Part II The Basics of Japans Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability Chapter 2 The New National Defense Program Guidelines Section 1. History of the National Defense Program Guidelines

Until now, Japan has developed its defense force and conducted its defense program based on the most

appropriate methods, in line with the international environment, current situation of the SDF, conditions

in the countries around Japan, and economic and fiscal conditions. The National Defense Program

Guidelines (NDPG) set forth the basic policies for Japans security, as well as a basic guideline for

Japans defense force in the future, including the significance and role of Japans defense force, the

specific organization of the SDF, and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built up.

In this chapter, Section 1 describes the history of the NDPG, and Sections 2 and 3 describe the contents

and the background to the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and

beyond (the new NDPG), approved in December 2010.

Reference 7 (pxx)

Section 1. History of the National Defense Program Guidelines

After 1958, Japan developed its defense force gradually based on four versions of defense development

programs and The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond1 (1976 NDPG) was

first approved by the National Defense Council2 and the Cabinet in October 1976 to clarify the level of

defense force which the country ought to maintain and as a guideline for matters including the modality

for developing Japans national defense capacity. Thereafter, in view of significant changes in

international relations represented by the end of the Cold War and rising expectations for the role of the

SDF, including in areas such as international activities, The National Defense Program Guidelines for

FY1996 and beyond3 (1995 NDPG) was formulated in November 1995. Further, in light of the fact that

issues such as activities by international terrorist organizations and the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and ballistic missiles were becoming shared concerns within the international community,

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond4 (2004 NDPG) was drawn up in

December 2004. Both the 1995 NDPG and the 2004 NDPG were approved by the Security Council and

the Cabinet. Based on these NDPG, Japan has drawn up its Mid-Term Defense Program every five years

since 1986 and has built up, maintained, and operated its defense capabilities to the present day.

(See Fig. II-2-1-1)

This section sets out the points of the NDPG that Japan has formulated until the present day5.

1. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond (1976 NDPG)

The characteristics of the 1976 NDPG were that it incorporated the Basic Defense Force Concept as the

basic concept behind the defense program, and, at the same time, it stipulated clearly the specific goals or

levels of defense capabilities that should be built up under this concept.

The 1976 NDPG was formulated against the background of the dtente in the 1970s6, and recognized the

state of international relations at the time as follows: 1) Generally, there was a low possibility for a

full-scale military conflict between the East and the West, given various efforts to stabilize international

relations; and 2) In Japans neighboring regions, the balance among the United States, China, and the

Soviet Union, as well as the presence of Japan-U.S. security arrangements, played a significant role in

preventing an actual invasion of Japan.

Based on the premise that these conditions would not undergo any major changes for the foreseeable

future, the 1976 NDPG set forth the following as the defense force that Japan should have:

1) to be equipped with the various functions required for defense,

2) to focus on keeping a balanced posture in that organization and equipment, including the logistics

support organization;

3) with that, to be on full alert even during peacetime, and, at the same time,

4) to be able to handle situations up to limited and small-scale invasions effectively, and

5) when the situation escalates and a new defense posture is needed, to be able to make a smooth

transition to the necessary state of defense.

The above were laid out under the Basic Defense Force Concept. The defense capability, which had

developed gradually based on four defense capability development programs, was then considered to be

at almost the same level as the goals of this concept, in terms of its scale.

Furthermore, in the 1976 NDPG, as part of the Concept of Defense, the fundamental point concerning

the defense of Japan was that it should forestall and prevent the invasion of Japan through the possession

of an appropriate scale of defense force and build up a defense system that is capable of dealing with any

form of invasions, alongside with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

In other words, the Basic Defense Force Concept introduced in the 1976 NDPG was the notion that

focused on preventing invasions to Japan and centered on the deterrence effect.

2. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and beyond (1995 NDPG)

The 1995 NDPG, drawn up approximately 20 years after the 1976 NDPG, was formulated in

consideration of rising expectations for the role of the SDF, in view of significant changes in international

relations such as the end of the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping operations and responses to the Great

Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster.

Stating that, until then, Japans defense force had been developed based on the Basic Defense Force

Concept of owning the minimal basic defense capabilities needed by an independent country, not to

become a power vacuum that produces instability in the region, rather than directly confronting military

threats to Japan, the 1995 NDPG continued this concept7.

After the end of the Cold War with the nominal and virtual collapse of the Soviet Union, a review was

carried out with the following results: 1) in the future, various efforts to stabilize international relations,

despite being fraught with opacity and uncertainties, would continue, and 2) the Japan-U.S. security

arrangements will continue to play an important role with regard to Japans security as well as the peace

and stability of the surrounding region. Based on these assessments, it was judged that the premises

behind this concept remain unchanged, and it was decided that Japan should take the same fundamental

stance as in the 1976 NDPG.

On the other hand, with regard to the contents of the defense capabilities that Japan should have, while

keeping a close eye on cuts of military forces and changes to the military situation in some of the

countries close to Japan, it was deemed necessary to review the concrete modality and to establish the

most efficient and appropriate defense capabilities. In addition, in consideration of changes in internal and

external conditions as well as the position that Japan is placed in among the international community, on

top of its main role of ensuring the defense of Japan, the SDF should also take on the roles of responding

to various contingencies such as large-scale disasters and contributing to the creation of a more stable

security environment, as and when necessary and in an appropriate manner.

The 1995 NDPG reviewed the scale and functions of Japans defense capability in line with the

abovementioned considerations. By further rationalizing, streamlining, and compacting defense

capabilities while taking steps to enhance the necessary functions and make qualitative improvements to

defense capabilities, it would be appropriate for Japan to develop defense capabilities that could

effectively respond to various contingencies, and, at the same time, which could ensure an appropriate

degree of flexibility in order to respond smoothly as the situation changes.

As described above, the characteristic of the 1995 NDPG was that it reviewed the scale and functions of

defense capabilities while continuing the Basic Defense Force Concept. On top of that, it placed the focus

on utilizing the capabilities of the SDF not just for Japans defense, but also in various other fields.

3. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond (2004 NDPG)

The 2004 NDPG was formulated based on the assessment that new guidelines on Japans security and

defense capabilities were necessary, in view of the need to respond to new threats and a multitude of

issues, such as the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well

as activities by international terrorist organizations. The characteristics of the 2004 NDPG are as follows.

1) Basic principles of security policy (Two objectives, three approaches)

The basic principles of security policy, premised by the modality of defense capability, have the following

two objectives: 1) prevention of direct threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that they do, repelling

them and minimizing any damage, and 2) improvement of the international security environment to

reduce the potential that threats will reach Japan. In order to achieve these two objectives, the objectives

were combined with three approaches in an integrated manner. The three approaches were Japans own

efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community.

2) New concept for defense force (shifting emphasis from deterrence effects to response capability)

Under a new security environment and in consideration of the facts that 1) the previous deterrence

effect would not necessarily function effectively due to the possibility of the sudden occurrence of new

threats and a multitude of events that are difficult to predict, and that 2) in order to consolidate peace and

safety in Japan, peace and stability in the international community is essential, and it is necessary to

participate in international peace cooperation activities voluntarily and actively, the 2004 NDPG assessed

that it was becoming difficult to develop defense capabilities based solely on the Basic Defense Force

Concept that focuses on the deterrence effects of owning defense capabilities and was centered around the

defense of Japan.

With regard to future defense force, while retaining the effective parts8 of the Basic Defense Force

Concept, it was deemed necessary to develop capabilities that could respond effectively to new threats

and various contingencies and that could participate in international peace cooperation activities

voluntarily and actively.

Furthermore, even as the role of defense force became more diversified as described above, there was a

need to pay attention to issues such as the decrease in the size of the young population in tandem with low

fertility rates, and increasingly difficult financial conditions.

In view of the above, Japans defense force needs multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense

capabilities that are equipped with high readiness, mobility, flexibility, and versatility, and reinforced by

advanced technology in line with trends in military technology standards and intelligence capabilities and

that can respond effectively to various contingencies through the flexible deployment of SDF units and

multifunctional defense equipment, aimed at achieving greater results with limited resources.

With the assessment of a decreasing likelihood of full-scale invasions against Japan, fundamental reviews

of equipment and personnel that had been maintained against full-scale invasions were carried out, and

efforts were to be made to streamline. At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of

defense force is to respond to full-scale invasions, and that such capabilities cannot be reconstructed over

a short period of time, it was decided that the most fundamental part of such capability was retained.

3) Other

In both the 1976 NDPG and 1995 NDPG, the target period for achieving defense capability objectives as

set out in the Guidelines, as well as the review of the Guidelines themselves, were not stipulated clearly.

However, the 2004 NDPG stated clearly that the modality of the defense force should be taken for the

next ten years, while the Guidelines should be reviewed and revised as necessary five years after

formulation, or in the event of significant changes to the situation9.

As described above, the characteristics of the 2004 NDPG are that it clearly stipulated the basic principles

for Japans security policy, and laid out the modality for the new defense force based on these basic

principles and that it put a stronger emphasis on response capability, while retaining the effective parts

of the Basic Defense Force Concept.

At the same time, with regard to joint development and production with the United States and items

contributory to support for anti-terror and anti-piracy measures, the statement provides that a conclusion

will be reached upon the review of each individual case, according to the basic principle of a peaceful

country to avoid the promotion of international conflicts in the future.

Section 2 Background to the Formulation of the New National Defense Program Guidelines

As outlined in Section 1, until now, the National Defense Program Guidelines have been formulated in

line with the developments in the security environment and other factors of the times. This section

explains the background and circumstances surrounding the formulation of the new National Defense

Program Guidelines.

1. The New Security Environment

More than five years have passed since the formulation of the 2004 NDPG, and significant changes have

been observed in the international security environment during the period. The following points were

taken into consideration in the formulation of the new NDPG.

(1) Overall state of international situationthe increasing complexity of issues and further diversification

of the role of military capabilities

With the increasing interdependency among countries and the decreasing possibility of large-scale wars

between major countries, the increasing risk that conflict and security issues in one country may impact

the rest of the world directly is becoming more apparent. Amidst such circumstances, in addition to

regional conflicts, there is also an increasing trend of gray zone conflicts, which are not to escalate to

armed conflicts over territory and sovereignty, as well as economic interests. Furthermore, with the

increasing strength of powers such as China, India, and Russia alongside the relative change of the

influence of the United States, the global balance of power is also shifting.

Response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorist

organizations, and acts of piracy remains a pressing issue, and regional conflicts as well as the presence of

countries with a weakened or collapsed governing system may also impact the global security

environment. In addition, risks to the stable use of the seas, space, and cyberspace pose new problems,

and, in the long run, there is also a need to pay attention to the impact of climate change on the security

environment.

Such global security issues involve a complex web of complicated issues (international terrorism,

weakening governing systems, etc.) and there is a trend for such issues to develop into cross-border

security problems. It is exceedingly difficult for any country to tackle these issues alone, and it is

important for countries that share common interests to work together even under normal conditions.

Amidst such circumstances, the role of the military in the international community is becoming even

more diversified. There are increasing chances for the military, in cooperation with civilian sectors, to

play an important role in the non-traditional security field, such as conflict prevention, reconstruction

assistance and other peacebuilding efforts, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and anti-piracy measures,

in addition to deterring and dealing with military conflicts, and nurturing relationships of trust and

friendship between countries.

(2) Situation in the Asia-Pacific regiondeepening cooperative relationships, and unpredictable and

uncertain elements

With expanding and deepening relationships of interdependency, efforts are being made to enrich and

strengthen cooperative relationships between countries in order to resolve security issues. In particular,

concrete steps are being taken to work together toward resolution of the issues particularly in

non-traditional security areas.

On the other hand, changes to the global balance of power brought about by the growing power of China,

India, and Russia are becoming apparent in this region. Large-scale military capabilities, including

nuclear force, are still concentrated in the region surrounding Japan, and many countries are modernizing

their military capabilities and intensifying activities by military and related organizations. In addition, the

presence of maritime and territorial issues, as well as problems relating to the Korean Peninsula and the

Strait of Taiwan, leave behind a trail of unpredictable and uncertain elements.

North Korea has kept up the development, deployment, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and ballistic missiles while maintaining a large-scale special operations force. It is also carrying out

repeated military provocations on the Korean Peninsula. Such military actions are perceived as an urgent

and serious destabilizing factor in the security of this region, including Japan, and pose a serious

challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which continues to grow as a major power, is

playing an increasingly important role in the region and in the world. On the other hand, China has

continued to increase its military expenditure, and is comprehensively modernizing its military

capabilitiescentered on nuclear and missile capabilities and its navy and air forceat a rapid rate.

Besides putting in efforts to strengthen its power projection capability, it is also expanding and

intensifying activities in the surrounding waters. Such trends, alongside a lack of transparency with regard

to Chinas military and security affairs, are becoming a cause for concern in the region and within the

international community. With regard to Russia, although the scale of military force in the Far East region

has shrunk significantly after the end of the Cold War, military activities continue to intensify.

Amidst such circumstances, the United States is placing a heavier emphasis on cooperating with its allies

and partner countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Australia, and is making efforts to strengthen security

relationships through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, with the aim of strengthening its ties with this

region. Such efforts play an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and

serve as a platform for U.S. efforts in tackling global security issues.

(See Fig. II-2-2-1)

(3) Characteristics of Japan

Japans territory consists of vast areas of ocean. It is a trading nation that depends heavily on overseas

markets and on foreign countries for food and resources. The security of the seas and the stability of

international order are vital to Japans prosperity. Japans topography is marked by the seas that surround

it, long coastlines, and numerous islands. Not only is it susceptible to disasters, the concentration of

industries, population, and information infrastructure in the cities, as well as the large number of

important facilities located at its coastal areas, make it vulnerable to security threats.

(4) Issues to be tackled

In consideration of the issues raised in points (1) to (3), despite the unlikelihood of a full-scale invasion

against Japan that may threaten its very existence, such as a large-scale landing invasion, the security

issues and destabilizing factors faced by Japan are diverse, complex, and intertwined. While Japan must

respond in an appropriate manner to contingencies arising from them, it is important, at the same time, to

cooperate with allies, friendly nations, and other countries involved, to proactively tackle both regional

and global security issues.

2. Background to the Revision of the 2004 NDPG

In view of the security environment described above, the new NDPG was formulated in December 2010.

The circumstances leading to the formulation of the new NDPG are outlined below.

(1) Review in 2009 and changes to timing of the revision

As described in Section 1, it is stipulated that the 2004 NDPG is to be reviewed and revised five years

after its formulation. 2009 was the year that corresponded with the five-year time period after the

formulation of the 2004 NDPG; thus, the necessary review leading to the revision of the NDPG was

carried out. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, convened in January 2009, submitted a

report to (then) Prime Minister Aso in August of the same year. The Ministry of Defense also held a

discussion on issues including the posture of defense capabilities in the Defense Council for Defense

Posture Review10 established in 2008.

However, as a result of the general elections held in August 2009, Japan underwent a regime change. The

revision of the 2004 NDPG is a matter of great importance pertaining to the countrys security, so it was

assessed, after the historical change in regime, that the new government needed to conduct a full review.

Under the FY2010 Build-Up of Defense Capabilities, etc. approved by the Cabinet in December 2009,

it was established that the conclusion of the review would be reached in 2010, not in 200911. In addition,

the Cabinet endorsed the build-up of defense capabilities in FY2010 based on the concept laid out in the

2004 NDPG and established four priorities for appropriate defense capability arrangements in the absence

of a mid-term defense program. These comprised 1) ensuring capabilities for deterring and immediate and

effective response to various contingencies, 2) further stabilizing the regional security environment, 3)

promoting efforts toward improving the global security environment, and 4) streamlining and

rationalization efforts. These priority items served as points of reference in the defense posture review in

the new NDPG.

(2) Reviews by the Government and the Ministry of Defense in 2010

1) Council on the Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era

In order to contribute to review the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Government

convened the Council on the Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era12 starting February 2010.

The Council, made up of experts in areas relating to security and defense posture, met eight times up until

May 2010, and submitted a report13 to Prime Minister Kan on 27 August.

The report laid out three security objectives: 1) Japans safety and prosperity, 2) the stability and

prosperity of the region surrounding Japan and of the world, and 3) the maintenance of a free and open

international system. As the strategy and means for achieving the objectives, the Council, analyzing

Japans security environment and other factors, described the importance of 1) Japans own efforts, 2)

cooperation with its allies, and 3) multilayered security cooperation.

With regard to the basic concept of defense posture, the report pointed out the importance of, as it were,

dynamic deterrent that operates even during normal times and that is able to demonstrate a high level of

defense capability. As the role that defense capability should play in the future, the report reorganized the

three roles14 laid out in the 2004 NDPG, namely 1) responding to various contingencies, 2) ensuring the

stability of the region surrounding Japan, and 3) improving the global security environment. It proposes

the need of selection and concentration concerning the defense functions and posture required to fulfill

these three roles.

With regard to the infrastructure needed to support the defense capabilities that Japan wishes to achieve,

the report points out that 1) with regard to human resource infrastructure, concrete system design should

be designed as soon as possible to resolve the problems caused in the SDF by an aging and low-fertility

society on the SDF, 2) with regard to physical infrastructure, there is a need to lay out strategies for

defense industry and technology, and to facilitate participation in international joint development and

production of equipment, 3) with regard to social infrastructure, there is a need to review the transmission

of information to citizens in emergencies, a need to seek the understanding and cooperation of local

residents in areas where defense facilities are located, and a need to implement joint use of defense

facilities between Japan and the United States. In addition, as part of the infrastructural development to

support the security strategy, and to make such strategies more effective, the report also lays out

infrastructural development such as the systems and structures required for the appropriate utilization of

defense capabilities as a means of ensuring security.

2) Review by the Ministry of Defense

In order to contribute to the governmental review described above, the Ministry of Defense held a broad

range of discussions in connection with other reviews within the Ministry, taking into consideration

factors such as the developments in the Japan-U.S. relationship and new observations in the surrounding

countries after the formulation of the 2004 NDPG, as well as the transition of international peace

cooperation activities into one of the primary missions of the SDF, and covering topics such as the

evaluation of the NDPG, the international situation, roles of the defense capabilities, and the defense

posture that Japan should be equipped with in consideration of future issues.

Specifically, under directives from Defense Minister Kitazawa, a comprehensive review of the diverse

problems faced by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF was conducted with the aim of building up a

more effective defense capability in a more efficient manner, from a new viewpoint that takes into

consideration the change in political regime. The issues faced by the Ministry and the SDF included

assessment of the security environment, roles of the defense forces, capacity and the actual number of

regular personnel, defense production and technological infrastructure, human resource measures, and

effective SDF posture. The contents of the review in the Ministry of Defense played an important role in

discussions by the Government, such as the Security Council meeting described in the following section.

3) Review by the Security Council, etc.

In order to review and discuss the defense posture and Japan's security for the future, in September 2010,

the Government moved forward on discussions within the Security Council, using the report by the

Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era as one of the materials for review. At the

same time, the ministers concerned also held discussions intensively to organize the points of debate and

consolidate opinions. Over nine sessions of Security Council meetings, comprehensive deliberations on

the posture of the defense force were carried out from a wide range of perspectives, culminating in the

Security Council and Cabinet approval of the new NPDG on 17 December 2010.

(See Fig. II-2-2-2)

Section 3. Content of the New NDPG

This section explains the new concept of the defense force in the New NDPG and the posture and

structure of the SDF.

1. Basic Concept Developing a Dynamic Defense Force

In order to react to the changing security environment, a major characteristic of the New NDPG is the

principle of developing a Dynamic Defense Force.

As many of the security issues facing the world today spread extend beyond geographical borders, it is

important for countries to collaborate and cooperate under normal conditions. Given this situation, the

role of military forces is increasingly diversifying, and it is becoming common for military forces to

operate continuously under normal conditions for such operations as humanitarian aid, disaster relief,

peace keeping, and anti-piracy operations. To date, the SDF has carried out numerous international peace

cooperation activities, and it is routinely engaged in overseas operations. Thus, in order to carry out such

activities, sustainability and other capabilities that enable continuous activities is growing important.

Furthermore, in the regions surrounding Japan, there still exist large-scale military forces including

nuclear forces, and many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military

activities. Under these conditions, not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force perse,

but also dynamic deterrence, which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as

demonstrating the nations will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military

operations under normal conditions, is important. Additionally, warning times of contingencies is

shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and

seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly

important.

Given these conditions, it is necessary that Japans future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively

perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force

without basing on the Basic Defense Force Concept that place priority on the existence of the defense

force. To this end, the New NDPG calls for the development of Dynamic Defense Force that has

readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology

based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of

this Dynamic Defense Force focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF

operations.

In order to handle an increasingly challenging security environment, Japan needs to steadily build an

appropriate-size defense force. In doing so, and in light of the difficult financial circumstances, the New

NDPG state that Japan will carry out selection and concentration to selectively concentrate resources on

truly necessary functions and bring about structural reform to the defense force to produce increased

outcome with limited resources after carrying out drastic optimization and streamlining the SDF overall

through fundamental review of the equipment, personnel, organization, and force disposition. Through a

fundamental review of personnel management system, it is also stated that Japan will curve personnel

costs and improve its efficiency and increasing the SDF strength by lowering its average age, in order to

improve the structure of the defense budget, which has a high promotion of personnel cost that currently

suppresses the expenditure of SDF activities. One of the characteristics of the New NDPG is that it

touches upon structural reform to the defense force and personnel structure reformas above.

2. Basic Principles of Japans Security

The New NDPG begin by defining firstly the basic security principles from the standpoint of clarifying

the most basic items for national security of Japan.

Specifically, the following three items are presented: 1) the prevention and elimination of potential threats

to Japan and the minimization of the damages thereof; 2) the further stabilization of the security

environment of the Asia-Pacific region and the prevention of the occurrence of threats through the

improvement of the global security environment; and 3) contribution to world peace and stability and

establishing security for people.

For the achievement of these goals, the New NDPG state that Japan will promote the following such

approaches as Japans own efforts; cooperation with its ally; and multi-layered security cooperation in the

Asia-Pacific region and the international community. Measures for this include more active utilization of

Japans diplomatic and defense capability, support for the United Nations related to international peace

and security, and the promotion of diplomatic efforts including establishing positive relationships of

cooperation with various nations.

Also, under the Constitution, and in line with basic principles such as maintaining an exclusively

defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military powers that poses a threat to other countries, Japan

will continue to uphold its basic defense policies such as securing civilian control, maintaining the three

non-nuclear principles, and building a modest defense force,. At the same time, to address the threat of

nuclear weapons, Japan will play a constructive and active role in nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons.

At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons do exist, Japan will closely cooperate with the United States

to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence15, with nuclear deterrent as a vital

element and also appropriately implement its own efforts including ballistic missile defense and civil

protection.

3. Basic Policies to Ensure Japans Security

(1) Japans own efforts

Based on the understanding that Japans own efforts are the first and foremost factor in achieving the

three goals presented in 2. Basic Principles of Japans Security, the New NDPG state that Japan will

constantly utilize all means to ensure its security under the basic defense policies, and in cooperation with

the ally, partners and other countries concerned. In the event of various contingencies arising from

security challenges and destabilizing factors facing Japan (hereinafter referred to as various

contingencies), the nation will seamlessly deal with the situation as it holds.

Furthermore, the Guidelines state that the nation will conduct integrated and strategic activities as

follows.

a. The improvement of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the government ministries and

agencies, a strengthened cross-governmental information security system, the promotion of space

development and use of outer space from the perspective of information gathering, communications, and

comprehensive strengthening of the posture and response capability to deal with cyber attacks.

b. Cooperation among government organizations under normal conditions; integrated response by the

government in the occurrence of various contingencies; examination of functions and systems related to

governmental decision-making and response through initiatives such as regular simulations and

comprehensive training and exercises; and consideration of necessary actions including legal measures.

c. Examination of organization, functions, and structure of the cabinet regarding security issues, including

the Security Council; policy coordination between cabinet members regarding national security; and

establishment of a body in the Prime Ministers Office which will be responsible for policy coordination

among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister.

d. Improvement of systems for responding to various disasters and for civil protection; and close

cooperation between national and local governments to ensure an appropriate response.

e. Cooperation among governmental organizations in the efforts to improve the global security

environment; participation in international peace cooperation activities in an efficient and effective

manner through collaboration and cooperation with non-governmental organization and other entities;

review and consideration of the five principles for participation in peacekeeping operations16 and other

policies regarding Japans participation in consideration of actual situation of U.N. peacekeeping

operations.

f. Efforts to make Japans security and defense policies easier to understand; and strengthened overseas

information dissemination to further deepen international communitys understanding of Japans security

and defense policies.

Regarding the defense force, the ultimate guarantee of Japans national security, the New NDPG state that

Japan will develop Dynamic Defense Force as explained in 1. of this section, based on the recognition

that represents Japans will and capability to prevent direct threats to Japan from reaching the country and

to eliminate any threat that reached it.

(2) Cooperation with its ally

The New NDPG state the understanding that the allied status, centering on the Japan-U.S. Security

Arrangements with the United States as a superpower which shares basic values, remains indispensable in

ensuring Japans peace and security, and that the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan

allow countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence

against and response to contingencies in this region. The Guidelines further state the understanding that

the Japan-U.S. alliance is also important for Japan to participate in multilateral security cooperation and

effectively respond to global security challenges.

Furthermore, in light of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance as described above, Japan

will further deepen and develop the Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment, specifically

through the following.

1) Continuous engagement in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordination with the United States,

including bilateral assessment of the security environment and bilateral consultations on common

strategic objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities

2) The promotion of cooperation in existing fields, including intelligence cooperation, deepening of

bilateral contingency planning, various operational cooperation including that upon situations in areas

surrounding Japan, ballistic missile defense and equipment and technology cooperation, as well as

consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security

3) Studying measures to enhance Japan-U.S. cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen the

U.S. forces deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies

4) Strengthening various regular cooperation, such as joint training and joint/shared usage of facilities,

and promote regional and global cooperation through international peace cooperation activities,

maintenance and enhancement of international public goods such as outer space, cyberspace and sea lanes,

as well as in the field of climate change

At the same time, the new NDPG state that Japan will steadily implement specific measures to review the

posture of the U.S. forces in Japan to reduce the burden on local communities such as Okinawa where

U.S. military bases are located, while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. forces, and it will

also take active measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, including Host

Nation Support

(3) Multilayered security cooperation with the international community

a. Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

The New NDPG state the understanding that forming a security network through a multilayered

combination of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is, together with

the Japan-U.S. alliance, essential for engaging in efforts for the further stabilization of the security

environment of the region effectively.

In light of this point, the New NDPG state that Japan will strengthen cooperation particular with South

Korea and Australia through bilateral initiatives and multilateral cooperation involving the United States.

The Guidelines also state that Japan will maintain and strengthen security cooperation with the nations of

ASEAN, and cooperation with India and other nations that share common interest in ensuring the security

of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.

Furthermore, it is stated that Japan will promote mutual trust and establish and develop cooperative

relationships with China and Russia, both of which have a significant influence on the security of the

region. Specifically with China, in line with efforts to establish a Mutually Beneficial Relationship

Based on Common Strategic Interests, and recognaizing that the reinforcement of a constructive and

cooperative relations with China in numerous fields is extremely important, it calls for active engagement,

together with the ally and other countries, in encouraging China to take responsible actions in the

international community.

Regarding multilateral security cooperation, the New NDPG state that Japan will play an appropriate role

in efforts toward establishment of regional order, norms, and practical cooperative relationships,

particularly through such frameworks as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN

Defense-Military Meetings Plus (ADMM Plus).

b. Cooperation as a member of the international community

The New NDPG state that Japan will actively promote such diplomatic efforts as the strategic and

effective use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving root causes of conflicts and

terrorism, and active engagement in international peace cooperation activities along with those diplomatic

efforts, in order to improve the global security environment and contributing Japan's security and

prosperity. In doing so, Japan will strive to provide assistance that makes use of Japans knowledge and

experience and carrying out these activities strategically with a comprehensive consideration of the

various conditions facing Japan.

With regard to efforts toward global security issues, the New NDPG state that Japan will cooperate with

the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European nations, and for

playing an active role in international activities to maintain and strengthen international public goods

including the stable use of the maritime domain, outer space, and cyberspace, and in international

communitys efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and

other means of delivery. Additionally, it is stated that Japan will actively participate in humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief in the event of a large-scale natural disaster or pandemic17 and in the reform

of the United Nations.

4. The Roles of Defense Forces

As stated in Section 1, with regard to the future defense force, the New NDPG state that it should perform

the roles of effective deterrence and response, further stabilization of the security environment of the

Asia-Pacific region, and improvement of the global security environment under the concept of

developing Dynamic Defense Force without basing on the existing Basic Defense Force Concept,

and that it ensure regular cooperation with relevant organizations.

(1) Effective deterrence and response

Considering that in the areas surrounding Japan, there exist issues over the Korean Peninsula and the

Taiwan Strait, and the military situation is adding complexity with many countries modernizing their

military forces and increasing military activities, the New NDPG place importance on dynamic deterrence,

which emphasizes operational use of the defense force. From this point of view, the Guidelines state that,

to closely follow trends in military activities of neighboring countries country and to detect indications of

various contingencies early, the SDF will ensure information superiority through continuous intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance activities (continuous ISR), and seamlessly respond as a situation

unfolds.

With regard to this role, the New NDPG place priority on 1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace

around Japan, 2) response to attacks on offshore island, 3) response to cyber attacks, 4) response to

attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, 5) response to ballistic missile attacks, 6) response to

complex contingencies, and 7) response to large-scale and/or chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear (CBRN) disasters.

Compared to the 2004 NDPG, characteristics of the New NDPG is that it clarifies the emphasis on (3)

response to cyber attacks, in consideration of the security environment of recent years, and that, the idea

is newly introduced that because situations (1) through (5) may not necessarily occur in isolation but may

occur in sequence or at the same time (complex contingencies), the SDF should efficiently respond to a

situation as it unfolds presupposing complex contingencies as is written in (6).

Note that regarding preparation against full-scale invasion, which was prescribed as one of the pillars in

the role of the defense force by the 2004 NDPG, the New NDPG state that the SDF will maintain a

minimum necessary level of preparations against possible changes in uncertain future circumstances as

part of the effective deterrence and response.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 (pxx)

(2) Efforts to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region

The Asia-Pacific region has seen numerous changes due to the reise of powers of China, India, and Russia

as well as progress in cooperation in non-traditional security fields. Japan should respond appropriately to

these trends in cooperation with the United States and other relevant nations. In the 2004 NDPG, such

regional cooperation was positioned under proactive efforts to improve the international security

environment. However, considering these regional conditions, the New NDPG positions efforts to

further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region as one of the pillars of the role of the

defense force.

Specifically, the New NDPG first aims to stabilize the security environment in areas surrounding Japan

by carrying out various activities in a timely and appropriate manner such as continuous ISR, and training

and exercises in those areas under the concept of the Dynamic Defense Force. This is from the belief

that these activities lead to preventing the worsening of the environment in the areas surrounding Japan.

Furthermore, the New NDPG state that Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation

and exchanges as well as joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner in order to maintain the

stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, it is stated that, in the field of non-traditional security,

Japan will promote practical cooperation by utilizing SDF capabilities including disposal of land mines

and unexploded shells, and make efforts in formation and strengthening of regional cooperation practice

and capacity building support18 for nations in the region.

See Part III, Chapter 3, Sections 1 (pxx) and Section 2 (pxx)

(3) Improvement of the global security environment

Multiple problems in the international society such as international terrorism, poverty, and weakening of

the governments are complexly intertwined, and the tendency is growing stronger for them to develop

into cross-border security problems. Thus, it is important for nations to cooperatively work on these types

of issues. Based on this understanding, the New NDPG puts forth the improvement of the global security

environment as a pillar role for the defense force.

Specifically, Japan will continue to actively participate in international peace cooperation activities,

including peace building such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and ceasefire monitoring.

Japan will also actively engage in various activities conducted by the United Nations and other

organizations such as arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation, and capacity building support.

Moreover, Japan will cooperate with its ally, partners and other countries concerned to actively promote

efforts to tackle international terrorism, secure the safety of maritime traffic and maintain maritime order.

See Part III, Chapter 3, Sections 3 (pxx) and Section 4 (pxx)

5. Specific Details of Defense Forces

Based on the idea that the SDF posture is derived from the handling of contingencies through joint

operations rather than derived separately by each SDF, the 2004 NDPG presented the approach to the

SDF posture, in addition to the roles and responses of the defense force for each type of incident,

comprehensively under the topic of the Roles of Defense Forces, and presented the organization of

major SDF units and the specific equipment posture in a separate table.

To fulfill that role, and the organization of major SDF units and the specific equipment posture are

presented in a separate table. Below, an explanation is given of the specific posture and structure of the

SDF in the New NDPG.

(1) SDF Posture

In order to properly perform the role of the defense force, the necessary posture must be taken to operate

the defense force with increased emphasis on carrying out intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

activities in a timely and appropriate manner, handling contingencies quickly and seamlessly, and

building international cooperation to handle the security environment that is growing more diversified,

complex, and intertwined. From that standpoint, the New NDPG state the postures that each SDF should

possess as follows while retaining the necessary posture for responses to various contingencies.

a. Readiness posture

The SDF should be able to carry out speedy and effective operations through maintaining a readiness

posture, enhancing mobility, and sustaining and improving skills and operations tempo. Furthermore, fuel

and ammunition supplies (including training ammunition) should be secured as well as securing the

durable base functions, and ensuring the maintenance of equipment.

b. Joint operations posture

In addition to maintaining the intelligence collection posture required for quick and effective response,

there should be a command and control functions utilizing advanced information networks including

satellite communications, as well as an information sharing system and cyber attack response posture.

c. Posture for international peace cooperation activities

Efforts should be made to enhance capabilities and posture to handle diverse missions, rapid deployment,

and long-term operations.

(2) SDF Organization, Equipment and Force Disposition

a. Basic concept

The New NDPG calls for the SDF to maintain a posture as explained in (1) while efficiently maintaining

the organization, equipment and force disposition that enable it to play the role of the defense force

effectively. In doing so, from the standpoint of effective and efficient buildup of defense capabilities, it

calls for the prioritized buildup of functions usable for responding to various contingencies and in

international peace cooperation activities, functions allowing asymmetrical response capability, and

non-replaceable functions19. Specifically, it calls for drawing down Cold War-type equipment and

organization such as reducing tanks and artillery acquired during the Cold War period and reviewing the

geographical distribution of units and unit operations, while enhancing the defense posture by placing

emphasis on building up the functions of warning and surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense, ballistic

missile defense, transportation, and command communications in other regions including the southwest

region.

Regarding the budget allocation to support this, according to changes of the security environment, the

New NDPG calls for drastic review from a comprehensive viewpoint, removing compartmentalization

without adherence to precedent.

Furthermore, from the standpoint of promoting joint operations and the formation of a joint Japan-U.S.

response posture, it calls for overall review of the state of GSDF basic operational units (divisions,

brigades) and five Regional Armies, with consideration for improving the efficiency of command and

control functions.

Note that based on the understanding that a full-scale invasion is unlikely to occur, the total number of

tanks and artillery of the GSDF that were arranged in preparation for an amphibious landing invasion will

be reduced and the organization of units which held them will be reviewed. However, it is inappropriate

to deny the possibility that a full-scale invasion could occur in the future that could only be handled by

tanks and artillery. For that reason, with regard to full-scale invasion, the New NDPG calls for continuing

to maintain relevant knowledge and expertise at a minimum necessary level to respond to uncertain future

conditions. With regard to tanks and artillery, recent advances in the military technology such as network

technology should be adopted to make them usable in diverse contingencies such as responding to special

operations forces and in urban combat, and a minimum scope of expertise will be maintained with regard

to combat using the mobile strike capabilities led by tanks to prevent and eliminate invasion by the enemy

and combat using artillery to strike enemy territory.

b. Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

The following are priorities in strengthening the organization, equipment and force disposition.

(a) Strengthening of joint operation

The SDF will enhance the basis for joint operations, including the functions of the Joint Staff, command

and control system, information-collecting capability and education and training. The SDF will also

develop effective and efficient systems applicable to joint operations by reorganizing, merging20,

centralizing and creating hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF, such as

transportation, medical service, anti-aircraft artillery, search and rescue, procurement, supply and

maintenance of equipment, and management of camps and bases.

(b) Enhancing capabilities to respond to attacks on offshore islands

The SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not

currently stationed. Also, the SDF will enhance its capability to respond to attacks on those islands and

ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space by securing bases, mobility, transport capacity

and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against such attacks.

(c) Strengthening capabilities for international peace cooperation activities

The SDF will tackle on upgrading equipment, strengthening maritime and air transport capability,

enhancing its logistical support posture and enhancing its engineering and medical functions, and

reinforcing its education and training systems.

(d) Enhancement of intelligence functions

In order to detect indications of various contingencies promptly and collect, analyze and share

information appropriately, the SDF will strengthen its diverse information-collecting capabilities utilizing

advanced technology, including space technology, and the all-source analysis and assessment capabilities

of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and other organizations. Additionally, the SDF will strengthen

the information sharing system among sections responsible for information collection, operations and

policy making. Furthermore, the SDF will improve the system for providing appropriate intelligence

support for activities conducted by SDF units dispatched abroad in remote areas through such measures as

strengthening capabilities to collect geospatial information, the SDF will make efforts to expand and

enhance intelligence cooperation and exchanges with countries concerned.

(e) Incorporating progress in science and technology into defense forces

In order to develop defense forces underpinned by advanced technology and information capabilities, the

SDF will appropriately exploit the achievements of technological innovation. In particular, the SDF will

ensure reliable command and control and quick information sharing by developing an advanced command

communications system and information and communications network, as well as develop a system for

responding to cyber attacks in an integrated manner.

(f) Efficient and effective build up of defense forces

Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will control defense expenditures by further

rationalizing and streamlining its defense forces. At the same time, Japan will make sure its defense

forces smoothly and successfully perform their missions while harmonizing other measures taken by the

Government. To that end, Japan will clearly prioritize among its defense projects, concentrate resources

on selected projects and promote efforts put forth in VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense

Capability.

c. Organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the SDF

The following section clarifies the approach to the organization, equipment and disposition of each

service of the SDF. The specific scale of major units and equipment is presented in a separate table.

(a) Ground Self-Defense Force

In principle, the GSDF will achieve appropriate force disposition of highly mobile units with ISR

capabilities according to geographical characteristics in order to integrally intertwine various functions

and effectively respond to various contingencies. These units can be rapidly deployed to various locations,

and are capable of performing diverse missions, including international peace cooperation activities. In so

doing, priority will be placed on the defense of off-shore islands where SDF units are not currently

stationed, and the organization and personnel structure of units will be reviewed so as to ensure thorough

rationalization and streamlining of the defense forces.

Furthermore, the GSDF will continue to maintain the Central Readiness Force in order to effectively

handle air transportation, airborne operations, defense against NBC weapons, special operations and

international peace cooperation activities. Also, in order to provide air defense to protect operational units

and key areas, seven surface-to-air guided missile units will be maintained, reducing the current eight by

one unit while adopting more advanced surface-to-air guided missiles for these units.

As a result, compared to the 2004 NDPG, the New NDPG calls for the following:

(1) The authorized number of active duty personnel will be changed from 148,000 to 147,000, while total

authorized personnel will be changed from 155,000 to 154,000;

(2) Tanks will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400 vehicles, while artillery pieces

(main artillery21 in the 2004 NDPG) will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400

pieces; and

(3) Surface-to-air missile units will be optimized/rationalized from eight anti-aircraft artillery groups to

seven anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments (six anti-aircraft artillery groups and one anti-aircraft

artillery regiment).

The basic tactical unit structure of eight divisions, six brigades, and one armored division will be

maintained.

(See Figs. II-2-3-1 and II-2-3-2)

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force

The principal aims of the Maritime Self-Defense Force include defense of the seas surrounding Japan,

ensuring the security of sea lanes, and international peace cooperation activities through regularly

conducting such operations as ISR, and anti-submarine operations.

1) The Destroyer unit has up to now consisted of the mobile operations units (32 ships), which respond

swiftly in various situations and in international peace cooperation activities, and the regional district

units (3 ships in 5 guard zones, 15 ships in all), which conduct warning and defense in coastal waters.

However, in light of growing pressure on the operations of the Mobile Operations Squadron due to the

expansion of international peace cooperation activities and other developments, the Area Deployment

Unit is reworking its structure to enable it to function efficiently beyond guard zones, and is now

operating in warning and surveillance in the southwestern area and in international peace cooperation

activities. As a result, the Escort Ship Squadron is restructuring its forces and now maintains the four-unit

Escort Group (32 ships) whose basic unit is escort groups consisting of eight escort ships and the new

four-unit Escort Corps (16 ships) whose basic unit is escort corps consisting of four escort ships. The

squadron now comprises 48 escort ships in all.

(See Fig. II-2-3-3)

2) The Submarine units continue to deploy submarines in key sea traffic points in the East China Sea and

the Sea of Japan. The units 22 vessels also conduct continuous ISR over a wide area in the waters

surrounding Japan including the southwestern area, ensure the superiority of information, and swiftly

detect indications of security dangers, while taking into account the geographical relationship between

strategic sea areas and military bases.

(See Fig. II-2-3-4)

3) The Patrol aircraft units continue to maintain a nine-unit aviation corps consisting of four-unit

fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and a five-unit patrol helicopter units. The squadrons capabilities are

aimed at conducting ISR over a broad area in the seas surrounding Japan and to be effective in patrolling

these seas and in ensuring the security of sealanes.

4) The Minesweeping units continue to maintain one-unit mine-sweeping group aimed at performing

effectively in minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in order to ensure the safety of the

lives of citizens who rely on marine transportation.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force

The primary focus of the Air Self-Defense Force is conducting continuous ISR in the seas and airspace

surrounding Japan, general air defense, and air defense of kea areas using a full range of capabilities.

1) The Aircraft control warning units, which conduct continuous ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace,

have maintained an eight-unit warning group and a 20-unit warning corps. In view of limits on human

resources, however, the units have been reorganized in order to achieve comprehensive air defense

capabilities as effectively as possible, with the eight-unit warning group reduced by four units. The

squadron now maintains a four-unit warning group and a 24-unit warning corps22. In addition, the

Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Squadron continues to maintain a six-unit Air Defense Missile Group

which provides air defense in key political, economic and defense areas.

(See Fig. II-2-3-5)

2) To provide a full range of capabilities for use in the defense of Japans airspace, the Air Self-Defense

Force maintains a 12-squadron fighter unit (including a squadron that maintains new fighter aircraft with

advanced capabilities), a one-squadron air reconnaissance unit that performs air reconnaissance, a

three-squadron air transport unit which swiftly transports troops in a variety of situations and which is

actively involved in international peace cooperation activities, and a one-unit flight corps consisting of an

air refueling and transport squadron that has air refueling functions and transport functions that can also

be used in international peace cooperation activities.

In light of the security environment surrounding Japan, the Governments severe financial situation, and

other pertinent factors, the Air Self-Defense Force has sought efficiency relating to major equipment,

reducing the number of strategic combat aircraft from approximately 350 to 340. However, it still

maintains approximately 260 fighter aircraft.

(See Fig. II-2-3-6)

(4) Principal equipment and core units used in ballistic missile defense

Japans ballistic missile defense (BMD) has adopted a multilayered defense approach consisting of an

upper-layer defense through the SM-3-equipped Aegis-class frigate and a lower-layer defense provided

through the Patriot PAC-3 for base protection.

1) Under the four-ship structure for Aegis-class frigates specified in the 2004 NDPG, if the necessity for

regular maintenance, replenishment, recreation, and training is taken into account, in principle, two ships

would be able at all times to execute their duties, and thus there would be limitations on maintaining a

state of constant readiness. In addition, in order to ensure the countrys defense against the threat of

ballistic missiles, including defense against the future threat of ballistic missiles equipped with interceptor

avoidance capabilities, ships would have to be equipped with an Aegis BMD system, which, if more

advanced interceptor missiles are developed in the future, could accommodate them and also be highly

expandable.

In view of these circumstances, the New NDPG, taking into account factors such as the Governments

severe financial circumstances and the need for rapid improvement of anti-ballistic missile defense

capabilities, provides for a total of six Aegis-class frigates equipped with ballistic missile defense

capabilities, including two ships equipped with Aegis BMD systems capable of accommodating the

improved interceptor missiles mentioned above and offering high expandability23. In addition, the new

Guidelines, in light of advances in ballistic missile defense-related technology and the Governments

fiscal circumstances, specifies, if provided for separately, the addition of escort ships within the scope of

total ship number.

2) As a result of the reorganization of units described in (3), 1) above, the Air Warning Control Squadron,

which is used in ballistic missile defense, has been reformed into a 11-unit warning group/corps

consisting of a seven-unit warning group and a four-unit warning corp. In order to make possible swift

nationwide deployment of the Period PAC-3 which maintains a three-unit anti-aircraft group, PAC-3 will

be deployed to the entire six Air Defense Missile Group. When this occurs, the newly developed PAC-3

will be limited to a one-unit FU24 under the New NDPG in view of the Governments severe financial

circumstances, and together with the existing 16-unit FU (for the anti-aircraft corps and that required for

education), gives a 17-unit FU to be stationed uniformly throughout the country, creating the most

efficient system possible.

(See Fig. II-2-3-7 and Fig. II-2-3-8)

6. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability

For the purpose of building a dynamic defense force and ensuring that it can perform flawlessly, it is

important to strengthen the social foundation, which includes the human and material resource base,

cooperation with regional public organizations, and harmony with areas surrounding defense facilities.

The New NDPG place emphasis on efforts such as the following in order achieve such a foundation.

(1) Effective utilization of human resources

As described in Section 1, the New NDPG seek to concentrate resources selectively in critical functions

with a view to developing a dynamic defense capability which actively and effectively performs a variety

of tasks.

Since the enactment of the 1995 NDPG, the personnel structure of the Self-Defense Force has undergone

changes including reorganization of units and personnel reductions. At the same time, with the scope of

the mission of the SDF widening and oversees operations increasing, the SDF has increasingly laid

weight on personnel with high expertise and specialty in its personnel structure. As a result, the number of

privates has decreased and the Self-Defense Force as a whole has been aging

Amid these developments, the New NDPG seek to appropriately manage the total number and structure

of SDF personnel so as to maintain the vigor of the forces, and lays out the following specific measures.

1) The SDF will review the rank and age structure so as to reduce the proportion of officers, warrant

officers and sergeants and increase the number of privates while giving consideration to the balance

among the missions of the SDF and the physical strength, experiences and skills of personnel.

2) The SDF will carry out reform of its personnel management system by reviewing the duties of SDF

personnel from the perspective of optimization of assignments, so as to give precedence to younger

personnel in assignment to front-line units while applying an optimum level of salaries and other terms to

personnel engaged in other duties. This reform will include review of personnel management policy in

line with the direction toward personnel cost reduction for national civil servants as a whole.

3) The SDF will secure effective defense capability amid severe fiscal conditions by further rationalizing

personnel and curbing personnel costs while streamlining logistical operations of SDF garrisons and bases

through effective utilization of private-sector resources and capabilities.

4) In the review of rank and age structure mentioned in 1) above, Japan will promote effective use of

retired SDF personnel in society, implement measures to support their re-employment including in the

public sector, and ensure they receive adequate post-retirement treatment. The SDF will also seek to

introduce an early retirement system to be implemented together with the above measures and create an

environment in which personnel that have been assigned to duties can engage in work without concern

and feel at ease. In addition, Japan will actively promote public-private cooperation and personnel

exchanges.

The New NDPG also specify the following as measures to maintain high morale and rigorous discipline

among SDF personnel: 1) Striving to recruit, retain and develop high-quality human resources and Prove

the necessary education and training in order to appropriately adapt to the declining birth rate, the

increasing ratio of people receiving higher education and the diversification of SDF missions; 2)

enhancing a medical service infrastructure to maintain the health and strength of personnel; 3) enhancing

the intellectual foundations for national security issues by promoting research and education in that field;

and 4) reviewing the overall institutional framework of the SDF personnel treatment system in order to

ensure appropriate treatment of personnel involved in the execution of arduous or dangerous missions.

(2) Measures for improving and strengthening the material foundation

a. Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment and improvement in the efficiency of equipment

procurement

Improvements in the functions of equipment in recent years have been accompanied by higher costs, and

the cost of maintaining equipment is also rising.

To adapt to these developments, the New NDPG state that the SDF will enhance the operational basis of

equipment essential to the exercise of defense capability through such measures as efficiently and

effectively maintaining equipment and by maintaining a high level of operations tempo.. The Guidelines

also state that the SDF will improve the cost-efficiency of equipment procurement by making thorough

efforts to curb the lifecycle costs of equipment, including the acquisition cost, and through improving the

overall contract system and further adopting efficient procurement systems such as short-term lump-sum

purchases, and enhance transparency over procurement by strengthening the external audit system.

b. Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases

In order to maintain and develop defense production and technological bases, it is necessary to increase

predictability for defense-related companies, hold in check their profit risks, and conduct investment,

research and development and personnel development from a mid- to long-term point of view. From this

perspective, Japan will set forth a strategy for defense production capability and technological bases. With

this strategy, Japan will identify critical defense production capabilities and technologies that should be

kept in the country and, through selection and concentration, develop and maintain defense forces in a

stable manner from the medium- to long-term perspective by concentrating resources on the development

and maintenance of those capabilities and technologies. This strategy will constitute a resource useful in

maintaining an efficient and effective defense capability.

c. Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense

equipment

In contributing to peace and promoting cooperation in international community, there are increasing

opportunities to conduct effective cooperation activities through measures such as the utilization of heavy

machinery and other defense equipment carried to the site by the SDF and providing equipment to

disaster-stricken countries. Moreover, it has become the mainstream among developed countries to

improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with rising costs of equipment by participating

in international joint development and production projects. Japan will study measures to respond to such

major changes.

In the talk given by the Secretary-General upon enactment of the New NDPG, it was mentioned that the

Three Principles on Arms Exports is based on the basic philosophy of peaceful nations to avoid fostering

international disputes, and that the Japanese Government will continue to firmly adhere to this basic

philosophy.

(3) Relationship between defense facilities and local communities

In order to promote efficient maintenance and improvement of defense facilities, Japan will implement

various measures to reconcile interests between such facilities and the surrounding local communities in

close cooperation with relevant local governments.

7. Additional Elements for Consideration

These Guidelines provide the vision for Japans defense forces for approximately the next decade, to

promote innovation of the defense forces. In case there are significant changes in circumstances, Japan

will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment and technological

trends at that time, among other things. The new Guidelines do not specify the time for the review, unlike

the 2004 NDPG, which prescribed to review five years later.

Japan will conduct systematic transition management through Mid-Term Defense Programs and annual

budgets so as to ensure smooth, swift and appropriate transition to the defense forces outlined in these

Guidelines, in consideration of relevant factors such as fiscal condition, maintenance of unit readiness,

influence on morale, impact on local communities and defense production and technological bases. In

addition, Japan will conduct ex-post verification and constant study on the future of its defense forces.

1 See http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1977/w1977_9110.html 2 The functions were taken over by the Security Council in 1986. 3 See http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/1996_taikou/dp96j.html 4 See http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2005/taikou.html 5 Excludes FY2010. See Section 2.2. 6 A series of measures to ease Cold War tensions, including the Basic Principles declaration that touted

peaceful coexistence and equality between the United States and the Soviet Union 7 It is stipulated in the 1976 NDPG that Japan will, in principle, independently fend off limited and

small-scale invasions. In consideration of the expanded role of the defense capabilities, this stipulation was considered inappropriate as it focused solely on invasions of Japan, and was thus removed.

8 The factors considered effective and retained are as follows: 1) Japanese defense force should not directly counter military threats, and 2) in order to forestall and prevent invasions, Japan should maintain a defense force that takes into consideration the strategic environment and geographic characteristics.

9 In addition, in the statement issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the formulation of the 2004 NDPG, with regard to the case of BMD systems as an item pertaining to the management of arms export, he stated that from the perspective of contributions to the effective operations of the Japan-U.S security arrangements and contributions to Japans security, in the event that joint development and production was carried out, it would not be dependent on the Three Principles of Arms Exports on the premise of strict export management.

10 Abolished in August 2009 with the establishment of the Defense Council 11 See Reference 11 (p. XX) 12 See http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/ 13 See http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf 14 Refers to 1) effective response to new threats and diverse situations, 2) preparation to deal with

full-scale invasion, and 3) proactive efforts to improve the international security environment. See 2 of this section.

15 This is the U.S. deterrence against attacks on allies and friendly nations of the U. S. such as Japan. Deterrence against attacks on the U. S. itself is called the basic deterrence.

16 This is the basic policy for participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3, Fig. III-3-3-x)

17 A phenomenon in which an infectious disease spreads throughout the world in a short period of time.

18 See Part III, Chapter 3, Sections 1-5. 19 While there is no fixed definition, functions with asymmetrical response capabilities refer to

functions that can respond to hostile activities while efficiently and effectively maintaining advantage over the enemy, such as warning and surveillance carried out by a highly stealthy submarine against an enemy surface vessel. Non-replaceable functions refer to functions that, if they did not exist, the ability to respond to attacks by the enemy capable of causing severe damage would be lost completely, such as a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

20 Joint GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units under the direct control of the Minister of Defense when unified joint operation is necessary to carry out the mission smoothly.

21 In the 2004 NDPG, howitzers, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and surface-to-ship missiles were categorized as main artillery whereas the New NDPG categorizes these, with the exception of surface-to-air missiles, as howitzers and rockets.

22 Although the level of authorized strength has been reduced as a result of incorporating the warning group into the warning squadron, the personnel cuts have been redirected into efforts such as strengthening fighter interceptors, which conduct such operations as interceptor control based on information obtained from radar sites, in an effort to strengthen warning and control functions in general.

23 Renovations are scheduled for the existing Aegis-class ships Atago and Ashigara so that they can be equipped with the highly expandable Aegis BMD system and other hardware.

24 Fire Unit (smallest firing unit of the surface-to-air guided missile units)