14-574 members of the kentucky general assembly

8/9/2019 14-574 Members of the Kentucky General Assembly

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__________________

__________________

__________________

__________________

No.14574

In the Supreme Court of the United States

GREGORYBOURKE,etal.,and TIMOTHYLOVE,etal.,

Petitionersv.

STEVEBESHEAR,GovernorofKentucky Respondent

BRIEFOFAMICICURIAE

106MEMBERSOFTHEKENTUCKY

GENERALASSEMBLY

INSUPPORTOFRESPONDENT

OnPetitionforaWritofCertiorari ToTheUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals

FortheSixthCircuit

Col.RonaldD.Ray RichardL.Masters

PostOfficeBox1136 Masters,Mullins&Arrington

Crestwood,KY40014 1012SouthFourthStreet

(502)2415552 Louisville,KY40203

CounselofRecord (502)5822900

CounselforAmiciCuriae

WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO., 619 W. KENTUCKY-P.O. BOX 3251, LOUISVILLE, KY


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLEOFAUTHORITIES.........................................ii

INTERESTOFAMICI.................................................1

SUMMARYOFARGUMENT......................................2

ARGUMENT................................................................5

1. TheCommonwealth’sSovereignRighttoDefine

Marriage..................................................................7 2. Kentucky’sDefinitionofMarriageDoesNot

ViolateTheFourteenthAmendmenttoTheUnitedStatesConstitution...............................................10

3. KentuckyHasSufficientLegitimateStateInterestinTheDefinitionofMarriagetoSatisfyReviewUndertheFourteenthAmendment .....................13

4. TheTenthAmendmentGuaranteesStatesTheRighttoMakeRationalDistinctionsConcerningtheMarriageRelationshipAndtoMakeNecessaryPolicy.....................................................................14

5. Kentucky’sLegitimateStateInterestinDefiningMarriageSatisfiesAnyStandardofJudicialReview..................................................................22

6. Kentucky’sPublicPolicyisNotBasedin Animus..................................................................24

CONCLUSION...........................................................32


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TABLEOFAUTHORITIES

Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810(1972).....................9,10

Bishop v. Smith,760F.3d.1070(10thCir.2014)25,27

Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett,531U.S.356(2001)..........25

Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen,252U.S. 553(1920) ...................................................................16

Carcieri v. Salazar,555U.S.379,129S.Ct.1058(2009)..........................................................................18

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,

Inc.,473U.S.432(1985).................................13,26,28

Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,503U.S.249(1992)..........................................................................18

Dandridge v. Williams,397U.S.471(1970)..............13

DeBoer v. Snyder,772F.3d.388

(6thCir.2014).................................................13,23, 30

FCC v. Beach Communication, Inc.,508U.S.307(1993).....................................................22

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,

458U.S.564(1982).....................................................18 Griswold v. Connecticut,381U.S.479(1965)............11

Haddock v. Haddock,201U.S.562(1906).......8,20, 21

Heller v. Doe,509U.S.312(1993)........................ 25,30

In re Burrus,136U.S.586(1890) ................................9

In re Marriage Cases,183P.3d.384(Calif.2008).....12

Jones v. Hallahan,501S.W.2d.588

(Ky.App.1973)....................................................5,6,30

Keegan v. U.S.,325U.S.478(1945) ...........................17

Lawrence v. Texas,539U.S.558(2003) .....................11


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Lockhart v. Napolitano,573F.3d.251(6thCir.2009).............................................................18

Lofton v. Sec. of Department of Children& Family Services,358F.3d.804(11thCir.2004)....23

Marbury v. Madison,5U.S.137(1803) .....................17

Maynard v. Hill,125U.S.190(1888)..........................8

McLean v. Arkansas,211U.S.539(1909)..................20

New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,285U.S.285(1932)...20

NLRB v. Noel Canning,134S.Ct.2550(2014).........14

Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,541U.S.125(2004).....................................................18

Palmer v. Thompson,403U.S.217(1971) .................24

Peterson v. Shake,Ky.,120S.W.3d.707(2003) Pinkhasov v. Petocz,331S.W.3d.285(Ky.App.2011)..............................................................7

Powers v. Harris,379F.3d.1208(10thCir.2004)...........................................................29

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,519U.S.337(1997)..........17

Romer v. Evans,517U.S.620(1996).............24,26, 28

Rowley v. Lampe,331S.W.2d.887(Ky.1960)......... 7,8 S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S.,265S.W.3d.804(Ky.App.2008)............................................................32

San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez,411U.S.1(1973).........................................................13

Shapiro v. Thompson,394U.S.618(1969)................16

Sosna v. Iowa,419U.S.393(1975) ............................16

Town of Greece v. Galloway,134S.Ct.1811(2014) .................................................14

United States Department of Agriculture v.

Moreno,413U.S.528(1973)..............24,25,26,27,28 United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,489U.S. 235(1989) ...................................................................18


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United States v. Windsor,570U.S.____, 133S.Ct.2675(2013)......................................... passim

Williams v. North Carolina,

317U.S.287(1942)...........................................9,19,21


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TABLEOFSTATUTES

DefenseofMarriageAct(“DOMA”)

1U.S.C.§7,and28U.S.C.§1738C.......................27

KyConst.§233A..........................................................7

Ky.Rev.Stat.§402.005................................................6

U.S.Const. Art.IV,§2................................................15

U.S.Const.amend.X......................................... passim

U.S.Const.amend.XIV...................................... passim


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TABLEOFOTHERAUTHORITIES

BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY(5thED.1979).... 5,11

DaleCarpenter,WindsorProducts:EqualProtection FromAnimus,2013SUP.CT.REV.183(2013)...........24

LOUISEE.GRAHAM&JAMESE.KELLER, KENTUCKYPRACTICEDOMESTICRELATIONS LAW§3.1(2010)..........................................................7

NoahWebster,WEBSTER’SNEWINTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY,SecondEdition(1934)........................5 W.WhitneyandB.Smith,THECENTURY DICTIONARYANDCYCLOPEDIA(1891)................6

RichardWolf,On a Roll, High Court Reigns Supreme, USATODAY(March26,2015)..................................32


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INTERESTOFAMICI

AmiciarecomposedofonehundredandsixmembersoftheKentuckyGeneralAssemblylistedbydistrictintheAppendix1. AmiciarecomposedofseventysixoftheonehundredmembersoftheDemocratcontrolledKentuckyHouseofRepresentativesandthirtyofthethirtyeight members of the RepublicancontrolledKentucky State Senate. As such, they representthe citizens of Kentucky in the exercise of theirconstitutionalrighttocontinuetorecognizeandlegally

define marriage according to longstanding history,custom, andcommon law,now codifiedas Kentuckystatute, and affirmed through a constitutionalamendmentratifiedbyseventyfourandsixthtenthspercent(74.6%)ofthevoters.

1PursuanttoRule37.6,amicibrieflystatethatnocounselforanypartyautho-rizedthebriefinwholeorinpartandnopersonorentity,otherthantheamiciandtheircounselmadeanymonetarycontributiontothepreparationorsubmissionofthisbrief. ThisbriefisfiledwiththewrittenconsentofallpartiespursuanttoRule37.2(a).


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SummaryofArgument

The Commonwealth has a sovereign right

to define marriage. The Court should respect the

democraticprocessbywhichthecitizensofKentucky,

acting collectively, have reached a consensus on

the issue of samesexmarriage. SinceKentucky is

permitted, but not required to legislatively “define”

marriage, its having done so does not constitute a

“ban on marriage” forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment.TheCommonwealthhas, rather,simply

codifiedtheconsensusofAmericanandworldhistory

astowhatconstitutesa“marriage.”

Kentucky has sufficient legitimate state

interests in the definition of marriage to satisfy

reviewunderTheFourteenthAmendment.Kentucky

also has a legitimate interest inthe enforcementof

marital responsibilities as part of social order and

structureintheCommonwealth.Moreover,Kentucky

hasalegitimateinterestinconsistentlyregulatingthe

publiceffectsandstabilityofmarriage,aswellasthe

economicandotherbenefitsofthatinstitution.

TheTenth Amendment guarantees states the

right to make rational distinctions concerning the

marriage relationship andtomake necessary policy.

Under the Tenth Amendment the “people” as the

states, have been accorded constitutional rights and

are entitled to all rights not specifically granted to

the federalgovernment. Among thoserights isthat

ofdecidingwho,ifanyone,shouldbegiventherightto

marryandtoreceivewhateverbenefitsandburdens

(ifany)thatstatusimports.TheCourtcannotcreate


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a constitutional right to samesex marriage without violatingtherightsreservedtothe“people”underthe

TenthAmendment.

Kentucky’s legitimate interests in defining

marriagesatisfyanystandardofjudicialreview.The

SixthCircuitaffirmedthestate’sconstitutionalright

under the 10th Amendment to rationally conclude

thatafamilyenvironmentwithmarriedoppositesex

biologicalparentsremainstheoptimalsocialstructure

in which to bear children, and that the raising of

childrenbysamesexcouples,whobydefinitioncannotbethetwosolebiologicalparentsofachildandcannot

provide children with a parental authority figure of

each gender, presents an alternative structure for

child rearing that has not yet proved itself beyond

reasonablescientificdispute to be asoptimalasthe

biologicallybased marriage norm. Even today, the

onlythinganyoneknowsforsureaboutthelongterm

impactofredefiningmarriageisthattheydonotknow.

Kentucky’spublicpolicyisnotbasedonanimus.

It is clear that the Kentucky GeneralAssembly did

not enact the statute defining civil marriage based

upon unlawful animus, since it had nonanimus

basedreasonsforadoptingthestatute. Inthiscase,

the Commonwealth is neither changing course nor

withdrawing privileges previously granted, nor

retractingarightonceaccordedaclassofindividuals.

As a reading of the statute will show, “love”

is not a prerequisite for a lawful marriage in the

Commonwealth.Accordingly, the mere presence of a

“lovingandcommittedrelationship” does notrender

all couples “similarly situated.” For example, apolygamoustriadwho profess“love” forone another


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andforeachother,failstosatisfyKentucky’sdefinitionofmarriage. Thus,Kentucky’sdefinitionofmarriage

isneitherconstitutionallyirrationalnorindicativeof

animus,butratherislegitimate,andispresumedtobe

constitutional.


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ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

Black’s Law Dictionary defines marriage asa“[l]egalunionofonemanandonewomanashusbandand wife . . . the legal status, condition,or relationofonemanandonewomanunitedinlawforlife,oruntildivorced,forthedischargetoeachotherandthecommunityof theduties legally incumbentonthosewhose association is founded on the distinction of sex.”

(emphasisadded)The Kentucky Court ofAppeals has affirmed

thisdefinitionofmarriageaccordingtocommonusagefor the citizensof the Commonwealth citing Black’sLaw Dictionary, and also quoting Webster’s NewInternationalDictionaryasfollows:

Astateofbeingmarried,orbeingunitedto a person or persons of the opposite

sexashusbandorwife;also,themutualrelation of husband and wife; wedlock;

abstractly, the institution whereby menandwomenare joined ina specialkindof social and legal dependence, for thepurpose of founding and maintaining afamily.

Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d. 588, 589 (Ky. App.

1973);citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY ,SECOND EDITION(1934).

The Hallahan court considered a question offirstimpression:whethertwoindividualsofthesamesexcouldlawfullymarryinKentucky.Afterexamining

the historical definition of marriage as well as thecustomofmarriage“longbeforethestatecommencedtoissuelicensesforthatpurpose,”thecourtconcluded


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that the twowomenbeforethecourt“are preventedfrom marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky orthe refusal of the County Court Clerk of JeffersonCountytoissuethemalicense,butratherbytheirown

incapabilityofenteringintoamarriageasthattermisdefined.” Id.Thecourt,inaunanimousopinion,held:“[W]efindnoconstitutionalsanctionorprotectionofthe right of marriage between persons of the samesex.” Hallahan,501S.W.2d.at590.

The Hallahan courtalsoquotedthedefinitionof marriage set out inThe Century Dictionary and

Encyclopedia:“Thelegalunionofamanwithawomanforlife;thestateorconditionofbeingmarried;thelegal

relationofspousestoeachother;wedlock;theformaldeclarationorcontractbywhichamanandawoman

joininwedlock.” Hallahan, 501S.W.2d.at589;citing,W. WHITNEY AND B. SMITH,THE CENTURY DICTIONARY ANDC YCLOPEDIA )(1891).

In 1998, the Kentucky General AssemblycodifiedthislongstandingdefinitionofmarriageinKy.Rev.Stat.402.005:“Asusedandrecognizedinthelaw

of the Commonwealth, ‘marriage’ refers only to thecivilstatus,condition,orrelationofone(1)manandone(1)womanunitedinlawforlife,forthedischargetoeachotherandthecommunityofthedutieslegallyincumbentuponthosewhoseassociationisfoundedonthedistinctionofsex.”

In 2004, the voters of the Commonwealthaffirmed this definition of marriage by ratifying anamendment to the Kentucky Constitution by an

overwhelming margin (74.6%). That Amendmentprovides:“Onlyamarriagebetweenonemanandone

womanshallbevalidorrecognizedasamarriageinKentucky.”KentuckyConstitution,§233A.

The history of the social and legal status of


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marriage in Kentucky clearly demonstrates thatKentuckydoesnotseektocreatenewrights,ortotakeawayanyexistingrightsguaranteedtothoseresidingin theCommonwealth. Rather,Kentucky, like many

other states, simply seeks to uphold and affirm itslongstandingandenduringruleoflaw–fixed,uniform,anduniversal–baseduponunchangingpublicpolicyasdeterminedbythepeople.

1. TheCommonwealth’sSovereignRightTo

DefineMarriage

TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesdoesnotmention, much less attempt to regulate, marriage

inanyway. TheConstitutionoftheCommonwealthof Kentucky, on the other hand, specifically definesmarriageasaunionbetweenonemanandonewoman.

AstheKentuckyCourtofAppealshasrecentlyacknowledged:“Itisaxiomaticthatstateshaveabsolute

jurisdiction over the regulation of the institution ofmarriage.” Pinkhasov v. Petocz, 331S.W.3d. 285, 291(Ky.App.2011),citing , Rowley v. Lampe,331S.W.2d.

887(Ky.1960),overruledonothergroundsby Peterson

v. Shake,Ky.,120S.W.3d.707,711(2003),andLOUISE

E. GRAHAM & J AMES E. K ELLER, K ENTUCKY PRACTICE-DOMESTIC RELATIONS L AW § 3.1 (2010)(MarriageState

AbilitytoRegulate). As authority for thisassertion, the Pinkhasov

courtcitedthelanguageoftheformerKentuckyCourtofAppealsin Rowley:“Therightsandobligationsofamarriagedonotdependuponanagreementbetween

thepartiesbutuponthelawofthedomiciliarystate,because the institution is one of society which is

regulated by public authority.” Pinkhasov, at 291-92,citing Rowley,at890. The Rowleycourt,inturn,cited Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.190(1888), inwhich


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thisCourthadstated:“ Marriage,ascreatingthemostimportantrelationinlife,ashavingmoretodowithmorals and civilization of a people than any otherinstitution, has always been subject to the control

of the legislature. That body prescribes the age atwhichpartiesmaycontracttomarry,theprocedureorformessentialtoconstitutemarriage,thedutiesandobligations it creates, its effects upon the propertyrightsofboth,presentandprospective,andtheactswhich may constitute grounds for its dissolution.”

Maynard v. Hill, 125U.S.at205.

Therefore,theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesdoesnotallowthedestructionorredefinitionofmarriage

inKentuckybyjudicialfiat,inoppositiontorecognizedandcodifiedpublicpolicyandlegislativeaction, andanamendmentof theCommonwealth’s ConstitutionbyplebisciteoftheCommonwealth’scitizens. Lestitbearguedthat Maynardisanoldercase,andmaynotrepresent the current stateofthelaw,thisprincipleis supported by the more recent acknowledgmentofthisCourtthat:“Thedefinitionofmarriageisthe

foundationoftheState’sbroaderauthoritytoregulatethesubjectofdomestic relationswith respectto the‘protection of offspring, property interests, and theenforcementofmaritalresponsibilities.’”United Statesv. Windsor,133S.Ct.2675(2013).

Indeed,thisCourt,likeKentucky’scourts,hasalsorelieduponlongstandinghistorytoaffirm: “[T]hestates,atthetimeoftheadoptionoftheConstitution,possessed full power over the subject of marriage

anddivorce . . . [and] the Constitutiondelegatednoauthority to the Government of the United States

on the subject ofmarriage anddivorce.” Haddock v. Haddock,201U.S.562,575(1906),overruledonothergroundsbyWilliams v. State of North Carolina, 317


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U.S.287(1942);seealso, In re Burrus,136U.S.586,593-94(1890)(“Thewholesubjectofthedomesticrelationsofhusbandandwife,parentandchild,belongstothelawsoftheStatesandnotto the lawsoftheUnited

States”);cf. United States v. Windsor,133S.Ct.,at2688(Scalia, J., dissenting)(“wehave nopower under theConstitutiontoinvalidatethisdemocraticallyadoptedlegislation.”) It is clear, therefore, from this Court’sownprecedent,thatitmaynotusurpauthorityovermarriage,butthatsuchauthorityhasalwaysbeenandisreservedexclusivelytothestates.

This principle is clearly acknowledged inWindsor where this Court stated:“The dynamics of

stategovernment inthefederalsystemaretoallowthe formation of consensus respecting the way themembersofadiscretecommunitytreateachotherintheirdailycontactandconstantinteractionwitheachother.”Windsor,133S.Ct.at2692.TheWindsorCourt’sprohibitionagainstthefederalgovernmentinterferingwithastate’srighttoredefinemarriage(throughtheDefense of Marriage Act) likewise prohibits federal

interferencewithKentucky’srighttoretainitsexistingdefinitionofmarriage.Therefore,baseduponitsownrecentprecedent,

thisCourtshouldnowrespectthedemocraticprocessby which the citizens of the Commonwealth, actingcollectively,havereachedaconsensusonthissocietalissue.ForthisCourtnowtooverrulethatdeterminationwouldnegatecenturiesofjurisprudentialprecedentforreasonswhollylackinganysupportinlaw.Indeed,as

theCourtaffirmed,indecliningtoconsiderthisissuein Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810(1972),thequestionof

samesexmarriagehasnoplaceinthisCourt“forwantofasubstantialfederalquestion.” Baker v. Nelson,409U.S.810(1972).


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2. Kentucky’sDefinitionOfMarriageDoes

NotViolateTheFourteenthAmendment

ToTheUnitedStatesConstitution

Petitioners’ repeated characterization of theaforementioned legislation as “Kentucky’s marriageban,” has no basis in either law or fact. Amicirespectfully insist that since Kentucky ispermitted,butnotrequiredtolegislatively“define”marriage,itshavingdonesodoesnotconstitutea“banonmarriage.”

The Commonwealthhas, rather, simply adopted the

consensusofAmericanandworldhistoryastowhatconstitutes a “marriage.” Indeed, despite their useof contorted language and inconsistent argument,Petitionersseemtoagreewiththishistoricalview.Theyspeak,forexample,ofthe“nuclearfamily,”Petitioner’sBrief, at 4, and the “legal foundation for forming afamilyandrearingchildren,”Petitioner’sBrief,at19,asconstitutingbothlaudablegoalsandpublicpolicy

forthelegalinstitutionofmarriage. Amici submit that Kentucky’s codification of

those historical views andconsensus simply affirmsits public policy. The Constitution does not requirethat states define marriage. Although some stateshaverecentlychosentodosoandhaveexpandedthecommonlawdefinition,Kentuckyhaschosentoretainitsexistingdefinitionofmarriage.

Thatdefinitiononlytreatsdifferentlythosewhoarenot similarly situated,onthebasisofconsanguinity,consent, or biology. Amici insist that Kentucky’sdefinitionof“marriage”doesnottreat equalsdifferently,andthereforeisnotdiscriminatory.“Discrimination”is

alegaltermofart;theEqualProtectionClauseonlyprohibitsstatesfromtreatingsimilarly situatedpeopledifferently,withoutsomelegitimatebasis.


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Black’sLawDictionarydefines“discrimination”in a constitutional sense as conferring “particularprivilegesonaclassarbitrarilyselectedfromalargenumber of persons, all of whom stand in the same

relationtotheprivilegesgrantedand betweenwhomand those not favoredno reasonable distinction canbefound.” BLACK ’S L AW DICTIONARY 420(5thed.1979).Otherwisestated,“discrimination”is“[a]failuretotreatallpersonsequallywhere no reasonable distinction canbefoundbetweenthosefavoredandthosenotfavored.”

Id. (emphasissupplied)

Laws defining and regulating marriage mayand do distinguish on a number of bases including

age,consent,biologicalsex,andconsanguinity.Simplycontinuingtoadheretothelongestablishedcommonlaw definition of marriage is neither unlawful,objectionable, irrational nor unreasonable; and itcertainlydoesnot“ban”somethingthatdidnot,andcannot,existunderKentuckylaw.

Petitionersfindscantsupportfortheirposition,in either Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.558 (2003), orGriswold v. Connecticut

, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), sinceneitherofthoseholdingssupportsan“evolving”viewofdiscriminationwhichwould includemarriage. Inbothofthosecases,theCourtaffordedconstitutionalprotection,undertheNinthAmendment,forintimacyin private relationships, behind closed doors. BothGriswold and Lawrence dealt with governmentalintrusionina private aspectofrelationships.Theyinnowaysupportanextensionofadditionalrightstosame

sexcouples. TheinstantPetitionersdemand,notjustthatcertain private behaviorsbepermitted,butrather

thattheCourtrequirestatestoaccordlegal statustoarelationshipwhichhasneverbeenrecognizedassuchintheCommonwealth’shistory.


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Indeed,thisCourtrecentlystated:It seems fair to conclude that, untilrecent years, many citizens had notevenconsideredthepossibilitythattwo

persons of the same sex might aspireto occupy the same status and dignityasthatofamanandwomaninlawfulmarriage.Formarriagebetweenamanandawomannodoubthadbeenthoughtofbymostpeopleasessentialtotheverydefinition of that term and to its role

andfunction throughout the historyofcivilization.

Windsor,133S.Ct.at2689.TheCourt further observed“The limitationof

lawfulmarriagetoheterosexualcouples...forcenturieshadbeen deemedboth necessaryand fundamental.”

Id.Other courts have similarly noted that the

recognitionofhomosexualrelationshipsas“samesexmarriage” is of recent origin.“The concept of same

sexmarriagewasunknown inour distantpast,andisnovelinourrecenthistory,becausetheuniversallyunderstooddefinitionofmarriagehasbeenthelegalorreligiousunionofamanandawoman.” In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d. 384, 460 (Calif. 2008)(Baxter, J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart)

PetitionersinsistthattherighttomarryhasbeenalongstandingandcentralpartoflibertyinAmerica.Petitionershaveevidentlyfailedtonotethatmanyof

thecasesuponwhichtheyrelysanctionthatprinciplebasedupontheunderstandingthat“marriage”wasa

unionbetweenamanandawoman.


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3. KentuckyHasSufficientLegitimateStateInterestsInTheDefinitionOfMarriage

ToSatisfyReviewUnderTheFourteenth

Amendment

The history of marriage in this country doesnot support recognition of samesex marriage as afundamental right.As the Court recognized in San

Antonio School District v. Rodriquez,411U.S.1(1973):“ItisnottheprovinceofthisCourttocreatesubstantiveconstitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing

equalprotectionofthelaws.”411U.S.at33.Because

this Courthasnotrecognizedtheclaimofsamesexmarriageasinvolvingeitherafundamentalrightorasuspectclass,Kentucky’spolicyandpracticalreasonsfordefiningmarriageasaunionbetweenonemanandonewomanissubjectonlytoarationalbasisreview.

This Court has long recognized that a statehaswidelatitudeintheareaofsociallegislation;andevenwhenfacedwithanequalprotectionclaim“the

Constitutionpresumesthatevenimprovidentdecisionswilleventuallyberectifiedbythedemocraticprocess.”

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,473U.S.432,440(1985).SuchwasthecogentanalysisoftheSixthCircuitCourtofAppeals,recognizing“thedeferenceowedthedemocraticprocess,”andthatapollofapanelofjudgesshouldnottaketheplaceofthatprocess. DeBoer v. Snyder,772F.3d.388,407,408,415,

416(6thCir.2014).TheSixthCircuit,relyinguponprecedentfrom

this Court, acknowledged: “[t]he signature featureofrationalbasisreviewisthatgovernmentswillnotbeplacedinthedockfordoingtoomuchorfordoing

toolittleinaddressingapolicyquestion.” DeBoer v. Snyder,772F.3d.at405,citing Dandridge v. Williams,397U.S.471,48687(1970). Amici submitthat this


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and homosexual. Individuals also have the right toobtain religious sanction for unions not recognizedbystatecivilmarriage laws;but thereisnogeneralfederalconstitutionalrighttothegovernmentbenefits

bestowed by state civil marriage laws. Indeed, thestatesarenotevenrequired toadoptcivilmarriagelaws.

Civilmarriage lawsareadopted fora limitedpurpose,namely,authorizingthegrantofstatebenefitsfor certain types of unions. Otherwise stated, theyaffordtopersonsinqualifyingrelationshipswhatthe

framersoftheConstitutionreferredtoas“privilegesand immunities,” U.S.Const.Art. IV, § 2, i.e., those

benefitsbestowedbygovernmentonsomeindividualstotheexclusionofothers.

Historically,the“privilegesandimmunities”ofcivilmarriagehavebeenaccordedonlytosocialunionscomplying with certain requirements. With some

variations,statelawshaverequiredthattheunionbe(1) ofamanandawoman, (2)whoundergo certainprocedures inadvance,(3)obtainavalid license,(4)

haveconsented,(5)areaboveacertainage,(6)arenotmarriedtoanyoneelse,(7)arenottoocloselyrelatedtoeachother,and(8)meetcertainotherrequirementsofceremonyand/orcohabitation.Statestypicallyhaveexcluded from special benefits all other groupings—including, but not limited to, samesex marriages,polygamous marriages, polyandric marriages, otherplural clusters, designated intrafamily unions (e.g.,brother/sisteranduncle/niece),marriagesbyminors,

andunionsthatareunlicensed,orthatotherwisefailtomeetthestates’requirements.

Agrantofspecialprivilegestoonegroup,whileexcludingothers,violatestheEqualProtectionClauseof the Fourteenth Amendment unless the state can


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showa legitimatepublicreasonforitsdecision.Theshowing required varies depending on the type ofcase.However,aStateneednotalwaysapply allitslawsorallitsservicesequallytoanyone,residentor

nonresident,whomayrequestitsotodo. Canadian

Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252U.S.553(1920);cf. Sosnav. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson,

394U.S.618(1969). TheSupremeCourtisextremelytolerant ofgovernment distinctionsamongeconomicclasses.Bycontrast,insocialissuecasessuchassamesexmarriage,theCourtsetsmoreexactingstandards.

It is clear that for constitutional purposes, statutesdefininghistoricmarriagemeetthoseexactingcriteria.Thisisbecauseoftheoverwhelmingevidenceofsocialbenefit deriving from heterosexual unions. Suchevidencearisesbothfromempiricalstudies,andalso

frompracticalexperiencegatheredoverthecourseofseveralmillennia.

Petitionersseektheextensionofthe“privilegesandimmunities”ofcivilmarriagetoothergroupings;amicisubmitthatthisisamuchtoughercasetomake

sincethesupportingsociologicalandscientificdataismuchweaker. Amicifurtherinsistthatinthecaseofsamesexmarriage, thesupposed“evidence”ofsocial

benefitisscant,highlypoliticized,andnotsufficienttorequirethatstatesrecognizesuchunions. A micialsosubmitthatunderEqualProtectionjurisprudence,thedispositiveissueisnotwhethertheevidencerequiresthat states such as Kentucky recognize samesexmarriage;thequestionisratherwhethertheevidencerequires those states to grant samesex couples“privilegesandimmunities”thatmanyother‘unions’

donotreceive. As noted above, the Constitution affords no

citizen of anygender or orientationa constitutional


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right to marriage. Since the regulation of marriageis not mentioned, it is not a power which has beendelegated to the federal government. Because theframerschosenottoaddresstheissue,amicisubmit

thattheinquiryendsthere,andthattheConstitution’ssilence requires judicial inaction. The Constitutionis rigid in its respect for federalism. Its frameworkof powers requires overwhelming popular supportinorder to effect changes.Sodifficult is the task ofamendingtheConstitution that ithasoccurredonlytwentyseventimesinthenation’shistory.

Amici respectfully submit that, under theConstitution,thisCourt’smandateistodeterminethe

constitutionalityoflaws. Marbury v. Madison, 5U.S.137(1803). TheConstitutiondoesnotempowerthisCourttocreatenewrights.Inconsideringconstitutionalquestions,theCourtshouldfirstlooktothedocumentitself,ratherthanitsownspeculationastowhattheframers may have intended. The document itselfshouldbetheprimary,eventheexclusive,source. Toresolveconstitutionalquestions, theCourtneedonly

applyacceptedprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretation.Onesuchprincipleistoavoidreadingintoastatutelanguage which the drafters did not include, suchas “marriage” or “gay marriage.” Keegan v. U.S.,325U.S. 478(1945). Anotherprincipleofstatutoryinterpretationmandates that when determining themeaning ofa statute, aCourtmustadopttheplainmeaningofthewords.Ofcourse,ifthewordsdonotevenoccur,thentheCourtneednotaccordthemany

meaning. AstheCourthasnotedin Robinson v. Shell Oil

Co.,519U.S.337(1997):Ourfirststepininterpretingastatuteistodeterminewhetherthelanguageatissue


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has a plain and unambiguous meaningwithregardtotheparticulardisputeinthe case. Our inquirymustcease if thestatutory language isunambiguous and

the ‘statutory scheme is coherent andconsistent’.

519U.S.at340Seealso, Carcieri v. Salazar,555U.S.379(2009);quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,

Inc., 489U.S.235,240(1989);Connecticut Nat. Bankv. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253254 (1992). “[P]lainmeaningisexaminedbylookingatthelanguageand

designofthestatuteasawhole.” Accord, Lockhart v. Napolitano,573F.3d.251(6thCir.2009).

Finally,toascertainthemeaning ofaword, acourtmustconsidertheentirestatutetodetermineifitsinterpretationisinternallyconsistent. “...[I]nter-pretations of a statutewhich would produce absurdresultsaretobeavoidedifalternativeinterpretationsconsistentwiththelegislativepurposeareavailable.”

Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541U.S.125(2004);Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458U.S.564,575

(1982).In making this determination, a court mustconsider the fundamental design of our federalConstitution, and the nature of federalism. The

judicialcreationofahithertounknownrightofsamesex marriage ignores the Constitution, evisceratesthe Tenth Amendment, and amounts to judiciallyamendingtheConstitution.Suchjudicialarrogationofpowerdefiesallprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretation

andconstruction. Torecognizeaconstitutionalrighttosamesexmarriage,theCourtmustfirstignorethe

Tenth Amendment which provides: “The powers notdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedtotheStates


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respectively,ortothepeople.”U.S.Const.amend.X.The“people,”consequently,aswellasthestates,

have been accorded constitutional rights. They areentitled to all rights not specifically granted to the

federalgovernment. See,U.S.Const.amend.X.Amongthoserightsisthatofdecidingwho,ifanyone,shouldbegiventherighttomarryandtoreceivewhateverbenefits and burdens (if any) that status imports.See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298(1942).TheCourtcannotcreateaconstitutionalrightto samesex marriage without violating the rights

reservedtothe“people”undertheTenthAmendment.Petitioners assert and would have this Court

holdthatafteronehundredandfortyeightyears,theFourteenthAmendmentnow gives rise toahithertounrecognized right to samesex marriage. SodoingtransmutestheFourteenthAmendment’sguaranteeof“equalprotectionofthelaws”intoanaffirmativerighttoequalityofoutcomesunderevery law.Petitioners’argument clearly implies that the Fourteenth

Amendmentaffordsthefederalgovernmenttheright,

andperhapsaduty,toenforcesocialchange. Petitionersappear to regard the Constitution not merely as a“livingdocument,”butasanagentforchangebywhichcourtsmay simplydiscardandcreaterightsastheydeemfit.

Under Petitioners’ view, the Fourteenth Amendment would supersede the remainder of thedocument,authorizinglegislationbyjudicialfiatandignoring theseparationofpowers. Petitionerswould

have this Court hold that those who adopted theFourteenthAmendmentanticipatedtheemergenceof

samesexmarriagenearlyonehundredandfiftyyearsinthefuture.Suchadistortedinterpretationofourfoundingdocumentbetraysabasicmisunderstanding


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oftheroleoftheseparationofpowersinourfederalsystem.

Emerging societal values cause changes inareasrangingfrommarriagetotaxes;however,when

attitudes change, our Constitution authorizes thepeopletomakelawsthatreflecttheirmoralchoices.This selfgovernance is the hallmark of civil societyandisachievedbythepeople’selectedrepresentativesrather than bya judicialpanel. Replacing politicalchoice with judicial fiat not only runs afoul of theConstitution,butwouldfundamentallytransformour

systemofgovernment. AsthisCourthaspreviouslyobserved,

The action of the state must be held valid unless clearlyarbitrary,capriciousor unreasonable. ‘The legislature,being familiar with local conditions, is,primarily, the judge of the necessity ofsuch enactments.The mere fact that acourtmaydifferwiththelegislatureinits

viewsofpublicpolicy,orthatjudgesmay

holdviewsinconsistentwiththeproprietyof thelegislationinquestion,affordsnogroundforjudicialinterference.’

New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,285U.S.262,285(1932),quoting McLean v. Arkansas, 211U.S.539,547(1909).

Statutory changes arebrought about throughavoteofthepeopleratherthanbeingdictatedbyanoligarchywithlittleregardforourfoundingdocuments.Contrary to the assertions of the Petitioners, our

Constitution permits laws regarding marriage todifferbetween the severalstates. Indeed, theTenth

Amendmentcontemplatesjustsuchdivergenceamongstate laws. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.562, 575(1906),overruledonothergroundsbyWilliams v. State


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of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Amicisubmitthatapplicationoftherulesetout

inWindsorisinstructiveofthecaseatbar. Windsoraffirmstherightofstatestodeterminehow“marriage”isdefined,anddeniesfederalcourtstheauthorityto

override a state’s determination concerning whattypesof“marriage”itwillrecognize.InWindsor,theStateofNewYorkhadchosentorecognizesamesexunions,andthustoextendthebenefitsofheterosexualmarriage to samesex couples. The Windsor Courtupheldtherightsofstatestomaketheirownmarriage

determinationsandrejectedfederalinterference.The Court noted: “The recognition of civil

marriages is central to statedomestic relations law

applicabletoitsresidentsandcitizens.”Windsor,133S.Ct. 2691 quotingWilliams v. North Carolina, 317U.S.287,298(1942)(“Eachstateasasovereignhasarightfulandlegitimateconcerninthemaritalstatusofpersonsdomiciledwithinitsborders”).Therighttodefine marriage isbutone facet ofa state’sbroaderauthority to regulate domestic relations within itsborderswith respectto the“[p]rotectionofoffspring,

property interests, and the enforcement of maritalresponsibilities.” Id.

This Court declared more than a centuryago,“[T]he states, atthetimeoftheadoption oftheConstitution, possessed full power over the subjectof marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitutiondelegated no authority to the Government of theUnitedStatesonthesubjectofmarriageanddivorce.”

Haddock v. Haddock,201U.S.562,575(1906). TheWindsorCourtmerelyaffirmedthisprinciple,i.e.,that

thepeopleofastatehavetherighttodefinemarriageastheyseefit,absentsomesupersedingfederalright.

Indeed,underWindsor,theConstitution prevents


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federalintrusionupontherightsofthepeopleundertheTenthAmendment,unlessaconstitutionalrightisimplicated. AsPetitionershavedemonstratednosuchright, amici submit that the Kentucky definition of

civilmarriagemustbeupheld.

5. Kentucky’sLegitimateInterestsIn

DefiningMarriageSatisfyAnyStandard

OfJudicialReview

In light of the foregoing, Kentucky hasnot merely a legitimate, but indeed a compelling

governmental interest and legal basis for holdingits longestablished historic definition of marriage.

Consequently, Kentucky’s choice should not be“subject tocourtroomfactfindingandmaybebaseduponrationalspeculationunsupportedbyevidenceor

empiricaldata.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,508U.S.307,315(1993).

In this regard, as the Eleventh Circuit hasobserved,courtscan:

rationally conclude that a family

environment with married oppositesex parents remains the optimal socialstructureinwhichtobearchildren,andthattheraisingofchildrenbysamesexcouples,whobydefinitioncannotbethe

twosolebiologicalparentsofachildandcannotprovidechildrenwithaparentalauthorityfigureofeachgender,presentsan alternative structure for childrearing that has not yet proved itselfbeyond reasonable scientific dispute to

be as optimal as the biologically basedmarriagenorm.

Lofton v. Sec. of Department of Children & Family


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Services,358F.3d.804,825,n.26(11thCir.2004)TheSixthCircuit,therefore,correctlyheldthat

theGeneralAssembly’slegitimatebasisforadheringtoitsestablisheddefinitionofmarriageisinnowaydiminishedbythechangingtidesofpublicopinion.

[A] State might wish to wait and seebeforechanginganormthatoursociety(likeallothers)hasacceptedforcenturies.That is not preserving tradition for itsown sake. No one here claims that theStates’ original definition of marriage

wasunconstitutionalwhenenacted.Theplaintiffs’ claim is that the States haveacted irrationally in standing by the

historicdefinitioninthefaceofchangingsocialmores.Yetoneofthekeyinsightsoffederalismisthatitpermitslaboratoriesofexperimentation–accentontheplural–allowingoneStatetoinnovateoneway,anotherStateanother,andathirdStatetoassessthetrialanderrorovertime.

DeBoer,772F.3d.at406.

ThisSixthCircuitfurtherstated: AStatestillassessinghowthis[re-

definingmarriage]hasworked,whetherin2004or2014,isnotshowingirrationality,

justa senseof stabilityandan interestin seeing how the new definition hasworkedelsewhere. Even today, theonlything anyone knows for sure about thelongtermimpactofredefiningmarriage

isthattheydonotknow.

Id.ThisstatementbytheSixthCircuitrepresents

thebetterview,andshouldbeaffirmed.


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6. Kentucky’sPublicPolicyisNotBasedon

Animus

Petitioners assert that the General Assemblyis motivated by animus against samesex couples.

Amici, the legislators against whom the charge ismade,categoricallydeny thatsuch isthe case. TheCommonwealth’sadherencetoitsconsistentandtimehonoreddefinitionofmarriageinnowaydemonstratesthe presence of “unconstitutional animus,” when

presented witha novel claim. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at

2689,269495,2696,270708;see also Romer v. Evans,517U.S.620,636(1996)(Scalia,J.,dissenting).

AsChiefJusticeRobertsobservedinWindsor:“snippets of legislative history” or a banal title oflegislation,withoutsomethingmore,doesnotprovideconvincing evidence that anact’s “principal purposewastocodifymalice,andthatitfurtherednolegitimategovernment interests.”Accordingly,heurgedcaution

againsttarring“thepoliticalbrancheswiththebrushofbigotry.”Windsor,133S.Ct.at2696.

Courts do not ordinarily consider legislators’subjectiveintentindeterminingtheconstitutionalityofalaw. See, Palmer v. Thompson, 403U.S.217,224(1971)(discussing the “hazards of declaring a lawunconstitutional because of the motivations of itssponsors”).Inalineofcases,beginningwithUnited

States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413U.S.528 (1973), this Court has created an exception tothatgeneralrulethroughadoctrinethathasbecomeknownasthe“animus,”ormoreaptlytitled,the“anti-animus,”doctrine.DaleCarpenter, Windsor Products:

Equal Protection From Animus,2013 SUP.CT.REV . 183,204-215 (2013). Uponrationalbasisreview,thepartychallengingaclassificationundertheEqualProtection


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Clause normally has the burden “to negative ‘anyreasonablyconceivablestateoffactsthatcouldprovidearationalbasisfortheclassification.’” Bd. of Trusteesv. Garrett, 531U.S. 356, 367(2001)(quoting Heller v.

Doe,509U.S.312(1993).Inapplyingtheanimusdoctrine,thisCourthas

soughttodetermine, onarationalbasis standard ofreview, whether there is a legislative motive whichappears to be based on irrational prejudice. Thestandardfromthesecaseshasbeenvariouslyreferredtoas“heightenedrationalbasisreview,”“rationalbasis

with bite,” “rational basis with teeth,” and“rationalbasisplus.” Bishop v. Smith,760F.3d.1070,1099(10 th

Cir.2014)(Holmes,J.,concurring)(citationsomitted).Thefirstcasetoapplytheanimusdoctrinewas

United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,413U.S.at528.ThatcasearosewhenCongress enacteda lawproviding that thedistributionof food stampsshould be determined on a household basis, anddefined“household”asincludingonlygroupsofrelatedindividuals. See,413U.S.at52930.ThisCourtfound

thattheterm“household”hadbeenlimitedtorelatedindividuals“topreventsocalled‘hippies’and‘hippiecommunes’ from participating in the food stampprogram.”413U.S.at535.

In invalidating the “household” classification,thisCourtheld:

If theconstitutionalconceptionofequalprotectionofthelawsmeansanything,itmustattheveryleastmeanthatabare

congressionaldesiretoharmapoliticallyunpopular group cannot constitute a

legitimate governmental interest. As aresult,apurposetodiscriminateagainsthippies cannot, in and of itself and


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without reference to some independentconsiderations in the public interest,

justifythe[classification].413U.S.at53435.

TheCourtagainaddressedtheanimusdoctrineinCity of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,473U.S.at432.ThecityofCleburne,Texas,hadrefusedtoissuea group home for mentally disabled individuals thespecialusepermitrequiredtooperatesuchahome.473U.S.at435.TheCourtheldthatthementallydisabledareneitherasuspectnoraquasisuspectclass, that

would requirea heightened standard of review.473U.S.at44247.

Despite applying rational basis review, thisCourtinvalidatedthezoningordinancethatrequiredhomesforthementallydisabledtoobtainaspecialusepermit,holdingthatthepermitrequirementappeared“torestonanirrationalprejudiceagainstthementallyretarded.”473U.S.at450.

In Romer v. Evans, this Court invalidated aColoradostatutethatrepealedanyordinanceorlaw

prohibitingdiscriminationagainsthomosexuals.517U.S.at620.TheCourtheldthat,in“theordinarycase,alawwillbesustainedifitcanbesaidtoadvancealegitimategovernmentinterest,evenifthelawseemsunwiseorworkstothedisadvantage ofaparticulargroup,or if the rationale for itseems tenuous,” andthat, “[b]y requiring that the classification bear arationalrelationshiptoanindependentandlegitimatelegislative end, [courts] ensure that classifications

are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantagingthegroup burdened by the law.” 517 U.S.at63233.

Quoting Moreno, theCourtheld:“thatabaredesiretoharmapoliticallyunpopulargroupcannotconstitutea legitimate governmental interest,” and that the


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Colorado law lacked any legitimate governmentalpurpose. 517 U.S. at 63435 (quoting United States

Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,413U.Sat534)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

InUnited States v.Windsor,thisCourtinvalidated§3oftheDefenseofMarriageAct, 1U.S.C. §7, 28U.S.C.§1738C(“DOMA”).Section3ofthatActdefinedmarriageasalegalunionbetweenonemanandonewoman.133S.Ct.at2683.ThisCourtnotedthat:“[i]ndeterminingwhetheralawismotivatedbyanimproperanimus or purpose, discriminations of an unusual

characterespeciallyrequirecarefulconsideration.”133S.Ct.at2693(citationsandinternalquotationmarks

omitted).TheCourtnotedthatDOMA’spurposewasto“identifyasubsetofstatesanctionedmarriagesandmakethemunequal,”ineffect,treatinglawfulsamesexmarriagesas“secondclassmarriages.”133S.Ct.at269394.

Inhis concurring opinion in Bishop v. Smith,Judge Holmes set out the correct interpretation ofthe animus doctrine. 760 F.3d. at 1096 (Holmes, J.,

concurring).TheTenthCircuit,inanopinionwrittenbyJudgeLucero, invalidatedanOklahomalaw thatprohibited issuing marriage licenses to samesexcouples.760F.3d.at1074.JudgeLucero,writingforthecourt,concludedthattheOklahomalawdenied“afundamentalrighttoallsamesexcoupleswhoseektomarryortohavetheirmarriagesrecognized.”760F.3d.at1081.

Neither the district court nor Judge Lucero

decidedthecaseonanimusgrounds.760F.3d.at1096.In fact, Judge Lucero did not address the animus

doctrine. 760 F.3d. at 107496. Judge Holmes wroteseparately,butstatedthathefullyagreedwithJudgeLucero’s conclusion and reasoning, including the


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decision nottoapply theanimusdoctrine. 760F.3d.at109697.JudgeHolmes’concurringopinionfocusedonthecontoursoftheanimusdoctrine,andexplainedwhyitdidnotapplyinthatcase. Id.,at1097.

Judge Holmes noted that the “hallmark ofanimusjurisprudenceisitsfocusonactuallegislativemotive.” Id., at 1099 (emphasis in original). Heassertedthatanunlawfulmotive“couldbeviewedasfallingsomewhereonacontinuumofhostilitytowardaparticulargroup.” Id.,at1099.“Ontheweakerendofthecontinuum,alegislativemotivemaybetosimply

excludeaparticulargroupfromone’scommunityfornoreasonotherthanan‘irrationalprejudice’harbored

against that group.” Id., at 1100 (quoting, City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,473U.S.,at450)“On the more extreme end of the continuum,

the legislative motive that implicates the animusdoctrine may manifest itself in a more aggressiveform—specifically, a ‘desire to harm a politicallyunpopulargroup.’” Id., at1100(quoting Moreno,413U.S.,at534)(emphasisomitted). JudgeHolmesstated

that,indeterminingwhetheralawhadbeenenactedbased on unlawful animus, a court should “explorechallengedlawsforsignsthattheyare,asastructuralmatter,aberrational inaway that advantagessomeanddisadvantagesothers.” Id.,at1100(emphasisinoriginal).Citing Romer and Windsor, Judge Holmesidentifiedtwostructuralaberrationsforwhichcourtsshould look.“Two types of structural aberrationareespecially germane here: (1) laws that imposewide

rangingandnovel deprivations upon thedisfavoredgroup; and (2) laws that stray from the historical

territoryofthelawmakingsovereignjusttoeliminateprivilegesthatagroupwouldotherwisereceive.” Id.,at 1100. He concluded that, once animus has been


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detected,acourtmustinvalidatethelaw. Id.,at1103.When a litigant presentsa colorable claim of

animus, the judicialinquirysearchesfortheseclues.Once the clues have been gathered, if animus is

detected,thelawfalls.Evenunderrationalbasisreview,the most forgiving of equalprotection standards, alawmuststillhavealegitimatepurpose.Alegislativemotive qualifying as animus is never a legitimatepurpose.Asaresult,onceanimushasbeendetected,theinquiryends:thelaw isunconstitutional. Id., at1103. However,astheTenthCircuithadpreviously

indicated, the animus doctrine applied only afteracourthaddetermined thatthere isno conceivable

purpose for passing a law other than an unlawfulanimus. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d. 1208,1224 (10th

Cir.2004). Applyingtheforegoinganalysistothefactsof

thecaseatbar,itisclearthattheKentuckyGeneral Assembly did not enact the statute defining civilmarriage baseduponunlawfulanimus, since ithadnonanimusbasedreasonsforadoptingthestatute.

Moreover, Petitioners’ reliance upon asuggestionofanimusinWindsorisnotdispositiveheresince,unliketheinstantcase,theWindsor Courtwasconcernedaboutthefederalgovernment’sretraction ofrights thathadbeen granted tosamesexcouplesinthosestateswhichrecognizedsuchmarriages. Inthiscase, the Commonwealth is neitherchanging coursenor withdrawing privileges previously granted, norretractingarightonceaccordedaclassofindividuals.

Those unable to marry in Kentucky,notwithstanding a personal desire to do so, include

individuals who have not yet attained theirmajority, and individuals within a certaindegree ofconsanguinity. The fact thatsuch lawsmayconflict


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with these individuals’ personal desires in no waysuggests that Kentucky harbors animosity towardsuchindividuals,hasdeemedthem“unworthy,”orhasrelegatedthemtosecondclassstatus.

Additionally, as a reading of the statute willshow,“love”isnotaprerequisiteforalawfulmarriageintheCommonwealth.Accordingly,themerepresenceof a “loving and committed relationship” does notrenderallcouples“similarlysituated.”Forexample,a

polygamoustriadwho profess“love” forone anotherandforeachother,failstosatisfyKentucky’sdefinition

ofmarriage.AstheSixthCircuitcorrectlynoted:There is no reason to think that threeorfouradults,whethergay,bisexual,orstraight,lackthecapacitytosharelove,affection, and commitment, or for thatmatter lack the capacity to be capable

(and more plentiful) parents. If it isconstitutionally irrational to stand bythe manwoman definition of marriage,it must be constitutionally irrational tostand by the monogamous definition of

marriage. DeBoer,772F.3d.at407.

For these reasons, Kentucky’s definition ofmarriage is neither constitutionally irrational nor

indicative of animus, but rather is legitimate, andis presumed to be constitutional. Petitioners havethe burden of proving otherwise and simply cannot“negative every conceivable basis which mightsupport it.” Heller v. Doe,509 U.S.312,320(1993).The term“marriage” hasbeenclearlydefinedinthe

CommonwealthofKentucky,firstbyjudicialdecisionin 1973 in Hallahan, by its legislature in 1998, by

overwhelming vote of its people in 2004, and most


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recentlybytheRespondentinthisaction.ThisCourt,therefore, ought notoverturn the longstanding andwellfoundedpublicpolicyofKentucky.


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CONCLUSION

TheKentuckySupremeCourtstated,in S.J.L.S.v. T.L.S.,265S.W.3d.804(Ky.App.2008):“Itisnotthisoranycourt’sroletojudgewhethertheLegislature’sprohibition of samesex marriage, or common lawmarriage, or bigamous marriage, or polygamousmarriage,ismorallydefensibleorsociallyenlightened.”

As Justice Kennedyobservedbeforea SenatepanelonMonday,March23,2015,“Itisnotnovelor

newforjusticestobeconcernedthattheyaremaking

so many decisions that affect a democracy, and wethinkaresponsible,efficient,responsivelegislativeandexecutivebranch…willalleviatesomeofthatpressure.”Thesweepingdecisionsof theCourtcausedtheUSATODAY SupremeCourtreportertoexclaim,“...neithertheexecutivenorlegislativebranchofgovernmenthashelda candle to the increased clout oftheSupremeCourt.” RichardWolf,On a Roll, High Court Reigns

Supreme, USA TODAY (March26,2015)at2B. Definingmarriage is constitutionally and historically under

thedomainofthestates. Amicirespectfully requestthat the Kentucky GeneralAssembly be unfetteredinfulfillingitslegislativeresponsibilitytoupholdthehistoricdefinitionofmarriageintheCommonwealth.TheCourt,therefore,shouldaffirmthedecisionoftheU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheSixthCircuit.

Respectfullysubmitted, Col.RonaldD.Ray RichardL.Masters CounselofRecord 1012SouthFourthStreetPostOfficeBox1136

Louisville,KY40203Crestwood,KY40014 (502)5822900(502)2415552


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APPENDIX


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APPENDIX LIST OF AMICI CURIAE

MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MEMBERS OF THE KENTUCKY SENATE

SENATE LEADERSHIP:

Robert Stivers II, PresidentKentucky Senate District 25

David Givens, President Pro TemKentucky Senate District 9

Damon Thayer, Majority Floor LeaderKentucky Senate District 17

Dan Seum, Majority Caucus ChairmanKentucky Senate District 38

Jimmy Higdon, Majority WhipKentucky Senate District 14

Ray Jones II, Minority Floor LeaderKentucky Senate District 31

Julian Carroll, Minority WhipKentucky Senate District 7

SENATORS:

Ralph AlvaradoKentucky Senate District 28

Joe BowenKentucky Senate District 8

Tom BufordKentucky Senate District 22

Jared CarpenterKentucky Senate District 34


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Danny CarrollKentucky Senate District 2

C.B. Embry, Jr. Kentucky Senate District 6

Carroll GibsonKentucky Senate District 5

Chris GirdlerKentucky Senate District 15

Ernie Harris

Kentucky Senate District 26

Paul HornbackKentucky Senate District 20

Stan HumphriesKentucky Senate District 1

Christian McDanielKentucky Senate District 23

Dennis ParrettKentucky Senate District 10

Dorsey RidleyKentucky Senate District 4

Albert RobinsonKentucky Senate District 21

John SchickelKentucky Senate District 11

Brandon SmithKentucky Senate District 30

Johnny Ray TurnerKentucky Senate District 29


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Robin WebbKentucky Senate District 18

Steve WestKentucky Senate District 27

Whitney WesterfeldKentucky Senate District 3

Mike WilsonKentucky Senate District 32

Max Wise

Kentucky Senate District 16

MEMBERS OF THE KENTUCKY HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES

HOUSE LEADERSHIP:

Greg Stumbo, Speaker of the HouseHouse District 95

Jody Richards, Speaker of the House Pro TemHouse District 20

Rocky Adkins, Majority Floor LeaderHouse District 99

Johnny Bell, Majority WhipHouse District 23

Jeff Hoover, Minority Floor LeaderHouse District 83

Stan Lee, Minority Caucus LeadershipHouse District 45

Jim DeCesare, Minority WhipHouse District 17


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REPRESENTATIVES:Lynn BechlerHouse District 4

Robert Benvenuti IIIHouse District 88

Kevin D. BratcherHouse District 29

Regina BunchHouse District 82

John CarneyHouse District 51

Larry ClarkHouse District 46

Hubert CollinsHouse District 97

Tim CouchHouse District 90

Will Coursey

House District 6

Ron CrimmHouse District 33

Mike DenhamHouse District 70

Bob M. DeWeeseHouse District 48

Myron DossettHouse District 9

Jim DuPlessisHouse District 25


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A5

Joseph M. FischerHouse District 68

David FloydHouse District 50

Jim GlennHouse District 13

Jim Gooch, Jr.House District 12

Jeff GreerHouse District 27

David HaleHouse District 74

Mike HarmonHouse District 54

Chris HarrisHouse District 93

Richard Heath

House District 2

Cluster HowardHouse District 91

Kenny ImesHouse District 5

Dennis KeeneHouse District 67

Thomas KerrHouse District 64

Kim KingHouse District 55


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Martha Jane King House District 16

Adam Koenig House District 69

Brian Linder House District 61

Donna MayfeldHouse District 73

Tom McKee House District 78

David Meade House District 80

Michael Meredith House District 19

Russ Meyer House District 39

Suzanne Miles

House District 7

Charles Miller House District 28

Jerry Miller House District 36

Terry Mills House District 24

Phil Moffett House District 32

Brad Montell House District 58


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Tim MooreHouse District 18

Rick G. NelsonHouse District 87

Ryan QuarlesHouse District 62

Marie RaderHouse District 89

Rick RandHouse District 47

Steve RiggsHouse District 31

Tom RinerHouse District 41

Bart RowlandHouse District 21

Steven Rudy

House District 1

Sal SantoroHouse District 60

Dean SchamoreHouse District 10

Jonathan ShellHouse District 71

John ShortHouse District 92

Kevin SinnetteHouse District 100


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14-574 members of the kentucky general assembly

Documents