URBAN BANK VS. PENA [2001]

FACTS:

UNION BANK BOUGHT A PARCEL OF LAND FROM ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY (ISC)

AGREEMENT INCLUDED A CONDITION THAT ISC WILL CAUSE THE EVICTION OF ALL THEOCCUPANTS OF THE PROPERTY

UNION BANK ALLEGES THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

O

ISC CONTRACTED THE SERVICES OF ATTY. MAGDALENO PEÑA FOR THE PURPOSE OF EVICTING THE OCCUPANTS

O

ATTY. PEÑA THEN ASKED FOR A LETTER OF AUTHORITY GRANTING HIM AUTHORITY TOREPRESENT COMPLAINANT IN MAINTAINING

POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND INANY COURT ACTION THAT MAY ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAID DUTY

O

UNION BANK ISSUED A LETTER OF AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO A CLARIFICATION THAT ITWAS ISC THAT CONTRACTED HIS SERVICES

O

ATTY. PEÑA REQUESTED SOME MODIFICATIONS, THUS A NEW LETTER OF AUTHORITYWAS ISSUED

O

LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE WERE PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS ISC WHOENGAGED THE LAWYER’S SERVICES

13 MONTHS AFTER THE EVICTION OF ALL THE APPLICANTS, ATTY. PEÑA FILED A COLLECTIONSUIT AGAINST UNION BANK FOR RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY’S FEES, EXPENSES, DAMAGESAND AGENT’S COMPENSATION ON THE BASIS OF THE LETTER OF

AUTHORITY ISSUED BYUNION BANK’S OFFICERS ATTY. BEJASA AND MR. MANUEL, JR.

UNION BANK FILED THIS CASE FOR DISBARMENT ALLEGING THAT ATTY. PEÑA IS GUILTY OF

DECEIT, MALPRACTICE AND GROSS MISCONDUCT

WHEN IT INSTITUTED A COLLECTION SUIT

ON THE BASIS OF THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY WHILE KNOWING FULLY WELL THE REASONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SAID LETTER OF

AUTHORITY

ATTY. PEÑA INTERPOSED THE FOLLOWING COUNTERCLAIMS:

1.

CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE THERE IS ANOTHER CASE INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES PENDING

IN THE RTC OF BAGO CITY

2.

THAT HIS SERVICES WERE ENGAGED BY DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF UNIONBANK

3.

THERE IS NO REASON FOR HIM TO DECEIVE UNION BANK INTO WRITING THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY BECAUSE HE KNEW FULLY

WELL THAT A VERBAL AGREEMENT ISSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; SUCH WAS ONLY DONEAS A

FORMALITY

4.

UNION BANK ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS OF HIS SERVICESREPORT AND RECOMMENDATION BY THE IBP

NO FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT PARTY IN ONE CASE IS THECOMPLAINANT IN THE OTHER AND VICE VERSA

IT IS NOT WITHIN THE IBP’S JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHO SHOULD PAY; IT SHOULDBE LEFT TO THE PROPER COURT

THE ONLY

ISSUE IS: WON RESPONDENT COMMITTED MALPRACTICE,DECEIT AND GROSS MISCONDUCT IN THE PRACTICE OF HISPROFESSION AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR. NO. BECAUSE THERE WASREFUSAL TO PAY

JUST COMPENSATION, ATTY. PEÑA MERELY INSTITUTED THEPROPER ACTION.

RECOMMENDED DISMISSALSC AGREED WITH THE IBP’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION, SAYING THATCOMPLAINANT FAILED TO

MEET THE REQUIRED BURDEN OF PROOF IN ORDER FOR THE COURT TOEXERCISE ITS DISCIPLINARY POWER:

COMPLAINANT HAS NOT PROFFERED ANY PROOF THAT THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY WASOBTAINED THROUGH MACHINATION OR OTHER

DECEITFUL MEANS

THOSE WHO ISSUED THE LETTER WAS NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES, NOR WERETHEIR SWORN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED

THE LETTERS PRESENTED CANNOT BY THEMSELVES BE ACCORDED STRONG PROBATIVEWEIGHT IN THE FACE OF (1) ATTY. PEÑA’S

EMPHATIC ASSERTION THAT HE HAS NEVER SEEN ANY OF THEM; (2) THE LACK OF INDICATION THAT COPIES WERE RECEIVED BYHIM; AND (3) THE ABSENCE OF HIS SIGNATURE OR THE DATE OR TIME HE

TOOKPOSSESSION OF THEM

FURTHERMORE, THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION WAS NOT THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY BUT ANORAL CONTRACT OF AGENCY PURPORTEDLY

ENTERED INTO BY ATTY. PEÑA WITH THE DULYAUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF UNION BANK (PROVED BY AVERMENTS IN THE

COMPLAINT INTHE OTHER CASE IN BAGO CITY RTC).

WITH OR WITHOUT THE LETTER, ATTY. PEÑA COULD HAVE INSTITUTED A COLLECTION SUIT.

THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION (10% OF THE MARKET VALUE OF

THE PROPERTY) WASNOT EVEN MENTIONED IN THE LETTER BUT WAS APPARENTLY SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF THE ORAL

CONVERSATION.HOLDING:DISMISSED DISBARMENT COMPLAINT. HE WAS IN THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT:INVOKING THE AID OF THE COURT IN RECOVERING RECOMPENSE FOR LEGAL SERVICES WHICHHE CLAIMS HE UNDERTOOK FOR THE COMPLAINANT, AND

WHICH THE LATTER DOES NOT DENYTO HAVE BENEFITED FROMURBAN BANK V. PENA

FACTS: In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to

Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold forP240 million.

As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Peña had to negotiate with them for them to relocate.

But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Peña.

ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Peña to negotiate with the tenants.

Peña had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them.

Peña then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Peña explained to him the situation.

In said conversation, Peña asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants.

Peña also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts.

Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Peña should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee.

Peña also asked that said authorization be put into writing. The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made

as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI).

Peña was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally

under the possession of UBI, Peña began sending demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million.

But UBI refused to make payment hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.

The trial court ruled in favor of Peña as it found there indeed was a contract of agency created between  and UBI and that Peña is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28 million.

The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Peña is entitled to payment but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Peña should only be paid P3 million.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million.HELD: No.

The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Peña is entitled to payment for compensation for services

rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony of Peña, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone.

The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the tenants.

The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Peña should be paid.

Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be applied.

In this case, Peña is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Peña didn’t have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering.

Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing

the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants.

Total of P4.5 million. The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it

is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees.

The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo’s Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a case[1] involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.[2]

On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent’s office to inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure

upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.[3]

Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period.

On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondent’s appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days.

Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainant’s family lost 7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not engage their services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least one-half of the land involved as his attorney’s fee, plus cash expenses, while the other asked for ¼ of the land in addition to a large sum of money. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his siblings on the matter.

Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to respondent’s office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for

transportation, meals and other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainant’s offer.

Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondent’s secretary P2,000.00 of the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellant’s brief.

On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003.

On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.

In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.[4]

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads:[5]

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.[6]

Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant.

Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.

Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.[7] The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons.[8] It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.[9] However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property.[10] In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[11] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice

of law when he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent’s act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.

We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.[12] All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.

HILADO V DAVIDFACTS:

HIlado brought against Assad to annul the sales of several houses and corresponding lots which were executed during the Japanese occupation.

These sales were executed Hilado’s late husband, allegedly without her knowledge. Counsel for Hilado: Delgado, Dizon, Flores, Rodrigo.

Counsel for Assad Ohnic, Velilla and Balonkita, they were replaced by Francisco. (in case you’re wondering David is the judge who tried the case)

Dizon in the name of his firm, wrote to Francisco, urging him to cease representing Assad on the ground that HILADO had consulted with FRANCISCO regarding her case.

It was alleged that she turned over papers to Francisco and that he sent her a written opinion.

When they did not receive an answer to this suggestion, counsel for Hilado filed a motion in court to disqualify Francisco. T

he letter to Hilado from Francisco was presented as evidence. In the letter Francisco described the basic facts which brought

about the controversy, gave his opinion that the action would not prosper because of the circumstances (title was already transferred, price was not grossly inadequate, the allegation that Assad is not the real purchaser is difficult to prove and that Mr Hilado is dead)

He therefore declined to appear as counsel and returned the records. The letter was dated July 13, 1945.

Francisco alleges that in May 1945, a real estate broker, came to his office to approach him about representing a Syrian national embroiled in real estate case (Assad).

He alleges that he accepted this case and that it was only a month later that Hilado appeared and brought her case to him.

It was however only in 1946 that Assad formally requested him to handle the case because Assad’s American lawyer had gone to the states.

Judge David dismissed the case because the interchange between Francisco and Hilado had not created a attorney-client relation.

Issue: was there an attorney-client relationshio between Francisco and Hilado? If so, was there a breach?Held:

In order to constitute professional employment it is not essential the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. Nor, that any retainer paid, promised, charged, nor that the attorney did not undertake the case after the consultation.

An attorney is employed in his professional capacity when he is giving advice thereon, just as if he were writing a pleading or litigating in open court.

Precedent supports the doctrine that mere relation of attorney and client should preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party’s retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received.

While it cannot be said that Francisco was acting in bad faith, his action of taking up the cause of an adverse party, cannot be sanctioned. In any case he has retainer fee

YAO VS. AURELIOFACTS:

Bun Siong Yao is a majority stockholder of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation and since 1987, he retained the services of another stockholder, Atty. Leonardo Aurelio, as his personal lawyer and also the brother-in-law of Yao’s wife.

In 1999, they had a disagreement. Aurelio then filed cases against Yao and his wife. Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife

constitute an abuse of the confidential information which Aurelio obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel.

Aurelio, on the other hand, claimed that he filed those which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.

The investigating commissioner found that Yao discontinued paying dividends to Aurelio which compelled the latter to file multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder.

He recommended that Aurelio be suspended from practice of law. The IBP approved and adopted the said recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Held: Yes.

Atty. Leonardo Aurelio is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

He took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at Yao and in doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with Yao and his companies for his own end.

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.”

An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents.

It is to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arise at the inception of their relationship.

It does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them.

It even survives the death of the client.

GENATO V. ATTY SILAPANFacts:

Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some of Genato’s cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a

car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to

Genato. The check was dishonored. Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22.

In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of “buying a selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals” and that he was also involved in bribery cases.

Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship.

Issue: Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?Held: No.

While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer.

It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.

Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.

However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not pertinent to the case.

It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand.

His professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case.

A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity. He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

JUNIO V GRUPO

Facts: Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be

used in the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so

the property was forfeited. Because of this, Junio wanted the money back but Grupo refused

to refund. Instead, Grupo requested that he use the money to help defray his

children’s educational expenses. It was a personal request to which Grupo executed a PN. He maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very

close since Junio’s sisters served as Grupo’s household helpers for many years.

Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was purely gratuitous or “an act of a friend for a friend” with “consideration involved.”

He concluded that there was no atty-client relationship existing between them.

The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.Held: Yes.

If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an attorney in his professional capacity and the attorney voluntarily permits in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation of master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his influence by not returning the money.

Grupo has committed an act which falls short of the standard conduct of an attorney.

If an ordinary borrower of money is required by law to repay his loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example.

*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month and to pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal rate.

Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALESFACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon.

Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find

out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents.

The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there was no longer any professional

relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?HELD: No.

Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant.

Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant.

The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.

There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

DOMINGO V AQUINOTEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971

FACTS NATURE: An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of

the Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate.

CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to the CA.

CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of Aquino (allowed compounded interest).

The estate's counsel in the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment.

Consuelo Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the CA’s decision.

CA denied motion for reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after respondent had filed in the intestate

court a motion for execution of the judgment, petitioner filed this petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

This was opposed by Aquino on the ground of finality.ISSUE: WON CA’s decision has become finalHELD: YES

CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with the Rules of Court and since no appeal was filed.

Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was without legal basis.

Petitioner’s motion for substitution filed with the appellate court after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate.

She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's decision — for such motion was never filed. She cannot use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels.

The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel.

He was representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr., so that even after latter’s removal, the former remains to be counsel of estate.

No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change of counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of

Court. Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by

registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court.

And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster.

The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court.

Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioner’s counsel shall pay treble costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had granted “new and further relief” to Aquino when, in fact, he had duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.

FELICISIMO MONTANO VS. IBPFACTS:

Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his client upon the latter's failure to comply with their retainer agreement.

HELD: We find Atty Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the

legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

Although he may withdraw his services when client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the atty’s fees. Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.

But, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed a s penalty.

VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSMEFacts:

Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute.

The court rule against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme

failed or refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another

lawyer to prepare the MR. Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants

informed him that he was withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case.

Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.

Issue: Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?Held: Yes.

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination – that is, until the case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of duty affects the client.

The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The application must be based on a good case.

What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22. There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3

months.

In Re: ATTY. DAVID BRIONESFACTS:

Atty. Briones is the counsel of the accused-appellant Restituto Cabacan in the case: People of the Philippines vs. Restituto Cabacan

Atty. Briones was given notice through mail to file appellant’s brief but failed in different occasions:

: He was given 30 days to file the brief but failed (August 6, 1998). : Submit brief within 10 days and show cause order why Atty.

Briones should not be disciplined by the Court failed (April 28, 1999).

The Court referred the matter of the repeated failure of Atty. Briones to file appellant's brief to the IBP for evaluation, report and recommendation (August9, 1999).

IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzales-De Los Reyes informed Atty. Briones of the Court's referral of the matter to the IBP and required him to file his Comment within 5 days from receipt of the letter again, he did not file any Comment (October 7, 1999).

COMMISSIONER DE LOS REYES’ FINDINGS: People vs. Cabacan has remained pending in view of the

negligence of Atty. Briones to file the required appellant's brief. It is evident that he violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. She recommends that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law

profession for a period of six (6) months. IBP: Adopted and Approved the Report and Recommendation. May 26, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the IBP a Motion for

Reconsideration/Reinvestigation. He contended: He filed a Comment on the administrative case but the same was

not considered by the investigating commissioner. Neither did the IBP conduct a formal investigation. IBP: Motion is DENIED. On October 5, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the Court a

Manifestation praying that his Comment submitted to the IBP on October 13, 2000 be considered by the Court.

He failed to file an appellant’s brief in the said case because he never received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file said brief.

If ever a copy was received by his secretary, the latter was not able to give it to him because he had already ceased practicing law failing health.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Briones properly withdrew his services as counsel.HELD: NO.

He is still the counsel of record. RATIO DECIDENDI: The cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for his failure to

file the required brief. Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law,

he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the records of the said case that Atty.

Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court

would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is expected to comply with all its orders and directives. RULING:

Atty. David P. Briones is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)months

OBANDO V FIGUERASNARVASA; 1990

FACTS NATURE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to

annul a Decision of the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice, of

Petitioner Felizardo Obando’s action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the RTC of QC.

Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras.

pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria.

Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Alegria’s Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando, Alegria’s nephew (herein petitioner)

the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City.

Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, and Obando was appointed as Eduardo’s co-administrator of the joint estates.

upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which led to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public document

probate court denied Eduardo’s Motion for authority to sell the parcels of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation, on the strength of an Order issued by the probate court in 1991. New titles were issued in the name of Amigo Realty.

Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of Alegria, filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (respondents), for the nullification of the sale.

the probate court removed Obando from his office as coadministrator.

Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on Obando’s loss of his legal standing to pursue the case.

Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied. CA dismissed Obando’s Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

rejected Obando’s contention: that he did not lose his legal personality to prosecute the civil case, since there was no categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery, and its probate was still pending

affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate court’s Order alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery.

that the probate of the Will had not been decided on the merits did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner Obando as coadministrator.

Petitioners' Claim Assignment of Errors: Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners:

(1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record;

(2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted;

(3) whether the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and

(4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the trial court.

ISSUES1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted. YES3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because Obando's conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal. NO4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss. NOHELD1.

the lawyer was still Eduardo’s counsel of record. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the

services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of RoC.

Counsel may be substituted only with the ff requisites:(1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is obtained; (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured

Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The Motion to Dismiss was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had

no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an atty. who has been dismissed by

a client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the client’s rights.

In this case, any irregularity should have been raised by respondent Eduardo, and not the petitioners.

2. if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the

case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even

after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.

The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.

However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of cause of action,24 and

(4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section1 of Rule 16 may be waived.

If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26 the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal

of the civil case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity. It was only after he had been convicted of estafa through

falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the Figueras estates.

It was only then that this ground became available to the respondents.

Hence, it could notmbe said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismissfiled after their Answer was submitted.

Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.

3. When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is revoked

by a probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case has nothing to do with such revocation.

This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case.

Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator.27

When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case.28

Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.29

Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in this Petition.

He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras estates.

4. There is no conflict between these court rulings. they were based on different grounds. The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time,

Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the Figueras estates.

The second Motion was granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as coadministrator.

The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court.

Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.