1409_aq_is

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www.othersolutions.eu

Al-Qaeda & Islamic State:

Friends or Foe?

To the left: Al-Zawahiri (leader of AQ), to the right: Al-Baghdadi (leader of IS)

September 2014

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 3

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

2. Overview of Al-Qaeda ..................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1 History/etymology................................................................................................................................... 5

2.2 2011 - Present ....................................................................................................................................... 5

2.3 The Importance of the Syrian Civil War in the AQ/IS split ...................................................................... 6

3. Overview of the Islamic State ......................................................................................................................... 8

3.1 Etymology .............................................................................................................................................. 8

3.2 Origins and Goals .................................................................................................................................. 8

3.3 Strategy .................................................................................................................................................. 9

3.4 Weaponry ............................................................................................................................................... 9

3.5 Economic ............................................................................................................................................. 10

4. AQ and IS Leadership .................................................................................................................................. 11

4.1 AQ's remaining leadership ................................................................................................................... 11

4.2 IS Leadership ....................................................................................................................................... 13

4.3 Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi vs Al-Zawahiri .................................................................................................. 15

5. Disagreements and Regional Perspectives .................................................................................................. 16

5.1 Ideological/strategic ............................................................................................................................. 16

5.2 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................................... 17

5.3 Regional Positions – Global Jihad ....................................................................................................... 17

5.4 Regional Positions – Nation States ...................................................................................................... 20

5.5 Future Risk and Regional Cooperation ................................................................................................ 22

6. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 23

Sources ................................................................................................................................................................. 24

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have reached the zenith of global terrorism. Both groups are found to be at the epicentre of security debates particularly in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa region. But even though IS initially started off as ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ in 2004, it has developed and emerged as a potential rival for the leadership of radical jihadists across the Muslim world. The focus of the present report is the schism that has happened between the two entities.

Al-Qaeda operates as a network involving multinational, stateless forces united under a common, radical Wahhabi Muslim movement calling for global Jihad, in particular against the United States and its Western and Middle-Eastern allies, with the eventual aim of recreating a Caliphate under a strict interpretation of sharia law. AQ transformed post-9/11 as an ideological - rather than operational - network affiliated to numerous franchises, in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Sahel region. As such, the group has successfully launched a global ‘war of terror’ against Western powers and had a distinct involvement in the Arab spring. Ayman Al-Zawahiri took over its leadership following the killing of Osama Bin Laden by U.S. Special Forces, and even though he is respected within the Jihadi circles for his own achievements and ‘knowledge’ of Islam, he is handicapped by his lack of charisma and limited operational experience compared to renown predecessor.

Following tensions and even armed conflict between two Al-Qaeda branches in the Middle-East (Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and the then Islamic State of Iraq), Al-Zawahiri publicly disavowed any relations with the latter in February 2014. A few months later, this same group changed its name to Islamic State (IS), self-proclaimed the (re)creation of a Caliphate, and announced that its leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi presented himself as Caliph on the 29th of June 2014.

The strategic competence of the group has been displayed as large swathes of territory fell under their control in Northern Iraq and Syria during the past few months. The group has the ability to conduct sophisticated operations ranging from suicide attacks, car bombings, and even laying siege to several towns simultaneously. Moreover, IS also has a governance and social strategy which increases the effectiveness of their operations and have put differences aside with Sunni tribesman, sparking greater cooperation with local communities. When faced with reluctant communities, they have not hesitated to impose their leadership through brutal and well publicised force. IS’s advancements against the Iraqi military has given the group the opportunity to create a somewhat conventional army rather than just a simplistic guerrilla force. But their strength also lies in using digital communications in such a way that they have managed to build an idealised image of what the Islamic State is, which is potent to attract recruits and funding from all over the world.

The current report analyses the key leaders of both AQ and IS and underscores that while a few members of IS’s leaders were already operating under its ancestor Al-Qaeda in Iraq, many are former Iraqi army officers under Saddam Hussein decommissioned from the Iraqi army after U.S. forces arrived, and who joined the Sunni Muslim insurgents to fight the Americans. This has contributed to create a generational shift within the global Jihadi sphere, between those that fought during the 1980s Afghan jihad and those that fought during the Iraqi jihad of 2003-2010.

The fact that IS has captured an immense amount of land increasing their capabilities and following, has raised criticism over Zawahiri and his role as leader of global jihad. Nevertheless, AQ’s Egyptian leader is expected to have a bigger role in the radicalization of the Asia and of the Arab peninsula, particularly since the Islamic State has largely failed to convince jihadi scholars (let alone mainstream Muslims) that its Caliphate is grounded in religious legitimacy. Despite Baghdadi carrying out Bin Laden’s dream of establishing a Muslim Caliphate in the heart of the Middle East, there are distinct differences in the ideological practices of both groups, which the report reviews in detail.

While fighting among Jihadi groups may lead to fragmentation and lowering of the threat against West interests, , excessive jihadi competition can also produce greater risk to the U.S. and the West. Understanding the implications of the creation of the Caliphate by IS, one must focus upon other jihadist groups and their allegiances. The report summarizes the updated positions of numerous groups in this distinct rivalry and

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concludes that none of the official Al-Qaeda regional branches have sworn allegiance to Al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State. While IS certainly has supporters within all of Al-Qaeda's branches - particularly among disgruntled elements or lower-level foot soldiers - this support hasn't translated into a shifting of loyalties or widespread personnel defections. Altogether, it appears that the global Jihadi sphere is currently very dynamic and we anticipate much shifting of allegiances in the coming weeks and months.

To better contemplate the state of realpolitik in the Middle East, it is important to compare and contrast various perspectives about the growing threat of IS and their rivalry with AQ. The report than looks into the interests and actions of key regional states, including China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the U.S. with regard to these Jihadi factions. In the near future and as the dynamics evolve quickly in Iraq and Syria, the true capabilities of IS will be unveiled. In particular, observers will look at its capacity to govern and hold territory while also fighting a multiplicity of enemies on all possible fronts. What is made clear is that if IS becomes a permanent reality, it will possibly continue to attract a massive wave of foreign jihadists creating a Sunni terrorist heaven in the Iraq and the wider Levant. The Iraqi authorities and all parties with vested interests will have to cooperate to tackle the largest existential threat presently in the region.

The AQ / IS split has created a distinct fragmentation in global jihad and will potentially continue doing so increasing the possibility of complete and more direct overthrow of AQ in the Islam area of influence. The risk of a sustainable Caliphate in Iraq and Syria can have a domino effect across the Muslim world from Indonesia to Nigeria as other groups strive to create their own sub-caliphates and emirates. The increasing alliances to IS are reflective of the rising popularity and legitimacy of Baghdadi as the new Caliph, even though none of the major Al-Qaeda regional players have sworn allegiance to IS, yet. AQ Central will nonetheless have to strengthen its ranks and reaffirm its regional alliance as well as forging new ones to compete against the ferocious wave of IS propaganda and efficacy, particularly in the Arab peninsula. In all cases, this inter-Jihadi rivalry will likely lead to further competition and efforts to outdo each other. With the potential for a spectacular attack against a Western power and further incursions against minorities in the region, the pivotal question at this point is whether countries will continue ceding power to these Islamist groups or push for more decisive action and cooperation?

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1. INTRODUCTION

Today, Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have reached the zenith of global terrorism. Both groups are found to be at the epicentre of security debates particularly in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa region. But even though IS initially started off as ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ in 2004, IS has developed and emerged as a potential rival for the leadership of radical jihadists across the Muslim world.

The focus of the present report is the schism that has happened between the two. For this, the paper will highlight the background of both organizations as well as the source of this apparent competition or rivalry between them. Differences will be evaluated under the premises of: ideology, strategy and leadership, focusing on disagreements between Bin Laden’s heir to AQ command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the IS Caliph Abu-Bakr Al Baghdadi.

Looking at the wider regional scenario, the positions of other jihadist groups (such as AQMI and JAN) as well as nation states (Saudi Arabia, U.S., China and others) will also be considered in order to contextualize the international community’s position in tackling terrorism across the Arab peninsula.

2. OVERVIEW OF AL-QAEDA

2.1 History/etymology

Al-Qaeda is a global militant Islamist group founded by Osama Bin Laden at the time of the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). The group’s name is in Arabic and translated in English means ‘The base’. Today, the organization operates as a network involving multinational, stateless forces united under a common, radical Wahhabi Muslim movement calling for global Jihad, in particular against the United States and its Western and Middle-Eastern allies, with the eventual aim of recreating a Caliphate under a strict interpretation of sharia law. Notoriously, the group under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden carried out several attacks against civilian and military targets in various countries, including the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 1998 U.S. embassies bombings in Dar El Salam and Nairobi and supported the 2002 Bali bombings. As the U.S. responded by launching their global war on terror leading to the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the group lost many members of its elite including Bin Laden himself (May 2, 2011). His right hand man Ayman Al-Zawahiri took over the leadership on the same day; this was confirmed by a press release from al-Qaeda's general command on June 16. Although he is respected within the Jihadi circles for his own achievements and ‘knowledge’ of Islam, he is handicapped by his lack of charisma and limited operational experience compared to Bin Laden.

2.2 2011 - Present

The U.S.’s counter-terrorism offensives in Central Asia, Middle-East and Africa have undoubtedly diminished the size and resources of Al-Qaeda, while also provided further justification to those advocating for the Jihad against the West. The killing of Bin Laden by the U.S. Special Forces in Pakistan as the founder and charismatic leader of the group was a distinct blow to the organization; weakening the core of AQ. However in the post 9/11 world, AQ had already transformed as an ideological - rather than operational - network affiliated to numerous franchises, in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Sahel region. As such, the group has successfully launched a global war of terror against Western powers and had a distinct involvement in the Arab spring.

There is an apparent controversy when attempting to define the current potency of Al-Qaeda and which group can actually be considered part of the Jihadist organization. Al-Qaeda itself continues to be subordinate to Mullah

“Sheikh Osama Bin Laden gathered all the mujahedeen with one word, but you [the Islamic State] divided them and tore them apart.”

- Al Adnani, 2014

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Omar, leader of the Taliban, through a loyalty oath from Bin Laden to Mullah Omar, which was reaffirmed several times in the recent months by Al-Qaeda's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Many policymakers tend to over exaggerate AQ as the ultimate mastermind behind Salafi Jihadism whilst others tend to portray an image of a diminishing AQ; lacking the capabilities and reach it did a decade ago. However, despite the death of Bin Laden, the effective use of drone strikes by the U.S. against AQ across the world, and the multiple arrests of AQ operatives, the group remains a viable threat to the West’s security. The anti-Western message passed by AQ central (AQC) has indeed taken global proportions starting or feeding local franchises all over the Muslim world. Groups such as Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in Iraq are existing examples of this form of exported or renewed terrorism.

The coordination and involvement level of AQ central with its affiliates is often over exaggerated as the latter actually have a large degree of autonomy within their localities. The role of Al-Zawahiri is strategically and ideologically significant, but AQC bears little power over the operations and activities of these franchised groups. This is all the more true that Al-Zawahiri appears to be struggling to even communicate with the different franchises. Indeed, although individual instances of contact have certainly occurred, Zawahiri's response times have not been adequate to address the growing number of crises faced by AQ and its affiliates on the global stage. In saying this, and regardless of AQ’s actual operation capabilities and command and control over its affiliates, AQ’s messages have left a legacy that acts as a global security threat for decades to come. For this reason and even if AQ has been recently eclipsed in the media by the IS, it is a force to count on for the foreseeable future.

2.3 The Importance of the Syrian Civil War in the AQ/IS split

In April 2013, the leader of the then Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, released a recorded audio message on the Internet, in which he announced that Jabhat al-Nusra, understood to be an Al-Qaeda offshoot in Syria, was merged with ISI to become the "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham." (ISIS). This was promptly rejected by Abu Mohammed Al-Julani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, who affirmed the group's allegiance to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Nonetheless, there were media reports that many of Al-Nusra's foreign fighters had left to join al-Baghdadi's ISIS, while many Syrian fighters left the group to join other Islamist brigades. In June 2013, Al Jazeera reported that it had obtained a letter written by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, addressed to both Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Mohammad Al-Julani, in which he ruled against the merger of the two organisations and appointed an emissary to oversee relations between them and put an end to tensions. Later in the same month, an audio message from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was released in which he rejected Zawahiri's ruling and declared that the merger of the two organizations into the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was going ahead. This sequence of events is said to have caused much confusion and division amongst members of Al-Nusra. This led Al-Qaeda to publicly disavow any relations with ISIS in February 2014. Shortly after, Zawahiri's representative in Syria, Abu Khalid Al-Suri, was killed in a suicide bombing in Aleppo. Open fighting soon broke out between ISIS and Al-Nusra, leaving hundreds dead on both sides.

In an unexpected and unprecedented turn of events, jihadists worldwide have openly criticised Al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and called for his removal. Yet although several Jihadi groups as well as thousands of Jihadists from all groups have joined the Islamic State, the major official Al-Qaeda affiliates, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, mostly in Yemen), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, mostly in North Africa), Al-Shabab (mainly in Somalia), and Al-Nusra Front (in Syria), have re-stated their allegiance to Al-Zawahiri.

These past few months, we witnessed a spate of splits within well-established groups (for instance within AQIM or the Pakistani Tehreek-i-Taliban), the creation of a new Al-Qaeda faction (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, announced early September 2014), the announcement of a completing (or competing?1) caliphate by the Nigerian Boko Haram, the rhythm of events is indeed accelerating in the global Jihadi sphere.

1 In a July 2014 video, Shekau voiced support for the leader of the Islamic State, but there was no indication from Shekau in

the latest video (August 2014) that he was associating himself with Baghdadi. As such, it was not clear if Shekau was declaring himself to be a part of Baghdadi's call or if he was referring to a separate Nigerian caliphate. In the 19th century, a Sokoto.

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Map (2014) illustrating presence of Al-Qaeda in the Middle East.

Map showing Al-Qaeda’s global presence2

2 Note that Al-Zawahiri also announced in September 2014, the creation of Al-Qaeda in India.

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3. OVERVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

3.1 Etymology

The Islamic State, previously known as ‘ISIS’ (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham) is an unrecognised country and an active militant jihadist group established in predominantly Sunni regions in northern Iraq and Syria3. The group has also been regularly changing its denomination (and acronyms), and was previously known by the names of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in addition to its Arabic acronym: ‘DAISH’ [al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām]. Its most recent name change to the Islamic State (IS) was most probably done in an effort to communicate effectively its existential objective of creating a land governed under (a radical Wahhabi interpretation of) Islam rather than narrowing it down to a certain region or country. At the same time, the group self-proclaimed the recreation of a Caliphate, and as such, claims authority over the entire Muslim world. The symbolic impact of reviving the memory of a glorified Islamic empire also known as the Caliphate is another method to win over the hearts and minds of young Muslims across the globe. The motto of the group: Remaining and Expanding [baqayyah wal tammadod] is also reflective of the organization’s aspirations to spread their caliphate beyond the Levant and Iraq.

3.2 Origins and Goals

The Islamic State started off as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarkawi (Jordanian) in October 2004. During this time AQI was supported by numerous Sunni jihadist groups in the region such as the Mujahideen Shura Council or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Additionally, there are a number of smaller scale militias predominantly made up of Iraqi tribesmen such as Jaysh al-Fatiheen, Jund al-Sahaba, Katbiyan Ansar al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, and Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura filled up its ranks.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 set the groundwork for Zarkawi and his men to propagate violence and dissent against the Western-led intervention as well as towards other local factions in the region. In addition to the war, it was also underlying social issues that contributed significantly towards the development of such radicalised militant groups throughout the northern region of Iraq. In particular, the economic and political discrimination targeting Sunni populations after the fall of Saddam Hussein led many of them to actively or tacitly support these AQ inspired militants, even as they attempted to ignite a sectarian war between Sunni and Shias. This was nearly achieved after the 2006 bombing attack upon Al-Askariya Mosque, an important Shia shrine in Samarra, Iraq. Despite Zarqawi, the mastermind behind the attacks being killed by the U.S. the same year, the threat of jihadism and sectarian warfare still loomed large. This was indicated by a former spokesman for the U.S. military in Iraq, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Buchanan who warned that "if the Iraqi security forces are not able to put pressure on them (the remaining AQ terrorists), they could regenerate”. Thus, the fallacies of the Iraqi government and the security vacuum that followed the departure of the last American forces from Iraq, became another important factor in the rise of IS in the region.

Another main catalyst for the creation and consolidation of IS was their participation in the Syrian civil war. In the on-going Syrian civil war, IS has had a large presence in the Syrian governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo.

As the membership of the group increased as well as their experience in tackling both other militant groups and the Syrian armed forces, IS essentially became ready to implement their plan of constructing a Caliphate. This can be understood by the sheer intimidation and strength displayed by the group, which has been largely broadcasted in recent months. It is during the Syrian Civil War, in February 2014, that the initial split between ISIS and AQ occurred changing the reality of ISIS as being simply a splinter faction of AQ.

Ideologically, the group is known for its ultra conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as well as its exterminating tendencies towards Shia, Christian populations and armed forces. The man leading this ideological menace is Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi who presented himself as Caliph Ibrahim on the 29th of June 2014. He

3 It is not the first time that a Jihadist group claims to have created an Islamic state. For instance in 2012, AQIM and its local

allies took control of northern Mali and attempted to create an Islamic state – but their effort was cut short by the French military intervention in January 2013.

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commands around ten thousands jihadists who have claimed responsibility for destroying government targets and causing mass civilian atrocities. The aim of the group is to create an Islamic state run under sharia law in Iraq and Syria but with the ambition of expanding well beyond.

3.3 Strategy

The strategic competence of the group has been displayed as Fallujah, Mosul and Nineveh fell under their control in spectacular fashion during the 2014 summer. As Western and regional analysts thought that IS’s conquest of Fallujah in January 2014 would be a unitary phenomenon, the group has clearly illustrated that they are focused on a rapid expansion, defying any governmental or other militant authority in their way. The group has the ability to conduct sophisticated operations ranging from suicide attacks, car bombings, and even laying siege to several towns simultaneously. This was exemplified through their attacks on the western province of Anbar which drew the Iraqi army away from the north. The offensive on several regions at once left the Iraqi army demoralised and unbalanced. This precise planning and execution has left regional and international observers concerned for the future, particularly regarding oil infrastructure in Mosul and other areas falling under IS control. The next strategic move of IS, was moving towards the resource rich Kurdish regions in Northern Iraq and Syria but their advances have been stopped by Kurdish Peshmergas allied with Iraqi forces and U.S. air support. Civilian population belonging to both Kurdish and Yezidi communities have been brought into a state of emergency as the threat of the expanding Caliphate grew. The latest updates concerning the struggle for “Kurdistan” will be discussed in more depth in the third section of the document.

Moreover, the group also has a governance and social strategy which increases the effectiveness of their operations. In both Syria and Iraq the group is attempting to govern the land under their control, to give justice, to provide social welfare to Sunni populations and occasionally distribute food, fuel, setting up clinics, and even creating recreational activities for children. This is a not a new strategy as other groups like Hamas or the Hezbollah have long been active proponents of “winning the hearts and minds” of the people, alongside frightening them to the ‘right path’. IS has nonetheless been quite pragmatic when governing the land it controls. It has for instance struck business deals with influential locals or supporters of Bashar Al-Assad; it also uses experts from overseas to manage technical areas such as Justice or telecommunications; they have also separated military operations from civilian administration, and Baghdadi has appointed civilian deputies called “walis.” Administrative regions are divided into waliyehs, or provinces, which, as with the case of the recently established al-Furat province, can span national boundaries. Fighters and employees receive a salary from a department called the Muslim Financial House, which is something like a finance ministry and a bank. IS invests also heavily in the next generation by inducting children into its ideology, and accepts women who want to fight or support the cause, including through “marrying” IS soldiers.

Baghdadi has also been more adamant about putting differences aside with Sunni Iraqi tribesman, sparking greater cooperation unlike his predecessor Zarkawi who alienated himself alongside AQI. Since they arrived in Syria, IS has been working on "marriages of alliance" in the tribal communities. They have been trying to arrange marriages between IS fighters and girls from the tribes, which means that in the long run those fighters would have a familial connection to the tribes, making it difficult for any internationally led military campaign to root them out. But the levels of entrenchment within the local communities vary considerably from one region to the other. There are areas where they are very well entrenched within local communities thanks to the connections, including business deals, they have actively set-up. In other areas, especially in and around Deir Ezzor in Syria, their military victories have been overwhelming, and their ability to beat local tribes – in a bloody and public way – has really frightened and terrified others.

3.4 Weaponry

IS’s advancements against the Iraqi military has given the group the opportunity to create a somewhat conventional army rather than just a simplistic guerrilla force. The opportunistic capture of equipment and large amounts of weaponry by IS militia, including US Humvees, has largely caught the world’s attention.

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IS has successfully acquired at least 30 T-55 Soviet made tanks in addition to 5 to 10 T-72 second generation Soviet tanks. As the group stormed Mosul they also acquired several U.S. made Humvees allowing for quick and efficient movement across rough terrain. Although IS does not have a weapon of choice, the AK-47 has become their standard assault rifle because of its low cost, durability, availability, and ease of use. More weaponry also includes the M79 Osa rocket Launcher, RBG – 6 Grenade Launcher and RPG -7’s. In terms of artillery the group has repossessed some M198 Howitzer’s, Type 591 Field Guns, ZU 23-2 Anti-Aircraft Guns, FIM-92 Stinger or similar MANPAD, HJ-8 and DShK 1938 Machine Guns. It is important to note that social media is used as part of the group’s ammunition.

Media savviness has been displayed by members conveying English and Arabic (but also Pashto, Dari and more) propaganda to spread knowledge of their ideology and activities. The recent stream of videos displaying the beheading of American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff and subsequent threat to the British ACTED-employed aid worker David Haines, captures the essence of the IS propaganda machine. While ‘traditional’ online propaganda tools used by Jihadists, and Al-Qaeda in particular, were often relying on password protected, moderated, forum, IS uses modern digital technology in a far more appealing way to the global connected-savvy youth. In addition to publishing regular magazines in various languages including English, it also includes numerous Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr and other less-known social networks. While some accounts are officials and managed by the well-organised IS equivalent of a Public Relations department, others are more personal as originating directly from fighters and supporters, including women. This peer-led approach, at times incongruous and funny, has allowed IS to reach beyond its usual channels. Prospective recruits can identify with the chatty, young jihadists, many of whom post messages saying how happy they are to be living in an Islamic land. Longer blogs and other sites of foreign fighters, give practical and motivational tips to reach Syria and join the fight. All of these materials serve both to attract would-be Jihadists to join the cause, and to shed light on the political and religious undertakings in the Islamic State, with the aim to of getting the support of the locals.

3.5 Economic

The financial needs of this group, just as any other terrorist or non-terrorist organisation, are a necessary component of its structure. A controversial question which remains is who is funding IS? The answer to this question is not simple due to the opaque nature of this process. There have been numerous claims that private Saudi donors have contributed to the growth of IS but there have been efforts by the Royal establishment to block such donations even if Riyadh could do much more to limit such private funds to reach IS. The global media largely reported that IS broke into several Iraqi banks during their blitzkrieg in Northern Iraq but it appears that the amounts stolen are not as high as initially shared.

In saying this, one should not underestimate the importance of considering IS’s independent and local sources of income. Primarily, the Islamic State’s strategic achievement has given the leaders control over their oil fields in Raqqa, as well as an additional 75,000 barrels per day in Deir Ezzor. Additionally, the recent capture of Mosul has meant that more productivity has been placed under the hands of these opportunistic Islamists. Other means for Baghdadi and his soldiers to acquire money is through extortion: demanding money from truck drivers, threatening to blow up businesses, robbing banks and gold shops etc. However, these outlaw-style tendencies are likely to reduce, as large scale territorial attacks have proven to be much more profitable for IS. The fact that the group was able to survive and prosper despite the toughest U.S. counterterrorism efforts, is a reflection of the efficiency of the group’s financial manoeuvres.

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Map displaying the Islamic State’s current operational presence – Sept 2014

4. AQ AND IS LEADERSHIP

4.1 AQ's remaining leadership

Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Ayman Al-Zawahiri was born in 1951 in the suburban neighbourhood of Maadi in Cairo, Egypt. He comes from a traditionally wealthy Egyptian family alongside his brother Mohamed Al-Zawahiri, and a twin sister, Heba Mohamed Al-Zawahiri. His father’s family mainly included doctors and scholars, a matter that encouraged young Ayman to pursue an education in medicine in Cairo University where he successfully completed his undergraduate studies as well as exceling academically by acquiring a master degree in surgery. As a youth Al Zawahiri travelled to the Balkans as well a South East Asia as part of the Red Crescent. Observing the hardship surpassed by thousands of Afghans, he supported the establishment of an Islamic government in the region. He also traveled to the U.S. in 1993 to raise money for Afghan children, further reflecting his humanitarian inclinations at the time. However during the 1990's this human approach to social problems was pivotal in founding the group Islamic Jihad in Egypt. His impact on global terrorism was illustrated by him being the number

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two - behind Bin Laden - in the 22 "most wanted list" announced by the U.S in 2001. Serving as Bin Laden’s right hand man, he is thought to be the group’s chief ideologue and believed by several experts to be the "operational brains" behind the 9/11 attacks in New York. On the 16th June 2011, few weeks after Bin Laden’s death, the surgeon was announced as the new leader of Al Qaeda. However, Zawahiri has been criticized by many experts for his inactive role post-2011 which will be discussed later in this document.

Nasser Abdul Karim Al-Wuhayshi

Al-Wuhayshi, a former private secretary to Osama Bin Laden, is the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which was formed in 2009 in a merger between two offshoots of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

U.S. officials suggest that he has recently been appointed as Al Qaeda's second-in-command - its "general manager" - by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, adding weight to claims that Al-Qaeda is reorienting from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to the Arab world. He is said to be only 36 years old. Al-Wuhayshi replaces "the Libyan", Abu Yahya Al-Libi, killed by a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan's north-west in June 2012.

Al-Wuhayshi, who is from the southern Yemeni governorate of Al Baida, spent time in religious institutions before travelling to Afghanistan in the late 1990s. He fought at the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, before escaping over the border into Iran, where he was eventually arrested. He was extradited to Yemen in 2003. In February 2006, Al-Wuhayshi and 22 other suspected Al-Qaeda members managed to escape from a prison in Sanaa. Among them were also Jamal Al-Badawi, the alleged mastermind of the USS Cole bombing, and Qasim Al-Raymi, AQAP's military commander. After their escape from prison, Wuhayshi and Raymi are said to have overseen the formation of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, which took in both new recruits and Arab fighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. The group claimed responsibility for two suicide bomb attacks that killed six Western tourists before being linked to the assault on the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008, in which 10 Yemeni guards and four civilians died. Four months later, Al-Wuhayshi announced in a video the merger of the Al Qaeda offshoots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia to form "Al Qaeda of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula" and his appointment as AQAP leader was later confirmed by Zawahiri. The group's first operation outside Yemen was carried out in Saudi Arabia in August 2009 against the kingdom's security chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, though he survived.

At home, Wuhayshi's group capitalised on Yemen's political turmoil to capture large regions of territory in 2011, only to be driven out of many areas in an army offensive in 2012. In 2013, the group has been blamed for a growing number of bombings targeting Yemeni security services.

Khalid Al-Habib

Khalid Al-Habib, thought to be either Egyptian or Moroccan, was identified in a November 2005 video as Al-Qaeda's field commander in south-east Afghanistan, while Abd Al-Hadi al-Iraqi was named as its commander in the south-west. In early 2006, Pakistani officials reported that Habib had died in a U.S. airstrike near the Afghan border, but have since retracted that claim, saying that no Al-Qaeda leaders died. He was described as Al-Qaeda's "military commander" in July 2008. U.S. military officials say he oversees Al-Qaeda's "internal" operations in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Habib may be operating under an assumed identity, according to some analysts. One of his nom-de-guerre is believed to be Khalid Al-Harbi.

Adnan Gulshair Al-Shukrijumah

Born in Saudi Arabia, Shukrijumah moved to the U.S. when his father, a Muslim cleric, took up a post at a mosque in Brooklyn. In the late 1990s, he became convinced that he had to participate in jihad in places like Chechnya and the Balkans, and left for training camps in Afghanistan. Shukrijumah has been named in a U.S. federal indictment as a conspirator in the case against three men accused of plotting suicide bomb attacks on New York's subway system in 2009. He is also suspected of having played a role in plotting Al-Qaeda attacks in Panama, Norway and the U.K.

Saif Al-Adel

An Egyptian in his late 40s or early 50s, Saif Al-Adel is the nom-de-guerre of a former Egyptian army colonel, Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi. He travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight Soviet forces with the mujahedeen. Adel was once Osama Bin Laden's security chief, and assumed many of military commander Mohammed Atef's

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duties after his death in a U.S. air strike in November 2001. He is suspected of being a member of the group which assassinated former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. In 1987, Egypt accused Adel of trying to establish a military wing of the militant Islamic group Al-Jihad, and of trying to overthrow the government. He is believed to have been involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa, training the Somali fighters who killed 18 US servicemen in Mogadishu in 1993, and instructing some of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Adel is believed to have fled to Iran with Suleiman Abu Ghaith and Saad Bin Laden, a son of the late Al-Qaeda leader. Abu Ghaith was arrested in Jordan and extradited to the U.S. in March 2013.Recent reports say Adel may have been released and made his way to northern Pakistan, along with Saad Bin Laden - but a report from 2011 suggested he had returned to Iran. The U.S. has offered up to $5m for information on his whereabouts.

Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud

Abdelwadoud, whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdel is a former science major at university and an infamous bomb-maker; Abdelwadoud is the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After completing university in 1995, Abdelwadoud joined the Armed Islamist Group (GIA as per its French acronym), a precursor to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC- French acronym) which shared its aim of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria. He is said to have become a member of the GSPC in 1998. He became leader of the GSPC in mid-2004, succeeding Nabil Sahraoui who got killed in a major army operation. In 2003, he was one of the main signatories announcing the principle of an alliance with Al-Qaeda. In January 2007, after the group had confirmed its allegiance to AQ, it announced it had changed its name to "Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb" to reflect its allegiance. Abdelwadoud said he had consulted Ayman Al-Zawahiri about the group's plans.

Months later, 33 people were killed in bomb attacks on official buildings in Algiers. Abdelwadoud allegedly supervised the operation. December 2007, twin car bombs killed at least 37 people in the capital. The ambitions of the group's leadership widened, and it subsequently carried out a number of attacks across North Africa. It also declared its intention to attack Western targets and send jihadists to Iraq. The group has also been involved in kidnapping foreigners predominantly of Western background or ethnicity.

In November 2012, Abdelwadoud appeared in a video praising his fighters and jihadist allies as "saviours" of the Mali's unity as they consolidated their hold on the country's north. Their territorial advance was only halted by the intervention of French forces.

4.2 IS Leadership

The following is an organogram published by The Telegraph, displaying the leadership and newly established ‘government’ of IS. While a few members of Jihadists that were already operating under Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s Zarqawi, many are former Iraqi army officers under Saddam Hussein decommissioned from the Iraqi army after U.S. forces arrived, and who joined the Sunni Muslim insurgents to fight the Americans. This has contributed to create a generational shift within the global Jihadi sphere, between those that fought during the 1980s Afghan jihad and those that fought during the Iraqi jihad of 2003-2010. There are reportedly approximately 1000 medium and top level field commanders, who all have technical, military and security experience.

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Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Characterised by the Times as ‘the world’s most dangerous man’ and ‘the new Bin Laden’ to Le Monde, the man in the forefront of this infamous organisation is Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, more commonly known as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Born a Sunni in 1971 in Samarra, he is a man from a religious family and his brothers and uncles include preachers and professors of the Arabic language. He himself acquired a doctorate from the University of Baghdad focusing upon Islamic studies. Later, as a lecturer and an Imam at mosques in Baghdad and Fallujah, he was detained by American forces in 2005 for his attempt of mounting a militant Islamic resistance movement. Arguably, this point marks the rise of the notorious Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi who allegedly received training and established links to AQ fighters during his stay at the Buqqa camp in southern Iraq. After his release three years later, he established the ‘Sunni Army’ militia and joined Al-Qaeda. By 2010 he had become so well respected amongst his peers that he gained control of AQI after the death of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, successor of Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi.

His reputation as a fearless leader is further exacerbated by his shrewd strategical prowess which has further enthralled his followers to the cause. Most importantly, it is his clandestine nature that creates a sense of mystery and unpredictability in his actions. The mystery surrounding Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - at the level of his personality, his movements, or even his relatives, his family, and those close to him - came as a result of what happened to previous leaders, who were killed after their movements were detected. In this way it can be understood that the newly (self-)declared Caliph of IS has learnt from the mistakes of his predecessors, and apart from his recent public appearance when announcing the Caliphate, can be characterised as an “invisible yet charismatic jihadist” that has succeeded in avoiding the limelight for a sustainable period of time, through which he has gained the respect and following of thousands of radical Islamist fighters. It is also to be mentioned that traditionally the Caliph is descended from Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe who Baghdadi actually claims to be from, adding further legitimacy to his self-proclamation as the Caliph.

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Abu Salah Abu Salah is an alias of Muafaq Mustafa Mohammed al-Karmous. He is in charge of general finances for IS. However his background is unclear to a great extent.

Abu Muslim Al-Turkmani Al-Turkmani is the Caliph’s right hand man. Fadel Ahmad Abdullah Al Hiyali is his government name: He has been appointed the emir of the Islamic State, charged with overseeing the Iraqi provinces of the Caliphate. He is one of the most experienced and important members of Baghdadi’s Council.

Abu Ayman Al-Iraqi Al-Iraqi is one of the principal leaders of the Islamic and a member of the organisation’s military council. He previously worked as a colonel in the Iraqi air defence intelligence under Saddam Hussein, during which time he was nicknamed Abu Muhannad Al-Suweidawi. He was detained for three years in 2007. Following his release, he moved to Syria and is currently commanding IS fighters in Aleppo and the mountains of Latakia. As displayed by the organogram he is currently one of the chief governors in IS

Abu Abdulrahman Al-Bilawi Al-Bilawi was one of the four members of the ISIS military council and former head of the group’s Shura council. Hailing from Al Khalidiya in Iraq’s Anbar province, he was detained on Jan. 27, 2005 in the American military detention centre, Camp Bucca. He was later killed in Al Khalidiya, Anbar. His real name was Adnan Ismael Najm. His vast experience as a seasoned fighter and ex- military man made him a vital component of the IS terrorist leadership. Haji Bakr Bakr was a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s army, charged with handling the development of weapons. He was later imprisoned at Camp Bucca and joined al-Qaeda after his release. Bakr was reportedly the strongest ISIS commander in Syria up until his recent death. His original name was Samir Abd Mouhammad Al Khleifawi. Abu Fatima Al-Jaheishi Al-Jaheishi was initially in charge of the ISIS operations in southern Iraq before he moved to the northern city of Kirkuk. His government name is Ni'ma Abd Nayef al-Jabouri. Presently as shown by the organogram he is one of IS’s appointed governors.

4.3 Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi vs Al-Zawahiri

Given the similarities in origins, goals and leadership of IS and AQ, one may wonder what sparked the schism between ISIS and AQC? As seen earlier in this report, the initial fallout between the two groups occurred as Al-Zawahiri sent a letter requesting ISIS to leave Syria and focus on Iraq. It is most likely that Zawahiri wanted to contain Baghdadi’s group as well as minimize the possibility of confrontation with JAN in the future. Trying to act as a mediator and leader in the Levant region, Zawahiri failed to influence Baghdadi and his men. ISIS ignored this demand leading to a public repudiation by Al-Qaeda which disaffiliated itself with the group. Statements in February 2014 made by AQ emphasized the brutal nature of ISIS and the violence targeting other Muslims jihadists and factions. In turn, ISIS directly challenged AQ by stating that Zawahiri and his soldiers had essentially abandoned their efforts of jihad in the Levant. IS’s spokesman Al-Adnani called upon all Salafi jihadist groups in the region to swear allegiance to IS and the new caliph Al Baghdadi.

ISIS “is not a branch of the Al-Qaeda group… Does not have an organizational relationship with it and AQ is not the group responsible for their action.”

- Al-Qaeda Central

Command,

February 2014

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The fact that IS has captured an immense amount of land increasing their capabilities and following has raised criticism over Zawahiri and his role as leader of global jihad. Criticism revolved around his cautious and uncharismatic leadership that has failed to become the popular figure Bin Laden was amongst radical Islamic circles. To many, Zawahiri has been holed up in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and hasn’t really done very much more than issue a few statements and videos. Whereas Baghdadi has done an amazing amount - he has captured cities, he has mobilized huge amounts of people, and is killing ruthlessly throughout Iraq and Syria, all aspects that contribute to the current attraction for thousands of would-be jihadists across the world. The cult around Baghdadi, also brilliantly constructed through skilful use of online social media, has possibly surpassed the competence of a wearing Zawahiri that could not control his rogue commander. In June 2013, Baghdadi’s statement “I chose the command of God over the command that runs against it in the letter,” portrays the

man’s strong sense of independence and his lack of willingness to follow AQ command. Al-Zawahiri’s deafening silence since the self-proclamation of the Caliphate, has left little to be said with regard to AQ influence and allegiances in the region.

Nevertheless, AQ’s Egyptian leader is expected to have a bigger role in the radicalization of the Asia and of the Arab peninsula, particularly since the Islamic State has largely failed to convince jihadi scholars (let alone mainstream Muslims) that its caliphate is grounded in religious legitimacy. If this is not the case, then his place in the upper echelons of Al-Qaeda and global jihad will be seriously put to question or further challenged. U.S. intelligence officials have claimed that IS are recruiting fighters from other Zawahiri affiliates, including al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch and the Somali-based Al-Shabab. These newly established alliances increase the likelihood that Al-Baghdadi has surpassed the international clout and prestige of Al-Zawahiri. Thus, in this hour it seems to be that the true heir to Osama Bin Laden may be IS’s leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi; a man who for some has displayed a more violent and virulent personality than Bin Laden himself.

5. DISAGREEMENTS AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

5.1 Ideological/strategic

After the lightning-fast capture of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, in June 2014 by the Islamic State, the world has been trying to understand it. This puritanical faction of Sunni Muslim extremists appears to be on the same page ideologically as Al-Qaeda. But their leader has defied AQ by naming himself Caliph, head of a self-declared Islamic state that demands allegiance from all Muslims, and attempts to seize control of the global jihad movement.

Despite Baghdadi carrying out Bin Laden’s dream of establishing a Muslim Caliphate in the heart of the Middle East, there are two distinct differences in the ideological practices of both groups. Firstly, IS and its predecessors have targeted Shiite Muslims and even fellow Sunnis in ways that AQ finds to be unacceptable and counterproductive. Secondly, the group has rejected a key ideological point that forms the basis for war against the West and the Arab autocrats espoused by Osama Bin Laden and his successor Ayman Al-Zawahiri. AQC believes that a Caliphate will emerge only after the wider Muslim world has been purified and that establishing it requires a social consensus. Therefore both groups in essence want the same thing - a pure Islamic state purged of what each of them views as the corrupting influence of the West. But IS is willing to enforce this idea without a

“[AQ] never recognized the Islamic State to begin with, although America, Britain and France acknowledge its existence... should we consult those who abandon us? Those who have betrayed us? Those who have disowned us and incited against us?”

- IS commander Al –

Shami, June 2014

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social consensus and on a much shorter notice than AQ. Al-Baghdadi and his men are seemingly using extreme forms of violence to drive out the “impure” and to rapidly establish their Caliphate.

5.2 Capabilities

IS has indeed been able to accomplish an enormous feat in a short period of time. And in global reach, fundraising and pure operational ability, they are certainly outpacing Zawahiri’s Al-Qaeda. Despite AQ being able to engage in strikes and bombings pre-September 11, what IS has now is more significant and varied that what AQ had in terms of its actual combat capabilities, in particular when analysing their possession of heavy artillery, territorial control and localized funding base. In terms of funding IS does not depend on individual funds and fortune as AQ did in respect to Bin Laden’s wealth, but rather has multiple financiers and has gathered millions worth of American weaponry and technology in Iraq. Additionally, their control of vast land masses has permitted their use of natural resources such as oil to fund their Caliphate. AQ simply does not possess the technology IS has at the moment.

In terms of governance IS also seems to be more effective than the original AQ in Afghanistan. It has an almost obsessive level of bureaucracy, account-keeping and centrally controlled but locally implemented military-political coordination. But unlike AQ, it has also developed an increasingly efficient model of governance, capable of simultaneously implementing medieval justice and a whole range of modern social services. Moreover, IS possesses the social networking that enables the group to reach a much larger audience than AQ. Nevertheless, the group is actually working of the global networks AQ built, so it is not developing from scratch but rather trying to dominate the franchise AQ envisioned. In this manner, AQ affiliates and independent jihadist groups will have to choose to support and join the Islamic State or oppose it. It is likely that once the dust has settled in Northern Iraq and Syria, we will find two competing international jihadist representatives: Al Qaeda with a more locally focused and gradual approach to success, and the Islamic State, with a hunger for rapid results and total hostility for competition. Fighting among Jihadi groups are positive for counterterrorism as infighting burns up resources, turns off donors and reduces foreign fighter recruitment flows. In contrast however, excessive jihadi competition can also produce greater risk to the U.S. and the West. If resources to both Al-Qaeda and IS remain constant, due to an unending Syria and Afghanistan conflicts for example, competing jihadi networks may present a most dangerous scenario where competition for notoriety and resulting perceived gains in manpower and resources push groups to seek more spectacular attacks on the West to demonstrate their prowess and assert their dominance.

5.3 Regional Positions – Global Jihad

Understanding the implications of the creation of the Caliphate by IS, one must focus upon other jihadist groups and their allegiances. The tables below summarize the updated positions of numerous groups in this distinct rivalry.

AQC Affiliates

Name Leader Area(s) of Operation

Year of Creation

Allegiance to…

Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]

Nasser Abdul Karim Al-Wuhayshi

Yemen

2009-Present

“If it be by the command of Allah, then await (the announcement of) the Islamic State of Iraq, Ash-Sham and the (Arabian) Peninsula. Whether it be from your tomorrow or after it, or be it from any sky which gives you shade or from any land which holds you.” Sheikh Makmun Hatim, spokesman of AQAP,July 2014. Nasser Abdul Karim Al-Wuhayshi, the leader of the group is known to be the ‘general manager’ of AQC and AQAP traditionally follows

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AQC. Thus this can be considered a message of empathy and support to IS rather than allegiance.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM]

Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel

Algeria

1998- Present

[We] "confirm that we still adhere to our pledge of allegiance to our sheikh and emir, Ayman Al Zawahiri, since it is a Sharia-accorded pledge of allegiance that remains hanging on our necks, and we do not see what requires use to break it.” July 2014 – despite conflicting information and an earlier rumours considering them to have aligned with IS, the group reaffirmed their support to Zawahiri’s AQC.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Asim Umar

Indian sub-continent

2014

Little information is available on the men who lead the new organisation, but are believed to be Pakistani nationals serving with Al-Qaeda’s command in that country. Ayman Al-Zawahari announced the formation of this new AQ wing the 4th of September 2014.

Al Shabab

Sheikh Ahmad Umar, a.k.a. Abu Ubaidah

Somalia / Kenya

2006 -Present

Less than one week after Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in an American airstrike in Somalia, the group has named a new emir and reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda.

Jabhat Al Nusra [JAN]

Abu Muhammad Al-Julani

Syria

2011-Present

“The sons of Al Nusra Front pledge allegiance to Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri," 2013 statement – allegiance to Al-Qaeda. This group is the only direct affiliate of AQ in Syria and was involved in the root of disputes between AQ and IS. The group remains in conflict with Baghdadi and his men and has aligned with other local jihadist particularly in the north of Syria to retaliate against IS dominance.

IS Affiliates


Year of Creation

Allegiance to…

Al-Qaeda in Lebanon

Abu Sayyaf al-Ansari

Lebanon

2011-present

“We pledge allegiance to [ISIS chief] Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Qurshi Al-Baghdadi to listen and obey…. We ask [Baghdadi] to reactivate its [ISIS] cells in Lebanon to carry on with jihadist [operations] that have intimidated America”. This statement was circulated in January 2014.

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the Abu Sayyaf rebels [BIFF]

N/A

Philippines Barangay Ganta,

Shariff Saydona Mustapha,Maguindan-ao

2008-Present

“We have an alliance with ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," BIFF spokesman Abu Misry Mama, August 2014.The group is believed to have a few hundred fighters, has rejected the peace talks and pursued the decades-old armed campaign to establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines.

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Jemaah Islamiyah [JI] / Mujahedeen Council

Abu Bakar Baasyir

Indonesia/ Malaysia/ Singapore

2008- Present

Leader swore his allegiance to IS and Baghdadi in prison. Preformed traditional ritual to symbolize binding force between his jihadist wing in Indonesia and IS in Iraq and Sham. Thousands of Muslim conservatives in Indonesia have followed up this statement by expressing their liking towards IS.

The Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad

Unknown

Jordan

Unknown

In a statement, the Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad, the youth wing of Jordan’s hard-line Salafist movement, denounced leading Al Qaeda clerics Abu Mohammad Al Maqdissi and Abu Qatada as “illegitimate”, pledging heir full support for the Islamic State and its recently announced caliphate.

Tehreek-e-Khilafat Group

Muhammad Omar

Pakistan

2002- Present

Has become the first in the region to break ranks and declare allegiance to the Islamic State in July 2014. The group is not very well known but has been the cause of several attacks in the Karachi region.

Unclear


Year of Creation

Remark

Ansar Bait Al Maqdis [ABM] aka Ansar Jerusalem

Ibrahim Mohamed Fareg

Shady Al Menaie?

Egypt/Sinai

2011- Present

The group has released videos stating their allegiance to AQ as well as using their flag symbolically to illustrate the group’s presence in Sinai. Some have suggested that the group is also supporting the action of IS, extending respect and appreciation to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while not subsuming itself under his Caliphate, if not openly rejecting it.

Ansar Al-Islam [AI]

Sheikh Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibrahim

Iraq / Kurdistan

2011

AI has a history of conflict with ISIS and its predecessor, AQI. AI has attempted to repair relations with ISIS since 2012, but to no avail. AI even contacted Al-Zawahiri, for assistance against ISIS; Zawahiri offered no help even though he has spoken out for other groups, including al-Nusra, against ISIS.

Ansar Al-Sharia

Abu Iyad al Tunisi

Tunisia

2011

Leader first announced his support for both the ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front (“Al-Qaeda in Syria”) but then denied rumors that it had joined IS's enterprise, and reposted on its official Facebook page AQIM's statement condemning the caliphate announcement.

Boko Haram

Abubakr Shekau

Nigeria

2002- Present

In a July 2014 video, Shekau voiced support for the leader of the Islamic State, but there was no indication from Shekau in the latest video (August 2014) that he was associating himself with Baghdadi. As such, it was not clear if Shekau was declaring himself to be a part of Baghdadi's call or if he was referring to a separate Nigerian caliphate. In the 19th century, a Sokoto caliphate was proclaimed across most of modern-day northern Nigeria and was considered separate from other Islamic kingdoms,

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such as the Ottoman Empire.

Hezb-e-Islami

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Afghanistan / Pakistan

1976

Commander Mirwais said in September 2014 that if IS proved a true Islamic caliphate, they would link up with it. “We are waiting to see if they meet the requirements for an Islamic caliphate. If we find they do, we are sure that our leadership will announce their allegiance to them.” The leader Hekmatyar publicly denies any ties to Al-Qaida or the Taliban.

Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP]

Mullah Fazlullah

Afghanistan / Pakistan

2007

TTP has strong links to al-Qaeda but in July 2013, TTP reportedly responded positively to a call by ISIS to send fighters.

Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan Jamat-ul Ahrar

Maulana Qasim Khorasani

Pakistan

2014

"IS is an Islamic Jihadi organisation working for the implementation of the Islamic system and creation of the Caliphate, we respect them. If they ask us for help, we will look into it and decide." Ehsanullah Ehsan, Spokesperson, September 2014. Yet, the TTP Jamat-ul Ahrar leader Khorasani has reportedly has strong links to Al Qaeda and Zawahiri.

As seen, none of the official Al-Qaeda regional branches have sworn allegiance to Al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State. It is to be noted that while IS certainly has supporters within all of Al-Qaeda's branches - particularly among disgruntled elements or lower-level foot soldiers - this support hasn't translated into a shifting of loyalties or widespread personnel defections.

Seeking to boost its influence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, a local cell with allegiance to Islamic State has been recently distributing pamphlets in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and eastern Afghanistan. Islamic State's daring provocation may have prompted Al-Zawahiri to announce the establishment of an Indian affiliate to raise the flag of jihad across South Asia, home to more than 400 million Muslims. This example however, does not mean that the global Jihadi sphere will end up in a bipolar world, with AQ and IS each leading their camp. Indeed, it is likely that some groups will prefer to not have to choose in between AQ or IS, and may focus instead on fighting their Jihad at local/regional level only. Altogether, it appears that the global Jihadi sphere is currently very dynamic and we anticipate much shifting of allegiances in the coming weeks and months.

5.4 Regional Positions – Nation States

To better contemplate the state of realpolitik in the Middle East, it is important to compare and contrast various perspectives about the growing threat of IS and their rivalry with AQ. Understanding the interests and actions of key regional states with regard to these Jihadi factions can help elucidate upon possible future developments.

Syria

The Syrian government has generally refrained from attacking IS strongholds, as the group has damaged other rebel factions. Assad’s regime has been long suspected by other Arab countries, Western nations and various analysts to have supported IS in the region. IS’s control of oil fields has meant that the regime reportedly engages in transactions with the group inevitably funding their cause. However, the first attack by the Syrian Air force against IS was recorded in June 2014, sparking a possible change to the battle on the ground.

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In terms of the IS/AQ conflict the Syrian regime is found to be the enemy of both groups with ongoing conflict against both JAN and the IS branch in Syria. However, from their perspective the ongoing conflict between groups like JAN and IS amongst themselves is an advantage as the jihadists are effectively weakening the resistance in this way. As their resources are consumed, this is viewed favourably by the regime which can capitalize on this fragmented and deconstructive form of Jihad. Additionally, Damas has attempted in late August 2014 to regain some international legitimacy by offering to collaborate with the West’s in their efforts against IS.

Iran and U.S.

Although it is clear that Iran built a greater influence after 2003 over its neighbour by funding political parties and militias, this interference has been increased with the arrival in Baghdad of the commander of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on 13th June 2014 to oversee the capital's defences. From this visit stemmed the Iranian decision to send 2000 troops to assist the Iraqi army struggling to contain IS.

Despite weakening the ranks of AQ and eliminating Osama Bin Laden in 2011, the U.S has found itself in the middle of a “jihadi spring” with multiple adversaries in the same region. Recently, the U.S. has aided the government in Iraq by sending military advisers as well as members of the Marines in northern Iraq, supporting the Kurdish Peshemergas with equipment and weapons and by launching a wave of targeted killings against IS. On the 16th august 2014, the U.S also engaged in air strikes in northern Iraq near the country’s largest dam at Irbil in order to save the country’s crucial infrastructure. The U.S. alongside its traditional allies such as the U.K. and France have realize the magnitude of IS’s security threat and, following the mediatised attacks by IS against the Yazidis populations in northern Iraq, and the beheadings of U.S. citizens, have started to use military options to deal with them. However, they have made it clear that a ground invasion or direct intervention is not a viable solution.

Nevertheless the most striking query is whether there is space for greater cooperation between Washington and Tehran. For the first time since the Shah’s ousting in the 1970’s both countries have found a common interest – i.e. to terminate IS. The involvement of AQ is quite irrelevant in Iraq currently; nevertheless both Iran and the U.S. have their distinct differences with AQC as well. In this fashion, greater cooperation in this issue is expected between both nations which could later foster a better understanding with regards to Iran’s nuclear programme as well as other key regional issues.

Turkey

As IS has captured several towns and cities by the Turkish border as well as kidnapped dozens of Turkish citizens, Prime Minister Erdogan has threatened to retaliate. However, there has been some level of hesitance due to the risk of severe civilian casualties. Turkish opposition has blamed the government for helping the rise of IS by allowing Syrian rebel factions to pass freely over the country’s borders. The government’s stance towards the creation of a Kurdish state has stayed negative; however, Turkey will surely remain attentive to unfolding events and the outcome of the current havoc in Iraq. Concerning the AQ - IS rivalry, Turkey would prefer this competition to stay clear from its own borders and not threaten its own security as the country has effectively closed its doors to any paramilitary forces. However factors such as an independent Kurdistan and an intolerable Syrian regime are the principle variables that Erdogan will be considering for future action.

New developments have seen IS push towards the Turkish border and their likely consolidation at a throwing stone from Turkey can potentially trigger a reaction from Turkey with the possibility of a massive movement of troops closer to the borders. An aerial bombing campaign is also a possibility as Turkish authorities will aim to minimize their current security threat. However, as the border remains closed the chance of a new humanitarian crisis is increasing. Syrian refugees and communities in southern Turkey are said to be at the lowest state of acceptance leading to clashes and violent confrontations with locals.

Saudi Arabia

Nour al Maliki, Iraq’s former Shia head of state, has accused Saudi Arabia in recent weeks of promoting genocide by providing moral and financial support to IS. The Saudi government commented on these claims by labelling them as a ‘malicious falsehood’. It reiterated that it does not support IS or any AQ faction in Syria or Iraq, and blamed the discriminatory and exclusionist polices of Maliki for the current state of havoc in Iraq. Despite

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speculation there is no clear or substantial evidence available. However as previously mentioned there has been evidence of private Saudi donors funding Sunni Salafist movements such as IS to further spread Wahhabi ideology and challenge the rise of Shia populations in the region. To what extent the royal family and their affiliates are involved in this process remains unclear. Nevertheless, the threat of Islamic militants turning their attention upon Saudi Arabia is a possible concern for the royal family.

China

In 2003, China strongly condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but showed no inclination to get involved one way or the other. Up until recently, the Chinese government seemingly ignored the Middle Eastern conflicts entirely. However, this status is quickly changing, as IS recently made revenge threats against China and other countries for seizing "Muslim rights." Since the news broke via Phoenix Weekly, a Hong-Kong based newsmagazine, the article has been widely circulated on Chinese news websites and has gained popularity on social media as well. Baghdadi stated that "Muslim rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine" and more than a dozen other countries and regions. China, which receives 10% of its oil imports from Iraq, has expressed growing consternation about the influence that Muslim extremists could have if infiltrating in Xinjiang. Because the country has been fighting a separatist insurgency of its own in the region for the past several years, authorities fear IS may embolden the simmering independence movement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that China was "keeping an open mind" about operations that would "help maintain security and stability" in Iraq. She also noted that China's embassy in Iraq has asked for Baghdad "to take concrete measures to ensure the security of Chinese citizens," and held out hope for Chinese assistance, saying "we are ready to continue with our help as our capacity allows."

5.5 Future Risk and Regional Cooperation

As all the regional players watch closely, there is sound reason to worry about the current status of IS in Iraq and Syria. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy emphasizes how this region consists of highly disaffected Sunni populations ‘which permitted a collection of ISIS and related allies to overwhelm an Iraqi army vastly superior in numbers and firepower’. Thus, the question becomes: if Al-Qaeda could produce 9/11 from its sanctuary in Afghanistan, what can a contemporary Caliphate in the heart of the Middle East achieve?

In the near future and as the dynamics evolve quickly in Iraq and Syria, the true capabilities of IS will be unveiled. In particular, observers will look at its capacity to govern and hold territory while also fighting a multiplicity of enemies on all possible fronts. What is made clear is that if IS becomes a permanent reality, it will possibly continue to attract a massive wave of foreign jihadists creating a Sunni terrorist heaven in the Iraq and the wider Levant. The Iraqi authorities and all parties with vested interests will have to cooperate to tackle the largest existential threat presently in the region. In the words of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry the Islamic State is a "threat not only to Iraq but to the entire region.”

There is no doubt that collective efforts on international military levels are vital. Nevertheless, the problem is still a political one, as each country perceives the danger from a different angle. The idea of assaulting IS by directly aiming at destroying its leadership will prove insufficient, as witnessed with AQC in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To reach a sustainable solution regional cooperation and addressing sectarian divides, particularly between Sunni and Shias is critical. Most importantly, the U.S. and its allies need to understand that the implications of the IS - AQ rivalry are potentially very dangerous for their own security at home as both groups try to enforce legitimacy upon their affiliates and other extremists around the world, and the risk of a “spectacular” attack such as 9/11 regains relevance. The public defiance of a Western power would theoretically increase the popularity and legitimacy of either group and solidify their elite position in global jihad.

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6. CONCLUSION

The rise of the Islamic State can be viewed as one manifestation of the transformation of the global jihadist movement over past several years. A reason for today’s AQ / IS rivalry result from two generations of veteran foreign fighter networks demonstrating preference divergence: those that fought during the 1980s Afghan jihad and those that fought during the Iraqi jihad of 2003-2010. The AQ / IS split has created a distinct fragmentation in global jihad and will potentially continue doing so increasing the possibility of complete and more direct overthrow of AQ in the Islam area of influence. The risk of a sustainable Caliphate in Iraq and Syria can have a domino effect across the Muslim world from Indonesia to Nigeria as other groups strive to create their own sub-caliphates and emirates. The increasing alliances to IS displayed in the third section of the document are reflective of the rising popularity and legitimacy of Baghdadi as the new Caliph, even though it is important to recall that none of the major Al-Qaeda regional players have sworn allegiance to IS. AQC will nonetheless have to strengthen its ranks and reaffirm its regional alliance as well as forging new ones to compete against the ferocious wave of IS propaganda and efficacy, particularly in the Arab peninsula. In all cases, this inter-Jihadi rivalry will likely lead to further competition and efforts to outdo each other. With the potential for a spectacular attack against a Western power and further incursions against minorities in the region, the pivotal question at this point is whether countries will continue ceding power to these Islamist groups or push for more decisive action and cooperation? Regional powers must strive for greater cooperation as displayed currently with Iran and the U.S. combining forces to tackle the threat of terrorism. The potential for further segmentation of Arab states is becoming more relevant and may indeed affect the balance of power and the geopolitics of the region.

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SOURCES

In addition to OTHER SOLUTIONS Consulting Ltd’s direct presence, own sources and information collection capabilities in all of the countries where AQ and IS operate, the following sources were used for this report.

� Akhbar Al Youm � Al Ahram Online � Al Arabiya News Online � Al Jazeera Online � Al Masriya news � Al Monitor Online � BBC News Online � CBC news � Combating Terrorism Center at West

Point � CNN news Online � Foreign Policy Magazine � Foreign Policy Research Institute � Georgetown Security Studies

� Huffington Post � Intelwire � Institute of Islamic Strategic Affairs (IISA

London) � SITE Intelligence � Telegraph online � The Guardian Online � The Independent Online � The New York Times � The Washington Post � United Nations confidential documents � Washington Institute Washington Institute

for Near East Policy � World Terror Watch

Information

For further information please contact OTHER SOLUTIONS Consulting Ltd on:

Phone: + 44 78 555 01 863

Email: [email protected]

1409_aq_is

Documents

overview of al

albaghdadi vs alzawahiri

albaghdadi leader

alzawahiri leader of

alqaeda islamic state

regional perspectives

syrian civil war

aqis split