136297_%28u-fouo%29 afnor
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FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ONLY MAY CONTAIN UP TO U/FOUO/LES INFORMATION
CONUS NORAD REGION
HQ 1ST AIR FORCE
AIR FORCES NORTHERN
CONR-1AF (AFNORTH)
FORCE PROTECTION SUMMARY (FPSUM)
49-11
02-08 DECEMBER 2011
UP TO: U//FOUO//LES WARNING: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of
installation personnel, equipment and facilities. The below information was extracted from various reports provided by sources within the Military, Law Enforcement,
Security and Antiterrorism communities. Contained within, information is compiled from open-source intelligence (OSINT)/unclassified information; therefore, information should be treated with due care. This collection of information is offered for informational purposes only and is not to be released either in written or oral
form to the media or the public without prior approval of the originating agency or person. It is not, and should not be construed to be, officially/formally evaluated
intelligence.
USNORTHCOM AOR FPCON STATUS:
USNORTHCOM DIRECTED BASELINE: ALPHA w/BRAVO measures 4, 5, 7, 10, 12 and 16 This condition applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or facilities,
the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON
BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs measures resulting
from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained
indefinitely.
Mexico in FPCON BRAVO as of 091725ZJAN09
TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL:
United States - SIGNIFICANT (DIA, 20 Sep 11)
Definition-Anti-US terrorists are present and attack personnel as their preferred method of operation or a group uses
large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method but has limited operational activity. The operating
environment is neutral. (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)
Canada - MODERATE (DIA, 20 Jun 11)
Definition- Terrorists are present but there are no indications of anti-U.S. activity. The Operating Environment
favors the Host Nation/U.S. (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)
Mexico - LOW (DIA, 14 May 11)
Definition- No group is detected or the group activity is non-threatening (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)
For updates to any USNORTHCOM AOR refer to the SIPR DIA website:
http://ctkb.dia.smil.mil/ctdb/country/ThreatChangeMatrix.jsp
National Terrorism Advisory System The National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, replaces the color-coded Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS). This new system will more effectively communicate information about
terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first
responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector.
Imminent Threat Alert
Warns of a credible,
specific, and impending
terrorist threat against the
United States.
Elevated Threat Alert
Warns of a credible
terrorist threat against the
United States.
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(U) Table of Contents
I. USNORTHCOM AOR THREAT INCIDENTS ......................................................................................... 3
A. MEXICO THREATS: .................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. (U//FOUO) WEEKLY FMSO INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEXICAN TCOs: .......................................................................... 3 2. (U//FOUO) LOS ZETAS LEADER FLEEING DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO ..................................................................... 4 3. (U) RING TRYING TO SMUGGLE IN GADHAFI SON DISMANTLED IN MEXICO .......................................................... 4 4. (U) POLICE CHIEF MURDERED IN COAHUILA ................................................................................................................... 5
B. CANADA REPORTS ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1. (U) CANADA-U.S. BORDER DEALS MERGE SECURITY CONCERNS WITH NEED FOR TRADE ................................ 5
II. DOD FOURTEEN CATEGORIES OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCIDENTS .................................. 6
A. ELICITING INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 1. (U//FOUO) MEMBER OF JIHADI FORUM LOOKING FOR BLUE PRINTS FOR THE PENTAGON ................................. 6
B. EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THREAT ........................................................................................................................................ 6 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS RESERVE AIRMAN DISPLAYED RADICAL VIEWS POPE AFB ........................................... 6 2. (U//FOUO) US ARMY PFC ADMITTED FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO HIMSELF AND ARMY RESERVISTS NJ ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
C. SURVEILLANCE ........................................................................................................................................................................... 7 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AT SHEPPARD AFB ..................................................................... 7 2. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS PHOTOGRAPHY AT THE NEW NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY (NSA) CONSTRUCTION SITE - UT .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
III. MISCELLANEOUS FORCE PROTECTION INFORMATION ............................................................ 8
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORIES ....................................................................................................................................... 8 1. (U//FOUO) PLANNED PORT PROTEST ALONG THE UNITED STATES WEST COAST .................................................. 8
B. WORLDWIDE OR TERRORIST TTPS ...................................................................................................................................... 8 1. (U//FOUO) FATHER OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI RELEASES VIDEO .................................................................................... 8 2. (U//FOUO) EXPLOSIVE DEVICE SENT TO BANK CEO GERMANY ............................................................................... 9
C. OTHER THAN DOD SUSPICIOUS INCIDENTS ...................................................................................................................... 9 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS MALE TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS ALONG AIRPORT FENCE LINE NH ............................... 9 2. (U//FOUO) POSSIBLE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF A VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE IN AUSTIN, TX ........................ 9
D. FP WATCH UPDATES ................................................................................................................................................................ 10 1. (U//FOUO) UPDATE: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY FROM 14 30 NOV AT FORT LEONARD WOOD MO ..................... 10 2. (U//FOUO) MILITARY A GROWING TERRORIST TARGET, LAWMAKERS WARN ..................................................... 10
E. AT/FP PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................... 11 1. (U//FOUO) PERIODIC FORCE PROTECTION BULLETINS ................................................................................................ 11
F. FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ISSUES .............................................................................................................................. 11 1. (U) TRAVELERS HEALTH..................................................................................................................................................... 11
G. FORCE PROTECTION DIRECTIVES/ADVISORIES RELEASED ..................................................................................... 11 1. (U//FOUO) USNORTHCOM FP ADVISORY 10-341 (2011 HOLIDAY SEASON) ............................................................... 11
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H. US GOVERNMENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS/ADVISORIES ........................................................................................... 11 1. (U) US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL WARNINGS/ALERTS .................................................................................. 11
I. AFNORTH FP PRIORITIES OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR) .................................................................... 12 1. AFNORTH FORCE PROTECTION PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (FP PIRs) ......................................... 12
J. AFNORTH FP WATCH WEBSITE ACCESS .......................................................................................................................... 14
K. AFNORTH FP WATCH CONTACT INFORMATION ........................................................................................................... 14
I. USNORTHCOM AOR THREAT INCIDENTS
A. MEXICO THREATS:
1. (U//FOUO) WEEKLY FMSO INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEXICAN TCOs:
- AUTHORITIES NARROWLY MISS ARRESTING EL LAZCA AND EL TALIBAN IN
FRESNILLO, ZACATECAS 01 DECEMBER 2011
On 15 November 2011, a joint air/land operation led to the arrest of a Zetas leader known as El
Aleman/El Comandante Aleman in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. Additional information regarding this operation
was reported as follows by the news media source Mundonarco:
It was carried out at a ranch and hotel in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. High ranking Los Zetas operators were
allegedly in the area to celebrate the birthday of El Talibn.
With this operation, authorities had hoped to arrest key Los Zetas operators to include:
o Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano aka El Lazca aka Z-3, a founder and the key
leader of the group
o Ivn Velzquez Caballero aka El Talibn aka El Z-50, the Los Zetas plaza
leader of Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potos, and part of Guanajuato
Just before the operation, El Lazca, El Taliban, and others were reportedly
present for a horse race being conducted as part of the birthday festivities, but
were tipped off about the raid prior to its initiation. This notice provided them
sufficient time to flee the scene and avoid capture.
Eyewitnesses reported to Mundonarco that U.S. agents participated in the operation.
- GUNFIGHT BETWEEN RIVAL GROUPS REPORTED IN CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA
05 DECEMBER 2011
A gunfight between two rival groups took place at the intersection
of Jimenez and Delicias Streets in the 9 de Septiembre
neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. A former judicial
police officer was wounded during this confrontation. Recovered
from this crime scene were 50 spent shell casings and a Toyota
pickup without plates.
- REMAINS OF DISMEMBERED VICTIM RECOVERED FROM TRASH CAN IN CIUDAD
JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA 05 DECEMBER 2011
On 05 December 2011, the chest and severed arms of an unidentified murder victim were recovered from
a trash can in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. The trash can in question was located at the intersection of
Iztaccihuatl and Xolotl Streets in the Del Real neighborhood.
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2. (U//FOUO) LOS ZETAS LEADER FLEEING DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO
(U//FOUO) The Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL) received information from
the DEA indicating Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano is preparing to enter the U.S. and
will engage law enforcement if encountered.
(U//FOUO) As of November 16, 2011, leader of the Los Zetas DTO, Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano,
was reportedly preparing to enter the U.S. in order to escape violence occurring in Mexico.
Reportedly, Lazcano will enter the U.S. by crossing the Rio Grande and may hide in Palmview, TX.
Lazcano allegedly will have a security detail and will engage U.S. Law Enforcement if approached.
(U) According to open source reporting, on November 15, 2011, the Mexican military conducted a
major operation to capture Lazcano-Lazcano in Fresnillo, Zacatecas, Mexico, but Lazcano fled prior
to the operation. (See story from FMSO above)
Source: DHS Intelligence Alert 02 Dec 2011
(U//FOUO) CONCLUSION: No additional information regarding specific dates or geographic area
for this threat is currently available. CBP OIIL will continue to monitor for additional information
and provide updates as warranted.
3. (U) RING TRYING TO SMUGGLE IN GADHAFI SON DISMANTLED IN MEXICO
A ring that was trying to smuggle Saadi Gadhafi, the son of late Libyan dictator Col. Moammar
Gadhafi, and his family into Mexico has been dismantled, officials said Wednesday.
Four suspects two Mexicans, a Canadian and a Dane involved in the scheme were arrested
during Operation Guest, Government Secretary Alejandro Poire said.
The suspects were trying to provide 38-year-old Saadi Gadhafi and his family with false Mexican
identification documents. The plan called for the Libyan businessman to acquire properties in
different parts of Mexico and establish his residence in Bahia de Banderas, a Pacific coastal town in
Nayarit state.
The suspects were identified as Cynthia Ann Ranier, a Canadian who is allegedly the gangs leader
and ran its finances; Gabriela Davila Huerta, a Mexican living in the United States who also used the
alias Gabriela Davila del Cueto, served as the logistics link
and contacted the document forgers; and Pierre Christian
Fleisborg, a Danish national who was in charge of logistics. The
fourth suspect was identified as Jose Luis Kennedy Prieto, a
Mexican citizen who was in charge of obtaining the false
documents.
The suspects face forgery, people trafficking, bank fraud and organized crime charges.
Saadi Gadhafi, who was born in 1973, commanded the Libyan Special Forces and is known for his
love of soccer.
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An arrest order was issued for Gadhafi by Interpol on Sept. 29 at the request of Libyas National
Transitional Council, which accuses him of taking properties via force or intimidation while serving
as head of the Libyan Soccer Federation.
Source: Borderlandbeat.com
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This information is provided for your situational awareness.
4. (U) POLICE CHIEF MURDERED IN COAHUILA
The police chief of Saltillo, the capital of the northern Mexican
state of Coahuila, and his 11-year-old son were killed by gunmen
while driving, prosecutors said Monday. Almaguer Perez and his
son were driving in their SUV when the gunmen opened fire on
them, the AG's office said.
Source: Borderlandbeat.com
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This information is provided for your situational awareness.
B. CANADA REPORTS
1. (U) CANADA-U.S. BORDER DEALS MERGE SECURITY CONCERNS WITH NEED FOR
TRADE
Prime Minister Stephen Harper is hailing a new set of border
agreements between Canada and the United States as a merger
between security concerns and the need for commerce and travel.
Harper says the deals on perimeter security and regulatory
harmonization represent the most significant steps forward in
Canada-U.S. co-operation since the North American Free Trade
Agreement. In the text of a speech delivered after a meeting with
President Barack Obama in Washington, Harper says the agreements
create a "new, modern border for a new century." The prime minister
says Canada shares U.S. security concerns, but he adds measures to
deal with criminal and terrorist threats can thicken the border and
hinder efforts to create jobs and growth. He calls the border deals
"practical steps to reverse that direction." Both countries agree the best way to deal with trouble is with
smarter systems at the continental perimeter, minimizing multiple inspections of freight and baggage . "We also believe that, just as threats should be stopped at the perimeter, trusted travellers should cross the border
more quickly," Harper said. "Indeed, these priorities are complementary: The key that locks the door against
terrorists also opens a wider gate to cross-border trade and travel." The second joint initiative will reduce
regulatory barriers to trade by streamlining and aligning standards "where it makes sense to do so."
"Naturally, in this area, as in all others, no loss of sovereignty is contemplated by either of our governments,"
Harper said. "Every rule needs a reason," he added, and "where no adequate reason exists for a rule or
standard, and that standard hinders us from doing business on both sides of the border, that rule needs to be
re-examined."
Source: Joint Base Lewis-McChord Protection Daily (07 Dec 2011)
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This information is provided for your situational awareness.
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II. DOD FOURTEEN CATEGORIES OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCIDENTS
A. ELICITING INFORMATION
Suspicious questioning of personnel by any means about particular DoD structures, functions, personnel, or procedures at the facility or infrastructure.
1. (U//FOUO) MEMBER OF JIHADI FORUM LOOKING FOR BLUE PRINTS FOR THE
PENTAGON
On 6 December 2011, a member of the Shumukh al-Islam, a top tier Al-Queda forum, initiated a discussion
thread he was requesting plans, blue-prints, for the Pentagon. He did not mention why he wanted these plans,
and only four responses have been observed. These responses included a diagram of the Pentagon and another
advised he should do a Google search. The translated request read as follows:
I need plans for the Pentagon building. Peace be upon
you and Allahs mercy and blessings. Proud brothers
and sisters, just as in the title, who can assist me, let
him not be stingy, and his recompense shall be with
Allah. The blue prints are available. I found them then
I lost them, Allah will help. George Edwin is the
building designer. Your brother Laith.
Source: eGuardian FLFCUCFIX-2011-00002
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This message is provided for situational awareness.
B. EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THREAT
A threat to DoD personnel or threatened damage to or compromise of a DoD facility or infrastructure.
1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS RESERVE AIRMAN DISPLAYED RADICAL VIEWS POPE
AFB
On 4 December 2011, an identified reserve airmen was admitted to Womack Army Medical
Hospital, Ft Bragg; for a mental health evaluation. The airmen stated on an identified social
networking site that he was denouncing his American citizenship to join the Moorish American
Nation. He further posted he converted to Islam, joined the Moorish American Nation, and changed
his name. The airman held a TS/SCI, and it was revealed his brother held more radical views than
he. Upon arriving at Womack the airman shut down and tried to flee. His overnight bag was
subsequently searched and a loaded .40 caliber weapon was discovered.
Source: SKIWEB
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Individuals with a security clearance acting radically present
a unique challenge to force protection as their access to facilities with increased security measures
routinely goes unfettered. Members are reminded to report suspicious activity to appropriate
authorities. This matter is currently under investigation.
2. (U//FOUO) US ARMY PFC ADMITTED FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AS A
POSSIBLE THREAT TO HIMSELF AND ARMY RESERVISTS NJ
On 22 November 2011, an identified US Army PFC was admitted to Lourdes Medical Center for
psychiatric evaluation. While training at Ft. Dix, NJ this individual told other soldiers he wanted to
shoot himself. During the evaluation he told the social worker since he was 14 he had the urge to
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shoot others. He also said he wanted to kill all of his fellow reserve soldiers.
Source: eGuardian NJFBINK00-2011-00269
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Ft Dix is a joint base with McGuire AFB. Numerous Air Force
personnel routinely find themselves working/training on Ft Dix. Although there was no direct threat
to Air Force personnel awareness must be given due to the proximity of this threat.
C. SURVEILLANCE
Monitoring the activity of DoD personnel, facilities, processes, or systems, including showing unusual interest in a facility, infrastructure, or personnel (e.g.,
observation through binoculars, taking notes, drawing maps or diagrams of the facility, and taking pictures or video of a facility, infrastructure, personnel, or the
surrounding environment) under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to perceive a threat to DoD personnel, facilities, or forces in transit.
1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AT SHEPPARD AFB
On 7 November 2011, two AF police officers witnessed an unidentified individual pacing in front of
a dining facility frequented by numerous military personnel and he appeared to have something
concealed under his clothing. This individual was described as possibly Middle Eastern. Security
Forces personnel responded but were unable to locate the individual. Approximately one week later,
witnesses reported an unidentified male, matching the same description as the individual mentioned
above, examining two water fountains at Sheppard AFB.
Source: eGuardian TXAFXSAFB-2011-00001
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This unusual behavior appears to be the same person and
stood out to numerous witnesses as suspicious. It is unknown if his actions are surveillance or simply
happenstance. Members are reminded suspicious activity such as this should be reported to the
proper authorities.
2. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS PHOTOGRAPHY AT THE NEW NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
(NSA) CONSTRUCTION SITE - UT
On 10 November 2011, a dark grey pick-up truck was observed parked on the shoulder. Out of the
drivers side window a large zoom lens was observed pointed in the direction of Camp Williams and
the new NSA server facility construction site. This vehicle was observed a second time in a different
location taking additional photos.
Source: eGuardian UTFCUSIAC-2011-00006
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This message is provided for situational awareness.
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III. MISCELLANEOUS FORCE PROTECTION INFORMATION
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORIES
1. (U//FOUO) PLANNED PORT PROTEST ALONG THE UNITED STATES WEST COAST
According to their official website, on 12 December 2011,
participants of the Occupy Movement intend to interrupt commercial
port operations in Anchorage, AK; Seattle, WA; Tacoma, WA;
Portland, OR; Longview, CA; Oakland, CA; Port Hueneme, CA; Los
Angeles/Long Beach, CA; and San Diego, CA. Sympathizers of this
West Coast Port Blockade seek to disrupt commerce at various
West Coast commercial ports in order to emphasize principles
supported by the Occupy Wall Street Movement.
Source: DTS-036-340-2011
MTAC COMMENTS: Based on fleet and NCIS field component liaison, as
well as open source research, MTAC is unaware of any current information
indicating protestors aim to target military installations, operations or
personnel. While the recent Occupy Oakland protest, held on 2 November
2011, demonstrates the possibility of heightened civil disturbance, MTAC is
not aware of any information to suggest that protestors aim to use violence
against individuals leaving or entering the identified ports. MTAC advises DON personnel to remain alert to
the possibility of civil disturbances that may lead to conflict between protestors and law enforcement and to
avoid these areas. MTAC remains engaged with other law enforcement agencies regarding this situation and
will pass relevant information as it becomes available.
B. WORLDWIDE OR TERRORIST TTPS
1. (U//FOUO) FATHER OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI RELEASES VIDEO
In an English-language video, college professor and former Fulbright Scholar, Nasser al-Aulaqi
condemned the death of his son in a US missile strike on 30 September 2011, and called on Western
Muslims to continue his son's jihadist teachings. The video was posted on YouTube on 2 December
2011, and was played at a London protest condemning US drone strikes in Muslim countries;
according to open source media, the video had only been viewed ten times online as of 4 December
2011. In the video Nasser reiterates there was no evidence presented against his son and that "no one
was concerned with justice"; he also claims the death of his grandson, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, was
"murder by a state gone mad," claiming that he was not operationally involved in terrorism.
Source: NGB J34 and New York Daily News (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/dad-u-s-
terrorist-anwar-al-awlaki-son-blood-vain-article-1.986595#ixzz1fg1UCGL8)
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: The authenticity of this video is unknown at this time. Despite
this, the death of Al-Awlaki and this video have the potential to influence lone-wolf attackers within
the United States. On Friday, U.S. Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano said the risk of
"lone wolf" attackers, with no ties to known extremist networks or grand conspiracies, is on the rise
as the global terrorist threat has shifted. Lone-wolf attackers may need only an influential push to
move them to act.
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2. (U//FOUO) EXPLOSIVE DEVICE SENT TO BANK CEO GERMANY
A report of a confirmed mail (package) explosive device was
addressed and sent to CEO, Dr. Joseph Ackermann of Deutsche Bank
in Frankfurt, Germany. The package was detected by x-ray
technology inside the mail room. The package did not detonate. An
investigation is ongoing.
Source: NYPD Shield
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Suspicious packages remain a constant concern as a force
protection issue to Air Force members and facilities. Members are reminded if they receive a
package they deem suspicious they should notify the proper authorities.
C. OTHER THAN DOD SUSPICIOUS INCIDENTS
1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS MALE TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS ALONG AIRPORT FENCE
LINE NH
On 28 November 2011, a suspicious individual was identified taking photographs along an airport
fence line in Londonderry, NH. Police officers questioned the man, but he denied taking
photographs. They searched his cell phone with his permission and found a single, blurry photograph
of a Southwest Airlines plane. The individual explained he was off of work and was out sightseeing.
Source: eGuardian MAFBIBS00-2011-00168
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This incident by itself seems rather innocent; however, a
similar incident reported in March, involved three individuals of the same nationality, same last
name, all living in the same area, which makes this particular incident more suspicious in nature.
2. (U//FOUO) POSSIBLE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF A VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE IN
AUSTIN, TX
On 17 November 2011, a contract security officer at the
Veterans Affairs Finance Service Center observed a vehicle
stopped on the east end of the facility. The individual inside
appeared to utilize a video camera. When the officer asked
whether the individual was waiting on someone the individual
stated no and indicated he was waiting for a friend from
another building. The individual would not look at the officer
and did not answer who he was waiting on. The officer called
another officer over and as the second officer approached the individual made a U-turn and drove
off.
Source: eGuardian TXFBISA00-2011-00041
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This message is provided for situational awareness.
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D. FP WATCH UPDATES
1. (U//FOUO) UPDATE: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY FROM 14 30 NOV AT FORT LEONARD
WOOD MO
The Threat Working Group Intelligence Fusion Cell released a Suspicious Activity Summary
highlighting three similar attempts to gain access to the Fort Leonard Wood installation. The
following is a recap on each of these incidents:
1. On 14 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males entered the Visitor Control Center (VCC) and
requested information and directions to the Main PX, claiming they were interested in selling
trinkets at the PX. After asking questions they departed in a silver 4-door vehicle.
2. On 27 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males entered the West Gate Visitor Center. The men
requested information and directions to the Main PX claiming they heard it was good place
to eat. They were instructed to pull their vehicle into the inspection point. The two departed
and attempted to access in two vehicles (white 4-door & blue 4-door). Each occupied by 4
individuals. Instructed to depart the installation after MOBILISA was unable to verify
identity of all occupants.
3. On 30 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males attempted to access FLW via the North Gate.
They were directed to the Inspection Lane where their IDs were verified through NCIC. One
individual presented a Valid MO DL, the other a MO Temp DL and Tulsa OK School ID.
After the verification the individuals departed the Inspection Lane, NFI.
Source: USNORTHCOM J34 LETIC
INTELLIGENCE FUSION CELL COMMENT: Three incidents in 3-weeks of suspicious activity
involving individuals attempting to gather information regarding the base, requirements for access,
and the post shopping area (PX). In each incident access was denied, with the last access granted
and individuals allow to proceed. It is unknown what activity occurred after obtaining access.
2. (U//FOUO) MILITARY A GROWING TERRORIST TARGET, LAWMAKERS WARN
There is growing evidence that homegrown terrorists see military personnel
and bases as legitimate, high-value targets, lawmakers said ahead of a joint
session of the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees on
Wednesday. "People in uniform are symbols of the United States. They're
symbols of America power, symbols of America might," Rep. Peter King of
New York, the Republican chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, told Fox News. "And if they (military personnel) can be killed,
then that is a great propaganda victory for Al Qaeda." King said there is also
evidence that extremists have joined the services. "There is a serious threat
within the military from people who have enlisted who are radical jihadists," King stated. "The
Defense Department is very concerned about them. They feel they're a threat to the military both for
what they can do within the military itself and also because of the weapons skills they acquire while
they're in the military."
Source: DHS Terrorism Report
Peter King (R-NY)
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AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENTS: Within the last week Pope AFB saw the threat of an airman
with radical views. This threat was deterred by fellow airman remaining observant and alerting law
enforcement personnel. Fort Hood has also seen the horrific tragedy a lone-wolf soldier with radical
views can have. It is imperative we remain aware of these threats and report suspicious activity to
the appropriate authorities.
E. AT/FP PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS
1. (U//FOUO) PERIODIC FORCE PROTECTION BULLETINS
Recently Added to the AFNORTH FP WATCH PORTAL HOMEPAGE
Classification and Title Source
1. (U//FOUO) Behavioral Indicators Offer Insights for Spotting Extremists National Counterterrorism Center
2. (U//FOUO//LES) Texas Gang Threat Assessment Texas Department of Public Safety
3. (U//FOUO) Terrorist Tactics Against US Government Facilities DHS-FBI Roll Call Release
4. (U//FOUO) Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities US House of Representatives
See below headline AFNORTH ATFP WEBSITE ACCESS instructions to view these bulletins
F. FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ISSUES
1. (U) TRAVELERS HEALTH
Air Force Public Health offers information to assist DOD travelers--active duty, reserve, guard, and
family members--and their healthcare providers decide which vaccines, medications, and other
actions are necessary to prevent illness during international travel--official or leisure. Contact the
Public Health office at your nearest AF Base for assistance before you go. (Public Health is part of
the base Medical Group.)
G. FORCE PROTECTION DIRECTIVES/ADVISORIES RELEASED
1. (U//FOUO) USNORTHCOM FP ADVISORY 10-341 (2011 HOLIDAY SEASON)
- Click on the link to see this and other USNORTHCOM Messages (registration will be required)
Source: USNORTHCOM/J34
AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: USNORTHCOM is publishing this Force Protection Advisory
to raise awareness to potential attacks against DOD personnel and facilities during the 2011 holiday
season.
H. US GOVERNMENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS/ADVISORIES
1. (U) US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL WARNINGS/ALERTS
The Department of State Travel Warnings/Alerts is updated frequently and should
be monitored at least weekly for troops deploying and on leave. Copy and paste the
URL below into your web browser for further details regarding current travel alerts.
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html
USNORTHCOM AOR Location Mexico: 04/22/2011 Travel Alert
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I. AFNORTH FP PRIORITIES OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)
1. AFNORTH FORCE PROTECTION PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (FP PIRs)
In order to focus collection and analysis efforts AFNORTH developed FP PIRs to drive information
collections across the USNORTHCOM AOR. We are actively seeking the reporting of these requirements to
the FP Watch for the purpose of analysis and sharing. DODI 2000.26 states Those responsible for protecting
DoD resources must have timely access to properly acquired FP threat information, particularly information
that indicates a potential threat regarding those who want to attack the U.S., their plans, capabilities and
activities, and the targets that they intend to attack. We are listing the AFNORTH FP PIRs below to socialize
them in order to increase reporting. They are also available on our SharePoint website at the hyperlink above.
1. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 1 - (Attack): Are there indications of a possible or actual attack within the USNORTHCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR) Area of Operation (AO) effecting DOD and/or Air Force (AF) personnel or assets from any entity group or
individual?
1.1. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of a possible or actual attack involving an individual/group actively engaged in killing or
attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area? What tactics are being used, how many attackers are there,
weaponry, hostages, multiple targets, and are they mobile?
1.2. (U//FOUO) Does a threat exist from a known or suspected transnational or domestic terrorist group(s); organized criminal
enterprises; transnational criminal organizations (TCO); foreign intelligence services (FIS); sympathizers or individuals
(Lone Wolf) against DOD/AF personnel, families, resources, and/or infrastructures?
1.3. (U//FOUO) What tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) might these groups use (i.e., eliciting information; test or
attempting restricted area access; hoax threats; remote/local surveillance; loss or theft of uniforms/equipment/materials; theft
or acquisition of resource/material)?
1.4. (U//FOUO) What capabilities/weapons do these groups possess for deployment of an attack against USNORTHCOMs
AOR (i.e., Weapons of Mass Destruction; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE);
environmental destruction; or Man-Portable Air Defense System)?
1.5. (U//FOUO) Has there been any theft or wrongful appropriation of CBRNE agents, munitions parts, precursors, or specialized
equipment used in handling/processing CBRNE material within the USNORTHCOM AOR or the vicinity of an DOD
asset/location?
1.6. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of recruitment, training, weapons acquisition or assembly/fundraising by these groups
inside the US or overseas with the intent to transit capability into the US (i.e., suspicious attempts to gain employment at
critical facilities/security units/outside vendors with access to critical DOD/AF facilities; attempts to recruit insiders to
support/advance criminal activities planning or execution; information that identifies plans for deception, diversionary
tactics, or planned security breaches)?
2. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 2 - (Leadership): Are there known information, threats, and/or plans which could precede an attempt to
harm, kidnap, or impede any other personal security to the President of the United States (POTUS), or other senior officials
whose security is supported by AF personnel, or COCOM Commander, or any other high risk personnel (HRP) residing
in/transiting the USNORTHCOM AOR?
3. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 3 - (POL-MIL): Has any other incident/event occurred in the US, or allied nation/nation of interest that
could be of immediate concern to USNORTHCOM AOR based on its nature, gravity, potential for adverse political/military
publicity or potential consequences (i.e., assassination/attempt, deployment of forces into/near the areas of conflict)?
4. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 4 - (FPCON Change): Has a Force Protection Condition (FPCON) change notification (raising or
lowering) been received within the USNORTHCOM AOR?
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4.1. (U//FOUO) Has there been a change in USNORTHCOM FPCON baseline or has an USAF directed Force Protection
Condition Alerting Message (FPCAM) been received (this includes any additional measures other than RAMS)?
4.2. (U//FOUO) Has there been a change in FPCON at any MAJCOM or Installation?
5. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 5 - (Criminal Activity): Has criminal activity in a crisis area exceeded the capabilities of local law
enforcement within the USNORTHCOM AOR?
5.1. (U//FOUO) Is there an off-installation riot, sabotage, illegal/serious disturbance, demonstration, or disruption effort targeted
at DOD/AF and in a manner that directly threatens personnel, facilities, property, or missions?
5.1.1. (U//FOUO) Are there any illegal direct threats or injury to DOD/AF personnel, facilities or property that occur
during what began as a legally-sanctioned off-installation demonstration?
5.1.2. (U//FOUO) Have there been any indications of conspiracy or conduct of illegal acts against DOD/AF (i.e.,
blocking DOD/AF convoys)?
5.2. (U//FOUO) Are there any agenda-driven activities, or hate crimes, directed against DOD personnel, infrastructure, resources,
or critical information systems with the intent of degrading or disrupting the DOD/AF mission?
5.3. (U//FOUO) Have there been any thefts or losses associated with a DOD/AF facility or infrastructure (i.e., badges, uniforms,
identification cards, emergency vehicles, technology or documents) that are proprietary to the facility?
5.3.1. (U//FOUO) Have there been instances of misusing or presenting false insignia, documents or identification, or
engaging in any other activity to misrepresent ones affiliation?
5.4. (U//FOUO) Has there been any theft of military arms, ammunition or explosives (AA&E) that have not been rendered inert
(i.e., missile, rocket, mine, mortar, artillery shell, automatic-fire weapon, fragmentation, concussion, phosphorous, high-
explosive grenade, other explosives, detonation cord, and/or blasting caps), and actual or attempted break-ins of weapons
rooms or storage areas?
5.5. (U//FOUO) Has there been a bomb/explosive incident(s) resulting in death or injury to DOD/AF personnel/property, that is
suspected or determined not to be an accident?
5.6. (U//FOUO) Has there been any reported association or communication of a DOD/AF affiliated person in support of a
terrorist, extremist, supremacist, gang, or organized criminal organization?
5.7. (U//FOUO) Are there any incidents or reports of an individual or group missing (i.e., unusual short absences of government
employees and/or foreign national student absences without leave) that may have the intent or capability to harm AF
personnel/resources?
6. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 6 - (Cyber): Were DOD/AF information systems affected by an attempted or unauthorized entry from an
external or internal threat within the USNORTHCOM AOR?
6.1. (U//FOUO) Were DOD/AF systems destroyed or stolen by an unauthorized individual or organization (i.e., cyber attacks;
loss and/or serious disruption of essential communications)?
6.2. (U//FOUO) Are there potential threats to DOD/AF government computer and/or communication networks (i.e., leaks in
classified information that could compromise mission/operation and cause loss of life; access to encrypted communication
radios)?
7. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 7 - (Disaster): Are there potential threats to DOD/AF personnel or equipment during natural disasters,
man-made disasters, or other events causing loss of life and large scale evacuations, potentially requiring support from DOD/AF
within the USNORTHCOM AOR?
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7.1. (U//FOUO) What environmental incidents (earthquakes; tsunamis; tidal waves; wild fires; hurricanes; typhoons; cyclones;
floods; avalanches; tornados; etc.) could affect USNORTHCOM AOR and to what extent and timing?
7.2. (U//FOUO) What local, state, and federal infrastructure damage exists potentially degrading the capabilities of first
responders in the USNORTHCOM AOR?
7.3. (U//FOUO) What conditions of major lines of communication, airports, coastal navigation, interstate highways,
energy/power networks, and railroads impact AFNORTH personnel or assets (leased facilities; critical infrastructure;
transiting forces; etc.)?
8. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 8 - (Medical Threats): Are there any potential medical threats to the USNORTHCOM AOR?
8.1. (U//FOUO) Does the potential for a pandemic event exist within the USNORTHCOM AOR that could affect DOD/AF
operations?
8.2. (U//FOUO) Are there indicators that a group or individual is attempting to secure biological weapons or samples for the
purpose of targeting DOD/AF personnel within the USNORTHCOM AOR?
9. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 9 - (Mexico\Canada): What are the current threats and environment in neighboring countries that could
affect DOD/AF personnel and assets within USNORTHCOM AOR (continental US (lower 48), Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto
Rico, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, St. Pierre & Miquelon, Turks & Caicos, and US Virgin Islands)?
9.1. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of targeting, surveillance, or information collection on DOD/AF personnel and/or assets?
9.2. (U//FOUO) Are areas experiencing emergent or increased violence and/or criminal activity from criminal organizations
where DOD/AF personnel may be operating?
9.3. (U//FOUO) Is there anti-US sentiment in the area that may harass or harm personnel?
References:
USNORTHOM J34 Law Enforcement Threat Information Requirements (LETIR)
CDRCONR-1AF (AFNORTH) Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)
J. AFNORTH FP WATCH WEBSITE ACCESS
The FPSUM, as well as plans and information sharing products, is posted to the CONR - 1st AF (AFNORTH) FP WATCH website. This
site allows more information to be posted within and aside from the FPSUMs, which have been sent via E-mail in the past. Access will be
granted to those needing access via a registration process, as the FP WATCHpage must be entered through the NORAD-NORTHCOM
Portal. A formal Request for Information (RFI) process is available on the website for MAJCOM ATOs to inquire about AT/FP related
issues.
To register for access, please follow the instructions detailed at the following URL:
Once registration completed and access granted, the direct link to the AFNORTH FP WATCH webpage is:
https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/afnorth/Directorates/A7/Force%20Protection/AT-FP/default.aspx.
SIPR http://conr.tyndall.af.smil.mil/directorates/a7/antiterrorism/default.aspx
NOTE: No registration required for SIPR access
K. AFNORTH FP WATCH CONTACT INFORMATION
1AF (AFNORTH)/A7SA
Security Forces & Force Protection Division
AFNORTH FP WATCH
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1214 Beacon Beach Road
Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5545
DSN: 523-5678/5832
Comm: 850-283-5678/5832
NIPRNet: [email protected]
SIPRNet: [email protected]
RELCAN: [email protected]
JWICS: [email protected]