13-18 date at the jmrc nl ii

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Decisive Action Training Environment at the JMRC, Volume II

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DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II



Foreword

As we look beyond the counterinsurgency (COIN)-focused decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan toward potential threats to security and stability, the decisive action training environment has emerged as an ideal platform on which to combine all that we have learned in the last twelve years with our core tenets of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

In October, 2012, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) conducted Operation Saber Junction, its second decisive action rotation and the largest exercise Europe had seen in more than 20 years. A year of planning went into crafting a complex operational environment featuring a near-peer conventional force, irregular and insurgent elements, and more than 6,000 personnel from 19 participating nations arrayed across 2,400 square kilometers of terrain from the Grafenwoehr to the Hohenfels Training Areas in Germany.

The Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment “Dragoons,” under the control of a higher headquarters replicated by the German-Netherlands Corps, entered a demanding scenario that forced them to simultaneously execute offense, defense, and stability operations while integrating and synchronizing the capabilities of host-nation, coalition, and interagency/intergovernmental partners.

Over the course of 16 demanding days, the Dragoons confronted the hurdles of how to shoot, communicate, and sustain while continuously on the move — a challenging departure from the forward operating base (FOB)-centric operations ingrained in our recent institutional memory. As the 2nd Cavalry Regiment overcame every obstacle placed in its path, several key observations were noted during the rotation, to include the following:

• Mission command on the move over great distances is exceptionally difficult given the digital networked capacity of a modern brigade combat team (BCT). Success requires careful planning, effective triage of information requirements as bandwidth contracts over distance, and a mission command philosophy of decentralized, mission-type orders.

• While many of our basic field craft skills have atrophied over a decade of FOB-based operations, our veteran force of combat experienced noncommissioned and junior officers adapt quickly to changing environments and these skill sets come back when demanded by the conditions.

• Experience, particularly in Operation Enduring Freedom, has shown that future conflicts may see multinational forces not just fighting side by side but fully integrated at the BCT level and below. This is a new phenomenon and this most recent rotational

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED



experience has taught us that preparing for this level of integration demands changes to how we train and in some cases, equip our forces.

At the conclusion of Saber Junction, JMRC’s observer/coach trainers were proud to stand on the objective with the Dragoons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. This newsletter is a direct result of their “sweat equity” and should provide valuable lessons learned as we face the complex and sometimes uncertain security environment that lies ahead. Train to win!

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DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Fighting a Complex Threat: Ten Observations from the Decisive Action Training Environment 1

Chapter 2. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Maneuvering Brigade-Level Command Posts in the Decisive Action Training Environment

13

Chapter 3. The Brigade Combat Team Information Collection Rehearsal 25

Chapter 4. Integrating Brigade-Level Targeting into the Operations Process Across Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Tasks in the Decisive Action Training Environment

31

Chapter 5. Fire Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training Environment 39

Chapter 6. Brigade Tactics and Techniques for Inform and Influence Activities in Decisive Action Training Environments 49

Chapter 7. Integrating Air Defense in the Brigade’s Military Decisionmaking Process in the Decisive Action Training Environment 53

Chapter 8. Tackling Communications Challenges During a Decisive Action Training Environment Rotation 55

Chapter 9. Legal Challenges in the Decisive Action Training Environment: What Judge Advocates Need to Know about Declared Hostile Forces, Surrendering Forces, and the Collateral Damage Methodology

59

Chapter 10. Military Intelligence Company Collection Teams: Creating a Combat Multiplier 71

Chapter 11. Personnel Recovery in Decisive Action and Other Operating Environments 77

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Chapter 12. Planning, Preparing, and Executing Stryker Battalion Sustainment: Logistics for Non-Logisticians 81

Chapter 13. The Sustainer’s Foxhole and Preparing for Unified Land Operations 89

Chapter 14. Accelerating the Flow of Human Intelligence Reporting: The Latest Time Information is of Value 95

Chapter 15. Utilizing the Goat as a Nonlethal Effect in the Decisive Action Training Environment 101

Appendix A. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Mission Command Focus Observations 105

Appendix B. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Intelligence Focus Observations 113

Appendix C. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Fires Focus Observations 119

Appendix D. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Movement and Maneuver Focus Observations 127

Appendix E. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Protection Focus Observations 131

Appendix F. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned, October 2012, Sustainment Focus Observations 137

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Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director COL Thomas H. Roe

Project Analysts Danny W. Reinick

Marvin K. Decker

MAJ Cyrus Russ

Contributing Authors LTC Curt Taylor

MAJ Matthew Todd

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Chapter 1

Fighting a Complex Threat: Ten Observations from the Decisive Action Training Environment

LTC Curt Taylor, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

In October 2012, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) executed the Army’s fourth decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation and the second one at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany. With more than 6,000 soldiers from 19 nations participating, Rotation 13-01 was the largest U.S. training exercise executed in Europe since 1989. Because it was unique, this training event represented an irreplaceable opportunity to identify critical lessons learned for the Army as it trains and prepares brigade combat teams (BCTs) for combat operations at this level. This article focuses on 10 of the major issues that should inform the development of decisive action rotations as well as the doctrine, training, and materiel solutions that will prepare future BCTs to succeed in this complex environment.

Figure 1-1. Soldiers secure a critical road intersection in a German town.

Observation 1: Mission Command on the Move. If there is one consistent theme from all four decisive action rotations the Army has conducted so far, it is the fact that its upper tactical networks are severely challenged in an environment that demands a sustained advance against an enemy force. As a point of comparison, in March 2003, the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) crossed the Iraqi border and fought north over 16 days, advancing 650 kilometers to seize the Baghdad International Airport on 4 April. Our command posts (CPs) have grown considerably since 3rd ID raced through the Karbala gap a decade ago. The four frequency modulated (FM) radio nets (command, fires, administration and logistics, and operations and intelligence) have grown into a multitude of digital and voice networks that connect battalion to brigade and brigade to division CPs.

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Most of these nodes are optimized for static operations over time. As the communication tether begins to stretch, it is often the coordinating staff communication, almost entirely reliant on digital systems, that fails first. While commanders can communicate using FM nets and the lower tactical Internet, the staff-to-staff coordination essential to shaping the fight grinds to a halt.

In Rotation 13-01, 2CR started the rotation with a sustained movement to contact against an enemy force covering more than 40 kilometers of complex terrain and more than 148 hours of continuous movement. Both the tempo of the advance and the sheer size and complexity of the terrain stretched every voice and digital network to the breaking point. The regiment developed a number of innovative ways to mitigate the digital challenge such as employing the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) communication platform to send human intelligence reports. Unfortunately, 2CR was fighting against the technology instead of the technology providing solutions to enable mission command in a fluid battlefield. As the Army continues to work the network integration evaluation process to develop systems that enable true mission command on the move, this is the most important challenge we must address. Our efforts must yield a series of networks that enable both voice and data communication on the move or at the short halt. These systems must allow not just commanders to communicate on the move, but also the staffs that support them to collaborate with one another and to monitor the rapid succession of decisions occurring on the command net.

Automatic data logs of FM communications, “cloud computing,” and staff-to-staff “chat windows” on the lower tactical internet are three simple ideas, well within capabilities of current technology, which would have improved the regiment’s ability to collaborate and share critical information on the move.

Observation 2: Brigades Manage Transitions. This 21-day exercise stressed the importance of simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks as defined in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, October 2011. While elements of all three operational tasks remained relevant throughout the exercise, their relative emphasis shifted from “Big O” to “Big D” to “Big S” as the operational environment changed.

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Figure 1-2. As the enemy situation evolved, the operating environment in Rotation 13-01 shifted over the course of the exercise.

The transition among the three phases forced the regimental staff to adjust in some unexpected ways. Most notably, the role of the staff changed as the environment changed. In the fast-paced, sustained offensive operations at the start of the exercise, where tempo and distance strained every communications network, the commander relied on the initiative of troop and squadron headquarters. Commanders had to understand and execute off the commander’s intent two levels up with very limited guidance as the situation unfolded across the operational environment. The staff found itself resourcing a decentralized fight against a centralized enemy.

As the regiment transitioned to a deliberate defense preparing for an attack from a near-peer conventional threat, the same decentralized management style was no longer appropriate. Effective integration of a regimental defense demanded compliance and coordination with dig schedules, obstacle emplacement, and engagement area integration all nested across squadrons. The emphasis shifted from command to control as the nature of the fight shifted from a decentralized fight to a centralized one against a centralized conventional threat.

As the regiment defeated the enemy conventional forces and transitioned to a wide area security mission across a large operational environment, the role of the staffs adjusted again. Because the nature of the conflict changed, rules of engagement, task organization, and battle rhythm required adjustment as well. The regiment found itself now fighting a decentralized fight against a decentralized enemy. For example, this change forced the S-2 cell to adjust its process for assessing the enemy courses of action (COAs) in order to avoid defining the scattered insurgent forces as a centralized enemy threat with a coherent scheme of maneuver.

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As the lowest echelon of command designed to simultaneously plan and execute tactical operations, the brigade is the level that must anticipate and manage the transitions in the operational environment. The staff must anticipate how the nature of the fight will redefine the staff’s role and the role of the brigade headquarters.

Future training events at the BCT and battalion level, whether conducting as a command post exercise or live, should emphasize the transition phase between operations and force staffs to adjust to the change in roles and responsibilities as the environment changes.

Observation 3: Understanding the Operational Environment. A decade of counterinsurgency (COIN) has taught us very valuable lessons about understanding the cultural and demographic contours of the terrain on which we fight. Identifying underlying sources of instability, a study once limited to political scientists and post-graduate studies, is now debated at length in our company command posts among sergeants and lieutenants. This experience has given us an appetite for unprecedented insight into a culture and what drives it to behave in ways counter to our war missions. As we expand our mission set to include combined arms maneuver operations, it is vital that we retain both the desire and the tools to understand why the population is motivated to act as it does. We should not lose our company intelligence support teams, our female engagement teams, or any of the other tools developed over the years in Iraq and Afghanistan that gave us the insight that we now have at the tactical level.

While a population under occupation by an organized-enemy conventional force has one very big source of instability, we cannot afford to ignore the rest while we deal with that threat. Brigades must develop systems that allow for the simultaneous execution of multiple lines of effort even while they still face a major existential threat from a near-peer opponent. This is hard government work. No commander wants to meet with the local mayor to discuss restoration of essential services while the enemy is still attacking in brigade strength. However, a review of recent conflicts from Iraq to Libya will show that it is in the transition from conventional to post-conflict activities where our strategic objectives so often slip through our grasp. Key to preventing this is a consistent approach throughout all phases of the conflict to understanding the underlying sources of instability and addressing them through multiple, well-considered, and resourced lines of effort. The exercise design of Rotation 13-01 forced this challenge on the 2CR as it had ongoing tactical- and strategic-level stability responsibilities in its area of operations while it still faced a major conventional threat.

Success required the regiment to enable its unified action partners with valuable resources that often had to be diverted from the conventional fight. One of the most important was the reach-back capability to contact their country-team or national-level agencies. Commanders down to company level had to understand both the political situation around them and the commander’s intent two levels up so that they could get the right resource focused on the right problem set.

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Figure 1-3: Engineers construct counter-mobility positions in preparation for the regimental defense.

Observation 4: The Role of Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) in the Logistics Fight. Sustaining a BCT on the move in an immature theater of operations is one of the hardest things we will ask from our logisticians. Success demands thorough and detailed planning, triggers for execution of push logistics, and combat logistics patrols that can fight and win against rear area threats to supply lines. Rotation 13-01 tested every aspect of the 2CR logistics capability from top to bottom. Successful units put responsibility for the logistics fight, and in particular, the evacuation of casualties on the battlefield, on the shoulders of their most capable senior NCOs. Troops with first sergeants who proactively fought for logistics resources and, more importantly, had the mobility to go and get those resources when the situation demanded it, fared the best. The same was true of the casualty evacuation effort. With very limited air medical evacuation resources available in theater, the regiment relied on casualty collection and ambulance exchange points. It was the first sergeants and the command sergeants major who made this system work.

Observation 5: Defensive Planning. After action review comments across the combat training centers (CTCs) from all three preceding DATE rotations have stressed the importance of defensive planning. Of the skills that have atrophied over 10 years of COIN warfare, the hard art of defensive planning has suffered the greatest degradation. The 2CR recognized this and devoted considerable energy to training troop commanders and platoon leaders prior to the rotation on the seven-steps-of-engagement area development, integration of obstacles and fires, and positioning of weapon systems to mass effects against the enemy. The real graduate level of defensive operations, however, is the resourcing and integration of these engagement areas at the battalion and brigade level. For example, the integration of “obstacle planning” and Class IV barrier materiel resourcing between the regimental engineer and S-4 proved to be a critical contribution of the regimental staff to the fight. Clear priorities of work at every echelon are

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vital. Commanders must be able to visualize the terrain and engagement areas from the enemy’s perspective and understand how they will use the terrain to achieve a position of advantage.

Our training at home station should continue to emphasize the critical importance of training the defense at every echelon. From the preparation of platoon dismounted strong points to the integration of battalion defenses into a brigade-level defense, every echelon plays a critical role.

Observation 6: Decision Point Planning. Operating in an environment of increasing complexity demands that tactical forces become masters of adaptation. The fine art of decision point planning is never as important as it is now as our future opponents have a near endless menu of options and novel challenges to present to us on the battlefield. Gone are the days when the Krasnovians would fix in the north and penetrate in the south or fix in the south and penetrate in the north. No tactical plan can anticipate every enemy reaction, but prudent decision planning is another of those lost arts that must become a core competency for us to succeed in this environment.

Where possible, decision points should be structured as an IF-AND-THEN statement tied to both priority information requirements about both the enemy and the environment and friendly force information requirements about our own capabilities. These decisions, when activated by the commander, should trigger a fully integrated COA that involves every warfighting function (WfF) and accounts for the time required for execution by anticipating appropriate triggers for action. The sketch in Figure 1-4 provides a possible format for a fully developed and fully integrated decision point.

Figure 1-4. Technique for developing a fully developed and integrated COA to support a tactical decision point

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If properly structured, these decision points determine the commander’s critical information requirements and the priorities for the brigade intelligence collection plan. Good decision point planning is vital to good execution because it takes us out of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) “whack-a-mole” game where targets are attacked as acquired with limited resources while the critical information that the commander needs to make vital decisions on the battlefield is ignored or forgotten.

An effective decision support template, however, should begin with a detailed and cross-functional intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Without an adequate enemy situational template that takes into account likely and feasible threat COAs accounting for known enemy capabilities, it is difficult for planners to develop the specific priority intelligence requirements that will confirm or deny enemy COAs and the tactical solutions that will defeat them. IPB against a hybrid threat is too important and too complex to be left entirely to the S-2. Given a broad variety of tools and methods that the enemy has at his disposal to affect the environment, it takes the full staff to develop the enemy template. For example, enemy air capabilities should be templated by the Air Defense and Airspace Management cell, subversion activities directed against the population should be templated by the S-9 cell, and threat propaganda by the S-7. A detailed threat assessment representing the joint analysis across all the WfFs is the single most important output of the mission analysis process because it has such a significant impact on how the staff conducts the rest of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). An integrated IPB drives the development of good decision points that allow the unit to preempt or respond to enemy actions on the battlefield.

Observation 7: Massing Fires and Close Air Support to Enable Combined Arms Maneuver. A decade of decentralized operations against a decentralized enemy force has taught us some powerful habits about how we apportion the brigade’s pool of lethal shapers including artillery fires, close air support, and close combat attack rotary-wing aircraft. Adaptation to that environment forced units to become very good at forecasting requirements and apportioning resources to support company- and platoon-sized operations over a wide area often planned well in advance. Continuous and sustained combined arms maneuver, however, turns this model on its head and requires a different approach to allocation of these resources.

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Figure 1-5. Soldiers from 2CR’s fires squadron provide fire support to the regiment.

In a fight against a conventional threat, the BCT has to choose when and where it will mass the effects of its artillery to defeat critical enemy capabilities. Those actions in turn must be tied to and rapidly exploited by well-synchronized maneuver actions or the temporary advantage is often lost.

During the rotation, the imperative to mass lethal effects in a few locations on the battlefield tied directly to maneuver (the close fight) or to critical enemy capabilities (the deep fight) forced the regiment to centralize the employment of artillery and close air support and fight the temptation to fire at every target identified by the UAS. The development of clearly understood attack guidance and very specific fire support tasks tied to the scheme of maneuver were critical to the regiment’s success.

The air mission request model that worked so well in Afghanistan has little relevance for a brigade in sustained offensive operations when subordinate units could not forecast their operations out four hours, much less 48 hours. Instead, BCT staffs must request and plan the employment of both rotary- and fixed-wing assets based on reasonable projections and the commander’s intent, establish rigid check-in procedures, and then centrally manage these critical resources. The complex airspace management required to simultaneously employ artillery including high altitude weapons such as EXCALIBUR with rotary-wing aircraft requires detailed airspace graphics. In 10 years of COIN, we developed an implicit assumption that the airspace belonged to aircraft unless designated for artillery through activation of a particular restricted operating zone. This complexity of the decisive action environment forced the regiment to employ specific graphic control measures for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to include air corridors and aerial battle positions in order to ensure that close combat attack aircraft did not disrupt the artillery fight.

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Observation 8: Air Defense Planning and Training. Rotation 13-01 presented 2CR with a real and dangerous manned and unmanned aerial threat. The regiment adapted and became increasingly proficient at dealing with the threat over the course of the rotation. Units began taking the air threat into account in the selection of command posts and assembly areas. Tactical command posts and company assembly areas disappeared into the tree line, Stryker crews started pulling “air guard watch” and the regimental staff started considering the employment of radar and air defense emplacement.

Figure 1-6. Slovenian air defense battery personnel search for enemy rotary-wing aircraft.

Our current technical overmatch assures us at least some level of air superiority very early on in any future conflict. The recent proliferation of UASs in the hands of our adversaries, however, should give us pause lest we retire the air defense branch prematurely. With a real enemy UAS capability out there, both passive and active air defense skills are going to be an important part of any future conflict. It does not take much imagination to see how a UAS capability combined with precision-strike rockets could wreak havoc on our large command and logistics nodes that are distributed throughout the brigade’s rear area.

“Combined arms for air defense” techniques are very effective when vehicle crews are trained on air engagement techniques and practice it on the machine gun range or in simulation. Identification and dissemination of local air defense warning status play a huge role in helping units visually identify and discriminate between friend and foe. Effective air defense radar emplacement based on a sound IPB that considers enemy air avenues of approach also improves the effectiveness of the air defense fight. As an Army, our passive and active air defense skills have atrophied over a decade of nonuse; however, this rotation demonstrated how quickly units adapted when forced to by a serious air threat in the training environment.

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Observation 9: Fighting to Communicate. True knowledge management (KM) is much more than just getting the unit’s SharePoint page updated with the latest fragmentary orders. KM is all about getting the right information to the right actor on the battlefield in time for him to make the right decision. As our digital communications networks have grown over the past decade, our ability to maintain those networks on the move has not improved. Experience in multiple recent rotations has shown that once a brigade begins sustained offensive operations, digital communications often degrade to the point that units just stop using them. In this rotation, the fine tuning required to build a stable e-mail or Command Post of the Future network could be measured in days, not hours. With squadron command posts moving every few hours, digital communications were throttled down to what could be typed in a FBCB2 free text message.

Technical solutions to this problem are on the horizon, but there is plenty of work to do now to adjust our doctrine to anticipate complex digital networks in immature and mobile environments. Field Manual (FM) 6.01-1, Knowledge Management, July 2012; and FM 6.02.71, Network Operations, July 2009, both focus on network operations in a garrison or stable forward operating base-based network environment. Our doctrine provides very little guidance for a BCT S-6 planning to operate in a degraded and immature communications environment. Trends from recent decisive action rotations suggest that building a network in this environment should start by understanding our information requirements rather than focusing on the technical capabilities of our systems. Units preparing for this environment should develop an “arms room” approach to networks — where particular networks are activated on an “as needed” basis. In short, the mission should define the shape and complexity of the network, not the other way around. Our tactical units need a doctrinal process integrated into the MDMP that defines their KM requirements, assesses the communications operating environment, and then develops a networking solution that is tailored to that environment.

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Figure 1-7. A Bulgarian Army soldier from the 61st Mechanized Infantry Brigade calls out enemy movement during Rotation 13-01 at JMRC.

Observation 10: Multinational Integration. We will likely never fight another conflict without substantial involvement from coalition partners on our flanks, in our higher headquarters, and within our own formations. With more than 1,800 NATO soldiers involved in the exercise from 19 partnered nations, this rotation afforded the ideal opportunity to test our ability to integrate our formations in a fast-developing, tactical situation.

While we stress the importance of multinational integration, our doctrine provides limited guidance on exactly how this process should take place. FM 3-16, The Army in Multinational Operations, May 2010, pertains mostly to the integration at the operational level. True tactical-level integration of multinational combat formations is a relatively new phenomenon. Furthermore, there is no easily accessible information resource for units to understand the capabilities, systems, and limitations of our multinational partners that will likely fight alongside us.

The 2CR exerted tremendous effort overcoming the doctrinal, equipment, and cultural boundaries that inhibited true integration, but this remains a critical skill that requires training and doctrine. Before 9/11, most of our multinational integration occurred at the brigade level and above and was little more than deconfliction of adjacent units. The last decade of conflict has seen the true integration of multinational forces at the company and battalion level. To achieve synchronization in tactical operations, units must have a solid understanding of the differences in equipment, doctrine, communications, and national caveats that will affect the operation. The rotation demonstrated that it takes a tremendous amount of planning and coordination to integrate a Romanian battalion into your formation in the middle of a deliberate attack or employ

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Ukrainian HIND-D helicopters over the top of an attacking squadron. Because of the critical importance of this integration task, we should continue to encourage multinational involvement at all of our CTCs so that the first time we learn these lessons it is not on the battlefield.

Conclusion

The 2CR proved that well-trained and well-led formations can adapt to a changing environment and bridge the skill gap between the environment that we have been fighting in for the past 10 years and the complex decisive action fight of the future. The agility of a professional military and the ingenuity of the American Soldier remain our greatest asymmetric advantages against the adversaries of the future. As our Soldiers, small units, and staffs adapt to this environment, it is imperative that our systems, equipment, and doctrine evolve as well to support that adaptation.

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Chapter 2

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Maneuvering Brigade-Level Command Posts in the Decisive Action Training Environment

LTC Eric T. Smith, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The decisive action training environment (DATE) is a vastly different operational environment (OE) from which we, as an Army, have been operating within for the past 10 years. Over the last decade, brigade combat teams (BCTs) conducting operations as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have operated from largely static command posts (CPs). Planning for mission command at the brigade level has focused on either the utilization of temporary mission command nodes deployed to support specific operations, or fixed mission command nodes that support the year-long deployment. In the DATE, CPs must support combined arms maneuver within a constantly changing OE.

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) located in Hohenfels, Germany, has completed two training rotations using the DATE. Although every rotation is unique, we can draw on this experience to develop conclusions that will assist other units as they train for future rotations and contingency deployments. One of the significant differences between the DATE and OIF/OEF operations is the requirement for brigade staffs to conduct deliberate course of action (COA) development in support of the organization, location, and movement of CPs. The establishment and maneuver of brigade-level CPs in the DATE must be deliberately planned, built to support the unique aspects of the OE, and tailored to the brigade commander’s mission command requirements.

This article discusses the following assessments, based on emerging trends and developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing brigade-level CPs:

• Utilizing a CP1 and CP2 methodology provides more flexibility than the main CP and tactical CP (TAC CP) doctrinal foundations.

• A fully-resourced CP2, resourced from the core TAC CP, is capable of providing mission command for BCT operations in the short-term, but requires augmentation to enable continuous planning in the mid- and long-terms.

• Modularizing CPs increases options for employment and maintains flexibility.

• Keeping CP1 and CP2 physically separated, even when they are co-located, reduces friction when the two are simultaneously employed.

• Disruption to the BCT operations (S-3, Plans) integrated cell must be minimized in order for the BCT to conduct continuous short-, near-, and long-range planning.

• Dependent on mission requirements and tempo, CP1 and CP2 can move using alternate or successive bounds.

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Staffs that develop a modular CP organization prior to initiating operations within the DATE, and then integrate COA development for the CP maneuver plan into their military decisionmaking process (MDMP) will be better prepared to meet the challenges inherent in this demanding environment.

Planning Starts with the Doctrinal Foundation

At the JMRC, brigades have started their operations in the DATE using our doctrinal structure and modified the implementation through the course of the rotation. Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, September 2011, defines four types of CPs:

• Main CP

• Tactical CP

• Command group

• Early entry CP

The main CP contains the majority of the brigade staff, is larger and less mobile than the tactical CP, and is usually overseen by the chief of staff or executive officer (XO). The TAC CP contains a tailored portion of the headquarters and is designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time. The command group consists of the commander and selected staff who assist the commander in controlling operations away from the CP. And the early-entry CP, not supported by the brigade modified table of organization and equipment, can be established in the initial stages of a unit’s deployment to provide mission command until the main CP deploys.

Using these doctrinal foundations as their start point, brigades have habitually begun operations in the DATE with a large main CP, a small TAC CP, and a command group that assists the commander in battlefield circulation. Some problems with this construct immediately become evident as the brigade conducts operations within the DATE.

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Figure 2-1. Airborne BCT early entry (assault) CP

Figure 2-2. Stryker BCT main CP

The main CP quickly becomes too big to be agile and requires increasing amounts of resources to sustain itself. At the start, BCTs have used the standard model outlined in the 2009 edition of the Warfighter’s Command Post Handbook as a baseline and then typically add additional tentage for subordinate CPs, sleep tents, a dining tent, perimeter wire, a maintenance section, the headquarters and headquarters company CP, a refueling section, and unit parking areas. This results in a perimeter footprint that is 300 meters by 100 meters, or 7.5 acres in size. The increased size creates a requirement for additional units to provide security and transportation

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assets to move the main CP, further enlarging the footprint. Moving the main CP typically takes 12-24 hours, disrupts planning, and degrades the brigade’s mission command networks.

Figure 2-3. Stryker BCT TAC CP

The commander is thus presented with a dilemma — does he leave his CP static and functional, though increasingly less relevant to his requirements, or does he move it frequently to keep it relevant, with the associated cost in security, transportation, and reduction in the mission command network fidelity?

By design, the TAC CP draws personnel and equipment from the main CP, tailored to the mission. The trend is for staffs to initially allocate the absolute minimal amount of personnel and equipment to the TAC CP, not wanting to overly degrade the main CP’s capabilities prior to the TAC CP’s deployment. When employed, the TAC CP is typically able to perform as the controlling CP for the brigade in the short term, though planning for near- and long-term operations is disrupted, as doctrinally, the planning staff is located at the main CP.

The command group is designed to facilitate the commander’s battlefield circulation and to allow the commander to control the brigade while he is not at the main CP or the TAC CP. Initially, commanders have started with a small command group, but once the capabilities of the main or TAC CP are degraded during movement, the commander typically begins to increase the size of the command group with the key leaders he needs. These have included the fires battalion commander, brigade S-3, intelligence officer (S-2), air liaison officer, and brigade aviation officer. The command group becomes a mission command node, potentially pulling resources from the main and TAC CP, while it remains inadequately resourced to meet commander’s needs.

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Figure 2-4. Airborne BCT TAC CP

By the midpoint in the rotation, the brigade has started with a doctrinal CP structure and morphed it into a three-tiered structure: a command group with principal staff officers who assist the commander in making decisions, a TAC CP with the ability to control short-term operations, and a cumbersome main CP monitoring decisions made in the command group and the TAC CP while conducting mid- and long-range planning. This ad hoc structure serves the commander well in the short term, but the disconnect in planning and marginalization of much of the staff in the main CP inhibits the brigade from proactively shaping future operations.

Changing the Paradigm: Developing CP1 and CP2

Units preparing for a combat training center rotation in the DATE can bypass the developmental process described above by establishing a CP construct based on a CP1 and CP2 methodology. Instead of visualizing the basic structure as a main CP and TAC CP, brigades organize two CPs — one habitually more robust than the other. CP1 is formed from the main CP, capable of exercising all its functions. CP2 is formed from the TAC CP, augmented with personnel and equipment to enable it to operate indefinitely as the controlling CP when the main CP cannot (such as while in transit, due to enemy attack, or due to catastrophic equipment failure). Modifying the TAC CP to become CP2 builds on its doctrinal foundation as a temporary CP for a specific purpose, and redefines it as an alternate CP, capable of controlling the brigade and conducting planning in the short term. This allows brigades to initiate operations with two CPs, both serving as the controlling CP while supporting continuous planning.

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Figure 2-5. Airborne BCT main CP

A good technique exercised at JMRC during DATE rotations is establishing CP1 and CP2 as separate entities, with distinct personnel and equipment from the onset. Both CPs learn to operate independently, with organic personnel and equipment, mitigating the disruption that might have been caused when CP2 deployed (resourced out of a combined CP1).

Organizing the brigade headquarters into modular sections increases the agility and flexibility for both CP1 and CP2. Typically, BCTs have started rotations using the Trailer Mounted Support System-Large (TMSS-L) as the core tent for CP1, with staff sections arrayed around it in Trailer Mounted Support System-Medium (TMSS-M) tents. The investment in set-up and tear-down time and manpower for the TMSS-L inhibits CP1’s agility and BCTs have found that a TMSS-M can adequately support the current operations (CUOPS) integration cell infrastructure requirements. A single or multiple TMSS-M can be “dropped” without degrading the CP as a whole. Planning to modularize CP1 and CP2 within TMSS-M tents and using the TMSS-L for briefings or rehearsals increases BCT flexibility through modularization.

A basic division of the brigade headquarters into TMSS-M shelters is illustrated in Figure 2-6. CP1 and CP2 CUOPS are divided from inception, as described above. The military intelligence company is combined with the brigade staff functional intelligence cell to create an integrated S-2 intelligence cell. The network operations cell is not depicted in this sketch as it should be co-located with the CUOPS cells for CP1 and CP2. This modularized organization gives BCTs the ability to easily structure and echelon the CPs.

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Figure 2-6. Brigade headquarters modular build

BCTs that planned for operations using the CP1 and CP2 paradigm built around a modularized headquarters, vastly increase the flexibility and agility of their CPs. If the commander wants to operate with a strict doctrinal version of the main CP and TAC CP, this organization facilitates that COA. If the commander elects to have alternate controlling CPs while executing combined arms maneuver, this organization fits that COA as well. Inevitably, the OE will change; a modularized CP1 and CP2 structure enables the staff to adapt quickly.

Maneuvering the Brigade Headquarters

Movement of the brigade headquarters is essentially bounding overwatch, using alternate or successive bounds with its two maneuver elements, CP1 and CP2. The significant distinction is that unlike an infantry platoon or armor company, one element is not stationary while the other moves, but “controlling,” while the other executes another activity.

Figure 2-7 shows a method for using CP1 and CP2 to move a short distance without disrupting command and control of CUOPs or planning for the mid/long-term time frames.

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Figure 2-7. Moving the main CP using CP1 and CP2 (alternate bounds)

In Stage 1, CP1 is the controlling CP. CP2 moves forward to a favorable position where it can support the mission command requirements for the brigade. Once CP2 is fully operationally capable, CP1 transfers responsibility for control of short-term operations to CP1 through a deliberate process and CP2 becomes the controlling CP. The commander has the option of positioning himself at CP1 if the decisive effort is planning, at CP2 if the decisive effort is ongoing operations, or elsewhere in the area of operations (AO) using the command group.

During Stage 2, personnel in the S-3 (Plans) integrated staff cell move into the command group tent to continue planning at CP1 while the all-source collection element (ACE) and S-2 consolidates into one tent as the plans and S-2/ACE TMSS-M shelters are moved to CP2. Once these workspaces are established, the planners and a portion of the S-2/ACE cell move to CP2. Disruption to mid- and long-term planning is minimal — merely the transit time between the two locations. In addition to controlling short-term operations, CP2 is now capable of mid-term and select long-term planning.

Stage 3 sees the remainder of the modular cells from CP1 move to CP2. The CP2, still the controlling CP, is now a fully established main CP capable of exercising all its required functions. The CP1 CUOPS TMSS-M is the last shelter to move, with the option of either repositioning with CP2 or moving forward to begin the whole process again.

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Using this technique, the brigade is able to maintain continuous mission command over current operations with redundant capability, minimize disruption to mid- and long-term planning, and allow the commander maximum flexibility to position himself on the battlefield where he feels he needs to be.

Figure 2-8. Brigade S-3 (Plans) tent

A method of maneuvering CP1 and CP2 utilizing successive bounds is shown in Figure 2-9. This technique is applicable when the brigade is conducting high-tempo operations within a larger AO. In Stage 1, the headquarters is fully established around CP1 with CP2 deployed forward to provide improved mission command. Initially, CP1 is the controlling CP until CP2 becomes fully operationally capable, at which point there is a deliberate handover and CP2 becomes the controlling CP.

In Stage 2, the S-3 (Plans) and S-2 TMSS-M shelters are moved to CP2. As in Figure 2-7, S-3 (Plans) personnel and S-2/ACE personnel at CP1 temporarily consolidate into other shelters to continue working. When the S-3 (Plans) and S-2/ACE workspaces at CP2 are fully operationally capable, the planners and select S-2 personnel move to CP2. This CP now has the capacity to control current operations and plan for mid- and long-term operations with the only disruption occurring while personnel are in transit.

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Figure 2-9. Maneuvering CP1 and CP2 with successive bounds

In Stage 3, CP1 bounds forward of CP2, with the majority of the brigade headquarters and establishes at a favorable location in the AO in which it can control CUOPs. When it is fully operationally capable, another deliberate handover occurs, this time from CP2 to CP1, and CP1 becomes the controlling CP. The planners located at CP2 move to CP1 and continue working in the shelters described above, followed by their TMSS-M shelters.

Stage 4 sees the consolidation of the brigade headquarters in one location, with CP1 forming the core, appropriate shelters arrayed around it, and CP2 co-located — though not integrated into CP1.

Planning During MDMP to Maneuver the Command Post

The staff can modularize the brigade headquarters into CP1 and CP2 as part of its preparation for operations in the DATE. The refined maneuver plan for the CPs cannot be developed until the staff executes the MDMP, both in support of the initial operation and subsequent missions. While executing the MDMP, the first time a staff will doctrinally plan for the establishment of headquarters is at the end of COA development, while building the task organization. Planners assign headquarters to groups of forces. This task organization is reflected in the COA sketch/statement and eventually, following orders production, in paragraph five of the operations order (OPORD). What our doctrine doesn’t describe in detail is the planning necessary to maneuver CPs, when that should be conducted, and who is responsible. The following technique is designed to integrate into the MDMP at the brigade level (see Figure 2-10).

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Figure 2-10. CP planning as part of the MDMP

Step 1: Assign Headquarters

During COA development, planners assign headquarters to groups of forces. It is a resource-unconstrained action and usually not linked to specific actions or triggers. Planners may determine several locations that require mission command nodes at varying times, each of which may involve a change in task organization. The requirements developed at this point in the planning are general (for example, “provide mission command for two rifle battalions” or “conduct liaison with host nation government and rear area security battalion”). At the conclusion of COA development, the COA sketch should include the location and purpose for CPs.

Step 2: COA Analysis

During wargaming, the staff identifies the specific events (triggers) which generate an action within a CP or the events (conditions) that determine if a CP should move. These requirements are articulated on the decision support matrix, refined COA sketch, and synchronization matrix. The XO must designate a single individual as the proponent for CPs during the wargaming process. This individual could be a planner, the operations sergeant major, S-6, headquarters company commander, or a trusted member of the staff who understands the headquarters. It should not be the XO himself, keeping him free to maintain oversight of the brigade staff as it works through the MDMP.

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The requirements that the staff develops during COA analysis are more specific than those developed during the initial arrival of forces. These may include specific actions the CPs are to perform (control counter-battery fires during the offense, provide mission command at the river crossing, engage the host-nation government officials). They may include specific triggers for the movement of the CPs (CP1 will move forward of Phase Line BLUE when CP2 takes over as the controlling CP; after Passage Point 2 is closed, CP1 will become the controlling CP and CP2 will move 5 kilometers east of CP1). Planners must clearly articulate what the CPs are supposed to do. This will allow the CP planner to develop the maneuver plan in coordination with other members of the staff.

Step 3: Orders Production

Following the commander’s updated guidance on the selected COA, the planners should articulate the scheme of maneuver for the brigade’s CPs, either in paragraph 5.b.(1) (CPs) of the OPORD, or in an annex to the order if the plan is complex enough to warrant inclusion as a separate document. This is the most critical and difficult portion of the process. The planner must integrate the requirements, develop a COA, and synchronize it within the overall plan. The XO has to ensure the staff is supporting the development of the headquarters maneuver plan while it is completing its own portions of the final order. In this final rush to publish, it is tempting for planners to rearticulate the unit standard operating procedures in paragraph 5, rather than invest in a tailored plan. Succumbing to this temptation will negate all the hard work done up to this point and relegate CP planning to the short term, as the unit becomes increasingly reactive to events in the OE.

Conclusion

The DATE is a unique OE for each brigade that operates within it. Staffs must develop a CP structure designed to serve the commander’s requirements. Prior to initiating operations, staffs can develop a modularized CP1/CP2 structure and integrate it into their standard operating procedure. This framework will serve the staff well when, during MDMP, the designated CP planner can use it as a foundation to build the mission-specific maneuver plan. The brigade will be able to conduct continuous operations in the short-, mid-, and long-term time frames and meet the commander’s requirements.

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Chapter 3

The Brigade Combat Team Information Collection Rehearsal

MAJ Eric M. Walthall, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Brigade combat teams (BCTs) operating in a wide area security or combined arms maneuver environment are supported by collection assets available from their organic organizations, their combined joint task force-level headquarters, their theater headquarters, as well as national intelligence agencies. Today, brigades must manage more collection support than a division headquarters was expected to manage prior to 2003. A common technique used at the division level to synchronize information collection prior to 2003 was the reconnaissance and surveillance rehearsal (25th Infantry Division [ID] Planning Standing Operating Procedures [SOP], 5th Edition, 8 February 2002). According to the 25th ID Planning SOP, BCTs should conduct information collection rehearsals as part of their military decisionmaking process (MDMP). While not doctrinally required, this practice helps collectors and users understand how information will be collected and disseminated throughout the operation in support of the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Observations

During their October 2001 Warfighter Exercise, the 25th ID assigned collection assets from every intelligence discipline, to include assets in the organic military intelligence battalion. Only two of its collection assets, collecting on then-MG James Dubik’s PIR, were airborne — one Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and one EH-60 Quick Fix helicopter (see Figure 3-1).

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Figure 3-1. 25th ID Warfighter Exercise, 261200 October 2001. Annex B (Intelligence) to 25th ID (Light) Operations Order 10-02 (TROPIC STORM).

During the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s Rotation 13-01, a decisive action training environment rotation, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment had assigned, attached, and in direct support, collection assets from every intelligence discipline. Five to ten of these assets, from during different phases of the operation, were airborne assets, to include organic Shadow unmanned aircraft systems, theater full-motion video, theater measurement and signature intelligence, and theater signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Timing Options

The first option for the timing of the intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) rehearsal is immediately following the production of Warning Order 2. Warning Order 2 doctrinally includes the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) order and information collection plan (per 25th ID Planning SOP, 5th Edition). The benefit of conducting the rehearsal early in the MDMP process is that it allows for a quick start to collecting on the commander’s PIR. The risk is that the rehearsal will only be focused on the initial set of PIR, and collectors and customers will not be able to rehearse events that have not been developed during course of action (COA) development. Conducting the IWfF rehearsal prior to COA development may be beneficial in movement to contact or offensive operations in which there is little known on enemy positions. The early commitment of collection assets may assist in refining enemy COAs prior to COA development.

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The second option for the timing of the IWfF rehearsal is immediately following the conduct of the combined arms rehearsal (CAR), prior to the conduct of the fire support rehearsal. The benefit of conducting the rehearsal following the CAR is that the plan is finalized and the collection plan should not change. This time will also allow the fires rehearsal to be conducted with a thorough understanding of the collection plan and how targets will be identified (see Figure 3-2).

Another option available when operating in a time-constrained environment is to cover key portions of the information collection rehearsal as part of the CAR. This method will most likely not get into the detail required to thoroughly synchronize the collection plan and will extend the amount of time required to conduct the CAR.

The Actors

The IWfF rehearsal should be set up by the brigade S-2 and run by the commander’s designated chief of reconnaissance. This can be the reconnaissance squadron commander or designated representative, the brigade S-2, or the brigade executive officer. The brigade collection manager, usually a senior lieutenant or junior captain should not run the rehearsal. Attendees should include the following:

• Brigade ○○○○ ○ S-2

○○○○ ○ S-3

○○○○ ○ Collection manager

• U.S. Air Force ○○○○ ○ ISR LNO

○○○○ ○ targeting officer

○○○○ ○ SIGINT technician

○○○○ ○ S-2X (human intelligence collection)/operational management team

○○○○ ○ UAV platoon leader or technician

• Reconnaissance squadron commander• S-3, or LNO• Artillery battalion S-2 and radar technician• Battalion/squadron S-2s and S-3s or LNOs as available

The Events

The rehearsal should be done by event or phase, in line with the wargame or CAR. For each event, the actors should brief each asset assigned or task organized, what named areas of interest they are observing, what indicators they are looking for, and what essential elements of information and PIRs they are attempting to answer. After briefing each asset using this method, the actor must then brief what reporting method they are going to use, and on what communication system (see Figure 3-3 for a recommended rehearsal format).

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Figure 3-2. The military decisionmaking process from Army Field Manual 2-19.4, Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, 25 November 2008, Figure 2-1.

All information collectors will brief how they are sharing the information they are collecting. Is the information being input into a digital system? If yes, who is inputting the information? How will battalions receive information if they are jumping their command post during this event/phase? Is the information required to be broadcast over the brigade operations and intelligence or command frequency-modulated radio network?

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Figure 3-3. Recommended information collection rehearsal format

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Following the completion of the events or phases, the rehearsal should include vignettes which test redundancy in collection and the use of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plans. Collectors and users should understand from the rehearsal what the commander’s priorities are, and that as a result of these priorities, collection assets may be moved or reallocated in order to answer PIR. Collectors and users should also have a clear understanding of the information dissemination PACE plan.

Conclusion

A properly conducted information collection rehearsal will provide the commander, staff, collec-tors, and subordinate commands with the understanding of the brigade collection and dissemina-tion plans, and how these plans will drive the commander’s decision points. Commanders and staff officers will both understand how and when information will be collected, and to whom the information collected must be disseminated. This will improve the commander’s situational awareness and result in better synchronized operations and targeting processes.

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Chapter 4

Integrating Brigade-Level Targeting into the Operations Process Across Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Tasks

in the Decisive Action Training Environment

CW3 Hondo J. Hack, Brigade Targeting Trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Midway through the brigade’s decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation in the country of Atropia, national-level surveillance and intelligence detects movement of the 11th Division Tactical Group (DTG) confirming the enemy’s most likely course of action. The 11th is the supporting effort of the Arianan attack into the country to seize the capital of Baku; this enemy unit is heading north towards the brigade’s southern boundary. The South Atropian Peoples’ Army (SAPA) insurgent forces are attacking in the brigade’s rear area security zone and are targeting logistics and the regiment’s main command post (CP). Refugees are beginning to flee their homes and towns to avoid the advancing Arianan forces while human intelligence reporting indicates that terrorists want to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in order to kill the mayor of Aghabadhi City. Criminal elements are disrupting relief supplies by blockading roads and hijacking trucks. There isn’t any power or running water in the city of Kiberly, the largest city in the brigade’s western area of operations. The brigade has received an order from its higher headquarters directing it to link up with Atropian forces and coordinate a defense of Aghabadhi Province while remnants of the Arianan 306th and 304th are attacking from population centers — intentionally using residential areas for cover against potential direct fire and counterfire from the brigade’s maneuver units. Bridges and roads are in need of repair. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State want to meet with the brigade commander, S-7, and S-9 to coordinate stability tasks. All of this occurs simultaneously and the brigade staff has to describe the operational environment (OE) to the commander.

The DATE is a dynamic training environment; units can quickly become overwhelmed by events. A systemic trend for units in a DATE rotation is that they tend to focus on the current operations (CUOPs) fight and attack targets of opportunity rather than adhere to their approved criteria; this causes them to desynchronize their combined arms plan and dynamically retask available collection and joint fires assets. Units also struggle with synchronizing lethal targeting and inform and influence activities (IIA) that shape and sustain decisive operations. To be successful in this dynamic training environment, units should consider a holistic approach that requires detailed integration with simultaneous execution.

To attack or engage both dynamic and planned targets in the DATE, units should conduct simultaneous targeting for both lethal and non-lethal target sets. To accomplish this, it is important for units to develop, rehearse, and execute an integrated targeting and operations plan. As the situation and mission develops, commanders and their staffs make minor adjustments off of their plans or they run the risk of just reacting to enemy contact. This article discusses an approach with emphasis on two key points for the brigade staff to consider:

• Evolve and adapt to the OE

• Integrate simultaneous targeting into the operations process to focus resources and measure progress.

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Targeting the Complex Threat

The opponent in the DATE is a thinking and adaptable complex threat. This threat reintroduces a near-peer force that conventional Army units have not faced since the fall of Baghdad in 2003. The Army is not discarding lessons learned from 11 years of counterinsurgency operations; the asymmetrical fight has been incorporated into the DATE. Units can expect to target conventional forces, insurgents, guerrilla forces, criminal elements, and terrorists. Targeting must also focus on key stability engagements such as provincial authorities, host nation security forces (HNSF), and internally displaced persons.

Successful targeting in the DATE also results from analysis and understanding of the adversary’s motivations and goals and how enemy operations are affecting conditions in the OE. For example, not all criminal elements are insurgents; they may have mutual agreements and profit from providing support to insurgent networks. Guerrilla forces differ from insurgents in that they are more localized and generally not interested in overthrowing the government. Failure to holistically analyze the complex threat will cause units to fall into the trap of associating all threats together and not target effectively to achieve desired outcomes.

Simultaneous Targeting Across Decisive Action Tasks

During deployments, units will conduct decisive action in support of unified land operations through regular and irregular warfare against complex threats in their OE. Units will accomplish their tasks through the application of the Army’s core competencies of combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) in contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operation. The mission will determine how the commander weighs the elements of decisive action based on the staff assessment of changing conditions in the OE and orders from higher headquarters. For example, units may focus more effort on offensive tasks during the first 24-48 hours of operations and then transition to defensive tasks. Units must also keep in mind that stability tasks cannot be put off until a transitional phase of the unit’s mission. Stability tasks, conducted simultaneously with offensive and defensive tasks, set favorable conditions for a unit to transition security and governance responsibilities to host nation officials.

During CAM, based on the scenario described above, units conduct operations to defeat enemy ground forces by targeting high-payoff targets (HPTs) of the 11th DTG, such as 2S19 self-propelled howitzers, SA6 surface-to-air missile systems, IL220U artillery-locating radar systems, and T-80 tanks. Although these enemy elements are not yet committed and outside of the unit’s area of operations, the brigade must work with its higher headquarters to attrit the size of the enemy force that it will face once the enemy forces enter the brigade’s area of operations and become committed.

During WAS, targeting must address the protection of populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities in order to deny the enemy positions of advantage while consolidating positive gains to maintain the initiative. Examples of lethal HPTs, based on the scenario, are remnants of the Arianan 306th and 304th and SAPA elements attacking the brigade’s rear security area. Non-lethal HPTs are provincial authorities that can mitigate the flood of refugees into the brigade’s engagement zones, members of the HNSF leadership who want to coordinate a defense of Aghabahi Province, and key power brokers who will assist in the restoration of essential services in Kiberly.

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It is the responsibility of commanders to guide their staffs and synchronize both lethal and non-lethal targeting efforts with operations. The most effective approach to accomplishing this critical task in the DATE is using the targeting cycle and targeting meetings as the mechanism for the staff to analyze and synchronize activities. Units develop and allocate priority targets based on the commander’s guidance for fires and approved fire support tasks. The staff identifies close and rear area targets to engage and must also focus and synchronize their deep targeting with the higher headquarters in order to shape the brigade’s close fight with joint fires. Next, the staff drafts HPTs based on holistic OE analysis and inputs the HPTs into the draft HPT list (HPTL). The HPTL is a list of recommended and prioritized HPTs that, when engaged, accomplish the commander’s key tasks for each element of decisive action.

Once the commander has prioritized and approved the HPTL, the staff and maneuver units synergize lethal and non-lethal assets by time, location, and desired effect to support the commander’s objectives. The staff builds the attack guidance matrix with both lethal and non-lethal assets and the target selection standards to set priority of HPT engagement based on criteria such as target size, target location error, target dwell-time, and desired effect. These documents form the basis of the target synchronization matrix (TSM), which is an end product of Annex D (Fire Support) to the unit’s operation order and produced by the brigade fires element.

Integrate and Synchronize Targeting into the Operations Process

The key to conducting simultaneous targeting across the elements of decisive action is the integration and synchronization of targeting with the operations process. This synchronization occurs in the brigade’s main CP to ensure that operations, collections, and targeting are fused from top to bottom with bottom-up refinement from maneuver units as required.

During the daily targeting meeting, the staff and maneuver element liaison officers synchronize collection assets to observe named areas of interest (NAIs) and allocate organic and joint fires to locate and engage HPTs lethally and non-lethally at the direction of the brigade executive officer (XO). The XO then briefs the brigade commander on the upcoming 24- to 48-hour targeting plan to gain his approval. For major operations such as defend or counter-attack, the brigade conducts combined arms and fire support rehearsals. The targeting plan is incorporated into these two rehearsals to ensure it is nested with maneuver and refined prior to execution of the operation.

While there are several decision support tools that can assist the commander and staff during execution, three specific matrices provide the staff with the method to conduct simultaneous targeting: the CUOPs synchronization matrix, the decision support matrix, and the TSM. The challenge for the staff is bringing all three planning documents together for execution. The CUOPs matrix is an operations synchronization tool developed and used by the mission command warfighting function (WfF) elements. The CUOP matrix contains the brigade’s collection plan and maneuver tasks. The decision support matrix, also developed by the mission command WfF, provides a war-gamed course of action with decision points and unit actions for each decision point. The TSM, developed by the fires WfF elements, provides guidance for the allocation and employment of collection assets, fire support, joint fires, and IIA in support of maneuver tasks. Combined, these three matrices become the execution matrices for operations and targeting at each echelon of the brigade. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, provides guidance on how a unit should utilize an execution matrix with the decision support matrix (or by WfF), but does not address how to integrate simultaneous targeting with operations. During execution of operations, doctrine states that it is the

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responsibility of the CUOPs integration cell in the CP to integrate forces and WfFs to accomplish the mission. The CUOPs integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly action to expect forces to execute in the near term or, in conjunction with the decision support matrix, which execution decisions to make (ADRP 5-0, paragraph 4-21). Figure 4-1 provides an example of a decision support matrix for a recent DATE rotation which includes lethal and non-lethal decisive action tasks. The staff has included tasks that address simultaneous targeting when executed as each decision is made by the commander.

Figure 4-1. A sample decision support matrix used during the DATE

What the decision support matrix does not include is the impact of dynamically retasking assets to attack targets that do not meet indicator requirements or where the commander will accept risk of not meeting a decision point. The matrix also does not include assessment reporting requirements to provide the commander and staff with the ability to determine if the decision was executed according to plan or if it was even effective.

Consolidate Matrices and Execute Integrated Plan

Current Army doctrine does not contain guidance on how units bring these matrices together and conduct simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks during a fast-paced DATE rotation. Units continue to observe breakdowns in simultaneous targeting during the unit’s CUOPs. The matrices produced by the various WfFs are being executed primarily in a “stovepiped” manner. WfFs are focused on their own lanes of the fight and not looking at the bigger picture in terms of ensuring that the integrated plan they developed together is subsequently being executed together. Joint and organic assets are dynamically retasked by the CUOPs integration cell as

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the assets become available. As a result, the fires cell loses visibility on collection and joint fire assets as these assets are retasked. The lack of integration in execution continues to have cascading effects that impact targeting efforts.

What should be considered is the consolidation of these WfF matrices into a product that is understood and utilized by each WfF. Figure 4-2 provides an example of an asset synchronization matrix developed for a contingency operation (CONOP) during a slower-paced mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). This matrix allocates collection and joint fires to a named operation for a cordon and search mission. If assets were to be dynamically retasked to support other operations, it is clear that this CONOP would be impacted and the mission would most likely be canceled. In the DATE, collection and joint fires are also allocated in the same manner, but the impact of dynamically retasking assets may not be visible to the CUOPs integration cell. This is where most simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks in the DATE breaks down. A CONOP essentially “locks in” assets whereas a CUOPs matrix, collection matrix, and the TSM do not. The CUOPs matrix is used more like a menu from which units select assets based on time and type rather than task and purpose. Units also do not have enough time in the DATE to develop CONOPs for each mission to ensure assets are “locked in.”

Figure 4-2. CONOP asset synchronization matrix used during MREs

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To address this shortfall and accomplish these complex tasks, the CUOPs integration cell must consider the addition and utilization of the TSM or develop a product, in conjunction with the fires and intelligence WfFs, that integrates the matrices into one executable document. Figure 4-3 provides an example of a combined decision support matrix, the TSM, and collection plan. The principles of the targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess are overlayed onto the decision support matrix to provide the CUOPs integration cell with guidance on employing collection, fires, and joint fires assets for each decision point by priority. The collection asset allocation provides the cell with guidance on what time organic and joint assets will be available, what NAIs the asset is to observe, and which decision points the assets are supporting.

Figure 4-3. Combined decision support matrix, TSM, and collection asset allocation for the DATE

Conclusion

The intent of consolidating the documents is to reduce the amount of dynamic retasking of organic and joint assets and fuse operations with fires and intelligence in order to integrate and synchronize targeting into operations. This matrix will provide the CUOPs integration cell with a tool to conduct simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks to achieve the commander’s objectives in the DATE.

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Doctrinal References

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.

ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.

Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process, 26 November 2010.

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Chapter 5

Fire Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training Environment

MAJ Bryan D. Schott, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Over the last 10 years of operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s field artillery branch often has been asked to conduct in lieu of missions or counterinsurgency-centric operations instead of its core fire support mission. While it has accomplished its assigned missions and performed these tasks well, the effect has been a degradation of its core fire support planning competencies at all echelons.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the decisive action training environment (DATE) where fire supporters are required to plan target acquisition, establish and manage radar zones, recommend fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), establish triggers, conduct battlefield calculus, develop sensor-to-shooter linkages, create observer plans, manage target lists, and integrate close air support (CAS) and close combat attack (CCA) while concurrently integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing it with the maneuver plan.

This article discusses key considerations and focus areas throughout the operations process for fire supporters to improve their ability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the fire support plan, in order to defeat a complex threat in the DATE.

Planning – Fire Support Planning and the Military Decisionmaking Process

In the DATE, fire support personnel at all levels must develop fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized fire support products that include the required detail and information to ensure top down fire planning and allow for bottom up refinement. These products include the following:

• Annex D (Fire Support)

• Fire support execution matrix (FSEM)

• Target list worksheet (TLWS)

• Attack guidance matrix (AGM)

• High-payoff target list (HPTL)

The fires cell responsibility for mission analysis begins before the mission is received and is continuous in the DATE. It must develop and maintain an accurate staff estimate to quickly transition between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The fires cell also must communicate clearly the results of the mission analysis and obtain the commander’s guidance for fire support. At a minimum, the fires cell mission analysis and staff estimate should include the following:

• Fire support running estimate (gun status/location, mortar tube status/location, radar status/location, CAS status, etc.)

• Specified/implied tasks from higher headquarters

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• Draft HPTL

• Established/recommended FSCMs

• Fire support intelligence preparation of the battlefield status (enemy capabilities, pattern analysis, likely firing locations)

• Fire support capabilities and limitations

• Recommended fire support tasks (FSTs) and purposes

The focus of course of action (COA) development is to build the initial execution portion of the FSTs. This will outline how to accomplish the FSTs. The fire support officer (FSO) should develop as much of the execution as possible to facilitate his participation in the wargaming process. The remainder of the details and timing will be finalized during COA analysis.

The key output for the COA development is the development of the FSTs and the draft fire support products (Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, HPTL). Skipping or conducting an abbreviated COA development may result in undeveloped details of these products, which may hinder analysis of the final details, refinement, validation of capabilities, and synchronization of the fire support plan during the wargaming process. This further affects the orders production and operation order brief, as the key details of the concept of fires cannot be briefed or rehearsed.

The outputs from the COA development will directly support the COA analysis. Therefore, the FSO and members of the staff must finish COA development as completely as possible before beginning COA analysis.

As the staff goes through the COA analysis/wargaming process, the FSO wargames against the same enemy COA as the maneuver elements do. The process of wargaming is typically done by turns. On the first turn, the FSO should use the draft FSEM from the COA development as a script and should give the initial set for all the fire support assets, such as combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs), fire support teams, mortars, artillery, radar locations, FSCMs, etc. During each turn, the FSO must be prepared to give the focus of fires, any FSTs being accomplished, priorities of fires, targets being fired (to include triggers), primary and alternate observers, active radar zones, and any other changes that have occurred during that time. If there are no changes, the FSO just says “no changes” and keeps the wargaming moving.

The FSO should come out of wargaming with at least an 80 percent solution on the fire support plan. Then, once the commander selects a COA, all the FSO has to do is refine the wargaming products and he is ready to publish the fire support annex.

Top-down fire planning is critical in the DATE because it ensures the plan is integrated and synchronized at the highest level. Fires plans must also be developed in coordination with the supported staff and tied into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). If the staff is going into a time-constrained planning process or receives a directed COA, fire supporters must be prepared to coordinate directly with other staff members.

Using as a baseline, the Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 Jan 2009, Figure 5-1 displays a checklist for FSOs and fire support noncommissioned officers to verify all appropriate products are developed during the MDMP and fires plan.

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Figure 5-1. Fires planning and MDMP checklist

Preparation – Rehearsals

Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation (Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011). Preparation includes, but is not limited to, refinement of the plan, coordination, inspections, and rehearsals. Rehearsals help staffs at all levels better understand their role in operations and creates conditions that improve the unit’s chances of success.

Combat rehearsals help units gain agility, ensure synchronization, increase initiative, and improve depth of knowledge through practice. Both fire support and maneuver actions should be rehearsed to reinforce the scheme of maneuver and fire plan. During the rehearsal, units should address specific actions to accomplish tasks and correct problems on the spot. A rehearsal should both practice and test the plan.

Rehearsal procedures should be established as a part of unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). As a minimum, SOPs should identify the following:

• Who will participate in the rehearsal?

• Who is in charge of the rehearsal?

• What should be rehearsed?

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• What is the sequence of the rehearsal? (Have a predetermined list of items to be covered.)

• What is the priority of the methods for rehearsals? (Use representative or actual terrain, model, map, sand table, wire, or radio.)

A successful rehearsal will:

• Ensure understanding of the plan.

• Synchronize fire support with the maneuver plan.

• Exercise primary and alternate communications nets.

• Ensure redundant observers and attack systems.

• Improve responsiveness of fires.

• Verify target triggering responsibility.

• Validate the plan.

Brigade/battalion fire support personnel may be involved in several types of rehearsals. Two of the most common types of rehearsals are the fire support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals. Multiple rehearsals ensure that maximum synchronization is gained in supporting the scheme of maneuver with fires. However, when time is limited, units may reduce the number and scope of rehearsals, focus the rehearsals on key FSTs or particular aspects of the maneuver or fire support plans, and conduct combined fire support/field artillery rehearsals.

Fire support rehearsals focus on the execution of FSTs, the effectiveness of FSCMs, and the timing and synchronization of all fire support efforts with each other and with the scheme of maneuver. Fire support rehearsals serve as tools to prepare for the combined arms rehearsals and to refine and reinforce key FSTs after the combined arms rehearsal. The fire support rehearsal and the field artillery technical rehearsal should normally take place before the combined arms rehearsal. It is imperative that the brigade/battalion fire supporters know they can support the plan. If a combined arms rehearsal is not conducted, a fire support rehearsal may serve as the primary preparation for execution of the fire support plan.

A fire support rehearsal may include key maneuver and fire support personnel involved in planning and executing the fire support plan, to include the direct support field artillery battalion tactical operations center. The fire support rehearsal may also be limited in scope with only fire support personnel and field artillery brigade/battalion personnel participating. A technique is to use the FSEM as a script for executing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. The field artillery battalion uses and verifies the field artillery support plan.

The brigade/battalion task force (TF) FSO should run the brigade/battalion TF fire support rehearsal. Include the brigade/battalion TF S-2 to consider enemy actions. Ensure subordinate FSOs and observers understand their roles in the plan by having them identify the targets and triggers for which they are responsible, to include how fires will be lifted and shifted during an operation. The key is to ensure the brigade/battalion TF is able to execute its FSTs.

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While there is no doctrinal template on how to conduct a fires rehearsal, the Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 January 2009, lays out a recommendation. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 provide recommendations for attendees and the outcomes of the fires rehearsal.

Figure 5-2. Fires rehearsal attendees and outcomes from Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 Jan 2009.

Figure 5-3. Fires rehearsal agenda from Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 Jan 2009.

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During the combined arms rehearsal, the unit S-3 normally directs the rehearsal using a synchronization matrix and/or execution checklist; the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)/FSO should use his FSEM. In doing so, the rehearsal is normally executed by reciting and/or performing:

• Actions to occur.

• Possible friendly initiatives.

• Possible reactions to enemy initiatives.

• Control measures.

• Significant events in relation to time or phases of the operation.

For each phase or time period of the operation, the FSCOORD/FSO should cover the following as a minimum:

• Verify grid locations for critical targets.

• Verify trigger points for each target and target engagement criteria.

• Confirm a primary and backup observer for each target.

• Verify primary and backup communications links for each observer.

• Verify that each target has a task and a purpose (what effects are to be achieved) and that targeting priorities are clearly outlined.

• Verify the method of engagement (at my command, time on target, or when ready).

• Verify attack guidance is specified for each target (such as unit(s) to fire, shell-fuze combination, and number of volleys).

• Verify the movement plan, specifying when and where units will move.

For units preparing for a DATE rotation, the unit should train on how to conduct proper fire support and combined arms rehearsals and ensure all participants understand their roles and responsibilities prior to arrival at a combat training center. Units must make rehearsals part of all operations, placing emphasis on the outputs of the rehearsals and following through with adjustments and subsequent fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). Units must also establish primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans for frequency modulated (FM) radio and digital rehearsals and ensure they are included in the planning timeline.

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Execution – Implementation of the Fire Support Plan

During execution, commanders focus their activities on directing, assessing, and leading while improving the understanding and modifying their visualization (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012). The staff, through the current operations, integrates forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission and makes refinements to the plan.

Due to the dynamic nature of the DATE, units must continuously refine their fire support plan and products in order to keep them current and synchronized. The fires cell, in conjunction with the staff, should integrate deliberate targeting into their operations process by conducting daily target synchronization meetings or operational synchronization (OPSYNCH) meetings to further develop and refine their deliberate targeting efforts for the next 24 to 48 hours.

During these meetings, the staff and fires cell should conduct and assessment of current operations and allocate or re-allocate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, field artillery, CAS, and CCA to subordinate units in support of the scheme of maneuver. The subordinate units should then provide bottom-up refinement for named areas of interest, observers, and priority targets. The end result is an updated target synchronization matrix or OPSYNCH matrix that can be used to continue current operations.

Prior to a DATE rotation or training event, units must develop a deliberate targeting process that is supportable within their battle rhythm. It should ensure that the products developed during the MDMP, such as the Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, and HPTL, can be quickly refined, re-synchronized, and redistributed to both higher and subordinate units based on the changing environment.

Assessment – Fires Running Estimate

Assessment is continuous. It precedes and guides operations and consists of monitoring the current situation, evaluating progress, and recommending or directing action for improvement.

In the DATE, a detailed running estimate is critical to the continuous assessment of the situation and can be used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent. By employing an effective running estimate, the fires cell can continuously assess the impact of new information on the conduct of fire support for the operation, updates the estimate, and determines if adjustments to fire support for the operation are required. It can also be used in order to monitor the current situation for unexpected fire support successes, failures, or enemy actions that can prevent the operation from progressing toward the desired end state.

The fires cell must determine what is critical for the fires running estimate during the operation. The following are some of the key items that may be tracked as part of the fires running estimate in the DATE:

• The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.

• The status and location of field artillery resources, including cannons and multiple launch rocket system launchers, ammunition, and target acquisition assets.

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• The availability and location of other fire support resources, including mortars, naval gunfire, tactical air support, and Army aviation support.

• The allocation of resources, weapons, and munitions for counterfire.

• The recommended counterfire priorities for each phase of the battle.

• The identification of new HPTs.

• Communication status with subordinate units, radars, COLTs, etc.

• The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to the coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff.

• Ammunition consumption and resupply rates, repositioning requirements, and priority of sustainment.

• Changes to survey and meteorological conditions.

• Current status of HPTs and battle damage assessment from observers.

After determining what is going to be tracked, the unit must develop a battle drill or SOP on how it is going to be done and who is responsible for both providing and tracking the information. Armed with this information, the fires cell can monitor the current operation for opportunities, threats, and progress and make adjustments to the fires plan as needed.

Conclusion

Units preparing for a future DATE rotation should focus on the following areas during train-up exercises and during the actual rotation:

• Develop SOPs on what information must be tracked and how it will be tracked in order to maintain an accurate fires running estimate throughout the operation.

• Focus on the inputs and outputs for the development of the fire support plan while conducting the MDMP. Ensure the staff understands the requirements to adequately coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires.

• Ensure fire support products (Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, HPTL) include the required detail and information to ensure top-down fire planning and hold units accountable for bottom-up refinement.

• Conduct fire support and FM fire rehearsals often and ensure all participants understand their roles and responsibilities. Ensure rehearsals focus on the identified outputs and follow through with adjustments and FRAGOs. Establish PACE plans for FM and digital rehearsals and ensure they are included in the planning timeline.

• Ensure deliberate targeting is part of the operations process by conducting daily target synchronization meetings or OPSYNCH to refine the fire support plan and keep it current and synchronized.

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• Acknowledging that every plan will change, ensure staffs and commanders balance the tendency to abandon the plan too soon against persisting in a failing effort too long. Use situational understanding and the fires running estimate to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.

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Chapter 6

Brigade Tactics and Techniques for Inform and Influence Activities in Decisive Action Training Environments

LTC Kevin Spielman, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Brigade combat teams (BCTs) face many complex challenges in the decisive action training environment (DATE). These challenges include having to contend with organized conventional military forces that have an information warfare capability; a robust media environment; insurgent groups with appealing narratives; and organized criminal/smuggler networks that, through their activities, serve as key information conduits to the populace. To effectively compete in this challenging information environment, units must properly integrate, inform and influence activities (IIA) enablers and also conduct messaging to achieve desired effects. This article discusses several key tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that BCTs can utilize to ensure IIA enablers are effectively employed, and recommends TTP for improving messaging coordination and overall effectiveness in the information environment.

Integrating Inform and Influence Activities Enablers

BCTs, to include headquarters elements, are required to move often in a DATE. Units are not operating from fixed locations with established communications, subordinate units most likely will not have an assigned operational environment (OE) to engage in, and there may not be other U.S. forces on the ground that the unit can linkup with and get an update of the situation in the population centers. These conditions make it challenging for the proper integration of IIA enablers such as military information support operations (MISO) units (formerly known as psychological operations units), public affairs units, and civil affairs units. BCTs strive to ensure the most effective use of these assets, but without the proper initial linkup, coordination, and guidance, these assets will most likely only play a marginal role in effectively influencing the information environment.

One technique units can utilize to positively affect the initial linkup with non-organic enabler forces is to establish a deliberate integration plan that includes the use of a checklist. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012, states “Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and mission essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on their places and roles in the force and during the operation.” Based on ADRP 5-0, the checklist should include, but is not limited to the following:

• Introduction of the new unit(s) to the supported force.

• Operational environment and mission briefs.

• Exchanging of SOPs and reporting requirements and procedures.

• Conducting rehearsals.

• Establishing communications links.

• Defining logistics support responsibilities.

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By conducting a thorough and deliberate initial integration of IIA enablers, BCTs can facilitate the effective use of these assets. They can also make these assets better prepared to operate in a DATE, where they will be continuously challenged by command and control issues while operating in new or changing information environments.

Units operating in the DATE will face adversarial forces that are in complete control of the information environment in some areas’ due to the fact that they have established a foothold and friendly forces have not yet arrived. This challenges a unit’s ability to conduct messaging and effectively compete in the information environment. A technique for units to use in situations like this is to look beyond their own organic IIA enablers and coordinate for the use of higher headquarters enablers. Getting this accomplished will require good coordination and communication with the higher headquarters in order to ensure the right message is sent at the right time by the right asset. A good example of this is requesting messaging ahead of where friendly forces are located by using an air platform like the EC-130J Commando Solo or requesting a MISO leaflet for drop over areas where no friendly forces are located.

Integrating IIA enablers above the BCT level increases the unit’s ability to conduct messaging across a broader array of targets as well as over an increased geographical area, thus increasing overall effects in the information environment. This puts the BCT in a better position to achieve not only tactical success on the ground, but also success in the information environment at large.

Soldiers are powerful IIA enablers under a BCT’s control. Soldiers often times have direct access to the population groups and key leaders that we are seeking to inform and influence. Additionally, Soldiers’ words and actions are often closely monitored and reported on by the local populace, the media, and our adversaries. Given this, Soldiers have a tremendous impact on the information environment. Therefore, they must be briefed on the information environment they operate in and must be armed to communicate messages which facilitate mission accomplishment.

To ensure Soldiers understand the information environment, a good procedure is to make it a mandatory requirement for all leaders to provide a current information environment update as part of paragraph one (Situation) of their operations order. This update should include information on the physical dimension of the information environment, which encompasses things like media broadcast facilities in the area, important meeting places, symbolic objects, and key organizations and leaders. The information environment update should also include an assessment of the informational dimension or how information flows in the area and how accurate the information is currently being disseminated in the OE. Finally, the information environment update should include information on the cognitive dimension of the information environment, which would be a review of the values, beliefs, and perceptions of the populace in the area who are receiving and transmitting information.

Chapter two of Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the OE, 16 June 2009, is a good reference for units and leaders to use when developing the information environment update for their orders. BCT S7s, in coordination with BCT public affairs officers (PAOs), should also provide assistance to subordinate unit leaders in developing this portion of the operations order.

In addition to increasing Soldier understanding of the information environment, units should also seek to improve their abilities to effectively communicate. BCT S7s, in coordination with BCT PAOs, should arm Soldiers with a simple and clear set of talking points for encounters with the

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local populace or media in the area. These talking points should also be reviewed during orders briefs to ensure Soldiers are aware of the latest messages. Table 1-2 of ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, May 2012, outlines “The Soldier’s Rules.” A good procedure for units to implement is to develop talking points cards, which have the unit’s current talking points on one side and “The Soldier’s Rules” on the other. These cards can be a reference for Soldiers as well as a visual reminder of the messages they need to communicate and the actions they need to take in order to ensure mission accomplishment.

The Soldier’s Rules F Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.

F Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superiors.

F Soldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.

F Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.

F Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.

F Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.

F Soldiers treat civilians humanely.

F Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.

F Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.

F Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superiors.

Figure 6-1. The Soldier’s Rules, from ADRP 3-0, Chapter 1, Page 1-14, Paragraph 1-86.

Properly preparing Soldiers to be effective IIA enablers increases the chance that real time engagements on the ground will produce the intended results in the information environment and facilitate overall mission accomplishment.

Planning for Messaging in the Information Environment

The DATE presents a competitive information environment for BCTs. With multiple actors conducting messaging it is imperative that the unit effectively plans and prepares its messaging efforts. IIA input to the military decisionmaking process is critical in ensuring the effective delivery of unit messages. A key technique for ensuring effective IIA (messaging) is to ensure the information environment is accounted for during mission analysis and that the significant aspects of the information environment are included into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Doing this improves situational awareness and understanding across the staff, and also provides a good indication of the types of messaging (and/or message delivery systems) that will be required for the mission.

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More TTP are available for BCTs to use: One of these is to ensure that during course of action analysis (wargame) the task and purpose of IIA enablers are reviewed as well as the key messages that will be communicated. The BCT S-2, in coordination with the BCT S-7 and PAO, should also incorporate the task and purpose of adversary information warfare enablers and adversary key messages as part of the wargame. Including adversary information warfare into the wargame will allow the unit to refine its messaging efforts as well as better anticipate adversary actions in the information environment. Conducting formal rehearsals of key IIA events is another good practice. These rehearsals would be conducted during preparation activities and should be utilized for major IIA events. A good example of this would be a unit press conference where multiple local, regional, and international media outlets are present. These events are unique opportunities for the BCT to deliver messages that will reach audiences not only at the tactical level, but also have the potential to communicate at the operational and strategic levels as well. Given this, it is important for BCTs to rehearse their expected actions at these events in order to improve their performance during the execution of the event, facilitating overall mission accomplishment.

A final tactic for units to consider when conducting messaging is pre-emptive messaging. This form of messaging is difficult because it requires BCTs to anticipate future adversary actions/ messaging and get out ahead of them. This requires an in-depth understanding of the OE, and good coordination with the S-2 section. An example of when to use these TTP is if intelligence reporting indicated that the enemy force planned to put indirect fires in close proximity to a heavily populated built up area. The S-7, in coordination with the S-2, and MISO personnel could develop a line of messaging and audio/video products to blame the enemy force in advance of them employing the indirect fires. This is a pro-active form of IIA that, in this case, seeks to ensure the enemy is held accountable for their actions and any associated civilian casualties or collateral damage. This action would require the BCT S-7 section to maintain a solid linkage with the S-2. Additionally, the S-7 would most likely be required to work within the next twenty-four to seventy-two hour window in order to ensure required actions and messages get out in a timely manner.

BCTs are exposed to complex challenges while operating in the DATE. This article suggests and discusses key TTP for units to utilize to improve their abilities to integrate IIA enabler forces and conduct effective messaging. Following the procedures and recommendations outlined in this article should improve the BCT’s ability to meet the complex challenges of the DATE, and facilitate unit success in achieving positive effects in the information environment that ultimately facilitates overall mission success for the BCT.

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Chapter 7

Integrating Air Defense into the Brigade’s Military Decisionmaking Process in the Decisive Action Training Environment

CPT Kyle W. Anderson, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The two decisive action training environment rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center have incorporated a robust enemy aerial threat that included rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). This incorporation of red air has been a key factor in training units to plan for all aspects of near-peer enemies. From a three dimensional perspective, future opponents will likely utilize cheap UASs to identify targets for indirect and direct fire engagements, in addition to any type of conventional rotary- and fixed-wing capabilities. To counter this threat, short-range air defense (SHORAD) artillery assets have been task organized to the maneuver training units. However, the reduced focus on SHORAD integration with maneuver forces over the last decade has decayed both brigade combat team staff planners’ and maneuver air defenders’ ability to integrate and synchronize these assets to support the overall brigade scheme of maneuver. There are key features throughout each step of the military decisionmaking process that will enable a better brigade air defense plan and assist in countering the red air threat.

During the mission analysis phase, the air defense airspace management (ADAM) cell must work with the brigade intelligence officer to conduct aerial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). At a minimum, the ADAM cell and brigade intelligence officer must identify the enemy air avenues of approach, the enemy air order of battle, enemy sortie generation rates, aerial weapons capabilities, ordnance release lines, enemy airfields, and hostile threat criteria for identification purposes. This information not only assists the air defense artillery (ADA) planner, but should also generate target nominations during the brigade’s targeting cycles to defeat red air. Most of this aerial IPB information should be reflected on the brigade’s enemy situation template, but the minimum that must be shown includes the enemy air avenues of approach, ordnance release lines, and projected enemy high-value targets that they will prosecute using aerial capabilities. After conducting mission analysis, the ADAM cell, in conjunction with the SHORAD commander, should receive initial guidance from the brigade commander regarding the brigade’s priorities for air defense. This guidance will allow them to focus their limited assets on defending the most critical brigade assets and develop the brigade’s defended or critical asset lists.

After finishing mission analysis and conducting aerial IPB, the ADAM cell executes course of action development. Based on the commander’s priorities for air defense, the ADAM cell should identify the assets or locations that can be defended with the SHORAD assets available and identify the best locations for radar employment. This also allows the ADAM cell to notify the commander of where he may have to assume risk or ask higher headquarters for more air defense assets. After identifying which assets or locations to defend, the ADAM cell must ensure the appropriate command support relationship is directed for the ADA elements. Failure to do so may result in poor logistical support, an uncertain engagement authority chain, and confusion over tasking authority. Once command support relationships are established, the ADAM cell and SHORAD commander can then develop the scheme of maneuver for the ADA assets. Using the enemy air avenues of approach, and ensuring that enemy ordnance release lines are factored in, the ADAM cell and SHORAD commander must identify battle positions (primary, alternate,

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subsequent), sectors of fire, engagement criteria, displacement criteria, radar coverage times and zones, coverage type (i.e. weighted, overlapping, defense in depth, etc.), and actions upon change in local air defense warning. This list is certainly not complete, but is a starting point for planners.

The air defense scheme of maneuver can be tested during the wargaming process. Wargaming should allow the ADAM cell to identify gaps in coverage that can be exploited by the enemy. The red cell, or opposing force representative, should actively try to engage critical assets exploiting the full extent of his aerial capabilities. Once wargaming is complete, the ADAM cell writes its portion of Annex E (Protection) to the brigade operations order. This annex should provide clear tasks and purposes for the SHORAD units and highlight the passive and active air defense measures for the rest of the brigade.

Employing maneuver air defense assets has become a lost art due to the nature of recent conflicts. However, future wars will likely not have the same level of air supremacy or even air superiority that has been enjoyed for the last decade. Enemies will utilize a wide array of manned and unmanned systems, and brigades must be prepared to request, synchronize, and employ SHORAD assets to support the overall scheme of maneuver and defeat any and all aerial threats.

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Chapter 8

Tackling Communications Challenges During a Decisive Action Training Environment Rotation

MAJ Edward Norris, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Maintaining reliable tactical communications in a stable environment is challenging enough; maintaining communications in a complex and continuously changing environment requires creative and adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Field Manual 6-02.43, Signal Soldier’s Guide, March 2009, advises to support the commander with reliable and vigorous communications through planning. To conduct such planning, leaders must understand the dynamics of operating in a decisive action training environment (DATE). There are significant challenges that units face in providing reliable robust communications:

• Speed of maneuver in the offense.

• Successful synchronization within echelons throughout a maneuver area.

• Use of retransmission (RETRANS) teams.

• Command post dynamics and geometry.

The challenge of speed of maneuver in the offense is that units can literally outrun their frequency modulation (FM) radio communications. Standard RETRANS planning identifies primary and alternate positions and triggers for the displacement of FM RETRANS teams without underestimating unit operational tempo. For example, to provide FM coverage and maintain mission command during a high-tempo movement to contact mission, units can use the tactic of bounding RETRANS teams. This entails moving one RETRANS team forward after the other team is set in position, similar to the tactical maneuver of bounding overwatch. Each team would have recommended positions to establish along a unit’s planned route. The disadvantage of using this tactic is having to dedicate RETRANS teams to particular units, reducing resources and RETRANS flexibility throughout the rest of the brigade.

Another technique is to develop and prepare additional contingent RETRANS teams for greater flexibility and coverage. These teams could be detached from the signal company. Contingency planning by the signal company should include identifying additional RETRANS vehicles, and ensuring they have the proper equipment to support when needed.

A third method is to use a “rolling RETRANS.” The capabilities of the Advanced Special Improvement Program radio models enable a unit to execute a same-net relay. To accomplish this technique, selected vehicle crews would connect a RETRANS dog-bone cable to two radios and configure them as mobile RETRANS stations. This technique has demonstrated excellent results for lower echelons.

The last procedure is to utilize the TOCNET’s (Tactical Operations Center Intercommunications System) software, Crew Access Unit System, to relay command post net identifications through the strategic network. Each Warfighter Information Network-Tactical element pulls the FM through the network, removing the line-of-site requirement. This procedure requires Command Post Nodes to be up and operating in a stable environment — a significant challenge during a

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movement to contact mission. By identifying and implementing these TTP, the signal community could provide robust communications across a large maneuver area.

A second major challenge units face is the diverse terrain across a maneuver area, which includes rolling hills, large ridges, and valleys. An S-6 staff officer must understand that the terrain selected for command post location directly impacts the FM architecture. During each planning phase, the S-6s at each echelon must actively participate in the selection of each location for their command posts. Each of these proposed command post locations must meet the operational planning requirements and provide suitable communications coverage. Upon execution of the command post displacement, the S-6 section must have a representative with the advance parties in the event an unplanned location is selected due to constraints related to the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. If a command post ends up in a communications dead space, this complicates communications connectivity to all other echelons, and requires the allocation of additional resources to move the necessary volume of information. The remedy for this deficiency is for the S-6 or one of his senior personnel to accompany the advance party for each command post movement.

High personnel turnover is always a challenge for units, especially in the turnover of key positions that require special training. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) or aide-memoire products must be available for new personnel. To maintain continuity during personnel transitions, units must establish and update TTP, SOPs, smart books, or any other products that can be provided to incoming personnel. A RETRANS SOP should cover, but not be limited to the following:

• Terrain.

• Reporting procedures.

• Priorities of work.

• Antenna emplacement.

• Systems employment.

• Load plans.

• Checklists.

• Security requirements.

Additional challenges that should be covered include: logistical support, driving TTP, information flow to and from higher headquarters, and evacuation procedures.

The challenge of planning how to support three simultaneously operational regimental command posts (the main command post, the tactical command post, and the mobile command group) requires an understanding of their operations, the commander’s preferences, and the information requirements. While providing communications for command is critical, the communications for control must be developed to allow staff collaboration. Based on the commander’s preferences, the S-6 must adequately support each element. This requires the S-6 team to train as they will fight to ensure they have capable coverage at each location.

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Planning considerations during the initial military decisionmaking process requires the S-6 to understand the role of each command element, the information requirements, and communication capabilities of each command post. Armed with this information, the S-6 can define how the communicators can support each command post without overlooking the other two.

Understanding the multiple complexities of a DATE environment is critical in planning for and providing reliable and robust communications. Ensuring that these lessons learned and TTP are captured, integrating these TTP into planning, and disseminating them to the lowest level can reduce risk and supplement planning in a time-constrained environment for future operations. Knowing the organization and equipment, the training and capabilities of Soldiers, and the commander’s intent are key features in providing the means for a unit’s mission command communications.

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Chapter 9

Legal Challenges in the Decisive Action Training Environment: What Judge Advocates Need to Know about Declared Hostile Forces, Surrendering Forces,

and the Collateral Damage Methodology

MAJ Marc B. Washburn, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Brigade judge advocates (BJAs) in a decisive action training environment (DATE) encounter a myriad of legal issues not commonly faced by their predecessors during previous deployments in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (OIF/OND) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In recent years, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps devoted significant resources and efforts to prepare deploying judge advocates to identify legal issues in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. BJAs have capitalized on this training provided in these mission-tailored programs and excelled in deployed environments. BJAs have integrated themselves well within the structured one-, two-, or three-week targeting cycles of most brigades in OEF or OIF/OND.

However, while the DATE allows BJAs to incorporate many of their lessons learned from COIN, it also presents them with a host of new challenges to address — namely, a near-peer conventional force adversary (Ariana); a host-nation minority political party (South Atropian People’s Party) with a paramilitary structured, disciplined paramilitary force capable of massing effects (South Atropian People’s Army [SAPA]); a functioning terrorist organization enjoying relative safe haven (Shariat Jamat); and numerous criminal elements. In addition, the DATE presents a host of humanitarian problems, including numerous internal displaced persons and potential for force majeure-induced humanitarian crises. All of these challenges are presented within the territory of a functional, albeit politically fragile and stressed, sovereign state in the Caucasus geopolitical region (Atropia).

The net effect in the DATE is that BJAs now encounter faster, multiple, simultaneous targeting cycles, while concurrently conducting current operations, future operations, and operational planning. To be successful in the DATE, BJAs will need to focus preparation on three primary areas:

• Identifying and researching potential legal issues.

• Revising pre-deployment law of war (LOW) and rules of engagement (ROE) training to address the specific challenges encountered in the DATE.

• Thoroughly integrating themselves into all facets of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) in order to maximize their abilities to proactively address legal issues.

This article focuses in depth only on the first area — to help judge advocates prepare for potential legal issues. By identifying these issues before training rotations, BJAs will be postured to tailor the LOW/ROE training for the scenario. They will also be better able to integrate into the MDMP.

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Positive Identification of Declared Hostile Forces

In the DATE, the National Command Authority typically declares the Arianan Conventional Forces and SAPA as hostile. Upon such a declaration, the ROE enable units to engage the forces without observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.1 Once positively identified as a declared hostile, the force or individual may be engaged unless surrendering or hors de combat due to sickness or wounds.2

The use of DHF presents the judge advocate with numerous challenges. These factors should be addressed during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield step of MDMP. First, the judge advocate will need to advise commanders and Soldiers on how to positively identify a DHF. Positive identification (PID) is “the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospacially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the law of war and applicable ROE.”3 Commanders may use any reasonably reliable means to establish PID, including information derived from human, signal, or electronic sources, radar acquisition, unmanned aircraft systems, or direct observation.

Typically, units have little difficulty with positive identification of Arianan conventional forces as DHF. The challenge lies in identifying SAPA. As a paramilitary group, SAPA often operates from among the population in a hodge-podge variety of civilian clothing. They are difficult to distinguish from other individuals who are not DHF — civilians, criminal elements, and even terrorists. In the absence of PID, the individual may not be targeted based upon their status as a DHF, but only upon their actions as a result of committing a hostile act or demonstrating hostile intent.

Judge advocates in the DATE must identify this issue during mission analysis for the commander. This may require the commander to establish priority intelligence requirements devoted to this purpose, which will lead to the S-2 designating named areas of intelligence and allocating collection assets to the task. Without doing so, the unit benefits little from the tactical advantage of SAPA’s designation as a DHF.

Surrendering Forces

In addition to positively identified DHF, judge advocates must ensure that units and individuals know the procedures to follow and LOW considerations relating to surrendering DHFs. While these should be incorporated into initial unit ROE training, judge advocates also have the opportunity to address the issue with written guidance as part of a fragmentary order issued during military planning and with rehearsal during wargaming. In all cases, the judge advocate should be prepared to: (1) clearly articulate that DHF who are surrendering may not be engaged; (2) reiterate and rehearse the reporting and investigation requirements if DHF have been, or may have been engaged while in the process of surrendering; (3) provide guidance on ways units and individuals may determine whether a DHF is actually surrendering; and (4) ensure subordinate units understand how to detain and process individuals who have surrendered.

International law recognizes that units or individuals can surrender “by any means that communicates the intent to give up.”4 There is no clear-cut rule as to what constitutes surrender. However, “most [nations] agree that surrender constitutes a cessation of resistance and placement of one’s self at the discretion of the captor.”5 The onus is on the person or force surrendering to communicate the intent to surrender.6

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Failure to properly prepare for or handle surrendering forces can have adverse operational and strategic consequences in the DATE. The most critical of these is that enemy units or individuals will continue hostilities and be unlikely to surrender when they observe or perceive their adversary violating the LOW by not enabling forces to surrender. This could drastically impact the unit’s stability tasks in the area.

Inherent Right of Self-Defense and the Collateral Damage Methodology

An emerging trend in the DATE is that new BJAs initially struggle to understand and correctly apply the CDM. This is in large part to the fact that the CDM is not the primary focus of instruction during the Judge Advocate Graduate Course and has very little mention in the Operational Law (OPLAW) Handbook.7 Those who are proficient, gained their understanding from either prior deployments in an OPLAW position or from attendance at the Joint Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Training and Certification Program.8

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01, No Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, 13 Feb 2009, is the primary reference for all judge advocates to review before conducting the DATE. CJCSI 3160.01 reiterates that “it is an inherent responsibility of all commanders . . . and targeting personnel to: (1) establish PID and accurately locate targets with current military objectives and mission specific ROE; (2) identify potential collateral concerns prior to munitions release and target engagement; and apply the CDM with due diligence to mission objectives, force protection and collateral damage.”9 The judge advocate clearly falls within the scope of “targeting personnel.” Only by becoming proficient in this instruction, can judge advocates effectively advise their commanders and staffs during targeting.

Inherent Right of Self-Defense

The most common question to judge advocates is whether a formal CDE is required for a particular target, and if so, who is the correct target engagement authority under the ROE. All too often, the question arises during a counterfire mission or with troops in contact.

At the outset, JAGs must carefully articulate the difference between the inherent right of self-defense and applying the CDM during targeting. CJCSI 3160.01 clearly states that the CDM does not limit a commander’s inherent right to self-defense under the LOW.10

“When the use of force in self-defense is necessary, including in situation with troops in contact, the nature, duration and scope of force should not exceed that which is required to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent. The concept of proportionality in self-defense is not to be confused with attempts to minimize collateral damage and the other tenets of LOW during military operations.”11

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In situations involving self-defense, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.12 “Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.”13 If time and circumstances permit, commanders should attempt to de-escalate the situation. Any force used in self-defense must be proportional: It must be sufficient to respond decisively, it may exceed that of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration, and scope of force should not exceed what is required to respond decisively.14

A common scenario encountered in the DATE involves enemy indirect fires originating from within population centers; that is, designated restricted-fire areas or no-fire areas.15 Other times, the point of origin is beyond the designated fire support coordination line. Many times, units fail to counterfire or incorrectly waste precious time requesting a higher headquarters to approve a counterfire mission given collateral damage concerns. These units are confusing the concept of proportionality in self-defense with attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.16

Judge advocates must be wary that not every counterfire mission announced in the command post invokes the inherent right of self-defense. For example, the inherent right of self-defense exists in a counterfire scenario when a unit is taking effective fire (i.e., a hostile act). Further, it may exist when the Q36/Q37 radar identifies an active SA2 surface-to-air missile system within a population center (arguably a hostile act, but at a minimum a demonstration of hostile intent). However, a non-active SA2 within a population center might not rise to the level of hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent that would invoke the inherent right of self-defense. In such a scenario, the judge advocate must work with the other warfighting function staff elements to be able to substantiate his/her legal opinion.

Judge advocates can assist their units by promptly directing them to the correct proportionality analysis. They must ask:

• Are we taking effective fire?

• If so, have we identified the point of origin as enemy?

• If not, what facts make this counterfire mission a response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent?

• Does the commander have the time or circumstances to de-escalate?

Provided that self-defense applies, the firing unit is not friendly, and de-escalation is not feasible, then the JAG should advise that the commander has the inherent right and obligation to respond with decisive force, but the nature, duration, and scope must not exceed what is necessary.

Collateral Damage Methodology — What Judge Advocate Generals Must Know

For all other situations not involving self-defense, the Joint CDM “must be applied as exhaustively and thoroughly as possible relative to commander’s guidance and operation specific constraints, and must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the pace and tempo of

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operations.”17 This enables a commander to mitigate collateral damage, weigh risk against military necessity, and assess proportionality.

The CDM is a means for the commander to adhere to the LOW. However, the CDM is not intended to deny a commander the ability to respond to time-sensitive targeting events. Nor should it be used as the sole justification to impede or delay fires for time sensitive targeting.18

The CDM consists of five mutually dependent CDE levels (CDE 1 through 5). As the CDM progresses through each CDE level, the number of weaponeering restrictions also increases, thereby elevating the potential risk to friendly forces and mission accomplishment based on weapon, platform availability, and threats in the target area. See Figure 9-1.

Figure 9-1. Collateral risk and damage estimation

Two essential components to CDE levels are the collateral effects radius (CER) and the collateral hazard area (CHA). The CER represents the largest collateral hazard distance for a given warhead, weapon or weapon class considering predetermined, acceptable collateral damage thresholds that are established for each CDE level. For cluster or improved conventional munitions (ICMs), the CER includes the pattern radius of the submunitions.

The CHA is formed by measuring a CER from either the edge of a target facility boundary, the aimpoint for a point target, or the edge of an engagement zone or artillery sheaf for an area target. The assessment conducted at each CDE level is based on the existence of collateral concerns (objects or persons) within the corresponding CHA. A CHA that contains an unacceptable probability for collateral damage will elevate to the next higher CDE level unless properly mitigated. Further, each succeeding CDE level employs mitigation techniques and weaponeering restrictions (such as the requirement to use precision-guided munitions) designed to reduce the area of collateral effects to an acceptable level. Examples from Figure 9-2 (Figure D-A-2 from CJCSI 3160.01) illustrate the relationship.19

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Figure 9-2. CHA measurements (from Figure D-A-2 from CJCSI 3160.01)

Before engaging any target, commanders must answer five threshold questions:

• Can I positively identify the object I want to affect?20

• Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or noncombatant personnel, involuntary human shields, or significant environmental concerns within the effects range of the weapon I would like to use to attack the target?

• Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by attacking the target with a different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still accomplish the mission?

• If not, how many civilian and noncombatants do I think will be injured or killed by the attack?

• Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to the expected military advantage gained and do I need to elevate this decision to the next level of command to attack the target based on the ROE in effect?21

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Collateral Damage Estimation Levels

CDE Level 1

The initial assessment for CDE Level 1 resolves the first two threshold matters of any target — PID and the existence of protected or collateral objects within the weapon’s effect radius. CDE Level 1 evaluates the target’s functionality for dual-use concerns, identifies potential CBR plume hazards, environmental hazards, and all collateral concerns within the Level 1 area.

During a Level 1 analysis, judge advocates must pay particular attention to the means used to positively identify a target. Most collateral damage incidents result from target misidentification.22 While the threshold remains a “reasonable certainty,” JAGs are cautioned to not assume that PID has been established. For example, if the claim is that an A10 aircraft circling overhead has established PID on the target, the JAG should ascertain whether the aircraft is above or below the cloud line and can actually see the target with available optics. JAGs must also be cognizant that the current ROE may not authorize the particular target for engagement — even though a legitimate military target — or may restrict engagement authority to a superior commander.

If the target serves a dual combatant and a civilian/noncombatant analysis (dual-use), JAGs should advise commanders to estimate the population density of the facility. All dual-use targets require a CDE Level 5 assessment.23

U.S. policy regarding human shields delineates between voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary human shields are direct participants in hostilities and have shed their protected status. Voluntary human shields are not considered collateral objects in the CDM. Only involuntary human shields are considered collateral objects. Use of involuntary human shields requires a CDE Level 5 assessment. Where the status of human shields is unknown, the more restrictive rule applies. 24

CDE Level 1 also assesses the potential for producing a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) plume hazard or environmental damage from either the target facility or surrounding collateral objects. Examples include CBR production/storage facilities, fertilizer/pharmaceutical/pesticide or herbicide production/storage facilities, medical equipment manufacturing and storage facilities, petroleum refineries and paper manufacturing facilities. Widespread, long-term and/or severe damage to the environment could result from flooding, uncontrollable fire, and spillage of hazardous waste. In almost all cases, these situations will elevate to CDE Level 5 High due to significant casualties or risk of expanding the effects of the conflict.25

In summary, the CDE Level 1 final assessment is:

• If the target is not positively identified, do not engage it.

• If the target is positively identified, is not characterized as a dual-use facility, does not present either a CBR plume or environmental hazard, and there are no collateral objects and/or involuntary human shields within the CDE Level 1 CHA, the target is Level 1 Low and may be engaged with any conventional weapon in the U.S. inventory.26

• If the target has been positively identified, but any of the other conditions are not satisfied, proceed to CDE Level 2.

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CDE Level 2

CDE Level 2 addresses the third threshold question for commanders and identifies basic weaponeering options to achieve the desired effect and mitigate the collateral damage. CDE Level 2 uses two different methods — minimum target size (MTS) or precision guided munition (PGM) general.

MTS compares the target’s size to the weapons system’s or delivery platform’s delivery error. It provides a simple means to determine the feasibility of engaging a target with unguided or ballistic weapons. Air-to-surface unguided munitions (ASUGMs) are often used for large-area targets, but incur a significantly greater delivery error and higher risk for collateral damage. However, ASUGMs are often more readily available than PGMs. If used, ASUGMs require a CDE Level 3 assessment.

PGM general assesses target engagement with PGMs on individual aimpoints while minimizing the weaponeering restriction to unitary or cluster PGMs.27 The preferred PGM general assessment method is the aimpoint method, which assesses the risk of collateral damage at each individual aimpoint. The target type will dictate whether a unitary or cluster weapon is most effective to use. If no collateral objects are located within the CHA for the selected weapon, it may be engaged using any of the PGMs on the respective reference table. If collateral objects are identified, a CDE Level 3 assessment must occur.28

During a CDE Level 2 analysis, judge advocates should pay particular attention to the methodology used and desired weapon. Unless the unit intends to utilize PGMs, the judge advocate should advise elevation to a CDE Level 3. If PGMs are used, the judge advocate should check for the existence of collateral objects within the CHA, which would elevate to a CDE Level 3. Moreover, even with PGMs, the judge advocate should consider whether slightly shifting the aimpoint could effectively destroy the target while removing collateral objects from the CHA, thereby keeping the matter at CDE Level 2.

CDE Level 3

CDE Level 3 refines the weaponeering options by expanding possible delivery systems, warheads, and fuse combinations that mitigate the risk of collateral damage while still achieving the desired effect. By comparing the more narrow collateral effects radius (CER) of the desired PGM to the nearest collateral object, the commander will know whether or not the PGM must be mitigated. As long as the CER for the desired Level 3 PGM is less than or equal to the distance to the nearest collateral concern, the target is assessed as either CDE Level 3 Low and may be engaged with an unmitigated PGM (no delay fuse) or a mitigated PGM ( delay fuse). However, if the CER is greater than the distance to the nearest collateral concern, the target requires a higher CDE level assessment.29

As with CDE Level 2, the JAG should pay attention to the weapon system used, means to mitigate, and consider whether slightly shifting the aimpoint could effectively destroy the target while removing collateral objects from the CER. They should also ensure the CER and not the greater CHA is used in the analysis.

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CDE Level 4

CDE Level 4 addresses the final weaponeering options (beyond fusing) available to achieve the final effect and mitigate for collateral damage. These include: delay fuse/warhead burial, variable time/proximity fuse, delivery heading restrictions, shielding and aimpoint offset.30 While it is possible to employ some of the weaponeering options listed above at other CDE levels (such as aimpoint offset), the ability to do so is conditional on the target’s location in the physical environment. Therefore, it is often considered at CDE Level 4.31

CDE Level 4 is calculated for less than 1-percent probability of fractional structural damage from blast based on the assumption that noncombatant personnel will be located in noncombatant collateral structures that afford some protection from fragmentation.32 This assumption accounts for the fact that the location and number of transient noncombatant or civilian personnel cannot be accurately predicted in space or time and limits the ability to mitigate collateral effects to those objects that can be seen, sensed or known with collection assets. However, it does not negate the responsibility to account for noncombatants or civilian in the open that can be predicted based on available intelligence or pattern of life analysis – such as rush hour traffic or anticipated internally displaced persons movements.33

The CDM does not support the use of cluster weapons and ICMs at Level 4.34 Nor does it support rocket assisted projectiles or extended/enhanced range munitions at Level 4.35

As with CDE Level 3, CDE Level 4 compares the number of collateral objects within the particular CER (not the CHA) for the selected weaponeering decision. If the CER value is less than or equal to the distance to the nearest collateral object, it is engaged as a CDE Level 4.36 In most cases within the DATE, this means that the brigade commander will be the approval authority for these targets. Those weapons that have a CER greater than the distance to the nearest collateral object will require elevation to CDE Level 5, and often require division or higher approval to engage.37 Here, judge advocates must coordinate with other WfF staff elements to help the commander determine whether he can weaponeer the particular PGM in such a way as to retain engagement authority at his level (i.e., CDE Level 4).

CDE Level 5

CDE Level 5 addresses the 4th and 5th questions of the CDM: number of civilians and/or noncombatants that may be killed/injured and the need to elevate engagement authority based on the current ROE. CDE Level 5 occurs when all reasonable and known mitigation techniques have been exhausted and some level of collateral damages is unavoidable. It is also used when a CDE Level 1 assessment identifies CBR plume hazards, environmental hazards, known or potential involuntary human shields, and/or dual-use targets.38

Once assessed as a CDE Level 5 target, the target remains classified as a Level 5 and may never be mitigated to a lower level.39 This will require the division commander or higher approval authority to engage.

CDE level 5 is the only level within the CDM that a final assessment of High may occur.40 If CDE Level 5-High occurs, the matter must be elevated to the next higher commander (under the sensitive target approval and review process) unless approval authority has previously been delegated by appropriate orders/instructions.41 Targets at CDE Level 5-High are commonly withheld to joint task force or combatant commanders to prosecute.

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When conducting the casualty assessment, judge advocates must be aware that the Level 5 assessment is only an estimate and should never be portrayed as an expected ‘casualty count.’ No precise means exists to predict noncombatant demographics. Commanders are limited to the knowledge of the unique characteristics and cultural behaviors of the region and country, population distributions, customs, cultural practices, and habits. Nor does it account for transient individuals unless refined by current intelligence analysis, such as pattern of life.42

With every CDE Level 5 target (whether Low or High), the formal CDE will occur at the division or higher command. Though the CDE does not occur at the brigade or regimental level, judge advocates at these lower echelons should be prepared to assist the other warfighting functions in ascertaining the relevant information to provide to their higher headquarters. This also enables the staff to arm their commander with all necessary facts when he contacts division to advocate for the target.

Here, judge advocates should pay particular attention to eliciting facts that refine the statistical data used by the higher headquarters to conduct the casualty assessment or determine if the suspected human shields are voluntary or involuntarily involved. This includes, for example, patterns of life and the most current information on known internal displaced persons locations or movement routes. It also requires assessing the reliability of the information. Is the pattern of life analysis from a week ago or two months ago? Who reported the use of human shields? How has it been corroborated?

In all such cases, judge advocates work together with the collective staff to provide the most current and accurate information to empower the decision maker. They also have the ability to leverage their technical chain and advocate to the division staff judge advocate on behalf of their commander. Though the matter is beyond their level to action, it is not beyond their influence.

Summary

By preparing early for common legal challenges in the DATE, JAGs can proactively advise their commanders and staffs. This enables them to participate effectively in the MDMP and tailor pre-deployment training to address common LOW and ROE issues. Overall, it will better enable their units to address issues of which only a handful in the unit may have any practical knowledge — DHF, surrendering forces, and when and how to employ the collateral damage methodology.

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Endnotes:

1. CJCSI 3121.01E.

2. Id.

3. CJCSI 3160.01, “No-Strike and CDE Methodology.”

4. Operational Law (OPLAW) Handbook, pg. 26.

5. Id.

6. GPW, art 4(a)(4).

7. OPLAW Handbook.

8. The Joint Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Training and Certification Program is a 40 hour course of instruction accredited by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) and endorsed by the Military Targeting Committee (MTC), leading to individual certification as a CDE Basic Analyst or CDE Analyst Instructor. The POI consists of ten training modules addressing the Joint Targeting Cycle, CDE in the Target Development Process, the Law of War (LOW), Legal Requirements of CDE, Operational Realities of CDE, Basics of Weapon Effects and Dominant Hazards of Concern for CDE, Conventional Warhead Weaponeering Principles for Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Air-to-Surface Unguided Munitions (ASUGM), and Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Munitions (SSBM), the CDE Assessment Process, Casualty Estimation, Mitigation Techniques, and CDE Automation Tools. The course consists of four days of instruction, practical exercises, and reviews, preparing the student for the end of course comprehensive examination, day five.

9. Encl A, para 1j.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. SROE, Enclosure A, 3a.

13. Id.

14. SROE, Enclosure A, 4a(3).

15. Rotation 13-01 ROE defined “restricted fire areas” to include all populated areas (any established city, town, village, or settlement inhabited by civilians; any temporary settlement, camp, or column of displaced civilians, migrants, or refugees; or any other concentration of civilians). Designated “no strike areas” included all hospitals, religious sites, cultural sites, historical sites, and Atropian infrastructure.

16. SROE, Enclosure A, 4a(3) (“The concept of proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.”).

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. CJCSI 3160.01, Figure D-A-2, p D-A-4.

20. PID is defined as the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the LOW and applicable ROE. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2a(1).

21. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2.

22. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2a(1).

23. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(3).

24. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(4)(a).

25. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(5-6).

26. Unless otherwise excepted in the CDE Level 1Reference Table.

27. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2c(1).

28. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2c(2).

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29. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2d.

30. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e(4).

31. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e(4)(e).

32. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e.

33. Id.

34. Id.

35. Id.

36. Id.

37. Id.

38. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f.

39. Id.

40. Id.

41. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f(3).

42. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f(1).

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Chapter 10

Military Intelligence Company Collection Teams: Creating a Combat Multiplier

SSG Mark Baldry, SFC Xavier Ortiz, SFC Maria S. Kernan, SFC William J. Carnes, and CPT Derek J. Kocher, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The military intelligence company (MICO) has a uniquely flexible structure within the brigade combat team. Organic collection and analysis elements work directly with leadership across the brigade to provide early warning indication, situational awareness, tracking and disposition of enemy units, and a common operating picture of the operational environment (OE). Effective management and training of collection teams improves the capabilities of the unit in tactical control of them, while providing the all-source collection element (ACE) with multi-source intelligence. These collection teams have proven themselves highly effective during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, adapting their use for broader unified land operations requires additional training for MI leaders and renewed focus on tactical support of these teams.

Designed to prepare MICO leaders and their collection teams for success during training and deployment, this article focuses on three areas: lateral coordination versus unit integration, self-sufficiency and survivability, and active collectors versus passive collectors. In addition, the article provides recommendations for home station training and improvement based on observations of collection teams made at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. These observations were collected from the recent decisive action training environment rotation conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, as well as cumulatively from other units over the past three years.

Lateral Coordination Versus Unit Integration

One of the most difficult tasks for low-level voice intercept (LLVI), Prophet signals intelligence (SIGINT) system, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection team (HCT) leaders — and to some extent unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operators — is interfacing with the leadership of the maneuver unit. The term integration is commonly used to describe this process. Integration has shown varying levels of success and relies heavily on the ability of maneuver unit leaders to understand the value of these enablers.

A time-intensive process, integration aims to unify personnel under a single command structure. MI personnel attending rotational training understand that collection teams should become a part of the maneuver unit they are tasked to support. This assumption often leads to friction when collection teams link up with maneuver units that were not expecting their arrival. This unexpected arrival is difficult to mitigate because it is often determined at different echelons and on short notice.

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A way for collection team leaders to streamline this process is to favor an approach emphasizing lateral coordination rather than complete integration. Lateral coordination focuses on parallel effort with the maneuver unit, instead of joining in subordination through task organization. By providing a valuable product, minimizing the operational footprint of the team, and retaining as much operational control as possible, the collection team has an improved opportunity to present itself as an added benefit, rather than just another attachment.

To be effective, initial lateral coordination with leadership must be concise and to the point. A five to ten minute introduction should be the goal. Battalion-level assignments and company-level assignments have different points of contact, and team leaders must be familiar with whom to interface. These leaders are good starting points for the initial linkup at the battalion and company level.

Battalion Level:

• S-2 officer in charge (OIC) and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC).

• S-3 OIC/operations sergeant major.

Initial coordination at the battalion-level should focus on near-term reconnaissance and surveillance taskings, who the team will be assigned to support, the common operating picture of the battalion’s OE, and a discussion ensuring the best possible opportunities for collection (capabilities brief). Other priorities should include: establishing early warning reporting procedures — who to relay time-sensitive information to, how to contact them, and contingency procedures in case of communications failure; obtaining a copy of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and the current priority information requirements (PIRs); coordinating with the S-2 or S-3 for secured communications with the brigade ACE for a data drop.

Company Level:

• Commander.

• First sergeant.

• Executive officer.

• Company intelligence support team (CoIST).

Initial coordination at the company level becomes more task oriented. Team leaders should in-brief maneuver leaders on how the teams can support upcoming missions and what factors ensure successful collection. The discussion should include current CCIRs and PIRs and how to report collected information to the appropriate leader or the CoIST. Link up with the CoIST to discuss any additional information requests, obtain details on communications and radio fills, and determine a secured way to pass information to both the ACE and the MICO. Before departing the company command post, team leaders should propose suggestions for taskings, if not already assigned one. Successful lateral coordination maximizes collection time and minimizes logistical requirements.

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Self-Sufficiency and Survivability

Too often, maneuver units have the impression that combat support personnel are burdens on resources and unnecessary security risks. Collection team leaders can mitigate this perception by demonstrating proactive work ethics and capabilities for independent operation. Training and active support from the MICO are paramount to this goal.

The goal of self-sufficiency is to rely on the assigned unit for logistical support as little as possible. If the MICO provides a majority of logistical support for their personnel, it provides a two-fold benefit — the flow of information from collectors back to their organic leadership becomes a part of the battle rhythm, and the perceived burden of additional personnel being placed on the maneuver unit is lifted. Daily coordination with MICO leadership should include a logistics status report — for resupply of classes I, II, III, V, VI, and IX — along with intelligence gathered. Supplies needed for upcoming patrols and missions away from the base of operations must be anticipated.

Collection teams often find themselves assigned to maneuver units unable to provide housing within the base of operations. A solution should be added to the collection teams’ standard kit anticipating the need for shelter. Setup should be co-located with the best collection site on the base, preferably a quiet and out of the way area. Shelters should be easy and fast to set up and tear down, and easily stowed away when teams leave the base of operations. Creating hide-sites, hasty fighting positions, natural shelters, etc., should be used in tactical situations and should be similar to those created by Soldiers in the assigned unit.

Active Collectors versus Passive Collectors

Trends from the past three years have shown that MICO collection teams have developed a mindset of passive collection, heavily influenced by the posture created by a long-term focus on COIN. Operating from heavily fortified bases and outposts has created a need for robust force protection, employing MICO assets to supplement this mission. While a valid concern, training centered on force protection has lessened the ability for collection teams to operate as independent reconnaissance elements. Unprepared for the risks of operating in a decisive action training environment, teams have demonstrated during rotational training that they are unprepared to engage a trained and organized force prior to deployment.

Recognizing that COIN is only part of a decisive action operation, preparing to employ collection teams for use during offensive, defensive, and stability operations requires a paradigm shift for MICO leaders. Creating a culture of active collectors — MI collectors pushing forward from bases of operations as reconnaissance elements — is the most effective way to employ these teams. Active collectors are motivated and take pride in their mission and skill set. They seek to push their capabilities to the limit and embrace challenges. Physically fit, technically and tactically proficient, active collectors are more likely to engage maneuver personnel and proactively seek mission assignments.

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Recommendations for Training and Improvement

Past observation of collection teams has shown that they often prove to have a high level of technical training and are proficient when operating their systems or engaging key leaders of a local populace. MICO training programs should aim to bring the tactical knowledge of their SIGINT, HUMINT, and UAS collection teams up to this level. What follows are areas that MICO leaders need to emphasize and track during home-station training events.

Signal Intelligence

In the last decade, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) collectors have received a greatly reduced amount of tactical and common core training. Focus areas include the following:

• Troop leading procedures.

• Creating a group of pertinent battle drills for training. Contingency procedures should be a focus area, e.g., avoiding contact with enemies, survival and evasion, maintaining control of sensitive equipment.

• Drafting and employing standard operating procedures.

• Performing precombat checks and inspections based on standardized checklists.

• Developing priorities of work once emplaced.

Specifically, SIGINT teams greatly benefit from training on long-range surveillance operations (Field Manual 3-55.93, Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations, June 2009).

Wear and tear on equipment has proven an issue during rotation training. Specific to SIGINT teams, movement over varied terrain takes a toll on fragile components such as antennae. The addition of an intelligence systems maintainer (military occupational specialty 35T) to SIGINT teams can greatly improve self-sufficiency. Technical experts, these Soldiers are able to not only operate the systems, but also provide field expedient repair solutions and ensure that their team is maximizing its system capabilities. If a scarce resource, 35Ts can provide valuable cross training for LLVI and Prophet operators prior to deployment.

Human Intelligence

HCTs share many of the challenges that SIGINT teams face, yet they have some unique concerns, such as the following:

• Team simultaneously attends KLEs and engages local populace, coordinates “every Soldier a sensor” (ES2) efforts.

• Using intelligence contingency funds to develop sources and provide the appearance of justified contact with local sources.

• Coordination with security team leader and security planning.

• Urban operations, breaching and room clearing.

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HCT members should remember that while they are not part of the maneuver unit, they must be prepared to assist that unit while on patrol. Reasonable requests for assistance, that do not hinder the HCT’s collection ability, should not be refused. This willing cooperation with the maneuver unit ensures a good level of trust and builds rapport. Training on urban operations and patrolling gives HCT team leaders the tools for success.

Unmanned Aircraft System

Common issues for UAS platoons include deconflicting tactical ownership/tasking of UAS assets, developing task and purpose of missions, and creating training that supports these tasks and purposes.

Observations have shown that UAS platoons would greatly benefit from MICO leaders working with higher headquarters to create single sources of tasking. Too often, UAS leaders receive taskings from multiple sources, creating confusion within the brigade and confusion with UAS operators. A single source of tasking allows for better intelligence collection tracking and planning, and allows UAS leaders to determine the best use of available resources. The recommended point of contact is the S-3 reconnaissance and surveillance team collection manager. In control of intelligence collection taskings, the collection manager is best prepared for predictive planning and mission assignment.

UAS mission planning should use a similar structure to planning for manned flights. Manned aircraft require justification for flight beyond supporting a unit. Deconflicting airspace, justifying the risk of valuable equipment and personnel, and allocating appropriate resources for flights are common factors for manned and unmanned missions. A clearly defined task and purpose for UAS missions gives operators and maintainers more effective control over their equipment and resources, and a better understanding of the operation. UAS operators who understand their mission need less oversight. Training can be tailored to prepare operators and maintainers for common mission types.

Conclusion

Laterally coordinating with maneuver unit leaders streamlines the link-up process and enables teams to maximize their collection time. Training and supporting self-sufficient teams increases capabilities and creates new opportunities to support their brigade. A culture of active collectors encourages proactive team leadership, esprit de corps, and movtivation with collection teams and prepares them for challenging tasks.

The key to success for each of these collector teams is creating a custome set of battle drills for them to train on. A written standard operating procedure book should be developed to provide instructions for contingency palns and create continuity, such as a training plan for new team members. MICO roles as training managers at home station cannot be emphasized enough. Preparing these teams to operate with little oversight during the Army force generation process ensures their success during deployment.

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Chapter 11

Personnel Recovery in Decisive Action and Other Operating Environments

CW3 John E. Clark, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

“I will never leave a fallen comrade. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit.”

—U.S. Soldier’s Creed

Overview

Personnel recovery (PR) encompasses the task of bringing our warriors home. It is part of the warrior ethos and should be profoundly embedded into the fabric of how the Army operates. Units in decisive action training environments (DATEs) face the probability of experiencing multiple incidents of isolated, missing, detained, and captured (IMDC) personnel. Each IMDC event is unique and brings to bear separate courses of action and battle drills necessary for completing the following five PR tasks:

• Reporting.

• Locating.

• Recovering.

• Supporting.

• Reintegrating.

According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned 09-25, Army Personnel Recovery Handbook, Army PR focuses on recovering isolated persons prior to detention. Therefore, commanders should always attempt to accomplish recovery at the lowest level of command due to the critical factor of time.

In preparation for mobilization prior to a DATE exercise or other deployment, units should have assigned a trained and certified personnel recovery officer (PRO). A fully trained and certified PRO is the lead advisor and planner of any PR event that may occur, enabling the commander to employ a decentralized execution approach or retain strict control of a PR mission at higher levels. To expand unit expertise and capabilities in this area, the PRO can designate additional PROs down to the company level and provide the appropriate training to enhance PR operations throughout the Army. By doing so, commanders can delegate PR decision-making authority to subordinate commanders. Such delegation facilitates decentralized execution and maximizes available time for planning and executing PR missions.

PR rehearsals are the most important preparation activities. Practicing PR actions prior to an actual IMDC event is critical to successful PR operations. Every leader is responsible to plan and prepare their unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities. Battle

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drills must include key information to enable the staff to identify the five PR tasks. During a DATE rotation, the commander’s intent may be to defeat the enemy at all cost, which may lead to the inability to complete the five tasks of PR. Reporting may be conducted, but the other four tasks will more than likely be set aside until the enemy is defeated. By having battle drills in place and flow charts available to indicate the appropriate actions that must be accomplished, units will be better able to continue the current operation as well as conduct the five PR tasks. Battle drill rehearsals enable a common understanding of procedures between higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders and staffs.

Doctrine

In accordance with All Army Activities (ALARACT) message 122/2005: PR events will be incorporated in all mission rehearsal/readiness exercises, combat training center rotations, and Mission Command Training Programs. All unit leaders will include PR actions into every order under paragraph III (Execution) and ensure plans utilizing all PR capabilities are put into place and rehearsed as part of mission preparation as described in Field Manual (FM) 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery, 21 November 2011. This is especially critical for small unit leaders to ensure PR is reinforced as a warrior’s ethos and part of Army core values.

Education

Currently, there is no one course of study to establish and certify unit PROs. There are several individual courses that are primarily computer-based training (CBT) along with some relevant resident courses. By combining the courses into one PRO course to create staff PROs for battalion level and above, the Army would greatly benefit by infusing fully-trained and qualified PRO management cells into all units. This would also remove the historically typical burden from intelligence sections and place responsibility on new PROs.

Training

Units should establish PR programs for staffs that provide brigade, regimental, and battalion level PROs by combining CBT as well as resident PR courses through the Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center (PRETC). This combined training enables units to have the flexibility to maintain operational focus while conducting the five PR tasks to accomplish recovery at the lowest level of command in accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, Joint Personnel Recovery, and FM 3-50.1.

Units should incorporate PR tasks and training objectives into Theater Specific Individual Requirements Training (TSIRT); such tasks may include completion or review of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREP), Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) 100.1 code of conduct training, recovery drills, moderate and high risk of isolation (MRI/HRI) briefs, and the use of personnel recovery support equipment (PRSE) to include blood chits and personal locating beacons. By incorporating the PR tasks and training objectives into TSIRT, the PRO will be enabled to focus on advising the commander and mentoring the staff on all PR actions.

Preparation

A unit level PR program can be established by creating and maintaining PROs at the brigade/regimental levels and the battalion/squadron levels. Establish guidelines in unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) to identify PROs and require a minimum level of training. Utilize

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FM 3-50.1 to establish pre-mobilization PR preparation activities to integrate all warfighting function capabilities and personnel.

Training and requirements should include, but not be limited to the following:

• Familiarization with Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 and FM 3-50.1 as well as with all PR-related web sites on Nonsecure/Secure Internet Protocol Routing (NIPR/SIPR) Networks.

• Selection of noncommissioned officers (rank of E-6 or above) to facilitate training and tracking on the NIPR Pre-Outside the Contiguous United States Travel File system used to create and track ISOPREPs.

• Establishment of Personnel Recovery Mission Software (PRMS) accounts on SIPR to manage ISOPREPs.

• Course completions of the following to prepare and enable competent PROs:

○○○○ ○ Army Personnel Recovery ARPR 202 (CBT). Command and Staff Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities. The digital video disk (DVD) may be ordered through the defense imagery website: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/index.html. Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI) Products. Order - DVD 878-07.

○○○○ ○ Introduction to JP 3-50. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/operations/csar.htm.

○○○○ ○ SERE 100.1 Code of Conduct, Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Direct Course; J3TA-US022. http://jko.jfcom.mil.

○○○○ ○ Army PR 101A: Introduction to Personnel Recovery.

○○○○ ○ Fundamentals of Personnel Recovery PR 102; JKO Direct Course; J30 P-US018. http://jko.jfcom.mil.

○○○○ ○ PRMS CBT. The compact disk (CD) may be ordered through the PRMS program or conducted online through SIPR. [email protected] for PRMS training CD ordering info.

○○○○ ○ Joint Personnel Recovery Agency courses to include: PR 106, 290, 295, 296, 297, 300 and 301, PRETC.

Implications

Training – Combine current PRETC courses to create one course that will produce PROs with knowledge on managing a unit level PR program. Incorporate PR tasks and training objectives into TSIRT programs.

Materiel – Provide PRSE and instructors for TSIRT to include MRI/HRI briefs.

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Leadership – Require a fully qualified PRO to be assigned at all times at brigade level and below. Require identified PROs to attend PRETC and complete PR 300 and 301.

Doctrinal references such as joint publications, Army FMs, CALL handbooks, and other publications, Army Regulations, and ALARACTs are necessary tools to establish guidelines to create unit SOPs, PR training programs, and battle drills. These resources provide PROs with sufficient knowledge to advise commanders and staffs to plan for any PR operation. However, doctrinal references do not provide PROs with peer interaction, personal experiences, nor the institutional knowledge PROs would gain from attending resident courses.

Providing our PROs with a resident single source program of study would unite the PR knowledge database from joint communities while instilling peer interaction, personal experiences, and institutional knowledge. A resident single-source program of study would enable our units with brigade level PROs that would be capable of training, educating, and qualifying lower-level PROs on multifaceted systems and processes throughout the full breadth of PR to better provide PR pre-deployment preparation, planning, and mission execution. The ultimate goal is always to bring our warriors home and deny the enemy a source of intelligence information, while also contributing to the morale and mission motivation of the combat forces.

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Chapter 12

Planning, Preparing, and Executing Stryker Battalion Sustainment: Logistics for Non-Logisticians

CPT Michael W. Kummerer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center CPT George L. Cass, 2nd Cavalry Regiment

“Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative and it provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.”

—Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, Sustainment, July 2012

For most maneuver, fires, and effects (MFE) officers, the last thing they want to be told is that they have been chosen as the next battalion S-4. The average MFE captain knows only as much about sustainment that wasn’t erased from his memory following the career course. For those lieutenants and captains that become S-4s prior to attending the career course, their knowledge of sustainment is even less. For most of them, the only thing they know is: a) Logistics isn’t sexy, and b) Logistics causes headaches. Luckily, for most MFE S-4s, there is a saving grace: brigade combat teams have forward support company commanders in every maneuver battalion, unless, of course, you find yourself in a Stryker brigade — in that case, guess what S-4, you’re on your own; figure it out!

Well, logistics may not be sexy, but it is essential. This article addresses some basic concepts for non-logisticians to consider when planning, preparing, and executing sustainment in a decisive action training environment (DATE). Just like the continuous operations cycle described in ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012, to properly execute sustainment, S-4s must develop a continuous cycle of understanding capabilities, developing requirements, identifying shortfalls and mitigating friction points (See Figure 12-1). The lessons learned that are discussed in this article come from the field artillery squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR). The focus of the examples and lessons learned pertain to 155 mm M777 howitzer ammunition, but can be applied to any critical class of supply used by any type of unit.

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Figure 12-1. The sustainment cycle

Understanding Capabilities

Before planning sustainment operations, it is essential to understand the capabilities of your battalion. This includes logistical capabilities (haul capacity and fuel capacity), as well as operational capabilities (supplies on hand). When calculating haul capacity, it is important to look at all of the transportation assets used to move supplies on the battlefield. These vehicular assets may include palletized load systems, load handling systems (LHS), the family of medium tactical vehicles, (FMTV), and trailers. Understanding haul capacity is more than knowing the cubic space and weight capabilities of a piece of equipment; it is about understanding how much of a certain class of supply can be carried and what effect that has on operations.

The 2CR’s field artillery (FA) squadron used an effective method of calculating haul capacity by illustrating it in a tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP), which also standardized mission-configured loads (MCLs) (See Figure 2). This technique allowed the unit to put their haul capacity capabilities into terms that were easy for commanders at all levels to understand. Likewise, when calculating fuel capacity, it is important to understand not only the fuel capacity of each vehicle type, but how those vehicles are distributed among subordinate units. By doing this, Soldiers have a better understanding of fuel requirements for a troop/battery when they report that they are 50 percent on fuel status.

Operationally, understanding capabilities means knowing what supplies are available in both space and time. The single most important factor that will lead to operational understanding of supplies on hand is accurate and timely reporting from subordinate units. Inaccurate reporting of supplies has the potential to be a singular point of failure for any operation. For the FA squadron, the most critical class of supply that required the greatest attention to detail was 155mm howitzer ammunition. When the administrative and logistics operations center was not receiving reports from the firing batteries and did not share a common operational picture (COP) with the squadron, they could not accurately report, predict, or forecast how much 155 mm ammunition was positioned at the gun lines. This lack of communication led to a very real risk of running out of bullets. Once the batteries got into a routine, and the communication structures improved, this risk was marginalized, and they never again risked going “black” on ammunition status.

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Developing Requirements

“Sustainment must be synchronized and planned in conjunction with operational planning. Through this collaborative planning effort, operational and sustainment commanders and staffs build a mutual bond, trust, and understanding of each other’s capabilities and requirements. Building trust and confidence in sustainment to support decisive action is essential.”

—ADRP 4-0

Figure 12-2. Example of MCL diagrams from the FA squadron TACSOP

A battalion S-4 cannot develop the sustainment requirements for his battalion by himself. It takes input from all the staff sections, subordinate units, and the command team to develop a successful plan. However, of all the sources that should be providing input to the S-4 to develop requirements, the single most important source is the operations officer and the operational staff. A sustainment plan that is not tied to and synchronized with an operational plan is destined to fail; likewise, a sustainment plan that does not remain synchronized throughout the execution of an operational plan runs a high risk of failure. This is why ADRP 4-0 lists integration as the most critical of the 8 “principles of sustainment.” The reference goes on to say that integration is combining all of the sustainment elements within operations to assure unity of command and

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effort. It requires deliberate coordination and synchronization of sustainment with operations across all levels. For a battalion S-4, this means that it is absolutely critical to not only play a significant role in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), but also maintain a COP with the S-3 as operations unfold. This can prove to be extremely difficult, especially in a DATE rotation when sustainment planners and executers often separate themselves from battalion command posts (CPs) by adhering to doctrine that requires that they operate from field trains and combat trains CPs. If operations and sustainment planners are not trained to plan, synchronize, and update each other while conducting split operations, they will likely experience degraded execution on the battle field during a DATE exercise.

The 2CR FA squadron learned this the hard way during the regiment’s initial entry and offensive operations, but learned from their mistakes and executed sustainment much more efficiently as the rotation progressed. The two biggest mistakes that the FA squadron made early on were not getting feedback from key staff members regarding the initial 155 mm ammunition draw and not maintaining a COP with the all of the CPs during mission execution. This led to an inadequate amount of 155mm dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to contend with the enemy armor threat, and skewed their consumption predictions because they were forced to fire less effective ammunition at a higher volume than originally anticipated.

After learning from these mistakes, the squadron implemented several staff functions that would improve synchronization between operations and sustainment for future operations. The most effective of these staff functions was integrating the development of requirements into the MDMP process and getting buy-in from all the key staff members when developing these requirements. An example of this was the process for identifying the ammunition requirements prior to the regimental defensive operations. The squadron S-2, S-3, fire direction officer (FDO) and S-4 were all involved in the process, and this staff synchronization resulted in the squadron having the right amount of ammunition to support the regiment’s operations. An example of a product that was used during this synchronization was the enemy event template (Figure 12-3). This template was produced by the S-2, used by the FDO to develop ammunition requirements needed to defeat expected enemy formations, used by the S-3 to establish resupply triggers and timelines, and finally used by the S-4 to develop ammunition requisition requirements based on feedback from the FDO and S-3.

Identify Shortfalls

After achieving a thorough understanding of capabilities and diligently working with other key staff members in developing requirements, it is time to conduct some basic sustainment algebra to identify sustainment shortfalls.

Requirements – Capabilities = Shortfalls

It seems easy, and as long as the first two steps have been completed and are as accurate as possible, it really is. Sustainment shortfalls can be anything from lack of supplies, to inadequate haul capacity, to a restriction placed on a unit by a higher headquarters. For 2CR’s FA squadron, the two biggest shortfalls were the 155 mm controlled supply rate (CSR) emplaced by 70th Infantry Division (ID), 2CR’s higher headquarters, and the squadron’s lack of haul capacity to support the 155 mm ammunition requirements.

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Figure 12-3. Enemy event template

During the MDMP process for defensive operations, the squadron identified that it would require over 800 rounds of DPICM to support the three day defense and disrupt enemy armor formations; unfortunately, the daily CSR of DPICM for the FA squadron was only 42 rounds — a major shortfall was identified. In regard to haul capacity, the squadron had two LHS trucks assigned to the squadron support platoon. Each LHS can haul approximately 240 rounds of 155 mm with all of the required fuses, propellants, and primers. A full battery unit basic load of 155 mm rounds is 474 rounds; that meant that the squadron only had enough haul capacity to provide a second load of ammunition for one battery, and if all three batteries were in different locations, the squadron could only resupply two batteries at a time — another major shortfall was identified.

Mitigating Friction Points

Once the shortfalls have been identified, it’s time to do a little more sustainment algebra. Computing this equation requires additional insight from and synchronization with the operational staff.

Operational Plan – Sustainment Shortfalls = Effects on Operations

Once you can clearly articulate the effects on operations caused by your sustainment shortfalls, you are ready to move onto the next step: mitigating friction points. There are a number of key players that can assist in mitigating friction points, but unless you can clearly explain why your

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sustainment shortfalls will have a negative effect on operations, you will not get the assistance you desire. Generally, the first key player that should be approached is either the brigade/regimental S-4, or the support operations officer (SPO) in the brigade support battalion (BSB) or regimental support squadron (RSS). When seeking assistance from either of these entities in mitigating friction points, it’s important to note that in addition to articulating negative effects of operations, you should also be prepared to discuss steps you have already taken or are prepared to take to assist the regiment or the RSS in overcoming your sustainment shortfalls.

As discussed earlier, the two biggest shortfalls that the FA squadron encountered were the CSR from 70th ID and the lack of haul capacity for 155mm ammunition. The unit was able to successfully mitigate both of these shortfalls by following a plan similar to that laid out in this article. By clearly articulating the detrimental effects of the 155mm CSR in a letter of justification to 70th ID, the CSR was lifted for the regiment’s defensive operations. This allowed the FA squadron to request enough DPICM to counter the enemy armor threat. By working directly with the regimental SPO, the FA squadron and the RSS developed a plan in which RSS LHS trucks were task organized to support the massive 155mm ammunition requirement. (See Figure 12-4.)

This type of relationship between the RSS/BSB and squadron/battalion S-4 is crucial to the success of any sustainment plan. Never underestimate the lengths of which the logistics planners and executers of the support battalion will go to support your mission, but also understand that like any relationship, it takes time to develop. S-4s that provide timely reports, participate in required meetings, seek regular guidance from the SPO and expend all resources before seeking assistance from the RSS/BSB will have a much easier time coordinating for and receiving support when it is needed. When this type of solid working relationship has been built, chances are the logisticians have already developed ways to support the requirement before the request is even sent forward!

“A successful sustainment plan will extend operational reach, prevent culmination or loss of the initiative, manage transitions, exploit possible opportunities, and mitigate risk.”

—Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, July 2012

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Figure 12-4. Distribution plan for 155 mm ammunition

Logistics during decisive action operations is difficult, even for logisticians. For non-logisticians, it can not only be difficult, but overwhelming at times. The ideas discussed in this article are not going to make sustainment operations easy, but they will certainly help make them slightly more manageable during planning, preparation, and execution. By adhering to the sustainment cycle of understanding capabilities, developing requirements, identifying shortfalls, and mitigating friction points, you will be well on your way to earning your undergraduate degree in logistics. Leave the graduate level stuff to the logisticians!

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Chapter 13

The Sustainer’s Foxhole and Preparing for Unified Land Operations

CPT Eric M. Stangle, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

(Previously published in Sustainment magazine.)

The challenging construct of the decisive action training environment is designed to refocus and reorient the Army for unified land operations in austere locations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. For tactical sustainment units, this means supporting on the move and employing certain skill sets and field craft, many of which have been largely undertrained or greatly diminished over the past decade.

Training in the field is the only way to become proficient at field operations. Regaining and honing the skills needed to operate in the field poses a challenge for sustainment units because they must balance the daily support requirements of their customer units and the training needs of their Soldiers.

The need for decisive action training extends beyond enlisted Soldiers; many noncommissioned officers (NCOs), company grade officers, and even some field grade officers have not had the opportunity to participate in this type of training for a long time.

Forward Operating Base Versus Brigade Support Area

Supporting from an established forward operating base (FOB) differs greatly from supporting from a brigade support area (BSA): the ways that we train for the two types of operations also differ. Over the past decade during mission rehearsal exercises at combat training centers, sustainment units almost exclusively operated out of fixed facilities that replicated any given FOB in Afghanistan or Iraq. During these exercises, life support, entrance control points, maintenance areas, motor pools, bunkers, and perimeter defenses are already established and usually transferred over to the incoming unit as they would be during the relief-in-place process. Units typically do not have to establish these necessities from scratch, and the training environment has reflected that fact.

On the other hand, during decisive action rotations and unified land operations, it would be very unlikely that suitable hard-stand facilities would exist to establish support areas; therefore support units would have to operate in the field, particularly during offensive operations when maintaining momentum is key to success.

The two modes of operational sustainment in decisive action bring into the planning and execution processes different skill sets and procedures, such as site reconnaissance and quartering party operations, tactical march techniques, site establishment, security, and incorporating additional entities such as field trains command posts, and joint and multinational partners.

As an Army, we have vast wartime experience. Indeed, most of our leaders and Soldiers have several deployments under their belts. However, a FOB mentality is prevalent and a significant shortfall exists in the knowledge base of leaders and Soldiers when it comes to conducting field operations.

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Basic Field Craft

The enemy gets a vote, and for the tactical-level sustainer, managing logistics data, providing distribution, providing medical treatment, or conducting maintenance can only be accomplished after first securing yourself or you may not live long enough for logistics to matter. Establishing a secure perimeter is a top priority in establishing a BSA, and so is clearly establishing priorities of work in order to quickly do so.

Leaders may be unfamiliar with the resources and time it takes to accomplish the multiple tasks required to establish and secure new field sites. Soldiers and NCOs may be unfamiliar with common tasks that support mission essential tasks, so simultaneously establishing security, life support, and conducting logistical tasks can be difficult. The consequences of which results in unsynchronized and inefficient operations, and inadequate rest plans that hinder operations as time progresses.

Many Soldiers just do not know what their individual responsibilities are in a field environment and are uncertain as to why these tasks are important. Many company-level leaders are equally inexperienced and therefore are not able to adequately identify training requirements or effectively manage myriad tasks during field operations. Senior trainers have observed the following trends:

• Unfamiliarity with properly constructing and emplacing fighting positions and concertina obstacles.

• Difficulty transitioning from cell phones to tactical communications.

• Unfamiliarity with drafting and understanding range cards and sector sketches.

• Not using camouflage nets.

• Lacking trained field sanitation teams.

• Relative unfamiliarity with guard mount duties, responsibilities, and procedures.

• Not employing challenge and password procedures.

• Not adhering to noise and light discipline standards.

• Not comprehending the rules of engagement.

• Not positively identifying conventional and unconventional threats.

• Unfamiliarity with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives tasks.

• Lacking standing operating procedures for field operations.

How is it we find ourselves in this situation? Many of our senior leaders have experienced multiple field training exercises of this nature in their careers. Certainly, most of our sergeants major have dug their share of fighting positions as they came up through the ranks.

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The answer is simple; we have been focused on the wars at hand. Counterinsurgency, counter-improvised explosive device training, and managing the Army Force Generation process, along with other key tasks, was our focus as we prepared for each deployment. But more than that, perhaps it has been taken for granted that these basic, seemingly simple skills are as ingrained in our Soldiers today as they were into our senior leaders many years ago.

Training Management and Mission Support

Providing sustainment in unified land operations is not about going “old school.” It is about sustaining the skills we have in our wartime deployments and building upon them to operate in the most austere of environments. In other words, do what we know how to do without doing it from a FOB.

As logisticians, our daily duties require us to be technical experts; we are great in a motor pool, warehouse, or troop clinic. As a consequence, we tend to be less tactically proficient than our combat arms counterparts even though we have a decade’s worth of experience securing tactical convoys, reacting to enemy contact, and operating in a counterinsurgency environment. These are all skills we need to sustain and incorporate into future training.

So, how do we tap into the knowledge and experience we have and build upon it? How do we get our NCOs, platoon leaders, and company commanders the knowledge they need to train their Soldiers in these areas and be efficient and effective managers of logistics in the field? We begin with research. The Army has set the conditions for this transition and is providing resources for commanders and leaders to access.

Some doctrine and training methodologies have changed, but some have not. For example, Field Manual (FM) 22-6, Guard Duty, hasn’t changed since 1975 and is still the current doctrine for guard duty. On the other hand, FM 7-0, Training the Force, 2002, recently evolved into Army Doctrine Publication and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 2012. It does not matter how old or how new the doctrine is if it goes unused.

Doctrine and other training resources are easily accessible online through the Army Publishing Directorate http://www.apd.army.mil and the Army Training Network (ATN) https://atn.army.mil. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has newsletters and bulletins from pre-2001 combat training center rotations that cover many good tactics, techniques, and procedures for field operations that would still be effective today.

Training Focuses

Developing and updating unit tactical standing operating procedures to include field operations would be extremely beneficial to any unit. The basic skills of field craft have not changed much over the years and can be taught almost anywhere if time is dedicated. Commanders should not take it for granted that their subordinate commanders and company leaders are knowledgeable in these areas.

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Leader training programs are important to incorporate into a training cycle; even an hour or two per week can have a big impact on the ability of junior leaders to conduct and lead training events. Sustainment and maneuver commanders should look for opportunities to integrate training for maneuver and sustainment personnel whenever possible as a means to share tactical expertise and experience.

Supply lines and distribution networks are always enemy targets and sustainers must be tactically proficient or they will risk not being technically capable. Training starts at the individual level; ensuring that our junior leaders are receiving the necessary institutional and professional education is important because it provides a solid foundation and prepares them for increased duties and responsibilities.

Many changes are already occurring, most recently with the updates to the Warrior Leaders Course and inclusion of the structured self-development modules in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). But individual training at the unit level is perhaps the most critical component to any training program because it is continuous and Soldiers must reach a certain level of proficiency in order to get the most out of collective training events. Individual training is also the most time consuming and personnel-intensive, and because of this, it creates the most friction in a sustainment commander’s training calendar.

Sending Soldiers to NCOES, new equipment training, and other troop schools, such as the Battle Staff NCO and the Equal Opportunity Leader’s Courses, among many others, will always be a necessary fact of Army life. But it also means that when coupled with daily support requirements, troop-to-task and manning requirements can quickly become a concern. When conducting training conflicts with providing support to the customer, the training event is often sacrificed.

To avoid this dilemma, commanders must clearly define their mission-essential tasks and desired end states with the intent to ruthlessly enforce training calendars. Only then can subordinate commanders conduct backwards planning, conduct battalion and company crosswalks, resource training, and manage their support requirements effectively.

Sergeant’s Time Training

Only by ensuring that our NCOs have the necessary resources and time to train the individual can we expect them to execute effective training events. Commanders can further reduce uncertainty by being creative in their approach to training. For example, leaders can conduct maintenance at a field site for a few days instead of in the motor pool, even if it is just a platoon at a time, and incorporate and reinforce individual-level field skills. Commanders should encourage junior leaders to conduct opportunity training and use any available time to train individual and collective tasks while still conducting daily support activities.

It’s all about training as you fight. It’s all about leader development. It’s all about conducting the military decisionmaking process. It’s all about efficiency and adaptability. Training individuals, teams, leaders, and units is all about a lot of things and it can be overwhelming, especially when confronted with tasks that are unfamiliar.

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Training Methodology

So where should we start? ADRP 7-0 tells us to train fundamentals first — a logical axiom that assumes the trainers are themselves proficient in the individual and collective tasks they are expected to teach their Soldiers. And if they are not, what is the next best step after reviewing the doctrine?

Officer and NCO professional development sessions present good opportunities for those most experienced to review and teach in a forum that is conducive to leader and trainer development. Start with the skill level1 tasks and work into the skill levels 2, 3, and 4 along with other mission-essential task list (METL) supporting tasks. This should go beyond classroom instruction and incorporate practical exercises in a field environment. Take your sergeants, lieutenants, and company commanders out to a field site and give them shovels, sandbags, lumber, a .50-caliber machinegun with tripod, and blank range cards and instruct them to build a crew-served fighting position to standard. Not only will this allow them to gain appreciation for amount of work that goes into these types of tasks in the field, but it also will give them the experience they need to expand their unit’s training plan and quality of instruction to their Soldiers.

Individual training is continuous and constantly builds and reinforces individual task proficiency through repetition with a series of desired outcomes that support the desired end state. A METL task of “deploy/establish support area” for example, encompasses multiple subtasks for subordinate units, such as “occupy a new operating site,” which involves multiple collective tasks and individual tasks. The individual task of camouflaging equipment can be partially trained in the motor pool or company area. Sewing the nets together, calculating how many and what configurations are required for assigned equipment, and the fundamentals that explain survivability can be taught within a few hours. Build upon this to create crew drills and time standards that reinforce individual responsibilities.

Next, incorporate such training into a field environment and use the natural terrain patterns, dispersion techniques, and proper set-up procedures. Several individual tasks can be trained in the same way and in conjunction with other mutually supporting tasks. In this way, we are not just checking the block on tasks, conditions, and standards; we are creating the basis for the desired outcome, which is to support the mission-essential task of establishing a support area.

As the Army transitions over the next few years, it’s not a question of if we will be prepared for unified land operations and future conflicts; it is a question of how well we will be prepared. Strong command influence on dedicating training time and resources will help ensure the basics of field craft are incorporated into unit training.

We as sustainers and leaders must safeguard to the best of our ability the limited time we have in our schedules to conduct sergeant’s time, individual, collective, and job specific training. Officers must participate in training just as they must assign the training tasks to subordinate leaders and hold them accountable. Building efficiency in the basics of field craft will result in adaptability in any environment and allow sustainers to better support customer units.

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Chapter 14

Accelerating the Flow of Human Intelligence Reporting: The Latest Time Information is of Value

CW4 David Slyman, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

In the world of journalism, there is a time-honored adage: “There is nothing older than yesterday’s newspaper.” What happened yesterday is already old news — and this applies equally to human intelligence (HUMINT) reports that are published 24 hours after the information is collected. It is old news to that maneuver commander who is on the offense in the fluid, dynamic decisive action training environment (DATE).

In the second DATE rotation that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, has hosted in the past year, some common intelligence themes have emerged during HUMINT operations. These themes include the following:

• Command/support relationships for the HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) — direct support or general support (reinforcing).

• The role of intelligence contingency funds (ICF).

• Screening, debriefing, and liaison operations.

• Source contact operations and field detention site-type interrogations.

• Order of battle interrogations.

• Determining how to expedite the flow of reports from the HCT to its operational management team (OMT).

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, leaders may have the luxury to wait 24 hours for a draft intelligence information report (IIR) to become published. In a DATE, 24 hours is too long to wait, so what is the latest time that information is of value to that commander? And since that timeframe is narrow, how can an HCT accelerate the flow of reporting to its customer?

Who is the Human Intelligence Customer?

The biggest problem within these themes was determining the fastest way to get an HCT report back to the OMT for eventual dissemination via the S-2X section (the primary HUMINT advisory staff element subordinate to the S-2). However, what the HCT, OMT, and S-2X overlooked was the fastest way to get that report to the HCT’s customer: the troop or company commander first, the squadron or battalion commander second, and the OMT/S-2X third for eventual dissemination to that regimental or brigade commander, and then to division and eventually the intelligence community.

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An Unorthodox PACE Plan

JMRC recommends the following unorthodox primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan to ensure that the HCT information makes it to its customers who cannot wait:

• PRIMARY: Face-to-face. Chances are that the HCT will accompany a troop or company on its mission. The HUMINT operator should find the commander or first sergeant to immediately share what was learned during the HCT’s endeavors.

• ALTERNATE: Frequency modulated (FM) radio or Blue Force Tracker (BFT). How do the elements of that unit communicate with its leadership when it is on the move? The HCT should use the same channels of communication to share its information with that maneuver leadership.

• CONTINGENCY: Cellular telephones. Virtually every country on this planet now has some sort of cellular service, and many large mobile telephone companies provide global roaming. An HCT must not withhold spot-reportable or other time-sensitive information simply because there are no secure communications.

• EMERGENCY: Satellite telephones. These should be last on the PACE plan because they can be sometimes problematic (i.e., they cannot be used indoors, or the HCT may have difficulty locating a satellite).

When Does the HCT Transmit a Report to the OMT?

In the DATE, the HCT transmits a report to its OMT after it has informed that maneuver commander. If the HCT is able to type a formal report, it may not be able to send that report for days unless it has the means to transmit data via the Global Rapid Response Intelligence Package (GRRIP) system. By the time a draft IIR reaches the OMT, it is no longer actionable, but may still be relevant to the analysts of the S-2X’s HUMINT analytical cell, the analysts of the all-source collection element (ACE)/brigade intelligence support element, or division/national level analysts. And by the time that draft IIR becomes an IIR it may be another day or two before it is “published” and can be found in searchable databases such as Query Tree, Pathfinder, M3, HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting (HOT-R), Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), etc.

When an HCT is sent into a DATE without its own independent communications equipment, and depends instead upon the supported unit for communications support, the HCT must wait until the airwaves are quiet before they are provided air time. Giving an HCT team leader a Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) laptop is not enough to make that team effective, as the HCT must compete with other hyper-busy squadron Soldiers for a SIPR drop. Worse, using a web-based reporting database (in this case it was CIDNE) only delayed the preparation and dissemination of draft IIRs, as none of the remote HCTs were able to log on to the database to draft their reports. By the time the HCTs developed a way to transmit the information back to the OMT without using the web-based reporting database, the information was not only a day old, but days old.

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So, if an HCT did not use the web-based reporting database, how did they transmit the reports to the OMT? SIPR e-mail, BFT, and FM radio became the reporting media. Using these channels meant that the OMT had to manually type the data into CIDNE to “push” the report to the S-2X for “publishing.” Again, these alternate channels still resulted in delays to information dissemination and thus, the information was of little value to the regimental commander.

However, these alternate communications channels did not impede the flow of information from the HCT to the supported squadron. If the HCT was in a remote location with an on-the-move troop, the HCT could verbally pass information first to that troop commander, second to that squadron S-2 using BFT or FM radio, and thirdly to the OMT.

What this ultimately resulted in was a low formal IIR production count — approximately 15 reports from five HCTs in a three-week exercise. However, the leaders who needed the information at the tactical level received it immediately either in person, via BFT or FM radio.

Figure 14-1. Expedited reporting and dissemination diagram

The illustration in Figure 14-1 shows one way to expedite the flow of information to those commanders who cannot wait for a formal report. The HCT conducts a meeting and passes what they learn first to the maneuver commander whom they are supporting. The flow of information flows successively higher and reaches the brigade two hours after the meeting. While this is happening, the HCT passes the draft IIR to its OMT. Four hours after the meeting the S-2X — not division headquarters — publishes the report.

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The important thing to note is that five hours after the meeting, the published report is available to national-level agencies. In a COIN environment, these publishing times could be anywhere from 24 to 48 hours after the source meeting.

Ensuring More Effective Human Intelligence Collection Team Communications

How can S-2X and OMT leaders better ensure their HUMINT operators are more communications-effective? Some recommendations include:

• Counter Intelligence-HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS)/CI-HUMINT Automated Reporting Collection System (CHARCS). CHATS/CHARCS has been fielded to virtually all tactical units, but most HUMINT operators use only the laptop that comes with the system. CHATS/CHARCS enables the HUMINT operator to draft an IIR, account for ICF, and manage source information all offline, so when they have access to a SIPR drop, transmission to an OMT is relatively quick.

• HCT Toolkits. An HCT Toolkit typically has, among other items, an Iridium satellite telephone, and often a device called a “secure sleeve” for secure voice communication.

• GRRIP. The GRRIP system combines the best of CHATS and the HCT toolkit by enabling the HCT to securely transmit data or voice. Moreover, a GRRIP can access SIPR-based web reporting databases such as the HOT-R or CIDNE portals.

• Mobile Phones. There are few countries in the world which do not have cellphone service. The astute S-2X and OMT leadership will have already conducted a study of all those countries in their potential area of operations and will have already purchased cellphones through a service provider which provides roaming coverage in that country.

• Establishing a standing operating procedure (SOP) which directs the HCTs to provide reporting first and foremost to that maneuver commander in whatever format that expedites the flow of information. Once that supported commander has received the information, the HCT will endeavor to pass it to the OMT as soon as possible. The OMT will disseminate the information to the S-2 operations, S-2X, ACE chief, etc., per the SOP.

Keeping the Maneuver Commander Informed is Job One

In a COIN environment where an HCT works from a fixed site with established communications architecture, an HCT strives to send a report as soon as possible to the OMT that will ensure it is reviewed, edited, and processed for publication and dissemination. This works well because the turn-around time to move an IIR from a draft to publication is quick (often less than 24 hours), and a spot report can be disseminated in an hour or less. In the relatively stable world of COIN, these timeframes are acceptable. In a DATE, a report received 24 hours later is just that: late.

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An HCT does not need the latest electronic device to pass information to the unit it supports. Sometimes the most effective way is the simplest and most fail-safe: in this case talking face-to-face with the commander. Ensuring that the HCT knows that its primary mission is to keep that maneuver commander informed first, rather than the OMT, guarantees that a maneuver commander will view that HCT as a value-added enabler. Besides, the life that HCT saves may be its own.

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Chapter 15

Utilizing the Goat as a Nonlethal Effect in the Decisive Action Training Environment

MAJ (Chaplain) Timothy L. Rietkerk, Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Unit ministry teams (UMTs) conduct religious area analysis (RAA) in order to advise the commander and staff on the role of religion in the operational area. In the decisive action training environment (DATE), with the focus of conducting simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations, the UMT must participate in the targeting process to best advise the commander and staff. When directed by the commander, the UMT can perform religious leader liaison (RLL) within the framework of Field Manual (FM) 1-05, Religious Support, October 2012, and the Chief of Chaplains’ Policy No. 3 on RLL.

This article offers several tactics, techniques, and procedures describing how the UMT participates in the targeting process and how RLL can be conducted in support of the stability working group.

Figure 15-1. A goat served as a nonlethal effect

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Rotational Training

In preparation for the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s DATE rotation, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s UMT, working through the RAA, identified the Islamic holiday, Eid al-Adha, as having significant importance for the local population and potential implications for operations. Eid al-Adha, also known as the Feast of the Sacrifice, is a four-day holiday to commemorate the willingness of the prophet Abraham to sacrifice his son Ishmael when commanded by God. God intervened and provided a ram for the sacrifice. Eid al-Adha involves the community coming together and sacrificing domestic animals. The meat is then split three ways between family, friends and neighbors, and the poor.

The chaplain brought this holiday to the attention of the S-9 and coordinated a RLL with the local imam. The chaplain discussed the holiday with the imam and ascertained a need within the community for potential assistance without making any direct promises for assistance. The imam expressed concern for the number of displaced persons who were in the process of relocating to an internally displaced-persons camp on the edge of the city and their ability to participate in Eid al-Adha.

The chaplain returned with this information and asked the S-9 and the judge advocate general (JAG) officer about the possibility of supplying goats to the imam in support of Eid al-Adha. The JAG researched the request and was able to locate authorized funding for the purchase of the goats. The chaplain also recommended that the provincial governor would be the best avenue to supply the goats to the local imam. By having the governor supply the goats, the regiment reinforced support for the local government, a key stability task. Purchasing goats through the local economy also provided economic development. In this way, the goat served as a non-lethal effect in support of key stability tasks in the DATE rotation.

Doctrine

By integrating with the staff and conducting the RLL in accordance with Chief of Chaplains’ Policy No. 3, the UMT upheld the intent of FM 1-05:

Chaplain sections and UMTs can work within boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge with the collective expertise of the staff in order to focus on specific problem sets to provide to the commander.

In order to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge, the UMTs must understand the targeting process. The UMTs must staff their requests for information from the RAA through the proper staff processes and then follow up with updating their running estimates when answers are obtained.

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Figure 15-2. Soldiers must understand and work with the populace

The S-2 can assist with requests for information for protected religious sites and local religious leaders. The S-9 provides another source for religious leader information. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, October 2011, under the social information category on page 4-8, looks at the “role of religion in society and the various religious and fraternal groups.” Also included in the analysis are “key events that can affect the commander’s mission, such as elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time).” The UMT should work with the S-9 who will be coordinating with the civil affairs teams to gather information on the local population. The UMT must integrate and synchronize the RLL activity with the S-9 when the commander decides to utilize the chaplain in this capacity. The RLL activity must also be conducted within the Chief of Chaplains’ policy in order not to violate the non-combatant status of the chaplain. The chaplain cannot serve as the sole or lead negotiator. Reporting requirements for the chaplain cannot be part of a directed human intelligence collection. The debriefing process for the chaplain should include these restrictions in the unit procedure for conducting leader engagements and the staff briefed on the Chief of Chaplains’ policy.

By being involved in the stability working group, the UMT synchronizes its advice and efforts with the rest of the staff during the targeting cycle. The UMT should incorporate unit knowledge management into their staff integration and utilize existing overlays and running estimates to display the impact of religion on operations. A way is to show how religious holidays shape population movements. The Islamic holiday Eid al-Adha involves the host nation community potentially gathering together in large groups. Stability operations should take into account

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security and support for the population during the holiday. The chaplain, along with the staff, provides recommendations to the commander on how to shape operations in this timeframe to meet his key tasks. The S-3 and the future operations cell incorporate the stability working group recommendations into operational planning and the overall targeting process.

In this way, the UMT can provide timely and effective advice on the role of religion in operations through the targeting process while fully maintaining the chaplain’s non-combatant status and staying within the Chief of Chaplains policy of RLL.

In utilizing the goat as a non-lethal effect, the unit supports the stability task in that the local government is viewed as taking care of the needs of the local populace. In this instance, the local government supports the population in celebrating an important religious holiday in a difficult situation involving displaced persons. This provides hope to the population and achieves the commander’s goal of the local government being viewed as legitimate and able to take care of the population. This also counters a key claim in the enemy’s campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the host nation government.

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Appendix A

Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01

Lessons Learned, October 2012

Mission Command Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Improving command post (CP) security and survivability.

Description: CP security measures should be a high priority for the operations element and the headquarters company command team as a CP is established to assume the mission command role for subordinate units.

Discussion: Often security is an afterthought without receiving the required emphasis. Pre-rotational rehearsals focus on setting up structures and the mission command architecture but not on the CP securing itself against direct or indirect attacks. As the CP occupies a position, Soldiers must continuously improve not only its mission command capabilities but also its security posture. Leaders and Soldiers must understand basic defensive operations as applied to defending a strong point or battle position. These are skills that have eroded and not practiced in a long time. Building fighting positions, preparing range cards and sector sketches, planning distribution of fires, preparing alert plans, evacuating and treating casualties, and establishing battlefield communications must be relearned and rehearsed at all levels, both during daylight and periods of limited visibility. If every Soldier does not understand or cannot execute these tasks to standard, the CP and all Soldiers associated with it are at great risk from enemy attack.

Insights/Lessons: Security is always the most important component of any mission. CPs are high priority targets for the enemy. Detailed plans must be published, trained, and rehearsed down to the lowest level both during daylight hours and during times of limited visibility. Leaders must know how to employ organic weapons systems and to control distribution of fire. Leaders must assign Soldiers/sections battle positions and sectors of fire and ensure they are understood. Sector sketches and range cards must be completed. Survivability positions must be dug to standard to protect weapons systems and Soldiers from enemy fire. An effective communication plan, using squad radios or similar systems, must be implemented so that the headquarters company commander and/or first sergeant can control available assets in the event of an attack on the CP. A quick reaction force/reserve element should be identified in case of a breach in the perimeter. Patrols and listening/observation posts must be established outside the wire providing the CP with adequate warning of ground attacks. Alert procedures and challenge and password procedures must be known by all and implemented in accordance with unit standing operating procedures. Continual improvements must be accomplished for as long as the CP occupies a position. In the event of a ground attack, all available assets that are not directly related to manning or running the CP should be used to protect the CP. Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, chapter 8, outlines comprehensive details in the planning, execution, and maintenance of area and strongpoint defensive operations.

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Observation 2

Title: Integrating inform and influence activities (IIA) enablers.

Description: Unit leaders should use doctrinal resources to improve understanding and assist proper integration of IIA enabler forces. One good tool is Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012. Additionally, units should review chapter 5 of Field Manual 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, January 2013, for guidance on how to effectively integrate IIA enablers into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

Discussion: It is important for units to effectively integrate new forces, and through careful planning, apportion and synchronize these forces to meet the requirements of the mission. ADRP 5-0 provides good guidance on how units should approach the initial integration of new forces and also provides a good checklist of tasks units should accomplish when integrating enabler forces. The publication states “Commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs help assimilate new Soldiers into their units and new units into the force. They also prepare Soldiers and new units in performing their duties properly and integrating into an upcoming operation smoothly. Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and mission essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on their places and roles in the force and during the operation. This integration for units includes, but is not limited to: Receiving and introducing new units to the force and the area of operation, exchanging SOPs, conducting briefings and rehearsals, establishing communications links, and exchanging liaison teams (if required).”

Contained in FM 3-13, Chapter 5, which is titled “Inform and Influence Activities Integration”, is a good reference for units to utilize during the MDMP to ensure IIA enabler forces are properly apportioned and synchronized to meet the requirements of the mission. In particular, units should refer to the FM’s guidance on course of action (COA) development which states “During COA development, the G-7 (S-7) provides advice on the potential impact of friendly and enemy information activities, related actions, or activities of the relative combat power of the two sides. This officer focuses IIA planning efforts on achieving an operational advantage at the decision point of each course of action. Lastly, the G-7 (S-7) develops schemes of support and objectives for IIA and input to a high-payoff target list for each course of action.” Units should also utilize the manual’s guidance on COA analysis which states “During COA analysis, the G-7 (S-7) helps the G-2 (S-2) with enemy information activities and assessments, provides input on high-value targets, and develops an IIA concept. This concept supports each friendly COA, addresses critical event actions and messages, and reviews and refines task organization of information-related capabilities to support IIA.”

Insights/Lessons: Incorporate guidance from ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-13 into unit SOPs for integrating IIA enabler forces and conducting IIA related aspects of MDMP.

Observation 3

Title: Understanding roles to enhance battalion-level command post operations.

Description: A battalion-level command post (CP) is manned with a battle captain and battle noncommissioned officer (NCO) and three to four radio operators (ROs) per day and night shift. During a training rotation, it is sometimes difficult to observe who is in charge or running the CP. The lack of ownership and understanding is evident in the critical processes of how data is

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received by the ROs and/or battle captains/ battle NCOs and disseminated to the commander and staff.

Discussion: A lack of ownership and understanding in CPs is partially due to undefined tasks and purposes of each duty position within the CPs. Developing a common understanding of duties and responsibilities demonstrates how each position supports the others enabling the battle captains/battle NCOs to analyze information and inform the commander. What is sometimes observed in a battalion CP is that an RO receives a radio transmission from a unit that meets a commander’s critical information requirement or friendly forces information requirement, but the data received from the RO stays within the CP and is not pushed to the commander until sometime after the event has happened. The figure below demonstrates how data transition to understanding. (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012)

Figure A-1. Data transition to understanding

Insights/Lessons: Prior to decisive action training rotations, battalion-level CPs should develop and implement CP standing operating procedures (SOPs). The SOPs should include clearly defined tasks and purposes per each role within the CP and how each role builds upon the others. The CP should also conduct rehearsals on battle drills, focusing on how data is received and the “step action” drill to get the data processed and sent to the commander and staff. Ownership will come once each CP function understands its role.

Observation 4

Title: Conducting mission specific rules of engagement (ROE)/law of war (LOW) training.

Description: Soldiers and units in the decisive action training environment (DATE) face many new and unfamiliar situations involving the ROE and LOW. To be successful in the DATE and mitigate against ROE/LOW violations, units must advance beyond the baseline annual ROE/LOW training mandated by Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, by developing and implementing training scenarios tailored address the more common ROE/LOW issues in the DATE.

Discussion: AR 350-1 mandates annual ROE/LOW training (Level B training) for every Soldier in the Army. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (13 Jun 2005), further tasks commanders with the primary responsibility for ensuring that their Soldiers are trained on the ROE. The judge advocate assists in the training of Soldiers, staff, and leaders.

ROE training is not a one-time event – it is a series of individual and collective training exercises. Upon receipt of mission specific ROE, units should develop a training program and leverage judge advocates to provide individual training for unit leaders. Leaders should then incorporate ROE training into the unit’s collective training events like situational training exercises. See also Commander’s Legal Guide, The Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, 15 June 2012.

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The DATE presents units and individual Soldiers with many of the same issues faced in prior counterinsurgency deployments in support of Operations Iraqi freedom/New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, as well as a host of new issues. Specifically, the DATE may require Soldiers and units to perform the following:

• Positively identify irregular or paramilitary forces (such as the South Atropian People’s Army) as a declared hostile force and thereby distinguish them from the civilian populace.

• Understand and correctly distinguish the inherent right of self-defense from the collateral damage methodology applied to offensive fires.

• Execute fires approved by the proper authority against targets within restricted fire areas, no fire areas or across international boundaries.

• Understand ROE applicability/limitations of operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or direct support multinational forces.

• Understand detention authority, applicable LOW rules and processing requirements for enemy prisoners of war and Atropian civilians.

• Comply with reporting requirements for suspected LOW violations.

Upon receipt of mission specific ROE for the DATE, the brigade staff must incorporate the ROE into their planning process, identify/seek appropriate revisions based on the unit mission, and pass the ROE (with applicable training aids) to subordinate units in the operation order.

During mission analysis, the brigade judge advocate (BJA) should identify those ROE/LOW issues that are likely to arise. The BJA should then tailor ROE training packages specific for the mission to enable subordinate units to train these issues. The BJA should work with the brigade planners to implement and track this training, as feasible. The unit must not merely rely upon baseline AR 350-1 Level B training to ensure that Soldiers were sufficiently trained on the ROE.

Insights/Lessons: During unit leader training programs, recommend emphasis on pre-deployment ROE training particular to the DATE. To enforce the emphasis, units could be required to backbrief their higher headquarters on the completion of such training during their deployment phase. Further, ensure that multinational and coalition partners who are TACON or OPCON to U.S. forces are properly trained on applicable ROE. Training is most effective when conducted in a small group forum (rather than battalion-sized briefings), or incorporated into other unit training events (such as situational training exercise lanes or during the command post exercise phase). Training is also more effective when led by the company and platoon officers and noncommissioned officers, assisted by on-site legal personnel.

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Observation 5

Title: Providing timely and accurate Title 10 reporting.

Description: The decisive action training environment (DATE) creates unique challenges to a unit’s ability to accurately report and/or investigate designated serious incidents (hostile deaths, fratricide incidents, duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) events, and law of war violations) within the strict timelines set forth by law or regulation.

Discussion: Title 10 of the United States Code, as well as various Department of Defense (DoD) directives and Army regulations, mandates that Army units will report and investigate designated serious incidents within strict timelines. These incidents include, but are not limited to: the death of any Soldier due to either enemy actions or operational accidents, suicides, law of war violations, any DUSTWUN Soldier, any suspected fratricide incident, etc. In a DATE rotation, the rotational training unit will be provided with an operation order (OPORD) from its higher headquarters with a detailed matrix outlining reporting and investigation requirements. The RTU will then need to incorporate those requirements into its OPORD, the associated legal annex, and its battle drills.

While not a new requirement, units may find reporting compliance within the DATE to be more challenging than past experiences had within mature theaters due to the lack of established reporting chains and developed communication capabilities. Units that are most successful at reporting during the DATE have spent time beforehand to plan and issue—

• Clear guidance of what items require reporting.

• A defined reporting chain.

• A detailed primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan that accounts for the likely communication breakdowns that can occur during operations that are highly mobile.

All this information should be disseminated in the unit’s OPORD and within its battle drills. Further, these battle drills must be practiced beforehand and then adhered to within the DATE to truly be effective. In defining the reporting chain and PACE plan, the unit should account for the realities of multiple command nodes that are often geographically dispersed and frequently relocate due to operational necessity. Proper contingency planning is essential for smooth and accurate reporting.

Units at every level must clearly assign the responsibility for Title 10 reporting so that some named individual is made responsible for ensuring that reportable information goes up within its prescribed timeline. This technique also allows for the unit to better focus training towards these people, which should ensure clarity at each level in regard to what type of events require reporting.

Insights/Lessons: The brigade judge advocate (BJA) should review the command post battle drills to ensure that all incidents requiring a report to higher headquarters/investigation have been designated someone responsible to report (chief of operations), what information must be reported, and the required timeline. They must also designate who is the proponent for follow-on reporting as the information becomes more available.

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The brigade and all subordinate units must routinely use the same command post battle drills to ensure consistency and accuracy. Units must regularly rehearse these. The brigade must also train subordinate units, staffs and liaison officers (LNOs) (including coalition partners who are not familiar with U.S. Title 10, DoD or Department of the Army reporting requirements and procedures) on the types of incidents that require reporting and timeframes associated therewith. Particular focus should be on the unit LNOs and the battle captains.

The BJA should attend all wargaming sessions and combined arms rehearsals to identify specific issues/battle drills that may be utilized during the upcoming mission. He/she should then coordinate with the LNOs and other potential individuals in the current operations cell to ensure all review and understand the battle drills. Rather than playing the action officer role for each reporting task, JAs should serve an oversight role wherein they track multiple reports to ensure their accuracy and timeliness.

Observation 6

Title: Defining the roles and responsibilities of the headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) command team.

Description: An open flow of communication must be established between the HHB command team and the other headquarters command posts to stay abreast on the status of their Soldiers, equipment, and requirements across the operating environment.

Discussion: The HHB command team plays a vital role in battalion/squadron operations. The HHB is responsible for the administrative, life support, and security requirements of the battalion/squadron staff members, sustainment Soldiers (medics, mechanics, fuel handlers), and numerous field artillery enablers such as radar, meteorological, and survey. This is perhaps the most widely spread organization within the regiment with the tactical command post (CP), main, main CP, company/battery CPs, field trains, combat trains, and field artillery enablers all located in different locations. Because the battery is spread out in such a manner, communication systems and procedures are paramount. Accounting for all the personnel and equipment across the battlefield will fail if the battery does not establish the mechanisms needed to meet battalion/squadron demands. Coordinating with sister units within the brigade is also a responsibility that should be fulfilled by the command team. This coordination includes sending the survey section out to the other units in preparation of a defense, ensuring that the lines of communication are open for the meteorological section to push the data to all the mortar sections, and ensuring that the radar sections are receiving the support and security that they need.

Insights/Lessons: Communication procedures within the HHB should be developed and practiced prior to DATE rotations. Establishing these procedures as well as reporting battle rhythms prevents the many elements of the HHB from going without required support or security. Additionally, individual sections should train on basic defense techniques with assistance from the battery first sergeant (1SG). According to Field Manual 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, December 1996, the 1SG is the principal enlisted advisor to the battery commander on reconnaissance and site selection of the battery position, as well as the execution of the overall battery defense plan. Finally, the HHB commander must decide where he and his command team should be positioned to facilitate effective mission command.

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Observation 7

Title: Enabling knowledge management to enhance effective staff collaboration.

Description: Field Manual 6-01.1 Knowledge Management Operations, July 2012, defines KM as the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking. The S-6 can enable staff collaboration through KM by understanding information requirements, the operational environments, and the communication equipment available. To achieve this, the S-6 must define and develop an architecture that supports the units KM requirements during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

Discussion: Each staff warfighting function (WfF) has unique information requirements that remain fairly consistent no matter the operating environment. Each WfF must be prepared to define their requirements during the MDMP. The S-6 must understand both the capabilities and the limitations of each of the WfF communication systems and the impact these will have on information delivery. Each WfF must be assessed individually when the network architecture is defined.

Each WfF has unique systems to share their information requirements. The unit’s capability set includes interoperable communication systems and applications fielded together to strengthen brigade combat team mission command networks and improve effectiveness in today’s operational environment. The S-6 must understand the capability set requirements for interoperability as well as understand which equipment can be operated on the move and which requires a fixed location. Communication systems considerations include Warfighter Information Network-Tactical suites, frequency-modulation and Harris radios, the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, cell/satellite phones, and local established networks. Until the Army delivers the network of the future, staffs must utilize the current communications systems that are available.

The operating environments must be considered across each echelon and operational mission. This requirement is the most challenging since it can change from mission to mission. Providing command communications is critical, but the control communications are what enable the staff collaboration. As part of the operating environment, the S-6 must also understand the command center(s) and the commander’s preferences in the roles and responsibilities of each node in the structure. Is there a main command post, a tactical command post, or a mobile command group? Who has the forward command, the rear command and what are the defined roles of the commands? Mobile versus stationary attributes will impact the unit’s ability to move information. Understanding the information requirements and the capability set are major considerations and will determine the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan for each WfF. A validation exercise helps refine each WfF PACE plan and ensure optimal information flow for each operating environment.

Insights/Lessons: The S-6 must plan each operation to meet the unique needs of the operational environment and tactical formations inherent to the mission at hand. Staffs must define their deliverables during the MDMP and train as they expect to fight in each operational environment. The S-6 must understand both the capabilities and the limitations of each WfF communication system and the impact these will have on information delivery.

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Appendix B



Intelligence Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Integrating human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs).

Description: Battalion and company staffs are unfamiliar with the capabilities of their HCT assets. HCTs appear to be often thought of merely as interrogators, but interrogations are only one of six disciplines which fall under a HUMINT collector’s skill set. This lack of knowledge regarding the HUMINT skill set makes it difficult for units to use all aspects of their information collection assets.

Discussion: Units are accustomed to integrating support elements such as supply or medical on a daily basis which makes their integration into the unit’s planning process a natural occurrence. The late integration of an HCT causes most units to think they need to adjust their plans for accomplishing a mission. This misunderstanding is in line with the knowledge gap regarding the use of HUMINT assets.

In most cases, units usually do not receive their HCT until they take part in a field training exercise together. These exercises are productive for learning individual skill sets pertaining to regular duties, but it leaves little time for units to learn how to integrate their HUMINT assets. This limited interactive training makes it difficult for unit commanders to learn and practice implementing the inherent capabilities of HCTs.

Insights/Lessons: The primary purpose for HUMINT collection assets is to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements. The knowledge gap regarding the operational use of HUMINT assets degrades the maneuver unit’s overall force protection posture. Units must integrate their enablers during the initial stages of the planning process, allowing the HCTs to thoroughly brief commanders on their capabilities. This gives commanders an opportunity to improve knowledge regarding how to implement HUMINT assets to unit advantage during future training exercises.

Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence, explains that HUMINT collectors’ efforts include the following:

• Debriefing (U.S. and non-U.S. civilians).

• Screening (detained personnel, friendly forces, as well as locally employed persons).

• Conducting liaisons with coalition forces.

• Conducting source contact operations.

• Conducting interrogations.

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These efforts are conducted in order to spot and assess near and long-term threats the unit may encounter.

Observation 2

Title: Brigade combat teams should conduct information collection rehearsals as part of their military decisionmaking process.

Description: Brigade combat teams operating in wide area security or combined arms maneuver environments are supported by collection assets available from their organic organizations, their combined joint task force level headquarters, their theater headquarters, as well as national intelligence agencies. Brigades must manage more collection support than a division headquarters was expected to manage prior to 2003. A common technique used at the division level to synchronize information collection prior to 2003 was the reconnaissance and surveillance rehearsal.

Discussion: The information collection rehearsal should be conducted by event or phase, in line with the wargame or combined arms rehearsal. For each event covered, the actors should brief each asset assigned or task organized, what named areas of interest they are observing, what indicators they are looking for, and what essential element of information and priority information requirements (PIR) they are attempting to answer. After briefing each asset using this method, the actors must then brief what reporting methods they are going to use, and on what communication systems.

Every information collector briefs how they are sharing the information they are collecting. Is the information being input into a digital system? If yes, who is inputting the information? How will battalions receive information if they are jumping their tactical operations center during this event/phase? Is the information required to be broadcasted over the brigade operations and intelligence or the command frequency modulation radio networks?

Following the completion of the events or phases, the rehearsal should include vignettes which test redundancy in collection and the use of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plans. Collectors and users should understand from the rehearsal what the commander’s priorities are, and that as a result of these priorities, collection assets may be moved or reallocated in order to answer PIR. Collectors and users should also have a clear understanding of the information dissemination PACE plan.

Insights/Lessons: The intelligence warfighting function rehearsal should include the regiment/brigade S-2, S-3, collection manager, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance liaison officer (LNO), targeting officer, signals intelligence technician, S-2X human intelligence/operational management team, unmanned aircraft systems platoon leader or technician, the reconnaissance squadron S-3 or LNO, the artillery battalion S-2 and radar technician, and battalion/squadron S-2s and S-3s or LNOs, as available.

The goal of the intelligence warfighting function rehearsal is an understanding of how information will be collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated for each phase/event of the planned operation.

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Observation 3

Title: Maximizing the capabilities of the electronic intelligence (ELINT) section in the military intelligence troop.

Description: The addition of an ELINT analyst section to the analysis and control element (ACE) in the decisive action environment can better facilitate communication between the signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoon and the targeting cell. Additionally, an ELINT section is able to provide additional insight into the common operating picture through its ability to track enemy weapon systems and their associated units from the order of battle.

Discussion: Adding ELINT capability to a brigade/regimental echelon may initially present a challenge, as these echelons typically do not have organic collection capabilities or procedures and equipment to receive ELINT reporting from higher echelons. Making effective use of tasking requests for division and national level intelligence collection assets allows analysts to receive a limited information feed, simulating reported information from the SIGINT production chain.

In one instance that was observed, the ACE officer in charge and SIGINT platoon agreed that creating a section directly within the ACE would improve communication between the ELINT analysts, the targeting cell, and ACE leadership. Analysts were limited to SECRET-level reporting within the ACE, and were able to effectively desensitize information for reporting purposes. All internal reporting was formatted as a “tipper” message, included weapon systems and locations, and sent via PSi-chat instant messaging platform. No formal intelligence reports were created. Close physical proximity to targeting allowed for the creation of timely fire missions against enemy anti-air defense and ground targets, ensuring air superiority for friendly air assets. ELINT was able to track movements of enemy units throughout the exercise, providing fusion cell analysts with accurate, timely locations of enemy forces. Near the end of the exercise, new techniques were developed for ELINT analysts to directly update the regimental common operating picture in near real-time.

Insights/Lessons: ELINT is a valuable tool for units in the decisive action training environment, particularly against conventional forces where the enemy incorporates complex weapon systems, anti-air defense, air assets, and specialized communications equipment. Units can effectively use information received to aid the regimental mission. However, at the exercise level, there is not a clear picture of what ELINT is and how its capabilities and limitations can be effectively leveraged. Units may receive information beyond the abilities of collection assets. Tactical ELINT analysis is a valuable tool, but intelligence warfighting function operators must reincorporate it in an accurate and appropriate manner to provide the best training.

Observation 4

Title: Enhancing understanding of the operational environment using the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) section.

Description: GEOINT is a crucial component of a staff integrated intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The analysis and control element’s GEOINT section helps task and direct available intelligence collection assets to answer the commander’s critical information requirements. The role of the GEOINT section noncommissioned officer in charge is important for quality control and accomplishment of the mission.

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Discussion: The senior or lead imagery analysts’ duty is to be prepared and have the section and equipment ready to deploy. It is also a responsibility to keep the staff informed of capabilities that the section can provide as well as communicate significant events going on before, during, and after a deployment. Prior to deployment, GEOINT sections should download raw imagery data needed for the operational environment on hard drives and provide capability briefs to commanders and staff. GEOINT section supervisors should fully incorporate the use of the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) and Full Motion Video (FMV) technology for conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. GEOINT sections are able to track movements of friendly and enemy units and vehicles throughout the area of operation using both GMTI and FMV providing situational development, accurate intelligence, and locations for fire missions. This significantly enhances the overall success of the mission and provides an accurate picture of the battlefield.

Insights/Lessons: Pre-deployment preparation is a must to improve a unit’s ability to execute an operation. Having all the imagery data of the operational area and briefing the commander and staff of all GEOINT capabilities prior to movement greatly enhances overall success of the mission. GEOINT sections should be integrated with their supported units prior to any training exercise or deployment. This enables the commander to fully identify how the GEOINT skill set can best be used to support the mission.

Observation 5

Title: Understanding the role of counterintelligence (CI) in tactical training environments.

Description: Tactical CI training is critical in providing experienced CI personnel that understand how to support commanders operating in tactical environments. Without proper training, CI Agents may not be able to articulate their roles to commanders, and may require more time to accomplish tactical CI tasks.

Discussion: According to Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence, March 2010, Chapter 6, CI’s primary purpose at the tactical level is to assess vulnerabilities and advise commanders on force protection issues. CI assets are instrumental in protecting bases of operations from infiltration, collection, planning, and targeting by foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) and international terrorist organizations (ITO) entities. FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, October 2009, provides guidelines of CI support to various types of military operations and identifies tasks associated with particular types of operations.

The success of a CI team is measured by the operational emphasis, resourcing, and equipping they receive from their supported commands. When operating at its full capacity, the role of the CI Team is to deny, degrade, disrupt, or mitigate FISS and ITO ability and capability to successfully execute intelligence collection targeting of U.S. or friendly force interests. CI focuses on countering FISS and ITO intelligence collection activities targeting information or material concerning U.S. or friendly force personnel, activities, operations, plans, equipment, facilities, publications, technology, or documents. The CI team activities include providing advice and assistance on security programs, education and awareness, threat vulnerability assessments, CI screenings, CI investigations, and CI collections to assist commanders.

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Insights/Lessons: CI personnel must read and understand FM 2-0 and FM 2-22.2 prior to deployment to a tactical training or combat environment. The S-2X cells must be fully integrated in the staff processes prior to any deployment so they have input and oversight of how to best utilize their personnel.

The CI Special Agent Course at Ft. Huachuca primarily focuses on strategic and field office operations. Expanding and updating the program of instruction would help train and prepare CI Agents for tactical operations to help agents articulate to commanders some aspects of their duties, responsibilities, and how they are force enablers.

Observation 6

Description: Units must develop effective planning cycles for UAS intelligence collection, specifically regarding the RQ-7B Shadow tactical UAS.

Discussion: The Shadow is a brigade level asset that should be integrated into the collection process prior to the start of a training rotation. Depending on task organization, geographical separation, and mission, it may take longer to integrate the Shadow into the intelligence planning cycle. Getting the Shadow integrated is critical in order to effectively utilize the asset and ultimately answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and determine enemy dispositions. In cases of geographical separation, it may be better to place the Shadow in direct support to a battalion-level unit or in direct support to the main effort. Having a detailed intelligence collection plan, describing named areas of interest, PIRs, and the friendly/enemy situation can all pay enormous dividends in the first hours of battle. Collection managers and UAS platoons must have frank discussions on the capabilities and limitations of the system. The collection manager should have an understanding of the impact that weather, maintenance, system characteristics, and crew endurance will have on the UAS mission. Having a general understanding will maximize effective use and reduce misallocation of resources.

Insights/Lessons: The S-2 and collection manager must integrate UAS into their planning cycles and effectively communicate mission requirements. In decisive action operations, UAS assets make the most impact in the days and hours prior to the battle by allowing commanders to see the battlefield and prioritize targets. This is a change from the counterinsurgency environment where UAS assets were often dynamically re-tasked to support ongoing operations. This change requires prior planning and communication of requirements in order to manage operational and logistic requirements.

Observation 7

Title: Equipping UAS units to enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Description: Shadow UAS platoons lack sufficient resources to operate with self-sufficiency during decisive action operations.

Discussion: In decisive action operations, units are expected to have some measure of self- sufficiency and have organic means for basic life support and communication. The current Shadow UAS modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has no maintenance tent or enhanced communications packages such as secure or nonsecure Internet protocol router network access point terminals or Command Post of the Future systems. Shadow platoons are forced to rely on existing structures to perform all of the maintenance operations. In the counterinsurgency

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(COIN) environment, Shadow utilized existing structures or locally purchased shelters. In the dynamic decisive action environment, Shadow needs to have a dedicated maintenance tent in the event that there is no suitable shelter at an airfield/landing strip. Additionally, the platoon needs life support equipment such as sleep tents, heaters, lights, and generators. Lacking these items is usually a problem at the unit level, but may indicate a prevalent problem that exists in many formations as the Army prepares for the transition to decisive action. Lastly, Shadow platoons must stay connected to the enterprise system. Mission information, weather reports, airspace coordination, and many other functions are mainly done over email and the Internet. Without these resources, Shadow platoons are forced to conduct all communications on frequency modulated radio and Blue Force Tracker (BFT). Managing and disseminating intelligence and aviation specific requirements via frequency modulation or Blue Force Tracker is nearly impossible. At best, this situation causes delayed intelligence to the warfighters and at worst it causes aviation accidents caused by a lack of situational awareness.

Insights/Lessons: The Shadow MTOE needs to be addressed at the Army level if there is truly an expectation to deploy Shadow in austere conditions. Commanders must seriously consider how to meet the logistic and communications requirements associated with the Shadow platoon if they intend to use them effectively. In decisive action environments, units should be able to operate with a reasonable level of self sufficiency, but with current equipping, the Shadow platoon will need outside support. The Shadow and the UAS community have grown and developed during the COIN conflict which featured forward operating bases and hardened structures. The Army must determine how to support its newer low density and highly-specialized logistic requirements.

As the Army embraces unified land operations and executes decisive action, it is imperative for entire formations to relearn how to face a peer/near-peer threat in any operational environment and succeed. Battles can be won and lost by the intelligence gathered in the moments preceding a conflict. Planning and synchronizing intelligence requirements for UAS assets is critical to achieving success in the beginning of the battle. UAS is a new asset to the decisive action environment, so there is no historical precedent addressing the employment of tactical (Shadow) UAS. As the Army continues to train in this “new” environment it must consider what equipment increases are needed for units that may be geographically separated due to limitations or system requirements.

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Appendix C



Fires Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Defining target acquisition (TA) platoon leader (PL) duties and responsibilities.

Description: Duties and responsibilities of TA PLs and platoon sergeants (PSGs) in direct support field artillery battalions must be clearly identified.

Discussion: A challenge for TA PLs during decisive action training environment (DATE) rotations is to identify and understand their roles and responsibilities as sensor managers. The TA PL position is relatively new and has not been well defined in doctrinal references.

The TA PL integrated and supported operations by being assigned to the regimental/squadron tactical command post, which was combined to better facilitate security, increase situational awareness, and provide better timeliness and responsiveness of fires. With the TA PL serving as the counterfire officer, some critical responsibilities/tasks were not accomplished due to physical separation and competing demands related to high operational tempo. Some of the critical friction points that arose were related to the survivability of the radar sections and the support requirements (Class I, III, IX) being properly forecasted and scheduled. This led to the radar sections having to conduct survivability moves at an unsustainable rate and resupply operations not being scheduled. What followed were large gaps in radar coverage due to the radar sections conducting their own resupply operations. Due to limited manning and key personnel (TA PL and PSG) performing other duties, the radar sections were forced to move as entire sections to conduct resupply operations at the combat trains command post.

Insights/Lessons: Challenges observed during the DATE rotation indicated a need for flexibility for TA leaders to conduct reconnaissance of potential radar sites, check radar site locations, check security, and check positioning for all sensors to include the Q36/Q37/Q48s to validate positioning and operations. Army doctrine should address the duties and responsibilities of the TA PL and PSG to allow these key individuals to develop as they negotiate the DATE. Recommended duties and responsibilities for the TA leaders in direct support field artillery battalions should include the following:

• Ensuring the TA platoon is deployed and functioning in accordance with the field artillery support plan.

• Ensuring the platoon elements receive proper administrative, logistical, and maintenance support.

• Coordinating higher-level maintenance support to facilitate mission requirements.

• Monitoring deployment of radar sections, survey teams, and meteorological sections; recommending general position areas, search areas, and cueing guidance to the S-2/S-3.

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• Facilitating maintenance support for TA radars, meteorological sections, and survey equipment.

• Monitoring the operations, status, and current and proposed locations of field artillery radars in zone.

• Managing implementation of radar zones in TA assets as directed by the radar deployment order published by the counterfire operations cell.

• Monitoring the terrain management plans for the positions of each section.

• Maintaining crosstalk between the section and the battalion.

• Establishing positions to best manage assets within the area of operations.

• Performing necessary tactical coordination for weapons-locating radars in the area of operations.

• Coordinating communications, security, air defense artillery, positioning (engineers and land clearance), logistics, and administration for assigned radars, survey teams, and meteorological sections, as required.

• Inspecting maintenance conducted by the platoon.

• Monitoring staff channels for related activities between the counterfire operations cell and target acquisition personnel.

• Performing other duties as directed by the headquarters and headquarters battery commander.

Observation 2

Title: Employing fire support at the company/troop level.

Description: Throughout the decisive action rotation, the rotational unit did an exceptional job employing their organic 120 mm mortar section. From the initial order, the unit integrated fire planning into their mission analysis and successfully executed all offensive and defensive missions/tasks. When properly employed, mortar sections are extremely effective in maintaining survivability against armored forces.

Discussion: During the offensive phase of the operation, the unit planned and executed targets that supported their surprise and tempo while they conducted a penetration out of their tactical assembly area. The result was the suppression or destruction of enemy forces while allowing them to continue with their mission without loss of combat power or tempo. During the defense, targets were planned in conjunction with emplaced obstacles to defeat enemy forces attempting to breach, as well as targets that allowed their forces to displace to alternate and subsequent battle positions. This resulted in the preservation of combat power throughout the fight, until adjacent unit positions were breached. The mortar section was extremely effective at displacing their mortar firing points after a set number of rounds had been fired, also maintaining survivability for their indirect fire assets. While the 120 mm mortars did not destroy many enemy

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vehicles, they did provide the unit the adequate time and space to reconsolidate and continue the fight.

Insights/Lessons: Units should continue to train on call-for-fire procedures and ensure they are conducted at the lowest levels. The ability of Soldiers to effectively adjust mortar fires proves to be a valuable skill during indirect fire engagements. This is especially important when operating with a limited number of forward observers to move with dismounted teams.

Observation 3

Title: Conducting fires battalion planning using “artillerized” intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

Description: The United States Army Field Artillery School’s “Fires Battalion Planning” White Paper from January 2010 serves as a great tool in assisting fires battalions in conducting IPB during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

Discussion: The publications Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, September 2011, and Field Manual (FM) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, December 2010 including Change 2, do an excellent job at outlining the key inputs, the processes, and the key outputs during the IPB process for maneuver units. However, the Fires Battalion Planning White Paper goes a step further and refines some of the IPB considerations to field artillery (FA) specific focus points and provides some useful techniques that have proven successful for many artillery units.

IPB during the mission analysis portion of MDMP drives a majority of remaining operational planning for the FA battalion. FM 2-01.3 states that the IPB process involves four steps: define the operational environment, describe the environmental effects on operations, evaluate the threat, and determine threat courses of action. The development of the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) assists in answering the first two of the four requirements in the IPB process and is arguably one of the most important tools the FA battalion requires to continue their planning effectively. FM 2-01.3 states “It is important that the MCOO be tailored to operational METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations] factors”, which are inherently different for an FA battalion than a maneuver battalion. Some of the considerations that must be addressed in the “artillerized” MCOO are: site to crest, intervening crests, cant issues, avenues of approach, and soil composition. Integrated IPB and MCOO development are essential to assist the FA battalion in its planning process.

Insights/Lessons: Continue to use the Fires Battalion Planning White Paper at the battalion level during MDMP. The techniques outlined in the White Paper are effective in helping the fires commander and staff conduct an integrated and thorough IPB. The techniques listed in the White Paper are proven and tested methods that can be put into Army techniques publications as part of the “Doctrine 2015” transition.

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Observation 4

Title: Conducting Firefinder radar planning and zone management.

Description: Planning and execution of radar zones to facilitate the maneuver commander’s force protection priorities is critical in the decisive action training environment (DATE).

Discussion: Firefinder radars are one of the primary means of locating enemy indirect fire systems. In order to effectively employ FA radars, the fire support officer (FSO) or counterfire officer must understand the technical characteristics of radars, how the radars acquire targets, and the technical requirements for radar employment.

FA target acquisition personnel on the brigade combat team staff must provide the technical expertise required to support radar employment planning by the controlling FA headquarters. They play an integral role in the MDMP, thus ensuring that radars are integrated into the operational plan. For the direct support FA battalion to provide responsive counterfire that supports the maneuver commander’s priorities for force protection, radar planning must be conducted within the MDMP.

Insights/Lessons: Units must review the newly released Army Techniques Publication 3-09.24, Techniques for the Fires Brigade, November 2012, and also Field Manual 3-09.12, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, June 2002, prior to conducting DATE or field training exercises to refresh or educate themselves on the proper planning, integration, and employment of Firefinder radars.

Properly planned, rehearsed, refined, verified and digitally executed radar zones can initiate prioritized counterfire during key times or events in the battle. During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, the FSO or counterfire officer must identify the key areas for coverage and identify likely enemy firing locations. The fires cell must make it a priority to integrate zone management for planning, allocation, approval, dissemination, and rehearsals into the overall planning process. Once zones are consolidated and approved, the FSO must incorporate them into the maneuver and fire support execution matrices or any other products used by the unit.

The fires cell, direct support battalion S-3/S-2, the task force fire support elements (FSEs), and the counterfire officer must all understand their roles in triggering, refinement, and verification of zones to match the scheme of maneuver. Verification of the unit or event location covered by the planned zones is critical to the success of the plan. Accordingly, the zones planned for the maneuver elements must be planned, verified, and triggered by the supported FSE. Radar employment, movement, triggers, and cueing schedules, must all be included in the fire support rehearsal, the FA technical rehearsal, the FA rehearsal (rock drill), and the combined arms rehearsal.

Observation 5

Title: Training the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) on employment of fires.

Description: The headquarters of the Department of the Army Mission Essential Task List (HQDA METL) No. 06-6-5066 “Employ Fires,” provides a guideline for the commander to use to train the FECC on employing fires. Units that train their FECCs on this METL task prior to

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decisive action training environment rotations can significantly improve their ability to deliver fires.

Discussion: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, August 2011, does a great job at defining employment of fires. However, HQDA METL No. 06-6-5066 “Employ Fires” lists out the key performance steps and measures the FECC needs to be proficient at before going into a collective training environment.

JP 3-0 defines “employ fires” as follows: “…to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various nonlethal ways and means (such as electronic attack) can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction.”

Training the employment of joint fires is a challenge because it requires two or more components to work together prior to a collective training event. There are performance steps and measures in the HQDA METL that the commander can use to determine whether the FECC is employing fires properly. Some of the key performance steps and measures listed in the HQDA METL No. 06-6-5066, “Employ Fires,” includes the following:

• FECC executing planned fire missions.

• FECC adjusting fires based on the commander’s guidance.

• FECC anticipating when the fire support coordinator will make recommendations, actions, or decisions.

• Processing target assessment.

Insights/Lessons: Units should review and continue to use the HQDA METL because it effectively outlines the performance steps and measures and allows the commander to determine and increase proficiency of the FECC’s ability to employ fires.

Observation 6

Title: Integrating brigade targeting and fires planning using synchronization meetings.

Description: Fire support can become desynchronized when units focus too heavily on dynamic targets and execute hasty instead of deliberate operations during their decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation. To mitigate this rotational trend in a dynamic training environment, staffs must consider and implement the discussion points and insights/lessons learned from previous rotational units.

Discussion: During a DATE rotation, the brigade staff should integrate lethal and non-lethal targeting with fire support planning into their operations processes by conducting daily target synchronization meetings to develop and refine their targeting efforts for the next 24 to 48 hours. This meeting synchronizes collection assets to support deep, close, and rear area operations and identifies targets that require additional non-organic assets to engage to shape the close fight for squadrons/battalions.

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Once formal planning begins for a transition to defense or counter-attack, the meeting provides the mechanism for the staff to develop targeting products that support combined arms maneuver. The staff conducts analysis and recommends to the commander the fire support plan with prioritized collection assets, field artillery, close air support, and close combat attack aircraft in support of the scheme of maneuver. Squadrons/battalions provide bottom up refinement for named areas of interest, observers, priority targets, and fire support control measures (FSCMs). Fire support and frequency modulated radio rehearsals are conducted before and after the combined arms rehearsal to exercise sensor-to-shooter linkages, FSCMs, and scheme of fires to ensure accomplishment of fire support tasks. During execution, the regiment/brigade level command post (CP) that has control of the fight must be able to communicate and coordinate fire support with maneuver elements, control movement and employment of organic and joint fires in accordance with an approved fire support plan, clear fires for both ground and air assets, receive and provide battle-damage assessments (BDA), and coordinate for higher level non-organic fires and collection assets.

Insights/Lessons: Adhere to battle rhythm meetings and avoid becoming overwhelmed by the current operations (CUOPs) fight. Targeting is both a CUOPs and future operations process; the staff will miss critical synchronization meetings and lose targeting momentum if these meetings are postponed or not conducted due to situations such as having units in contact. Avoid placing assets under the control of multiple regiment/brigade level CPs; this will de-synchronize the combined arms fight. Two or more CPs will have difficulty coordinating with each other to synchronize fires and collection assets in support of maneuver operations. When conducting centralized control of fires, organic cannon calls for fire and counterfire missions are coordinated through the CP that has the ability to clear fires for both ground and air assets, otherwise units run the risk of fratricide. This CP must also have visibility on movement of gun platoons and available cannon fire to support maneuver, which is battle tracked by the fires cell.

Utilize and follow fire support products such as the target synchronization matrix in order to avoid re-directed joint fires and collection platforms based on enemy contact that do not meet high-priority target (HPT) criteria. Engage enemy forces at the squadron/battalion level and below before re-tasking higher organic and joint fires assets. Ensure the CP in charge of the fight, receives BDA reports to assess effectiveness of fires on enemy HPTs. This information is critical to staff targeting analysis and planning for the next 24-48 hours.

Observation 7

Title: Developing and using tactical and technical triggers.

Description: Tactical and technical trigger development is vital in delivering timely and accurate fires in preplanned groups and series.

Discussion: Units are more successful when basing triggers on maneuver events or enemy actions rather than on time. It is also important to synchronize triggers during the wargaming process and during rehearsals. These actions help to avoid late fires or those placed on the wrong formations and that are not adjusted to support the desired effects as stated in the fire support tasks (FSTs).

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Triggers identified early in the planning process must be properly disseminated to observers, tied to primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, and adequately rehearsed to successfully execute planned, massed, and synchronized fires instead of just targets of opportunity.

Insights/Lessons: Fire support officers (FSOs) must rehearse triggers in detail to accurately display the amount of time required for the event to occur. Also, FSOs must ensure that observers are in position to provide battle damage assessment and understand the attack guidance matrix to refine the target locations or repeat missions in order to achieve the desired effects. This ensures the conditions have been met to allow commanders to continue to maneuver. Defensive triggers must be physically emplaced for redundancy and the commanders must understand what actions will trigger fires to be executed. Offensive triggers must be based on friendly movement in relation to the targets and execution of the FSTs.

Observation 8

Title: Developing effective observation plans.

Description: Fire support officers (FSOs) must develop and execute effective observation plans to support fire support tasks (FSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver.

Discussion: During the wargaming process, FSOs are challenged to synchronize observation plans with the scheme of maneuver. Three trends observed during DATE rotations include the following:

• Observation planning is seldom top-down driven, often resulting in plans that do not include trained observers with direct observations of the unit’s targets in support of FSTs.

• During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, terrain management tools are not used to identify observation post (OP) locations with line-of-sight to the target area.

• Fire support teams/combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) are not getting into position to acquire the enemy before becoming decisively engaged.

Insights/Lessons: During the wargaming process, FSOs must synchronize observation plans with the scheme of maneuver. To do this, staffs must conduct thorough terrain analyses and have an understanding of the enemy’s capabilities. FSOs must then provide top-down plans that are refined by subordinate units in conjunction with their commanders.

Field Manual 3-09.31, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, October 2002, states the major responsibility of the FSO includes coordinating with the S-2 and S-3 to assist in the development of the battalion observation plan, and plan for and supervise the execution of assigned and developed FSTs.

• FSOs must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver’s commander’s decision points and each FST.

• Consider using scouts, COLTs, or maneuver shooters as observers.

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• FSOs should identify requirements for OPs and include their locations in the fire support annex and also in the tasks to maneuver units of the base operation order.

Use terrain management tools to provide line-of-sight diagrams to observers relative to the targets they are responsible for. FSOs must synchronize the occupation of OPs with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process and rehearse the movement in detail to ensure the observers can occupy OPs prior to being decisively engaged.

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Appendix D



Movement and Maneuver Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Achieving fire superiority while allowing for reacting to contact, breaking contact, and continuing reconnaissance.

Description: According to Field Manual (FM) 3-21.94, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, April 2003, a dismounted reconnaissance team has the option to take one of four M240B 7.62 mm machineguns assigned to the platoon with them on a patrol/mission. The FM also outlines essential equipment for establishing observation posts (OPs). Crew served weapons or M249 5.56 mm light machineguns are among the listed items essential for establishing OPs; however, M249s are not actually provided to the recon platoon as part of their standard modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The platoon is manned to send out three separate four-man dismounted elements to observe three separate named areas of interest. Without sufficient numbers of M249s, the three dismounted teams must carry three of the platoon’s four heavier M240Bs, which slows movement and degrades the platoon’s mounted element some of its casualty-producing firepower.

Discussion: The scout platoon, whether conducting scout or alternative operations, does not have the ability to react to contact like an infantry or standard combat unit because of its lack of firepower. An infantry platoon has the ability to react to contact by laying down enough suppressive fire to achieve fire superiority, thus allowing the unit to choose whether or not to push the attack or break contact. A scout unit conducting reconnaissance operations is supposed to stay hidden, but maintain contact with enemy elements in order to give commanders real-time positions and movements of enemy forces on the battlefield. If a four-man scout team is compromised during a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrol or while occupying an OP, its main goal is to break contact because it does not have the ability to sustain a prolonged engagement.

A dismounted scout team will move in two- to four-man elements depending upon the mission. Those missions include R&S patrols as well as establishing OPs. They can also be tasked to conduct additional missions that are not related to scout operations, which may include establishing traffic control points, providing personnel security detachments, or conducting presence patrols inside of towns. Scout leaders want their elements to travel light to allow their teams to be able to move more quickly and break contact more easily if compromised. To that end, the scouts only carry M4 carbines and one M203 grenade launcher per team.

Insights/Lessons: Dismounted scout teams lack the firepower to effectively suppress enemy elements to allow for breaking contact and continuing reconnaissance. Scout leaders should integrate M249 light machineguns into their dismounted scout teams; squadron MTOEs should be adjusted to include three M249 light machine guns for each battalion recon platoon.

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Observation 2

Title: Supporting a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) with tanks.

Description: An organic Stryker company requires additional friendly armor to defend itself against a significant armored enemy force for any substantial period of time and retain combat power during a prolonged decisive action training environment.

Discussion: When confronted with enemy forces far superior to their organic anti-armor capabilities, SBCTs are challenged during both the offense and defense to significantly slow the forward momentum of replicated T-72, T-80, and BMP armored vehicles. The M2 .50 caliber machinegun and Mk19 grenade launcher mounted on M1126 infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs) are most effective against dismounted infantry or lightly skinned vehicles or structures and cannot be expected to cause any significant damage to enemy tanks. Though there are variants of the standard ball ammunition (i.e., saboted light armor penetrator, armor piercing incendiary, or armor piercing explosive rounds to name a few), enemy tanks are too heavily armored to expect the M2 to have any significant effect. Concurrently, the 40mm high explosive round from a Mk19 may destroy external optics and weapon systems on a tank, but the tank will still be able to return relatively accurate fire from its main gun using auxiliary sites — a significant problem for the lightly-skinned ICV.

As the most prevalent variant in an SBCT, ICVs must rely heavily upon the dismounted Javelin missile systems and to an extent, the M1128 Mobile Gun System (MGS) Stryker to repel armored threats. Though effective, Javelin teams are limited by the considerations addressed in Field Manual 3-21.11, The SBCT Rifle Company, January 2003, Appendix A: visibility and time-space factors. Visibility is often diminished by heavily wooded terrain that offers Javelin gunners limited time to identify targets and allow the proper lock-on by the missile system.

According to FM 3-21.11, Appendix B, “although the MGS has a limited armor killing capability, it should never be considered a tank. The intended purpose of the MGS is primarily to close with and destroy enemy infantry.” The MGS is capable of carrying 105mm high-explosive anti-tank and sabot rounds in order to defend itself against armored infantry vehicles. However, it is not designed to sustain a prolonged volley between T-72s or T-80s. The primary function of the MGS is to serve as an element to assist in the breaching of an obstacle or as a support by fire for mounted or dismounted infantrymen as they approach an objective or enemy obstacle. Once its position is compromised to a vehicle with greater armor and main gun caliber, an MGS must displace or risk destruction. The MGS is unable to survive even one main gun round strike from an enemy main battle tank (MBT).

Insights/Lessons: Each Stryker variant has its own specific purpose and capability. When forced through either planning or necessity to stray from that intended purpose, a Stryker unit may expect to endure heavier casualties. An SBCT must have a significant attachment of heavily armored friendly elements to ensure success against an enemy with tanks, regardless of type or main gun capability. One company/troop of armor should be attached to each squadron/battalion to provide the needed firepower to reduce enemy threats and retain significant combat power. Squadrons/battalions would then be able to integrate armor into the defense or offense, saving the Strykers and infantry for ground fights against enemy infantry.

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Observation 3

Title: Controlling troop-level direct fires while conducting aggressive reconnaissance.

Description: While conducting zone reconnaissance, a fratricide incident occurred between the headquarters section and an attached infantry platoon.

Discussion: While transitioning from zone reconnaissance to a screen in depth, the attached infantry platoon had displaced from its most recently reported position, but informed neither the commander nor its adjacent platoons of its new location. Upon 3rd Platoon’s visual contact with an enemy BRDM and the platoon leader’s subsequent description of the BRDM’s activity and location, the headquarters element engaged one of the attached friendly infantry carrier vehicles, mistaking it for the BRDM. Contributing to the cause was a lack of consistent reporting with the newly attached infantry platoon. The primary cause, however, was the lack of direct fire control measures being established and enforced during the troop’s aggressive reconnaissance. At platoon-level, direct fire control measures must be established to prevent friendly direct fire oriented on dismounted observation posts and vehicle hide positions. Also, troop commanders must establish direct fire control measures between the platoons and establish very clear named areas of interest and platoon boundaries.

Insights/Lessons: While direct fire planning and emplacement of direct fire control measures is more difficult while conducting movement than while stationary, the ever more likely occasion for confusion on the battlefield is all the more reason to establish effective and easily identified fire control measures. While easily identified target reference points are not always feasible given movement through complex terrain, Army doctrine provides various threat- and terrain-based fire control measures to prevent fratricide. Sometimes, the only reasonable direct fire control measure is an azimuth-based sector of fire, directed from the troop commander to the platoon leaders who then divide sectors amongst platoon weapon and observation platforms. Development of the situation requires refinement of these sectors of fire based on the present fields of fire. Often, to set the proper conditions for direct fire control, simple maneuver-focused graphic control measures keep friendly personnel, vehicle, and weapons platforms in the right place at the right time and provide situational awareness to friendly unit leaders. If executing aggressive zone reconnaissance (on the move), establishing directed weapon systems orientation and keeping friendly units relatively “on line” is a very basic method of direct fire control. Commanders and subordinate leaders should establish methods within their tactical standing operating procedures to better control direct fires and to better mass the effects of friendly fire on enemy forces.

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Appendix E



Protection Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Integrating short range air defense (SHORAD) artillery assets with the scheme of maneuver.

Description: As the Army shifts focus back to the decisive action training environment at the Army combat training centers, it is imperative that air defense officers regain proficiency at employing maneuver air defense assets to enhance the overall brigade scheme of maneuver and provide force protection. Common mistakes are made during all phases of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) cycle which subsequently result in executing air defense operations that fail to fully utilize the capabilities of the assets available, leave high value assets unprotected, or fail to protect maneuver formations from enemy air threats.

Discussion: During mission analysis, the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell must fully understand the SHORAD assets available, especially if the supporting air defense artillery (ADA) unit is a multi-national unit. This provides a complete understanding of capabilities and limitations. In addition, the ADAM cell will often not receive specified air defense tasks in the operation order (OPORD) from higher headquarters but will have many implied tasks that have to be identified, analyzed, and matched up to the assets available to conduct those missions. Mission analysis for air defense includes not just the maneuver forces but also radars, data link architecture, and early warning systems. The ADAM cell also has to spend time with the brigade S-2 identifying enemy air avenues of approach and the enemy air order of battle to determine what the most likely enemy air courses of action are. Without the proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products, the ADAM cell will move into course of action (COA) development without a clear understanding of how the enemy intends to utilize his aerial assets to achieve desired results.

After identifying how and where the enemy will likely use air assets, the ADAM cell can then begin to create a scheme of maneuver that synchronizes with the brigade’s ground scheme of maneuver. A key to employing SHORAD assets is to provide them the same level of detail and clear task and purpose as any other maneuver force. Simply giving a task to provide air defense will cause significant challenges during execution. Included among the numerous items to plan for are battle positions (primary, alternate, subsequent), sectors of fire, and displacement criteria. Additionally, if SHORAD assets are going to be task organized to subordinate units, then a clear command support relationship is required. If not, units will have confusion on logistical resupply, engagement request channels, and security.

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During wargaming, the ADAM cell can bring the air defense plan and have it tested against the red cell. It is paramount that the red cell fights with their aerial assets as realistically as possible. This should identify any potential shortfalls in the air defense plan and highlight any friction points that will cause the brigade to either request additional assets or point out any areas where the commander may have to assume risk.

Lastly, the ADAM cell must spell out everything they planned in the Annex E (Protection) portion of the brigade OPORD. This should include not just the active air defense measures but the passive ones as well.

Insights/Lessons:

• The brigade commander has to provide his priorities for air defense coverage.

• The ADA planner, in conjunction with the brigade S-2, has to do a thorough enemy aerial IPB during mission analysis.

• Mission analysis should encompass maneuver forces, radars, data link architecture, and early warning procedures.

• COA development has to provide clear task and purpose to subordinate units.

• Proper command support relationships should alleviate issues with communication, logistics, and tasking authority.

• The red cell or opposing forces should utilize aerial assets during wargaming to test the air defense plan.

• OPORD, Annex E (Protection), spells out both the active air defense and the passive air defense measures.

Observation 2

Title: Tying reinforcing obstacles into existing obstacles in support of engagement areas.

Description: During the defense, the observed squadron conducted an area defense to block enemy mechanized forces from using a specific direction of attack. After conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield and determining the enemy’s most probable courses of action, engagement areas were established where the enemy would be destroyed. To support these engagement areas, the squadron and its attached engineer support dug tank ditches and emplaced several hundred meters of mine and wire obstacles with the intent of turning attacking forces into established engagement areas.

Discussion: The maneuver unit had a clear understanding of desired engagement area and obstacle effect to turn the enemy mechanized forces to provide flank shots for anti-tank (AT) systems. However, the reinforcing mine and wire obstacles and anti-tank ditches were not tied in to impassable or severely restricted terrain. This allowed enemy forces to bypass the obstacles and avoid the engagement areas by utilizing logging trails and forested areas with more than three meters between trees. Utilizing these covered and concealed routes, enemy forces were able to mass on friendly battle positions and achieve penetration of the squadron defense.

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Insights/Lessons: After issuing operations orders, units must conduct reconnaissance to confirm or deny the applicability of their plans, to include proposed engagement areas. During preparation and priorities of work, commanders and key staff should physically inspect preparations to include siting of obstacles. If it is not possible to tie reinforcing obstacles into natural obstacles or severely restricted terrain, the obstacle or maneuver plan must incorporate other methods to force the enemy into the desired engagement areas. Against mechanized threats, this can include dismounted AT ambushes against smaller maneuver corridors, emplacing hoax minefields, or other deception methods.

Observation 3

Title: Providing training and external augmentation to bolster aviation expertise at the brigade level.

Description: Additional training is available to increase resident aviation expertise particularly if brigade aviation elements (BAEs) are not fully manned. Additionally, aviation liaison officer (LNO) teams can assist in providing the necessary aviation specific knowledge for planning and coordination.

Discussion: According to Training Circular (TC) 1-400, The Brigade Aviation Element Handbook, April 2006, the BAE is a “…planning and coordination cell whose major function is to incorporate aviation into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver.” The BAE focuses on providing employment advice and initial planning for aviation missions, unmanned aircraft systems, airspace planning and coordination, and synchronization with the air liaison officer and the effects coordinator. The BAE also coordinates directly with the aviation brigade or the supporting aviation task force (TF) for detailed mission planning. The BAE accomplishes these core responsibilities through “…close coordination with the S-3, commander and staff.” While the members of the BAE are permanent members of the staff, aviation LNO teams, who represent the supporting aviation TF at a designated maneuver headquarters, can perform the necessary critical tasks required for proper integration of aviation in order to maximize their effects in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.

Insights/Lessons: Every effort should be made to train the available personnel on BAE-specific duties and responsibilities through the myriad of courses available. Resourcing the available courses becomes more critical with any shortages to authorized aviation personnel within the BAE and/or in anticipation of increased operational tempo. If non-aviation personnel are assuming the role(s) of the BAE, it is imperative that they receive the respective courses as resources are available. Aviation LNO teams should be requested and appropriately staffed, even if only for specific operations, particularly if the authorized BAE is not fully manned and/or the appropriate personnel are not adequately trained. Effective employment of properly trained aviation personnel and/or LNOs is imperative for coordination and synchronization between the brigade and the supporting aviation TF. Other implications include the following:

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• Training: BAE personnel, or those filling the role, should attend the Air Defense Airspace Management/BAE Course at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the Joint Firepower Course at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Joint Targeting School; the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course; the Joint Personnel and Recovery Agency (JPRA) personnel recovery courses 101 and 301; or the Joint Air Tasking Order Process Course (JATOPC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

• Personnel: Maintain BAE personnel as a priority aviation fill due to branch-specific subject-matter expertise requirements not otherwise present in brigade-level staffs. If resident aviation subject-matter experts are unavailable, the staff should request LNO augmentation from the supporting aviation TF.

Observation 4

Title: Manning and equipping brigade aviation elements (BAE) for the decisive action training environment (DATE).

Description: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) that are preparing for DATE rotations must resource the BAEs with the proper equipment and trained personnel.

Discussion: In accordance with TC 1-400, The Brigade Aviation Element Handbook, April 2006, the BAE will be task organized and resourced to enable the BCT to maintain 24 hour synchronized aviation operations and conduct airspace command and control while operating with multiple command posts such as tactical command posts (TAC), tactical operations centers (TOCs), and mobile command groups. Unit BAEs must be task organized and resourced with staffs to include the following personnel:

• One aviation branch major.

• One aviation branch captain.

• One aviation branch chief warrant officer three (CW3), tactical operations (TACOPS).

• One aviation operations (15P) sergeant first class.

• One (15P) staff sergeant.

• One (15P) specialist.

The current modified table of organization and equipment includes the additional manning of one unmanned aircraft system(UAS) warrant officer (150), and one air traffic control operator staff sergeant (15Q). With an integrated and resourced BAE, units would greatly improve their overall capability to function as a synchronized aviation operation during planning and targeting working groups. The aviation major and captain are both key personnel required to sustain 24-hour operations while operating two command posts to provide valuable insight to the BCT commander on aviation operations and planning. In the event of a shortage of the aviation branch major or captain, the TACOPS or UAS warrant officer can provide valuable input and synchronization to the aviation, targeting, and collection working groups. A qualified personnel recovery officer or TACOPS warrant greatly enhances the BCT in the pre-mobilization and deployment training and will prepare the BCT for any personnel recovery mission

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The TOC and the TAC must be resourced with the essential equipment to include two Air and Missile Defense Workstations (AMDWS) and two Tactical Airspace Integration Systems (TAISs). Both systems are essential for proper clearing of air space for fire missions and other air traffic. Units that are not properly resourced with two TAIS and two AMDWS systems can use other systems such as a secure Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) laptop and a Raven UAS laptop with the FALCON View program to identify restricted operating zones and air corridors. This is generally insufficient to maintain a constant air picture and maintain situational awareness, but the 15P aviation operator can clear air and talk to aircraft with frequency-modulated radio communication while monitoring the stale picture on the FALCON View system. This is commendable when the battle is in a lull. However, when operations require multitasking with the use of multiple aircraft and fire missions, having adequate resources utilizing the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) such as TAIS and AMDWS will greatly enhance the aviation synchronization operations at the TOC and the TAC.

Insights/Lessons: BCTs should exhaust all efforts to increase the BAE staff to full operating capability well before a deployment or any large exercise such as a DATE rotation. BAE personnel would greatly benefit from the specialized training offered to BAE elements, such as the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM)/BAE course at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The course offers a robust training atmosphere that studies the ADAM/BAE roles and responsibilities and the many systems the ADAM/BAE uses to enable BCTs in operational synchronization and integration. Resourcing the ADAM/BAE with two TAIS and two AMDWS systems greatly enhances the split operations of the ADAM/BAE affording the brigade aviation officer (BAO) the opportunity to properly advise the BCT commander, have a constant air picture, maintain situational awareness, remain connected, and attain a fully functional system with the TOC. Other implications include the following:

• Training: Units should send personnel to attend the ADAM/BAE course at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Require at least one of each key training slot to be filled at all times (i.e., BAO, ADAM officer in charge, TACOPS/Personnel Recovery Officer, Aviation and ADAM noncommissioned officer-in-charge).

• Materiel: Units should add redundant TAIS and AMDWS in the ADAM/BAE cells.

• Leadership: Require that prior to assignment to BAE positions, all personnel attend the ADAM/BAE course.

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Appendix F



Sustainment Focus Observations

Observation 1

Title: Task organizing to effectively execute sustainment operations in Stryker units.

Description: After 12 years of continued conflict and multiple deployments to counterinsurgency environments, units have begun to lose their institutional knowledge on conducting logistics operations in decisive action training environments (DATE). Stryker organizations, which were designed to have an austere combat service support (CSS) footprint, require even more thought and planning for their sustainment operations. Units must train to conduct logistics operations with the task organization they will have when operating at a combat training center (CTC) if they anticipate executing logistics successfully.

Discussion: Field Manual 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion, April 2003, states, “due to the nature of the battalion’s capabilities, the CSS structure is purposefully austere to increase force mobility.” The Stryker squadron is manned to field a combat trains command post (CTCP), which consists of the unit’s S-4, S-1, combat repair team attached from the regimental support squadron (RSS) and squadron aid station (SAS). The organization of a traditional field trains command post (FTCP) does not exist in the doctrine. Instead, the headquarters and headquarters troop commander and his headquarters element provide the squadron with direct interface with the RSS by locating inside the regimental support area. The FTCP is rounded out with the addition of the troop supply sections.

Recent rotational units have task organized a logistics element that consisted of three fuelers, two heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wreckers and four HEMTT load handling systems from the RSS to the squadron to serve as the logistical support team (LST) for the squadron during their CTC rotation. The squadron then dedicated three Stryker infantry carrier vehicles to serve as a security element for the LST. That element proved to be inadequate to execute logistics packages for the entire squadron as well as execute additional emergency Class IV and V resupplies and recovery operations. If LSTs are task organized down to the squadron level, they will require enough assets to adequately move and support the squadron with Class III, IV, V, and IX as well as recovery assets over a large, complex area of operations. The LST should be able to maneuver as two separate elements in order to execute multiple tasks simultaneously.

Units must also consider an elements ability to secure itself when considering task organization for executing logistics operations. When operating in a DATE with a hybrid threat, units must ensure that every element within their formation can secure itself. In some cases, that may mean task organizing a combat platoon to secure the CTCP, which generally doesn’t have any combat arms Soldiers but contains most of the squadron’s support assets and SAS.

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Insights/Lessons: As units prepare to execute a CTC rotation, they must evaluate the environment they are entering and task organize their elements to effectively execute logistics in that environment. Units must ensure that their logistics elements are capable of executing all the tasks they will receive as well as secure themselves and move independently. Units should exercise their task organized logistics elements during training exercises prior to training at a CTC. The CTC should be used to validate their previous training.

Observation 2

Title: Standardizing battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) and recovery operations.

Description: Mechanics and recovery operators must have the proper information to conduct timely and efficient battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) and recovery operations. Units must utilize standardized recovery reports.

Discussion: Recovery operations should be coordinated with the squadron/battalion maintenance managers and should be conducted in accordance with the commander’s priorities. There should be a specified timeline that enforces recovery decisions based on the amount of time operators spend attempting self-recovery or BDAR. If the timeline or the capabilities are exceeded, the site that requires recovery must send a recovery request containing the proper information through the administrative/logistics operations center and finally to the mechanics and wrecker operators. The maintenance team needs accurate information regarding the type of equipment, description of damage, and action required to improve response times, reduce excess time spent on the site, or provide the ability to successfully execute additional missions.

Insights/lessons: Battalions must develop standardized recovery request formats to give maintenance teams and commanders clearer pictures of situations and what is required to perform recoveries. The recovery reports should, at a minimum, provide the following information:

• Equipment identification.

• Location (grid coordinates).

• Detailed equipment fault/level of immobility (mire factor).

• Evaluation of on-site repair capability.

• Tactical situation.

• Security measures/recommended route of approach.

The use of standardized formats developed by the maintenance personnel, S-4, and commander helps expedite recovery operations and allows more flexibility during tactical operations.

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Observation 3

Title: Accounting for fuel issue and receipt of petroleum products.

Description: During decisive action training environment rotations, squadrons/battalions must properly account for fuel issued or received during tactical refueling operations.

Discussion: With the ever increasing budget constraints on the U.S. Army, the Command Supply Discipline Program (CDSP) should be a high priority for leaders at all levels. CDSP applies to all classes of supply, and is not optional during training events regardless of the importance of the training or the units operational tempo. During field exercises, units must utilize the Department of the Army (DA) Form 3643, Daily Issue of Petroleum Products, to account for daily issues and receipts of JP8 fuel. The DA 3643 was developed so a unit can accurately account for fuel, forecast requirements, and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Lack of proper accounting can result in inaccurate usage reports to higher echelons of support. Without utilizing a DA 3643, there is no way to accurately prepare the DA Form 3644, Monthly Abstract of Issues of Petroleum Products and Operating Supplies, which report a unit’s monthly fuel consumption rate. In addition to fiscal responsibility, proper fuel accountability is vital to accurately forecasting requirements for future combat operations.

Insights/Lessons: Field Manual 10-67-1, Concepts and Equipment of Petroleum Operations, April 1998, defines how fuel is accounted for on the battlefield. The information collected feeds the S-4’s running estimates and ensures enough fuel is on hand for contingency operations and planning. Using this doctrinal method to account for petroleum products ensures compliance with Army standards and prevents mishandling of government supplies.

Observation 4

Title: Maintaining a logistics common operating picture (LOGCOP) through accurate sustainment reporting.

Description: The importance of overcoming the challenges associated with obtaining and maintaining a current LOGCOP has a major impact on future mission planning.

Discussion: Inaccurate and late logistics status reporting from subordinate units can cause mission planners at the brigade/regimental level to speculate on their logistics posture during the military decisionmaking process. The end result is commanders making uninformed decisions based on incomplete information available at the time of course of action approval. In order for a unit in combat to retain and exploit the initiative, it is vital for sustainment planners at all levels to accurately determine what their unit’s current LOGCOP is, and what their future logistics requirements will be.

Insights/Lessons: The best platform for maintaining a current LOGCOP is the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3). The BCS3 is best used on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) while executing fast-moving operations in an expeditionary environment. Communications between the regimental support operations officer, regimental S-4, and the regimental logistics planner must be maintained at all times. All three must have a good understanding of their current LOGCOP.

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Sustainers should conduct daily face-to-face logistics synchronization meetings. These meetings produce the best up-to-date unit-level LOGCOP information possible. In turn, this information enables the planners in the regimental staff to have a clear situational understanding of their logistics posture to use for future mission planning purposes.

Suggestions for success during future decisive action rotations includes the following:

• Validate unit reporting standing operating procedures, reporting battle rhythms, and primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans before the beginning of training rotations.

• Use BCS3 as the primary method for logistics reporting.

• When rapid movement on the battlefield is anticipated, look at co-locating the BCS3 with very small aperture terminals (VSATs) as a short-term method for BCS3 communication until NIPRNET connectivity is established.

• Incorporate face to face logistics synchronization meetings into the daily battle rhythm.

Observation 5

Title: Processes for casualty reporting and personnel accountability.

Description: Accurate and timely casualty reporting has an important impact on future mission planning.

Discussion: The accuracy and timeliness of the casualty packet submission from subordinate units to the regimental or brigade-level S-1 is a critical component of casualty management. Leaders at all levels must know and understand their roles, duties, and responsibilities, and how they impact the unit’s personnel accountability and replacement process. Commanders and staffs make decisions based on unit-level strengths and capabilities. Casualty reporting timeliness and accuracy is extremely important, and must be managed efficiently and thoroughly. Most importantly, poor casualty reporting can have a negative effect on the next-of-kin (NOK) notification process. The recorded information facilitates NOK notification, casualty assistance, casualty tracking and status updates, and provides the basis for historical and statistical reports.

Insights/Lessons: One major lesson learned during the decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation was the importance of timely and accurate reporting from the subordinate company/troop level, all the way up to the regimental S-1. Units engaged in combat operations in an expeditionary environment must have a full understanding of the casualty management process. Strength reporting has a direct impact on the brigade or regimental staff’s ability to have a clear situational understanding of their operational capabilities. Unit-level casualty operations standing operating procedures (SOP) should cover the management of collecting, recording, reporting, verifying, and processing of casualty information from the unit-level to Headquarters, Department of the Army. Communication and dissemination of unit strength reports is essential in keeping planners and commanders informed on their current manning posture.

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Suggestions for success at future DATE rotations include the following:

• Validate casualty reporting SOPs, reporting requirements, and primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans before beginning a training rotation.

• Conduct training on the casualty reporting process at every level before deployment to a combat training center exercise.

• Have battle drills designed and rehearsed for executing and reporting on mass casualty situations.

Observation 6

Title: Planning, organizing, and rehearsing medical operations.

Description: Brigade or regimental medical planning to facilitate the movement of the wounded from the point of injury to the nearest medical treatment facility is vital for the success of any unit engaged in combat operations. This includes the execution of ground or air medical evacutions (MEDEVACs)/casualty evacuations (CASEVACs). The purpose of a unit’s medical common operating picture (MEDCOP) is to track the location, capability, and medical assets of all treatment facilities across the unit’s area of operation.

Discussion: A critical function of a unit’s surgeon cell is to obtain and maintain an updated MEDCOP. This gives the unit’s medical planners situational awareness required for planning and course of action development. One method to ensure information is being received and understood throughout the entire unit is through the conduct of routine medical synchronization meetings. Additionally, the brigade or regimental surgeon cell must ensure that rehearsals of the medical evacuation plan are conducted and are to standard. These rehearsals should start from the lowest level of medical care to a medical treatment facility with the required definitive care. The ultimate goal is to keep all medical planning on the same operating picture.

Insights/Lessons: To ensure mission success, a brigade or regimental surgeon cell must make it a priority to keep the MEDCOP updated. Equally as important, they should make this information easily accessible to its subordinate squadron or battalion medical planners. In turn, subordinate units must use the same MEDCOP for their planning and rehearsals purposes.

Properly planned, resourced, and executed, medical evacuation rehearsals, focusing from the point of injury through the entire evacuation process will allow all medical planners and leaders to identify conflicts, constraints, or limitations in their plans.

Routinely conducted medical synchronization meetings allow the brigade or regimental surgeon cell, medical support operations officer, and the medical planners at the squadron- or battalion-level to be involved in the planning process.

Conducting medical evacuation battle drills on the current operations floor creates a continuity of proficiency that ensures that all vital steps in the evacuation process are completed.

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Observation 7

Title: Planning air MEDEVAC and CASEVAC.

Description: In decisive action environments, air MEDEVAC and CASEVAC operations must be thoroughly planned and communicated down to the lowest unit levels.

Discussion: MEDEVAC is the timely, efficient movement and en route care by medical personnel of the wounded, injured, or ill persons from the battlefield and/or other locations to medical treatment facilities. The provision of en route care on medically equipped vehicles or aircraft enhances the patient’s potential for recovery and may reduce long-term disability by maintaining the patient’s medical condition in a more stable manner. CASEVAC is a term used by nonmedical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft. Patients do not receive medical care.

During decisive action operations, casualties may mount and lines of communications become extended, necessitating increased use of aviation assets to conduct CASEVAC. When responding to such requests, tasked aircrews must understand comprehensive CASEVAC plans to transport casualties to higher levels of care. Aircrews must be aware of any existing casualty collection points and locations of ambulance exchange points and battalion aid stations. Ground units must communicate situations where landing locations may not be secure or within enemy direct fire range and they must ensure that pick-up zones are large enough to land the various helicopter CASEVAC/MEDEVAC platforms.

Insights/Lessons: CASEVAC and MEDEVAC planning is a brigade/regimental level task as described in Field Manual (FM) 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, July 2009 including change 2, paragraph 4-43. The regiment must ensure that the plan is disseminated to supporting units. If air CASEVAC or MEDEVAC is required, casualties must be moved to locations suitable for aircraft. The air ambulance evacuates Priority I, URGENT patients from as far forward as possible (FM 4-02.2, paragraph 4-39). When using aviation, some considerations include proximity to the enemy and size of the landing area. In contrast to counterinsurgency operations, when conducting decisive action during unified land operations, the least preferred method of air CASEVAC/MEDEVAC is directly responding to the point of injury. This puts aircrews and aircraft at extremely high vulnerability to shoot-down risks. See also FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, April 2000.

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