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Left Wing Extremismin India:Context, Implicationsand Response Options

Manekshaw PaPer no. 9, 2009

in association with

KONWLEDGE WORLD

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

New Delhi

Centre for Land Warfare Studies

New Delhi

G D Bi

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies

T Ct fo Ld wf studi (CLaws), n Dli, i utoomou ti-t dlig

it tiol cuity d cocptul pct of ld f, icludig covtiol d ub-

conventional conict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and

policy oitd i ppoc.

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2009, Ct fo Ld wf studi (CLaws), n Dli

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KNOWLEDGE WORLD

Editorial Teamedito-i-Cif : Big Gumt kl (rtd)

Mgig edito : D n Mo

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Contents

1. Summary of Findings 5

2. Introduction 7

3. Demographic Drivers of Internal Security 10

4. The Tribal Nature of LWE 12

5. The Tribal Dimension of Insurgency in South Asia 146. History of Tribal Rebellions in India 16

7. Brief Historical Overview of Naxalite Violence 21

8. Present Strengths and Organisation of LWE 24

9. Incident Analysis and Operational Trends 26

10. The Time Dimension: Indias Three Front Scenario 31

11. Government Response so Far 32

12. Response Options: Use of Army 3414. Conclusion 41

15. References 43

Tables and Figures

Table 1 Tactical Exchange Rate/Casualty Ration between Police/CPOs

and Left Wing Insurgents 9

Table 2 Core Insurgency Area Analysis 10

Table 3 Comparative Evaluation of Development Indices of ST/SC 20

Table 4 Spatial Growth of LWE 2001-2008 22

Table 5 Casualty Ratio 23

Fig 1 Demographic Dimensions of Internal Security 11

Fig 2 Organisational Structure of CPI (Maoists) 26

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LeFT wInG exTreMIsM In InDIa

Summary of Findings

Lft ig tmim (Lwe) i pimily tibl iugcy. Oly12

p ct of t Idi tibl popultio liv i t nott. T

nott tibl iugci d bo out i 1956 d yt

to b fully olvd. T v tid do to to i diviio of

t Idi amy d ug umb of pmility d polic foc.

a bllio by 85 p ct of t Idi tibl popultio tt liv

i t ctl Idi tld, tfo, vy iou cuity

implictio.

wt m t Lwe pticully ditubig i it coltio it

t dmogpic yout bulg i t gl Idi popultio. Ti

ill tlt ito t d fo gtig billio job by 2026. If tIdi tt fil to do o, t idpd umploymt could ld

to a serious internal security situation. LWE is its rst manifestation.

T Moit idology i t m ti tibl iugcy pticully

dgou d lily to bidg t ul-ub fultli. It po

tt ot jut to Idi cc to it mil ouc but to Idi

libl d dmoctic polity per se.

Idi i i dgou to-fot ttgic itutio. Itl cuity i

ft bcomig it Tid Fot. kpig i vi Ci iig po,

Idi limitd tim oizo i ic to dd ti itl

cuity dimio i ioltio. It ill oti v to dl it it i

tdm it tl tt.

T dv culty tio i polic-nl optio igligt t fct

tt iugci bt tcld by mility foc tt tid

d tuctud fo ti ol.

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a co t bod pmilititio of t polic foc i ot

poibl o dibl. It ill t ov dcd of itiv tiig

d tuctuig d till ot dliv optiml ult. no i t

old i iugcy big tcld by t polic.

Iugcy cll fo mility po d o ill v to b

iititd t om tg. T Idi tio-tt i pd fo tim.

w mut top tig ouc i tyig to pmiliti t polic

d Ctl rv Polic Foc (CrPF).

If the army/RR (Rashtriya Ries) has to be involved, this must not be

dlyd y fut. w could bgi by offiv p i 2009 (i

pt of Optio stpl C I).

If tt do ot giv dciiv tbc to Lwe, Idi ill v o optio

but to i to to t dditiol my diviio/rr fomtio i

compd tim-fm fo focful d pupoiv po.

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Left Wing Extremism in India:Context, Implications and

Response Options

Introduction

Idi tody do ot fc y ittil tt fom tl ouc. ayfuture conict with China or Pakistan is likely to be a limited one under

coditio of ucl ymmty. Idi, ov, do fc ittil

tt fom ot of itl to. T g fom fctuig of

t Idi polity tt could ult fom cctutio of idtity-bd

politic, to t ymmtic ult lucd by t jehadi tanzeems idd

d bttd by t It-svic Itlligc (IsI) of Pit. a filu of

t tio-tt to gt dqut mploymt fo t ug youtfulpopultio (tt i ult of t dmogpic yout bulg) ould gt

mjo ocil tio. Ti dmogpic bulg, i tu, could gt

mjo ul-ub fultli i Idi. T pimy mifttio of ti tody

i i t lft ig tmim (Lwe) tt i pig toug t tibl

gio of ctl d piul Idi. nlim d ttd gi

bllio by t stl tibl of nlbi i wt Bgl i t y

1967. rutl ttmpt by t tt to tmp it out v fild t

tt ibitd lc of politicl ill to ffct gi fom. Ti

iugcy ufcd i t 1980 it t i of t Popl w Goup

(PwG) d Moit Commuit Ct (MCC). I 2004, t PwG d MCC

mgd to fom t Commuit Pty of Idi (Moit). Ti giv

p-Idi oittio to Lwe. T ptil got of Lwe tft

b dmtic d lmig. Lg cl diplcmt of tibl popultio

by mjo ydo-lctic pojct d tiv miig i jugl ld

to t tid p of Lwe. Fom jut i tt d 53 ditict i 2001, it

i viouly timtd to v ffctd om 203 to 252 ditict i 18 tt.

Of ti, t co of t iugcy i focud i Cttig (abujm

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region) and Jharkhand, with signicant activity levels in Bihar, Andhra

Pd, Mt d Oi. wt i bcomig cu fo lm i t

dv tcticl cg t o cully tio bt t polic/ctl

polic ogitio (CPO) d t nl. Ti d gd bt ot

vy uig 1:1.4 to 1:2 bt 1999 d 2006. hov, i t y

2007 d 2008, ti tio bcom mo dv d tiltd i fvou of

t lft ig iugt. T Moit o tlig of rd Coido (o

Compct rvolutioy Zo) tt ttc fom Pupti i npl to

Tiupti i sout Idi. Tibl m tul guill. Oly 12 pct of

Idi tibl popultio liv i t nott. Ti d voltd i 1956

d tid do om 2 to 6 diviio of t Idi amy d t tim ttnumber of police and paramilitary forces. Eighty-ve percent of the Indian

tibl popultio liv i ctl d piul Idi. It i ti ic i o

i vyig tg of bllio. T itl cuity implictio of ti

ptt d obviou. Uli t li iugci i t nott d t

toit movmt i Pujb d Jmmu d kmi (J&k), ti i ot

imld iugcy but tld bllio. T Idi amy obviouly

i ot to itv bcu ti ill d it f y fom tbod it i uppod to gud. T y iu i: c (o ould )

militi ou polic foc to qull ti iugcy? T tgt of t

Idi tt polic foc b id by 300,000 i t pt f y. It

go up fom 1.3 millio to 1.6 millio. T Ctl rv Polic Foc

(CrPF) i iig 10 Combt Bttlio rolut actio (COBra) bttlio

to combt ti mc. so f, ov, t culty tio bt t

polic d iugt b cu fo coc. T old ov, mi mployd to tcl iugci. Militiig t ti polic foc

ould t 8 to 10 y it t itig tiig iftuctu. would it

b cot-ffctiv o v poibl to i t tcticl ill of ll t tt

polic foc to v bl mility lvl? Quit obviouly, tfo,

t ad Pd Gyoud modl of lit, pcilid polic foc

i t obviou olutio. It od ll i ad Pd. C t

ad modl b plictd i Cttig d Jd? T outloo

m t pimitic t tt of od iftuctu i muc poo

i t to tt. a btt od commuictio to i ad

Pd d bld t polic to gi t upp d. Ufotutly, t

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polic ldip i Cttig d Jd b focuig mo

upo iig t gl lvl of tiig of t ti polic foc t o

ctig lit foc o t ad modl. Cout-iugcy (CI) tiig

d optio ttd vitul puimt potig/igmt d

t tt of mol d motivtio of t tt polic foc i poo.

a ic of pu by t Gyoud i ad Pd mly

pud t lft ig dalams ito t igbouig tt of Jd d

Oi. T y pmt to b cloly tcd i t tcticl cg

t o t culty tio bt t polic d t lft ig iugt.

Ti i o bcomig cu fo coc. sould ti dtiot fut,

we may have to consider a genuine paramilitarisation of the conict i.e.intervention by the Rashtriya Ries (RR) or Assam Ries (AR). Alternatively,

my v to coid o-tim pt of Optio stpl C

(my itc povidd to ti-nl optio i wt Bgl i 1971).

T pim of coc t co Lwe ffctd tt of Cttig

d Jd. Tbl 1 d 2 igligt t c of t poblm.

Table 1: Tactical Exchange Rate/Casualty Ratio between Police/CPOs and Left Wing Insurgents

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Polic/CPO

Culti

98 125 100 105 100 153 157 236 175

Lft wig

Iugt

254 182 141 211 87 255 274 141 137

rtio 1:1.6 1:1.4 1:1.4 1:2 1:0.8 1:1.6 1:1.6 1:0.6 1:0.7

Source: etctd fom Miity of hom affi sttu Pp o Itl scuity,3 sptmb 2008. Dt compild till 31 augut 2008.

a idl cuity foc to iugt culty tio tt i idictiv of

uccful CI cmpig i 1:5 o 6. T polic-lft ig iugt culty tio

, tu, b ub-optiml tougout. Ti i du to t idpd u

of impovid ploiv dvic (IeD)/ldmi by t lft ig iugt.

hov, t i cu fo iou coc i t dv culty tio

tt occud i t y 2007 d 2008 t cg t tiltd

clly i fvou of t iugt. Tt ti ppd dpit t miv

ffot t tiig, quippig d moditio of t polic foc oly

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cctut t lvl of coc. It clly igligt tt polic foc

ot optimlly uitd fo offiv cout-iugcy optio.

Table 2: Core Insurgency Area AnalysisState No. of Casualties

2005 2006 2007

Cttig 168 388 369

Jd 119 124 157

Bi 96 45 67

ad Pd 208 47 45

Mt 53 42 25

Oi 14 9 17

Source: etctd fom Miity of hom affi aul rpot 2007-08.

Tbl 2 clly igligt t gogpicl Lwe i bcomig

cu fo iou coc. It i ototy tt culti v com do

i ad Pd fom 208 i 2005 to 45 i 2007. Ti i idictiv of t

operational efcacy of the Greyhounds model. The prime states of concern,

ov, Cttig d Jd culti du to Lwe vb iig tdily ic 2005. I 2007, t igt culti i Cttig

(369) d t i Jd (157). T Cttig abujm/Ddy

i t co of Lwe d b cld libtd zo by t iugt.

Demographic Drivers of Internal Security

O of t y div of t tiol cuity poc i t pct of

dmogpic got. Ufotutly, o f, cuity lyt v giv it

miiml tttio. Idi popultio td t 1.1 billio tody; 62.9 pct

of ti compi t oig g goup. By 2026, Idi popultio ould

v ovt tt of Ci d ould td t 1.4 billio. Of ti, 68.4

pct ould b i t oig g goup. Ti tlt ito d fo

ctig o billio job. Filu to ct ti ug umb of job could

ld to lg cl umploymt d coqut iou itl itbility.

hitoiclly, uc yout bulg v ivibly pcdd t ot of bloody

volutio. Idi got toy o f b lopidd. Idi got

not been inclusive and has largely beneted some 300 million urban middle

cl. T ticl do ffct ot b viibl o f. Ti lft om

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800 millio popl i tg of md ltiv dpivtio. Idi ct

coomic vivl ctd t micl of jobl got. T doizig

d utomtio mantra bood by ou iduty by multig t bt

pctic of t wt. Ufotutly, ti lopidd got do ot t ito

ccout Idi dmogpic tuctu, d if ot coctd, could ld to

itl cuity dit.

Fig 1: Rural-Urban Faultline?

Demographic Dimensions of Internal Security

T i it dbt mogt dmogp bout t impct of ti

dmogpic yout dividd. hvd dmogp Dvid Bloom, i i

pp titld Dmogpic Titio d ecoomic Micl i emgig

ai d lyd t mbl popultio td tt d coicidd

it et ai coomic boom tt occud bt 19502000. Ti

d ultd fom yout dividd tt tud um cpitl ito t

t t Mltui libility. Ti t, ov, ultd fom t

pop illig d ductio of t popultio. Litcy lvl d i

dmticlly i sout ko, sigpo d Ti. Ti d cd t

ill lvl of t popultio potilly. L gyig popultio mt

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l pctg of tiol icom big pt o t ocil lf cot of

dpdt popultio. Ti ld to ig t of vig d ti i itlf

pud coomic got. hov, i i boo (Imagining India: Ideas for a

New Century), nd nili igligtd tt oly illd popultio

c tlt ito um cpitl, itd of coomic libility. a miv

unskilled and unemployed population with a youthful prole could prove to

b dmogpic tim-bomb itd of povidig dmogpic dividd.

T biggt cllg Idi fc tody i to duct d quip it youtful

popultio it t quiit ill fo poductiv mploymt. Filu to

gt t ill d ct t lvl of mploymt quid could

ld to iou itl cuity poblm. Ti itl cuity icbg imiftig itlf tody Lwe, d iig tid of fticim bd o idtity

m li ligiou, ct d ub-giol idtiti. Lwe, ov, i

pobbly it mot pig d iou mifttio tt i ctig log d

omiou do upo ou collctiv futu.

Ti could tlt ito ul-ub fultli of dgou dimio.

The rst manifestation of this faultline in India has taken the form of LWE.

The Tribal Nature of LWE

Dpit t citicl ldip d idologicl guidc povidd by t

committd ub yout, Lwe tody lgly mi tibl pomo. a

lyi of it ptil d gogpicl pd clly igligt it coltio

it Idi fot cov d tibl ditict boudi. It i t tibl tu

of ti movmt tt compoud t itl cuity tt pottil of

ti iugcy. Idi 533 tib, compiig popultio of om 88.3

millio. Ti cotitut om 8.6 pct of Idi ovll popultio d

pimily ibit Idi fot tct. a tudy of t gogpicl ditibutio

of ti popultio pt om ittig iigt:

85 pct of ou scduld Tib (sT) popultio id i t

fotd tct of ctl d piul Idi. T mi tib of ctl

Idi t Bil d God o umb 6 millio, t stl umb

4 millio d t Oo 3 millio.

a m 11-12 pct of Idi tibl popultio id i t fot

of t nott. Tu, t ng umb 12-14 l d t Mizo

jut 7 l. hov, t tibl popultio cocttio f

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d d, i my c, cotitut t mjoity i mot tt of t

nott. T tibl mjoiti i t plid lgly by

t filu of t sitid ay civilitio of t pli to ptt

t mot fot gio. T scduld Ct (sC) popultio, o t ot d, umb ov

179.7 millio (2001 Cu) d cotitut 17.5 pct of Idi ovll

popultio. Ittigly, ly 84 pct of Idi sC popultio liv

i t 10 tt of Utt Pd (UP) (21.5 pct), wt Bgl

(11.6 pct), Bi (9.09 pct), Tmil ndu (7.75 pct), ad

Pd (7.6 pct), Mdy Pd (6.96 pct), Mt (6.34

pct), rjt (5.5 pct), kt (5.3 pct) d kl(2.09 pct).

It i ototy tt t pcily t tt fom ic t fot

cov b cld fo lg-cl, ttld gicultu. Ti ld

om topologit to pcult tt t bul of ou sC popultio

poibly fom tibl of t fot o itgtd ito

t fold of t ay civilitio, glly t t lot lvl of t

ct ici. I mot c, ti poitio i to tt of tlv lbou ic d lpd to build t gd iftuctu of

t rom empi. hov, ti ty lvl lgly fuctio

of t pvilig mility fotu of tt . Tu, my tib i

npl d Mipu bl to gi ty t muc ig lvl of

t ct ici, icludig t igt Bmicl o ktiy

lvl. hov, i mot c, ty itgtd t bymlly

lot tt d v b t victim of ublivbl oppio

d ploittio. Ty motly ldl lbou d f. T

politicl lc of ill to foc ld fom i t potidpdc

era was the primal cause of the rst Naxalite upsurge in India in 1967.

Lt u ot fogt tt Mo Zdog d bd t volutio i Ci

o t ldl pty. T bic cu of ti gtt glig

lc of ld fom till ot b ddd i Idi. wt

i cu fo op d optimim, ov, i t vy ig lvl of

politicl mobilitio of Idi sC popultio, ic i o mig

it umb cout i t Idi lctol poc. T Dlit v

poducd my p-Idi lvl ld li ambd, kim,

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Jgjivm d Myti. a coquc, t um idic of

dvlopmt of t sC popultio v ugd viibly d of to

of Idi sT popultio. T t tgdy of ou tibl popultio

b it complt filu to mobili itlf politiclly d to

up cimtic p-Idi ldip ic could ticult it

dmd iti t dmoctic ytm. Ti, i tu, i ffct of

t bymlly lo lvl of litcy of ou sT popultio. a p t

2001 Cu, ti jut 29.6 pct compd to t tiol

vg of 65.4 pct. ev t sC litcy lvl 37.9 pct

i compio; 45.8 pct of Idi sT popultio blo t

povty li compd to t tiol vg of 27.09 pct.It i ti ic focd Idi fot tib to t up m d

d toug violt m. T lc of politicl mobilitio

mogt t ctl Idi tib cdd ti ttgic pc to t

tmit ogitio. Ti i um i t bi of t cltig tibl

iugcy i ctl d piul Idi.

It i ototy tt iugci d bo out i t nott tibl f bc 1956. T v pt 2 to 6 diviio of t Idi amy,

some 45 Assam Ries battalions and large number of CPOs and police forces

tied down for over ve decades. The tribal societies lend themselves to easy

milititio t ub-t of ill quid fo utig d ub-covtiol

operations is similar. The tribals are innately good at eld craft, stealth and

tul ligmt fo ootig. a uc, ty m igly ffctiv iugt.

If 12 pct of t tibl popultio could ti do uc ioditly iglvl of Idi cuity foc fo dcd, it i ot coidig t

t impct of volt by 85 pct of ou tib i ctl d piul

Idi could b. T um d pyicl ti idlly ld itlf to

pologd d cotly iugci.

The Tribal Dimension of Insurgency in South Asia

Incidentally, this tribal upsurge is not just conned to India but is today

ffctig tibl ociti i t ol of sout ai. It tm fom itoicl

filu of t tt i sout ai to ffct compiv dmiittiv

d iftuctul pttio of ti tibl .

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Pakistan

el i sout ai, t tib of t nott Foti Povic

(nwFP) d Fdlly admiitd Tibl agci (FaTa) of Pit

i vitul volt. T poblm t b gvly compoudd by

t ot-igtd polici of t Piti tt ic ld to idpd

poliftio of mll m d opitictd po i Pit tibl

ociti. Pit, i fct, militid d md it tibl ocity to t tt

to g jehad git t sovit foc i afgit. Ti idicimit

poliftio of m i t Piti tibl odd t vy bi of

t tio-tt itlf. Pit i i iou dg of loig it ti tibl

tct t of t Idu iv. T tmit jehad idology it utud ipovig to b tt to t vy ytm of tio-tt d tody i poig

iou ittil cllg to t itoic gicultul civilitio tt d

ourished east of the Indus river. Pakistan is now facing the very real spectre

of tt collp Tlibitio dit outd fom t tibl gio

of t nott d m iod ito t Pujb tld.

NepalI npl, t Moit bllio i vy clo logu of t Lwe i Idi. It

b i lgly tibl (t Mg, Guug d Pu tib of ctl d t

npl) il t ldip i fom t ductd lit of t ktmdu

vlly. T Moit movmt i npl fougt t royl npl amy (rna)

to tdtill. T Moit movmt i npl d ffctd omt

pmtu itc to gul mility optio. It d lucd i

of disastrous, frontal attacks on well fortied positions of the RNA. These

cud it to uff uc vy ttitio tt ultimtly complld it to

llic it t dmoctic pti d gotitd ttlmt. It

ubqutly mitmd d o fomd Moit-ld govmt

i npl. It mi to b t ti mitmig modl ill o

tifctoily i npl itlf d t it ould iduc t Lwe i Idi to

lo mitm d t t dmoctic poc.

Bangladesh

T Buddit Cm tib d voltd i Bgld i t 1970. Toug

ti iugcy lgly b cotid by igly piv mu

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(icludig cgig t dmogpic compoitio of t tibl ),

Moit tyl iugci uptig mogt t ot tib lmot

ympttic dtotio iducd by t tibl/ Moit iugci i wt

Bgl d npl.

T ot of tibl iugci, tfo, i ot jut Idi pomo;

it i dmic to t ol of sout ai d tm fom cl of t mod

idutil civilitio tig oot i t couti it t ublt tibl

cultu lft ov fom p-itoy. Dug Mit i i ti, Udtdig

Idi Iugci: Implictio fo Cout-Iugcy Optio i t

wold, dvlopd Idi vit of t socpol modl to pli t

cutiv fcto of Idi iugci. socpol gud tt t pobbilityof volutio git t tt i dtmid by t dg of pttio

of t tiol titoy by t tt, t impotc of ocilly mobilid

goup d t dg of buuctitio of t tt dmiittio d

it md foc. Mit cotd tt t dg of iccibility of

(tt i, t lc of logiticl, iftuctu d dmiittiv pttio),

t tgt of pt ocil idtity of it popultio d t mout of

external unifying inuence on it determine the propensity of that region foriugcy. Lft ig tmim i t dict outgot of t filu of t

tt to ffct compiv pttio d cotol of it fotd .

History of Tribal Rebellions in India

Tibl bllio ot pomo. T Muy tt d

mployd tibl lvi fo cig t tgt of ti tdig o gul

mi i tim of . kutily did ot tut t tibl lvi d pimily

ud tm fo lootig d pillgig t my coutyid. I ct itoy,

t v b umb of lg cl tibl bllio:

Pre-Independence

kol d Bumi volt ely 19t ctuy

stl hool 1855

Bi Mud (Ulugul) 1911

Gud rmp 1920

wli rvolt 1945-1946

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Post-Independence

Bt Upiig 1966

Jd agittio

(Tibl ditict of Bi)

Mti Boomi s 1970

kt ki sgt

Pott git kol ko 1980

Pojct i Bi

nmd Bco adol

Oi Tibl ld t y fo mi 1990

all govmt i t Idi itoy fild to ubdu o ptt t

d fot tibl tct o t uggd illy gio of t nott. It

imply ot cot-ffctiv to pcify o cotol t tibl bcu

ty poducd o gicultu uplu tt could yild tbl vu. T

gicultul civilitio i sout ai, tfo, imply mgilid t

ublt, tibl cultu d cott to lt tm uviv i ioltio

o t fig/pipy. T ot of idutilitio o md uccotiud mgilitio impoibl.

Tody, t tibl ociti ibit Idi poot d lt dvlopd

jugl gio. Pdoiclly, t ict i mil dpoit: 85 pct

of Idi col v i Cttig, Jd, ad Pd,

wt Bgl d Oi. T lo v ug dpoit of io o

d buit. Idutilitio, tfo, bougt bout violt cl

of t to civilitio. a lg umb of mg ydo-lctic pojct,mll dm, mi d o t tblimt of spcil ecoomic Zo

(seZ) v ld to t lg cl diplcmt of tibl popultio. It i

timtd tt fom 1951-2005, om 50 millio popl diplcd i

Idi du to uc mg pojct. Tibl ociti cotitut om 40 pct

of ti diplcd popultio. Ti vitully mout to om 20-24 millio

out of tibl popultio of 85 millio. so f, oly 18-20 pct of t

popl v b bilittd. T tib v lo b diplcd fom

ti tul bitt by ild lif p d ctui. T Fot rigt

act of 2006 giv t tib oly t limitd igt to o, collct, mov

d dipo of mio fot poduc (.g. oy, tdu lf, tc). spcil

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ecoomic Zo big tblid i t mil ic , ldig

to fut diplcmt of tibl popultio. By d lg, t fot

ld cld fo cultivtio, t tibl lgly imiltd i t

ay/sitid civilitio t t lot lvl of t ct icy.

Ti poitio i t gicultul i to tt of t lv lbou tt

built t rom empi. Tody, ti dcdt till t victim of

ublivbl ct oppio d occupy t lot ug of t coomic

d ocil icy ldl lbou. T govmt clly o

lc of politicl ill to foc ld fom tt ould giv oip of

t oil ty till to t dtitut ctio of t popultio d tby giv

tm m of cu livliood.

The Naxalite Upsurge

T lit diffc i t pot-idpdc tibl upug of Lwe i t

dangerous ideological dimension provided by Maoism. If it remains conned to

tibl bllio, it could t bt dly o diupt Idi idutilitio d

moditio by idig cc to it mil i t tibl gio. hov,

Lwe i Idi po iou log-tm idologicl tt toug it pottilto gt dgou ul-ub fultli. Ti fultli ill cqui t

popotio of ittil tt oc Idi dmogpic bulg cqui

citicl m bcu of iig umploymt. Mo d bd i volutio

i Ci ot upo t idutil poltit but upo t ldl pt i

t coutyid. It , i c, gi volutio tt ovt t

ldlod d dvlopd t-p modl of Popl rvolutioy w

tt dftd t rpublic of Cig ki s d ud i Commuit ul

i Ci. T volutio ttd i t coutyid d lt ovlmd

t citi. Mo igul cotibutio t cocpt of t t tg of

guill f tt ucitd duig t Ci civil :

The Strategic Defensive: I ti p, t ct guill

organisation was formed and increased its inuence by selective terrorist

ctio git t tt fuctioi d ti uppot it im t

ti tg uvivl d coolidtio.

The Strategic Stalemate: Mo t ud pc to td t i

time and exhaust the state of its will to ght. Company and battalion-size

guill bd fomd d tdd t i pc d tim

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fo o to to dcd by mployig it d u tctic of id d

mbu.

The Strategic Counter-Offensive: Oc t tg t by

tdd guill f, t gul Popl Libtio amy

fomd to ffct t itc to covtiol mility optio tt

ould dliv t coup de grace d dtoy t utd md foc

of t tt.

I c, t Ci civil tuggl bt ly

idutiliig cpitlit tt d volutio ld by t pty of Ci. It

tuggl bt t cit gicultul civilitio d t mgtidutil civilitio. T volutio ld ot by t idutil poltit

but by t pt of Ci. It i ti plllim ic i ctig omiou

idologicl do ov t mc of Lwe co tibl Idi.

a idutil my, id Mo, mobilid ll it mtil ouc to gi

ift victoy i tim. T im to dy it tt quic victoy fo it could

not sustain its material mobilisation indenitely. Mao used space to extend the

i tim, to dg it o fo dcd to , do d ut tmy; to iduc i d omic d do i ill to

it. To mobili t m, Mo ud politicl mobilitio, popgd

d ubvio. T pim im to ttc t ill of t cl my d

cout i idutil mobilitio it mobilitio of t m.

It i t itoductio of ti Moit idology tt po log-tm

ytmic d ittil tt to Idi dmoctic d libl tt tt i

bd o f mt coomy.

nlim ttd i Idi gi volt i t wt Bgl

ditict of nlbi i 1967. Ti gi bllio cud i

butl polic ctio. I 1971, t Idi amy d povidd itc by

tbliig t out codo i Optio stpl C I. P sig

fom dicto gl (DG), Bod scuity Foc (BsF) d DG Polic,

UP povidd utiv ccout of t got of nl violc

i i mil booThe Naxalite Movement in India. wt i upiig i

t tcity d pitc of ti idology of ul bllio. T

lftit govmt of wt Bgl d kl ffctd ld fom d

ddd t oot cu of t ul gt. all t ot tt govmt

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of Idi, ov, v b ubl to ummo t politicl ill to dd

t iu of ld fom. It i ti tt pli t pitc d tcity

of Lwe. Lg cl diplcmt of tibl popultio by mg pojct

d seZ d t iitiv implmttio of t Fot act v oly

ddd to t tibl gt. T filu of iftuctul d dmiittiv

pttio d ld to t utl ploittio of t tibl by vl

money lenders and forest contractor maas. Coupled with horric caste

oppio, t tociti v fulld t tibl gt to lvl it

i o miftig itlf i idpd md iuctio git t tt.

wt i pticully oiom i tt t nlit dalams o v

vtd itt i pig t iccibl gio bcd, to pvttt pttio d cc; to bloc dvlopmt tt could d tt

tribal angst and in specic prevent road construction which would facilitate

t movmt of cuity foc d impov t dlivy mcim of

govc.

Political Marginalisation of the Scheduled Tribes

wt i pticully ditig i t cotiud politicl mgilitio oft scduld Tib (sT) tt ot llod tm to dvlop t i

t dmoctic ytm. Compd to t sT, t scduld Ct (sC)

v fd muc btt i tm of politicl mobilitio. Ti lc of politicl

empowerment is reected in the clear development differential that is fast

mgig bt t sC d t sT tmlv:

Table 3: Comparative Evaluation of Development Indices of ST/SC

Development Indices ST SC

Litcy rt 29.6% 37.9%

Blo Povty Li 45.8% 36.2%

scool Dopout(Bfo mticultio)

62.5% 49.4%

sf wt 43.2% 63.6%

no acc to Docto 28.9% 15.6%

Immuitio 42.2% 57.6%

Source: rmcd Gu, adivi, nlit d Idi Dmoccy, Economic &Political Weekly, 11 augut 2007.

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T sC compi om 16.2 pct of t Idi popultio. My

nlit ffctd ditict md by ig popotio of Dlit

popultio d pcilly i Bi ty v b tig ctiv pt i

t lft ig iugcy, pt of t fom MCC. hov, Dlit gt

b muc btt ddd du to t upio politicl mobilitio

of t sC. It i t totl politicl mgilitio of t sT tt focd

tm to ot to violc d lt t lft ig tmit cmpio ti

cu.

Brief Historical Overview of Naxalite Violence

First Phase: Naxalbari

T itoy of Lwe i Idi i ll documtd. Ti bif ovvi ill oly

igligt t lit dtil. nl violc ttd gi volt i

1967 by t stl pt of t nlbi ditict of wt Bgl. Ty

ld by dco Commuit ld li Cu Mzumd d ku

Sanyal. This uprising was initially hailed in the Chinese ofcial media. In fact,

t Peoples Dailyi it ditoil of July 5, 1967, ild it spig TudB ov Idi. hov, ubqut nlit log li Ci

Cim i ou Cim, ld t Ci to did tm iftil

Commuit. Ty fomd t tid Commuit Pty Commuit Pty

of Idi Mit-Liit [CPI (ML)]. It tud tod violt iiltio

of cl mi toug ul bllio i Bi, siulm i ad

Pd d wt Bgl (Db, Gopibllbpu d Bud ditict). By

1970, it bg to t t ub of kolt (Clcutt). Bt 1970

d 1971, t 4,000 icidt of nlit violc. Coctd polic

optio lucd. T culmitd i Optio stpl C1

(1 July-15 augut 1971) i ic t my povidd t out codo fo

joit optio it t polic. Ti bo t bc of t movmt

and crushed the rst agrarian rebellion in India. It is noteworthy, however,

tt ti volt occud i t pli of wt Bgl d Bi t

commuictio iftuctu fily ll dvlopd d gv t ditict

dvtg of vicl-bd mobility dftil to t cuity foc. It

lo mit mpi tt t stl tib lgly md it bo,

o, dahs d p.

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T nlit movmt lo uffd iou dmolitio d

i of plit (po d ti-Li Bio fctio). It d fom 1972-77.

T impoitio of t mgcy ld to mjo ccdo tt bougt t

movmt to vitul tdtill. T Moit Commuit Ct (MCC) d

mgd i Bi. Ti ld to t fomtio of ct mi li t rvi

s d t tuggl dgtd ito ct violc.

Second Phase: Peoples War Group (PWG)

I t 1980, t cod upug of t lft ig violc. T

viou nlit goup d mgd i apil 1980 to fom t PwG.

Insurgency in the plains was easily combated as the mobilisation, re-po d movmt dftil ly tily it t cuity foc. I

po, t PwG, tfo, iftd t tuggl tod t fotd

tibl i adilbd i ad Pd. T ti f mo

difcult and the forest tribes better suited for guerrilla warfare than the

lo ct pt of t pli. Fot Committ d md qud

o dalams fomd. T tuggl, tu, iftd fom Bgl to ad

Pd d Bi d fom t it pd to Mt, MdyPd d Oi by 1991.

The Third Phase: Left Wing Violence

Fom 1990 od, Idi bg to globli it coomy. Liblitio

oppod togly by t lft ig tmit. a i of mg o too

plc to tgt t Moit upug. Tu, t nit Pty Cog

t mg of t CPI (ML) d t PwG. O 21 stmb 2004, t PwG

of Kondapally Seetaramiah and MCC of Kanai Chatterjee nally merged to

giv p-Idi oittio to Lwe i t fom of CPI (Moit). T pd

of Lwe tft b dmtic.

Table 4: Spatial Growth of LWE 2001-2008

Year No. of States No. of Districts

2001 09 53

2004 13 105

2008 17 180

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T ptil pd of Lwe i d viouly by difft tt gci/

t mdi. Glly, t hom Miity d tdd to ply do it tt

d pd. Upp timt put t umb of ditict ffctd t 232 out

of Idi totl 601 ditict. hov, om 60 ditict iouly ffctd

i t tt of Cttig, Jd, Bi, ad Pd, Oi d

Mt. Of t, om 8 ditict citicl.

Casualty Ratio

wt i cu fo coc i t dv culty tio bt t polic d

CPOs and the Naxalites, as indicated by the Ministry of Home Affairs gures.

Table 5: Casualty Ratio

Year PoliceCasualties

LWECasualties

Ratio CivilianCasualties

2002 100 141 1:1.4 382

2003 105 211 1:2 410

2004 100 87 1:0.8 466

2005 158 223 1:1.5 524

2006 129 210 1:1.6 521

2007 236 141 1:0.6 521

2008 175 137 1:0.8 310

Dt compild till 31 augut 2008, fom Miity of hom affi aul rpot.

T cuity foc v b utiig o vg 150 culti

p y fom 2004 od. T vy ig culti cud by

t tiv u of IeD/ ldmi by t lft ig tmit. It i

ototy tt bcu of tiv miig i t tibl , my

youg m dpt i t dlig of idutil ploiv li dymit

d glti. som of t ploio v b o poful tt ty v

ovtud fully ld mi potctd vicl (MPV), tu, cuig lg

cl culti. It i potd tt t Libtio Tig of Tmil elm

(LTTe) d Popl Libtio Ogitio of Tmil elm (PLOTe)

itucto d tid t lft ig tmit i t t of mig d

uig IeD. a b otd li, mjo cu of coc i t

dv culty tio bt t polic d t iugt, pcilly

i 2007-08. It i ti ic cll ito qutio t cotiuig u of t

polic d CPO fo offiv CI optio.

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Present Strengths and Organisation of LWE

T CPI (Moit) t itlf t im of ovtoig t tt i Idi

d plcig cotitutiol, plimty dmoccy it it Janathana

Sarkaro popl govmt. Toug togly lftit i it idologicl

oittio, it mi pimily tibl bllio. a p ao Pti,

there are 187 districts in India with a signicant percentage of tribal

popultio. Ov lf of t cutly ffctd by Lwe. Of t,

84 ditict cctid by d fot cov. Tu, cl ptil

coltio i tblid bt t pd of Lwe d t tibl

ditict log it t fot cov. a cl p-i ditictio c

also be seen among the three phases of the Naxalite struggle. In the rstp, it d bgu gi volt by t stl tib of t pli

of wt Bgl. It lid to it cot tt t pli ti ill uitd fo

guill f. I t cod p, tfo, it iftd t tuggl fom

wt Bgl to t tibl tct of ad Pd. Itiv optio

i ad Pd pud it ito Cttig, Jd, Oi d

Mt. I t nit Uity Cog, t CPI (Moit) d dcidd

to itify t popl i t i guill zo d t foud itc . It po of dvlopig t abujmDdy

ito b fo t volutio d pdig t to

. It ougt uity it t tuggl of t oppd tioliti i

Jmmu d kmi (J&k) d t nott. It i lo tyig to coopt t

itc of t pt d tibl to t tblimt of seZ oud

t mjo mtopol of kolt (Clcutt) d n Dli lo i t

fotd of Oi, Jd d Cttig. It i o tyig topd t volutio fom t coutyid to t citi.

Strength: a p ao Pti, t CPI (Moit) d ot plit goup

timtd to v tgt of om 10,000 md cd. T

om 45,000-50,000 ovgoud o d ovll po oldig of

om 15,000 otd po.

T po oldig of t Lwe v b timtd by ao Pti

to b i t gio of:

900 X AK-47/AK-56 ries

200 x ligt mci gu (LMG)

100 X 2 mortars / grenade ring ries

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Besides, LWE has several thousand .303 ries, 7.62 mm self-loading ries

SLRs and 12 bore ries along with pistols and handmade country guns. What

i cu fo iou coc pot tt it tblid t ct

fo t mufctu of locl po. supiigly, t iclud igly ltl

oct luc.

O of y ftu of ti iugcy i t tiv u of IeD

d ldmi to cu vy culti to t cuity foc. Du to t

idpd miig ctiviti i t tibl , my tibl yout fmili

it t dlig of idutil ploiv, ic lo idly vilbl

i t bcu of miig. Toit ogitio td to to.

a clo li fogd bt t lft ig tmit d t UitdLibtio Fot of am (ULFa) d t jehadi goup, could

icig u of locl cmicl li mmoium itt, ydog poid,

ulpu, luy, ful-oil d ogl-90 fo mig IeD. T i ugt

quimt to cc t idpd d y vilbility of ploiv.

Organisation:wt i cu fo coc i t icig cooditio

d ctlitio of t ctio of t Lwe toug t mgc oftdd Commuit ogitiol tuctu. T v lot i commo

it t ogitio d tuctu of t Moit movmt i npl.

Ctl Mility Commiio (CMC): T CPI (Moit)fomd Ctl

Mility Commiio of om 35 mmb. It i dd by t Gl

scty Lm ro Gpty d i guidd by 13-mmb

Politbuu.

Regional Bureaus: Under the CMC are ve Regional Bureaus which cover

viou gogpicl potio of t couty, idictd i Fig.1.

Zol Mility Commiio:T rgiol Buu cotol t Zol Mility

Commissions. These, in turn, control the ghting cadres or the dalams of t

popl militi.

Libtd Zo: T lft ig tmit v t up libtd zo it

Janathana Sarkars (popl govmt) dJan Adalats (popl cout) i

pt of 60 ditict.

rd Coido: T Moit o tlig of tbliig Compct

rvolutioy Zo o rd Coido ttcig fom Pupti i

npl to Tiupti i sout Idi. Ti ill comp t tibl of

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Bi, Utt Pd, Mdy Pd, Jd, Oi, Cttig,

ad Pd, Mt, kt d kl.

Fig 2: Organisational Structure of CPI (Maoists)

Incident Analysis and Operational Trends

wt i cu fo iou coc i t t ly itc to mobil

f o gul optio by t Lwe. T Lwe i Idi ti td

i commo it t Moit of npl o d lo dvlopd pct

fo lucig lg cl fotl ult (i tgt gig fom 1,000 to

lmot 5,000). suc lg tgt t v v b coutd bfo

i t cout-iugcy/cout-toim (CI/CT) optio i J&k,

Punjab or the Northeast. This reects a fatal tactical aw that must be

ploitd to t optimum. a ill b dtild ubqutly, uc lg

cl, fotl ult o t royl npl amy (rna) pot d cud

t Moit to uff iou ttitio (up to 40 pct i igl ult

d ty lot lot of ti middl ti ldip). Ti vy ttitio

focd tm to pc tl d ligmt it npl politicl pti,

ic ultimtly ld to ti mitmig d pticiptio i dmoctic

lctio.

Politbuu

Ctl Mility

Commiio

5 rgiol Buu

(rB)

not

rBsoutt

rB

et

rB

Zol Mility

Commiio

Popl Militi

Ctl

rBOi

Cttig

rB

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Major Incidents of LWE in India: 2003 - 08

October 2003: attmpt to it Cif Miit of ad Pd

(aP) M. Cd Bbu nidu, t Tiuml (i Cittoo ditict)February 2004: attc o ditict hQ to of koput i Oi. Lucd

ll cooditd d multi-pogd ttc o 13 loctio (ditict Polic

hQ, ditict mouy, ditict tuy, ditict jil, stt amd Polic

Bttlio hQ d vl polic ttio; 528 vic po lootd.

7 April 2004: 28 policm illd d 11 ijud i ldmi blt t wt

sigbum i Jd

20 November 2004: 10 Povicil amd Cotbuly (PaC) j d

ve members of a civilian police party killed in landmine explosion.

11 March 2005: attc o polic pot t Cil kluipt i Gutu ditict

of aP; 5 polic pol d 2 civili illd.

23 June 2005: Lg cl ttc i Mdubi to i t Cmp.

Four groups launched concurrent attacks on police stations, block ofce,

locl bc of tt d ctl b d t ou of Mmb of

Plimt (MP). Lootd 29 po d r 9.8 l i c.

3 September 2005: 22 Ctl rv Polic Foc (CrPF) pol

d 2 polic cotbl illd i ldmi blt i Dtd ditict

(Cttig) il tvllig i MPV. MPV ovtud.13 November 2005: ridd ditict jil i Jbd d cud 150

Moit cd d lootd 16 po.

10 February 2006: Lg cl ttc o Ctl Idutil scuity Foc

(CIsF) mgzi t hioli i Dtd, Cttig. 8 j illd d 9

oudd.

24 March 2006: Lg cl d cooditd ttc o rmgii d Udigii

to of Gjpti ditict i Oi.

15 March 2006: attcd ily ti i Lt ditict, Jd.15 March 2007:ridd sl Judm cmp i ribodili, Cttig d

mcd 56 cuity pol (icludig 35 sPO).

26-27 June 2007: efocd coomic blocd i Jd, Oi d

neighbouring states by disrupting rail and road trafc. Stopped movementof ll

mild o i Cttig d Jd fo 48 hours.

15 February 2008: Lg cl ttc o nyg to i Oi. Ov

t polic ttio, illd 13 policm d 2 civili d dcmpd it

1,100 po (400 id to v b covd).29 June 2008: 39 Gyoud pol illd ti bot mbud

d u i Oi.

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a lyi of t lit icidt idict icig lvl of

bold, ultig i lg cl d cooditd fotl ttc bd o

t Moit ptt of npl. Cooditd ttc o to li Mdubi,

rmgii, Udigii, nyg d t ditict jil t Jbd vy

ditubig pott. T mig of uc lg tibl cocttio could

ily v b picd up by polic itlligc. suc lg cl ttc

pt igly pmtu itc to gul f d povid mjo

tgt t o ic vy d luty ttitio could v b impod

as was done by the RNA in Nepal. The failure of the police to inict even

modt lvl of ttitio i cu fo coc. T tibl pct

fo lucig uc lg cl fotl ttc d to b fully ploitd.T IeD ttc cuig vy ig culti. T i ovidig

d, tfo, to cutil t vilbility of ploiv to t Lwe d to

specically target IED experts. The police and CPOs must follows proper

od opig dill d covoy ytm d t od mut b itid

pio to t mov of uc covoy.

Lessons from the Maoist Insurgency in NepalT i tog plllim i t Moit iugcy i npl d t

Lwe iugcy i Idi. T i mbl imilly of ogitiol

tuctu, mmt ptt d optig tciqu. a uc, tudy

of t Moit iugcy i npl ould b igly ituctiv d uful d

ill to up vlubl iigt d lo fo tclig t Lwe i Idi. T

Moit iugcy i npl ltd dcd fom 1996-2006. It pimily

tibl iugcy of t Mg, Guug d Pu tib of ctl d t

npl. T ldip, ov, povidd by t ktmdu vlly

itllctul (li Pcd d Btti). about 40 p ct of t md

cd fml d pfomd ll i combt. som 13,000 mility,

polic d civili pol illd.

Strength: accodig to sD Mui, t Moit d om 15,000 md

guill, militi of 36,000, om 14,000 politicl ctivit, om 24,000

ovgoud o/uppot d ppoimtly 100,000 ympti.

Armament Pattern: T bul of t opitictd po lootd

fom t rna/polic. T icludd:

11 81 mm mot

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6 MMG/GPMG

58 LMG

568 x semi-automatic ries

2056 x .303 ries

Assorted country-made ries /pistols

Tu, t ogitiol tuctu d mmt ptt mbly

imil to t Lwe i Idi. T npli Moit d Ctl Mility Commiio

it rgiol Buu d Zol Mility Commiio. Ty d t

diviio it vl bigd of om 1,000 m c. T cooditd ti

movements to launch large scale, frontal attacks on well fortied RNA positions,ic d b tgtd by mi d bbd i d covd

by utomtic i ll dug-i bu. T Mg d Guug tib od

great penchant for launching suicidal frontal attacks without any covering re by

tilly o mot. Ty uffd vily i t bgi (tig up to 40 pct

culti i uc ttc ic dcimtd ti middl ti ldip). som of

t t-pic ult v b coutd i dtil by sm Cov i vy

ifomtiv ticl i t Himal South Asia Magazine (T Lot Bttl of kd Pili) d mit tudy, fo ty to up vy vlubl lo:

March 2002: Popl Libtio amy (PLa) (t Moit my it

t m m t Ci) ttc o rna B t k(ruum

ditict wt npl). Ti vy cotly filu d t PLa lot

om 150 cd. aft ti ttc, t rna vily ifocd t b

and fortied it with mines, barbed wire and well dug-in bunkers.

November 2002: PLa attc o klg B(Juml ditict). Ti

mjo filu d povd to b tuig poit i t . It covicd

t Moit tt ty ould v to cl do ti pitio fo

ovll mility victoy.

March 2004: attc o Bi B (wt npl).Ti ot

cotly filu.

7 April 2005: scod ttc o rna B t k.Ti lucd

t t iitc of Pcd ft kig Gyd bg t mility

ccdo o t Moit. T Ctl d wt Diviio of t

PLa combid foc to luc t cod mjo ttc o k. T

ttc pd om fo 18 ou but povd to b cotly filu.

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T PLa uffd ov 250 illd. It oly ft t filu of ti

ttc tt Pcd gd to Idi-mditd llic it t

politicl pti of npl.

7August 2005: attc o egi Bttlio t Pili.kig Gyd

ud to m pomi of buildig od v mt t popl.

To v fc, odd gi bttlio to b t to Pili o t

Til iv ( tibuty of t kli) i mid-t kliot Ditict. Ti

ditou dciio tt ould v b oppod togly by

t npli Cif of amy stff (COas). hov, cquicd. T

Moit pidly cocttd t bigd (3,000 m) ft log focd

mc d lucd coctd ttc v lg potio of tgarrison was receiving its supplies by helicopter. The commanding ofcer

(CO) of t bttlio d jut ivd by t m licopt. Of t

227 defenders, some 58 were killed, 60 captured and 115 ed. The RNA

blmd t poo pfomc o t llgd filu of t Idi upplid

INSAS ries in this operation. This was the only face saving victory for the

Maoists in their string of failed frontal attacks on fortied positions.

A similar tribal rashness and penchant for such high prole bravado is

visible even in the large scale LWE assaults on signicant towns in Indian

states. In specic, the attacks on Koraput, Madhubani and Nayagarh are

plic of t npl Moit optio. Ufotutly, t lc of poply

cooditd dfc ultd i diml filu of t Idi polic to

inict heavy attrition in response to such frontal assaults. This constitutes a

igly pmtu itc to gul tyl optio by t iugt ic

must be exploited to the optimum. Prohibitive casualties can be inicted if

uc ttc ticiptd d dqut pptio md. a imil,

pmtu itc to gul, t-pic optio by t Vitmi (i not

Vitm i 1953) d cud tm to cout iitil dit. T Fc

d podd by tbliig i-mitid mility gio dp i t

Vitmi ld /libtd zo. Di Bi Pu lmot diviio-

iz gio. hov, by 1956, t Vitmi d cquid tilly d

mot d optig i diviio-iz fomtio. It ti tt ld

t Fc to cout dit t Di Bi Pu.

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The Time Dimension: Indias Three Front Scenario

T tim dimio i t mot citicl pct of ti lyi. Oc gi,

ti upiigly ot foud plc i mot lyticl fmo fo

ddig Lwe. T iu d to b plcd i lg go-ttgic

ppctiv.

T y ftu of Idi ttgic itutio i it to-fot oittio

it Ci to t ot d Pit to t t.

Itl cuity i t fom of Lwe djehadi toim cotitut t

tid mgig fot.

Such a scenario makes it vital for a nation-state to clearly dene its time-

li. a poctiv po dmd tt do ot jut ct to itutio

but dene our clear time horizons for tackling strategic adversaries/

cllg qutilly d ot ll togt.

T y qutio i: do pct ou tl viomt to

tu otil d dmdig?

If o, do popo to dl it ou itl cuity poblm

i dtil bfo v to dl it tm i coct it tltt?

Ci cut big tc of ig pcful pipy migt cg

buptly d i o-li fio, bd upo it pcptio of Idi llyig

itlf it t Usa d moutig itl cuity cllg i Tibt.

To tt tt, t tim oizo of t Idi tt fo olvig it

itl cuity tt mdly limitd d do ot v t luuy

of diftig log fo dcd o mo i tclig t Lwe. w v cut

lull/ gc piod of pcful pipy. It ould b fully ploitd to dl

it ou itl cuity to i dtil bfo t ctio of tl

actors take away the initiative from our hands and we are forced to ght on

vl fot cocutly.

T t to to fou y tim-fm, tfo, i citicl fo dlig

it t iou itl cuity tt fom Lwe d jehadi toim i

poctiv d compiv m. a tio-tt, cot ffod

to conne ourselves to a purely reactive stance that lets the internal security

tt c cii popotio bfo ct to tm i coctd m.

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Pmptio ould b t y to cot-ffctiv d timly po. Vid

i ti ligt, t Lwe violc d to b iouly cubd t ti tg itlf

bfo it bcom umgbl o upt i tdm it tl ci. It

would be essential to head off this threat before external actors establish linkages with

this emergent threat and escalate the levels of weapons/logistic support. a tictd

tim oizo of 2-4 y dmd tt u foc i big o to ic

c b pidly id d do ot qui mjo ogitiol cg o

oittio of optiol cultu. T CrPF t pim CI foc my ot

b t optiml olutio t ll. T Idi tio-tt tity dqut

ogitiol mcim d optiol mmoy d pti to dl it

ti poblm i t d o, t t lttig it dift till it umlmig popotio i f y tim-fm. It d to b igligtd tt

i t lt to y, t tid of t polic bttl git t lft ig iugt

t ufvoubl tu. T culty tio iftd i fvou of t

iugt i 2007 d 2008. Ti i cu fo iou coc.

T co of t po ttgy mut t upo pmptio d dig

off t poblm bfo it bgi to um umgbl popotio. Ou

tiv pic i coutig iugci d toit movmt ouldo bl u to gdut fom puly ctiv tc to poctiv ttgi.

Government Response so Far

T ocio-coomic bi of gt tt ful t Lwe i ll o d

udtood, d o i t d fo d btt dmiittiv dlivy

mcim. It cot b ttd puly l d od poblm. Du

to multiple causes, there has been a denite failure of the administrative

ytm t t goot lvl. spd of good govc ould b t

bic y to omliig t itutio. accodigly, il ddig t

Cif Miit Cofc o Itl scuity i n Dli o 13 apil

2006, t pim miit d ucitd t l o to lg po

cio i t mility d dvlopmt olutio implmtd

cocutly. a 14-poit policy to combt nlim lo ucitd

i ti mtig ic icludd inter alia t d to ditibut ld to t

ldl poo pt of pdy implmttio of ld fom d t

dvlopmt of pyicl iftuctu. T Plig Commiio, ud

it Bcd Ditict Iititiv (BDI) d Bcd rgio Gt Fud

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has identied 250 districts for pumping in extra funds for the purpose of

ccltd dvlopmt.

Providing Employment

at t gd ttgic lvl, o of t pim cllg of t Idi

tt i to impt job ltd ill d ductio to it ug d goig

yout popultio tt i tig t oig g goup vy y. If

Idi uccd i ductig d multi-illig it popultio, it um

cpitl could ll bcom y ouc tt ill bl it to pfom

coomic micl i ti couty d v pot illd mpo

to couti it gyig popultio. hov, t coquc of filu to do o c b quit gim. Idi dmogpic dividd could ll

tu out to b dmogpic tim-bomb. T citiclity of mploymt

gtio cot b ovttd.

Security Responses

T govmt ctly ctiod r 800 co fo ti-Lwe

optio d to impov cuity d mobility. som of t muvigd :

riig 10,000 tog COBra bttlio ud t CrPF. T li

pl to i ot 180 CrPF bttlio igtly lvd.

Tmc ppoc od to pot to pvt u of IeD (ic i

to plt o umttld od/tc).

stgtig of moui t c polic pot /jil to tt ttc. T

will need to be tactically sited and fortied to inict deterrent casualties if

ttcd. T could ply mjo ol i cig t lvl of ttitio

by ploitig t tibl pct fo lg cl t-pic fotl ult

d pmtu itc to t tid p of guill .

Co focu to b oigt ditict

m Bi augbd d Gy

m Cttig Bypu d Dtd

m Jd Ct d Plmu

m Oi Mlgii d rigd

Ditict md fo pcil tttio

m ad Pd km

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m Mdy Pd Blgt

m Mt Gdcioli d Gdy

m UP so Bd

T nlit lo ctiv i Tmil ndu, kt d kl d

t ditict ould lo v to b cloly moitod.

Response Options: Use of Army

sould t mu t o f uccd i cotiig t itutio, mility

po could b obvitd. hov, ould t itutio dtiot

fut, cll ould v to b t o mployig t my o oti i

ly/mid 2009. Poibl my mploymt optio could b:Steeple Chase II The Offensive Sweep Model: P sig, fom

DG BsF, uggtd o-tim mploymt of t my fo limitd

piod i t Offiv sp Modl. a mi of rr d ifty bttlio

it ct CI/CT optio pic could b mployd fo 6 to

8 mot piod i t co 8 ditict (augbd d Gy i Bi,

Bypu d Dtd i Cttig, Ct d Plmu i Jd d

Mlgii d rigd i Oi). w could mploy o/to rr sctohQ d 4 to 6 bttlio fom J&k d o/to ifty bigd fom t

nott fo ti t. Uit could b dployd i bttlio b. O

pcil foc tm it quiit licopt ffot could b lloctd to c

of t fou tt fo t dutio of ti optio. T optio could

b dictd by Diviiol/rr Foc hQ lloctd to hQ Ctl Commd

fo ti pupo. Cful itlligc pptio fo ti offiv p

ould v to b udt by um itlligc/ tcicl itlligc

ouc (.g. umd il vicl UaV) d il uvillc. T

offensive sweep should be designed to inict major attrition on the LWE

dalams, eliminate key leaders and IED experts, and give a signicant military

tbc to ti iig tid of Lwe.

Covert Application Model: Ti ould til ploitig t tibl

pct fo lg cl t-pic ttc by vig my pcil foc (i

polic uifom) tbli li-mitid pot povoctivly i Libtd

Zo li abujm, Dtd, Ddy, tc. to ivit lg cl t-

piece attacks and inict deterrent attrition. Once the left wing extremists

iducd to coctt fo uc lg cl ttc d pt izbl

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tgt, libo optio could b moutd to ploit t itutio o

octtd.

CI Grid in Eight Core Districts: T lttiv ould b to i 20

to 30 rr o ar bttlio i pd m (10 bttlio p y)

to tbli clicl CI gid i t igt co ditict d cy out

offiv CI optio fo to to t y piod. a miimum 30

p ct of t cuitmt fo t rr/ar bttlio ould b fom

t locl tibl . T ould b upplmtd by hom d ht

Ta (Titoil amy) bttlio tily cuitd fom t (to

povid mploymt d uc out t cuitbl ml popultio

lo to obti btt um itlligc. T pic of iig 30rr bttlio d 10 scto hQ i y (i G BC Joi tu i

1994) v pcdt fo pid po i poctiv tim-

fm. ec of t co ditict ould d t miimum o rr/ar

cto c, t ovll quimt ould b 8 rr scto hQ d

24 bttlio t t lt.

Recommended Option: I c of udd dtiotio of t itutio,t offiv p modl o t covt dploymt modl (o judiciou

combination of both) could rst be employed. Only if this fails to restore the

itutio ould pocd to P To i t fom of tbliig rr/

ar bd CI gid i t 8 co ditict ud Foc hQ optig dictly

ud hQ Ctl Commd (it Foc hQ d 6 to 8 scto hQ it

24 to 30 rr Bttlio).

Response Options: Other Than the Use of the Army

T Idi amy udtdbl uillig to gt mboild i

itld iugcy tt c ti it do toud of mil y fom

t bod it to dfd, focd t uio d tt govmt

to ly upo t polic foc d CPO to tcl ti iugcy. Ti i

iou cotit. T old ov, offiv cout-iugcy optio

are conducted by armies and not police forces. Insurgents specically

tgt t cuity foc d dopt mility tctic d ogitio. a

uc, iugt ( oppod to toit o pimily tgt oft d

upotctd tgt) bt tcld by mility m. T luctc of

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t Idi amy to gt ivolvd tm fom it coc bout t impct

of such involvement on a conventional conict with Pakistan or China. The

Cold stt docti i pmid upo ducig mobilitio timig fo y

o t wt Fot. T ill b dvly ffctd by y committl

of t gul my dp i t itio. wt t t o-mility

po optio? T bodly t-fold.

Paramilitarise the Police of the Affected States

T polic to popultio tio i Idi i mogt t lot i t old. I

po to iig itl cuity tt, t tgt of t tt polic

foc go up fom 13 l to 16 l i t lt fou y. O coolof tougt, tfo, i to opt fo co t bod cpcity buildig by

vitully pmilitiig t tt polic foc of t nl ffctd tt.

Ti til quippig t foc it mod ifty po to mo

than match the insurgent repower (semi-automatic ries, carbines, mortars

d oct luc). Ti, i fct, i t ppoc of t Cttig d

Jd tt polic foc ic fcig t but of t tibl iugcy

o. a Cout-Toim d Jugl wf (CTJw) Ct b tup t k i Cttig ic i ld by tid my bigdi. Ti

ti up to 3,600 pol ully. hov, t ti t, it ill t up to

8-10 y to ti t ti polic tgt of t Cttig Polic itlf

(33,000 m). Mot of t k ti t potd ll ov t tt

(t t big focud i pcilid polic uit). Ti vly dilut

ti impct. Offiv cout-iugcy optio v v b t

fot of polic foc o pt of ti to. I fct, CI igmt dtiig potig glly dmd puimt potig. Mot polic

pol pi fo luctiv pc igmt i citi d to ic

giv tm ocil ptig, moty dvtg d oft lif. T po

holdings and standards of ring are generally abysmal. The army is providing

itiv tiig uppot to tt polic foc d CPO d, p t

COas, o f povidd tiig to ov 150 compi. T ufotut

fct, ov, i tt tt polic foc ogid o t polic coi

o pot t pimy uit. Ti ogitio digd fo oml

policig d ot combt duti i tm of offiv CI/CT optio. T

lttiv i to ti t Idi rv Polic Foc bttlio fo uc

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ol. hov, t uff fom imil cotit of ogitiol cultu,

to d tiig t tt polic itlf.

An Evaluation of the Training Infrastructure

T Buu fo Polic rc d Tiig d cid out vlutio

of t polic tiig iftuctu d ouc i t couty. Ti i

ofully idqut fo v t itig ol of tiig cuit (to

ct fo t miv cotmpltd ic i polic tgt) d coduct

of pomotiol/upgdtio cou. rf tiig it oly i m.

wpo tiig i mjo cotit. T polic dly tid v i

ring the legacy World War I .303 Lee Eneld ries that they are equippedit. a ct Mumbi ttc igligtd o pifully, v udimty

training in this legacy rie would have enabled the police to respond much

better. Untrained personnel should best re with such single shot ries

ty ould td to t mmuitio it t mo mod mi-

utomtic. T .303 i vy ig pod bullt tt c ptt mot

of t body mou/bullt poof vt o vilbl. hov, du to lc

of ring ranges, resources and time, most policemen of the state policeforces hardly get a chance to practise ring each year. A study conducted

by Os J, c t t Ititut fo Dfc studi d aly

(IDsa), vld tt it t itig d v gtly cd polic

tiig iftuctu, it ould t 8-10 y o mo to ti t tt

police forces to acquire a bare modicum of tactical, eld craft and shooting

ill. It i popod to t up 20 cout-iugcy d ti-toim

tiig ct i t couty. hov, v it t, it ill t 8-10y t t vy lt to put t bul of t tt polic foc toug

uc cd. C t tio ffod ti log d cotly dly? T vy

to of ou polic foc ould v to b vmpd d my li

ub-cultu ic giv pimcy to tiig d optio ill v to b

itoducd. Tiig igmt mut v omou ptig vlu d

b lid to pomotio. svic i ctiv cout-iugcy optio

mut b citio/om fo pomotio d uc igmt ould ot

b ttd puimt potig bft of luctiv oppotuiti i pc

viomt. I ot, it cll fo miv d dicl tfomtio of

t polic to d cultu. aot y qutio i of ldip. Ti

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cot b bd o t ll Idi ioity picipl lo but dymic polic

ofcers (in the Rebiero, KPS Gill and Gurubachan Jagat mould) must be

lctd fo ldig t polic i t Lwe ffctd tt of Cttig,

Jd, ad Pd, Bi, Oi d Mt. T 1861 Polic

Act itself may need substantial modications if the state police forces are

itdd to b pmilitid.

The Central Police Organisation (CPO) Option

Pot t kgil w, t Goup of Miit (GOM) d digtd t

CrPF t pimy cout-iugcy foc of t couty. Ufotutly,

ti til vy mjo tuctuig d ovul of t vy ogitiolto d tuctu of ti foc. It my b clld tt t CrPF d b

id t Co rv Polic Foc i t coloil . It pimily

dd-o polic foc digd to tcl ggvtd l d od itutio

tmmig fom Mtm Gdi o-violt fdom tuggl d lt t

commul violc gtd by t ptitio. I tt lo tt viomt,

it povd to b cllt d ivlubl dd-o polic foc. It b

pcilly uful i tclig commul iot, lctio duti d ggvtdl d od itutio. I CI d CT optio i t pt, it glly

b igd potctiv duti li gudig vulbl d vulbl

poit d y itlltio, ic it do cditbly. It pimy uit

of fuctioig i t compy (d ot t bttlio ic i dd fo

cohesive CI operations). Its age prole is a serious constraint for undertaking

offiv CI/CT optio. som of it cotbl i t dvcd g

goup of 55 to 60 y d c by o ttc of t imgitio b dmdt for such duties. This force would need major restructuring and overhaul

if it i to v t pimy CI foc of Idi. a of o, it i ot cpbl

of uc tig.

T BsF, o t ot d, id i t pot-idpdc

for the specic purpose of border guarding. As such, it has a far greater

pmility oittio t t CrPF. It ogitiol tuctu of

bttlio d compi miod o t mility modl. a lg

number of army ofcers who came to it on deputation initially imparted it a

pmility oittio d to. I it G sctio/Bc it d vy good

um itlligc (hUMInT) ogitio. a uc, BsF uit tdd to do

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ltivly btt t CrPF uit i offiv CI/CT optio. Puut to

t GOM pot (pot kgil) t BsF plcd by t CrPF i t

mot citicl ct of gvity i J&k t cpitl city of sig. Ti

ty d pmtu dciio. a t ct 2008 lctio i J&k od,

sig bcom t otbd of cioit timt tt i t odd it

t flig i t t of t tt. Ou ct of gvity, i fct, bcom

ou t d mot tuou li, d ti mit ugt coctio. Pot

kgil t miv ic i t CrPF d BsF tgt. T CrPF

pdd by t dditio of ppoimtly 180 dditiol bttlio

d t BsF by 140 bttlio. Ti occud t t m tim t

tidt mdi outcy to doiz t Idi amy. T imilmedia speculation in 2008 that due to the intensication of LWE, the CRPF

tgt ould b cd by ot 180 bttlio. Giv t foc

ogitiol d optiol to cotit, ti ould v b mot

o-cot-ffctiv olutio. T combt pfomc of mot CrPF uit

i offiv CI optio b ub-optiml pimily bcu of ti

manning prole and overall operational ethos. The very adverse casualty ratio

bt t polic/CPO d lft ig iugt igligt t uuitbility oft itumt fo offiv CI optio. Coctig ti filu o givig

t polic d CrPF 8-10 y to l o t job i luuy t Idi tt

my ot b bl to ffod fo log. Pitig it ti ppoc ill oly ult

i gt polic culti d mo lo of po to t Lwe. It my b

tim to cut ou cot d ccpt covtiol idom by lvig offiv

CI optio to t my o ttd pmility foc li t rtiy

Ries/Assam Ries (RR/AR). Turf equations between the Ministry of Defence(MoD) d t Mility of hom affi (Mha) mut tictly b lft out of

t coig dlig it iu of uc iou impct o Idi

tiol cuity. I cogitio of t limittio, t CrPF i o iig

10 COBRA battalions at the rate of two battalions per year over the next ve

years. These are designed to have a much younger age prole and are based

o gtig 18 tm p bttlio cpbl of udtig CI optio i

dp jugl. Dpit t mtil omcltu, it mi to b o

ffctiv t COBra bttlio ill b i offiv CI optio. a lg

popotio of t cuit fo uc bttlio ould b cuitd fom t

tibl to povid locl lgug d ti oldg ill.

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The Andhra Pradesh Greyhounds Model

T Gyoud of ad Pd Polic v bcom muc tld of

modl tt mit multio by ot tt polic foc. T lit

uit fo offiv cout-iugcy optio tt giv t cm

of polic mpo d ouc, d ditict to d l d ld

t ti-nl tuggl i ad Pd. all Idi Polic svic (IPs)

ofcers on joining the Andhra Pradesh police cadre had to do a compulsory

iitil tit it t Gyoud. T Gyoud t bicild of

erstwhile State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) ofcer and have done very well in

combt. slctd m of t ad Pd Polic v fo t y

o codmt to t Gyoud d t vt to oml polic duti.Tu, ty povid pool of tid mpo v fo uc optio.

T Gyoud modl i ot ll tt . It d b tid it gt

ucc li i Pujb d J&k. T J&k polic d cuitd my -my

commdo/m fom t pcil foc to i ti spcil Optio

Foc (sOF). T lit polic foc povd f mo pcticbl to i

and train and have proved their efcacy in such operations. Quite obviously,

ti modl of iig lit pcil polic foc i ll t nl ffctd tt it mot optiml olutio d mut b pditd. hov, to cotit

tt uc lit polic foc ould uff fom :

Ti iz ould mi mll compd to t ovll foc quimt

tild. a vy lg cl pio, ov, could dilut qulity d

militt git ti litit tu.

ev toug igly ffctiv iti t tt du to btt goud

itlligc, t ould pt t poblm of it-tt cooditio

mog t lit goup of viou tt polic foc. Ti cooditio

my b f btt civd by ctl pmility foc.

The Civic Action Dimension

T Idi tibl popultio b t victim of milli of glct d

ploittio. Ti givc gui d mit ugt dl. It i

pimily iu of govc. Ufotutly, t tibl iugcy

cd tg t iugt o v vtd itt d t

in the continued underdevelopment of this area. They are specically keen

to prevent infrastructural penetration of these difcult jungle areas and, to

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tt tt, v b doig ti bt to mp od cotuctio d

dvlopmtl ctiviti. Dvlopmt d good govc i sine qua

non fo t olutio of ti vd poblm. hov, tig v cd

a stage where development will have to be preceded by area pacication in

most cases. Without such a pacication of the region, the administrators and

dvlopig gci ill ot b bl to opt optimlly i t mot

d iccibl . Ti cll fo t tblimt of clicl CI gid of

pot, d ugt od cotuctio pogmm to op up t mot

areas. Infrastructural penetration will have to be facilitated by specic area

pacication operations. There is a need to replicate the Operation Sadbhavana

modl of civic ctio i J&k by t cuity foc ivolvd.

Conclusion

T i pcptibl gp bt t ttd timt of t Lwe itutio

articulated by the Prime Ministers Ofce (PMO).The MHA had till recently tended

to doply t itutio d d put fot tt oly om 76 ditict of 7 tt

ffctd. suc optimitic pi my ll tu out to b cout-poductiv

in the long-term. The Institute of Conict Management estimates indicate 194districts in 18 states. The Planning Commission has identied 250 backward

ditict fo ccltd dvlopmt. T PMO ppctiv i f-igtd d

lit d t ito ccout t dmogpic div of ou itl cuity.

It ould b bt if t poblm could b cotid by pcil polic foc (t

Gyoud modl).hov, cotigcy pl fo t mploymt of t rr/

my mut b d up. It i ototy tt o l i t old

offiv cout-iugcy optio big udt by polic foc lo.T i d to ditigui bt iugcy d toim. Toim i

bt tcld by t polic but i iugcy, t pimy tgt ytm t

cuity foc tmlv. Floggig t polic fo t og t ill oly ic

ti culti d ult i lo of mo po to t iugt.

T om miit, i i itt ply i Plimt, d giv out t

comptiv ttitic of culti i J&k, t nott d Lwe violc

ic 2004 to 31 augut 2008. T :

J&k 1,882

nott 1,909

Lwe 2,281

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Tu, t lvl of violc of Lwe v clly ovt t violc

d culty lvl i J&k d t nott. sould t itutio dtiot

fut d it bcom imptiv to itify t mility po (

poctiv po optio to cutil t Lwe got bfo it c

citicl popotio), my d Optio stpl C II i t fom of

offiv p modl o covt ctio modl o combitio of bot.

Oly if ti fil to t/to t itutio ould coid gdutig

to t cod p of tbliig CI gid of t rr i t 8 co ditict

identied earlier. For this, India would have to urgently raise some 4 Sector

hQ d 30 rr Bttlio i to to t y tim-fm. It i, ov,

vitl tt t t iig td of Lwe violc bfo tl cto to ploit it to dtbili ou couty i iou m. abov

ll, log-tm ppctiv plig dmd tt d up tiol tim-

li d odmp fo poctiv po tt to d off dv

itutio ll bfo ty cqui citicl m.

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References

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emgig ai, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, no. 3, sptmb 1998, pp. 419-55.Cbti, simti, China and the Naxalites (n Dli: rdit Publi, 1990).Co, sm, T Lot Bttl of k d Pili, Himal South Asia Journal, sptmb 2008.

Dgupt, Biplb, The Naxalite Movement(n Dli: allid Publi, 1974).Dyo, Tim, robt C d Ll Vii (d.), Population Economy, Human Developmentand the Environment(Lodo: Ofod Uivity P, 2004).

Dovl, ajit k, Cod rd: nl T Biggt Tt,Hindustan Times, 26 Mc 2006.______ Idi nlit: a spct hutig Idi,The Economist, 17 augut 2006.Duyo, edd, Tribal Guerrillas: The Santhals of West Bengal(Dli: Ofod Uivity P,

1987).

Go, Jyti d C P Cd s, Idi Pottil Dmogpic Dividd, The Hindu,17 Juy 2006.

Go, Jyti, T Ucti advtg of Dmogpic Cg,The Asian Age, 26 Juy2006.

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hudo, Vli d addo Bo, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asias SurplusMale Population (BCsIa studi i Ittiol scuity, MIT P, 2004).

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2006).Mibot, P n, Demographic Scenario 2025, study s-15, rc Pojct o Idi-2025

coductd by Ct fo Policy rc, n Dli, 2003.Mi, Tit, Barrel of the Gun: The Maoist Challenge to Indian Democracy (n Dli:

sdi Boo Compy, 2007).Mit, Dug, Udtdig Idi Iugci: Implictio fo Cout Iugcy

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Compy, 2003).nili, nd, Imagining India: Ideas for the New Century (n Dli: all L, Pgui

Idi, 2008).Pti, ao, Lft wig etmim: Cu d Ppctiv, NDC Research Journal, 2008.

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routldg, 2004).simo, Juli, The Ultimate Resource (Picto:Picto Uivity P, 1998).sig, P, The Naxalite Movement in India (n Dli: rup, 2006). _______, sttgy to Combt Lft wig etmim effctivly, smi o Lwe t

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