesh from al-Qaeda, whose CBRN aspirations reportedly have suffered from this limitation. Daesh has already used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, but a growing risk exists that the group could send foreign fighters back to their home countries to carry out CBRN terrorism or charge home-grown terrorists to act on its behalf.

17. Daesh has clearly shown that it wants to further develop its CBRN capabilities. In the territories held in Iraq and Syria, it has reportedly put into place a special unit for chemical weapons development. Daesh draws upon the expertise of former officials under Saddam Hussein as well as foreign experts, for example from Chechnya and Southeast Asia. The United States believes that Daesh has employed chemical weapons in at least a dozen incidents in Syria and Iraq. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has officially confirmed the use of sulphur mustard in Iraq by a non-state actor, and while the OPCW was not assigned to attribute responsibility, it appears very likely that Daesh was the side using chemical weapons. In a joint inquiry with the UN on attacks in Syria, the OPCW reportedly identified Daesh as the only plausible actor to have carried out a sulphur mustard gas attack in Marea in August 2015. Moreover, Moroccan authorities claim that Daesh was planning a chemical weapons attack in the country in early 2016. In a raid against a Daesh-linked terror cell, they found manuals on how to produce chemical weapons.

18. Daesh has so far resorted to chlorine gas and low-grade sulphur mustard delivered by IEDs, mortars, rockets and missiles. Both agents – at least in the way the group currently uses them – are weapons of terror, rather than WMDs, as the concentration is not high enough to kill healthy adults. The attacks involving chemical agents have indeed caused few casualties, and US officials have emphasised that deaths in instances where Daesh used chemicals were most likely caused by the artillery hits – not the chemical agents.

19. The extent of Daesh’s chemical weapons infrastructure is still largely unknown. Some experts believe that much of the sulphur mustard appears to be stolen from Saddam Hussein’s old stock. Some of Saddam’s sulphur mustard-filled shells were sealed in bunkers in Iraq, as they were considered to be too unstable to be moved or destroyed safely. Daesh could be using these degraded shells. In February 2016, US Special Forces and Iraqi intelligence captured Daoud al-Afari, a key chemical weapons engineer for Daesh in Iraq who is believed to be a former industrial engineer in Saddam Hussein’s military. Information obtained from al-Afari confirmed that Daesh has weaponised some sulphur mustard and loaded it into artillery shells. Daesh has also allegedly used toxic industrial and agricultural chemicals, for example insecticides, as weapons. Daesh has reportedly captured chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria, but it is unknown to what extent the group has access to chemical facilities. The risk of Daesh having access to such sites certainly exists, as gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies remain with respect to Syria’s chemical weapons facilities, activities, munitions, and chemical materials. Indeed, the OPCW is at present unable to verify fully that Syria’s declaration and related submissions are accurate and complete. So far, however, experts do not believe Daesh has the wherewithal to launch large-scale chemical attacks. While it can draw on a limited amount of expertise, equipment, and materials as well as a partial supply chain, it is a long way from having a proper chemical weapons programme.

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20. The coalition against Daesh has recently stepped up its air strikes and raids against the chemical infrastructure in the group’s hands. Reportedly, in early 2016, the coalition against Daesh was able to conduct at least two strikes in Iraq that targeted Daesh’s chemical programme based on intelligence acquired from al-Afari. In September 2016, the United States conducted an operation against 50 targets near Mosul, with the participation of B-52 bombers and F-18D aircraft. The United States stated that the targeted area was a pharmaceutical complex that Daesh had converted to a sizable chemical weapons production facility.

21. In 2016, Daesh has increasingly been using chemical weapons in the north of Iraq, as Kurdish local and Iraqi national forces are making gains against the group. Some military analysts believe that the increased use of chemical weapons in Daesh’s attacks signals their weakness on the battlefield. Others suggest that Daesh uses chemical weapons in a tactical way to weaken frontlines. If the former theory holds true, however, then this dynamic could further heighten the risk for the Euro-Atlantic community, as experts already view Daesh’s increasing number of attacks in Europe as a sign of its diminishing capabilities in Syria and Iraq.

22. It would be difficult, but not impossible, for Daesh to smuggle chemical agents and/or their methods of delivery into NATO member states. While it may be hard to transfer the necessary material and components for chemical weapons, the technical expertise can be shared. For example, the group has been discussing on social media sites how its followers can use cyanide and sulphuric acid to launch small-scale targeted attacks on American soil. Also, the expertise gained in Iraq and Syria could be transferred to operatives in Europe. Daesh would not necessarily need to transfer chemicals that can be weaponised, as they are widely available in Europe. The group could target industrial facilities to acquire chemicals. Alternatively, they could infiltrate or attack such facilities to release chemicals into the environment.

23. In terms of Daesh’s biological efforts, in 2014, a laptop captured from a Tunisian member of the group contained instructions on how to develop biological weapons, including the bubonic plague. In fact, some observers have argued that the group would not face many hardships in obtaining the bio-reactors and agricultural sprayers required to weaponise naturally occurring pathogens. However, the group could have trouble obtaining the more advanced scientific expertise involved in biological weapons, as Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful attempts showed in the 1990s.

24. Experts have been concerned with Daesh’s attempts to obtain radiological material as well. In June 2015, the Australian intelligence community argued that Daesh had amassed enough radiological material for a radiological dispersal device. Daesh acquired unenriched uranium from the University of Mosul when it took over the town, and Iraqi authorities are also concerned that 10 grams of Iridium-192, a small quantity of a highly dangerous radioactive isotope, have fallen into the hands of the group. Moreover, Daesh has been scouting out European nuclear sites. Belgian counterterrorism authorities found a video shot by suspects connected with the Paris attacks which contained more than ten hours’ worth of surveillance footage of the Belgian official in charge of nuclear research and development. It is unclear why the video was made, but Daesh might have been plotting to kidnap the scientist either to gain access to radiological material or gain access to a nuclear facility. Information found at the home of one of the Paris attackers also revealed that he had been gathering information on the research centre Jülich situated in North-Western Germany. The centre’s research currently serves as storage for radiological waste. Furthermore, a 2015 issue of the Daesh magazine Dabiq, the group claimed that it wants to buy nuclear weapons from Pakistan. This has however been judged as baseless propaganda by experts.

IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE TERRORIST CBRN THREAT

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25. Efforts to counter CBRN attacks by non-state actors demand action at all policy levels – from international treaties on multinational cooperation and state efforts down to local authorities. At the treaty level, the CWC, the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons represent the backbone of CBRN arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts among states. However, the acquisition of CBRN weapons by non-state actors does not lie at the core of these agreements, as they first and foremost govern state behaviour. This section therefore examines the most important counter-CBRN terrorism efforts at the multinational and international level, including within NATO and the European Union (EU).

A. KEY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

26. The OPCW’s broad membership base puts it in a unique position to foster global chemical security, and the organisation is undertaking efforts to counter chemical terrorism. In June 2016, the OPCW suggested steps to support states parties in their counter-terrorism efforts, including facilitation of best practices exchange, creation of an international network dedicated to chemical security, involving both state and non-state actors, as well as OPCW assistance to states parties. In May 2016, the OPCW Technical Secretariat ruled that the CWC Article VI provision on “necessary measures” to ensure legal usage of chemicals extends to counter-terrorism efforts. The OPCW suggested that this provision requires state parties to prevent terrorists from gaining access to chemicals and they set out ways in which the CWC can contribute to counter-terrorism efforts drawing upon existing mechanisms.

27. In 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of WMD. The resolution obliges states to refrain from any means of supporting non-state actors in developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using WMD as well as their delivery systems. States are required to establish national rules and regulations to prevent such proliferation. A “1540 Committee” has been tasked to collect comprehensive reports from states on progress towards the implementation of mandatory steps. The mandate of the resolution was extended in 2011 for a period of ten years to 2021. A comprehensive review of the resolution was launched in 2016. In his opening remarks, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon highlighted the need to enhance CBRN security and guard against the misuse of technology by non-state actors.

28. In June 2002, the G8 decided on a ten-year, USD20 billion Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction. The initiative aims to provide effective measures concerning CBRN weapons and related materials, in order to prevent the acquisition or development of CBRN weapons by terrorists or by states that support them. Since then, the GP has grown to 29 members. In 2011, the G8 decided to extend the GP’s mandate for another decade and to raise an additional USD20 billion. In conjunction with the Global Partnership, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group was established in order to provide technically informed strategic policy advice that could have a bearing on safety and security in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

29. The Proliferation Security Initiative, established in 2003, seeks to stop trafficking of CBRN weapons, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. One hundred and five countries have endorsed the informal initiative that aims to detect and disrupt black markets for CBRN material, inter alia by intercepting illicit goods. Members have pledged to act when necessary to help seize or foil dangerous trade at sea, in the air or on land, and readily share information with one another.

30. Interpol runs several CBRN operations. The Interpol Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement Programme is “a global effort to counter the international smuggling of chemicals used in the manufacture of weapons designed to kill and injure indiscriminately’’. Operation Safe, Secure,

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Surveillance of Microbiological Material and Emerging Technologies was launched to enhance the safety and security of biological materials and introduce and enhance disease surveillance in regions where it is most needed. Operation Fail Safe has aims to gather information on individuals known or suspected to be involved in the illicit trafficking of radioactive material.

31. The Australia Group is an informal group of 42 countries, including all EU member states, Canada, Norway, Turkey, and the United States. The group works together to harmonise export controls to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. The group meets annually to assess how national-level export licensing measures can be made more effective in non-proliferation efforts. At its 2016 annual meeting, the group agreed to intensify its focus on the role of emerging technologies in manufacturing chemical and biological weapons as well as the challenge of chemical and biological terrorism.

32. The World Health Organization is involved with several aspects of biological safety and security. It has instruments in place that handle outbreaks of international significance, such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. Moreover, the organisation has also made available materials to emergency responders for treatment of victims of exposure to chemical and biological agents.

33. The Global Health Security Agenda, launched in 2014, is a growing partnership of nearly 50 nations, international organisations, and non-governmental stakeholders that help build countries’ capacity to create a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats and elevate global health security. The Agenda helps strengthen the capacity to prevent, detect and respond to threats of human and animal infectious diseases whether occurring naturally, accidentally, or deliberately.

34. In 2005, the UN General Assembly approved the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which obligates states parties to cooperate in preventing or prosecuting radiological or nuclear terrorism.

35. The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is the only international legally binding Convention that governs the physical protection of nuclear material, albeit only during international transport of such material. In 2016, an amendment to the Convention was ratified, making it legally binding for state parties to the Convention to protect all nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It extends the Convention to include offences such as the theft and smuggling of nuclear materials, and the sabotage of nuclear facilities. Further, the Convention promotes information sharing between states parties.

36. The IAEA has a host of recommendations, standards, and services to support nuclear safety and security, for example the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations, but also five conventions on nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. These are not legally binding on the IAEA’s member states. The IAEA also has an International Physical Protection Advisory Service that provides peer advice on implementing international instruments and on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.

37. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is a voluntary international partnership committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Currently, 86 states and five international organisations have joined the Initiative. It conducts multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations.

38. In the UN Conference on Disarmament, 65 states have been discussing to propose a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which would prohibit the production of the two main components of

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nuclear weapons: highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. However, discussions have been stalled by Pakistan for many years, as the treaty does not address current stockpiles, which Pakistan argues would leave them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis its neighbour, India. In a move that surprised many observers, Russia introduced a draft Convention for the Suppression of Chemical and Biological Terrorism in the 2016 round of talks in the UN Conference on Disarmament, citing serious gaps in the international framework. A number of states, including many Allies, have argued against the Russian proposal as it now stands, arguing inter alia, that the problem of biological and chemical terrorism was not the lack of legal instruments, but the lack of implementation of the existing treaties and instruments listed in this section. Furthermore, many questions remain. It is unclear how seriously Russia wants to negotiate such a convention, as the Conference on Disarmament has failed to produce any convention since the mid-1990s; whether the Conference of Disarmament is the right place for introducing a convention on terrorism (rather than disarmament); and if the vague language proposed by Russia could undermine strong universal norms and legally binding obligations against chemical and biological weapons.

39. In his famous 2009 speech in Prague, US President Barack Obama called for a global summit on nuclear security, which would help “secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”. Four Nuclear Security Summits have been held since (Washington DC 2010, Seoul 2012, The Hague 2014, and again Washington DC 2016). Important goals of the Summits have been the minimisation and securing of weapons-usable nuclear materials; enhancement of international cooperation to prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear material by non-state actors, most importantly terrorist groups and organised crime; and steps to strengthen the global nuclear security regime. States attending the Summits primarily made national pledges and came together in smaller groups to further these goals. The 2016 Washington DC Summit was the final one and led to action plans and initiatives that ensure that the work undertaken at the Summits could be continued at the UN level as well as in the IAEA, Interpol, Global Partnership, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

B. NATO EFFORTS

40. The spread and potential use of CBRN weapons and the possibility that non-state actors could acquire them are viewed as major threats by the Alliance. NATO is engaged in preventing the proliferation of CBRN weapons by both state and non-state actors, through an agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as by developing and harmonising defence capabilities. Should the Alliance suffer a WMD attack, NATO is prepared for recovery efforts through a military, political, and civilian approach. NATO’s counterterrorism efforts are directed towards improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and engage in cooperation with partners and international organisations. At the NATO Headquarters level, the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre and the Counter Terrorism Section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division are the main focal points in dealing with CBRN terrorism.

41. In terms of counterterrorism efforts, NATO continues to increase its awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, intelligence-sharing amongst member countries, partners and international organisations, as well as strategic analysis and assessment. The NATO Headquarters Intelligence Unit is the main body that deals with awareness within the organisation. In the context of intelligence sharing, Allies made an important decision at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. They recognised that “NATO intelligence reform must be an ongoing, dynamic process”, as the importance of intelligence in NATO activities continues to grow. Thus, Allies agreed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division to be led by an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. The new Assistant Secretary General “will direct NATO's intelligence and security activities, ensuring better use of existing personnel and resources, while maximising the efficient use of intelligence provided by Allies.” Your Rapporteur applauds this new initiative and hopes that it will facilitate information sharing on CBRN threats.

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Capability development and advancement of innovative technologies dealing with asymmetric and terrorist threats is mostly conducted through the Defence against Terrorist Programme of Work. Engagement is carried out via different agreements with partners and international organisations. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counterterrorism in their individual cooperation agreements with NATO, for example. In the context of this report, it might be useful if NATO also encouraged inclusion of a section of counter-CBRN terrorism, in particular when it signs such agreements in high risk areas such as the Middle East or North Africa. At the international level, NATO cooperates, in particular, with the EU, the UN, and the OSCE. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme, where cooperation between scientists and experts from allies and partner countries occurs, has counterterrorism as one of its main focuses as well. Finally, NATO also serves as a forum for comparing and analysing national programmes to ensure that plans and procedures are being put in place and that enough is being done for addressing emergency situations should they occur. In 2011, a civil emergency planning action plan on CBRN was adopted. Within NATO, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre are key actors in this regard.

42. In terms of CBRN efforts, the Alliance launched a WMD Initiative in 1999, designed to integrate political and military responses to the proliferation of CBRN weapons. A direct result of this was the 2000 WMD Non-Proliferation Centre. The 2009 WMD Strategy currently frames the Allied response to CBRN terrorism and is built upon three pillars: prevention of CBRN weapons, protection against CBRN attacks or events, and recovery from such attacks or events. NATO’s core areas in terms of countering the proliferation of CBRN weapons are:

- standardisation, training, research and development;- arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation;- deterrence;- improving civil preparedness;- creating standard agreements amongst Allies;- cooperating with partners; and- international outreach activities.

43. Five CBRN defence initiatives were endorsed by the Alliance, in order to create:

- a Prototype CBRN Joint Advisory Team that can assess the effects of a CBRN attack;- deployable analytical CBRN laboratories that can be transported rapidly into theatre for

investigation purposes;- a CBRN virtual pharmaceutical stockpile shared amongst members for immediate support in

the event of an attack;- a Virtual Centre of Excellence for CBRN defence to enhance visibility and transparency of

NATO CRBN training and education; and- a Near Real Time Disease Surveillance System to rapidly collect, identify, analyse and

disseminate information related to any outbreak, which was declared initially operational in 2007.

44. The first two initiatives have now become the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Battalion and Joint Assessment Team, which together form the NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force. This Task Force and the NATO-certified Centre of Excellence on Joint CBRN Defence are designed to respond to the CBRN threat, including from non-state actors.

C. EU EFFORTS

45. In general, counterterrorism is a member state responsibility in the EU. However, due to the cross-border implications of a potential attack, the EU has adopted a number of policies to address the threat of CBRN terrorism. The European Security Strategy of 2003 identified the

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proliferation of WMD as “potentially the greatest threat to our security”. It stressed the link between external and internal security aspects, and suggested a central role for international cooperation. In the same year, the EU adopted its Strategy against Proliferation of WMD to “prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate” the spread of these weapons and their means of delivery. The Strategy reiterated the importance of international cooperation as a framework for action. Further, it called for enhanced programmes to promote disarmament and incorporate the non-proliferation obligations in all political, diplomatic and economic EU activities. In the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the EU proposed to base its counter-terrorism efforts on four pillars: to prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Further, the EU reiterated its support for enhanced cooperation in the fields of non-proliferation of CBRN weapons. In the new 2016 EU Global Strategy, it is asserted that “[t]he proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains a growing threat to Europe and the wider world”.

46. The focus on CBRN-related terrorism has led to concrete measures. Following terrorist attacks in the US and Europe in the early 2000s, several programmes were adopted to combat terrorism, including a joint programme to improve EU cooperation on preventing and limiting the impact of CBRN-related threats. In November 2010, the European Council adopted the EU CBRN Action Plan to strengthen CBRN security in the European Union over a five-year period, particularly in the areas of prevention, detection, preparedness, and response. The Action Plan aims to secure CBRN materials, to improve member states’ capacity to detect such materials and to respond to incidents involving these materials. Subsequently, the EU also launched the CBRN Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative seeking to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the EU to mitigate CBRN risks. The implementation process of the Action Plan included establishing a European network of CBRN law enforcement units and an Early Warning System for incidents related to, inter alia, CBRN substances. The process also aimed at strengthening the dual-use export control system. A review of the CBRN Action Plan and its implementation was provided by a 2012 Progress Report, which noted that the implementation process across member states was uneven. The report in particular highlighted the importance of Europol as a facilitator of information sharing and good practice, the organisation of joint training exercises, data collection and the dissemination of early warnings. The CBRN Action Plan review also underlined the importance of developing a more strategic and overarching approach to CBRN and explosives (E) policies. A discussion on a new CBRN-E Agenda was initiated in 2012. In 2015, a Communication on a new approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks at EU level was adopted, proposing a set of 30 actions including cooperation with industry and operators of facilities dealing with CBRN-E materials. However, no new legislation has been proposed yet.

47. Several EU regulatory regimes have been established for CBRN-related materials. A 2009 Regulation set up restricted access and control on exports, transfer, brokering, and transit of dual-use items. A 2013 Regulation on the marketing and use of explosive precursors set up a tighter regulatory regime for high-risk chemical precursors, with the aim to reduce their accessibility to the general public. It also established mechanisms for appropriate reporting of any suspicious transactions involving both the restricted precursors and other non-restricted substances of concern.

48. The European Commission has set up an Emergency Response Coordination Centre which is able to quickly react to disasters inside the EU. The underlying motive is to avoid unnecessary and expensive duplication efforts in worst-case-scenario emergencies, including CBRN attacks.

V. CBRN SECURITY

49. To acquire a CBRN weapon, terrorist groups would need to buy, steal, or manufacture a warhead or the lethal material used in a weapon as well as buy, steal, manufacture, or conceive a

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method of delivery. The international community’s responsibility is to block, through all available means, every one of these pathways. The previous section has outlined key international efforts in this regard. Perhaps the most crucial element of counter-CBRN efforts is, however, the security of the lethal material used in a weapon. If terrorists cannot get their hands on the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material needed to fabricate a CBRN weapon, their efforts are in vain.

50. It is in any state’s interest to safeguard CBRN-related materials – both military and civil. The international community should not be complacent, however, as the risks and challenges emerging from CBRN terrorism go beyond state borders. For example, states with weak governance structures face higher risks that CBRN material could be illicitly diverted. Nevertheless, the biggest risks emerge from dual-use science and technology. The fundamental problem is that science, technology, and material required for CBRN weapons is increasingly accessible in the public domain and becoming cheaper and easier to employ. A main reason is that dual-use science, technology, and materials hold enormous potential in terms of human advancement. Chlorine is essential to modern water treatment; research on strains of dangerous diseases helps find the cures to them; and agricultural nuclear technology increases crop production in developing countries. Still, all three types of material could be used to make a CBRN weapon. In terms of CBRN security, the international community thus faces a double conundrum: how to secure existing military and civilian stocks and how to manage the enormous proliferation of dual-use materials which could be used in CBRN attacks.

51. The international chemical security regime, under the principal leadership of the OPCW, is strong compared to the regimes governing biological and nuclear security. The CWC is still not universal, even though only four countries are not states parties to it: Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. Israel has signed, but not yet ratified, the treaty. As mandated by the CWC, states parties to the treaty have established national authorities to implement it. The CWC has also created a detailed verification scheme. The OPCW inspects both facilities that produce chemicals that have relevance to chemical weapons production, and facilities that produce discrete organic chemicals meeting certain criteria and production thresholds. There are roughly 5,000 factories in the latter category.

52. The risks of chemical agents getting into the hands of a terrorist group is largest in states with previous chemical warfare programmes where the state is not entirely in control of its territory. As previously mentioned, Daesh is tapping into expertise and material in Iraq and Syria, but Libya also represents a potentially dangerous theatre, as terrorist groups could expand into areas with relevant chemical facilities. Libya’s stockpiles of sulphur mustard were destroyed in 2014. After long delays, Libya’s final stockpile slated for destruction abroad – more than 500 metric tons of mostly chemical agent precursors (toxic industrial chemicals) was sent out of the country in the early fall of 2016. However, in late 2015, Daesh fighters in Libya were entrenched just over 70 km away. In addition, large risks exist regarding dual-use items such as agricultural chemicals or chlorine. Experts believe that today there already exists a black market in the Middle East and North Africa for chemical agents that could be weaponised and for their precursors. As chemical attacks are becoming increasingly prominent in Iraq and Syria, experts also judge that more and better information on weaponisation and methods of delivery exists on the internet.

53. The BWC, unlike the CWC, does not have a permanent secretariat or strong verification mechanisms. Review conferences are held every five years, which have led to limited institutionalisation. Since the 1986 Review Conference, politically-binding annual confidence-building measures have been promoted. Seven categories of confidence-building measures exist: exchanges of data and information on a) research centres and laboratories, b) national biological defence research and development programmes as well as c) outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; d) active promotion of contacts; declarations of e) legislation, regulations and other measures, f) past activities in offensive and/or

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defensive biological research and development programmes and g) vaccine production facilities. Ultimately, however, transparency on biological material that could be weaponised is very low. In December 2016, the states parties to the BWC will meet again to discuss the treaty. For many Euro-Atlantic states, a key issue will be whether the BWC can be adapted to improve the international community’s handling of converging and emerging science and technology, which is the subject of the next section.

54. Radiological and fissile material is plentiful in the civilian world, as it is essential in various fields, such as agriculture, medicine and energy production. Experts estimate that material that could be used in radiological devices is contained in 70,000 sources located in over 13,000 buildings. No globally-binding regulations on nuclear security exist. The Nuclear Security Summits process is geared towards filling in some of the gaps at international level. A crucial problem is that many sources of radiological and even fissile material are still not adequately secured.

55. A thriving black market for radiological material exists. Over 130 states participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, which records and analyses incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. All incidents in which nuclear and other radioactive material is outside of regulatory control are contained in this database. Between 1995 and 2014, the IAEA recorded 27,341 confirmed incidents. A recent Associated Press investigation on nuclear smuggling reveals that nuclear security fears are real. Between 2009 and 2015 at least four attempts were made by criminal networks with suspected ties to Russian organised crime to sell radiological material to terrorists. Although the investigation did not reveal how widespread nuclear smuggling is, it did show that a nuclear black market emerged in the Republic of Moldova. The ring offered to sell radiological material, including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and caesium, as well as blueprints for a radiological dispersal device to extremists in the Middle East. While it is good news that Moldovan investigators together with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation have disrupted these plots, it is unclear whether the smuggling ring has been shut down.

VI. EMERGING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND CBRN WEAPONS 56. The exploitation of science and technology has brought enormous benefits to human society and will continue to do so in an age of rapid scientific and technological progress. However, new developments in science and technology can often be abused by malicious actors – by states, but also by terrorists. Indeed, several emerging trends could make it easier for terrorists to acquire or employ CBRN weapons. This section examines some of these potentially worrying trends, seen through the prism of security, but also offers some perspectives on how emerging technologies could make it easier to tackle the challenges of CBRN terrorism. The section pays special attention to biological trends, as massive changes are underway in this area.

A. CHEMICAL TRENDS

57. As Dr Jonathan E. Forman, a Science Policy Adviser at the OPCW, told the Members of the STC in 2014, roughly 15,000 entries for new chemical substances are logged into the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry per day. In fact, the CAS registry has stopped registering new substances, due to the dramatic increase in new entries. The CAS registry is the most authoritative collection of disclosed chemical substance information, containing more than 109 million organic and inorganic substances and 66 million sequences. Inevitably, some of these substances and sequences could be used in an adverse fashion. For example, many chemotherapy drugs include nitrogen mustard and other chemicals inspired by mustard agents and some drugs for treating Alzheimer’s Disease work by inhibiting the same biological functions as nerve agents – albeit with significantly lower toxicity and non-permanent inhibition.

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Furthermore, chemistry and biology research and development programmes are no longer so easily distinguished. Indeed, converging science is becoming the norm, as chemistry, biology, physics, engineering, informatics, and many other fields are coming together to work for a development of science and technology that benefit humans and the environment. Some observers even argue that one should look at the whole range of biological and chemical threats as one biochemical threat spectrum, where the lines between chemical and biological warfare agents blur easily. All of these developments present potential CBRN terrorists with new avenues that they could pursue.

B. BIOLOGICAL TRENDS

58. Perhaps the biggest story in CBRN-weapons-related science and technology is the so-called ‘biotech revolution’, which continues to revolutionise the use of biological processes, organisms or systems in industrial applications. Advances within genomics have enabled DNA sequencing of, for example, animals and plants, and if data collection continues to increase at its present rate, by 2025 there will be more sequence data than the combined data amount generated within the other major Big Data domains of astronomy, Twitter and YouTube.

59. The exploitation of biotechnologies for human development – and counter-CBRN efforts – has brought enormous benefits, but the biotech revolution has the potential to change the risks of biological terrorism in profound ways. Biotech knowledge is mostly freely available in the public domain, and the government has little control over biotech innovation and materials. Instead, the market is shaped by a multitude of private sector agents, ranging from one-person companies to large-scale pharmaceutical companies. From a security perspective, the fundamental problem comes down to the fact that the science and technology that can cure diseases can also enable the development of more potent pathogens, or make it easier for terrorists to acquire and use them.

60. Genetic engineering in particular is a field that has worried security professionals for a number of years. Genetic engineering enables the modification of an organism’s genetic material by means of adding, changing or removing DNA sequences. An upcoming field is gene editing, where the CRISPR/Cas (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats / Associated Protein) technology allows researchers to slice a genome at their choosing and thereby target specific DNA sequence in a genome. Genetic engineering is used to introduce more desirable properties to an organism, such as disease resistance or faster growth, and is commonly applied on plants within agriculture and in parts of the world also to modify animals’ DNA. Furthermore, synthetic biology is a new technology that seeks to make biology easier and faster to engineer. It is an interdisciplinary field that, inter alia, combines biology, chemistry, computer sciences and electrical and chemical engineering. Synthetic biologists aim to a) design and fabricate biological components and systems which do not yet exist in the natural world or b) redesign and fabricate existing biological systems. Synthetic biology harbours many exciting possibilities to improve standards of living. It could revolutionise the pharmaceutical industry. New biological systems could be used as data storage. Biosensors that monitor the environment and report anomalies could be developed. New materials that optimise desired properties could be designed. Space could be more easily explored if astronauts are enabled to manufacture material from local resources. In contrast, security experts looking at synthetic biology see many potential dangers. If one can more easily manufacture ‘designer materials’, one could also more easily fabricate very harmful substances. If one can manipulate pathogen characteristics, one could increase a pathogen’s drug resistance, lethality or survivability and even endow them with new capabilities. If one can put assemble pathogens from scratch, one could manufacture pathogens previously eradicated in nature.

61. In the short and medium term, synthetic biology is expected to focus on research and development of commercial substances in well-secured facilities. Some observers argue,

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however, that existence of a vibrant “do it yourself” biology movement, where people with no formal background in biology design new materials, holds some risk in the near future. While many in this movement profess progressive technology ethics, it is easy to understand that a dark side could emerge, as it has in the field of cyber technology. Other observers do not rate this risk very high, as CBRN-related synthetic biology would challenge even trained specialists. In the longer term, the risks emerging from synthetic biology increase, as knowledge and expertise grows and synthesised biological agents proliferate.

62. In general, there is no clear governance approach on the horizon for emerging science and technology fields and their potential misuse of CBRN weapons. This is perhaps especially true for biotechnology. For one, security concerns often clash with biotech investment and innovation. Furthermore, existing non-proliferation approaches are further being undermined by the online sale of biotechnology equipment, the availability of advanced computers as well as the rise of open science movements. Rapid development cycles, especially compared to slow policy cycles, also make it very difficult to control the discipline going forward. Europe and United States remain the market leaders in biotech, but the lead is narrowing as biotech investment increases in developing and emerging economies. Biotech innovation often takes place in countries without the regulatory barriers to biological terrorism, not only as emerging countries build up their industries, but also because many European and North American companies have begun to outsource key technical operations. All of these developments have many experts worried.

63. The old approach of relying purely on government regulation is no longer sufficient. In light of the shortcomings in the BWC and the low possibility that more binding regulations will be agreed upon in the 2016 Review Conference, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts concerning biological agents must go beyond the treaty. Pathogen and laboratory safety measures, for example, remain insufficient in many countries, especially in light of the rapid advances in science and technology. As scientists find it increasingly easy to synthesise deadly viruses, measures to control biological substances are struggling to keep pace. The industry and academia need to be incentivised to play along. They need to increase efforts to put self-governance tools in place, without governments abdicating the responsibility for biosecurity to academia and industry. A new overall paradigm of biosecurity is needed; yet the international community seems at a loss on how to achieve this. However, it must be noted that it is very hard to regulate and it would involve high costs for other interests. For example, consumers might not profit from all the promising possibilities of new biotechnologies. Furthermore, strict regulation might not work very well. Advanced biotech seems likely to legally proliferate in countries which do not regulate it very strictly, as it is an increasingly global phenomenon. Even in countries which do regulate it strictly, individuals and groups might develop significant biotech skills because it often requires only very little infrastructure, although for non-scientists the skills, knowledge and understanding of how to handle and control biotech remains very difficult. A cultural change must take place in the discipline. The development of a global code of ethics or conduct for scientists engaged in the life sciences has therefore been suggested by many experts.

64. To conclude on a positive note, synthetic biology also harbours many possibilities to improve counter-CBRN capacity. Synthetic biology can accelerate the production of vaccines and enable timely protection against CBRN attacks, and it holds the promise of developing “smart vaccines” that could be programmed to trigger immune responses when needed. Efforts are also underway to develop compounds capable of detecting and neutralising both chemical and biological warfare agents as well as designing personal protective equipment.

C. NANOTECHNOLOGY

65. Nanotechnology refers to creation and/or manipulation of materials at the nanometre scale, for example at the scale of one billionth of a metre. In the eyes of some observers, nanotechnology holds almost limitless promises, even opening the potential of self-replication and

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self-guidance of technology. However, nanotechnology could also lead to a paradigm shift in warfare if weaponised or otherwise misused by state or non-state actors. For one, nanoparticles can be extremely dangerous due to their characteristics: they are hard to trace, are unpredictable and have the ability to infiltrate technology. In particular, nanoparticles could pose a serious threat to biological systems, including humans, as they are able to use other pathways than biological pathogens. The science and technology community still knows too little about how the human body would react to nanoparticle exposure or what treatment could be effective. Nanotechnology could also be used to increase the lethality of weapons. So-called proto-nanoweapons that disperse shrapnel and make weapons more indiscriminate are already available. With regard to CBRN terrorism, some experts have pointed out that nanomaterial could be used to aid or conceal the delivery of chemical or biological agents. For example, chemical or biological agents could be encapsulated by nanomaterial which would make the substance appear innocuous at first glance. Drug delivery strategies already use this technique, but it still faces many scientific and technical obstacles. In the short and medium term, it appears, however, that non-state actors will face difficult challenges to employ nanotechnology in the service of CBRN weapons.

66. Nanotechnology could in the future also be used in counter-CBRN efforts. For example, nanotechnology could be used to monitor dispersal patterns of a chemical attack, improve decontamination efforts and create protective clothing.

D. UNMANNED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY

67. The development of ever more advanced unmanned aerial, ground or maritime vehicles could present yet another set of new CBRN challenges and opportunities. Some terrorist groups have already proven unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities, including Hezbollah, Hamas’ Al-Qassam brigades and Daesh. These groups most often have used them for surveillance, propaganda and to steer suicide car bombs. However, Daesh has deployed drones in targeted attacks and seeks to improve its capabilities to equip unmanned aerial vehicles with IEDs. The advantages of using unmanned technologies for CBRN purposes include a potential low risk of detection and the minimisation of personnel at risk in an attack.

68. In the context of this report, unmanned vehicles could, first, be used as a means of delivering CBRN weapons. Currently, most unmanned vehicles are limited in the payload they can carry. This is especially true for commercial unmanned vehicles that could be easily acquired by terrorists. This limited payload would make them unattractive for attacks that require large quantities of CBRN material. However, unmanned vehicles could be used for those that do not. For example, in 2015, an unmanned aerial vehicle, containing traces of radiation, landed on the rooftop of the office of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Also, unmanned aerial vehicles are increasingly deployed in agriculture for spraying chemicals. They could, as well, be used in attacks on CBRN facilities, leading to the release of CBRN materials into the environment. Illicit flights over nuclear power stations and even near a nuclear weapons complex in the United States have already occurred. In addition to unmanned vehicles providing intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, terrorists could load conventional explosives onto an unmanned vehicle and have them attack chemical, biological or nuclear facilities, for example. As the majority of the security measures at nuclear sites were designed before the advent of commercial unmanned aerial vehicles for example, they are not equipped to detect them or defend against an attack. Again, the payload limitation could make this difficult, but with the development of autonomous cars, for example, this risk could rise.

69. The deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles in particular has the potential to help counter-CBRN efforts. The defence industry and governments are researching how to use such vehicles in areas such as CBRN detection. Many futuristic ideas are on the drawing board, for example swarms of drones that could be used to detect, decontaminate or deliver medical countermeasures. So far, however, unmanned aerial vehicles are underperforming in

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counter-CBRN roles, as the task is technically more difficult than one would assume. Experts argue, however, that they can play an important complementary role, especially in gathering vital intelligence on terrorist networks and flows of illicit goods. A parallel development occurred with regard to the potential of unmanned aerial vehicle technology in the fight against improvised explosive devices. Over time, developers and operators found out that the added value of such assets lies in disrupting networks and not in detecting IEDs after they are emplaced.

E. CYBER TECHNOLOGIES

70. Cyber space is another realm with profound consequences for defence and security policies. However, at this point, cyber technology can only affect damage or lead to the loss of life as second- or third-order effects. Indirectly, cyber infiltration could lead to easier access to secret CBRN-related information. Most importantly perhaps, cyber-attacks against chemical, biological and nuclear facilities could lead to the release of CBRN materials into the environment. By accessing the business network or directly targeting the control network of such facilities, terrorists could execute shutdown or release operations or could otherwise try to wreak havoc. Attacks on critical infrastructure, including on CBRN-related facilities, is a crucial concern today and one that the STC has paid close attention to. The risks of successful attacks rise as the technological capabilities of non-state actors become more sophisticated and the operators of critical infrastructure lag behind in updating their cyber defence and security.

F. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING

71. Additive manufacturing, often labelled 3D printing, allows digital models to be turned into solid objects by gradually adding layers of material, including certain plastics, metals and chemical compounds. The technology enables the production of complex designs that, inter alia, increase the durability and performance of products. Additive manufacturing is expected to revolutionise several industries, including the defence industry. Users of additive manufacturing already today create prototypes and produce tools from which final products are made, and it quickly emerging as a technology to manufacture end-use industrial products and to fabricate personalised items. Experts mostly worry about how additive manufacturing can potentially be misused by malicious state and non-state actors for conventional means of attacks, but CBRN challenges arise as well. The technology reduces the need for expertise as it only requires access to a blueprint as well as a 3D printer. Thus, it potentially lowers the barriers for terrorists to manufacture CBRN-related material, and perhaps even weapons themselves. Additive manufacturing capacities also reduce the dependence on illicit trade networks. The technology furthermore has a small physical footprint, reducing the need for safe spaces or havens. Tracking CBRN activities will thus become even harder: instead of smuggling devices used in CBRN attacks, blueprints would be shared digitally.

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VII.CONCLUDING REMARKS

72. The world has only seen a small number of terrorist CBRN attacks, and much of the information pertaining to attempts to procure CBRN capabilities remains classified. As a result, experts disagree on the severity of the CBRN terrorist risk, which for most observers is a function of the threat posed by terrorist groups, the vulnerabilities of prospective targets and the potential consequences of an attack. Gregory Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, Virginia, who has briefed the STC in the past, differentiates between three groups in the expert community:

- Optimists believe that terrorist groups ultimately have little real intention and few capabilities to acquire a CBRN weapon. Even if a group could successfully employ such a weapon, the consequences would likely be minimal. They argue that CBRN terrorism is a ‘very low probability, very low consequence’ risk.

- Pessimists see the probability of a successful attack as growing because technological barriers become lower and terrorists ever more unconstrained. Moreover, they believe that a successful CBRN attack could have catastrophic effects. They thus view CBRN terrorism as a ‘low probability, high consequence’ risk.

- Like the pessimists, pragmatists do not think that the stated intentions to acquire CBRN capabilities should be underestimated and also believe that technological barriers are steadily falling. Nevertheless, unlike the pessimists, they point out that the difficulties are still significant and that not every successful attack would lead to catastrophic effects, but that it depends on the specific circumstances. To increase vigilance, pragmatists advocate more fine-grained analyses of terrorist groups. They thus see CBRN terrorism as a ‘low but growing probability, low consequence’ risk.

73. As has been shown throughout this report, CBRN weapons cannot be treated as a monolithic or uniform category. Thus, assigning one degree of probability and one level of consequences across all potential CBRN attacks by terrorists would be misguided. Your Rapporteur would therefore disagree with all three of the above judgments. To illustrate, a chemical attack by Daesh is more likely than al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear weapon, but the former will likely have lower consequences than the latter. Your Rapporteur would therefore advocate that CBRN terrorism is addressed in a clear-headed manner, bearing in mind that each weapon type has its own characteristics and thus requires a tailored response. Terrorist groups have the stated intention to acquire CBRN weapons, and they act upon it, steadily increasing their capabilities. Moreover, new possibilities are opening up in science and technology. Understanding the threat, including through vulnerability analyses and adequate intelligence efforts, is necessary to devise the most efficient policy responses at the international, multinational, state, and local levels.

74. Today, the Euro-Atlantic community faces challenges at home, in its neighbourhood and across the globe unlike anything it has seen over the last two decades. Parliaments must match scarce defence and security resources in the most efficient way to cope with all of these challenges. Given these challenges, the resources allocated to counter-CBRN efforts will, realistically, remain stagnant. However, your Rapporteur hopes that this report makes it clear that, even though non-state actors still face substantial hurdles in perpetrating CBRN terrorism, the reality is that the risks are real, significant, and growing. Parliaments in the Alliance must therefore invest the resources needed to address the problem of CBRN terrorism.

75. A key supporting element for success is to counter terrorism in all its variations in a much more effective manner. Ultimately, it does not matter whether terrorists are planning a complex conventional plot, like the ones in Paris or Brussels, or a CBRN attack. Allies must invest into effective counterterrorism efforts across the board, and this will go some way in preventing CBRN terrorism.

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76. Policies need to address the full spectrum of CBRN terrorism. As it is very difficult to deter terrorist groups, perhaps even impossible, the transatlantic community needs to focus on preventing terrorist groups from acquiring CBRN weapons in the first place. Furthermore, resilience is key. To achieve more resilience, NATO and its partners need to:

- be adequately prepared and protected for an attack;- rapidly detect when an attack occurs; - manage the consequences of an attack, including through first responses and long-term

medical care, decontamination, as well as management of the psychosocial impact; - clean up the affected site of an attack; and - deal with the long-term consequences.

77. The risk of terrorist attacks with CBRN weapons will continue to increase as science and technology innovation, research, development, and distribution are becoming more easily accessible and globalised. The increasing diffusion and accessibility might enable innovative terrorist groups to reach levels of technology previously only achieved by highly developed states. The increasing ubiquity of material that could be used in terrorist CBRN weapons as well as the insecurity of some existing stocks could, in the future, give individuals with a modest education and a certain level of technical proficiency the power to bring about massive damage. Indeed, history shows that terrorist groups often innovate and exploit new technologies to make up for what otherwise they lack in capacities.

78. As the Irish Republican Army once famously stated after a failed assassination attempt against Margaret Thatcher: “You have to be lucky all the time. We only have to be lucky once.” Fortunately, CBRN weapons are still difficult to acquire and use. One could turn this saying around: terrorists have many opportunities to get unlucky along the long path to a CBRN attack. It is the responsibility of the international community to increase the likelihood that terrorist groups do indeed get unlucky. Yet, the possibility that a CBRN attack might take place should not be discounted. As Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (ret) and Margaret J. Nencheck put it, “[t]he best we may be able to achieve [against terrorist groups] is to understand that we live in danger, without living in fear.”

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY(For further information on sources, please contact the Committee Director)

Forest, James J.F., and Russell D. Howard (eds.), Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism (Second Edition), New York: McGraw Hill, 2013

Immenkamp, Beatrix, “ISIL/Da’esh and ‘Non-Conventional’ Weapons of Terror”, European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, December 2015

Rudischhauser, Wolfgang, “Could ISIL Go Nuclear?” NATO Review, 26 May 2015Rudischhauser, Wolfgang, “Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats – NATO’s

Achievements and Ongoing Challenges,” CBRN Protection Made in Germany, Bonn: Mittler Report, 2015

The Royal Society, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Convergent Trends in Science and Technology, 2013, The Royal Society, https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/brain-waves/2013-08-04-chemical-weapons-convention-and-convergent-trends.pdf

Unal, Beyza, and Sasan Aghlani, Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons by Non-State Actors, Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs), January 2016, https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/2016/cbrn.pdf

Caves, John P. Jr., and W. Seth Carus, The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030, Occasional Paper 10, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, US National Defense University, June 2014,

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/cswmd/CSWMD_OccationalPaper-10.pdf

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https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/2016/cbrn.pdf

https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/2016/cbrn.pdf

https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/brain-waves/2013-08-04-chemical-weapons-convention-and-convergent-trends.pdf

https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/brain-waves/2013-08-04-chemical-weapons-convention-and-convergent-trends.pdf