16.11 options to facilitate socio-political stability...

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Options to Facilitate Socio-Political Stability in Syria and Iraq

An SMA White Paper

November 2016

ContributingAuthors:Dr.VictorAsal(SUNYAlbany),Dr.ElizabethBodine-Baron(RAND),Dr.SaraCobb(GMU),Dr.BobElder(GMU),Dr.ToddHelmus(RAND),Mr.BobJones(SOCOM),Dr.LarryKuznar(NSI,Indiana - Purdue U Fort Wayne), Dr. Gina Ligon (Univ. of Nebraska Omaha), Dr. Jacob Olidort(Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Dr. Karl Rethemeyer (SUNY Albany), Dr. Jason Spitaletta(JHU/APL),Dr.GwynethSutherlin(GeographicServices,Inc.),Dr.JosephYoung(AmericanUniversity)

ScientificEditors:Drs.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI)andHriar“Doc”Cabayan(JointStaffJ-39)

Compiler:Mr.SamRhem(SRC)

StrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication

Thiswhitepaperrepresentstheviewsandopinionsofthecontributingauthors.

ThiswhitepaperdoesnotrepresentofficialUSGpolicyorposition.

Thiswhitepaperisapprovedforpublicreleasewithunlimiteddistribution


Contents TableofFigures........................................................................................................................................2

ListofTables.............................................................................................................................................2

Preface.....................................................................................................................................................3

ExecutiveSummary..................................................................................................................................5

ARegionalStrategicPerspective:MrBobJones,USSOCOM...................................................................9

ManagingtheStrategicContextintheMiddleEast:APreliminaryTransitivityAnalysisoftheMiddleEasternAllianceNetworkandItsOperationalImplications,Dr.LawrenceA.Kuznar,NSI,Inc.andIndianaUniversity–PurdueUniversity,FortWayne.............................................................................13

AnAnalysisofViolentNonstateActorOrganizationalLethalityandNetworkCo-EvolutionintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:Drs.VictorAsal,KarlRethemeyer,SUNYAlbany&Dr.JosephYoung,AmericanUniversity...............................................................................................................................23

CounteringtheIslamicState’sIdeologicalAppeal,Dr.JacobOlidort,WashingtonInstitute.................28

FrameworkforInfluencingExtremistIdeology:Drs.BobElderandSaraCobb,GMU...........................37

Off-RampsforDa’eshLeadership:PreventingDa’esh2.0,Dr.GinaLigon,UniversityofNebraskaOmahaandDr.JasonSpitaletta,TheJohnHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory..................40

ComprehensiveCommunicationsApproach:Drs.ToddHelmusandElizabethBodine-Baron,RAND...47

AHumanGeographyApproachtoDegradingISIL:Dr.GwynethSutherlin,GeographicServicesInc....50

Table of Figures Figure1:Dyadicvs.TriadicRelationships..............................................................................................14Figure2.ExampleTriadTypesfromSyriaIraqConflictsurroundingDa’esh......................................15Figure3:Scenario1:ISDivides,ThreatsDiversify................................................................................35Figure4:Scenario2:ISConsolidates,AllieswithOtherJihadis.................................................................36Figure5:NarrativeStrategy.......................................................................................................................38Figure6:FactorsofTMTTrust(AdaptedfromMayeretal.,1995)............................................................41Figure7.Pro-ISILFamilyGroupsthatmakeuptheHumanGeographyacrossSyriaandIraq..........50Figure8.Thepro-ISILgroups......................................................................................................................51Figure9.Thetribalfootprint......................................................................................................................52Figure10.Neighboringfamilygroups........................................................................................................53

List of Tables Table1.ActorsinSyriaIraqConflictwithDa’esh..................................................................................18Table2.PoliticalRatingSystemforCharacterizingDyadicRelationsinaNetwork............................18Table3.InventoryofTriadswithKnownSignforSyriaIraqDa’eshConflict......................................19Table4.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoDa’esh..................................................................................20


Table5.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoFatahalSham.....................................................................20Table6.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoAssadRegime.....................................................................21

Preface

This White Paper presents the analytic results from Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) project touching on the Middle East and North Africa. The objective is to suggest options to manage conflict in the region and to facilitate socio-political stability in Iraq and Syria. Options that are discussed are intentionally “out-of-the-box”, non-kinetic, and focused on potential Coalition efforts to:

1- Diminish the allure of the ideology that Da’esh presents to radicalized and potentially radicalized and other youth in the region; and

2- Shape the context to best support reduced regional turmoil and defeat of the Da’esh organization while minimizing the risk of further spread of the jihadist ideology.

The findings discussed below are the result of the SMA’s standard multi-disciplinary approach and belief that no single discipline by itself can provide a comprehensive approach to this global and regional conundrum. The analyses were conducted unconstrained by policy, legal, and operational consideration and attempts were made to garner insights from historical precedent.

Following are brief summaries of the articles in this white paper.

In his opening article, Mr. Bob Jones (SOCOM) argues that we live in revolutionary times and ISIL leverages the energy in Sunni populations to their advantage. In revolutionary times, revisionist powers see and seize opportunities; while status quo powers tend to be defensive, reactive, and see agents of change as “threats.” Iran saw an opportunity to expand its sovereign privilege across the region with the fall of Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda saw opportunity to reduce foreign influence, remove corrupt autocrats, and restore dignity to the Ummah; Da’esh saw the opportunity to best AQ in Syria and Iraq by offering “Caliphate today” in lieu of AQ’s more patient approach.

In his article entitled "Managing the Strategic Context in the Middle East: A Preliminary Transitivity Analysis of the Middle Eastern Alliance Network and Its Operational Implications", Dr. Larry Kuznar advances balance theory to gauge the overall stability of the conflict system that surrounds the battle against Da’esh in Syria and Iraq. This system is characterized by multiple simultaneous conflicts engaging numerous state and non-state groups in the region and from outside of the region. The analysis focuses on the relations between 24 of the key state and non-state actors in this system and indicates that the region is locked in a well-established system of conflict that is likely to persist given the high degree of transitivity in established relationships

In “An Analysis of Violent Nonstate Actor Organizational Lethality and Network Co-Evolution in the Middle East and North Africa”, Drs. Victor Asal, Karl Rethemeyer (SUNY Albany) and Dr. Joseph Young (American University) use new data that spans the years 1998 to 2012 to model the behavior of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Middle East. Using several statistical techniques, including network modeling, logit analysis, and hazard modeling, they show that governments can use strategies that influence a group’s level of lethality, their relationships with other groups, and how long and whether these groups become especially lethal.

In his “Countering the Islamic State’s Ideological Appeal”, Dr. Jacob Olidort (Washington Institute) discusses an options-focused assessment for policy and practitioner communities in the United States government concerning the ideological threat posed by the Islamic State. The paper examines the possible


evolution of the Islamic State in the event that it loses its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and the nature of the threat it could pose to Western targets and interests. The assessment is based on the recently-published Washington Institute report, Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom, as well as the author’s cumulative research on the texts and ideas of the Islamic State and other Salafi and Islamist groups.

In their paper entitled “Framework for Influencing Extremist Ideology”, Drs. Bob Elder and Sara Cobb (GMU) discuss negotiation research, drawing on rational choice theory which provides a wealth of findings about how people negotiate successfully. They also describe some of the pitfalls that have been associated with negotiation failures. Building on narrative theory, they attempt to expand the theoretical base of negotiation in an effort to address the meaning making processes that structure negotiation as the basis of a framework for influencing extremist ideology. This research is combined with decision-related research conducted in support of deterrence planning as a means to discover potential influence levers for possible use as a counter to extremist ideology. Recognizing that conflict resolution is complicated because it involves changing the story from within the interactional context from where it arises, the framework assumes a staged approach to address the narrative structure of the ideologically-based conflict which anchors the influence actions on the strategic positions and identities, embedded in the narrative logics of the key characters.

The focus of the article entitled “Off-Ramps for Da’esh Leadership: Preventing Da’esh 2.0”, by Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska Omaha and Dr. Jason Spitaletta, The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is two-fold. First, they discuss the underlying theory of TMT (Top Management Team) collaboration, and provide practitioners with some tactics to foment barriers and distrust to aid the operations meant to degrade the organization (e.g., retaking of Mosul). Second, given their analysis of what motivated each of these leaders to join and remain in Da’esh, they provide a set of tailored off-ramps to be considered to deter captured leaders from reconstituting Da’esh 2.0.

In their article entitled “Comprehensive Communications Approach,” (excerpted from their 2016 report, “Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter,” available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html), Drs. Todd Helmus and Elizabeth Bodine-Baron (RAND) argue the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), like no other terrorist organization before, has used Twitter and other social media channels to broadcast its message, inspire followers, and recruit new fighters. Though much less heralded, ISIS opponents have also taken to Twitter to castigate the ISIS message. Their article draws on publicly available Twitter data to examine this ongoing debate about ISIS on Arabic Twitter and to better understand the networks of ISIS supporters and opponents on Twitter in order to craft more effective counter-messaging strategies.

Finally, in “A Human Geography Approach to Degrading ISIL” Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services Inc.) argues that stabilizing the region and degrading ISIL will be an international effort with geopolitical and large network engagements. Ultimately, the activities proposed will have an impact for families and their homes on the ground in Syria and Iraq; therefore, the perspectives and priorities of these populations should be foregrounded in any approach, including the involvement of key stakeholders from the earliest possible phase, to lay the groundwork and build partnerships for the long-term stabilization process.


Executive Summary Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI)

KeyObservations

TherewasconsensusamongSMAresearchersandobserversthat:

• Da’eshrepresentsacompoundthreat:itisboththeorganizationandtheviolentextremistideaitrepresents.

• Da’eshbattlefieldlossinIraq/Syriatheaterwillnotbringaboutanendtothesalienceoftheextremistideologythatitrepresents.Rather,the“ideologicalbattle”islikelytocontinueoverthecomingyearswithpotentiallyunacceptabletollsonWesternsocieties.

• Theefforttomitigatethethreatshouldbecompoundandcomprehensive:addressingtheregionalconflictasawhole,notDa’eshonly,usingtargetedkineticoptionsalongwithcomplementarymessagingandothernon-kineticoptions.

Theobservations,researchfindingsandimplicationspresentedbelowsummarizethecontributionsoftheseparateresearcheffortsincludedinthispaper.Theyrepresentathree-prongedapproachforencouragingsupportforregionalstabilityby:

• diminishingtheglobalallureofthejihadistideologythatDa’eshpresents;

• attendingtotheunderlyingandpersistentdriversofregionalconflict;

• shapingandinfluencingnarrativestominimizeDa’eshappeal.

AnalyticFindingsandRecommendations

DiminishAllure,StemSpreadofIdeologyOBSERVATION:Thereareatleasteightinter-relatedmilitarizedconflictsintheregion.USfocusonDa’eshinIraqandSyriahasweakenedDa’eshbut,bynotaddressingotherregionalconflicts,hasallowedextremistideologytobecomefurtherentrenched.OBSERVATION:Da’esh’scaliphate-stateconcept,theappealofjihadism,andterroristtacticsareunlikelytodisappearinthenearterm.However,wemaybeabletoimpacttheirappealtoaggrievedpopulationsanddiminishtheirlethality.RESEARCHFINDING:ViolentandrepressivecounterVEOeffortsincreasetheincidenceandlethalityofVEOresponses;non-violentapproachesappeartomakegroupslesslethal(SeeAsal,RethemeyerandYoung,page22).IMPLICATIONS:

• DefeatingDa’eshtheorganizationwithovertkineticandviolentmeanswillatbestdiminishaportionofthethreatandleavetheregioninpersistentturmoil.

• EffortstoneutralizeDa’eshshouldbedoneinawaythatreducesthepossibilityofAQresurgenceoremergenceofotherVEOs,including:


• separatingreferencestoIslamist/caliphistpoliticalthoughtinUSnarrativesandstrategiccommunicationsfromtheviolentmeansassociatedwithit;

• addressingandworkingtomitigatethenegativepsycho-socialdynamicsinIraqandSyriathatimpactbothciviliansandcombatantsmanyofwhomarelivingwithseverepost-traumaticstressdisorder(PTSD);

• buildingtrustwithelite/leadernetworksinsecret,overtime,usingrewards,andwithholdingpunishmentsinordertoaccommodateacceptableelementsofthelargermovementofwhichDa’eshispart.

UnderlyingandPersistentDrivers:ShiftEmphasistoAvoidingCivilWarinIraq

RESEARCHFINDING:Basedontherangeofinterests(i.e.,economic,social,domestic,etc.)ofregionalactors,Da’esheventuallywillbedefeatedregardlessofUSeffortsinSyria.TheinterestsofregionalactorsthatpossesstherelevantcapabilitiestoimpactthefightagainstDa’eshshowhighresolvefordefeatistdefeatinSyriaandevenmoresoforDa’eshdefeatinIraq1.

RESEARCHFINDING:WhetherIraqitribalelitesandSunnifactionsperceivethatthererangeofinterestsarebetterservedbtheGovernmentifIraq(GoI)orlivingunderDa’esh/jihadistruleisdeterminedbywhattheybelieveaboutthesecurityconditionsthateachwouldbring.

RESEARCHFINDING:Giventheirrangeifinterests,thebenefitKurdishgroupsderivefromcontinuedcivilconflictinSyriaandIraq(e.g.,wealth,prestige,territory)canbecounteredwitheconomicarrangements,andenhancedinternationalanddomesticinfluence.

RESEARCHFINDING:GoIandShi'ahardlinersinIraqhavehighresolve(politicalwill)toavoidmakingsubstantivepost-conflictpoliticalreformsthatincreasethestatureofSunnivoicesintheIraqigovernment.Twoconditionshoweverchangethedecisioncalculusofeachgroupstopreferringtomakethesereforms:1)outbreakoffull-scalecivilwarfareinIraq;or2)Iranianbackingforsuchreforms.

IMPLICATIONS:Nowistheopportunetimetoshiftpolicytowardsconflicttransformation-avoidingcivilwarinIraq;beginengagingallpartiesinpublicallyvisibledialogueregardingtheirviewsandrequirementsforpost-Da’eshgovernanceandsecurity.

• EngageSunnifactionsonsecurityguaranteesandrequirementsforpoliticalinclusion/power;

• EngageKurdsoneconomicandinternationalanddomesticpoliticalinfluencerequirements;

• IncentivizeIrantobackoffonproxyfunding,diminishstridencyofShi’ahardlineeasingwayforGoItomakesubstantiveovertures,opengovernancereformtalks.

1Fullanalysisoftheinteractionsoftheinterestsandresolveof23regionalactorsincludingdataavailableonrequestfromtheSMAoffice.


UnderlyingandPersistentDrivers:RestabilizeSaudi-IranianCompetitionforDominance;UseofProxyForces

RESEARCHFINDING:Theregionalsystemwillremainunstable;defeatofDa’eshdecreasessystemconflictonlymarginally.

RESEARCHFINDING:Saudi,Iranianuseofproxyforcescanquicklyreignitehostilitiesintheregion.Althoughdirectconfrontationisverycostlyforeach,thechancesofunwantedescalationarehigh.

RESEARCHFINDING:Iranmaybeincentivizedtolimitproxysupportbyinternationaleffortsto1)recognizeIranasaregionalpartner,2)mitigateperceivedthreatfromSaudiArabiaandIsrael,and3)expandtraderelationswithEurope.RESEARCHFINDING:TherearefewpotentialleversincentivizingSaudiArabiatolimitproxyism,althoughitmayrespondtowarningofrestrictionsonUSsupportifnotcurtailed.IMPLICATIONS:Tobeeffective,effortstoaddresstheunderlyingsourcesofregionalinstabilityshouldincludeashiftfromanarrowfocusonDa’eshtowardthemultipleactiveandlatentconflictsintheregion,mostnotablytheSaudi-Iranian,Sunni-Shi’arivalry.ActivitiesshouldincludeopendialoguewithIran,SaudiArabiaandregionalactorstoquelltheintensityofSaudi-Iranrivalryandmutualthreatperceptions.UnderlyingandPersistentDrivers:AddressDisaffectedPopulationsOBSERVATION:TheregionalpopulationistraumatizedandwroughtwithPTSD.Bothciviliansandcombatantsarephysicallyandpsychologicallywounded.OBSERVATION:RegionalactorsareusingthefightagainstDa’eshasanexcusetofightotherswithwhomtheyhavelong-standinganimosities.OBSERVATION:Aspopulationscontinuetobedisaffected,Da’eshgainsempathy,nation-statesfindavenuestoeitherdirectlyassaultoruseproxiestoundermineadversaries,andUSinterestsarecurtailed.IMPLICATIONS:Addresspopulationgrievances,notjihadistideologyindependentofcontext.Sincerelyaddressingdisaffectionofregionalpopulations–physical,socialandpolitical--makesconditionsunfavorableforboththeDa’eshorganizationandtheideology.Italsosetsthecontextfordiminishingtheallureofviolentextremistideology,civilconflict,andultimatelyregionalstability.Activitiesshouldincludeinstitutingimmediatehumanitarianrelieffordisaffectedpopulationwillhelpeasetraumaandfacilitateoverduecareforthosewoundedbyallwarringpartiesinthisconflict,anddevelopmentoflong-termplansfordealingwithIDPs,refugeesandreturnees.


DiminishingDa’eshAppeal:CounterDa’eshCommunications

RESEARCHFINDING:MembersofDa’eshdonotholdhomogenousmotives;theyaredrivenbydifferentmixesofideological,pragmatic,andviolentmotivations

FINDING:SyrianMujahedeenhavepotentialtoinfluenceDa’eshsupporters

FINDING:Da’eshopponentsonTwitteroutnumbersupportersbutlackcohesivemessagingstrategiesandarefracturedalongsectarianandnationallines.

IMPLICATIONS:EffectivedisengagementmessagingtoDa’eshmembersrequiresthatindividualswhoareprimarilypragmatically-motivatedaretargetedwithdifferent“off-ramp”communicationsthanthosewhoareideologically-motivated.Thereislittlevalueinmessagingindividualswhoareprimarilymotivatedbyviolence-seeking.Directanti-Da’eshmessagingtospecificcommunitiesandaddresstheirlocalconcerns.Activitiesmightincludesocialmediatraining,ofregionalanti-Da’eshinfluencersandofSyrianMujahedeentobuildtheircapacitytoengageandenhancethecredibilityandeffectivenessofcounter-messaging.IMPLICATIONS:Tailorthemesandmessagestopragmaticattributeswithinindividualsand/ortargetaudiences.Focusontakingpositive,pro-socialaction,towardthenewIraq/SyriainsteadofawayfromDa’esh.Highlightinconsistenciesbetweenideologyandbehaviortoreinforcetheproprietyofseekinganalternative.IMPLICATIONS:Leveragethesubjectiveexperienceofin-groupmembers(defectors)tohighlightDa’eshfailuresandGoIsuccesses,particularlyinaddressingSunnigrievances.Inaddition,highlightdiscontentwithinDa’eshcontrolledlandsusinglocally-generatedcontentandprovideproverbial“GoldenBridge”sothatDa’eshmemberscanpreservetheiridentitywhilerenouncingDa’eshandengaginginpro-socialactivities.AnalyticRoadMap:SynthesizingStabilizationEfforts

AnalyzeDa’eshmemberswithintheirHumanGeography–asetofrelationshipsincluding:ethnicity,religion,language,tribe,clan,familygroup,politicalorothernetworkaffiliations,and

UsetheseIraqiandSyrianconceptsacrossallStrategicStabilizationOptions:

a. Geopoliticaloptionsassessmentbasedonlocalgroupsconsiderationsofviability/options

b. Networkanalysisofregionalactorsincludingtribal/clanfootprint,allegiances,motivations,regionalconnectionsfromfamily-grouplevel

c. Comprehensivecommunications:moreeffectivepersuasiontechniquestoconfrontideology

d. Selectionof‘off-ramp’modelsbasedoncultural‘touchstones’forDa’eshmembers


A Regional Strategic Perspective: Mr Bob Jones, USSOCOM

Thispaperexaminesthestrategicenvironmentofthisconflict,notjustofSyriaandIraq,butthelargerdynamicsplayingoutgloballyandthroughouttheregionthoseconflictsareoccurringwithin.ThisisdoneinthecontextoftheSOCOMStrategicAppreciationdocument,whichwassignedbyGeneralVotelinhisroleastheSOCOMCommanderinDecember,2015.

Threatsexistwithinthestrategicenvironment,butthreatsdon’tdefinethestrategicenvironment.Inthatcontext,ISILisasmuchasymptomofdeeperproblemsastheyareathreattoanyparticulargovernment.Itisalsoimportanttoappreciatethattheirsuccessinattractingfollowersspeakstoaperceivedneedforwhattheyofferthatgoesfarbeyondtheirideologicalrhetoric,ortheircultureofviolence.Weneedtounderstandthatneedfromtheperspectiveofthepopulationsitradiatesfrom,andlookbeyondthetroublingtacticalcriterialikeideologyandviolence,whichdrawourattention.

WecanlooktotheStrategicAppreciationforamorefundamentalperspective.AswelookedattheglobalstrategicenvironmentatSOCOM,thethingthatreallystoodouttousisthataroundthegloberightnow,thereisrapidlyshiftingpowerbetweenstateactors,rapidlyshiftingpowerfromstatestopopulations,andrapidlyshiftingpowerintothesenewtypesofactorslikealQaeda.Thisshiftpowerisfuelingtherevisionistforcesatplay,driving“grayzone”competitionsbetweenstates;drivingrevolutionwithinstates;andfacilitatinganewbreedofempowerednon-sateactorsabletoconductdistributedandnetworkedapproachestounconventionalwarfarethatextendsacrossandamongstates.Weliveinrevolutionarytimes.

Inconjunctionwiththisrapidlyshiftingpower,thereisslowingadjustingsovereignprivilege,andslowingadjustingpoliciesandgovernanceaswell.Thesearethechallengesofstatusquopowers.IfyoulookatthechartintheStrategicAppreciation,wetrytoshowthatthereistremendousenergybuildingupbetweenstateactorswheretheseimbalancesinpowerandsovereigntyarebeginningtomerge.Thereisanevenmoresignificantexploitableenergywithinpopulationsperceivingpowerfulgrievanceandwheregovernmentsarelaggingintheirabilitytokeepupwithevolvingexpectations.Eventhemostagileofgovernmentswiththemostempoweredpopulationsarestrugglingtokeepup.Whereneitherempowermentnoragilityexistthesituationsarehighlyvolatile,andverysusceptibletoexploitationbythosewhoseeopportunityintheresultantfriction.

Whenthissituationoccurs,thereisapotentialenergythatgrows.Ifoneisarevisionistpower,onetendstoseetheopportunityinpotentialenergyandarequicktoleverageintheadvancementofone’sinterests.If,however,oneisastatusquopower,onetendstolag,bedefensive,bereactive,andseetheseagentsofchangeasthreatstobeblamedfortheconditionstheyexploit.Thisisnotjustavariationonwell-foundedtheoriesofinternationalrelations,thisisarealityplayingoutaroundtheglobetoday.Wehavepotentialenergybuildingbetweenstatesandwithinpopulations.Wheretheseconditionsarenotrecognized,ornotaddressed,potentialenergybuilds,andtherevisionistexploitersofthisenergygather.Thisistheprimarydriverofinstabilityinsomanyplacesaroundtheglobetoday.

ThisiscertainlythestrategicenvironmentframingthedynamicsplayingoutinSyriaandIraq.IransawtheopportunityintheUSinvasionandsubsequenttransitionpolicyforIraq.USactionscausedtheIranian-Saudi(andassociatedShia/Sunni)lineofcompetition,oncestabilizedalongtheIran/IraqborderbySaddam,todropdownontothebordersofKuwait,SaudiArabia,Jordan,and


Israel.USrevisionistpolicyforIraqopenedupopportunitiesfortheforcesoftheregion,andIranwasbutoneofmanywhoquicklyseizedthatopportunity,expandingtheirsphereofinfluencefromtheHinduKushtotheMediterranean.Withinthisstateonstatecompetitionforinfluence,therewaspopulation-basedcompetitionforinfluenceplayingoutaswell.

Thepost-ColdWareraofglobalizationhasenabledtremendousopportunitiestoleveragetherapidlygrowingandincreasinglyexploitableenergywithindisenfranchisedSunnipopulationsacrossthegreaterMiddleEast.OrganizationslikealQaedaandISILareconductingverysophisticatednetworkedapproachestounconventionalwarfare(UW)toconnectandleveragetheenergywithinthesedistributedpopulationstoadvancetheinterestsoftheirrespectiveorganizations.AlQaedawastheearlyleaderinthatcompetition,withtheirprimaryadvantagebeingthesanctuaryborneoftheirnon-statestatus.Withnoterritorytohold,andnopopulationstogovern,alQaedaprovedlargelyinvulnerabletotraditionaltoolsofstatecraft.ISIL,however,hasabandonedthatsanctuarytooffertothepeopleoftheregionthetangiblerealityofaSunni-ledstatetheyliveintoday.WhiletheformationofaphysicalstatemakesmanyintheWestnervous,therealityisthatISILhasmadethemselvesincrediblyvulnerable,andarebyfarthelesserthreattoWesterninterests.ButbycharacterizingtheseUWcampaignsinsymptomatictermsas“terrorism”wecreateobstaclestounderstandingtheminwaysthatfacilitatecoursesofactionfarmorelikelytoattainourdesiredstrategicgoalsthanthecounterterrorismframeworkemployedtodate.

WeneedtounderstandtheseUWcampaignsforwhattheyreallyare.OnlythencanweworktoeffectivelycounterUWcampaigns,andnotjustreacttotheterroristtacticstheytendtoemploy.Tocharacterizetheseorganizationsas“terrorist”andthisdynamicas“terrorism”isbothsimplisticandinaccurate.WhenISILemergedfrompoliticalchaosofIraqtheywereabletoout-competeAQwiththesesamepopulationsbyofferingaphysicalCaliphatetoday.TheurgencyofthedangersformanyofthesepeopledidnotallowtimeforAQ’smorepatientapproachofCaliphatesomeday.At-riskpopulationsneededsomethingtangibletheycouldtrusttoday.Thestatusquopowersoftheregionandtheglobecontinuetounderestimateandunderservethisdemand.TheresultisthatanydefeatofISILwillnotsolvethecurrentproblem,butwillmostlikelyvalidateandrestoreAQ’smorepatient,anddangerous,approach.AdefeatofISILwillalsofracturethecurrentstate,andconvertacivilwaragainstasmallweakstatebackintoapowerfulrevolutionaryconflictagainstadozenactors,allcompetingviolentlytolandontoponcethedustfinallysettles.

Strategicsuccessintheseconditionsdemandsthatweconsiderfirstorderfactorsasthesymptomstheyare,andinthecontextofthestrategicdynamicstheyoccurwithin.Otherwisewearemerelytargetingandsuppressingsymptoms,andquitelikelymakingthefundamentalproblemsworseintheprocess.TothisendIposesomerhetoricalquestions:Howdowehelpourpartnerstoreducetheexploitableenergy?Howdowebetterdeterrevisioniststatesfromseizingopportunitieslikethis?Howdoweencourageandsupportpartnersmoreeffectivelywhoarestrugglingtoevolveandarefeelingthreatenedbythisblendofinternalandexternal,formalandinformal,blendsofrevisionistactors?Howdogovernmentsmaketheseevolutionarychangesinpolicy,strategyandtacticswithoutappearingtobeweak?

Inthisrevolutionaryera,theUSistheultimateguardianofthestatusquo.Howdoweregaintherevolutionaryspiritinourthinkingandactionsnecessarytofacilitatepositivechange?Inmanyways,we’vebecomethemodernRedcoatsandareveryanxiousaboutthelatestgenerationofrebelshidinginthewoodsandnotfollowingourrulesorideasofwhatisproper.Onecannotrationalizepopulation-basedconcerns,norcanoneignoreorwishawaythecompetitionfor


regionalinfluencebetweenIranandKSA.TheUSactedtotakeoutSaddamwithoutfullyappreciatinghowIraqunderhisleadershipservedasafigurativekeystoneinanarchofthesecompetingforces.Saddamkeptthosedynamicforcesinanartificiallystablestatethroughthestrengthofhisgovernment;andwhenwedestroyedthatstrength,wedestroyedthestabilityaswell.Thewell-intendedvisionofreplacingthathardgovernancewithsomethingfuzzier,softer,provedfarlesscapableofstabilizingthesepowerfulforces.Ironictoourroleasastatusquopower,itwasourownrevisionistagendathatsetthesepowerfulforcesintomotion.

IfoneisgoingtogettostabilityinSyriaandIraq,onemustfirstdevelop,communicateandputintoplaceaviableplantorestabilizethecompetitionbetweenIranandSaudiArabia.Inextricablylinkedtothepoliticalcompetitionbetweenthosestatesistheassociatedreligiousandculturalcompetition.ThewholeIran-ShiaandSaudi-Sunnilinkagesareaninescapableaspectoftheproblem,andmustbecentraltoanysolution.TofacilitatethisasanoutsidertheUSmusttakeamoreneutralstance.ItdoesnothelpwhentheWesternnarrativeoverlyfixatesonforeignSunnisdrawntothiscompetition,whilelargelyignoringthefactthattherearenearlyasmanyforeignShiadrawnintotheregionaswell.ItdoesnothelpwhenmuchoftheworldviewstheUSasfaithlessinourabandonmentoftheinterestsofourSaudiallies,andasdefactoproxiesofIran’sambitions.Wecan’ttalkaboutjustonesideoftheequation,norcanwejumpsidesintheequation.TheUSmustseektobalancetheequation.

Restabilizingthisstate/culturalcompetitionisonlythefirststep.ItisprobablynotfeasibleintheneartermtorestorethiscompetitionbacktotheIran-Iraqborder.AnewstabilitywillprobablyemergealongTigrisorEuphrates,butsomedecisionhastobemadeandbroadlycommunicatedbytheproperstakeholdersandplacedintoeffectwithanadequate,andappropriatesecurityforcededicatedtoitsenforcement.Untilthatkeypieceisrealized,nothingelsehasmuchchancetotakeroot.Onlyoncethelargercompetitionisrestabilizedonecanshifttodetermining,communicatingandworkingtowardamoreviablepoliticalalternativefortheSunnipopulationsoftheregionthatISILreliesupon,andbalancingthoseinterestswiththoseoftheotherpowerfulpopulation-basedgroupsintheregion.

Statusquopowersareoftenatadisadvantageinthesetypesofconflicts.Revisionistpowerstypicallyworkoutsidethelaw,soarefreeofthatconstraint.Revisionistsarealsoperceivedmorebythepromisestheymake,andnotjudgedbythepromisestheyfailtokeep.Statusquopowersmustworkwithinthelaw,andactuallyactonthecommitmentstheymake.Evenourdefinitionsofcommonterms,like“legitimacy”or“terrorist”or“population”tendtohindersuccess-particularlywhenawordcanhavemanydifferentmeanings.Forexample,whileitistruethatthereisanationalistpopulationlivingwithinanystate.Today,however,whenonethinksaboutthedisaffectedoneneedstothinkaboutthedistributedpopulationsacrossmanystatesthatformaroundspecificidentitiesandsharedgrievance.

Overlyfocusingonwhyanyparticularindividualbecomesarevisionistgeneratesunnecessarycomplexityandalsoservestoinflatetheroleofsuperficialfactorslikeideology,orunemployment.Itismorehelpfultoshiftfocustothoserevisionistidentitiesattractinglargenumbersofsupporters.Thesearetheidentitiesrisingtoalevelthatoneiswillingtokillordieforifnecessary.Theseareidentitiesthatarealsoperceivedtobeatriskunderexistingsystemsofgovernance.Thesearethepopulationsonemustfocusupon.Thecriticaltasksaretounderstandwhothesepopulationsare,whatthenatureoftheircoregrievancesare,andhowtoworkwiththesepopulationstogettotrust.Criticaltothiseffortisanappreciationthatbeingillegaldoesnotmake


oneinherently“wrong,”nordoesbeinglegalmakeoneinherently“right.”Governmentslackingtheflexibilitytoevolveintheirpositions,ortoreconcilewithrevisionists,mayultimatelyapplyenoughstatepowertosuppressthesymptomsofconflict,butareunlikelytofindthedurablestabilitytheyseek.

ThereareSunniArabpopulationswhoquitereasonablydonottrustorseeafuturewiththeexistinggovernmentsaffectingtheirlives.Thisisthepopulation-basedcenteroftheISILprotostatewagingcivilwaragainstthegovernmentsofSyrianandIraq.Thisisalsothepopulation-basedcenterofmanyoftherevolutionarygroups.TofixthepoliticaldisaffectionintheSunniArabsdemandsofferingthemsomethingtheycantrust,andtrustisanearlycasualtyinthesetypesofconflict.Toooftengrievanceareframedinsymptomaticterms;againstthesubtextofunemployment,youthbulges,foodprices,etc.Whilethesefactorsareimportantandultimatelymustbeaddressed,thecriticalquestionsweneedtoaskare‘howdoesthispopulationfeel’aboutthesegrievances,and‘whodotheyblame’?Ifpeoplefeelthisgrievanceisbasedingovernanceperceivedasillegitimate,oranysortofdisrespectorinjusticeenabledorconductedthroughgovernance,onehasapowerfuldriverofrevolutionaryenergythatmustbeaddressed.

Thebigquestionultimatelybecomes‘whatistheviable,politicalalternativesforthesedisaffectedpopulations’?Itcannotbesimplyarestorationthestatusquoofgovernance,asthosearetheconditionstheproducedtherevolutionaryenergytobeginwith.AndinthecaseofSyriaandIraq,itcannotbesustainingthegovernmentofIraqwhileencouragingbreakingdownthegovernmentinSyria.Ithasgottobesomethingelse.Wehavegottoidentifywhatthatviable‘somethingelse’isanditneedstobeclearlycommunicatedtotheaffectedpopulationsinadvanceofmilitaryoperations.AsHoChiMinhwiselypointedout,“Militaryactionwithoutpoliticsislikeatreewithoutroot.”SofarourmilitaryactionsagainstISILinSyriaandIraqhavelackedthe“root”necessarytostabilizethesituation.


Managing the Strategic Context in the Middle East: A Preliminary Transitivity Analysis of the Middle Eastern Alliance Network and Its Operational Implications, Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar, NSI, Inc. and Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne

[email protected]

Abstract

Balancetheoryprovidesmetricsformeasuringthestability,orinstability,ofasocialnetwork.WeappliedbalancetheorytogaugetheoverallstabilityoftheconflictsystemthatsurroundsthebattleagainstDa’esh in Syria and Iraq. This system is characterized bymultiple simultaneous conflictsengaging numerous state and non-state groups in the region and from outside of the region(Astorino-Courtois,2015).Ouranalysis focusedon the relationsbetween24of thekey stateandnon-stateactorsinthissystem.

Thebasicfindingsinclude:

• Thesystemofregionalconflictislargelystableandtheconflictsbetweenactorsarelikelytocontinue,despitemajoractionsorpolicyshiftsbytheUSoranyoneelse.

• The conflict system has great potential to shift in any direction (stasis, greater stability,increasedinstability)duetothenumberofrelationsbetweenactorsthatarefundamentallyambiguous, either because the actors have not yet worked out their relationships orbecauseactorsholdcompetinginterestswithoneanother.

• Da’esh exhibits a unique ability to foment conflict between its enemies, and tomaintainconflictwithitsenemies,unusualforanysocialsystem.

• Majorpolicyshiftsforindividualorganizationscreaterippleeffectsthroughoutthesystemandcancreatemuchinstabilityandambiguityconcerningthatspecificorganization,whilenot necessarily changing the overall level of conflict in the system. The case of Jabhat alNusra’sbreakingitsalliancewithalQaedaplacestheorganization’s(nowknownasJabhatFatehalSham)regionalpositioninpoliticalflux.

• The Assad regime is firmly entrenched in a system of alliances focused on fighting itsenemies, and these alliances form very stable triads. There is little to indicate that thecurrentAssadregime’spositionintheregionwillshift.

• Our analysis identifies specific, unstable triads that couldbe influenced to alter a specificalliancenetworkandthuspresentopportunitiesforinfluencingthelargerregionalconflictsystem. The overall robustness of the regional conflict systemhowever suggests that themostlikelyeffectswillbelocal.


BalanceTheoryandTransitivityBasics

Transitivity is the glue that holds human societies together. Dyadic relations (relations betweentwoparties)areimportant,butacollectionofdyads,unconnectedtoanyothers,doesnotmakeasociety. It is only when the circle is closed on those dyads that a society exists. The mostfundamentalcircleisatriad,oranetworkofthreeconnecteddyads.Oncedyadsconnecttootherdyads, triads are formed and a society is created (Error! Reference source not found.Error!Referencesourcenotfound.).

Figure1:Dyadicvs.TriadicRelationships

Asocietycanhavemanytriads.2However,noteverypotentialtriadmustbemadetoformasociety.

Triadscomeinfivebasicdifferentforms(Figure2):

• FFF:ACircleofFriendsinwhicheverydyadicconnectionispositive(friendship,alliance);• EEF: Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend in which two parties are friends because of an

enmitytowardthethird;• EEF:TheAwkwardsituationinwhichanindividualisafriendtotwoenemies;• EEE:ACircleofHateinwhichallpartiesareinconflictwithoneanother;• AmbiguousTriads (NotFriendsNotEnemies): It is important to recognize thatnotbeing

friendsisnotthesameasbeingenemies.Thisconditiongeneratesaproblematiccategoryoftriadinwhichthreepartiesareconnected,butthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenanytwo parties is ambiguous. These triads are inherently unstable since the parties do notknowwhatdyadicallianceswouldbeintheirbestinterests.

2Ifeverypartyisconnectedtoeveryotherpartyinanetwork,thenumberoftriadsis:!(!!!)(!!!)

!


Figure2.ExampleTriadTypesfromSyriaIraqConflictsurroundingDa’esh.

Anunderlyingmathematicallogicmeasuresthestabilityofthesedifferenttriads,andbyextension,thestabilityofasociety(Cartwright&Harary,1956).Stabilityofasingletriadismeasuredbythesignoftheproductoftherelationsbetweenthedyadsinatriad.CirclesofFriends(FFF,+×+×+=+)and Enemy ofMy Enemy isMy Friend (EEF, −×−×+=+) both yield positive products, and in fact,represent empirically stable relationships that theoretically can continue in perpetuity (Heider,1946). In contrast, Awkward (EEF, −×+×+=−) and Circle of Hate (EEE, −×−×−=−) triads yieldnegativeproducts,andinfactempiricallyrepresentunstablerelationshipsthattendtoresolvetoatransitivestate.

Awkwardrelationshipsforceapartytochoosesides,resolvingthetriadtoEEF,andinaCircleofHate,usually,twopartieswillrealizetheymutuallyhateathirdmore,resolvingtoatransitiveEEFrelationship.However,CircleofHatetriadsmaybemaintainedinanetworkiftheyareinvolvedinanetworkwithmorethantwofactions(Davis,1967).Inanyrealsocialnetwork,ambiguoustriadsare practically inevitable; the actors themselves simply cannot decidewhat their connections toother actors are. In our analysis, we assign a value of zero to ambiguous dyads, which yields aproductofzeroforthetriad,orinotherwords,anunsignedtriad.

Ouranalysis considersall five typesof triads. Stable social systemsaredefinedas social systemsthatcanexist inastablestate,andwillhaveastrongmajorityoftransitivetriads.Unstablesocialsystemswillhaveatleastastrongminorityofintransitiveand/orambiguous(unsigned)triads.

ABriefHistoryofBalanceTheoryandTransitivityAnalysis

Balancetheoryandtheimportanceoftransitivitywasfirstformulatedinsocialpsychologytogaininsight into interpersonal relationships (Heider, 1946). Mathematicians formalized Heider’sinsightsandprovidedalogicalproofthatbalancedgraphs(eithercompletecirclesoffriendsortwofundamentally opposed alliances) were possible, and also generalized balance theory to social


situations beyond interpersonal relations (Cartwright & Harary, 1956). Balance theory has beensuccessfullyscaleduptorelationsbetweenpolitiesandnation-states(Antal,Krapinsky,&Redner,2006; Healy & Stein, 1973; Khanafiah & Situngkir, 2004). Simulations have demonstrated itsapplicability in complex systems (Khanafiah & Situngkir, 2004) and balance theory has beenextendedtoexplainnon-humananimalbehaviorinanevolutionarycontext(Ilany,Barocas,Koren,Kam,&Geffen,2013).(Doreian,Kapuscinski,Krackhardt,&Szczypula,1996)provideareview.

MeasuringTransitivity

Themoststraightforwardwaytomeasurethetransitivityofanetworkissimplytoinventorythedifferent typesof triads thatexist in thesystem.Empirical studiesof social systems indicate thatrelatively stable social systems (i.e. social systems that can continue to exist as they arewithoutcollapsingorradicallychangingtheirnature)existifamajority(generallyover67%)ofthetriadsistransitive.However,analysisiscomplicatedbytheconsiderationofambiguoustriads;andtherearenoclearguidelinesastowhatpercentageofambiguoustriadsastablesystemcanendurewithoutbecoming ambiguous or unstable. The following analyses will provide inventories of all signed(positive andnegative) triads and all existing triads (positive andnegative aswell as ambiguoustriads).

ApplicationofBalanceTheorytotheNetworkofActorRelationsinSyriaandIraq

Caveats:BoundingtheProblem

Socialnetworkanalysisisnotoriouslysensitivetohowasocialnetworkisbounded(Wasserman&Faust,1994).InordertomakethisstudyfeasiblewelimitouranalysistothecurrentturmoilintheregionofSyriaandIraq. Anotherboundonanalysisisthedegreetowhichonehasconfidenceinone’sempiricaldata.Thisanalysisispartofanongoingdatacollectionandanalysiseffort.However,wehavesufficientconfidenceinourempiricalinputthatthepreliminaryconclusionsweofferhere,whilenotprecise,arebroadlyaccurateportrayalsofthenetworkinvolvedinconflictagainstDa’esh(ISIL)inSyriaandIraq.

OurUnitsofAnalysis

Weinclude24keyactorsinthecurrentconflictcenteredonDa’eshinSyriaandIraq(


Table1).Otherconflictsareconcurrent(SaudiArabiavs.Iran,Turkeyvs.PKK,Israelvs.Palestine)and should be similarly studied. Actors in this study included Da’esh, and local jihadistorganizationssuchasAhraralShamandFatehalSham,Assad’sSyrianregimeand theAbadi-ledGovernmentofIraq.Neighboringstatesactivelyinvolvedintheconflictwerealsoincluded:SaudiArabia, Iran,Turkey,andotherArabstates.Keystates fromoutsideof theregion, suchas theUSand Russia were included. Finally, a number of non-state factions were part of the network,including the various Kurdish factions (YPG, PKK, KDP, PUK), Shia militias, Hezbollah and IraqiSunnitribes.


Table1.ActorsinSyriaIraqConflictwithDa’esh.

TypeofActor ActorsGlobalJihadists Da’eshLocalJihadists AhraralSham,FatehalSham,JaishStatesinTurmoil SyrianAssadRegime,GovernmentofIraqProxyOrganizations HezbollahNeighboringStates Turkey,Israel,Jordan,SaudiArabia,UAE,Qatar,IranExtra-RegionalStates US,RussiaFactions Kurds (YPG, PKK, KDP, PUK), Sunni tribes allied with Da’esh,

SahwahSunnifightingDa’esh,IraqiShiaPMFs,ex-Baathists,

RatingSystem

Our methodology involves rating the quality of the dyadic relationships between actors in anetwork.Thisismeasuredona-4to+4scale(Table2).

Table2.PoliticalRatingSystemforCharacterizingDyadicRelationsinaNetwork.

Score Relationship-4 Absoluteenemies-3 Enemiesmostofthetime-2 Enemies,butcandependoncontext-1 Adversaries,butnotnecessarilyengagedinopposingoneanother0 Ambiguousrelationship1 Potentialallies2 Allies,butcandependoncontext3 Alliesmostofthetime4 Strongallies

Theanalysesinthisreportdonotleveragethemagnitudeofthedyadicrelationships(±0–4),butrather focussimplyonthesignof theproductof therelationships ina triad.Futureanalyseswillutilizethequantitativevalues,whichmeasurethestrengthofthetransitivityofthetriads.

CharacterizationoftheSystemofConflictinSyriaandIraq

Therearetwowaysofanalyzingtheinventoryoftriads:allconnections(+/-,0)canbeexamined,orone could focus only the connectionswith known signs (+/-). Different insights are gained fromeachapproachandwewilluseboth.

The inventoryof triadswithknownsignedrelationships (+/-) for theentirenetworkanalyzed inthispreliminarystudydemonstratesthatthemajorityoftriads(63.8%)aretransitiveFFForEEFtriads.Thestrongmajorityoftransitivetriadsindicatesthattheregionalsystemisrelativelystablewith respect to well-established relationships (Table 3). However, of the transitive triads, thestrongmajority of are EEF (EnemyofMyEnemy isMy Friend) relationships (83.3%), indicatingthatwhatisstableintheregionalsystemisconflict,notpeace.


Table3.InventoryofTriadswithKnownSignforSyriaIraqDa’eshConflict.

TriadType n PercentageFFF 54 10.7%EEF 269 53.1%EEF 35 6.9%EEE 149 29.4%Total 507 100.0%

Focusingonallknowntriads (+/-,0),however, revealsanadditional505ambiguous triads in theregional system,which represents 49.9%of all triads in the system.These represent triadswithundetermined sign that could flip to stable, transitive, or unstable intransitive relations. Theimportantpointisthattheyincreasetheambiguityofthesystemandthereforeincreasetherangeofpossiblestates,stableorunstable,itcouldtakeinthefuture.

Thehighpercentageoftransitivetriadswithknownsignsindicatesthatmostactorsintheregionare fairly entrenched in the relationships that have formed. However, there are many groupsinteracting that we do not think have worked out their relationships with one another, andthereforetheregionalsystemhasgreatpotentialtoshiftinmanydirections.

A closer examination of a few key groups will emphasize the operational significance of thetransitivityandambiguitywehavemeasuredintheregion.

SomeInsightsonSpecificGroupsinSyriaandIraq

Examiningtheinventoryoftriadsforaparticularactorprovidesameasureofhowentrenchedthatactor is in its network, and identifies ambiguous relationships that might be influenced. WeexaminesixactorsintheconflictwithDa’eshinSyriaandIraqtoillustratehowtransitivityanalysiscouldbeusedoperationally.

Da’esh

TheinventoryoftriadsinvolvingDa’eshisuniqueintheregionandindicatesthepolarizingeffectthatDa’eshhashadonregionalrelations(Table4).Intermsoftriadswithknownsigns,only40.7%aretransitiveandtheyareallEEFrelationships.TherestofDa’esh’ssignedtriadsareintransitiveandareallEEE,orCircleofHaterelationships.Da’eshuniquelyfomentsconflict,notonlybetweenitself and others, but has the singular talent for generating conflict among its enemies. Previouswork has established that the sowing of chaos is a fundamental strategic goal, if not ultimatemotivating goal, for the organization (Kuznar & Moon, 2014). From the perspective of balancetheory(Davis,1967),akeyreasonthatDa’eshhasbeenabletomaintainsomanyEEErelationshipsmay be because Da’esh serves as a connector to many different factional conflicts that aresimultaneously raging in the region, such as the Turkish/Kurd, Saudi/Iranian, Iraqi Sunni/Shia,Islamists/Assadconflictstomentionafew(Astorino-Courtois,2015).


Table4.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoDa’esh.

TriadType n PercentFFF 0 0.0%EEF 55 40.7%EFF 1 0.7%EEE 79 58.5%

Da’eshalsohas the fewestunsigned,ambiguoustriadsofanygroup in thissudy(197of thetotaltriads,or31.1%).Therefore,thereislittlepotentialforDa’esh’sstructuralpositionintheregionalconflicttochange.

FatehalSham

ThecaseofJabhatFatehalShamillustratesthepoliticalinstabilityofagroup’spositioninalargersystem,oncethatgrouphasmadeamajorpolicyshift.FatehalShamistheformeralNusraFront,whichwasalliedtoalQaedaandthereforepartofaglobaljihadistnetworkduringthetimeoftheiralliance. However, in 28 July, 2016, the group’s leader, Abu Mohammed al Julani, announced aformalbreakwithalQaeda,withalQaeda’sblessing,andwiththatadoptedaformalshiftinpolicyfrom global jihad to a jihad strictly against the Assad regime. This could shift some of theorganization’s relationships with others in the region, in turn, altering relations throughout theregion.

In fact,ourestimation is thatonly27.3%ofFatahalSham’ssignedtriadsaretransitive,andtheyarenowconnectedtoanoverwhelmingproportion(72.7%)ofintransitivesignedtriads,allCircleof Hate types (Table 5). Furthermore, the strongmajority of triads towhich they are connected(72.7%of all triads) areunsigned, ambiguous triads.Byeverymeasure,Fatehal Sham’spoliticalposition in the region is evolving and one would expect many of the groups with which itcooperatestoshift,andinturneffectthealliancesofthegroupswithwhomtheyareconnected.

Table5.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoFatahalSham.


Assad

Incontrast to the instability(measuredby intransitiveandambiguoustriads)demonstratedwithDa’esh and Fateh al Sham, theAssad regime exhibits a high degree of stability. Almost all of thesigned triads (69.8%) towhich the Assad regime is connected are transitive; almost all of these(95.6%)areEnemyofMyEnemy isMyFriend triads, reflecting that the regime is entrenched inalliances for conflict (Table 6). Of all triads, only 20.7% (121) are unsigned, ambiguous triads,


indicatingthattherearerelatively fewopportunities forrelationshipswiththeregimetoalter itsbasiccharacterandpoliticalpositionintheregion.

Table6.InventoryofTriadsConnectedtoAssadRegime.


Conclusions

Balance theory provides a potentially powerful tool for characterizing a social network andevaluatingitsstability.Also,oncespecifictriadsareidentifiedandtheirtransitivitymeasured,theirpotentialforbeingalteredandtheconsequencesofalteringthemcanbepredicted.Wethinkthatthishaspracticalsignificanceatthestrategicandoperationallevels.

This paper demonstrates the strategic use of balance theory to characterize a social system thatimpactsUSnational security, in this case the regional conflictwithDa’esh in Syria and Iraq.Ouranalysis indicatesthattheregionis lockedinawell-establishedsystemofconflictthat is likelytopersistgiventhehighdegreeoftransitivityinestablishedrelationships.

Understanding the relative transitivity or intransitivity of a single actor’s network of triads canprovideinsightintothelikelihoodthatanactor’sallegiancemightbeupforgrabs,andifsoinwhatdirections.Forinstance,FatehalShamappearstobeconnectedtoaparticularlyhighproportionofambiguous triads, and therefore one could expect shifts in their alliances, but inwhat direction?TheyareswornagainstAssadandDa’esh,butcertainlynotnecessarilyagainstotherlocaljihadistgroups such as Ahrar al Sham and Jaish. Further analysis of on the ground data may indicateinterestingpossibilitiesbetweenFatehalShamandTurkeyand/orKurdishYPG.Analysisoftriadsprovidesaguidetoquestionsonemaynotthinktoask,andawindowintonewinsightsregardingwhenalliancesfluctuate.

Theanalysisoftransitivitycouldbeusedtoexploretheimplicationsofstrategicpolicydirectionsand ask key questions including:What is the effect of Da’esh’s defeat on the regional system ofconflict? WhatiftheAssadregimeweretostepdown?WhatistheeffectofRussiaontheoverallsystemofconflict?

At the operational level, intransitive and ambiguous triads represent opportunities for influence,whereastransitivetriadsareprobablyimpervioustoinfluencingoperations.Triadinventoriescanbe used to identify opportunities for change or wastes of time. Furthermore, course of actionanalysisispossiblebymeasuringtheeffectofalteringaspecificallianceinthenetwork.


ReferencesCited

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Astorino-Courtois, A. (2015). Framework. In H. Cabayan & S. Canna (Eds.),White Paper on SMASupport to SOCCENT (pp. 3-5). Arlington, VA: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO.

Cartwright, D., & Harary, F. (1956). Structural Balance: A Generalization of Heider's Theory.PsychologicalReview,63(4),277-293.

Davis,J.A.(1967).ClusteringandStructuralBalanceinGraphs.HumanRelations,20,181-187.Doreian, P., Kapuscinski, R., Krackhardt, D., & Szczypula, J. (1996). A Brief History of Balance

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networksofawildmammal.AnimalBehaviour,85,1397-1405.Khanafiah,D.,&Situngkir,H.(2004).SocialBalanceTheory:RevisitingHeider’sBalanceTheory for

manyagents.Kuznar,L.A.,&Moon,W.H.(2014).ThematicAnalysisofISILMessaging.InH.Cabayan&S.Canna

(Eds.), Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL (pp. 47-54). Arlington, VA: Strategic MultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO

Wasserman,S.,&Faust,K.(1994).SocialNetworkAnalysis: MethodsandApplications.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.


An Analysis of Violent Nonstate Actor Organizational Lethality and Network Co-Evolution in the Middle East and North Africa: Drs. Victor Asal, Karl Rethemeyer, SUNY Albany & Dr. Joseph Young, American University

VictorAsal

UniversityatAlbany,SUNYandTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)

[email protected]

R.KarlRethemeyer

UniversityatAlbany,SUNYandTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)

[email protected]

JosephYoung

AmericanUniversityandTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)

[email protected]

Abstract

Usingnewdatathatspanstheyears1998to2012wemodelthebehaviorofviolentnonstateactors(VNSAs)intheMiddleEast.Usingseveralstatisticaltechniques,includingnetworkmodeling,logitanalysis,andhazardmodeling,weshowthatgovernmentscanusestrategiesthatinfluenceagroup’sleveloflethality,theirrelationshipswithothergroups,andhowlongandifthesegroupsbecomeespeciallylethal.Whenmodelingwhysomegroupsbecomehighlylethal(whichwedefineashavingkilledmorethan100civiliansinterroristattacksinanyyearorcausingmorethan100battledeathsinanyyear),wefindthat:

• VNSAsaremorelikelytokillmanyciviliansinoneyearwhentheycontrolterritoryandwhengovernmentsuseviolence,orwhatwecallastickstrategy,againstthem;• VNSAsaremostlikelytokillmanyciviliansinoneyearwhengovernmentsuseamixedstrategy–thatis,acombinationofviolence(stick)andnegotiation(whatwetermacarrotstrategy)asopposedtoeitherstickorcarrotalone;• VNSAsaremostlikelytoinflictmorethan100battledeathsinoneyearwhentheycontrolterritory,arehighlyconnectedtootherVNSAs,andarelarge(thoughthereisastrongrelationshipbetweensizeandcontrollingterritory);• VNSAsarelesslikelytoinflictmorethan100battledeathsinoneyearwhentheyhaveaformalpoliticalparty.


Wealsoindependentlymodeledtheco-evolutionofnetworkstructureandVNSAkillingthroughterrorism.Thatis,thewayinwhichnetworkstructureaffectslethalityandthewaylethalityaffectsalliancechoices.Thisapproachunearthedseveralcomplementaryfindings:

• VNSAsthataresociallyisolated–thatis,havenoallianceconnections–tendtobelesslethalandtendtostayrelativelylesslethal;• Socialisolationisarelativelystablestate;however,therearefactorsthathelptodriveorganizationallianceformationlikesharedlocation,ideology,andpreferenceforclosedrelationship–afriendoffriendtendsalsotobeafriend;• Onceanorganizationgeneratesallianceconnections,afeedbackloopdriveslethalityup;• Maintainingorganizationalisolationappearstobeausefulstrategyfordampeningorganizationallethality

Introduction

Previousresearchfocusingonviolentnonstateactors(VNSAs)hasexaminedthedeterminantsofterroristlethality(AsalandRethemeyer2008)andterroristnetworkformation(Asal,Park,RethemeyerandAckerman2015).However,thesestudies(1)reliedoncross-sectionaldata(2)thatcoveredacompressedperiod(1998-2005).WhiletherehavebeennumerousstudiesofterroristorganizationsintheMiddleEast(includingonestudybytwooftheco-authorsonpursuitanduseofCBRNcapabilitiesbyorganizationsintheMiddleEast(AsalandRethemeyer2009)),fewofthesestudieshave(1)beenbothquantitativeandlongitudinalor(2)examinedbothinsurgentandterroristorganizations(thoughwenotethatsomeorganizationscanbeboth).

ThisstudyprovidesananalysisofVNSAlethalityaswellasthe“co-evolution”ofVNSAlethalityandallianceformationusingtheBigAlliedandDangerousVersion2(BAAD2)dataset–anewlycreateddatasetthatcoversbothterroristandinsurgentorganizations.WebeginthisstudybypresentinganoverviewofBAAD2andthenpresenttwoanalyses:onefocusedjustonlethalityandanotherfocusedonlethalityandallianceformationco-evolution.ItisveryimportanttonotethatthisanalysisisonlyfororganizationsinthewiderMENAregionandonlyfororganizationsthatmeetacertaincutofflevelofsuccess.Awideranalysisincludingasignificantproportionofweakergroupsorindifferentregionsorworldwidemayverywellproducedifferentresults.

DataOverview

TheBigAlliedandDangerous(BAAD)DataProject,directedbyVictorH.AsalandR.KarlRethemeyerthroughtheUniversityatAlbany–SUNY’sProjectonViolentConflict(PVC),focusesonthecreationandmaintenanceofacomprehensivedatabaseofterroristorganizationalcharacteristicsthatmaybelinkedtoprominentevent,insurgency,andcountry-levelcharacteristicsdatasets.Thisprojectwasfoundedinordertofillamajorgapinthefield’s“dataverse.”Whilethereareseveraldatasetsthatrecordterroristevents(includingtheInternationalTerrorismAttributesofTerroristEvents(ITERATE)andGlobalTerrorismDatabase(GTD)datasets)andonethatexaminesinsurgentorganizationsduringperiodsofconflict(theNon-StateActorDatasetdevelopedbyCunningham,GleditschandSalehayan),thereisnodatasetavailabletounclassifiedresearchersthatcomprehensivelycharacterizesthenatureofVNSAorganizationsonayearlybasis.TheBAADprojectisanefforttoprovideyearlyVNSAdataworldwideoninsurgentandterroristorganizations.


ThedataforthisanalysiswasextractedfromBAAD2.Theextractcontains203VNSAsthatconducted10ormoreattacksorkilled25ormorepeopleinbattlebetween1998and2012.Weshouldnotethat,onaverage,themajorityofVNSAsdonotreacheitherofthesemarks,sothisdataextractisrestrictedtorelativelylargeandwell-organizedentitieswhoseorganizationalfeaturessuggestthattheyposeasubstantialthreat.Asrequested,werestrictedouranalysistoorganizations“homebased”intheMiddleEast.TodefinetheMiddleEast,wereliedonthelistof28countriescreatedbytheG8(seehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Middle_East).Ourdataincluded72organizationsfrom15countries,includingAfghanistan,Algeria,Djibouti,Egypt,Iran,Iraq,Lebanon,Pakistan,PalestinianTerritories,Somalia,SouthSudan,Sudan,Syria,Turkey,andYemen.ThelistoforganizationsmaybefoundinAppendixA.Thedataisorganizedasanunbalancedpanel–thatis,organizationsmayenterthesampleafterthefirstyearand/ordepartthesamplebeforethelastyear.Thesampleincludes697organization-years.

FindingsusingLogisticRegressionandHazardModeling

Whenmodelingwhysomegroupsbecomehighlylethal(whichwedefineashavingkilledmorethan100civiliansinterroristattacksinanyyearorcausingmorethan100battledeathsinanyyear),weusedalogisticregressionanalysisandhazardmodeling.WecouldnotmodeltheimpactofcarrotapproachesbecausetherewerenocasesinoursamplewhereagovernmentusesCarrotandagroupexceeds100terrorismfatalities.Turningfirsttotheterrorismresults,whenaStickstrategyisused,theprobabilitythatagroupishighlylethalincreasesto7%.Thisisa106%increaseintheprobabilityora3.6percentagepointincreaseoverbaseline.WhenaMixedstrategyisusedtheprobabilitythatagroupishighlylethalincreasesto34%.TerritorialControlalsohasalargeeffectontheprobabilitythatagroupwillkillprolificallythroughterrorism.WhenaVNSAcontrolsterritory,theprobabilitythatagroupishighlydeadlyincreasesto20%.Bycontrast,religiousideologyhasasmallereffect.Religiously-inspiredorganizationshavea5%probabilityofreaching100terrorismkills,whichisa47%increaseintheprobabilityoverbaseline.Turningnexttothebattledeathresults,AllianceandRivalryconnectionsincreasethenumberofbattledeathsthatthegroupproduces.Whenagrouphasmanyallianceconnections,thisleadstoa36.3percentagepointincreaseintheprobablythataVNSAwillcrossthe100battledeaththreshold.Whenagrouphasmanyrivals,thisleadstoan11.3percentagepointincreaseintheprobablythataVNSAwillcrossthe100battledeaththreshold.Sizehasasmallpositiveeffect,whilehavingapoliticalpartyreducestheexpectedinsurgentviolence.

Thehazardmodelsusethesamevariablesasthelogitmodelstopredictwhengroupsproducehighlethality.Ingeneral,theresultsareconsistentwiththepreviousmodels.Carrotperfectlypredictsthetimeuntilagroupexceeds100terrorismfatalitiesandthusisdroppedfromthemodel.3MixedandStickdecreasethetimeuntilagroupwillbehighlylethal.Similarly,holdingterritorydecreasesthetimeuntilagroupishighlylethal.OneimportantdifferenceisReligiondecreasesthetimeuntilagroupislethalbutisnotrelatedtowhetheragroupbecomeshighlylethalornot.Inotherwords,amongtheVNSAswhobecomelethal,religionseemstospeeduptheiruseofviolencebutnotwhetherornottheyactuallybecomeexcessivelydeadly.Connectedness,likeinthepreviousmodels,speedsupthetimetobecominghighlylethalamongbothterroristsandinsurgents.

Thehazardmodelsusethesamevariablesasthelogitmodelstopredictwhengroupsproducehighlethality.Ingeneral,theresultsareconsistentwiththepreviousmodels.MixedandStickdecrease3Apositivecoefficientheremeansthatthevariableincreasesthelikelihoodoffailure(exceeding100battledeathsand100terrorismfatalities).Anotherwaytosayitisthatapositivecoefficientdecreasesthetimetofailure.


thetimeuntilagroupwillbehighlylethal.Similarly,holdingterritorydecreasesthetimeuntilagroupishighlylethal.OneimportantdifferenceisReligiondecreasesthetimeuntilagroupislethalbutisnotrelatedtowhetheragroupbecomeshighlylethalornot.Inotherwords,amongtheVNSAswhobecomelethal,religionseemstospeeduptheiruseofviolencebutnotwhetherornottheyactuallybecomeexcessivelydeadly.Connectedness,likeinthepreviousmodels,speedsupthetimetobecominghighlylethalamongbothterroristsandinsurgents.

FindingsusingNetworkAnalysis

Socialnetworkanalystshavelongrealizedthatnetworkformationandbehavioraredeeplyintertwinedwithoneanother.However,mostanalystshaveattackedonlyonesideofthisfeedbackloopatatime.QuantitativemodelsofVNSA(primarilyterroristorganizations)behaviorsometimesincludesummarymeasuresofnetworkstructure–forinstance,measuresofnetworkcentrality–butusuallyexamineonlythe“influence”channel.Thatis,thesemodelsassumethatnetworkpositioninfluencesbehavior.Anothergroupofanalystshavesoughttounderstandformationofterroristnetworks,theirstructure,andtheirevolution.Thismodelingattacksthe“selection”channel,seekingtoexplainhowbehaviorhelpstostructurepartnerselectioninnetworks.Bothliteratureshavecreatedimportantinsightsintothebehaviorofterroristorganizations.However,itisalsopossiblethatasimultaneousmodelmayrevealnewinsights.Additionally,stochasticco-evolutionmodelsprovideamorerigorousmethodologicalfoundationforstudyingthesequestions(assuming,ofcourse,thatbothinfluenceandselectionoperate)asthewell-knownissuesofsimultaneityandobservationaldependencethatmaybiasothermethodsareexplicitlymodeledinthisapproach.

Ourmodelingfindsthreestrongbasesforconnections:sharedethnonationalistideology,sharedreligiousideology,andshared“homebase”country(see,respectively,Sameethnonationalistideology,Samereligiousideology,andSamecountryinTableD1),thoughorganizationsthatespousethecompoundideology“ethnonationalist-religious”werenomorelikelytoconnectthanthosewithotherideologicalcommitments(leftist,rightist,etc.).Alsoasexpected,territorialcontrolisanimportantfactor,thoughthet-statisticfallsjustbelowthe2.00cutoff.Becauseourdataisnotdirectionalwecannotsaywhetherthosethatcontrolterritorybecomemorepopularandthusgarnermoreconnection,orthatterritoryholdersbecomemoreoutgoing(possiblybecausetheycanmoresecurelymakeconnectionsknowingtheirmainbaseofoperationsissafeeveniftheconnectionprovestobehostile).

Asexpected,wealsofoundaclearbehavioraldynamicinnetworkformation:thecountoffatalitiesfromterroristattacksisahighlysignificantpredictorofnetworkactivity.Likewithterritorialcontrol,wecannotsayforcertainwhetherthisisduetopopularity(killingattractspeersthatseekapartner,trainer,mentor,orsupplier)or“outgoingness”(killingrequiresmoresuppliesandhelpthatmaybesecuredfrompeers).

Turningnowtothebehavioraldynamics,thebehavioralcomponentofco-evolutionmodelsaresimilartomultinomiallogitmodelswherechangesfromoneleveltoanotheraremodeled.Forthisreasonthedependentvariable,fatalities,wasdividedintoninecategoriesrangingfrom0fatalitiesto500ormore.

Ourfindingsindicatethat,onaverage,mostorganizationsdonotkillverymuchIndeed,mostterroristorganizationsneverkill.However,thesignificantquadratictermsuggeststhatonce


organizationsstartkilling,theytendtomovetohigherandhigherlevelsofkilling.Inco-evolutionarymodelsapositivecoefficientonthequadratictermisusuallyindicativeofan“addictive”behaviorthatfeedsonitself.OuranalysisofTerritorycontrolandRegimetype,homebasecountryconfirmsourpreviousfindingsthatorganizationsthatcontrolterritoryandoperatefrommoredemocraticcountriestendtokillmore.TheCTstrategy:violentorviolent&nonviolentvariableOurworkherealsoconfirmsafindingfromotherworkinthisstudy:“mixed”counter-terrorismstrategieselicitincreasedviolence.

WeshouldnoteagainthatthisisafirstcutatthisanalysisthatfocusesspecificallyontheMENAregion.Wearenotmodelingsmallerorganizations,nordowemodelconnectionsoutsideofMENA.Inthefuturewealsoplantoexaminehowgovernmentstrategiesoverthelongrunmayimpacttheterminationorsurvivalofsuchorganizationsandtheendofconflicts.

Citations

Asal,V.,&Rethemeyer,R.K.(2008).Thenatureofthebeast:Organizationalstructuresandthelethalityofterroristattacks.TheJournalofPolitics,70(02),437-449.

Asal,V.H.,Park,H.H.,Rethemeyer,R.K.,&Ackerman,G.(2016).WithFriendsLikeThese…WhyTerroristOrganizationsAlly.InternationalPublicManagementJournal,19(1),1-30.

Asal,V.H.andR.K.Rethemeyer."IslamistUseandPursuitofCBRNTerrorism."(2009)inG.AckermanandJ.Tamsett,eds.,Jihadists&WeaponsofMassDestruction:AGrowingThreat,BocaRaton,FL:CRCPress.


Countering the Islamic State’s Ideological Appeal, Dr. Jacob Olidort, Washington Institute OptionsforStakeholdersintheU.S.Government

JacobOlidort,Ph.D.

SorefFellow,TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicyhttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/jacob-olidortjolidort@washingtoninstitute.orgNovember2016Thispaperisanoptions-focusedassessmentforpolicyandpractitionercommunitiesintheUnitedStatesgovernmentconcerningtheideologicalthreatposedbytheIslamicState.ThepaperexaminesthepossibleevolutionoftheIslamicStateintheeventthatitlosesitsstrongholdsinIraqandSyria,andthenatureofthethreatitcouldposetoWesterntargetsandinterestsintheregionandoverseas.Theassessmentisbasedontherecently-publishedWashingtonInstitutereport,InsidetheCaliphate’sClassroom,aswellastheauthor’scumulativeresearchonthetextsandideasoftheIslamicStateandotherSalafiandIslamistgroups.IntroductionTwoyearsaftertheIslamicState(IS)announceditscaliphateinJune2014itremainsatopnationalsecuritythreatfortheUnitedStatesanditsalliesaroundtheworld,especiallyinEuropeandtheMiddleEast.Itisalsoathreatunprecedentedinitsscale,agilityandresilience.AsidefromseizingandcontrollingterritoryintheMiddleEast–bothitscoreintheIraq-Syriatheaterandinits“provinces”inLibyaandSinai–thegroupdirectsand“inspires”attacksaroundtheworld.Moreover,thegroup’sdirectedandinspiredattacksseemtoincreaseinproportiontotheterritoryitloses,evincedbythegroup’s“Ramadanattacks”overthesummer,whichresultedin5,200deathsorinjuries.4Duringthesameperiod,U.S.officialscitedsignificantlossesofIScoreinIraq,with47percentreductionofitsterritoryandareductionoffightersfrom33,000in2014toanestimated18,000to22,000.5ThesetrendssuggestthatIS-linkedterrorismbecomesamoreimmediatethreattotheU.S.andEuropeasthegroupsuffersdefeatsinIraqandSyria,andthatthegroup’sideologicalappealamong“lonewolf”terroristsremainsstrongdespiteterritorialsetbacks.FBIDirectorJamesComeysuggestedasmuchrecentlywhenhepredictedthat“thereisgoingtobeaterroristdiasporaoutofSyrialikewe’veneverseenbefore”andthatISwillproducedtentimesasmanyterroristsasdidtheAfghanistanconflictinthe1980s.6

4 “ISIS boasts of violent Ramadan with claim it killed or wounded 5,200 people,” The Independent, 13 July 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-ramadan-islamic-state-is-Da’esh-orlando-attack-syria-terrorism-a7133941.html, accessed 26 July 2016. 5 John Hudson, “Top U.S. Official: Islamic State has Lost 47 Percent of Its Territory in Iraq,” Foreign Policy, 28 June 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/28/top-u-s-official-islamic-state-has-lost-47-percent-of-its-territory-in-iraq/, Accessed 26 July 2016. 6 Steve Visser, “FBI Chief: Success against ISIS means more terror,” CNN, 29 July 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/politics/isis-goes-west/index.html, accessed 29 July 2016.


ThispolicypaperoffersrecommendationstostakeholdersintheUnitedStatesgovernmentonhowtocounterIS’sideologicalappeal,especiallyasthegrouplosesterritoryinIraqandSyria.Thepaperaddressesthefollowingquestions:whatdistinguishestheIslamicState’sideologyfromthatofotherjihadigroups?WhataretheuniqueideologicalmotivesthatcauseindividualstomigratetoIS-controlledterritory,tofightonitsbehalf,andtoconductinspiredterroristattacksinitsname,andhowsimilar/differentarethese?HowcantheUnitedStatesstopthegroup’sinspirationofterroristattacksby“lonewolf”perpetrators?DoestheIslamicStatehaveideologicalvulnerabilitiesthattheUnitedStatesanditspartnerscanexploit,andwhatarethemosteffectiveapproachestodoingso?TowhatextentcantheIslamicState“survive”itsideologicalvulnerabilities,andhowcoulditadapt?Thestudy,basedontheauthor’soriginalresearch(whichincludesthefirstsystematicoverviewoftheIslamicState’sArabiclanguagepublications),7willbeginwithasetofassumptionsaboutthenatureofthethreatfromISandsimilarentities.ThepaperwillthenidentifytheuniquefeaturesofIS’sideologyandwillthenlookmorecloselyatthedistinctkindsof“pull”factorsthegroupofferstopotentialrecruits.Basedonthesepreliminarysections,thepaperwillnextidentifyideologicalvulnerabilitiesandwilloutlinestrategicoptionsforhowthesemightbeexploitedbytheUnitedStatesgovernment.Thepaperwillclosewithpresentingtwopossibleday-afterscenariostheU.S.governmentcananticipatefromISandsimilarentities(NusraFront,al-Qaeda,etc.)goingforward.AssumptionsAnumberofassumptionsabouttheappealoftheIslamicState,aswellasjihadismandterrorismmoregenerally,informthisstudy:

• TerroristactsandjihadiideaspredatetheemergenceofIS,willoutliveitand,indeed,cannotbedefinitivelystopped.8

• TheinspiredterroristthreatsposedbytheIslamicStatetotheUnitedStatesandEuropearedirectlylinkedtoeventsintheMiddleEastandhowtheseareperceived.9

7 Jacob Olidort, “Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom: Textbooks, Guidance Literature and Indoctrination Methods of the Islamic State,” Policy Focus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/inside-the-caliphates-classroom, Accessed 17 August 2016. See also the author’s presentation of his findings at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy here: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/teaching-terror-the-islamic-states-textbooks-guidance-literature-and-indoct For the author’s other work on this topic, see: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/jacob-olidort 8 For a longer discussion of this, see Jacob Olidort, “After ISIS: A Smarter Way to Fight Radicalization,” The National Interest, 21 June 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-isis-smarter-way-fight-radicalization-16673, Accessed 26 July 2016. 9 For my thoughts on how events in Iraq affect IS-inspired terrorism abroad, see Jacob Olidort, “The Game Theory of Terrorism: How ISIS Radicalizes Others,” Foreign Affairs, 10 December 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-10/game-theory-terrorism, accessed 26 July 2016.


• TheIslamicState’sideologicalappealandaccessarefacilitatedbyanumberofunprecedentedphysical,politicalandtechnologicalcircumstances,including:regionalinstabilityintheMiddleEast,actionsofMiddleEastactorswithsectarianovertones(includingBasharal-Assad’sactionsinSyria,ShiiitemilitiasandPMNouriKamalal-Maliki’slegacyinIraq,perceivedIranianhegemonyintheregion),andsocialmediaplatformsandmobileapplications.

• TheIslamicStateremainstechnologically,rhetoricallyandtacticallyagile,willadaptitsnarrativefollowingterritoriallossesandwillcontinuetoinspireevenwithoutterritory.

• TheIslamicStateisaneffect,ratherthanacause,ofterritorialopportunitiesandpoliticalinstabilityintheMiddleEast.Indeed,territorialcontrolhasbecomeamainstayamongthemostpotentjihadigroupstoday,evincedbyAlQaedaintheArabianPeninsulaand,mostrecently,NusraFront,whichhasrecentlyrebrandeditselfasdistinctfromal-Qaeda.

• Basedontheabove,ourstrategyinstoppingISmustbepartofabroaderstrategyofidentifyingandconfrontingterritorialjihadigroupsthatclaimtooffersectarianutopiastofollowers,sophisticatedintheircommandoftechnology(includingsocialmedia,cyber,anddarkweb),andhavethepotentialtonotonlydirectbutto“inspire”attacks.10

UniqueCharacteristicsofISIdeology

Incontrasttootherjihadigroups,theIslamicStateisdistinctinanumberofways,whicharealsokeyforunderstandingitsuniqueideologicalappeal.11

• An“Islamic”State:Thisfeatureiscommontomostsuccessfuljihadigroupstoday(NusraFront,BokoHaram,Al-QaedaintheArabianPeninsula)–theaimofestablishinga“pure”andexclusivistIslamicSunnistateintheirrespectivegeographicareas.

§ ISisdistinctinthatitsIslamicstatedoesnotrecognizeborders(while,forexample,Nusra’sisaSyria-firstIslamicstate)andisexpansionist–theideaof“remainingandexpanding”couldallowforakindofagilitythatwouldallowitto“expand”beyondterritory.Moreover,itisnotmerelyajihaditerroristgroupbut,liketheotherexamples(NusraFront,AQAP,etc.)italsoseekstogovernterritoryandtoenforceitsversionofIslam.

• Acaliphate:Unlikeotherjihadigroupsclaimingterritory,ISclaimsthatitisacaliphateaswell,withAbuBakral-Baghdadiasitscaliph.Thetitleofcaliphisbothasignofreligiousandpoliticalpower,andimpliesleadershipoftheworld’sMuslimcommunity.ISusesthis

10 For more on these points see: Jacob Olidort, “After ISIS: A Smarter Way to Fight Radicalization,” The National Interest, 21 June 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-isis-smarter-way-fight-radicalization-16673, Accessed 29 July 2016. 11 For an earlier discussion of this, see Jacob Olidort, “Fueling the Islamic State’s Engine,” The Cipher Brief, 5 May 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/fueling-islamic-states-engine-1089, accessed 29 July 2016.


titletoarguethatitsversionofIslamistheonlyacceptableversionofIslamtoday,andthatanyMuslimwhodoesnotjoinitscauseorfightonitsbehalfceasestobeMuslim.

• Apocalypticnarrative:ISisuniqueinthatitsexistenceandlegitimacyalsocomesfromthefactthatitseesitselfasadivineresolutiontoregionalsectarianconflictspreordainedinhadithreports(statementsfromtheProphetMuhammad).Manyofthesedescribeend-of-daysbattlesinSyriancitiesandISliteratureusesthese,aswellasbattlesfromtheProphetMuhammad’scareer,asreferentsforpresent-dayconflicts,withlessonsforhowISistoconductitsbattles.

• Ultraviolenttactics:KeytotheIslamicState’sappealisitsuseofbrutalviolence,anditsmarketingtheseonitspropaganda.Oftenthisviolencetakestheformoftargetedmassacresofgroupsdeemed“apostates”or“deviants,”andthegroupdrawsontheharshest(evenifmostobscure)punishmentsinearlysources.ThesearepartandparcelofitsclaimtorepresentingtheonlyauthenticversionofIslam,andareexhibitedinbothhowthegroupexecutesindividualsinitsterritoryandpossiblyhowloyalistschoosetheirtargetsoverseas(forexample,IShasexecutedhomosexualsonovertwentyoccasions,haswrittenextensivelyontheneedtoimposethehudud–corporalandcapitalpunishments).

The“Pull”Factors:ToFight,FleeandFomentTerror

Anindividual“inspired”tojoinIScanchooseoneofatleastthreeoptions:tofightonitsbehalf(i.e.tomigratetoIS-controlledterritorytobecomeasoldierforit);tofleetoIS-controlledterritoryforanon-combativepurpose(i.e.toliveinaSunniutopia,toprovidehumanitariancaretoSunnibrethreninSyriaandIraq,etc.);ortofomentterrorathome.Thephenomenonof“inspiring,”alongwiththevarietyof“pull”factorsISoffers,distinguishthegroupfromthemoreclandestineandhierarchicalal-Qaedanetwork.PartofthishastodowiththecircumstancesofregionalinstabilityintheMiddleEastandthepopularityofsocialmedia,bothofwhichallowformanymoreopportunitiestojointhegroupandpromoteitscause.Indeed,onecanexpectsimilarpatternsofinspirationwithNusraFrontandothergroups,especiallyif/whentheISbranddiminishes.

Thepotentialforthese“pull”factorstosucceed(or,alternatively,theabilityofISto“inspire”)dependona)thegroup’sbrand;b)thephysicalopportunitiesofmigratingtoIS-territory,and;c)the“inspired”individualsinquestion.Anychangestothesefactorscouldinfluencewhetherandhowthegroupcan“inspire”others.Forexample,ifISinIraqandSyriaiseliminated,theoptionsofflightandfighttoISareeliminated,andthegroupcouldexclusivelypromotefomentingterrorathome(asitdidlastmonth).Similarly,theindividualjoiningIStoachievebattlefieldgloryasoneofitsfightslikelyhasadifferentprofilefromanindividualmigratingtoISterritorytolivean“Islamic”life.

IdeologicalVulnerabilities

TheunprecedentedprojectoftheIslamicState,andthewiderangeof“pull”factorsalsoreflecttherangeofthegroup’sideologicalvulnerabilitiesanditsultimatefragility,wereanyofthesetofaceobstacles.Theseinclude:


§ IdeologicalPurity.Thecombinationofastatethat,atonce,claimstobeauthenticallyIslamic,acaliphateandapocalypticmeanthatthegroupironicallymakesideologicaltradeoffsinbuildingan“Islamic”caseforitsproject.Forexample,sincesomeofthefoundationalmedievalwritingsonIslamicgovernancewerewrittenbySufischolars,thegroupcitesthese(eventhoughSunnifundamentalistsuniversallycondemnSufis).Similarly,thegroupincorporatesthewritingsofmedievalPersianpoetsinitstextbooksonArabicliterature,eventhoughitwouldotherwisecallthesedeviant.SuchtradeoffsinitspropagandaandcurriculacouldbeexploitedbytheU.S.governmentandpartnerMuslimcommunitiesinordertodiscreditthegroup’spuristbonafides.\

§ PromisesofSunniUtopia.AsidefromshowingthatIS’sterritorialprojectdoesnotmeetthepuriststandardsofhowotherjihadiswoulddefineaSunniutopia,theveryfailureofIS’sstatetoofferagoodlifetoits“citizens”isapowerfultoolfordiscreditingitsappeal.Justasthegroupincludesphotosinitspropagandaofpeoplebuildingbridgesandvaccinatingorphansinitsterritory,sotoothegroup’sexcessivetaxes,harshpunishments,corruptionandsocialinjusticecouldallhelpundoitsbrandanddiminishtheappealofallthe“pull”factors.

§ PoliticalDependence.TheISbrandandnarrativeareonlyasgoodasthepolitical

narrativesthatvalidatethem.ThismeansthatsolongaseventscontinuealongtheircourseinSyria,withtheperceivedbrutalityofaShiiteregimeofaSunnipopulation,thelongerISpropagandacanusethesecircumstancestopushitscauseandtoattractabroadrangeofsupport.Byextension,therefore,majorpoliticalsuccessesshouldbeexploitedandmarketedtoinvalidateIS’snarrative–thisincludesstepsinresolvingtheSyrianconflict,partneringwithSunnisandotherstorebuildwar-tornareas,etc.

§ EaseofAccess.AbasicreasonthatIShasbeenabletobothattractlargenumbersof

migrantstoitsterritoryandtoproduceforeignfightersinawaythat,say,Afghanistaninthe1980s,hasnotisgeography.Morespecifically,thecloserproximityandrelativeeaseofaccesstoSyria,ascomparedtofar-offAfghanistan,hasallowedforindividualstoeasilymovetoandfromSyria.ThethreatcomingfromsuchmovementhasexacerbatedwiththerecentinstabilityinTurkey,theonlybufferbetweenSyriaandEurope.ThismeansthatfocusedbordercontrolandinternationalsecuritycooperationcoulddeterandthereforediminishsomemigrationtoandfromIS-controlledterritory,therebychokingthegroup’smanpowerandresources.

StrategicOptionsforReducing“Pull”Factors

WhiletheeliminatingeitherIS’scaliphateconceptandjihaditerrorismarenear-impossible,theeliminationofIS’s“pull”factorsisanattainableandurgentobjectivetheUnitedStatesgovernmentanditspartnerscanachieveindefeatingIS’sideologicalappeal.Thismixofstrategic


andtacticaloptionscanapplytootherjihaditerritorialgroups(NusraFront,BokoHaram,etc.),especiallyif/whenthesegroupsbegin“inspiring”otherstojointheircauseasIShasdone.

§ CreatestressesonIS’sstate-buildingprojectinIraqandSyria.Thisrequirescontinuedpolitical-militaryoperationsinIraqandSyria,targetingthegroup’sstrategicandsymbolicstrongholds.Strategicstrongholdsarethosewithaccesstowater,resourcesandammunition,whilesymboliconesarethosethatholdparticularsignificanceforeitherearlyIslamichistory(Dabiq,whichisdescribedinhadithreports)orrecenteventsinIraqandSyria(forexample,Anbar,thesiteofthe2007“SunniAwakening,”Ghuta,wherethegovernmentofBasharal-Assadreportedlyusedchemicalweapons,etc.).

§ DiscredittheideaandviabilityoftheIslamicState.Inparticular,byexploitingthetestimonialsofISdefectors,exposingthegroup’sideologicalinfelicities,andpromotingnarrativeofSunniandotherlocalactorsrebuildingtheircountriesandfightingtheIslamicState.

§ DiscreditingthemediatheIslamicStateandothergroupsusetodisseminatetheirmessages.Thistacticalapproachwouldhavetheeffectofthrowingthegroup’spropagandaoperationsintoanxiousdisarrayandshouldincludeaconsistentandcoordinatedtargetingofsocialmediaandothercommunicationschannelsthegroupsuseswiththeaimofsowingdistrustbetweenISleadershipandsupporters,howtheyreceivetheirmessages,andwhatthemessageis.

o FloodingsocialmediaspaceswithimitationISsupporters.MockISsupportersonTwitter,FacebookandYouTubecoulddeliversubtledeviationsfromISpuristpropaganda,expressgrievancesaboutrealitiesofIS-controlledterritory,andprovideanecdotesthatcontradictISnarratives.Suchmessagingshouldnotoccurthroughanyconsistentpattern,voiceorprofile.Moreover,suchastrategy,deliveredbyaseemingrandomnumberofsocialmediausersoverrandomspurtsoftimeratherthancontinuously,couldsowbothideologicalanxietyandmistrustbetweenISleadershipandloyalists/fans,therebydissuadingISleadershipfromdependingonsocialmedia.

o Pushoutalternative“dawa”publicationsascounterweighttoISpropaganda.

TheideahereistohaveamorepermanentformatandrecordofISnarrativesandtactics.Moreover,suchaformat–withimagesandreligiously-symbolictitlesanddiscussions–couldprovidethespacetofullyshowcaseIS’sideologicalfragility.Magazinesandothermediacouldprovidemorecontinuityofideasandcounter-messagingcampaignsinwaysthattweetscannot.MuchliketheimitationISsupportertactic,publishingcanstirideologicalanxietywithinIS’sranksandcanbeeffectivelyconceivedandexecutedthrougharangeoflanguagesandwitharangeofregionalandglobalpartners,beginningthosealreadypartneringwiththeU.S.initsCVEprograms.

“Futures”ProjectstoConsider


LookingbeyondIS’sprogresstoday,theUnitedStatesgovernmentcouldconsiderresearchintothefollowingareasofinquiry,providedeventsinMiddleEastcontinueontheirpresentcourse.

• ISExtremistOffshoots.GiventheunprecedentednatureofIS’sterritorialproject,andthelikelihoodthatmoreextremistoffshootswillemergebecauseofnecessaryideologicaltradeoffs,USGcouldlookintowherethesegroupsmighttakeshape,theirlessonslearnedfromIS,howtheymightbrand,whatkindofsupporttheycouldmuster,providedcircumstancesinMENAcontinue.

• WherewillISCaliphate2.0emerge?IfweassumeISwillcontinuelosingterritoryinSyria-Iraqandproposethatitabandonterritorialpursuitsandonlydirectoffensiveattackswhileinspiringfollowersaboutareturnoftheircaliphate,whatarepossibleat-riskareasandwhatcouldbedonetomitigate?Possibleoptions:Syria(again),SaudiArabia,Turkey.(key:launchingsitewouldneedtobelocationofreligious/apocalypticimportanceforthegroup,likeSyriawasoriginally).

• Prospectsforcompetitorjihaditerritorialgroups.NusraFront,Ahraral-Sham,

andothergroups.WhataretheirchancesofsuccessatreplacingIS’sterritorialproject,inspiringanddirectingattacksoverseas.

• ISanditsFriends?Whatarepossiblealliancesthegroupcouldmake,whichgroups

(inMENAandbeyond)arelikelytobesympathetictoit,andwhatkindsofoff-rampscouldbeusedtodrivewedgesintosuchprospects.Ifalliancesareforged,whatarelikelihoodthatstrategywillbesameandinwhatwayscouldevolve?HowaboutISProvincesandtheiralliances,andtowhatdegreewillthesereplicatethethreatfromIScore?


Day-AfterScenariosforIS(andSimilarEntities)

ThefollowingaretwopossiblescenariosforhowISwillevolvegoingforward.Asmentionedpreviously,asthemostsuccessfulterroristgroupstodaycontrolterritory,thefollowingscenarioscouldserveasblueprintsforanticipatinghowthosecanevolveaswell(NusraFront,al-QaedaintheArabianPeninsula,BokoHaram,etc.)

Figure3:Scenario1:ISDivides,ThreatsDiversify

Inthisscenario,IS’sideologicaltensions–inparticularitsbalancingactofmaintaininganimageofideologicalpurismwhilejustifyingitsstate-buildingandotheroperationsthroughideologically“impure”religioustextsandideas–willleadtoasituationinwhichthecentercannolongerhold.IScoreinSyriaandIraqwillremain,willtrytocontrolterritoryandwilldirectattacks.GrievancesfrommoreextremistelementswithinISwillcauseinternalfrictionandviolenceagainstcoreISleadershipandstructures.OutsideofIS,othercopycatgroupswillcropup,claimingtobemorepuristandviolentthanISandwilltrytodeliveronpromisethatISfailedtoachieve.LoyalistsoverseasandonsocialmediawillcontinuepromotingISandconducingterroristsinitsname.

Result:Diversifiedthreat.Self-radicalizedterroristactsinthenameofIS(andpotentiallyothergroups)willcontinue,withtemporaryhaltinshortterm.Moreviolentimitationgroupscouldemergeintheregion,especiallywhereopportunitiesexistinterritorywithsymbolicsignificanceandinstabilityakintoSyriaandIraq.DamagetoISbrandoverall,butrebrandingmomentforothergroups.

Ideologicaltensions

Morepuristandviolentoffshootsin

MENA

IScoreasInsurgentgroupseekingtobuildstateinMENA

LoyaliststoeitherISor

moreextremebrand

overseas

Intra-IStensionswithmoreextreme

wing


Figure4:Scenario2:ISConsolidates,AllieswithOtherJihadis

Inthisscenario,ISleadershipdefersstate-buildingcaliphateproject,marginalizedtoidealtoworktowardsratherthanonetoachievetoday.Instead,prioritizeunitingstrategywithotherjihadigroupsbasedongreatestcommondenominator–terroristactivityoverseasagainstWestandWesterntargetsandinterests.Whenopportunitiespresentthemselves–therightcombinationofregionalinstability,goodrelationswithcompetitorjihadigroups,andpoliticalcircumstanceswithpotentialfordrivingsectariannarrative(akintoSyriaunderAssad)–ISoffshootsallywithjihadigroupsintheMiddleEasttoprioritizecontrollingterritoryand“purifying.”AstheseterritorialconditionscontinuetoimproveforIS,coulddecidetobreakawayfromjihadigroupsandreclaimitsownstateonceagain–possiblyoutsideofIraqandSyriabutinlocationwithsimilarreligious/symbolicresonanceforasectariannarrative–ashappenedinsummer2014.

Result:Ebbandflowbetweenterroristattacksandterritorialclaims.Waveofhighvolumeterroristattacksconductedinitiallyinthenameofcompetitorjihadigroups(AQ,IS,etc.)oronegroup(IS-AQ?),followedbyexpeditionaryterritorialismandquietseasonforterroristactivity,andsoon,untilonegroupclaimsindependentstateinsymbolicallysignificantterritory.

ISasterroristorganizajon(akacks

inMENAandoverseas)

ISallieswithgroupsinMENAtocontrol

territory

ISreclaimsbrand;usesterritorytogovernandlaunch

akacks


Framework for Influencing Extremist Ideology: Drs. Bob Elder and Sara Cobb, GMU

[email protected]@gmu.edu

ABSTRACT

Negotiationresearch,drawingonrationalchoicetheory,providesawealthoffindingsabouthowpeoplenegotiatesuccessfully,aswellasdescribingsomeofthepitfallsthathavebeenassociatedwithnegotiationfailures.Buildingonnarrativetheory,thispaperattemptstoexpandthetheoreticalbaseofnegotiationinanefforttoaddressthemeaningmakingprocessesthatstructurenegotiationasthebasisofaframeworkforinfluencingextremistideology.Thisresearchiscombinedwithdecision-relatedresearchconductedinsupportofdeterrenceplanningasameanstodiscoverpotentialinfluenceleversforpossibleuseasacountertoextremistideology.Recognizingthatconflictresolutioniscomplicatedbecauseitinvolveschangingthestoryfromwithintheinteractionalcontextfromwhereitarises,theframeworkassumesastagedapproachtoaddressthenarrativestructureoftheideologically-basedconflictwhichanchorstheinfluenceactionsonthestrategicpositionsandidentities,embeddedinthenarrativelogicsofthekeycharacters.

Thisframeworkforinfluencingextremistideologyleveragesagrowingbodyofresearchthatseekstounderstandpatternsof“meaning-making”innegotiation.Ratherthanaccentuatespecificattributesofthepersons,orthesituation,thislineofresearchfocusesonattributesofmeaning-makingitself.Onestrandofthisresearchemploysnarrativetheorytodescribethedynamicsofnegotiationprocesses,bothescalationsandtransformation,intermsofnarrativestructuresandprocesses(Cobb2006,2013;BambergandAndrews2004;WinsladeandMonk2000;Hajer1997).Researchinthislinetreatsnarrativesasadiscursiveconstructionthatreflectsparties’commitmentsintermsofplotsequences(past,present,andfuture),rolesthatareassignedandattributed(characterizations),andmoralframeworks(valuesorthemes).Thisapproachhasidentifiedplotslinkedtosequencesofevents,charactersthatoperateasprotagonists,andasetofmoralimperativesandbehavioralinjunctionsaselementsthat,recursively,shapethedevelopmentofinteraction.Thesetofmoralimperativesandbehavioralinjunctions,forexample,createwhatLabovandWaletzky(2003)callthe“evaluativepoint”ofanarrative,thefeaturethatdifferentiatesitfromacollectionofevents;theevaluativepoint,inturn,providesthefoundationforpositioningwithintheinteraction(HarréandSlocum2003).Anarrativeapproachhasbeenshowntobeusefulforanalyzingmeaning-makingandfordesigninginterventionsinsituationsofprotractedandescalatingconflict(Bar-onandKassem2004).Researchonnarrativeandconflictinthelastdecadehasemphasizedgenericprocessessuchaspositioning(HarréandMoghaddam2003),bridging(Pappe2003),anddestabilization(Cobb1993;WinsladeandMonk2008)thatcanhelpaccountforprotractedconflict.

TheframeworkforinfluencingextremistideologyadaptsacommonlyuseddeterrencedefinitiontoexaminetheDecisionCalculusofActor‘X”regardingAction‘Y’underCondition‘Z’leveragingworkconductedinaprevious“OperationalizingDeterrence”SMAstudy.Agiven“decisioncalculus”arisesfromanassociatednarrativelogic,which,inturn,hascorrelateinterests.Theactorsofinterestinthisdefinitionhavebeenidentified,andtheconditionofinterestcanbegenerally


describedasanenvironmentcharacterizedbytheconductofgrayzoneactivities.TherehasbeenanassumptionthattheUSanditspartnerswouldwanttodeter“grayzone”activities,butthisexaminationinsteadassumesthatitisimportanttoidentifythestrategicactionsorbehaviors(vitalinterests)thatposearisktotheUSanditspartnersandthenexaminehowthe“grayzone”activitiescontributetothestrategicactionsorbehaviorsthatneedtobedeterred,oralternatively,tolerated.Thisarguestheneedtoputthegrayzoneactivitiesinastrategiccontext,recognizingthattheconcernforUSandpartnerdecisionmakersisthatthegrayzoneactivitiesmaycollectivelyleadtoanundesirablebehavior.

Therefore,thefirststepistodefineforeachspecificactorwhichpotentialgoalsorobjectivesthattheUSwantstodetersinceitwouldbeimpracticaltodeterallgrayzoneactoractivities.Withthat,plannerswillhaveallthreecomponentsofthedeterrencedefinitionandcanthenfocusonidentifyingthecausalinfluencescontributing(oropposing)theconductofactionsorbehaviorsthatwouldaffecttheseidentifiedvitalUSstrategicinterests.Itisimportanttoestablishacommonunderstandingofeachparty’scoreinterests,althoughitisnotimportantorlikelythatthepartiesaccepttheother’scoreinterestsastheirown.

Thenextstepistoexaminethoseactionsinordertounderstandthenarrativelogicatplay,andthentoidentifypotentialUSresponsesfromanescalationperspectivetosetthestageformodelingUS(andpartner)shaping,engagement,andresponseactivitiesthatshouldbeconsideredtoinfluencetheactor’sideologyinwaysthatreducetheriskoftheadversestrategicactionorbehavioroccurring.Oneofthewaysthathasproveneffectiveinthepasttounderstandotheractorsisthroughnarrativeanalysis.ThisstudyincorporatesframeworksdevelopedbySaraCobbatGMU’sCenterforNarrativeandConflictResolution.Ingeneral,theapproachanalyzestheotheractor’snarrativeinthecontextofanactionorbehaviortobedeterred,andthenexaminetheutilityofUSandpartneractionsintermsofhowtheyeitherreinforceorcounterthenarrative.

Figure5:NarrativeStrategy

ThechartinFigure5depictsanapproachtonarrativestrategy(Cobb,2015)thatencouragesgrowthalonganengagementspectrum,recognizingthatchangingtheideologyofapopulation


mustbedoneinstages.DrawingonGreimas(1977),wesuggestthatthesepatternedinteractionscanbeunderstoodasafunctionofnarrativegrammarthatlinksthe“apparentlevelofnarration”(utterances)—whichprefigureandlimitaction—with“immanentlevel,constitutingasortofcommonstructuraltrunk,atwhichnarrativityissituatedandorganizedpriortoitsmanifestation.”Aswithanygrammar,narrativegrammarinvolvesbothmorphologyandsyntax(Greimas1977,p.26).Themorphology,thesetofmorphemesorunitsofmeaning,isregulatedbythesyntaxorthe“operationalrules…(for)manipulatingthetermsofthemorphology”.Inthecaseofnarrative,thisgrammarfunctionsto“reestablishanorderofthreatenedvalues”(Ricoeuretal.1989,p.601).Narrativegrammarispertinenttothestudyofnegotiationpreciselybecauseithighlightsboththemorphology—themeaningstructuresthatemergeininteraction—aswellasthespecificsyntacticruleswhichgovernthecombinationandtransformationofthosemeanings,inthestruggletoassertandestablishtheorderofvaluesthatunderlieagivenparties’framingoftheproblem,aswellastheirdesiredsolutions.Butnarrativegrammarisalsopertinenttothestudyofnegotiationbecausetheperformanceofnarrativeslimitsthenatureofthestoriesthatcanbetoldandsetsinmotioninteractionalpatternsthatrestrictnarrativecomplexity(Cobb2006;Colemanetal.2005).

Conflictresolutioniscomplicatedpreciselybecauseitinvolveschangingthestoryfromwithintheinteractionalcontextfromwhereitarises,oncethenarrativestructureoftheconflicthasalreadybeenestablishedandisanchoringthestrategicpositionsandidentitiesofthecharacters(Cobb2013).Further,giventhatnarrativesdohaveagrammarthatregulatestheirproduction,theinteractionofconflictingnarrativesanchors,andsolidifiesthesyntacticrulesthatleadtoescalations.Sowhileresearchersinthenarrativetraditionroutinelynotethetremendousvariabilityofnarrativecontent,aswellastheimportanceofcontextforunderstandingthedynamicsofconflict(Whitebrook2001),certainnarrativepatternsareempiricallydominantinnegotiation(Nelson2001).Conflictscenarios,forexample,canoftenbesummarizedasrathersimplebinaryjuncturesinwhicheachparty“punctuates”thesequenceofevents(Watzlawicketal.1967)inamannerthatexternalizesresponsibility,inspiralsofescalationthatcanleadtoviolence.ThisapproachseekstoreversethesequenceofeventsfromonethatfuelsviolencetoonethatseeksaccommodationbyincrementallyaddressingthefactorswhichcontributedtothedevelopmentofideologiesthatthreatenUSinterests.IdentifyingandprioritizingthegrayzoneactivitiestobedeterredandunderstandingthenatureofhowthenarrativelogicscorrelatetothosebehaviorswouldallowUSoperatorstodesignnarrativelogicstosupportstrategicdeterrenceofcertainactions,andtodesignandlaunchthenarrativelogicsassociatedwiththeEngagementSpectrum.


Off-Ramps for Da’esh Leadership: Preventing Da’esh 2.0, Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska Omaha and Dr. Jason Spitaletta, The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory WehavearguedthatDa’eshiscomprisedofleaderswithheterogeneoustalentsandmotivations(Ligon,2014;Ligon&Derrick,2015;Derricketal.,inpress).UponexaminingtheDa’eshleadershipteam(bothformalandinformalleaders)forpastsevenyears,wehaveidentifiedthattheyhaveamoreheterogeneousTopManagementTeam(TMT)thanotherVEOs,particularlythantheirpeersintheGlobalJihadIndustry12.Todate,thesedifferenceshavebeeneitheroverlookedorseenasastrength13.However,inconventionalTMTs,weoftenseesuchheterogeneityleadstosignificantbarrierstocollaboration14,andthesebarrierscanleadtofissuresandseamsthatcancausedecreaseddecisionmaking,splintering,andotherorganizationaltensions.Inshort,whileastrengthofDa’eshisitsdiverseworkforce,inconditionsofexternalpressureandcompetition,thisdiversitycanalsoresultintremendousbarrierstocollaboration.Inaddition,theyalsorequiretailoredapproacheswhendecidingwhattodowiththeseleaderstopreventthemfromcreatingDa’esh2.0ortakingtheirtalentselsewhere.PrecisionisanecessarycomponentforeffectiveinfluenceandsegmentingDa’esh’sTMTallowsformorepersonalizedlinesofpersuasion15basedontypologies.Thus,thefocusofthischapteristwo-fold.First,wewillsharetheunderlyingtheoryofTMTcollaboration,andprovidepractitionerswithsometacticstofomentbarriersanddistrusttoaidtheoperationsmeanttodegradetheorganization(e.g.,retakingofMosul).Second,givenouranalysisofwhatmotivatedeachoftheseleaderstojoinandremaininDa’esh,wewillprovideasetoftailoredoff-rampstobeconsideredtodetercapturedleadersfromreconstitutingDa’esh2.0.

CapitalizingonOperations:FomentingBarrierstoCollaborationamongLeadersIncombinationwiththeremarkablekineticoperationstoretakekeyterritorysuchasMosul,influenceoperationsshouldfomentDistrustwithintheTopManagementTeam.Usingsocialidentitytheory,socialdominancetheory,andinformationprocessingtheories,therearetypicallythreetypesofsubgroupsinorganizations:1)Identity-BasedSubgroups2)ResourceBasedSubgroups3)Knowledge-BasedSubgroups16.Da’eshTMThasidentifiablesubgroupsbasedonall12ForadetailedreportofourlongitudinalstudyofVEOleadershipteams,pleasevisithttp://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/organizational-determinants-violence-and-performance 13WeissandHassan’s2015bookdescribedtheroleoftheformerBaathistsasasignificantoperationaladvantageinearlyIraqterritorygains.14M.Hansen’s(2009)workonbarrierstocollaborationinformshowtofomentorganizationalfactions.15 Spitaletta,J.(2013).NeuropsychologicalOperations:AConceptforCounter-Radicalization.InM.Reynolds&D.Lyle(Eds)(2013).TopicsforOperationalConsiderations:InsightsfromNeurobiology&NeuropsychologyonInfluenceandExtremism—AnOperationalPerspective.Washington,DC:StrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.16Carton,A.M.,&Cummings,J.N.(2012).Atheoryofsubgroupsinworkteams.AcademyofManagementReview,37:441-470.


threeofthesedrivers.Analysisofthetargets(i.e.,message,receivers)forthethreesubgroups/Da’eshleadertypologies(i.e.,ViolentSeekers,TrueIdeologues,andPragmatics)followsonsubsequentpages.Messagingtoeachofthesegroupsshouldtakeintoaccounttheirdecision-makingstyle(anderrors/biases),organizationalfunctions,lifehistory,psychologicalcharacteristics,network,influencelevers17

Mayer’smodel18oftrustamongleadersisbasedonTMTmembersperceivingeachother’s1)Ability(expertisesource),2)Benevolence(toeachotherandexternal“in-groupactors”),and3)Integrity.Onewaytofomentdistrustandcauseabarriertoeffectivecollaboration(e.g.,C2,decisionmaking)istoerodeperceptionsamongtheTMTofeachother’sability,benevolence,and/orintegrity.Thus,messagingshouldhavethesegoalstoacceleratefissuresandbarrierstocollaborationamongthethreeidentifiedleadergroups.

17InfluencemechanismsbasedonYukl’smodel(1990)ofinspirationalversusrationalappeals.18Mayer,Davis,&Schoorman(1995).Anintegrativemodeloforganizationaltrust.AcademyofManagementReview,20(3),709-734.

Figure6:FactorsofTMTTrust(AdaptedfromMayeretal.,1995)


AnalysisoftheTarget(i.e.,Message,Receiver):Da’eshLeaderTypologies19:TrueIdeologues:DecisionMaking:Focusonideologicalgoalsindecisionmaking(e.g.,returntopastlevelsofgreatness,useofnegativementalmodels/pastexperienceswithfailuretoinformonlessonslearnedandmistakestoavoid(thus,historicalreferencesvalued),useofsymbolicimageryandritualsincommunications.(1) LikelyCognitiveErrors:lowintegrativecomplexity,blackandwhitethinking,lackof

flexibility,canoverlyattendtopotentialnegativeconsequences.(2) LikelyOrganizationalFunctions:ShariaCouncilmembersatCentralorRegional/Province

levels;governingwingandadministrativefunctions;highorganizationalknowledge/expertise.(3) Biodata/LifeHistory:Highlyeducated,strongunderstandingandidentitywithtenetsofIslam;

10yearsormoreinformalreligioustraining.(4) PsychologicalCharacteristics:Deferenttoauthority,HighAllegiancetoISIL20;Risk-taking;

Patientwithnewconvertsandloyaltothosewithideologicalexpertise.(5) Network:MuftisandEliteClerics;tangentialconnectionstosomeformerBaathists.(6) InfluenceLevers:

a. InspirationalAppeal–EmotionalrequestsorproposalsthatarouseenthusiasmbyappealingtoTakfirivaluesandideals,orbyincreasingtheirconfidencetheycandosomethingwell.Maybeprovokedifchallengedontheircredentials.

b. UpwardAppeal–persuadehimthattherequestisapprovedbyupperleadership,orappealstoupperleadershiptogaincompliancewithrequest(insinuateapprovalbyindividualstheyperceiveaspowerful,expert,ortrustworthy.

(7) FactorsofPerceivedTrustworthiness:a. Ability–perceivedinspiringcohesion,commitmenttocause;expertiseinSharia;seen

astheconscienceandSpiritualleader.b. Benevolence–EquitabledistributionofISILresourcestopopulace,aslongasseenas

compliantwithISIL.c. Integrity–Seenaspureanddeeplycommittedtoreligiousideals.

(8) MessageCharacteristics:a. Do:craftinspirationalmessagesinidealofIslamandpurity.Focusonincongruenceof

decisionsofothersubgroupsthatareinconflictwithhistoricalvisionofCaliphate.b. Don’t:attackideology,don’thaveincompleteorweakargumentsbasedon

misunderstandingofIslam.Don’tuseApostatestodelivermessage.(9) MessageCharacteristicsABOUTTHEMfromCREDIBLESOURCE:

a. Attacksourceofexpertise:focusonhishypocrisy.b. Focusonlackofdatabehinddecisions(iftoPragmatists)c. Focusonlackofpenchantforviolence(iftoViolenceSeekers)d. FocusonIdeologues’unwillingnesstodirectlypartakeinviolence(iftoViolence

Seekers)e. FocusonIdeologues’strategicshiftawayfromIraq&Syria(iftoViolenceSeekers)

(10) MessageMOEs:a. Questioningpragmaticandviolencegoals/decisionsb. IncreasedRisk-Takingc. Weakeningloyaltytootherleadersubgroups

[email protected]@unomaha.eduformoreinformationonthiseffort.20Pleaseemaillkuznar@nsiteam.comandJason.spitaletta@jhuapl.eduformoreinformationonpsychologicalprofiling.


d. Greaterattentiontopotentialnegativeconsequencesofaction.e. Silocommunication(lowercommunication,informationsharingwithotherleaders)

Pragmatics:(1) DecisionMaking:Focusonsecular,tangiblegoalsindecisionmaking(e.g.,controlof

government,criticalresources,strategicrevenuestreamssuchashighlytraveledroads);usedataandfactstomakedecisions,rationalandincrementalprogresstowardlong-termgoals.Focusonsolvingday-to-dayproblemsfororganizationandpeople.

(2) LikelyCognitiveErrors:decisionparalysisfromoverlyanalyticalapproach;canoverlyweighimportanceofpragmaticgoalsversusideologicalgoals,misunderstandingofViolenceSeekersrationaleforparticipation..

(3) LikelyOrganizationalFunctions:ShuraCouncilmembers,militaryfunctions(withsomerotationstoadministrativefunctions–highlevelsandlargespanofcontrol).

(4) Biodata/LifeHistory:Highlyeducated,typicallysecularinnature.Someideologicaltraining,butfarlessthantrueideologues.Technicaltraining(e.g.,accounting,engineeringfunctions),militarytraining.ManyareformerBaathistswhosawISILasawaytoregainpower.

(5) PsychologicalCharacteristics:Deferenttoauthority,ModerateallegiancetoISIL(seenasawaytomeetmorepragmaticgoals);lowrisk-taking;pragmaticloyaltiesbasedonperceivedusefulness.

(6) Network:Baathists;someYazidisiffromNorthernIraq;distrustfulofformalgovernmentinIraq.

(7) InfluenceLevers:a. RationalAppeal–Uselogicalargumentsandfactualevidencetopersuadehimthata

proposalorrequestisviableandlikelytoresultinattainmentoftaskobjectives.b. ExchangeAppeal–Makeexplicitpromisesorimplicitpromisesthathewillreceive

rewardsortangiblebenefitsifhecomplieswitharequestorsupportsaproposal,orremindhimofafavortobereciprocated.

(8) FactorsofPerceivedTrustworthiness:a. Ability–perceivedasexpertproblemsolversandplanners;oftenhavespecial

technicalexpertiseandtrainingthatmakesthemassets.b. Benevolence–Lowestofthethreecharacteristicsforthem;situationalkindness

(almostalwaysbasedonpragmaticexchanges);reciprocalaltruismc. Integrity–SeenasloyaltotheISILorganization,butmayactuallyviewthe

organizationsimplyasameanstoanend.(9) MessageCharacteristics:

a. Do:craftrationalmessagesbasedondata,facts,andlogicalarguments.Highlighthowideologicalgoalsandviolentgoalsconflictwithmoredata-driven,incrementalapproaches.Remindthemoftheireducation,traininginacademics.Praisetheirattentiontodetailandcarefulplanning.Focusonthefuture.

b. Don’t:Useideologicalorinspirationalappealstoinfluencethem.AvoidfocusingonpastDa’eshatrocities(ifpossible)asitmightpresentperceivedbarriertodefection.

(10) MessageCharacteristicsABOUTTHEMfromCREDIBLESOURCE:a. Attacksourceofexpertise:denigratehisplanning,technicalskills.b. Focusonidentifiableoutgroupcharacteristics(Baathist,relationshiptoYazidis)c. Focusonlackofreligiousconviction(iftoIdeologues).d. Focusonlackofdirectparticipationinviolence(iftoViolenceSeekers)

(11) MessageMOEs:a. Questioningideologicalandviolencegoals/decisionsb. Slowerdecisionmakingc. WeakeningloyaltytoISILorganizationandotherleadersubgroupsd. Focusonday-to-dayshorttermgoalsoverlong-term,strategicgoals.


ViolentSeekers:1) DecisionMaking:Focusonadventureseeking,sensationseekingactivities;short-term

decision-making;escalationofviolenceandmeanstopunishothers.2) LikelyCognitiveErrors:Overlookpragmaticandideologicalgoalsoforganizationinnameof

increasedviolenceandexcitement,Overestimatepotentialrewardsofsuccess/victoryandunderestimatetherisks.

3) LikelyOrganizationalFunctions:MilitaryorHisbahifadministrative;iffromWesterncountryorTunisia,likelyinhigherlevelandgreaterspanofcontrol.

4) Biodata/LifeHistory:Variablelevelsofeducation,butexperiencewithcrime,hunting,orcombat.Likelyexperiencedprisonordetentionearlyon;problemswithauthority.Earlyevidenceofthrillseeking.Noviceinideologicaltraining.

5) PsychologicalCharacteristics:Difficultyfollowingauthorityunlessverybrutal,controlling;highrisktaking,lowallegiancetoISILasanorganization.Mayappearferventincommitment,butislikelyarecentconvertwithsuperficialunderstandingofIslam.Oftenseekingamasculinesocialidentifyandtendtowardbehaviorsthatadvertise“maleness”,

6) Network:heterogeneous,butmadeofforeignfightersoutsideofIraqandSyria.7) InfluenceLevers:

a. PressureAppeal–useofdemands,threats,orintimidationtoconvincehimtocomplywitharequest;respondstoassertiveness.

b. ExchangeAppeal–Makeexplicitpromisesorimplicitpromisesthathewillreceiverewardsortangiblebenefitsifhecomplieswitharequestorsupportsaproposal,orremindhimofafavortobereciprocated.Rewardsshouldbetiedaroundthrill-seekingandviolence.

8) FactorsofPerceivedTrustworthiness:a. Ability–perceivedasexpertfighters;alsoperceivedasknowledgeableabouthome

country(e.g.,targetsofinterest).b. Benevolence–Lowestofthethreecharacteristicsforthem;situationalkindness

(almostalwaysbasedonopportunityforexcitement)c. Integrity–Seenascommittedastheytraveledfromcomfortablehomecountriesto

join;butovertime,maybeseenasimposter/foreigner.9) MessageCharacteristicsTOTHEM:

a. Do:craftmessagesaboutchanceforviolence;needtoescalate(andother’sslowdecisionmaking);douseforcefulmessengerswhohaveexpertiseinfighting.

b. Don’t:Useideologicalorrationalappealstoinfluencethem.10) MessageCharacteristicsABOUTTHEMfromCREDIBLESOURCE:

a. Attacksourceofexpertise:denigratehisfightingability.b. Focusonidentifiableoutgroupcharacteristics(accents,skincolor)c. Focusonlackofreligiousconvictionand/orintellectualskill.d. HighlighttheIdeologuesandPragmatistsrelativelackofregardforViolenceSeekers.

11) MessageMOEs:a. Questioningideologicalandpragmaticgoals/decisionsb. Impulsivedecisionmakingc. WeakeningloyaltytoISILorganizationandotherleadersubgroupsd. Lowinformationsharinganddecreaseinexchange.

ProvidingOff-RampsforDa’eshLeadersRetakingDa’eshTerritoryisthefirststepindefeatingthemasanorganization.However,thereisadangertothinkthatitistheendofthebattle.Moreover,manyoftheleadersofDa’eshhaveledotherconflictsthroughouttheirlives,infactservingasmercenaryleadersforviolenceofalltypes.


Thus,thepurposeofourfinalsectionistooffersomepotentialoff-rampsfortheseleaderstoinfluencethemtodesistfromideologically-motivatedviolence.Todothiscorrectly,however,thenatureofwhatmotivatesthemmustbetakenintoaccount.Thus,ourlongitudinalworkprofilingtheseleadersasdetailedintheprevioussectioniscriticalforprovidingtailoredoff-rampsor“GoldenBridges”toencouragethemtodesistfromviolence.

Asdescribedintheprevioussectionandinotherpublications(e.g.,Ligonetal.,2014),thethree“types”ofDa’eshleadersholddistinctpositions,haveuniquedecisionmakingstyles,andwillbeinfluencedbyverydifferentoff-ramps.First,theTrueIdeologues,whohaveheldpositionsofreligiousauthorityinDa’esh,makedecisionsbasedonhistoricallessonsofwhattoavoidandwhathasbeengleanedfromthepast.Theyviewcurrentbattlesaspartofalong,historicalbattlebetweenIslamandCrusaders,andtheygenuinelybelievetheirreligionisunderattack.WhiletheirallegiancetothemorepragmaticmembersofDa’esh(e.g,formerBaathists,alliancesamongtribes,etc)hasbeenshakeninformermonths,theyarehighlytrustingofotherswhotheyperceivetohavereligiouspietyandconvictiontothecause.Off-rampsthatmayworkshouldbedeliveredbycrediblemessengers,orthosewithideologicalmindsets(credentialsarelessmeaningfulwiththisgroup,astheybelieveinTakfirandarewearyofthosewithformalideologicaltraining;instead,focusonthirdpartyendorsementsfrommeaningfulnetworkstoincreasecredibilityofthemessenger).Theseideologuesmaybeswayedbytheopportunityforrecognitionofthemeaningfulnessofthecauseandtheirhistoricalrolesinit.Oneoptioncouldbeensurethattheyhelpchroniclethemovement,playingupthatweneedtheirinputonthedecisionstheymadealongthewaythatinspiredtheoneofthe“mostimportantIslamicSocialMovements”ofourtime.Thisappealforchroniclinghistoryishighlypersuasivetoideologues,astheywanttoensurewhattheydidwillberememberedandstudied.Next,iftheseleadershavefamily,ensuringsafepassagefortheirfamilymemberstoaSunniCountry/Territorywheretheycanbeinstrumentalinoverseeingtheconfinementconditionsofcapturedfighterswouldalsoengendergreaterfeelingsoftrustamongthecoalitionandthefamiliesofthetrueideologues.Theleasteffectiveoff-rampforthisgroupwouldbetosendthemtoatraditionalderadicalizationprogram;astheleadersofDa’eshseetheirbeliefsascentraltotheiridentity,tryingtoderadicalizethemfromthesestronglyheldbeliefsandvalueswillbeunsuccessfulinthisgroup.Instead,programmaticeffortsshouldfocusondesistancefromviolenceandalternativemechanismstoaffectsocialchange.

Contrarytotheideologues,pragmaticsoftenholdverytechnicaloradministrativepositions.Theirdecisionmakingischaracterizedbyloyaltiesbasedonperceivedinstrumentaluse,andtheycanbepersuadedwithmorerational,logicalandinterestbasedappeals.Theyalsoareinfluencedbyexplicitpromiseofreward(orreductioninpunishment),andtheadministrationofresourcescannotbeunderemphasizedwiththisgroup.Again,theseleaderswillbepersuadedbythepromiseofsafepassagefortheirfamilieswithvisitationelementssimilartothoseinwitnessprotectionprograms.Inaddition,off-rampsshouldfocusonleveragingtheirexpertiseforrestorationplanningforformerlyoccupiedland(particularlybecausetheywereoftenleadsatholdingterritoryoncegainedbyDa’esh),andcollaboratingwiththemtoassistintherebuildingoftheformerlyDa’esh-heldterritory.ManyoftheseindividualshaveuniqueskillsandtalentsthatmadethemusefultoDa’esh,andoff-rampsthathighlightthesecanyieldgreatercommitmenttodesistfromviolencedowntheroad.

Finally,theviolenceseekersoftenheldpositionsofleadershipwheretheymetedseverepunishment.Forexample,anyoneinvolvedwiththeatrocitiesagainsttheYazidis,inadministrative


positionsintheHisbawheretheywereinvolvedinadministering“justice,”oranyonewhocanbeconnectedtodirectviolenceandatrocitiesaboveandbeyondcomplicityorknowledgeposthocwillmeetthesecriteria.Theseindividualsoftentraveledfromothercountriestojointhefight,androseintheranksduetotheextremelevelsofbrutalityandviolenceinwhichtheyengaged.Theyhavedifficultyfollowingauthority,andtheyoftenhavepersonalitydisorderssuchasextremenarcissism(andaccompanyingobjectbeliefs),anti-socialpersonality,andoppositionaldefiantdisorderasclassifiedbywesterndiagnosticmanuals.Theymayappearferventintheirconviction,butinreality,havesuperficialtrainingandknowledgeaboutIslam(manyarerecentconverts).Withtheseleaders,ourviewisthattherearenosuitableoff-ramps;moreover,theseindividualswillnotbenefitfromopportunitiesfordesistanceorrebuildingIraqandSyria.Thus,itisourrecommendationtheybedetainedandallottedpunishmentcommensuratewiththeirhomecountries’norms.

InsummaryDa’eshasaparamilitaryforceisinwithdrawal(ifnotdefeat)andDa’eshasanorganizationisindecline;however,Da’eshasanideapersists.TheUSandouralliesshouldcontinuetosewfear,uncertainty,anddoubtwithintheranksoftheViolenceSeekerswhocompriseasignificantportionoftheparamilitaryforce.ThiseffortneedstofocusonnotonlydegradingtheircurrentcapacitytoresistbutalsousingtheViolenceSeekersthemselvesaswarningstoothersnottoaffiliate.TheUSandouralliesalsoneedstoengagethePragmatistswithinDa’esh’sTMTtoendtheconflictandbringaboutabetterpeace;thisrequiresnuancedappealsandpoliticalcompromisebuttheeffortinnecessaryinordertosplitthePragmatistsawayfromtheIdeologues.TheIdeologuesrepresentthemostincorrigibleoftheDa’eshTMTandthusthemostresistanttoinfluence.Effortsmuststillbemadetonotonlylimittheirabilitytoretainthoseunderarmsbutalsomobilizenewadherents.AsMachiavellicautioned,theUSmustavoidmakingmartyrsoutoftheIdeologuesbutinsteaddelegitimizethem.Thisentailsusingtheirformerclerics,bureaucrats,andsoldiersagainstthemandthosewhomaycomenext.DoingthisrequiresanuancedunderstandingoftheorganizationalandindividualpsychologyofDa’esh,it’sTMT,andit’smembers.Thispapersummarizesyearsofworkdonetodevelopthatunderstandingalongwithsuggestionsabouthowthoseresearchfindingsmaybeoperationalized.


Comprehensive Communications Approach: Drs. Todd Helmus and Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, RAND ExcerptedfromElizabethBodine-Baron,ToddC.Helmus,MadelineMagnuson,andZevWinkelman,ExaminingISISSupportandOppositionNetworksonTwitter,RAND,2016,availableathttp://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html

TheIslamicStateinIraqandSyria(ISIS),likenootherterroristorganizationbefore,hasusedTwitterandothersocialmediachannelstobroadcastitsmessage,inspirefollowers,andrecruitnewfighters.Thoughmuchlessheralded,ISISopponentshavealsotakentoTwittertocastigatetheISISmessage.ThisreportdrawsonpubliclyavailableTwitterdatatoexaminethisongoingdebateaboutISISonArabicTwitterandtobetterunderstandthenetworksofISISsupportersandopponentsonTwitter.

TosupportthecountermessagingeffortandtomoredeeplyunderstandISISsupportersandopponents,thisstudyusesamixed-methodsanalyticapproachtoidentifyandcharacterizeindetailbothISISsupportandoppositionnetworksonTwitter.ThisanalyticapproachdrawsoncommunitydetectionalgorithmsthathelpdetectinteractivecommunitiesofTwitterusers,lexicalanalysisthatcanidentifykeythemesandcontentforlargedatasets,andsocialnetworkanalysis.Thisresearchsetouttoanswerthreekeyquestions:

• HowcanwedifferentiateISISsupportersandopponentsonTwitter?• Whoarethey,andwhataretheysaying?• Howaretheyconnected,andwhoisimportant?

HowCanWeDifferentiateISISSupportersandOpponentsonTwitter?

WhileISIShasformallyrequestedthatitsfollowersrefertoitasTheIslamicState,orwhetherexaminedWeDa’esh.or,داعش,abbreviationtheuseoftendetractorsgroup,الدولةاإلسالمیةthesetwotermswouldserveasputativemeasuresofISISsupportoropposition,respectively.Usingaten-monthsampleofTwitterdata,welexicallyanalyzedthecontentandkeythemesofuserswhomostlyemployDa’eshversusthosewhomostlyuseIslamicStateintheirtweets.Aspredicted,wefoundthatfrequentusersofDa’eshhadcontentthatwashighlycriticalofISIS,withusersusingsuchtermsasTerroristDa’esh,Kharijites,militantsofDa’esh,dogsoffire,anddogsofBaghdadi.UsersofIslamicState,however,usedglowingtermssuchasmonotheistsMujahideen,SoldiersoftheCaliphate,andlionsoftheIslamicState.Otherreferencestopeople,states,organizations,andlocationnamesweresimilarlypredictiveofsupport.

Drawingonthismeasureofsupportandopposition,wefoundthatovertheten-monthperiod(July1,2014,toApril30,2015),ISISopponentsgenerallyoutnumbersupporterssixtoone.Onadailybasis,ISISopponentsoutnumbersupportersnearlytentoone.However,ISISsupportersroutinelyouttweetopponents,astheyproduce50percentmoretweetsperday.InexaminingthetimelineofISIS-relatedtweets,wefoundthattheburningoftheJordanianpilot,Moathal-Kasabeh,sparkedahugeupsurgeinanti-ISIStweets.Inaddition,attheendofourreportingperiod(MarchtoApril2015),wefoundasignificantreductioninthenumberoftweetingISISsupportersandanupsurgeintweetingopponents.

WhoAreThey,andWhatAreTheySaying?


WeusedlexicalandnetworkanalysisinaniterativeapproachtoidentifyandcharacterizedifferentcommunitieswithintheTwitterISISconversation.Drawingoncommunitydetectionalgorithms,wedistilled23milliontweetsfrom771,321usersinto36distinctcommunitiesandultimatelyintofourmajormetacommunities.Wethenusedlexicalanalysistocharacterizetheidentitiesandprominentthemesofthesemetacommunities.

LexicalanalysisshowsthatthesefourmetacommunitiesappeartobelongtoShia,Syrianmujahideen,ISISsupporters,andSunni.

• TheShiagroupcondemnsISISusinghistoricalIslamictermsandlinkstoSaudiArabia,expressespositiveattitudetowardtheinternationalcoalitionandChristians,andfocusesonsectarianismandfrustrationswithSunni/Shiadivisions.

• SyrianMujahideensupportersrepresentindividualsthroughouttheMiddleEastwhosupporttheanti-AssadSyrianMujahideenmovement.TheseindividualshavemixedattitudestowardtheIslamicStateandgenerallynegativeattitudestowardtheinternationalcoalitionfor“supporting”theSyrianregime.

• TheISISsupportersfrequentlyinvokethreatsagainstIslam,highlightpositivethemesthatincludereligion,belonging,andpositiveterms,anduseavarietyofinsultsandderogatorytermstorefertoShia,theSyrianregime,theinternationalcommunity,andothers.TheanalysisalsosuggeststhatISISsupportersmoreactivelyadheretogoodsocialmediastrategybyactivelyencouragingfellowsupportersto“spread,”“disseminate,”and“link”messagestoexpandtheirreachandimpact.

• TheSunnicommunityishighlyfracturedincomparisonwithothermetacommunities,andresonantthemesareverydifferentwithinthevariousSunnisubcommunitiesandappeartoalignwithdifferentMiddleEastnation-states.Forexample,oneSunnisub-communityappearstofocusonthemesofEgyptiannationalism,toincludethethreatofISIStowardEgyptandconcernsabouttheMuslimBrotherhood.AnothergroupappearsfocusedonJordanianissues,withcommonthemesincludingtheISISthreattoEgypt,theexecutionoftheJordanianpilot,Moathal-Kasabeh,andJordan’sroleintheinternationalcoalition.

HowAreTheyConnected,andWhoIsImportant?

Wenextappliedsocialnetworkanalysisatthecommunityleveltoassessrelativestrengthandweaknessesofdifferentconnectionsbetweencommunitiesandhowtheywerepositionedwithrespecttooneanother.Wefound

• thecoreoftheSyrianMujahideenmetacommunityservesasanimportantconnectionbetweentheShiametacommunity,someSunnicommunities,andtheISISSupportermetacommunity,whoareotherwisedisconnected.ItisthuspossiblethatindividualswithintheSyrianmujahideencommunitycouldserveasinfluencersofISISsupportersandconnectISISopponentstogether.

• TheEgyptian,SaudiArabian,andGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)communitiesformthecoreoftheSunnimetacommunity,whichisbyfarmorefracturedthantheShia,SyrianMujahideen,andISISSupportermetacommunities.Ingeneral,eachsubcommunityisconcernedwithitsownspecificissues,whichcouldcomplicateconstructingacoherentSunnianti-ISIScountermessagingstrategy.

• WithintheSunnisubcommunities,theYemenicommunityhasthehighestpercentageofISISsupportersandissharplydividedbetweenISISsupportersandopponents.


ImplicationsandRecommendations

Basedonthesefindings,weofferseveralrecommendationsforpolicymakers:

• ResearchinstitutionsshouldcontinuetousethemodelofDa’eshversusIslamicStateforISIStogaugeworldwideactivityofISISsupportersandopponents.TheU.S.governmentmayusesuchmodelstotesttheimpactofanti-ISISprograms.

• ISISopponentsareplentifulbutmayrequireassistancefromtheU.S.StateDepartment,intheformofsocialmediatrainingsandotherengagements,toenhancetheeffectivenessandreachoftheirmessaging.21Ofcourse,withal-Qa’idaanditsaffiliatescountedamongtheISISopponents,carewillhavetobetakeninselectingthosesuitabletotrainandempower.

• Twittershouldcontinueitscampaignofaccountsuspensions:ThiscampaignlikelyharassesISISTwitterusers,forcesthemtolosevaluabletimereacquiringfollowers,andmayultimatelypushsometousesocialmediachannelsthatarefarlesspublicandaccessiblethanTwitter.

• U.S.militaryInformationSupportOperationsplanners,aswellasStateDepartmentmessengers,shouldcontinuetohighlightISISatrocities.TheTwitterimpactoftheburningoftheJordanianpilotaswellaspreviousfindingssuggestingarelationbetweenISISatrocitiesandISISoppositiononTwitterindicatethatsuchatrocitiesmaygalvanizeopponents.Note,however,ISISclearlyusesultraviolenceasakeycomponentofitsbrand,andamessagingstrategy,consequently,highlightingsuchactionsrisksplayingintoitshands(Winter,2015).Amoresystematicexaminationofthecausesbehindthesespikesandtroughs,suchasISISatrocities,wouldbevaluable.

• Nationsandorganizations(suchasU.S.militaryandStateDepartmentmessengers)lookingtocountermessageISISonTwittershouldtailormessagesforandtargetthemtospecificcommunities:TheISISTwitteruniverseishighlyfragmentedandconsistsofdifferentcommunitiesthatcareaboutdifferenttopics.Countermessagingshouldtakethisintoaccountwithtailoredcommunicationstodifferentcommunities.

Winter,Charlie,TheVirtual“Caliphate”:UnderstandingIslamicState’sPropagandaStrategy,London:QuilliamFoundation,July2015.AsofApril12,2016:https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf

21 The U.S. and the international community already provide training in social media to select civil society members in the Muslim world, and such programs could be expanded and strengthened to provide a more robust effort to expand the voice of ISIS opponents.


A Human Geography Approach to Degrading ISIL: Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin, Geographic Services Inc.

[email protected]

Abstract• HumanGeographyanalysisofDa’eshcontext• Usingtherelationshipsbetweenlocations,socialgroups,andsocio-culturalattributesto

understandrelevantcontext• Supportpost-conflictrebuildingandresettlementplanningthroughmappedrelationships• LeveragegranularHumanGeographydatatosupportsynthesisofmulti-modalapproach

Figure7.Pro-ISILFamilyGroupsthatmakeuptheHumanGeographyacrossSyriaandIraq

IntroductionHumanGeographyanalysisisanapproachthatintegratesthephysicalgeographyandthenetworksamongthepeoplewholivethere.Theresearchusedintheapproach,mapsrelationshipsbetweenlocationsandgroupsofpeoplealongwithfundamentalsocio-culturalattributesincludingethnicity,religion,language,andtribalaffiliation(orsocialrelationships)atagranularfamily-grouplevel.Fromthisfoundation,morecomplexanddynamicsocio-culturalrelationshipscanbeanalyzedandmapped,suchaspoliticalallegianceorproxyinfluence.Theapproachprovidescriticalcontextforunderstandinglocaldriversofconflict,particularlythefactorsthatmakegroupsvulnerabletoviolentextremistorganizations(VEOs).TherelationshipsandattributeswithinHumanGeographycanbeusedtoinvestigatecommunicationspatterns,motivations,allegiances,biases,anddecision-makingpatterns.Finally,therefugeeanddisplacementcrisisintheregiondemandsasignificantfocusonhumanitariandevelopmentinthepost-conflictplanning.Therelationshipsandpreserved


pre-migrationlocations(inadditiontocurrentlocations)arevaluableforrebuildingandstabilizationeffortsintheregion.

ToconsidertheHumanGeography,startbyexaminingasinglefamilygroup(definedastheextendedfamilythatmightgatheratareunion).AnindividualDa’eshmembercanbeassociatedtothatfamilygroupthroughresearch.Thatfamilygroupisthebasicunitwithinasocialhierarchy.Ithastheattributesofethnicity,languageandreligionthatcombineoverasharedhistorytoinformthatfamily’sidentity,itsvaluesandbeliefs.Itscollectivememorythatisconnectedthroughextendedfamilyandsocialrelationshipsacrossawidegeography.Socialcapitalamongsocialnetworkshashighvalue.Themappedrelationshipsdescribewhereallegianceisowed,inwhatdirection,andduetowhatlevelofinfluenceparticulargroupsorindividualshave.AsinFigure1(below),thatfamilygroupisvisualizedinrelationtoitslocation.Thatlocationhassignificance.Ithasahistory.Ithasschoolsandplacesofworshipandsitesofculturalsignificance.Thelocationhasalocaldialect.Ithasaspatialconnectiontootherfamilygroupswiththeirownattributestoexplore,theirownprominentindividualsandrelationships.Itisaboundedareafromwhichtocollectcommunications,understandlocalpatterns,connotations,andbuildcontext-specificmessaging.

Figure8. Thepro- ISILgroupsarehighl ighted inpurple. Thegreenpolygonsrepresent thehighlydiversearea. For example,mostof thegreenpolygonshave familygroupsor c lansthat areShi ’aandhaveapro-Governmentallegiance. Theredpolygon is aSunni Clan.


Therearehundredsofpro-ISILfamilygroups,clans,sub-tribes,andtribesconnectedtolocationsacrossSyriaandIraq.Ateachone,theattributesofthatfamilygroupofferinsightintothegroup’spast,itsvalues,grudges,biases,anddispositiontotrust.Socialconnectionsinthisareaoftheworldarevital.Theysupportbusinesstransactionsmaintaininglocaleconomiesandsustainalliancesforgenerations.Thebasicunitsofeconomyandsocialfunctionarecapturedinthenetworkofsocialrelationshipsfromfamilytoclantotribe.Additionally,prominentindividualsateachlevelofthesocialhierarchyaredescribedinthisapproach.Theseindividualslendinfluencetoparticulargroupsandareimportantmodelsofstrategiccommunicationswithintheculture.Forexample,ifacertainclanhasmanyprominentfigures,suchastribalsheikhsorgovernmentministers,thisclanwouldbemoreinfluentialamongotherclanswithinitstribe.

Whenanalyzingcommunicationsordirectlyengaging,thesedetailswillassistindevelopingmessagingandleveragingkeyrelationshipsforstabilizationefforts.

ApplyingHumanGeographyAnalysistoDa’eshContextPlacingDa’eshmemberswithintheirHumanGeography–asetofrelationshipsincludingethnicity,religion,language,tribe,clan,familygroup,politicalorothernetworkaffiliations,andlocation—offersseveralavenuestopursueanalysisandunderstandthree(3)keyconcernsfordegradingtheirinfluenceandcapabilitiesinordertostabilizetheregion.

1. HowcanDa’eshmembersbereframedforpost-conflictengagement?Inordertomoveforward,redefiningDa’eshmembersbynon-extremistcharacteristics.Characteristicsofidentityareaccessiblethroughtherelationshipstheyhavetofamily,clan,tribe,location,history,andsocio-culturalcontext.

2. AddressinggrievancesofthelocalpopulationfromthegroundupmakesconditionslessfavorableforVEOs.Thisconflicthasdisplacedlargegroupsofpeople.Retracingsocialgrouprelationshipsandunderstandingsocio-culturalclaimstolocationswillbeofvalueinrebuildingandresettlement.

3. Engagingwithlocalpopulationsandaportionofpost-Da’eshmemberstoarriveatpoliticalresolutionthroughculturalandcontext-specificpersuasionmechanisms.

Figure9.Thetribalfootprint.ofextendedfamilyandclanrelationshipstothefamilygroupabove.Thisisapro-ISILtribewith108familygroupsand27ProminentIndividuals


HumanGeographyasFoundationtoSynthesizeStabilizationInpreviousconflictsinvolvingterroristorganizations,suchasinColombiawiththeFARCorinNorthernIrelandwiththeIRA,therewasapoliticalaimbecausetheterrorismtargetedaparticulargovernment.Andinbothcases,theendtotheviolentconflictinvolvedashifttopoliticalengagement(Ramsbothamet.al,2016).Inthiscase,whileDa’eshmadesomemovementtowardcreatingaState,itsprimaryobjectiveshavenotbeentoalterpoliticalpolicies.Apost-conflictapproachwillnecessarilyneedtoinvolvethelocalpopulationswhereitisanticipatedthatthesefighterswillreturninordertodevelopapost-ISILtransitionthatshiftsfromviolencetopoliticalengagementaroundaplatformthatislocally-driven.UnderstandingtheHumanGeographyisessentialforgaugingthedispositionofthepopulationandplanningforpost-conflictrebuilding.Thelackofprecedenceandinherentcomplexitiesnecessitateamulti-modalapproachtostabilization.

1. Whatarethelocalsympathies?AndhowwasthelocalpopulationaffectedbyDa’eshduringthecourseoftheconflict?HowareDa’eshleadersperceivedbyclanleadersinareaswhereformerDa’eshmembersmightreintegrate,seekrefuge,resources,recruits,etc.?HumanGeographyanalysisoffersinsightintogranularallegiances,overlapofevents(attacks)andpopulationattributes,andcurrentlocationsofvarioustypesofsocio-cultural,religious,andpoliticallyalignedorinfluencedgroups.

a. Usingasampleofseveralprominentindividualsidentifiedthroughtheironlineactivityaspro-ISIL,theradiusandreachoftheirinfluencewasobservedbyfollowingtherelationshippathsoftheirtribalconnectionstootherlocationsacrossthegeography,thenobservingonlinecommunicationsfromotherassociatedgroupsthattheycouldinfluence.Thetoneandthemesofthecommunicationsatvariouspointswithintheradiusofinfluencewerenoted.Performedoverthespanofpro-ISILterritory,withseveralthousandprominentindividuals,resultsindicatethestrengthoftribalconnectionstodriveallegiancevs.moreidiosyncraticorothervariables.

2. Whatisthelocalconceptofreconciliation,justice,andtrust-buildingthatshouldbeattheforefrontofanydialogorapproach?Withcommunicationsanalysisordirectengagement,cantheseculturallyspecificandculturallyacceptedconceptsbeintegratedintoapproach?HumanGeographyanalysiscaptureslocaldialect,attributesthatindicatecontextandconnotation,andrelevantsocio-culturalfactors.Itcansupportbothnarrativeanalysisand

Figure10. Neighboringfamilygroups,oneShi ’aoneSunni in theAlAnbarProvince. The ‘fuzzy’buffer aroundthepolygonindicatesthe fuzziness of thehumangeographyfootprint. I thasseveral appl icationsincludingradiusof influence forprominent individuals andcatchmentarea for communicationsanalys is that re lies onhumanboundaries ra ther than lat/ long. In this case, theyoverlap.


directengagementatlocalornationallevels.Themesofparticularinterestwouldindicatethepresenceoffeardrivingtheadoptionofmessageswithinalocation,somethingthatmighthappenwithahigherspeedorurgencyvs.otherthemesthataremoreconsistentlypresentwithinthecommunityandarestrongerindicatorsoveroverallallegiance,motivation,anddisposition.(Sutherlin,2015)

3. Selectionof‘off-ramp’modelsbasedoncultural‘touchstones’forDa’eshmembers.These‘touchstones’willincludeculturallyspecific,triballyrelevant,orgenerationallymeaningfulreferencesthatholdsignificanceforgroupmembers.Theycanbecomefolkloricorsimplybeasharednarrativethatmayfeedbiasesordefineidentityroles.Theknownlocations,socio-culturalattributes,andrelationshipscanbeusedtodiscoverculturallyrelevanthistoryandresonantnarratives--touchstones.Thiswillincreaselikelihoodofsuccessinde-escalationactivities,trust-building,andpersuasionbasedonculturallydeterminedreward/punishmentconcepts.

ConclusionStabilizingtheregionanddegradingISILwillbeaninternationaleffortwithgeopoliticalandlargenetworkengagements.Ultimately,theactivitiesproposedherewillhaveanimpactforfamiliesandtheirhomesonthegroundinSyriaandIraq;therefore,theperspectivesandprioritiesofthesepopulationsshouldbeforegroundedinanyapproach,includingtheinvolvementofkeystakeholdersfromtheearliestpossiblephase,tolaythegroundworkandbuildpartnershipsforthelong-termstabilizationprocess.Ramsbotham,O.,Woodhouse,T.,&Miall,T.(Eds.).(2016).ContemporaryConflictResolution:Theprevention,managementandtransformationofdeadlyconflict.4thedition.Cambridge,UK:Polity.Sutherlin,G.(2015).EmergingTechnologies:culturalconceptsinICTdesignforconflictcontexts.Uganda:Voices:JusticeandReconciliationProjectMagazine.

16.11 options to facilitate socio-political stability...

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