GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA

Izdavač:CENZURA

Branimira Ćosića 5, Novi Sad

Produkcija:Omladinski centar CK13

Vojvode Bojovića 13, Novi Sad

Realizacija:Alternativna kulturna organizacija – AKO

Vojvode Bojovića 13, Novi Sad

Centar za socijalna istraživanja CSIVojvode Bojovića 13, Novi Sad

Urednik:Željko Klarić

Prevod:Vincent Spevak

Petar Atanacković

Dizajn grafičkog simbola projekta:Hanna Blank

Dizajn i priprema za štampu:Mirjana Popović

Štampa:Daniel Print, Novi Sad

Novi Sad, 2009

Projekat podržao:National Endowement for Democracy

Svako kopiranje i dalje korišćenje tekstova iz knjige je dobrodošlo (izuzev upotrebe u okviru rasističkog, seksističkog, fašističkog konteksta).

GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJ IMA

CENZURANovi Sad, 2009

SADRŽAJ

Petar AtanackovićGOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: UVOD......................................................................7

Hanna BlankRATNA PROPAGANDA: MEDIJI KAO INSTRUMENT MANIPULACIJE........................10

Transkript tribina:GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: RATOVI 1990-ih.....................................................17GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: SRBIJA POSLE 5. OKTOBRA....................................40

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Petar Atanacković

GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: UVOD

Istraživanje govora mržnje zauzima značajno mesto u analizi javnog diskursa u savremenom srpskom društvu. Ratno iskustvo 1990-ih i nerazvijenost političke kulture u Srbiji, uticali su na veliku raširenost govora mržnje, koji u određenim krugovima javnosti predstavlja gotovo dominantni oblik javnog govora. Međutim, postoje nedoumice oko definisanja samog ovog pojma, koje su u mnogome i odredile odnos javnog mnenja prema njegovim manifestacijama. S jedne strane prisutna je namera da se svaka vrsta uvredljivog govora, javnog manifestovanja nekulture i netolerantnosti prema drugačijem, najčešće političkom mišljenju, (pogrešno) obeleži pojmom govora mržnje, čime se jasno doprinosi obesmišljavanju samog termina. Sa druge strane, pak, tipični primeri javnog govora mržnje u određenim (opet političkim) krugovima percipiraju se kao “samo” emotivno snažniji izlivi patriotizma i manifestacije “razvijene” nacionalne svesti, čime se, opet, želi postići istovetni efekat. Pri tome uobičajeni vid odbijanja prigovora o govoru mržnje jeste pozivanje na pravo i slobodu govoru. Istina je da sloboda govora predstavlja osnovno pravo, ali ne može se apsolutizovati do te mere da se (zlo)upotrebom ove slobode ugrožavaju prava, slobode i fizička bezbednost drugih ljudi, društvenih grupa i pojedinaca.

Zato je neophodno pokušati sa definisanjem pojma govora mržnje, a jedna od mogućih definicija može glasiti ovako: pod govorom mržnje podrazumeva se propagiranje, veličanje ili opravdavanje zločina, kao i podsticanje na zločin prema društvenim grupama i njihovim pripadnicima, a na osnovu njihove rase, boje kože, verske pripadnosti, nacionalnog i etničkog porekla, pola ili seksualne orijentacije. Kao govor mržnje se tretira i iznošenje ili prenošenje ideja o superiornosti ili podređenosti jedne društvene grupe ili njenih pripadnika, kao i upotreba simbola koji podstiču na mržnju i ističu superiornost ili podređenost društvenih grupa i njihovih pripadnika1.

Zašto uopšte treba isticati problem govora mržnje u Srbiji? Iskustvo ratova iz poslednje decenije 20. veka, koji su pažljivo pripremljeni “ratom reči” i različitim diskvalifikacijama drugih i drugačijih etničkih i verskih grupa, predstavlja jasno

1 “Govor mržnje u Srbiji”, Newsletter No. 1, YUCOM Komitet pravnika za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2008, strana 1. www.yucom.org.yu

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upozorenje na koji način govor mržnje u sredstvima javnih komunikacija može predstavljati uvod u oružane sukobe i sa njima povezane ratne zločine, etnička čišćenja i genocidne poduhvate. Permanentnom šovinističkom propagandom, podsticanjem strahova i predrasuda, pospešivanjem verske, nacionalne i rasne isključivosti kroz ratno-huškačke propagandne aktivnosti, populacija Srbije, Hrvatske i BiH početkom 1990-ih je dovedena u stanje potpune neuračunljivosti. U takvoj situaciji sve je bilo moguće i svaki zločin imao je svoje opravdanje, bilo da je reč o ubistvima, silovanjima, proterivanjima civilnog stanovništva ili organizovanju koncentracionih logora. Čak i onaj najstrašniji među ratnim zločinima – genocid – nalazio je svoje opravdanje i logično mesto u okviru šireg koncepta t.j. celine. Utoliko treba istaći da genocid u Srebrenici 1995. godine ne bi bilo moguće ni realizovati ni opravdati bez propagandnih aktivnosti koje su mu prethodile. Podsticanje starih strahova, etničke i verske isključivosti, neprestane istorijske i verske reference (podsećanje na “turski jaram”, na bedem hrišćanske Evrope, pozivanje na osvetu za bedu iz vremena Otomanske vlasti itd.), zajedno sa širenjem rasizma, pre svega oličenom u tezi o potrebi da Muslimani, kao ljudi niže vrste, prosto “nestanu” i tako oslobode životni prostor za Srbe, na kraju je rezultiralo genocidom. Ovaj ratni zločin bez presedana ne bi bilo moguće realizovati i opravdati t.j. podvrgnuti normalizaciji bez mesecima i godinama intenzivno izvođene propagande, zasnovane na govoru mržnje. U tom smislu treba istaći glavnu karakteristiku govora mržnje, a to je činjenica da govor mržnje ne predstavlja isključivo verbalnu aktivnost, već mu je imanentno delovanje na praktičnoj realizaciji verbalnog momenta.

Primeri iz vremena ratnih sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji devedesetih predstavljaju najočigledniju manifestaciju govora mržnje i njegovog uticaja na društvo. Međutim, svakodnevni primeri širenja govora mržnje, podsticanja na obračun ili opravdavanja konflikta sa različitim društvenim grupama, diskriminacije na osnovu etničke, verske, seksualne, starosne ili neke druge karakteristike, prisutni su gotovo svakodnevno u javnom govoru srpskog društva i danas, 14 godina od okončanja ratnih sukoba. Poslednji u nizu slučajeva – kampanja protiv Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava i Sonje Biserko u septembru 2008. godine2 , kao i šovinistički ispad bivšeg ministra Velimira Ilića u vezi proslave Dana državnosti u februaru 2009. godine – samo potvrđuju gornju tezu. Dakle, očigledno je da pojedini delovi javnosti još uvek nisu izvukli neophodne

2 Izveštaj o ovom slučaju objavljen je u publikaciji “Govor mržnje u Srbiji. Napadi na Sonju Biserko kao klasičan primer govora mržnje prema braniteljkama ljudskih prava”, Newsletter No.1, u izdanju YUCOM-a

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zaključke na osnovu iskustva ratova 1990-ih, ili, što može biti značajnije, nisu želeli da ih izvuku...

Projekat Govor mržnje u medijima pokrenut je sa ciljem istraživanja fenomena govora mržnje i njegovog mesta u javnom diskursu, pre svega u medijima, kao društvenom faktoru od najvećeg uticaja na raspoloženje i ponašanje javnosti. Kroz seriju tribina održanih tokom prve polovine decembra 2008. godine u Omladinskom centru CK13, kao i kroz individualni istraživački rad, grupa autora, novinara, lingvista i istoričara pokušala je da definiše pojam govora mržnje, da analizira njegove manifestacije u toku 1990-ih godina, kao i da sagleda njegove pojavne oblike na medijskoj sceni nakon demokratskih promena u Srbiji 2000. godine.

Osnovna ideja projekta, koji od samog početka nije posedovao velike pretenzije, bila je da se pokuša definisati i osvetliti ovaj problem iz ugla različitih stručnjaka, ali pre svega novinara i publicista, kao glavnih aktera medijske scene i, u mnogome, kreatora raspoloženja javnosti. Metodi javnog dijaloga data je prednost u odnosu na metodu individualnih i/ili grupnih istraživanja i utoliko osnovu ove publikacije i predstavljaju transkripti dve javne tribine.

Namera autora ovde iznetih izlaganja i ogleda, kao i namera uredništva, nije bila da se ovom publikacijom zaokruži ova tema ili stavi tačka na njeno istraživanje. Materijal koji ovom prilikom donosi publikacija treba i razumeti na taj način – dakle, kao prilog istraživanju fenomena govora mržnje. Iz tog razloga publikacija i ne može predstavljati okončanje analize i istraživanja, već upravo nagoveštaj njihovog stvarnog začetka.

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Hanna Blank

RATNA PROPAGANDA: MEDIJI KAO INSTRUMENT MANIPULACIJE

Uvod

Mediji igraju ključnu ulogu u periodima konflikata i ratova. Mediji sami ne mogu proizvesti ratove, ali njihova sistematska manipulacija igra značajnu ulogu u planovima ratnih lidera. Uticajni mediji se koriste da bi se stekla podrška javnosti ili barem javno tolerisanje politike koja, u najboljem slučaju, predstavlja pretnju miru i javnoj bezbednosti. Ova podrška ili tolerancija “ne može biti osigurana ukoliko javnost ne prihvati stav da oružani sukob neće predstavljati preveliku cenu za ostvarenje nacionalnih ciljeva” pri čemu su “mediji predstavljali suštinskog pribavljača ovakvog pristanka”1.

Takođe, upotreba medija kao sredstva pritisaka i represije ne predstavlja ništa novo. Kontinuiranu tradiciju autoritarnosti u medijima objašnjavaju reči Konstantina Geberta: “kada prevodite sa rečnika komunizma na rečnik demokratije, morate izmeniti i rečnik i gramatiku... ukoliko želite da prevedete nešto sa rečnika komunizma na rečnik nacionalizma, treba samo da promenite rečnik. Gramatika ostaje ista. ...to je uključenje protiv isključenja i nasilje kao legitiman način ostvarenja prethodno ideoloških, a sada nacionalnih ciljeva”2. Opravdanje autoritarne vladavine se sprovodi kroz manipulaciju strahovima ljudi. Režimi u Jugoslaviji su sistematski razvijali strah od političkog procesa, zato što su znali da “što duže budu sprečavali mase od participiranja u civilnom životu, mogu nastaviti sa vođenjem nekih svojih politika”3.

Metodi i principi ratne propagande u medijima

Činjenica je da javnost ne želi konflikte ili ratove. Ali ova opšta pozicija javnosti može biti izmenjena različitim mehanizmima. Prvi je da se javnost ubedi da jedinu krivicu za konflikt i/ili rat snosi druga strana, da je rat nametnut od strane neprijatelja i da se mora prihvatiti. Konflikt ili rat nije naprosto naš izbor, nego mi moramo da se branimo od njih, da suprotstavimo naš nesebični i dobar cilj njihovim sebičnim i lošim

1 Thompson 1999, p. 291f2 Thompson 1999, p. 293 (K Gebert)3 Thompson 1999, p. 294 (Blagojevic, S and Demirovic, H: Erewhon 1994 Amsterdam)

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razlozima i ciljevima. Takva je bila situacija u Srbiji i drugim bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama u toku 1990-ih godina. Sa jedne strane političari su isticali svoju volju za mirom, ali na drugoj strani i dalje su tvrdili da su bili naterani na rat, da je prvi napad došao od strane neprijatelja, da su morali da se brane, da su postupali u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom itd...4

Zahvaljujući ovoj logici, uvek je postojala jasna slika u srpskim medijima, zato što “srpska strana nikada ne napada; ona odgovara na neprijateljske provokacije, napade, zločine ili genocid”5. U medijima srpske snage su uvek predstavljane kao “nenaoružani branioci vekovnih ognjišta” ili češće skraćeno navođeni kao “branioci” ili paralelno kao “oslobodioci” gradova i sela. U toku prva dva meseca opsade mediji nisu spominjali da je Sarajevo bombardovano od strane srpskih snaga. Upravo suprotno – prema reporterki Radi Đokić – muslimanske vlasti su držale Sarajevo u opsadi iznutra, tako da su Srbi bili u poziciji da brane svoja vekovna ognjišta i vekovna brda oko Sarajeva6.

Poseban primer koji bi potkrepio ovu tezu može se naći u vreme sukoba sa NATO paktom 1999. godine. Na principu okrivljavanja drugog, “drugog koji je sve započeo” argumentacija zapadne vojne alijanse je sledila istu logiku: zato što neprijatelj prezire i potcenjuje našu snagu, mi ne možemo više biti samo posmatrači, već smo primorani da demonstriramo našu snagu7. Na isti način zapadna propaganda je tvrdila da je Jugoslavija provocirala NATO i na kraju isprovocirala vojnu intervenciju. Francuske novine Le Soir su 18. januara 1999. godine pisale da Jugoslavija provocira NATO sa neverovatnim cinizmom i pitale se koliko će dugo najveći vojni savez opravdavati svoju uzdržanost i posmatračku ulogu8.

Obično postoji velik procep između zvaničnih i nezvaničnih ratnih ciljeva. U slučaju rata sa NATO t.j. tzv. intervencije, zvanični ciljevi bili su očuvanje multietničkog karaktera Kosova, prevencija nasilja nad manjinama, implementacija demokratskog sistema i rušenje srpske vlade. Nakon rata bilo je očigledno da većina zvaničnih ciljeva nije ostvarena. Ali, nezvanični ekonomski i geopolitički ciljevi bili su ostvareni, iako nikada pre rata nisu bili spomenuti. Nakon sukoba NATO je stekao značajniji uticaj na jugoistoku Evrope, otvarajući baze u Albaniji, Makedoniji i na Kosovu. Plan iznet

4 Morelli, 2004, p. 15 5 Thompson 1999, p. 906 Thompson 1999, p. 90 7 Morelli 2004, p. 298 Morelli 2004, p. 30

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na konferenciji u Rambujeu pre ratnog sukoba viđen je takođe kao implementacija slobodnog tržišta i uključivanje Kosova u tržište svetskog kapitala9. Na kraju su bombe, koje su dokrajčile jugoslovensku postsocijalističku privredu, predstavljale poslednji korak za otvaranje čitavog regiona prilivu stranog kapitala t.j. za njegovo uključivanje u svetske ekonomske tokove. Prema rečima Džejmija Šeja, portparola NATO pakta, troškovi vojnih operacija će biti pokriveni profitima koji će se dugoročno ostvariti ulaganjima u regionu10. Drugim rečima, sasvim je sigurno da motivi za rat nisu bili humanističke prirode, ali da su ovakvi motivi bili propagirani da bi se uticalo na javno mnenje i stekla podrška za rat11.

Drugi važan momenat mobilizacije javnosti je kreiranje straha. Da bi se država mogla uključiti u rat, veoma je važno da stekne podršku populacije za takav čin. To je razlog zbog kojeg propaganda mora ubediti ljude da su njihovi nezavisnost, čast, sloboda, čak i životi u opasnosti i da rat primorava na implementaciju neospornih vrednosti12. Kroz neprestano predstavljanje i ponavljanje pretnje koja dolazi od strane neprijatelja, postavljen je scenario sveprisutne opasnosti. Opis neprijatelja kao demonske pojave cilja da moralno opravda rat i da postavi kategorije dobra (=mi) i zla (=neprijatelj). Na primer, jugoslovenska novinska agencija Tanjug koristila je 1992. godine krajnje problematične i steretipne termine za oružane snage bosanske vlade: “muslimanske snage, mudžahedini, muslimansko-hrvatske snage, muslimanski ekstremisti, muslimanske paravojne formacije itd”13. Cilj ovakvog pristupa i demonizacije neprijatelja bilo je stvaranje opšteg utiska “da su muslimansko-hrvatske snage prouzrokovale međuetnički sukob postizanjem nezavisnosti bez srpskog pristanka; i da su bosanski Srbi samo reagovali na ovu pretnju i samo se branili...”14.

Značajan momenat predstavlja personalizovanje neprijatelja. Upotreba nasilnih stereotipa kojima se opisuje neprijateljska strana primetna je i u hrvatskim i u srpskim medijima, jednako u štampi, na radiju i televiziji. Na jednoj strani su “srpski teroristi” ili “srbo-komunistička okupatorska armija”; na drugoj strani hrvatske snage se nazivaju ustašama, čime se izjednačavaju sa armijom Hitlerovih satelita iz vremena II svetskog

9 Morelli 2004, p. 5610 Morelli 2004, p. 57 11 Morelli 2004, p. 5812 Morelli 2004, p 4513 Thompson 1999, p. 2614 Thompson 1999, p. 26

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rata15. Ratna propaganda često je koristila rasističku retoriku da bi inkriminisala neprijatelja, što je bilo tipično i za srpsku i za hrvatsku stranu u balkanskom ratu. Upotreba jezika takođe igra važnu ulogu u medijima tokom ratnih sukoba. Na primer, epitet povampireni je predstavljao jedan od omiljenijih u srpskoj ratnoj propagandi. Na primer, Radovan Karadžić, ratni lider bosanskih Srba, “opisivao je rat u Hrvatskoj kao borbu protiv povampirene fašističke svesti”(N Malcolm (1994): Bosnia. A Short History. London, 228)16.

Ovaj propagandni metod predstavlja rat kao konflikt između varvarstva (neprijatelj) i civilizacije (mi). I “u tu svrhu potrebno je potvrđivanje da neprijatelj svojom slobodnom voljom i sistematski čini okrutnosti, dok se na našoj strani događaju “greške” i to isključivo slučajno t.j. bez namere”17. Na taj način ekstremni oblici kriminalnog ponašanja, koji bez sumnje predstavljaju deo svakog rata, postaju ekskluzivni atribut neprijateljske armije. Ovakva armija onda se opisuje kao vojska koja se sastoji od beskrupuloznih i anarhičnih zveri18.

Ključnu ulogu u ratnoj propagandi predstavlja blokada informacija t.j. kontrola, cenzura i prilagođavanje informacija za javnost. Radi konstantne podrške populacije ratnim naporima, potrebno je adaptirati izvesne informacije i interpretacije podataka. Raspon metoda se prostire od proste dezinformacije do ispravljanja informacija, od opisivanja sopstvenih gubitaka u sukobu kao zanemarljivih, a gubitaka neprijatelja kao ogromnih, do prostog ispuštanja negativnih i neželjenih vesti. Kako bilo, medijsko izveštavanje karakteriše manjak odgovarajućih detalja, nepostojanje balansiranog predstavljanja važnih informacija, komentari zasnovani na predrasudama, očigledan govor mržnje i “peglanje” kontroverznih događaja19.

Na primer, NATO pakt je pokušavao da opravda bombardovanja u toku sukoba sa Jugoslavijom, između ostalih stvari, i tvrdnjom da je na ovaj način uništen ogroman broj tenkova Vojske Jugoslavije. Izveštaj Pentagona iz juna 1999. godine je procenio da realan broj uništenih tenkova ne prelazi 14 (a ne 120, kako je ranije tvrđeno)20. Dalje, britanski RAF je priznao 2000. godine da je samo 40% municije, koja je bila izbačena nad jugoslovenskom teritorijom, stvarno i pogodila svoje ciljeve. Sa druge

15 Zimmermann, W. In: Thompson 1999, p. 32816 Thompson 1999, p. 2317 Morelli 2004, S. 5918 Morelli 2004, S. 6119 Thompson 1999, p. 20020 Morelli 2004, S. 93

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strane, jugoslovenski mediji su neprestano objavljivali fotografiju trojice američkih vojnika, uhvaćenih početkom ratnog sukoba. Očigledno je namera bila da se javnost ubedi da je uhvaćeno mnogo više od trojice vojnika. Pred kraj sukoba jedan od istaknutih jugoslovenskih generala tvrdio je da su NATO snage izgubile na desetine aviona, helikoptera i bespilotnih letelica, kao i stotine krstarećih raketa21. Dakle, na obe sukobljene strane ovakvi tipovi informacija imali su za cilj da osnaže moral sopstvenih trupa i da ubede sopstvene populacije u opravdanost konflikta.

U slučaju izveštavanja stranih medija o pojedinim događajima, kada izveštaji nisu mogli biti prepravljani ili ignorisani, srpska državna televizija RTS je, na primer, primenjivala različite taktike da umanji eventualnu propagandnu štetu. Pobijanje stranih izveštaja, kvarenje efekta priče pažljivom pripremom i prezentacijom, premeštanjem na kraj informativnog programa ili slanje paralelnih izveštaja o istom događaju da bi se umanjila snaga autentične informacije, samo su neki od metoda koji su upotrebljavani da bi se negativne informacije odstranile iz vesti22.

Takođe, uobičajenu praksu predstavljale su instrukcije medijima i novinskim agencijama. Na primer, 1999. godine srpsko ministarstvo informisanja je izdalo konkretna uputstva kako da se izveštava o različitim stvarima: na primer, akcije vojske i policije morale su biti predstavljene kao “odbrambene aktivnosti”, dok su NATO snage morale biti opisivane kao “agresori”23. Sličan kod ispravnih naziva i termina bio je postavljen i na hrvatskom HTV-u 1991. godine. Istovetni termini koje je koristio RTS 1999. godine, hrvatska televizija je primenjivala kada je izveštavala o srpskim snagama koje su bile aktivne u različitim delovima Hrvatske24.

Ratovi i konflikti često imaju religijski karakter t.j. dobijaju i određenu versku dimenziju. U konfliktu između Srba i Albanaca, verska osećanja su takođe bila zloupotrebljavana radi kreiranja mi-oni dihotomije. Na primer, srpska propaganda je često referisala na sukob krsta i polumeseca. Pravoslavno hrišćanstvo, kao jedna od osnova srpskog identiteta, dobilo je naročito na značaju kada je trebalo ujediniti srpsku populaciju protiv NATO pakta25. I ovako i onako postojala je velika umešanost crkve i verskih organizacija u rat. Na primer, pojedini biskupi iz zapadne Evrope podržali su

21 Morelli 2004, S. 9422 Thompson 1999, p. 9223 Thompson 1999, p. 11724 Thompson 1999, p. 15925 Morelli 2004, S. 117

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intervenciju NATO pakta u Jugoslaviji, dok su na drugoj strani ruska i grčka pravoslavna crkva podržavale njihovu srpsku pravoslavnu braću26. Ali, u pogledu verskih motiva treba spomenuti činjenicu da će oni biti (zlo)upotrebljeni u toku ratnog sukoba samo ukoliko služe svojoj osnovnoj svrsi t.j. ukoliko učvršćuju propagandne pozicije27.

Ratna praksa pokazuje da se novinari vrlo često mogu naći u poziciji da budu proglašeni za izdajnike. Ukoliko samo obavljaju svoj posao, pokušavajući da saslušaju argumente obe strane i da nakon toga formiraju sopstveno mišljenje ili da makar posumnjaju u zvaničnu verziju događaja, čsto mogu doći u situaciju da se posmatraju kao saradnici neprijatelja28. Većina novinara u zapadnim zemljama tokom 1999. godine imala je mogućnost izbora između prostog prenosa informacija koje su dobijali na dnevnim konferencijama za štampu NATO portparola Džejmija Šeja ili da preispitaju te informacije i da ih kritički komentarišu. Nekolicina novinara koja nije odabrala lakši put morala je da se suoči sa verbalnim napadima i prigovorima da su antizapadnjaci, antidemokrate pa čak i sledbenici Miloševića29.

Na isti način albanski intelektualci sa Kosova, koji su kritikovali zločine i druge kriminalne akte prema nealbanskom stanovništvu, našlo se pod udarom kritika zvanične novinske agencije kosovskih Albanaca, koja je u to vreme bila bliska UČK30. Francuski nedeljnik L’ Evenement od 29. aprila 1999. godine, pod naslovom “Saradnici Miloševića” objavio je fotografije i imena francuskih intelektualaca, pisaca i pevača koji su bili skeptični ili kritični spram intervencije NATO. Šta više, ovaj magazin je napadao druge medije, koji su davali prostora inkriminisanim osobama31. Takođe u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji, novinari su se u slučaju kritikovanja odluka vlade suočavali sa ogromnim pritiskom, kako od strane vlade, tako i do strane drugih novinara. Diskreditovanje novinara kao dezorjentisanih ili nepatriota postala je uobičajena praksa u državnim medijima.

Iz tog razloga značajnu ulogu na javnoj sceni igrali su nezavisni mediji. U toku ratova u 1990-im godinama, u nekim delovima Srbije, uglavnom u Beogradu, postojale su nezavisne medijske produkcije, koje su donosile stavove opozicionih stranaka i otvoreno kritikovale politiku Miloševićevog režima. U takve medije spadali su magazin

26 Morelli 2004, S. 11827 Morelli 2004, S. 11928 Morelli 2004, S. 12429 Morelli 2004, S. 12531 Morelli 2004, S. 126

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Vreme, TV Studio B i Radio B92. Međutim, područje uticaja ovih medija bilo je dosta ograničeno, a svaki pokušaj širenja uticaja bio je sabotiran ili direktno zaustavljan. Režim je pri tome koristio najrazličitije metode: manipulacije sa porezima i troškovima za nezavisne publikacije i emitere, onemogućavanje distribucije štampanih medija van Beograda, stalni pritisak državnih medija na nezavisne izveštače, kao i stvaranje atmosfere fizičke ugroženosti, u kojoj su bili mogući i dešavali se fizički napadi na novinare, pa čak i ubistva32. Međutim, nezavisni mediji, uprkos svim ograničenjima, pritiscima i napadima, uspeli su da opstanu i odigrali su veliku ulogu u rušenju Miloševićeve propagande i njegovog političkog režima.

Bibliografija:

Morelli, A. (2004). Die Prinzipien der Kriegspropaganda. Klampen Dietrich.

Thompson, M. (1999). Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina. University Of Luton Press.

32 Thompson 1999, p. 140

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Transkript tribine:“GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: RATOVI 1990-ih”

08. 12. 2008Omladinski centar CK13

Učesnici:Miloš Pankov (magistar književnosti, Novi Sad)

Senka Gavranov (magistarka lingvistike, Novi Sad)Dinko Gruhonjić (novinar, predsednik NDNV, Novi Sad)

Moderator:Zoran Petakov (istoričar, Novi Sad)

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Zoran Petakov: Dobro došli na prvu od dve tribine u okviru projekta „Govor mržnje u medijima“. Projekat je realizovan od strane Alternativne Kulturne Organizacije i u okviru njega ćemo pokušati da pokrenemo neke teme i pokušamo da odgovorimo na nekoliko pitanja jer poznato je kakav je bio uticaj medija na raspad Jugoslavije. Drugo pitanje koje ćemo pokušati da pokrenemo jeste šta se desilo nakon tzv. demokratskih promena 2000. godine. Da li se uloga medija u društvu promenila ili su oni zadržali svoju ulogu ali su promenili retoriku. Večeras će nam u tome pomoći Dinko Gruhonjić predsednik NDNV, novinar BETE, gospodin Miloš Pankov, magistar lingvistike i Senka Gavranov magistarka engleskog jezika. Moje ime je Zoran Petakov.

Miloše, ti si se dosta dugo vremena bavio i baviš se još uvek tom temom. Pa najpre prvo da definišemo taj pojam koji se toliko upotrebljava u kolokvijalnom govoru „Govor mržnje“ . Šta je to? Šta on podrazumeva? Zašto i kako je sve počelo? Izvoli.

Miloš Pankov: Hvala. Ja bih na početku rekao nekoliko reči o nekim osnovnim stvarima kao što su uloga masovnih medija u modernom društvu, a zatim bi se osvrnuo na neke terminološke stvari. Šta je sam govor mržnje, kako je on definisan, kako se koristi, kako se proširuje putem masovnih medija.

Uloga masovnih medija u modernom društvu

Masovni mediji često se pogrešno povezuju samo sa fenomenom zabave, pa se kao takvi smatraju marginalnim u životu većine ljudi. Međutim, masovne komunikacije su deo ukupnih društvenih aktivnosti. Jedna od njihovih osnovnih uloga jeste informisanje, ali i da svojim angažmanom zauzmu kritički stav prema temama i događajima od javnog značaja i time utiču na kreiranje javnosti, odnosno javnog mnjenja. Ne samo zato što utiču na naše stavove, već i zbog toga što predstavljaju instrumente pristupa različitim oblastima ljudskog znanja. U ranijim teorijama komunikacije mediji su označeni kao posrednik u prenosu poruke/vesti, međutim sa porastom uticaja elektronskih medija i razvojem informacionih tehnologija koje omogućuju gledaocima da budu trenutni svedoci nekog događaja koji se dešava na drugom delu sveta počeo je da raste njihov uticaja na oblikovanje sadržaja poruke koju prenose. Ova pojava navela je Meklauna na zaključaka da je u društvu budućnosti

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došlo do preoblikovanja komunikacionog lanca tako da medij postaje poruka. Uticaj i vlasništvo nad sredstvima informisanja postaju tako ključni instrumenti političke i finansijske moći zbog mogućnosti medija da utiču na kreiranje javnosti i saopšte verziju stvarnosti na veoma ubedljiv i sugestivan način.

S druge strane, neke od savremenih teorija javnosti (Jirgena Habermasa, čije ideje podržava od domaća sociološkinja Zorica Tomić) ističu da upravo širenje masovnih medija i masovne zabave čini da javna sfera postaje obična varka. Javno mnjenje se ne formira na osnovu otvorene diskusije nego putem manipulacije i kontrole. Po mišljenju Bodrijara pojava masovnih medija, pogotovu elektronskih promenila je samu prirodu naših života, jer ne samo da predstavlja svet, već i definiše kakav je svet u kojem živimo. On smatra da se u doba u kojem su masovni mediji sveprisutni stvara nova realnost – hiperrealnost, u kome se prepliću ljudsko ponašanje i medijske slike. Nove oblasti medijskog prostora dovele su i do prekompozicije u sferama javnog i privatnog života. Pojava novih medijskih tehnologija, poput interneta na primer doprinosi demokratizaciji medija i činjenici da vaše mišljenje ili iskustvo predstavljeno posredstvom nekog foruma može biti dostupno milionima širom planete, ali u isto vreme rođena je televizijska publika koja veruje da je legitimna stvar da svaki, pa i najintimniji deo nečijeg života bude dostupan medijskoj publici, posredstvom televizijskih kamera, kao što je i ostvareno u šou programu Veliki brat.

Politički diskurs i medijski diskurs

Kao jedna od metoda za proučavanja upotrebe jezika osnovana je analiza diskursa, disciplina koja proučava upotrebu širih jezičkih jedinica u određenom kontekstu. Jedna od njenih najširih oblasti primene upravo se odnosi na jezik medija i govor medija, kao i na različite društvene sfere upotrebe jezika, poput politike. Savremeni teoretičari medijskog diskursa naročito su se bavili sadržajima medijske poruke u odnosu na društveni kontekst i društvena značenja. Na osnovu socio-kognitivnog modela Teuna Van Dijka dovođenjem vesti u društveni kontekst, na nivoima jezičkih mikro-struktura pokazuje se ostvarivanje društvenih odnosa i procesa. Pristup Normana Ferklafa je po mnogo čemu sličan Van Dijkovom, s tom razlikom što on pokušava u svoj model da inkorporira elemente intertekstualne analize, utvrđivanjem porekla i značenja različitih govornih (diskursnih) žanrova unutar medijskog uzorka. On postavlja tri područja analize medijskih tekstova sa ciljem razumevanja odnosa

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između komunikacionog procesa i socio-kulturnog okruženja. To su problemi :

- reprezentacije (načina na koji je svet ili događaj predstavlja)- identiteta (na koji način su predstavljeni identiteti učesnika u novinskom tekstu)- odnosa (analiza odnosa u komunikacionom lancu medija : odnosi medij–publika,

političar-publika i slično).

Povezanost političkog diskursa sa medijima ostvaruje se zahvaljujući činjenici da se osvajanje i očuvanje društvene moći, u novije vreme, efikasno obavlja uz pomoć medija. Pristup i kontrola medijima govorniku pruža mogućnost da plasira svoje poruke istovremeno pred milionskim auditorijumom. Otuda i sam sadržaj i način oblikovanja političkog govora stoji u sve tešnjoj vezi sa izborom medija i medijskog žanra, kao svojim direktnim komunikacionim kanalom.

Preplitanje govora učesnika u medijskom tekstu ili emisiji veoma je značajno prilikom analize ukupne medijske poruke. Potrebno je razgraničiti šta je stav samog medija, odnosno govor novinara, a šta su delovi drugog govora (posebno političkog govora) koji mediji prenose u direktnoj ili indirektnoj formi.

Govor mržnje

Govor mržnje postao je u novije vreme veoma izlizan i semantički neodređen termin. Veoma često se pozivaju na to da su postali njegove žrtve upravo osobe i politički krugovi koji su ga najčešće koristili, uspevajući prilično vešto da relativizuju njegovo značenje. Ono što je osnovno značenje govora mržnje kao termina (hate speech) o čemu je u domaćoj literaturi najviše govorio i pisao Ranko Bugarski jeste javno etiketiranje, diskvalifikacija i satanizacija određene društvene grupe, koja često može da bude (naročito u ratnim uslovima) i najava moguće fizičke likvidacije. Ovako određen, govor mržnje jeste sredstvo kojim se u mobilizatorske svrhe služi jezik politike orijentisane na ućutkivanje ili odstranjivanje oponenata, često u fazi pripreme za rat ili u toku samog rata, kada govoru mržnje pripada vodeća uloga orkestriranja ratne retorike. Neki od njegovih uzora svakako bi se mogli naći u rasističkoj propagandi Trećeg Rajha, ali nama je svakako najbliži i najočigledniji primer medijsko raspirivanje mržnje koje je prethodilo ratu na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Struktura govora mržnje podrazumeva dve suprotstavljene grupe aktera, pri čemu je govorno lice, bilo da je u pitanju političar, novinar, urednik, ili neka druga javna ličnost, nosilac određenog identiteta i predstavnik grupe MI (koju zastupa on i njegovi istomišljenici), a onaj

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prema kome je usmerena predstavlja grupu ONI ili DRUGI. U osnovi govora mržnje ne postoji tolerancija, poštovanje različitog mišljenja, kulture, identiteta. U toku svojih radova Bugarski je identifikovao različite faze upotrebe govora mržnje na medijskom prostoru Srbije. Od početka pojave ratnohuškačke propagande, koju sam pomenuo grupu MI činili su Srbi, predstavljeni kao patriote, branioci vekovnih ognjišta, žrtve nametnutog rata, nebeski narod i slično. Dok su sa druge strane bili svi oni koji će doći u konflikt sa tadašnjom politikom Miloševićevog režima: drugi jugoslovenski narodi, kasnije svrstani u ustaške koljače, džihad ratnike, šiptarske teroriste i slično. U drugoj fazi grupu MI više ne čini srpski narod, već režim u Srbiji, a na meti su kao ONI Zapadne sile i unutrašnji neprijatelji (opozicione stranke u Srbiji ). Tako su na primer učesnici protesta 1996. godine nakon pobede opozicije na lokalnim izborima: huligani, izdajnici i strani agenti, profašistički elementi, kvislinzi, da bi sa rasplamsavanjem sukoba i izmicanjem vlasti režimski mediji pribegli i agresivnijoj retorici pa su korišteni termini poput: NATO-fašistički šljam, šačica novih janičara, izrodi, moralne nakaze...

Ovo su svakako najočigledniji primeri, koji će nam ostati u pamćenju jer se znatan deo građana tih godina osećao lično prozvanim i ugroženim. Međutim, perfidniji načini pakovanja medijskih poruka i prepoznavanje oblika govora mržnje u društvima koja nisu diktatorska i od strane medija koji slove za demokratske jeste oblast inenzivnog naučnog proučavanja. U zapadnim medijima se kao takva podrazumeva svaka negativna karakterizacija, odnosno širenje stereotipa posredstvom medija usmerenih ka marginalizovanim grupama kao što su: stranci, manjinske zajednice ili žene. Povreda ovih normi podleže kršenju ljudskih i građanskih prava i postoje precizno definisani kodeksi kojih se mediji moraju pridržavati kako bi izbegli ovakve slučajeve. U radovima Van Dijka i Rut Vodak nailazimo na sistematsko proučavanje rasističkog govora, koji je naročito apostrofiran u vreme Hajderove vladavine u Austriji pre nekoliko godina, kada je zbog čitavog slučaja i sama Austrija bila izložena sankcijama Evropske Unije. Kao rasizam u političkom diskursu smatra se svako pominjanje neke zajednice ili naroda kao manje vrednog u odnosu na sopstveni, ili navođenje nekih njihovih osobina u tom značenju. On može biti eksplicitno naveden u medijima u primerima poput :

...Hrvati su genocidan narod

...ali ponekad je za njegovo otkrivanje potrebna dublja semantička analiza

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Ja nemam ništa protiv Kineza, ali je činjenica da sa njihovim dolaskom naši radnici ostaju bez posla.

Etnicizam u jeziku je bio relativno česta pojava u medijima za vreme trajanja ratova na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Rut Vodak definiše ovakav tip diskursa kao blaži vid jezičke agresije od rasističkog govora, navodeći kao primer odnos Srba i Hrvata, čiji su državni mediji često razmenjivali teške optužbe, ali se ona nije mogla nazvati rasističkom propagandom upravo zbog zajedničkog jezika i porekla, koji nije išao u prilog tezama o biološkim superiornostima jednih u odnosu na druge.

Kao posebnu jezičku strategiju desničarskih partija i njima naklonjenih medija, Pol Čilton u analizi političkog diskursa, navodi implikature koje sa formalnog stanovišta ne sadrže negativnu poruku. Informacije, međutim, koje upućuju, recimo na nacionalnu pripadnost aktera događaja, manipulišu svešću publike koja se može dovesti u zabludu da je neki incident nacionalno motivisan.

Kinezi pretukli četiri čoveka u Beogradu (Kurir, 2006. godina)

Kada su američki mediji u pitanju naročito su česta meta manipulacije događaji iz 11. septembra i sve vladine akcije koje su često dovodile do kršenja ljudskih prava skrivajući se iza borbe protiv terorizma, praćene antiislamskim stavovima, ili proglašavanjem sopstvenih političkih protivnika posrednim pomagačima terorista. Veoma je važno zapažanje Van Dijka da je, pri tom, manipulacija javnim mnjenjem efikasnija ako su svi ključni mediji pod kontrolom manipulatora, dok se demokratizacijom medijskog prostora za manipulaciju znatno sužava prostor.

Kao uputstvo za izbegavanje diskriminatorskog jezika naveo bih smernice koje preporučuje Dubravka Valić-Nedeljković u svom Praktikumu novinarstva koji može biti i uputstvo čitaocima/gledaocima za prepoznavanje govora mržnje. U njemu se navodi i Kodeks neseksističke upotrebe jezika Svenke Savić, kao i saveti za nediskriminatorsko izveštavanje u odnosu na rasu :

Spominjite nečiju rasu samo ako je jako bitno

Izbegavati reči koje pripadnici određene rase smatraju uvredljivim (melez,

obojen...)

Ne nagađati o kulturnom poreklu osobe

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U zborniku koji je deo međunarodnog istraživačkog projekta Sppining out of controll ( U Srbiji pod imenom Intima javnosti) objavljene su studije odnosa medija prema sukobljenim stranama u svim konfliktima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Ono što je bio posebno obiman istraživački zahvat jeste usmerenost na što potpuniji jezički korpus, u kome su analizirana izveštavanja više medija (na primer iz Srbije i Hrvatske) i na svakom od njih način prikazivanja sopstvene i suparničke strane u ratu. Jedna od polaznih hipoteza u ovom zborniku bila je činjenica da probuđeni agresivni naboj koji je postao jezik državne propagande često prerasta u spiralu nasilja, te da i sami političari na kraju postaju zatvorenici sopstvenog diskursa.

U delu projekta u kome sam učestvovao kao jedan od autora, a koji se odnosi na sukob između bivše jugoslovenske federacije i Slovenije na putu ove republike ka osamostaljenju, važan metodološki korak bio je upravo razgraničavanje govora novinara od govora drugih lica u vestima i usredsređivanje na analizu jezika samog medija kao jednog od indikatora medijske politike. Na osnovu analize prikazivanja aktera sukoba u televizijskim vestima Televizije Ljubljana i TV Beograd uočeni su početni stadijumi govora mržnje odnosno širenja stereotipa prema pripadnicima drugog naroda sa kojima smo još uvek tada bili, kao i decenijama pre toga, u istoj državi. Kao deo medijske strategije priprema za rat neposredno pre vojne intervencije započeto je sistematsko prenošenje odgovornosti za pojedine događaje sa pojedinih političara na čitav narod i državu i razvijanje negativnog stava prema njima (Slovenija i Slovenci).

U drugoj studiji slučaja kojom sam se bavio a odnosi se na Masakr na Markalama, na delu su u potpunosti primenjeni mehanizmi ratne propagande, kojima se zajedno sa vojnim formacijama, i čitavi narodi proglašavaju neprijateljskim, uz brojne primere širenja etničkih stereotipa. U isto vreme uspostavlja se jedinstvo između medijske publike, samog medija i naroda čiji se interesi propagiraju, zajedno sa njihovim političkim liderima i vojnim jedinicama koje takvu politiku sprovode u delo.

U trećem analiziranom konfliktu promenjen se odnos prema vojnom i političkom rukovodstvu Republike Srpske Krajine, kao jednoj od grupa aktera u sukobu, do tog vremena podržanog, kao dela srpske strane, uporedo sa politikom medija koja više ne daje bezrezervnu podršku nastavku rata, dok se stav medija prema suprotstavljenoj strani (Oni) i dalje zasniva na širenju neprijateljstva prema njihovim vojnim jedinicama, narodu i političkim liderima koji ih predvode.

Najefikasnije motivaciono sredstvo koje su, tom prilikom, koristili mediji odnosi

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se na povezivanje političkih predstavnika druge strane sa zločinačkim simbolima, pokretima i idejama iz perioda Drugog svetskog rata, ekstremističkim i terorističkim organizacijama, manipulišući na taj način ukorenjenim strahovima zasnovanim na istorijskom pamćenju stanovništva.

Kada je u pitanju današnje vreme moja koleginica će vam reći nešto o tome koji su mogući izvori za širenje govora mržnje. Znači jako je važno znati da li postoji određeni kodeks, recimo novinarski, koji će sprečavati novinara odnosno savetovati ih kako da to ne koriste, da li je to zakonom sankcionisano i da li neki viši zakonski akti pružaju određenu inspiraciju za takav govor. Ja vam se zahvaljujem.

Zoran Petakov: Hvala Miloše na iscrpnom prikazu. Dinko, Mi koji imamo dovoljno godina da se sećamo početka ’90ih i izveštavanja domaćih medija o tome kako počinje rat u ex-Yu sećamo se dnevnikovih dodataka koji su trajali satima i u kojima su vrlo eksplicitno bili prikazivani leševi, ljudi koji beže iz svojih kuća itd. Mi smo to gledali sa strane kao konzumenti, međutim, ono zbog čega si ti interesantan sagovornik je što si sve to vreme bio aktivni novinar i ti poznaješ te ljude i sve vreme si situaciju, da tako kažem gledao iznutra. Pa bih voleo da nam malo približiš taj proces koji se odvijao na medijskom prostoru Srbije i novinarima koji su u njemu učestvovali. Definitivno je da lustracija nije sprovedena, niti će biti sprovedena niti je to sad moguće učiniti ali o tome se sada ćuti.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Hvala. Dobro veče svima. Ja sam bio isto i suviše mali da bi se bavio novinarstvom tamo krajem ’80ih i samim početkom ’90ih ali kao pasionirani ljubitelj medija i u to vreme sam znao da ću biti novinar. Sad me Miloš svojim istraživanjima podstakao odnosno osvežio mi neka sećanja kad si govorio o slovenačkom ratu. Priprema za taj rat je počela davno ranije, ja sam tad bio u vojsci, ono kad su Slovenci napustili legendarnu sednicu saveza komunista tad su još bili okrivljeni da su austrijski konjušari, separatisti itd. I tad su ljudi u Srbiji, ne znam da li se toga sećate, zaista je bilo dole slučajeva u Srbiji da su bacali frižidere i veš mašine kroz balkon i prozore u znak protesta, naravno marke Gorenje. Tako da i to smo preživeli. Preživeli smo i to što si rekao za pripremu rata u Hrvatskoj, perjanica je naravno bila televizija Novi Sad današnji tzv. „Javni servis Vojvodine“. Pa sve do trenutaka, iz 1995. godine, toga se sećam kao da je juče bilo, i znam da je u Hrvatskoj u toku operacija „Oluja“, a 4 avgusta, dakle kad je počela operacija na prvom programu RTS

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ide Ruski cirkus. Znači ništa se ne dešava, tad su kolone traktora još uvek stajale na granicama Sloba (Slobodan Milošević) ih nije još pustio u Srbiju zato što nije doneo odluku da li će ih usmeriti ka Kosovu ili će ih pustiti u Vojvodinu. Kad sam spomenuo Vukovar, to me je podsetilo na jedan događaj koji se nedavno desio. Naime, večeras se otvara izložba, festival o ljudskim pravima Vivisekt. Tema je diktatorski režimi, i između ostalog organizatori izložbe su tražili iz arhive Dnevnika, novosadskog lista, fotografije. Pošto Dnevnik ima jako bogatu arhivu fotografija iz svih tih gibanja ’80ih, ’90ih godina i to ne samo na prostoru ex-Yu već i na prostoru čitave bivše istočne Evrope. I otkrili su da jednostavno nema fotografija, nestale su, odnosno nisu nestale nego su uništene. Uništene su ne zato što je to neko namerno uradio, već zato što je neko bio aljkav. I zato što neko nije bio svestan da je to kulturno-istorijska građa i tako da sada jedna od najbogatiji novinskih arhiva fotografija u Srbiji više ne postoji. Ne postoje ni negativi i oni su uništeni zbog aljkavosti i neadekvatnog čuvanja. Ono što je još uvek neproverena priča da je uništena video arhiva, dobar deo video arhive televizije Novi Sad. I to je očigledno uništavano po nalogu odozgo zato što je uništavan tzv. kompromitujući materijal sa vukovarskog i slavonskog, sremskog ratišta 1991. i 1992. godine. Pošto tu ima vrlo zanimljivih lica i vrlo zanimljivog dokaznog materijala koji bi svakako mogao da posluži kao građa specijalnom tužilaštu za ratne zločine. Pretpostavljam da ste imali prilike da čujete ili možda i da čitate jednu analizu medija koja se zove „Rat je počeo na Maksimiru“ to je ona čuvena utakmica Dinamo-Crvena Zvezda. Tad sam bio u vojsci u Zagrebu tad smo srećom imali zabranu izlaska tako da nisam išao na taj derbi. Tad su se potukli navijači između sebe, igrači između sebe i tukli su igrači policiju bio je opšti haos, nije se znalo ko je koga tukao. Nakon toga, bilo je interesentno kako su iz Beogradskog studija izveštavali Marko Marković a iz Zagrebačkog studija, jedan od dotadašnjih mojih idola, kad su sportski komentatori u pitanju, Boris Mutić. Tu vam je već bilo potpuno jasno da su se oni već stavili na stranu Tuđmanovog odnosno Miloševićevog režima i da nedvosmisleno optužuju isključivo drugu stranu za to što se dešavalo. Postoje takođe i vredni filmovi Lazara Lalića koji je nažalost netragom nestao, odnosno ne netragom. Nego je to još jedan dokaz kako se sa ljudima od formata postupa u ovoj državi. Lazar Lalić je uredno skupljao Dnevnike RTS odnosno tadašnje RTV Beograda i od toga su napravljeni filmovi koji se zovu „Godina prva“ , „Godina druga“ i „Godina treća“. Gde zapravo imate bez ikakvih komentara, samo isečke Dnevnika i pratite genezu raspada i genezu mržnje i genezu zločina ako hoćete. Tako da se sve to za onako koga to zanima može

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pronaći. Ja to volim studentima da pokažem pošto i tada od 1989. do 1991. godine pa do samog početka rata ključna reč naravno bila, pogađate Kosovo. I onda oni mene pitaju: „Profesore Vi se šalite sa nama ovo je nešto što je sveže ovo nije iz 1989 godine“.. Ja im kažem: „Ne to je Dnevnik iz 1989. godine“. Dakle, godine kada je i formalno ukinuta autonomija Kosova i kada je policija upadala u Rilindiju, Prištinski list. Jedino se razlikuju policijske uniforme, a komentari i sve ostalo ništa se ne razlikuje i tad je to bila sveta srpska reč Kosovo. Mi možemo da pričamo šta god hoćemo, ja jesam Jugo nostalničar, ali u medijskom smislu ne mogu da kažem da su mediji u eks Jugoslaviji bili slobodni kad nisu. Oni su bili pod jasnom ideološkom matricom kada je politika u pitanju. Kada je kultura i ostale oblasti imali su mogućnosti i to su i radili da prave vrlo vredne medijske proizvode vrlo vredne dokumentarne filmove, vrlo vredne igrane filmove dok u samoj informativnoj sferi apsolutno je postojala cenzura, jasna cenzura SKJ. I kada imate takvu vrstu drila ili treninga tokom 45 godina koliko je trajao „komunistički“ režim onda je savršeno jasno da ako se bavite informativom ako se bavite unutrašnjom politikom, pre svega da vama više ne treba cenzor vi već posedujete čip za autocenzuru upravljate se prema onome ko je na vlasti.

Zoran Petakov: Da li sa tim ima veze i to da je više od 35 hiljada ljudi koji su ostali bez posla samo u Vojvodini onog trenutka kad je Milošević došao na vlast. Jer tu su bili i ljudi koji su bili stručni u svom poslu u radu u medijima njih su prosto počistili iz svih medija. To se ne sme zaboraviti

Dinko Gruhonjić: Nažalost ti su u pravu, ali sa druge strane to je jedna manjina novinara. Znači jedna baš ubedljiva manjina novinara koji su imali hrabrosti da se usude na takav korak i suprotstave se nacionalističkom ludilu to su očigledno bili ne samo vrhunski intelektualci nego i vrhunski profesionalci kako se to kaže i ljudi koji jednostavno imaju čast i obraz i nisu hteli na to da pristanu. Jer mislim da i ko je imao i malo pameti shvatio je šta se dešava. Ne zato što sam ja predsednik NDNV ali mi smo prvo nezavisno udruženje novinara na prostoru čitave eks Jugoslavije. Formirano ’90te godine i formirali su ga upravo ljudi od kojih su neki ovde u publici koji nisu hteli da pristanu na tu vrstu diktature i cenzure. Ovi ostali su očigledno pošli linijom manjeg otpora, ili su pošli ambicijom da će se konačno skloniti najbolji pa da će oni loviti u mutnom i postati izveštači pod šlemom, u uniformi . Bilo je tu i kojekakvih iznenađenja od ljudi za koje smo mislili da su časni i čestiti da odlično rade

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svoj posao da su se pretvorili u neku vrstu monstruma i ratnih huškača. Ovi ostali su bili manje ili više nikogovići koji su kroz rat očigledno kao i u svim ostalim sferama života jednostavno ugledali priliku da preuzmu uredničke funkcije

Zoran Petakov: Još par stvari koje nisi spomenuo. Ti si bio i još uvek si, dopisnik BETE, u to vreme agencije koja nije državna. Znamo svi čitali smo o tome kakvi su sve pritisci bili od pretnji do zatvaranja tzv. slobodnih medija, odnosno medija koji nisu bili na liniji tadašnjeg režima, do ubistva pojedinih novinara koja još uvek nisu rasvetljenja. Uvek je postojala sprega između tih ljudi i opozicije koja je samo koristila politički momenat da se iskaže kao oponent režimu. Ali u nekim slučajevima su ljudi ostajali potpuno sami nezaštićeni, bilo koga ko bi podigao glas kad se to desi. Pre nekoliko dana je bilo deset godinina od gašenja Naše Borbe i ti si tad rekao, i ja mogu da se složim sa tobom da je to bio jedan od najdemokratskijih da tako kažemo najslobodnijih medija u to vreme, ali je činjenica da je on ugašen i da se posle toga nije skoro ništa desilo. Niko nije mnogo protestovao zbog toga. Pitanje je kako se čovek oseća kad radi neki posao koji voli, a na kraju ga svi ostave da se bori sam.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Pa ja sam rekao na toj tribini da Naša Borba po mom mišljenju bila ubedljivo najbolji dnevni list koji smo mi imali ikada, dakle u istoriji srpskog štampanog novinarstva. Ne znam koliko se sećate tih novina ali to su bile novine kojih se ne bi posramile ni puno veće države sa izgrađenim demokratskim sistemom. Još jedan detalj jedna mala digresija da probamo da povučemo paralelu između tog vremena i ovoga sada. Ono što sam ja zaboravio a što su me podsetili na toj tribini je da je Naša Borba imala nešto što se zove nagrada za toleranciju i prve godine je nagradu za toleranciju dobio pokojni Aleksandar Tišma. Druge godine je nagradu za toleranciju dobio studentski protest ’96. / ’97. godine i treće godine je nagradu za toleranciju, sad dobro slušajte u Beogradu dobila Unija albanskih studenata iz Prištine. To sad zvuči kao neverovatan podatak jel možete sad da zamislite u ovom momentu krajem 2008. godine u Srbiji da neka dnevna novina dodeli nagradu Uniji hrvatskih studenata ili bilo kome ko ima veze sa državama u regionu. Ja nažalost ne mogu i to je ono što je rekla gospođa Latinka Perović sama činjenica da je Naša Borba ugušena i ovo što si ti rekao da ni tada nije bilo, a ni sad nema ideje kako da se ona obnovi znači da nažalost ne postoji u društvu potreba za takvom. Uprkos mom

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optimizmu da su stvari sada nakon tih osam godina tzv. demokratskih promena u medijskom smislu čak puno gore nego što su bile. Doduše nemamu više tu vrstu političke represije kao što smo imali u vreme Vučićevog zakona o informisanju, ali imamo Aleksandra Vučića na svim medijima. Nemamo više tu vrstu političkog pritiska kao što smo imali tokom 90-ih godine, ali imamo sofisticirani ekonomski pritisak koji je vrlo jednostavan za objasniti. Dakle, u Srbiji postoji fingirano tržište koje zapravo nije tržište. To je tržište ekvivalentno onome što se u istoriji ekonomije naziva prvobitna akumulacija kapitala sa akcentom na monopole. Znači mi smo trenutno u toj fazi ekonomskog razvoja. Imamo monopol da li gospodina Miškovića, kad je veleprodajni lanac u pitanju ili gospodina Babića, kad su lekovi u pitanju ali gde god se okrenete imate monopol. I sad, tzv. veliki mediji kao što su B92, Pink, kao što su beogradske dnevne novine pokušavaju da žive na tržišnim osnovama, a pošto je nemoguće da se živi na tržišnim osnovama ako nemate tržište onda se suočavate sa problemom da ukoliko pišete o poreklu para Miroslava Miškovića ili Miodraga Babića u vašim medijima nema oglasa. I onda se mi pitamo što u Srbiji nema istraživačkog novinarstva. Vrlo jednostavno zato što Veran Matić neće pustiti novinara, da radi istraživački članak jer će ostati bez nekoliko sati reklama i oglasa od strane kompanije Delta ili kompanije Hemofarm. Tokom 90-ih godina. imali smo medije zbog kojih smo bili u tom smislu fenomen, dakle mi jesmo fenomen za izučavanje i po govoru mržnje definitivno ali smo fenomen i po tome što smo imali i Našu Borbu i B92 i Nezavisni i Vreme. Nezavisni više ne postoji, Vreme ne čitam od ’99. godine sem povremeno zato što sam se razočarao. B92 se silom prilika transformisao u televizuju koja je postala komercijalna, Naša Borba više ne postoji. Ali to jesu bili čestiti primeri novinarstva to jesu bili hrabri ljudi koji su se bavili u najtežim vremenima izveštavanjem o najgorim mogućim stvarima. Pazite Vreme je ’95. godine kada je čitava Srbija glumila ludilo i da ne zna šta se dešava u Srebrenici, Vreme je to imalo na naslovnoj strani. Znači tekstovi i reportaže Dade Vujasinović su bili objavljivani sad pazite u Dugi za koju se ne može reći baš da je bila nešto prograđanski, liberalno orijentisana ali je puštala reportaže. To su bile ratne reportaže Dade Vujasinović koje se danas koriste u procesima pred Haškim tribunalom. Imate njene reportaže i na sajtu www.dadavujasinovic.com, to je njena sestra sve skupljala i objavila. Dakle, da je devojka, pisala sve ovo što smo mi kasnije kao otkrivali kao Škorpioni, sad mi od jednom 2006. godine saznajemo da su Škorpioni čuvali naftu za Goran Hadžića i za ekipu u Slavoniji pa to je Dada pisala još ’92. godine. Sve bilo apsolutno jasno. To jesu čestiti primeri i čini mi se da toga sada

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nema. Sada imamo tzv. medijski pluralizam tzv. fingirani medijski pluralizam koji na neki način zapravo liči na ono što je trend u svetu. Znači svi mi kod kuće manje više imamo kablovske televizije gde vam se desi da prešaltate onih sedamdeset kanala i da ne nađete ništa, apsolutno ništa. Znači da nalazite samo varijacije na istu temu ne računajući Discovery ili National Geographic tako neke zanimljive i non profit kanale. E tako i u Srbiji danas, sve super, podeljene frekvencije, cveta demokratija imate milion medija, a u stvari ne možete ništa da objavite. Ja sam bio u jesen 2006. godine suočen sa najgorom cenzurom u svojoj novinarskoj karijeri. Referendum o Ustavu Srbije nije bilo nijednog medija, nažalost, priznajem i potpisujem koji nije imao dil sa vladom da ne talasa. Niti jednog ja sam morao da u svojoj matičnoj kući pravim gerilske akcije, da pravim talove sa urednicima za koje znam da su normalni da puštamo vesti koje su protivne ustavu iza ponoći kad urednici legnu da spavaju. Ja sam to doživeo 2006. godine, a nisam to doživeo za vreme režima Slobodana Miloševića. Danas kad pogledam ukoričene primerke Nezavisnog od ’97. do ’99. godine pomislim da bi nas danas streljali trideset puta za ono što smo tad objavljivali. Kakve su to bile sprdnje ko je sve pisao za taj Nezavisni od Indire Vlasi do Esada Kočana i sve ljudi „pravovernih“ imena. Toga danas nema, danas postoji fingiranje medijskog pluralizma što je posledica izostanka lustracije, to je posledica opšteg društvenog trenda da se sve baci pod tepih jer potpisali smo deklaraciju o pomirenju i sve je dobro imamo i naprednjake i svetlu budućnost.

Zoran Petakov: Hvala ti Dinko. Mislim da nisi mogao bolji šlagvort da nam daš od ovog Ustava obzirom da Senka ima da kaže nešto baš na tu temu.

Senka Gavranov: Umesto o govora o medijima ja sam rešila da pođemo od jednog dokumenta koji isto ima veze sa javnim govorom a pri tom je pravno konstitutivan za državu. Uradiću jednu analizu, ne bi trebalo da bude puno bolno sa puno gramatike ali čisto da vidite šta se dešava i kakvi su to slojevi ispod određenih površinskih jezičkih struktura. Prećićemo preko preambule Ustava i preko prvog člana Ustava. Samo sam htela da kažem za govor mržnje da član 49. Ustava iz 2006. godine pod nazivom „Zabrana izazivanja rasne, nacionalne i verske mržnje“ kaže: “ Zabranjeno je i kažnjivo svako izazivanje i podsticanje rasne, nacionalne, verske ili druge neravnopravnosti mržnje i netrpeljivosti.“ Znači da zapamtimo zabranjeno je i kažnjivo svako izazivanje i podsticanje rasne, nama je u ovom slučaju bitna nacionalna mržnja zato se vraćamo

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na preambulu Ustava. U preambuli Ustava se kaže „Polazeći od državne tradicije srpskog naroda i ravnopravnosti svih građana i etičkih zajednica u Srbiji“ i onda ide onaj čuveni deo sa Kosovom „polazeći i od toga da je Pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija sastavni deo teritorije Srbije da ima položaj suštinske autonomije u okviru suverene države Srbije i da iz takvog položaja Pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija slede ustavne obaveze svih državnih organa da zastupaju i štite državne interese Srbije na Kosovu i Metohiji u svim unutrašnjim spoljnim i političkim odnosima. Građani Srbije donose Ustav Republike Srbije.“ Imajući u vidu da član 49. zabranjuje bilo kakvo izazivanje i podsticanje nacionalne i verske neravnopravnosti i netrpeljivosti, ja neću da kažem da preambula i prvi član Ustava to rade, oni to ne izazivaju nacionalnu netrpeljivost. Medjutim, ustavopisci u preambuli Ustava dozvoljavaju da određene vrste govora koji diferenciraju građane Srbije po nacionalnoj pripadnosti, postoje zato što je sam donosilac ovog pravno-utemeljujućeg akta Ustavom napravio razliku između dve grupe ljudi. To izgleda ovako u preambuli Ustava u kome se kaže: „polazeći od državne tradicije srpskog naroda“, to je znači jedan princip od kojeg se polazi, princip jedan to je tradicija. Drugi princip je „ravnopravnost svih građana i etničkih zajednica“. Treći princip je Kosovo i on nas u ovom uopšte ne zanima. Ono što nas zanima je šta nama kažu ustavotvorci „državna tradicija srpskog naroda“, za koju ne znamo šta je jer nije definisana već se verovatno oslanja na nekakav kontinuitet, ja sad mogu samo da zamislim šta je. Nisam uradila istraživanje,ali eventualno mogu da zamislim da je to nešto što ima veze sa 1918. godinom ili sa Nemanjićima. To bi bila neka državna tradicija srpskog naroda, moramo da pogađamo jer to u Ustavu nije eksplicitno definisano. Druga stvar, drugi princip je „ravnopravnost svih građana i etičkih zajednica“ ja ne znam da li su ustavotvorci ovako hteli da formulišu, da li je ovo silno moje lingvističko cepidlačenje ali „ravnopravnost svih građana i etničkih zajednica“ u Srbiji naprosto nije sadržano u „državnoj tradiciji“ prema ovakvoj jezičkoj formulaciji. U redu, može i tako priznajemo svoje greške. 1918. godine nisu postojale ideje ravnopravnosti svih etničkih zajednica, ne znam kako drugačije da protumačim, a ovaj dokument ne sme da bude ovoliko otvoren za tumačenja. Međutim, dolazimo do prvog člana Ustava u kome se kaže: „ Republika Srbija je država srpskog naroda i svih grđana koji u njoj žive.“ Šta ovo znači da srpski narod nije u uključen u „svim građanima“ i obrnuto. Ovo obrnuto još može čovek i da razume nisu svi građani Srbi, doduše ne znam zašto bi to bilo važno. Međutim, srpski narod mora biti deo građana. Ono što je ovde trebalo da se stavi u Ustav ako smo već naveli srpski narod, a ne znam

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zašto smo ga navodili, znači „svi ostali građani“ jedino tako je logički, ali je politička implikacija mnogo opasnija. Ja ne znam da li se pravnici bave jezičkim pitanjima, ali morali bi pogotovo u tom najvažnijem zakonskom aktu jedne države. Ono što je jedan od problema sa ovakvom podelom, je što bi srpska država prema Ustavu bila unija svega ovoga: „Republika Srbija je država srpskog naroda i svih građana koji u njoj žive [...] zasnovana na vladavini prava i socijalnoj pravdi i na načelima građanske demokratije.“ Kako je ona zasnovana na načelima građanske demokratije i kako onda Ustav i ustavotvorci definišu građansku demokratiju ako Srbi uopšte nisu građani, kao što je implicirano lingvističkim formulacijama u 1. članu. Između preambule i prvog člana koji kaže: „polazeći od državne tradicije srpskog naroda i ravnopravnosti svih građana i etičkih zajednica u Srbiji“ i onda ide deo sa Kosovom, se dalje kaže: „građani Srbije donose Ustav Republike Srbije.“ Ako su ustavopisci definisali građane Srbije kao „sve ostale koji nisu Srbi“ da li to znači da Ustav donose građani Srbije koji po definiciji iz Ustava nisu Srbi (srpski narod)? Ono na šta stvarno hoću da obratite pažnju ako kažete da je neko društvo građansko vi onda ne možete da delite ljude po etničkom principu vi ste izdvojili srpski narod na etničkom principu, međutim kažete da vam je država građanska demokratija, čemu tu služi etnički princip? Ako ovakve nedefinisane pojmove imamo u Ustavu, ako se ljudi dele prema nacionalnoj osnovi u najvišem konstitutivnom aktu jedne države zašto se onda pitamo i dikutujemo o tome zašto novinari pišu tako kako pišu. Zašto se kada je kriminalac, recimo romske nacionalnosti uvek napiše da je neko Rom, a kada je to Srbin onda se to ne napiše. I sad, čitajte svaki dan u šest različitih časopisa da je kriminalac, lopov, silovatelj Rom ili Albanac. Vi ćete to onda da krenete da pamtite kao nekakvu matricu to postane deo društvene svesti, mentalne percepcije o celoj jednoj grupi ljudi: „Romi, Albanci i ostali ne-Srbi ubijaju“. A ostali kad ubijaju, siluju su nacionalno neodredjeni. Dvostruki standardi u izveštavanju. Na kraju krajeva, ili na početku svega, zašto je uopšte relevantno ko je koje nacije? Kad je to relevantno? Relevantno je kada je neko žrtva zločina mržnje, kada je neko pretučen zato što je Rom ako je njegova etnička pripadnost bila motiv za taj zločin. Verujem kada bi neko seo i uradio jako ozbiljnu jezičku analizu da bi se tačno moglo videti koje su to političke strukture koje su insistirale na tome da se uvede reč srpsko, srpski narod u Ustav. Verovatno da je to bio DSS. Gde su pokušavali da pomire tzv. građansko demokratsku struju među ustavopiscima i onu koja je nacionalistička. Ako vi napravite član 49. u kojoj zabranjujete netrpeljivost samo kad je direktna i eksplicitna a dozvolite da se ljudi dele po nacionalnom ključu implicitno

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u Ustavu onda sami sebi skačete u stomak, i pri tom ste društveno neodgovorni jer šaljete oprečne signale. Podela stanovnika Srbije na srpski narod i građane nije govor mržnje još jednom govorim, preambula i prvi član Ustava nisu govor mržnje, ali su oni taj pogled na svet, na društvo, na državu i implicitno dozvoljavaju razvijanje govora mržnje kroz recikliranje podela ljudi prema nacionalnoj pripadnosti. Toliko za sad.

Zoran Petakov: Hvala Senka. Želeo bih da ti postavim još jedno pitaje jer znam da si se i time bavila a sad si se i dotakla toga u jednom trenutku. Kada se recimo u Srbiji sukobe dve grupe mladića, pa je neko pretučen neko je uboden nožem.Onda se u vestima pojavi da su se u sukobu dve grupe mladića u kojem je korišteno hladno oružje povređeno dvoje ljudi. Međutim kada se sukobe negde gde je izmešano stanovništvo onda se uopšte nisu sukobile dve grupe mladića nego su se sukobili npr. Srbi i Mađari. Znači to što si ti primetila primećujemo svaki dan u određenim medijima. Kako to može da deluje, to si počela da pričaš pa bi voleo da nastaviš o tome, na nekog ko svaki dan sluša takve stvari ili bolje reći konzumira.

Senka Gavranov: Članovi Ustava koji se tiču sprečavanja diskriminacije su veoma dobri. Međutim, ako imate preambulu i prvi član od kojeg polazite i definišete svoju državu na jedan način naprosto mi deluje licemerno da ste posle tvrdili nešto drugo. A što se tiče diskurzivne prakse i izveštavanja medija kad dođe do sukoba na nacionalnoj, rasnoj osnovi, zbog nečijeg seksualnog opredeljenja i ostalog tu postoji, par stvari i par strategija koje su već proučavane u drugim medijima. Jedna od strategija je manipulacija aktiva i pasiva i ukoliko uzmimo primer: „Amerikanci su bombardovali Irak“ ako hoćemo da kažemo u medijskom diskursu i ako želimo da iznesemo tačnu vest reći ćemo: „Amerikanci su bombardovali Irak“. Tu se zna ko je vršio određeni akt ko preuzima odgovornost za to što je urađeno: subjekat rečenice, odnosno Amerikanci. Ako hoćemo da izbegnemo imenovanje aktera, subjekta, odgovornih osoba ili grupa, reći ćemo: „Irak je bombardovan“. Naprosto prebacimo rečenicu u pasiv. Ako hoćemo potpuno da izbrišemo bilo kakvu odgovornost iskoristićemo bezličnu formu, glagol bezlični i reći ćemo: „Bombardovanje Iraka se desilo“. To ćete čuti i za ratove na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije gde će se reći: „Desio se rat“. Rat se ne desi, postoje akteri postoje žrtve. To je manipulacija aktivom i pasivom ili kad je u pitanju nominalizacija. Od glagola bombardovati npr .“Amerikanci su bombardovali...“, napravi se imenica „bombardovanje (Iraka)“ gerundiv, ustvari glagolska imenica. Šta

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mi saznamo iz ovakve konstrukcije? Da se bombradovanje desilo. Dobili smo deo informacije. Da bi se ovakvo, u suštini pristrasno, a nikako objektivno izveštavanje izbeglo, naprosto mora da se kaže kaže se ko je uradio šta. Stane se iza svoje reči i svog dela. Morate da budete za nešto odgovorni ljudi se ne pretuku sami kao što bi se iz izveštavanja medija nekad dalo zaključiti. Još jedan primer u seksističkom govoru, zamislite da muž pretuče ženu, ona leži onesvešćena, on zove hitnu pomoć i ne kaže „Ja sam pretukao ženu“ već „Moja žena je pretučena“. Znači izbegne odgovornost, pa i kaznu za ono što je uradio.

Zoran Petakov: Hvala ti Senka. Naravno sad su na redu vaša pitanja ukoliko ih ima. Izvolite.

Pitanje 1 (Branislava Kostić): Vratimo se govoru mržnje. Ovde smo čuli sjajna izlaganja ali ja bih jako velela da se vratimo temi. Pa krenemo recimo od primera koje smo čuli večeras. Problem govora mržnje je što je strašno lepljiv i to što stvara kontekst govora mržnje. Šta je ovde problem? Prvo, mediji postoje na tržištu, rekoste i sami, odnosno neophodna su neka sredstva. U diktatorskim režimima obezbeđuje ih svojim kanalima sam režim a u navodno demokratskim društvima finansiraju se na tržištu. Dinko, zašto su mediji ’95. godine mogli da pišu to što smo pisali, sve te godine? Zato što su dobijali pare iz inostranstva to je tako jednostavno. Danas nemamo više tih para pa mora Big Brother, Trijumf i sve ostalo da bude na B92. Zašto je govor mržnje ovde bitan? Šta je on uradio raspadu Jugoslavije? Uradio je jednu ključnu stvar, ’89. godine tačnije krajem ’89. godine istraživanje javnog mnjenja urađena na teritoriji cele ex-Yu, validan uzorak u svim Republikama i Pokrajinama, pokazivao je 79% građana te tadašnje SFRJ je bio za opstanak u toj državi. Nacionalna distanca je bila na marginama osim prema Albancima i Romima i to ne u svim sredinama. Znači, nauka bi rekla ovde ne može da dođe do nacionalnog sukoba, etničkog sukoba, ne može da dođe. Ista stvar je važila i u Bosni. Je li došlo do krvavog rata u Bosni? Jeste. Kako se desilo da su za godinu dana ti isti građani te iste SFRJ krenuli da se ubijaju. To je sad problem. To je pitanje govora mržnje. Kako je govor mržnje postao tako moćan? Kako su mediji mogli za godinu dana potpuno da preokrenu javno mnjenje? Kako su to mediji uradili? Dinko je rekao jedan deo toga. Šta je problem sa našim govorom sada u medijima? Ako je u društvu govor mržnje dopušten, a dopušten je, onda je dopušten i u medijima. Ajde sad da budemo jasni; govor mržnje Ustavom nije

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dopušten, postoje tri zakona koji regulišu medije u našoj zemlji: Zakon o radio difuziji, Zakon o telekomunikacijama i Zakon o javnom informisanju. Svi izričito zabranjuju govor mržnje, ali ima jedno veliko ALI. Svi zabranjuju govor mržnje ali nema sankcije za to. Govor mržnje, kad se pojavi na jednoj strani izaziva govor mržnje i na drugim stranama, da kažemo u množini. Medijski sistem Srbije isto kao i Hrvatske i drugih delova koji su nastali iz bivše Jugoslavije takođe je nastajao u ratnim uslovima kao posledicu toga imamo da govor koji u svim zemljama od kako uopšte postoje zemlje, države uobičajeno i normalno da u vreme ratnih konflikata neprijatelj postaje onaj koji je naša suprotnost i svojim građanima moramo da objasnimo da je časno, da je pošteno, da je bitno, da je obavezujuće da se borimo protiv neprijatelja. Neprijatelj je uvek oličenje zla u svim ratovima u svim zemljama bitno je da njihovo javno mnjenje da počne da percipira neprijatelja kao oličenje zla. U SFRJ se ’89. i ’90. godine desilo da govor mržnje u svim sadašnjim zasebnim državama, nekada republikama imao samo jedan cilj, a to je da stigmatizacijom makar i kroz izmišljanje novih termina onu drugu stranu okarakteriše ne samo kao neprijatelja već kao oličenje zla. Pa su za Hrvate Srbi bili koljači, a za Srbe Hrvati su bili koljači i ako su uz potpuno istu muziku kretali jedni na druge. Znate ona pesma koja se u Srbiji peva kao „Marširala, marširala kralja Petra garda“ u Hrvatskoj je u isto vreme pevana kao „u boj u boj za narod svoj“ na potpuno istu melodiju. Cilj medija odnosno govora mržnje bio i sad je okarakterisati drugu stranu kao zlo kao nešto protiv čega čovek treba da ima otpor iako je častan treba protiv toga da se bori. Govor mržnje je uvek signal, a vrlo često je i okidač za pravo na činjenja zla drugoj strani. Problem govora mržnje uvek je isti. Onoga ko je suprotan od nas onoga ko je ONI bez obzira da li je druge vere, nacije ili samo mislio drugačije govorom mržnje okarakterišemo kao zlo. Protiv koga ova naša strana treba da se bori svim sredstvima. To je govor koji je još uvek prisutan ovde jer u našem političkom govoru ali na žalost generalno u našem javnom govoru još uvek postoji taj relikt ratnog javnog govora, a to je da je svaki neistomišljenik istovremeno neprijatelj, a prema tome on nije ljudsko biće on nije vredan čovek.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Ti se sećaš sigurno, a ja kao Bosanac to i znam da je jedan od prvih ciljeva bivše JNA u BiH bilo zauzimanje repetitora. Ponoviću oni su prvo zauzeli repetitore pa su se desile posle toga i Prijedor i Sarajevo i Srebrenica. U mojoj Banja Luci u kojoj smo tada gledali, do tad gledali iz čisto geografskih razloga, TV Sarajevo 1 i 2 i TV Zagreb 1 i 2, zato što nam je Zagreb bliže od Beograda. Od jednom smo

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dobili TV Beograd u jesen ’91. godine. Ja isto nisam sklon da krivim medije, mediji su zapravo tu bili samo nož ili čekić u rukama političara. Zašto su oni baš zauzeli repetitor? Neki dan sam čuo podatak iz istraživanja da ljudi u Srbiji danas televizuju gledaju u proseku nešto manje od 5 sati dnevno. Meni je to zastrašujući podatak to je horor. Tako da je televizija postala i tada je bila instant za vaš život. U tradiciji autoritarnih režima i u tradiciji naroda koji su izloženi takvim režimima TV ima isti autoritet kao što ima vlast. Jer oni percipiraju TV kao neosporni autoritet preko koga vam se obraća predsednik države. A kao što je poznato u tradicijama ovih naroda država je majka. A majku se ima slušati, pa samim tim TV se ima slušati. Pa će te i danas čuti kad priča neki priprost čovek neku neverovatnu priču a vi ga pitate odakle to znaš on će reći : “Reklo je na televiziji“. Pazite to bezlično to itekako ima veze. E zato su oni zbog tog „reklo je na televiziji“ osvojili prvo repetitore da bi ovo sve posle toga bilo moguće u BiH u Hrvatskoj itd.

Krivična odgovornost za novinare to je pitanje koje smo mi isto kao udruženje i posle 5 oktobra postavljali kao neku vrstu lakmus papira i probnog balona. Osnovna stvar recimo niko pred Haškim tribunalom sem Florens Artman koja će na proleće da odgovara ali iz nekih drugih razloga, niko pred Haškim tribunalom nije optužen od novinara sa prostora bivše Jugoslavije. Ja sam sa ljudima iz tribunala pričao i oni kažu da je bilo pokušaja da se sačini optužnica protiv perjanica ratne propagande kakvih je nažalost bilo dosta. Međutim, tu je trik, po njihovom pravničkom razmišljanju, zapravo u tome što mora da se dokaže njihova krivična odgovornost. Sad plastično da pokažem direktnu vezu izmeđe Milijane Baletić one legendarne scene kad dolazi da pravi reportažu iznad Dubrovnika između toga što je ona izgovorila i konkretne žrtve granate koju je taj vojnik ispalio. Eto to je ta pravna začkoljica kada su novinari u pitanju. Za razliku od bivše Jugoslavije, tribunal za Ruandu je osudio dvojicu novinara. Tamo je bila izvesna radio stanica koja je otvoreno pozivala na genocid, oni su otvoreno, ovi naši su se kao nešto uvijali, ali ovi su otvoreno „ubijte ih kao bubašvabe“, „ne ubijajte ih puškama nego koristite mačete“ znači otvorena uputstva za ubistvo i oni nisu imali problema da podignu optužnicu protiv te dvojice idiota. Nisu imali problem zato što je dokaza bilo na pretek i mogli su da povuku tu paralelu između onoga što su ovi govorili na radiju i onoga što je bila konkretna akcija na terenu a to je rezultiralo sa blizu milion ubijenih.

Što se tiče govora mržnje i ovoga što ti kažeš moram priznatio da se u finesama ne slažem sa tobom. To je kao ono kad Peru Lukovića opužuju, to je bila divna scena u

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školi za demokratiju Helsinškohg odbora za ljudska prava Pera je došao verovali ili ne da drži predavanmje mladim studentima o govoru mržnje. I krene Pera u epopeju sve po spisku konkretna imena i majku i oca, ova deca koja imaju 17, 18 godina oni gledaju i ne mogu da veruju. Oni ne znaju ko je Pera Luković ne znaju genezu uopšte o slučaju i završi Pera predavanje i reče: „Ajmo sad ko ima pitanja?“. Oni tako pokunjeni, tek jedan tako dečko stidljivo diže ruku „izvinite gospodine Lukoviću a da li je to sad što ste vi koristili govor mržnje“ kaže Pera: „Nije“, „ti ćeš meni da je to govor mržnje“, još napadne dečka. Pera je zapravo neka vrsta megafona onoga što svi mi mislimo. Ja živim u društvu gde mi je komšija ispod mene bivši novinar TVNS dobro poznati huškaš, on živi u mojoj zgradi ispod mene uživa u penzionerskim danima, komšija iznad mene bivši oficir Užičkog korpusa o kojem neću da trošim reči šta je uradio. Dakle, ja živim u sendviču između potpukovnika i ratnog huškaša i sad da ne upotrebljavam govor mržnje pa ja ga ne bih upotrebljavao da su oni krivično odgovarali ili moralno odgovarali ali kao čovek ja moram da upoterebljavam takav govor. I uvek se setim i iskoristim to kao zgodan argument za odbranu od toga, recimo kad su Tomasa Mana pitali o nacistima on bi psovao. Zašto? Kad su ga pitali zašto psujete gospodine Tomase Mane kad ste vi otac moderne nemačeke književnosti, nemačkog jezika on kaže zato što stoka i bagra drugi jezik ne razume. To što ovo društvo nije bilo dovoljno jako da izvrši lustraciju, barem lustraciju u pravosuđu, danas jedemo plodove toga. Mi živimo u društvu u kojem je savršeno normalno zvati Mladena Obradovića iz „Obraza“ ili Firera i to u bioskopu Rex i zovu mene da učestvujem tu kao da budem druga strana. Kome druga strana? Pa MUP Srbije ovakav kakva jeste njih okarakterisao kao klero fašističke i neo nacističke organizacije. Nije sloboda govora dati fašistima pravo da govore. Fašisti su neprijatelji demokratije koji zaslužuju pendrek . A ne da ga dovodite na medije i da se onda mene optužuje kako ja koristim govor mržnje prema bitangama. Pa koristiću ga uvek. To što Komrakov nije lustriran, krivično nije odgovarao da sad budem maksimalno patetičan za svu onu nejač koju su pobili to nije moja krivica, ali pošto ja to znam pošto sam bio svedok vremena kao građanin imam pravo da barem kažem javno ko je taj čovek i da pri tom ne budem optužen za govor mržnje. Hvala.

Senka Gavranov: Govor mržnje morate biti jako jasni to je upereno protiv grupa ili pojedinaca koji pripadaju grupi koja je recimo različita po rasi, etnicitetu, seksualnoj orijentaciji, po polu, po godinama ili koja pripada drugoj lingvističkoj grupi. Ja na

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primer nikog ne bih ni uvredila, ja ne verujem da bi nekome mogla da kažem da je krava ili konj ili nešto slično naprosto ne mogu ali to je i dalje uvreda to nije govor mržnje. Zato što je ono čega se ja bojim banalizacija govora mržnje to je druga strana. Ja vas razumem ali vi možete ovde da se pozivate na kulturu, poštovanje jedni drugih, na kurtoaziju, na etiku, na bilo šta drugo ali ne možete na govor mržnje u slučaju Dinka Gruhonjića . Ja se slažem da se ne koriste ružne reči da se ne koriste uvrede. Ali ne smete uvredu nazvati govorom mržnje jer ste je trivijalizovali.

Branislava Kostić: Jezičke analize govora mržnje pokazuju zaista da ima kod nas dosta mešanja stigmi koje imaju, koje su na privatnoj osnovi i ostalo sa govorom mržnje. Ali naši zakoni koji se tiču medija vrlo su precizni u tom definisanju govora mržnje. Ponavljam ono što je kod nas problem i što Dinko sa pravom kaže to je ne samo da nije bilo lustracije već prosto naša javnost nije bila spremna da uradi analizu delovanja medija na jedan krajnje transparentan način. Ovo opravdanje koje je rekao Dinko potpuno poštujem ali sa druge strane neko će verovatno imati hrabrosti u nekom momentu da postavi pitanje. Da li zaista Pera Luković u ime svega onoga čime nas je sve zajedno zadužio u nekom drugom vremenu ima neograničeno pravo vređanja svi onih koji mu u datom momentu dođu pod ruku. Ali to nije tema ove tribine.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Pera Luković je pisao žanr tokom ’90ih, Pera Luković je oduvek takav. Sad neću da budem ovde advokat Pere Lukovića, ali ono što hoću da kažem je da je Miodrag Popov u post peto oktobarskoj Srbiji dobio slučaj protiv Pere Lukovića na sudu. Taj isti Miodrag Popov što je došao u uniformi što je izveštavao sa onim šlemom. I sad Pera dođe i kaže pa ljudi moji da li ste vi normalni, na sebi svojstven način, pa taj je čovek bio ratni huškač. To je jauk, arlauk koji je on imao hrabrosti da umesto mene izgovori. I ovaj ga tuži za uvredu i klevetu i dobije i nikom ništa. Ne samo nikom ništa nego Pera Luković posle 5 oktobra više nije mogao nigde u Srbiji da objavljuje. Niko nije hteo da objavljuje Perine tekstove. Znači objavljivao u Feralu, objavljivao u BiH Danima i evo sad ima e-novine. Tako da opet se vraćam priču oko nepravde, a Pera je uvek tako pisao. I ona „Ćorava kutija“ ako se sećaš u Vremenu, a sećaš se to je bila sotira tako se zove taj književni žanr. Znači, neka vrsta teške satire u kojoj je delio uloge tadašnjim političarima i sprdao se sa njima na jedan jako zabavan način i Feral mu je izdao knjigu koja se zove „Godine raspada“ koja može da služi kao

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neka vrsta zanimljive istorije ovih prostora. On je oduvek tako pisao, čak bi mogao i sa pozicije književnog žanra da ga branim i da kažem da to nije mržnja.

Miloš Pankov: Evo i ja bih hteo da odgovorim na deo pitanja koji se tiče te čuvene dileme kako su narodi od jednom postali žrtve govora mržnje. Jedan deo mog istraživanja se naravno odnosio i na to ja nisam detaljnije o tome govorio u uvodnom izlaganju. Ali ako ćemo već o tome govoriti postoji precizna hronologija koji su bili stepeni u razvijanju tih stereotipa. U prvobitnoj fazi kada se bavimo analizom određenih aktera i radnji u sukobu kad polazimo od nekih neutralnih novinarskih formi, normalno je reći da su vojne formacije izvršile neke operacije ili da je nešto urađeno i da su dve vojske konkretno na bojnom polju u nekoj akciji to je jedna situacija potpuno neutralna i to nije nešto što je nenormalno. Dakle, postoje i takvi načini ratnog izveštavanja. Međutim, ono što su prvi znaci govora mržnje kada počne da se koristi umesto konkretnik ličnosti ,evo kad je u pitanju slovenački rat Kučan ili slovenačko rukovodstvo itd., slovenci su takvi oni nas ne vole oni hoće da se ocepe, pa zatim počne polako da se koristi čitava Slovenija je takva. Na suprotnoj strani imamo takođe fenomen balkanizama. Dakle u zapadnim medijima uopšte u zapadnom diskursu postoji taj fenomen orijentalizma, kako ga je nazvao Said, a koji takođe primenjivan na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije kada se napravio stereotip Balkana i balkanizma gde su stanovnici Srbije i navodno primitivnijih republika postali žrtve takvog stereotipa. Primitivni ljudi koji nisu dovoljno dobri za Evropu koji nisu dorasli evropskom društvu i to je nešto što je primenjivala recimo slovenačka televizija. Dotle se stiglo u desetodnevnom ratu koji je veoma kratko trajao i završio se tako da su se domaći političari i sa slovenačke i sa srpske strane ponašali kao da žele sve da zaborave. Podeljene su teritorije podeljena je vojska i dalje su svi išli svojim putem. Dalje faze su primenjivane u BiH i Hrvatskoj na taj način što su od odgovornosti čitavih naroda i država počele da se prave određene metafore. Tu već bili muslimani nego su bili mudžahedini, recimo nisu više bili Srbi već su bili četnici itd. Da se vratim na ovu socio-kognitivnu teoriju Van Dika jedno moje zapažanje koje se dosta oslanja na njegove teorijske postavke jeste da je motivacija za taj govor mržnje upravo ukorenjeni strahovi i istorijsko pamćenje stanovništva. Namerno su birani pojedini izrazi i pojedini motivi koji su ostali u nekom istorijskom pamćenju iz vremena Drugog svetskog rata npr. koji su mogli da se iskoriste u pojedinom momentu i da ponovo pokrenu te stare strahove i da poseju među ljudima mržnju. Naravno pošto je izvršena odgovarajuća

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medijska vojna i druga priprema.

Zoran Petakov: Dobro mislim da se više niko ne javlja za pitanja ili konstataciju? Ne. Dobro. Hvala vam što se bili. Sledeće nedelje u isto vreme na istom mestu se bavimo takođe govorom mržnje ali ovaj put posle 5 oktobra 2000. godine na koji način se govor mržnje i dalje koristi u našim medijima posle tzv. demokratizacije društva i pobede tzv. demokratskih snaga na izborima 2000. godine.

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Transkript tribine:“GOVOR MRŽNJE U MEDIJIMA: SRBIJA POSLE 5. OKTOBRA”

16. 12. 2008Omladinski centar CK13

Učesnici:Teofil Pančić (novinar časopisa Vreme, Beograd)

Tomislav Marković (zamenik glavnog urednika web magazina e-novine, Beograd)Petar Atanacković (istoričar, Novi Sad)

Moderator:Miloš Perović (sociolog, Novi Sad)

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Miloš Perović: Dobro veče i dobrodošli na drugu tribinu u vezi govora mržnje koju organizuje Omladinski Centar CK 13. Ovoga puta su sa nama Teofil Pančić, novinar i kolumnista nedeljnika Vreme, Tomislav Marković, takođe novinar i zamenik urednika e-novina i gospodin Pavel Domonji je bio sprečen da dođe, pa će ga ovaj put zameniti Petar Atanacković, istoričar i takođe saradnik e – novina. Dakle, prošli put smo definisali pojam govora mržnje i pričano je o govoru mržnje u medijima u doba ratova u eks Jugoslaviji i nekakav zaključak je bio da je, da smo tada mogli da vidimo drastičan primer kako ono što počinje u javnom govoru na kraju prelazi u dela sa nesagledivim posledicama. Dakle, danas, pošto smo obradili taj period naše bliže istorije ovoga puta ćemo pričati o govoru mržnje u medijima nakon 2000. godine i takozvanih demokratskih promena u srpskom društvu. Prvo pitanje sa kojim bih ja počeo i koje bih postavio gospodinu Pančiću, je, dakle, šta se promenilo u javnom govoru nakon 2000. godine, pošto čini se da je forma promenjena ali ne i suština, ponekad se čak čini da je situacija još gora nego devedesetih i da je danas puno opasnije kritički nastupati spram nacionalističke ideologije i njenih medijskih agitatora. Dakle, šta se i da li se nešto bitno promenilo u javnom govoru nakon 2000. godine.

Teofil Pančić: Pa bilo bi dosta teško odgovoriti na to pitanje nekako jednoznačno nekim prostim da ili ne, pa to onda obrazložiti u nekoliko rečenica. Meni se čini da su tu stvari dosta komplikovanije. Dakle, s jedne strane svakako da je period posle 5. oktobra obeležen daleko većom slobodom javnog govora i nekakvim izraženijim medijskim pluralizmom i time da su recimo pale, uslovno rečeno, neke tvrđave dotadašnje, je li, najtvrđih medija režimskih koji su postojali i koji su kontaminirali javni prostor i to izgleda kao neka forma uspeha. I to je nešto što je možda u neko prvo vreme nakon 5. oktobra funkcionisalo. Međutim, pokazalo se brzo da zapravo imperija uzvraća udarac dosta uspešno. Uzvraća ga na nekoliko načina. Jedan od načina je pojava ovih potpuno trovačkih, kvazipolitičkih tabloida koji su zapravo premrežili prostor. Ti ako pogledaš u devedesetim godinama tih tabloida praktično nije bilo. Svi su oni fenomen dvehiljadite. Uzmi Kurir, Nacional, onaj sad pokojni Press, mislim sve te varijante, kako se zvao onaj, Centar, mislim sva ta čuda, sve je to zapravo nastalo u tom post petooktobarskom periodu, čak većina toga u periodu posle smrti, odnosno ubistva Zorana Đinđića. Dakle, to je način na koji ono što je ranije šireno pre svega preko RTS ili Politike i tako dalje se sada preselilo u tabloide, a preselilo se na drugi

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način i na internet, ali o tome ćemo kasnije, je li. I mislim da je u tom smislu taj neki govor mržnje zapravo dobio, ja to kažem on se preselio u taj čudesni svet privatluka i dobio čak dodatni zamah i dobio jednu formu koja je do te mere usmerena ka onim najnižim instinktima mase, da je u tom smislu daleko efikasniji i prodorniji od onoga što je bio ranije. U tom smislu mi se čini da je učinjen neki korak unazad. Naravno, neko bi sad mogao reći, ali to ti je jedna nus pojava slobode. Ima i u tome neke istine. Ali, ova vrsta slobode ti je sloboda bez suvislih pravila. Kao kad ne bi razlikovao fudbalsku utakmicu koja se bazira na izvesnim pravilima koja se moraju poštovati u interesu svih strana, je li, kad bi to recimo poistovetio sa time da dođu neka 22 klipana na livadu pa krenu da se biju. I sad kažeš, dobro, pa to je mislim legitimno, došli ljudi da se biju i imaju pravo na to. Pa dobro, nemaju! Mislim, ako želimo da živimo u suvislo uređenoj društvenoj zajednici, onda zapravo nemaju. Dakle, moraju da postoje neka elementarna pravila igre, ne u smislu da se sad neko igra velikog cenzora, nego u tom smislu da se zna šta su stvari koje prosto etički i civilizacijski nije dopušteno činiti drugim ljudima. I to je ono gde je zapravo srpska medijska scena pala. Dakle, ona je pala na toj tački da je jedan infantilni izgovor za sve “pa ljudi tako žele” ili “svako ima pravo na svoje mišljenje”, pa ne znam, neko je za genocide, neko protiv, pa su to sad dva ravnopravna mišljenja, pa ćemo mi sad da razgovaramo o tome i tome slično. Znači ta vrsta pseudo debatnog nihilističkog pristupa u kojem su sve vrednosti izjednačene što zapravo nije ništa drugo nego zapravo ukidanje svake mogućnosti da nekakve vrednosti uopšte postoje u društvu, to je ono što je za mene generalna slika nakon 5. oktobra. Dakle, ako smo do 5. oktobra imali jedan centar moći koji je bio užasan, pa smo mogli lepo da ga mrzimo, je li, ovaj i koji je diktirao, dominirao, cenzurisao, koji je usmeravao jedan dobar deo medijske scene na svoj način, nakon 5. oktobra došlo je do njegove decentralizacije i njegovog seljenja u takozvani privatni sector gde je on mnogo manje ranjiv jer on nema jednu glavu i ti nemaš jednog određenog, jasno fiksiranog neprijatelja kao što si imao u vreme Miloševića i on zapravo može da se širi na sve strane. Naravno, da se razumemo pokazuje se i da ta vrsta govora uvek ima dovoljno konzumenata, što takođe nije za zanemarivanje ovaj put.

Miloš Perović: Da, upravo delom ovih odgovora je dat dobar šlagvort za sledeće pitanje koje ću postaviti gospodinu Atanackoviću, a to je upravo to o čemu je Teofil malopre pričao da je nakon 2000. na delu eksplozija te takozvane političke žute

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štampe u kojoj možemo naći neke od najdrastičnijih primera govora mržnje. Koje društvene snage po tvom mišljenju stoje iza ove vrste medija i koliki je njihov uticaj na kreiranje javnog mnenja?

Petar Atanacković: To je sad teško pitanje koje snage stoje iza toga. Teofil je rekao da je posle 2000. došlo do pojave preseljenja iz državne u privatnu sferu. Znači to više nisu državni mediji, u pitanju su privatni mediji i onda se naravno postavlja pitanje porekla kapitala koji je uložen u medije. Kurir, Glas Javnosti, Press, Pravda i tako dalje…znači postavlja se pitanje njihovog načina rada. A njihov način rada je daleko od ne samo profesionalne etike, ne samo od profesionalnog novinarskog kodeksa, nego od bilo kakve etike. Oni su prvi, čini mi se, uveli sistem naručivanja tekstova, pisanja tekstova po porudžbini, da se dakle plati medijima, oni napišu i objave tekst, povedu kampanju, zavisno od toga koliko novca se investira u poduhvat. Možemo samo da nagađamo ko stoji iza toga. To su neke parastrukture koje su naročito do izražaja došle u periodu prve i druge vlade Vojislava Koštunice, mada njihov začetak imamo u vreme vlasti Zorana Đinđića. Uostalom, ovakvi mediji su igrali značajnu ulogu u kampanjama protiv samog Đinđića, za koje znamo kako se se okončale – dakle, ubistvom.

Što se tiče same žute štampe, ona ne predstavlja novost u Srbiji – istinu govoreći, nije je bilo u ovakvom obliku dugo vremena, pa i decenija. Istina, postojalo je između dva svetska rata nešto slično ovome, tabloidi kao što su bili Beogradski dnevnik i Balkan. Ako se svi vratimo par godina unazad setićemo se da je pre par godina egzistirao jedan istoimeni list tabloidnih tendencija. Ja sam imao prilike da prelistavam te stare brojeve Balkana iz ’35., ’36.‚’37. i da ih poredim sa ovim današnjim tabloidima i čini mi se da je neko od njihovih urednika ili finansijera stvarno čitao nešto od te stare žute štampe. Mada, sasvim je moguće i da nije po sredi taj slučaj, već, kako je rekao Toma malopre kada smo razgovarali, da imamo na delu ponavljanje jedne te iste matrice. Dakle, u toku tridesetih godina tabloidi su pisali vrlo slično današnjim. Na jednak način su vodili kampanje protiv političara i širili govor mržnje, sa tom razlikom što je u tadašnjim tabloidima dominirala neka antisemitska tematika. Što je, čini mi se nekako i bilo logično, s obzirom na porast značaja antisemitizma nakon trijumfa nacizma u Nemačkoj. Tako su i tadašnje jugoslovenske novine, konkretno Balkan, neprestano donosile napise o tome ko je kriv za propast, na primer, naših obućara, kako Jevreji sabotiraju našu privredu i sve u tom duhu. Ako posmatramo stvari na taj

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način, širenje govora mržnje naprosto ne predstavlja novost. Ono što zabrinjava jeste da je u odnosu na Balkan iz ’38. prošlo sedamdeset godina, a da se i dalje koriste isti obrasci, da se piše na isti način, gotovo isti jezik se koristi, što je činjenica koja zabrinjava. Naravno, javno mnenje je takvo kakvo jeste, podaci govore da u Srbiji ima 3-5% nepismenih, međutim, ta istraživanja nepismenosti i popisi nikada ne analiziraju koji procenat od ovih 95% pismenih predstavljaju stvarno funkcionalno pismeni ljudi, oni koji razumeju kontekst pročitanog. Upravo taj društveni kontekst delovanja medija, opšta zaostalost i polupismenost, predstavljaju po mom mišljenju glavni problem, jer u takvim okolnostima spomenute parastrukture imaju idealne uslove za delovanje.

Miloš Perović: Da, kad si već pomenuo ovaj kampanje kao jedan oblik govora mržnje kojim se služe tabloidi, upravo nedavno smo mogli svedočiti jednoj takvoj kampanji koja je pokrenuta protiv Helsinškog Odbora u Srbiji, tj., preciznije protiv njene predsednice Sonje Biserko koja je bila izložena baš najočitijem primeru govora mržnje koji je najvećim delom poticao upravo iz tih tabloida. Povod za te napade je bio godišnji izveštaj Helsinškog Odbora o stanju ljudskih prava u Srbiji za 2007. godinu i ovo pitanje bi bilo upućeno gospodinu Markoviću: Šta je, po vašem mišljenju, bio povod za ove napade i iz kojih krugova oni dolaze i koja je njihova metodologija? Ako možete to da analizirate.

Tomislav Marković: Pa zapravo taj izveštaj HO je stajao mesecima na sajtu HO i niko se time nije bavio, sve do onog trenutka dok Slobodanu Antoniću zvanom „Ruho“ nije ponestalo tema, ili je imao neke dublje razloge da pokrene tu kampanju. On je inače poznat po tome što svako malo pronalazi neprijatelje koje treba istrebiti na svakom koraku. Meni su bile zanimljive prethodne kampanje koje je on radio protiv Peščanika, proglasivši sve slušaoce Peščanika sektom. To je onako dosta zanimljiv izbor reči. On je tvrdio kako se slušaoci Peščanika petkom okupljaju da slušaju Peščanik. To je isto dosta bizarna stvar, pošto koliko ja znam, okupljanje to je kad se više ljudi skupi na jednom mestu, a Peščanik se sluša na radiju, ne pušta se preko razglasa na Trgu Republike...

Teofil Pančić: ...za sada..

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Tomislav Marković: za sada, ali postoji indicija da će se to promeniti. I zanimljiv je taj izbor reči “sekta”, znači ne kaže se sekta nego mala verska zajednica. On je pokušao tom odrednicom da njih negativno legitimiše, da njih proglasi nekom vrstom neprijatelja koje naravno treba istrebiti. Em su politički neprijatelji koji se okupljaju oko jedne emisije i njegovi politički neistomišljenici s jedne strane, a s druge strane nisu samo to, nego su i sekta, dakle neka paralelna verska, poluverska organizacija sa kojom zna se kako se treba obračunati. Još jedna zanimljiva stvar je, on je za pripadnike “druge Srbije” upotrebio reč “zombi i to je pokušaj da se ljudi sa kojima on ne deli isto mišljenje proglase za neku vrstu ne – ljudi, zapravo za nešto drugo, za nešto što nije ljudsko I da ih se tako stavi izvan političkog poretka. To je nešto slično kao što su nacisti radili u svojoj antisemitskoj propaganda tridesetih godina. Oni su tako Jevreje proglašavali za razne vrste živuljki, a živuljke treba istrebljivati. Ta retorika je vrlo česta kod naše ekstremne desnice. Nešto slično je upotrebio Emir Kusturica čini mi se, čiji je primer takođe zanimljiv. On je ljude nazvao miševima na onom čuvenom mitingu “Kosovo je Srbija”, a miševi, je li, nisu ljudi nego štetočine, miševe treba istrebljivati. Tako da je ta vrsta retorike vrlo za njih zanimljiva. E sad ova poslednja priča oko Sonje Biserko i HO za ljudska prava, to se onako ponavlja svako malo tu postoji lajt motiv našeg medijskog života. Slobodan Antonić je zapravo u Glasu javnosti objavio jedan tekst gde je tvrdio kako Sonja Biserko i HO za ljudska prava proganjaju našu inteligenciju, našu nacionalnu, kulturnu i svaku drugu elitu, kako su oni neprijatelji, kako to rade po nalogu svojih finansijera i nalogodavaca iz inostranstva, kako su oni protivni srpskim interesima i sve u tom stilu i onda je to bio okidač. Sutra dan javili su se iz brojnih medija tipa Večernje Novosti, tabloidi i drugi, pa su onda zvali te nacionalne uglednike da oni kažu šta misle o tome. Pa su oni opalili iz svih oružja po Sonji Biserko. A zanimljiv je taj izbor nacionalnih uglednika i zanimljiv je zapravo razlog šta piše u tom izveštaju HO za ljudska prava, o čemu se tu zapravo radi, zašto su se oni toliko naljutili. Oni su se naljutili zato što Sonja Biserko i ekipa koja je to radila, taj izveštaj, njih citira. Dakle, oni su samo citirali ljude, objavili su šta su oni rekli, pričajući o širenju nacionalizma koji je i dalje jak u Srbiji i koji prosto onako deluje poprilično nezaustavljivo i koji je neka vrsta prepreke na našem putu u evropske integracije. Oni su pobesneli zato što ih neko citira. Znači niko nije lagao ništa, niko se ne služi tim tehnikama laži kao što to radi Slobodan Antonić i tom montažom, izvlačenjem iz konteksta, pa sad, bude nešto potpuno drugačije od onoga što su ljudi rekli. E to je sad išlo do, onako, drastičnih razmera, pa je recimo Dule Savić

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u jednom sportskom žurnalu ili Sportu, tako negde, izašao je naslov izvučen iz njegove izjave koji kaže “Hoće da me ubiju”. Znači Sonja Biserko kao da ima nekakvu jedinicu za specijalne operacije. Zapravo potpuno su zamenjene uloge. Oni su uradili sve da sebe viktimizuju i da sebe prikažu kao žrtve iako su oni zapravo dobitnici i profiteri čitavog procesa devedesetih godina. Među njima, osim tog Duleta Savića, koji je sad veliki patriota, član upravnog odbora javnog servisa i drugih institucija koji je rat proveo hrabro boreći se za nešto u Parizu, koliko se sećam. Drugi najzanimljiviji slučaj u celoj toj priči je Vasilije Krestić, akademik, koji je jedan od pisaca Memoranduma, koji je čovek koji je skovao onu čuvenu sintagmu “genocidni narod” i Hrvate proglasio za genocidni narod i on je jedan od ovih velikih kartografa Velike Srbije i cele te priče koja je zapravo pokrenula čitavu mržnju, pokrenula ratove. Mislim, tu njihovu priču je Milošević koji je bio jedan komunistički aparatčik do tada, preuzeo kao svoju i onda je gurao kraoz devedesete godine. Do neko vreme ozbiljno, posle su se oni razočaravali redom u njega, jer eto nije hteo da ratuje do kraja, pa su bili velika opozicija, od Matije Bećkovića preko Dobrice Ćosića i drugih. Dakle, ti ljudi su bili besni jer su citirani i sad tu nije kraj, pošto je tu prozvan Pravni Fakultet kao leglo antihaškog lobija, onda je Pravni Fakultet drugog dana objavio veliki oglas gde se brani od tih optužbi u Politici i Večernjim Novostima, sad navodeći sve dobre stvari koje se rade na Pravnom Fakultetu, i sve je to, je li, tačno, ali na Pravnom fakultetu predaju i Kosta Čavoški i Oliver Antić i mnogi drugi, i na Pravnom fakultetu je organizovana ona čuvena tribina “Istina o Srebrenici”, koja je zapravo iz drugog puta uspela, iz prvog puta, nisu uspeli prvi put da je održe, jer je to trebalo da bude slavlje nekakvo valjda oslobađanja Srebrenice, valjda nekakva godišnjica, oni smatraju da tamo genocide nije počinjen i Srebrenica je po njima oslobođena od civila vrlo efikasno, a na toj tribini “Istina o Srebrenici” između ostalih govorila je i Ljiljana Bulatović koja je pričala jednu ovako groznu i morbidnu priču o tome kako se njihova groblja sada nalaze na srpskoj zemlji i kako Muslimani treba da izmeste ta svoja groblja na svoju zemlju, jer to je plodno srpsko zemljište koje treba da se obrađuje. Sad ne mogu tu nekakve kosti da im smetaju, mislim neće lepo salata da niče verovatno, to im užasno smeta. To je jedan od najmorbidnijih stvari koje sam čuo sa te strane. E sad tu se ne završava ova hajka na Sonju Biserko. Tu su bile reakcije po ovim drugim medijima, tu je Teofil nešto pisao, mi smo nešto pisali u e-novinama i po nekim drugim medijima su se pojavile reakcije protiv te hajke, ali to je sve rezultiralo onom šetnjom, u to vreme su i dalje šetali ovi zaštitnici i branitelji Radovana Karadžića koji se svakog dana okupljaju

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na Trgu Republike i protestuju protiv njegovog hapšenja, to su ljudi koji podržavaju genocid očigledno i koji podržavaju Radovana Karadžića i njegove ratne operacije. E onda su oni malo zastali ispred HO za ljudska prava, malo su tu urlali neke svoje parole i zalepili su kukasti krst. To je isto zanimljivo. Znači ljudi koji podržavaju jednu fašističku ideologiju zalepe vam kukasti krast proglašavajući vas fašistom. I na kraju, kao kruna svega su dva nepoznata čoveka sačekala Sonju Biserko ispred njenog stana, ona je zvala neke svoje prijatelje koji su se tu brzo pojavili pa se tu ništa nije desilo, ali moglo je dakle da dođe do nekog fizičkog obračuna.

Teofil Pančić: Adresa njenog stana je objavljena, to je važno, znači kako su je oni dočekali ispred stana.

Tomislav Marković: Adresa njenog stana je objavljena u medijima. Znači tu je u pitanju hajka koja zaista ide na, ono, što sam nedavno napisao o Slobodanu Antoniću – kud on okom Obrazovci skokom, kud on slovom, ovi drugi olovom. To je zapravo njegova osnovna intencija, a on sve vreme sebe predstavlja kao ugroženog i to je, po meni, dosta zanimljiv obrt. Njihova želja, mislim stvari su se naravno promenile, devedesetih godina verovatno bi se svašta desilo , kad je objavljen onaj čuveni tekst o Ćuruviji on je ubijen posle toga. Danas se to ne dešava, nego vas samo malo tako zaplaše, malo vas napadnu, ali stvari uopšte nisu bezazlene. U nekim malo drugačijim okolnostima, kada bi se stvari malo radikalizovale, tu bi verovatno došlo i do fizičkih žrtava. To oni zapravo žele samo što Slobodan Antonić glumi finog gospodina, pa neće to da kaže tim rečima.

Teofil Pančić: Ja bih samo ovaj, ako mi dozvoljavaš...Zapravo sam shvatio da nisam odgovorio na drugi deo tvog pitanja, pa pre nego što mi postaviš novo, samo da dopunim, znači na neki način se i nadovezujući na ovo što si ti sada rekao. Pošto je taj tvoj drugi deo pitanja bio zapravo „da li je bilo opasnije tada govoriti, pisati protiv nacionalizma, ili sada“. Zapravo se razlikuju struktura straha odnosno struktura, smer iz kojeg dolazi potencijalna opasnost. Može se reći da si se ti devedesetih godina pre svega imao razloga bojati države, državne represije, znači to je ono, UDBA, vojne, paravojne, policijske, parapolicijske strukture, ratno, kriminalno, mafijaško, što je sve u jedno uvezano klupko, je li, i mi smo, na kraju krajeva, ja kao čovek iz medija to dobro svedočim, znači, imao si primere naših ubijenih kolega poput Dade Vujasinović

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i Slavka Ćuruvije i tu nema šta da se priča. Znači, to je bio jedan strah, pre svega, od države i tog represivnog aparata. Nakon 5. oktobra taj strah od države je neuporedivo manji, to se mora priznati. To je realno tako. Hvala bogu. Pa ako to nismo osvojili, onda zaista ništa ne bismo osvojili, ali s druge strane, postoji taj strah od društva ako tako mogu da kažem. Naravno, od jednog dela društva, od tog dela koji naginje tom ekstremno desnom ponašanju i koji je danas daleko kuražniji u tom ponašanju nego ranije. Zašto je to tako? S jedne strane, je to tako zato što je sam Miloševićev režim imao neku nacionalističku ekipu, pa onda iskazivati javno neki nacionalizam nekako je značilo biti režimski čovek po defaultu, što se jednom delu tih desničara recimo nije dopadalo, nisu se baš toliko pronalazili u tome. Ti dakle imaš jednu situaciju koja, formalno vlasti u Srbiji nakon 5. oktobra sve su redom proevropske, demokratske, ovakve, onakve. To hrani svakog nezadovoljnika bilo čime u svom životu i u ovom društvu da sebe proglasi, je li, velikim protivnikom sistema sa velikim S, tako što će za sve da optuži, je li, izdajnike, strane plaćenike, nesrbe, ovakve, onakve, je li, i to na neki način stvara jednu strukturu nekog besnog, isfrustriranog sveta, a to ne treba potcenjivati, jer takav svet je u svim istorijskim primerima bio, na kraju krajeva, onaj najpogodniji za rađanje nekakvog fašističkog pokreta i svega toga, i vi kad vidite te mlade ljude nabijene gnevom, mržnjom, beskrajno agresivne, pri tome beskrajno, moram reći, beskrajno nepismene i beskrajno velike neznalice, a beskrajno agresivne i samouverene vi zapravo vidite ljude koji su proizvod, s jedne strane proizvod Miloševićeve epohe, ali sa druge strane, koji su se tako politički formirali u tom postpetooktobarskom vremenu, koji misle da je svako zagovaranje demokratskih vrednosti neka vrsta, to je kao da si mainstream, to nije ono pravo, ono radikalno, jer biti protiv svega za šta se deklarativno zalaže sadašnji sistem, pošto je naravno ovde neka radikalna levica u suštini stvar koja postoji samo u tragovima, onda se ide na radikalnu, kao u ostalom i u drugim istočno – evropskim zemljama, dakle, s druge strane, onda se ide u tu radikalnu desnicu, i onda se njima čini, to je s jedne strane onako fancy, a to što je njima fancy to zapravo naravno realno može da se pretvori u veliki problem za ovo društvo. Mislim da tu treba naglasiti, znači ono što je devedesetih godina bio, ono što je dolazilo iz pravca samog režima, samog državnog aparata, danas više ne dolazi ili je marginalnije sa te strane, a primarno dolazi znači sa strane tih, to je ono što ja kažem, freelance (frilens) ludaka. To je ono ti naprosto, ti izađeš na ulicu i ti ne znaš da jednostavno neće naići nekakva budala , i ne znači da je neko toj budali u BIA, ili ne znam gde naredio da te..., ne on to radi jednostavno

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ono „od ruku i kruhu“.

Miloš Perović: Dakle opasnost više ne dolazi sa vrha nego sa dna?

Teofil Pančić: Da, da, i to je taj problem

Miloš Perović: Da, pa dakle, pomenuto je par puta, posle 2000. godine i te tzv. demokratske vlade i vlasti su se izmeljale u nekoliko oblika, neprestano se pozivaju na svakojake vrste sloboda, kojih ne znam gde ih vide, ali dobro, pa se tako neprestano izgovara i floskula o slobodi govora, a čini se da uopšte nije definisano šta se podrazumeva pod slobodom govora. Pa tako imamo primere da se slobodom govora pravdaju istupanja raznih fašističkih, profašističkih organizacija i pojedinaca. Dakle, da li iznošenje fašističkih ideja u javnom govoru spada pod slobodu govora?

Teofil Pančić: To jako zavisi od konteksta istorijskog u kojem neka zemlja postoji. Dakle, često se naši ekstremni desničari pozivaju na neke primere, pre svega iz anglo – saksonskog sveta gde je daleko veća tolerancija prema određenoj vrsti fašističkog javnog govora nego što je to u tzv. kontinentalnoj Evropi. To je iz razloga naprosto što anglo – saksonski svet nije imao istorijsko iskustvo sa organizovanim fašističkim pokretima, naprosto, niste imali tu vrstu iskustva, i vi onda možete imati mnogo jaču toleranciju prema nečemu što naprosto nije trauma vašeg društva. Ali na primer zato jeste trauma u Americi kako je nastao taj famozni politički korektni govor da se ne može reći za crnca ne samo nigger što je uvredljivo , nego se ne može više reći ni crnac. Ne možeš reći black person nego kažeš afro – american person, što ponekad zvuči i malo komično. Ja uvek kažem, ali ja kad vidim crnog čoveka na ulici koji mi prilazi, otkud ja znam da je on African American, možda je on upravo došao iz Čada, jel’ tako? Ali hoću da kažem, znači ono što je njihova frustracija, njihova trauma to se itekako gleda da se s time raskine. Pa zato recimo se jako pazi na to obraćanje kada je u pitanju rasna pripadnost i tako dalje. Naravno, kod nas u kontinentalnoj Evropi, počevši naravno od same Nemačke koja je bila znači taj epicentar nacizma i koja ima veoma stroge zakone po tom pitanju, i logično je da Nemačka ima najstrože zakone, mi moramo na te stvari da gledamo drugačije. To je nešto što je ovde pobilo milione ljudi. I mi to ne možemo gledati samo kao nekakvu potpuno apstraktnu akademsku

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raspravu o granicama slobode javnog govora. Pa ne možeš, znaš, apstraktna rasprava prestaje na onoj tački gde počinje ubijanje. Pošto mi to iskustvo imamo, mi naprosto to ne možemo sebi dozvoliti, i zato je sasvim logično i nije ni u kakvoj suprotnosti sa bilo čijim liberalnim, demokratskim, socijal – demokratskim ili ne znam kojim sve ubeđenjima tražiti da, na primer, u Hrvatskoj ne smeju da se ističu ustaški simboli, da u Srbiji ne smeju da se ističu ljotićevski simboli, da u svim tim zemljama ne smeju da se ističu ti, kako da kažem, opšte nacistički simboli. To je naprosto savršeno normalno u kontekstu ovog društva, jer je to što je ovde ljude ubijalo. To je ono što je ovde ljude klalo. To je ono što je ovde ljude teralo u logore. To je ono što je ovde ljude teralo iz kuća. Pa mislim, dakle ne govorimo o nekim stvarima koje eto ne dopadaju nam se pa ajde da ih zabranimo. Ne. Znači društvo čuva demokratiju tako što zabranjuje najekstremnije forme simboličkog , a naravno posle i fizičkog opravdavanja i provođenja organizovanog nasilja nad drugim grupama ljudi. Jer vi ne možete, fašizam nije nikada samo neka apstraktna pozicija. Ja ne mogu da zamislim čoveka koji bi na primer verovao, ajde da uzmemo situaciju da neko veruje, eto apstraktno veruje da su Jevreji niža rasa. Da li vi možete da zamislite situaciju u kojoj on ne bi kao sledeći korak svog verovanja smatrao da, pošto su niža rasa, treba da trpe neke posledice zbog toga. To nikad ne ide bez posledica, to nikad ne ostaje na nivou nekog apstraktnog uverenja. Izvinite molim vas, ako su Jevreji niža rasa, najmanje što treba da im se dogodi je l’ tako, to je , na primer, da ne mogu da rade poslove koje možemo ti ili ja, a u, naravno, kako to ide dalje u degeneraciju na kraju se, bože moj, završi u konc logorima, a gde bi se završilo nego u konc logorima? Tako da te stvari nikada, znači to je uvek zamena teza. Kada se govori o tome kako neko želi zabranu govora mržnje da sprečava nečiju slobodu mišljenja i govorenja, to je uvek elementarna zamena teza. Radi se samo o tome da društvo zarad svoje samoodbrane mora da spreči ono što je uvek prvi korak ka sprovođenju delatnog nasilja nad drugim ljudima.

Miloš Perović: Sledeće pitanje bi bilo za kolegu Atanackovića. Dakle, koliko su pripadnici političke i intelelektalne elite u Srbiji danas uopšte svesni težine javno izgovorene reči? Jer mi recimo danas imamo primer, i slobodno ću reći bez ustručavanja, pomahnitalog Ministra inostranih poslova Jeremića koji recimo jednom svojom izjavom naruši ionako jadne odnose u regionu. Da li je moguće, mislim to je, taj ministar je iz Demokratske Stranke koja je jel’ tzv. demokratska

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stranka i koja je jel’ nenacionalistička i tako dalje, da li je moguće uopšte u dogledno vreme prevladati tu matricu koja se izgleda ponavlja već zadnjih 25 godina u javnom govoru Srbije?

Petar Atanacković: Svest političkih elita o nekoj težini izgovorene reči očigledno ne postoji. Njihov osnovni problem, jedan od osnovnih problema, jeste što ne poseduju svest da u građanskom društvu, ako uzmemo recimo da je ovo građansko društvo, neka bude tako, postoji razgraničenje javne i privatne sfere. Znači da postoji razgraničenje između onoga što Vuk Jeremić konkretno misli kad ode u toalet i onoga što izjavljuje u funkciji ministra. To je donekle i problem same slobode govora. Teofil je govorio o ubeđenju tih nekih profašističkih krugova da se njima navodno oduzima sloboda govora. Zapravo, niko njima ne zabranjuje da misle, eto konkretno, u svojim privatnim stanovima šta god hoće i da rade u svom privatnom prostoru šta hoće, ali jednostavno u javnosti ne smeju, odnosno ne sme im se dozvoliti da tako istupaju. Vuk Jeremić je klasičan primer nerazlikovanja te javne od privatne sfere, pa između toga njemu nedostaje svesti o težini izgovorene reči. Nedavno sam bio u Berlinu nekim drugim povodom i tamo samo saznao kakvo mišljenje vlada o Vuku Jeremiću, a vlada mišljenje da je njegov jedini kvalitet – kvalitet pod znacima navoda – to što on može da najbrže na svetu izgovori frazu „nacionalni suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet“ i to na engleskom jeziku. To mu je glavni diplomatski kvalitet. Dakle, u pitanju je karikatura od čoveka koji se ponaša kao kauboj. Svojevremeno je u novinama pisano o tome kako se on odnosi prema diplomatama. A taj njegov fokus na Hrvatsku tj. pik – pa očigledno je odlučio da na odnosima sa Hrvatskom i na njihovom nepotrebnom zaoštravanju gradi sebi neku poziciju u domaćoj politici. Prosto koristi spoljnu politiku zarad unutrašnje – političkih razloga. Ni sam nije svestan da time ozbiljno narušava i onako krhke odnose između Srbije i Hrvatske. Tako da je on uistinu šampion svega toga.

Dakle, privatni interesi dolaze na mesto opštih, kako je ono Milan Kangrga uvek govorio, upravo to zamenjivanje opšteg pojedinačnim, koje se u filozofskoj etici definiše kao zlo. Mislim da nije Vuk Jeremić jedini primer toga: svojevremeno je postojao ministar po imenu Milan Parivodić koji je bio zadužen za oblast ekonomije i koji je javno na televiziji govorio kako kada neko spomene Milana Nedića svi treba da stanu mirno. Pitam se šta ministar za ekonomske odnose sa inostranstvom zna o Milanu Nediću i zašto je njegovo mišljenje relevantno o tome, ali on je prosto očigledno

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osećao potrebu da to kaže. Onda, jedna čuvena priča o jednom još čuvenijem ministru. Svi se sećamo ministra kulture Dragana Kojadinovića koji je jednom prilikom, to sam čuo iz proverenih izvora, na nekom skupu sa predstavnicima nemačke ambasade i predstavnicima nemačkih medija izjavio da, parafraziraću, postoji velika bliskost i interes za saradnjom između Nemačke i Srbije i tako dalje, a da smo to iskazali još tamo između 1941. i 1945. godine. Rezultat je bio ozbiljan diplomatski skandal, koji je ovaj nepismeni ministar kulture izazvao svojom glupošću. Ambasador je morao da mu objašnjava da je Nemačka antifašistička zemlja, da on nije prisutan u svojstvu predstavnika Trećeg Rajha nego Savezne Republike i tako dalje. A da li je Kojadin to shvatio, ne verujem.

Miloš Perović: Dobro, posle ovoga je teško vratiti se u normalu, ali dobro...Sad bih otvorio jedno pitanje koje mislim da uopšte nije bilo u fokusu naše javnosti kada se priča o govoru mržnje uopšte, ja nisam čuo primer da se o tome uopšte priča, a upravo su e-novine donele maestralan, moram reći, tekst Viktora Ivančića pod naslovom „Nula od čovjeka“ u kojem se skreće pažnja na jedan oblik govora mržnje, na, koji kao što kažem, uopšte se ne obraća pažnja u javnom govoru. Naime, Ivančić u tom tekstu opisuje reklamu za balkansko izdanje magazina Forbs koja ide pod parolom „ne budi nula od čovjeka, budi sedam nula“ i ukazuje upravo na klasnu mržnju koja izvire iz te glavne teme prvog broja ovog magazina. Po ovome su ovde oni drugi i drugačiji oni siromašni , pa se u toj reklami i u celom tom magazinu kroz to „ne budi nula od čovjeka, budi sedam nula“ je li, spočitava se da ste manje vredni ukoliko niste u najmanju ruku milioner i ukoliko niste u najmanju ruku neki Mišković ili neki Todorić ili već koji balkanski tajkun. Pa zamolio nih gospodina Markovića da prokomentariše, da otvorimo tu temu.

Tomislav Marković: Pa ja bih samo hteo da se nadovežem kratko na ono što je Petar pričao. Meni se ne čini da Jeremić pogrešno ne odvaja tu privatnu od javne sfere. Mislim kada bi on pričao nešto što nije po volji Borisu Tadiću i vladi ja pretpostavljam da bi se neko bunio. Očigledno je da on sprovodi politiku koja je politika ove zemlje, samo što je on najglasniji i najagresivniji. Mislim, ipak je on Tadićev „mali od palube“, nije on sad tu nešto sam po sebi, nije se on tu stvorio...

Teofil Pančić: On je Velja Ilić ove vlade.

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Tomislav Marković: Mlađi, lepši i perspektivniji i Tadić ga više voli pošto mu je i predavao. Tako da mislim da tu ne postoji ta vrsta kolizije. Na žalost. Bilo bi dobro da sad ovi misle da ne treba tužiti Hrvatsku i da ne treba zaoštravati, ali izgleda da to njima odgovara. Ja bih podsetio isto da kod one tribine o Srebrenici na Pravnom fakultetu tada je B. Tadić rekao da svako ima pravo da iznosi i izražava svoje mišljenje, negirajući sve ono što mi večeras pričamo. Da nema granice u slobodi govora. Čovek je očigledno liberalniji od nas kao što se primeti. A ovo, da, to je bio zanimljiv tekst Viktora Ivančića „Nula od čovjeka“ jer je on pokazao kako govor mržnje zapravo proširuje područje, polje područja borbe. Zapravu, tu su se, čini mi se, stvari malo obrnule. Ovde kad smo pričali o ovim primerima govora mržnje tu je nekako, oni koji su moćni, oni koji su nekako na vlasti, ili pri vlasti, ili su povezani sa nekakvim novcem spadaju u nekakvu manjinu. Mislim borci za ljudska prava su manjina, Romi su manjina, ljudi koji slušaju Peščanik su takođe manjina, levica je manjina i tako dalje. Ovde u toj reklami koja je najavljivala balkanski Forbs, Viktor Ivančić je pronašao nešto potpuno obrnuto, da zapravo manjina koja drži svu vlast, bogatstvo i moć u svojim rukama, koja je lepo međusobno povezana, ona zapravo potpuno nipodaštava i širi neku vrstu govora mržnje prema većini, prema barem 90% stanovništva, dakle, prema svim običnim ljudima, radnicima. Sad tu postoji jedan zanimljiv obrt. Sve ove grupe o kojima smo govorili manjinske, one nekako mogu da se bore za svoja prava, i to je nekako legitimno i prirodno i normalno i niko tu sa naše strane ne postavlja pitanje. Ali, recimo, Ivančić tu tvrdi da radnici nisu zapravo svesni da su radnici, i da su oni, da imaju jednu vrstu interesa u odnosu na one koji su gazde i u odnosu na one koji drže svu moć.To je sad na zapadu , kao što neko citira tu i tamo, da tamo radi skalpel, a ovde radi satara, nekakav kasapski nož. Malo su stvari drugačije. Kod nas su potpuno ogoljeni, manje više znamo kako su svi ti ljudi sa sedam ili više nula došli do svog kapitala, i znamo da je to bilo u nekim prilično nelegalnim uslovima. Sad oni su to sve u glavnom legalizovali, ali oni sebi u toj najavi za prvi broj magazina Forbs daju za pravo da prosto sve ostale ljude proglase nekakvim neljudima. I upravo tu on nalazi paralelu između, je li, nacističke propagande koja je izvan pravnog poredka postavljala Jevreje, koji nisu ljudi, koji su nešto drugo. E sada su se kriterijumi promenili. Ako imate novac vi ste čovek, ako nemate novac vi ste ništa i sa vama možemo da radimo šta hoćemo. E sad, ja mislim da je kod nas malo problem što se ljudi protiv toga ne bune. Mislim taj Kurir i svi ti časopisi, Pravda, gledao sam na nekoj televiziji, mislim onoj koja pripada Bajatoviću proslavu stotog broja Pravde, ili tako nešto, i sad tu su se

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pojavili Dragan Đilas i cela ekipa, to je bilo veselo, i oni su proslavljali što su posle tri meseca došli do tiraža od 50 000 primeraka. To je velik tiraž, znači ljudima odgovara. Ja imam utisak da je ovde proizvedena takva matrica koja od ljudi nasilno, mislim pomoću oružja, pomoću svih mogućih vrsta torture i nasilja tokom devedesetih godina stvorila nekakvu strukturu koja nema baš običaj da se mnogo buni i da se bori za svoja prava. I mislim da se to nekako širi i dalje. Ja sam, što iz ličnog iskustva, što iz nekih istraživanja, jedna moja prijateljica je radila istraživanje po beogradskim srednjim školama o predrasudama i išla je samo u centralne beogradske škole, i sad za jedno 5, 6 dana će biti gotovo to istraživanje pa ćemo to objaviti u e-novinama, i tu su rezultati porazni. Ja sam 2005. godine pričao sa decom koja su imala 16 godina u jednoj prigradskoj beogradskoj opštini i pričali smo o Albancima nešto i odeljenje se podelilo u dve grupe, dečaci i devojčice. Dečaci su bili za rešenje po kratkom postupku, to sve treba pobiti, dok su devojčice bile onako malo nežnije, kao što i priliči tom stereotipu o slabijem polu, one su bile samo za proterivanje. I borili smo se da im se nekako objasni da su Albanci takođe ljudi, i to je napredak. To je, mislim, onako prilično jezivo. Sad ja ne bih da zvučim katastrofično,ali čini mi se da je to seme zla koje je posejano krajem osamdesetih godina i preuzeto iz nekih drugih kulturnih obrazaca koje je proizvodila naša nacionalistička inteligencija, tako da je to dalo svoj plod protiv kojeg ćemo se mi boriti dugo. A ovo, mislim, izgleda da su se stvari u Hrvatskoj malo negde pomeraju pa se otvaraju neke druge teme, tako da bih ja ovde voleo da se počnu otvarati neke drugačije i druge teme. Ali mi taman kad pomislimo da ćemo sad negde da krenemo eto došla je kao neka proevropska i demokratska vlada, evo se pojavi pomahnitali Jeremić, i kao vrati vas u ono gde ste već bili. I opet morate da se bavite istim temama, što je dosadno. O Jeremiću mi je dosadno više da pišem, ili o nekim sličnim stvarima. Stalno ponavljate iste priče, ajmo malo na neke druge teme. Ali, na žalost, oni nemaju razumevanja za naše novinarske probleme.

Petar Atanacković: Samo da dopunim, a pro po ove tvoje priče, odnosno pitanja oko Viktora Ivančića i Forbsa, Feral je davnih dana pratio te zanimljivosti među osveštenim novobogatašima na Balkanu. Forbs, to balkansko izdanje ovog časopisa, samo je jedna nova stvar u nizu, Feral je svojevremeno pisao o prvom srpskom izdanju Glorije i onako propratili su ga odličnim tekstom: pisali su o potocima šampanjca, o pojedenom kavijaru i tako dalje, i prepoznali u tome neku vrstu, kako su tada rekli, klasno – nacionalističkog saveza, jer su sve to bile one heavy nacionalističke strukture

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iz Hrvatske i Srbije, od Tončija Huljića i slične ekipe, do Duške Jovanić koja je u svojim novinama pravila od svakog iole poznatijeg Srbina svetsko – istorijsku pojavu. Dakle, to su sve te nacionalističke strukture koje su se po toj novostečenoj klasnoj osvešćenosti sa pozicije tajkuna ujedinili, pa je nacionalistički savez dobio još dodatnu, hajde da kažem, klasnu komponentu, ali naravno uvek na neki izvrnuti i potpuno perverzan balkanski način.

Miloš Perović: Ja bih postavio još jedno pitanje gostima, pa bih onda vama prepustio iz publike ako imate nekih pitanja da postavite. Dakle, internet kao novi medij koji je, s kojim je l’ i nemamo baš nekog iskustva prevelikog. Poznato je da taj medij nije kontrolisan i da se na njemu može naći masa stvari iz koje se može očitati govor mržnje i masa fašističkih, profašističkih sajtova i jednostavno ta sfera medija uopšte nije pravno regulisana. Dakle, da li uopšte je potrebno pravno regulisati taj medij, i da li uopšte ga treba stavljati u pravo, jer, kao što je poznato, on ima, kao što ima tih negativnih tendencija, ima i pozitivnih. Komentar.

Teofil Pančić: Nisam pravnik, ne bih se bavio time, bar ne na direktan način kako se to može regulisati i da li treba, ali možda na kraju i dođemo do toga zaobilaznim putem. Zapravo, ja moram priznati da ja nemam pojma šta je to internet, da li se on uopšte može nazvati medijem. Znači, kako ćemo definisati medij, pre svega? Ako je on medij, onda je on sasvim drugačiji medij od svega onoga što mu je prethodilo u tom smislu. I sada tu postoji čitav niz problema. Ja sam, moram priznati, neka vrsta velikog internet skeptika, ako se to tako može nazvati, što je verovatno jedna od najnepopularnijih pozicija koje danas možete zauzeti. Jer svi obožavaju internet. Fašisti - antifašisti, levičari - desničari, bogati – siromašni, građani – seljaci , pametni – glupi. Ne daj bože da se nešto kaže protiv interneta kao takvog. Naravno, i besmisleno je u osnovi govoriti protiv nekog medija kao takvog, jer to je, isto tako bi se moglo govoriti i protiv televizije, novina, ali one postoje pa postoje. Međutim, šta je problem sa internetom? Ja to gledam naprosto sa stanovišta čoveka koji sam radi u medijima, ali ne samo da radi u medijima, nego ja sam naprosto neko ko od kada zna za sebe praktično, ono, intezivno trošim sve moguće medije, a naravno, pre svega, one pisane, i pošto ste vi u glavnom u publici, a bogme i vi ovde u glavnom znatno mlađi od mene i vi se ne možete ni setiti tog iskustva, ali, znate, nećete verovati, recimo, do pre 20 godina u našim novinama ti nisi mogao praktično objaviti pismo čitalaca bez pune adrese.

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Znači, Pera Perić, ono, ulica Vojvode Bojovića 13, 21000 Novi Sad. Pa ti sad brate reci šta ti je na duši. Danas, to je zapravo, ne da nema tvoje adrese, ne da nema tvog imena, tvog lika, nego nema ničega, nema ni tebe. Dakle, ti možeš se nazvati bilo čime i možeš biti neki, recimo, ne znam, neki stari čovek koji se proglašava za mladu zanosnu plavušu i iz perspektive mlade zanosne plavuše radi ne znam šta po internetu. Dakle, taj stepen virtuelizacije u kojem se gubi svaki suvisli identitet subjekta se čini ljudima strašno zavodljivim. On nam se čini kao prostor beskrajne slobode. Mogu da radim šta hoću, mogu da govorim šta hoću, mogu da komuniciram s kim hoću po celom svetu, to je sve lepo, to je super. Međutim, postoji tu druga strana. Ja bih rekao da je to često zapravo prva strana. On omogućava da ljudi rade sve one loše i ružne stvari drugim ljudima, upravo u kontekstu govora mržnje i svega ostalog, a da se pri tome osećaju savršeno sigurnim, savršeno bezbednim, savršeno anonimnim. To je idealna situacija za manijake, frustrate, bolesnike svih vrsta. Internet je ostvarenje njihove utopije. Zašto? Upravo zato što on nema taj famozni filter. A odgajani smo u jednoj kulturi permisivnosti koja je prilično lakoumno i lakomisleno proglasila svaki filter za cenzuru. Jer svaki klasični medij, zvao se on novine, zvao se on televizija, radio, pa čak i internet, ako je zaista medij, on ima nekog svog urednika ili urednicu, tamo naprosto postoje neki ljudi i ne može tamo da objavi neko da se ne zna ko je, je l’ tako, znači, čovek objavi autorski tekst pa stoji imenom i prezimenom iza toga, i tako dalje, međutim, internet to sve lepo ukida, on to sve lepo vezuje u mašnicu i kaže „evo, izvolite, sloboda podjednaka za genija, za kretena, za ovog, za onog, za ljubav, za mržnju, za pamet, za glupost, sve je ravnopravno, sve je slobodno, izvoli, udri, lupi, ožeži, opljuj...I ja moram reći da način na koji se internet komunikacija kod nas degeneriše je meni duboko uvredljiv. Trudim se da u tu kantu za đubre ne ulazim duboko, ali svaki put kad se zeznem pa uđem pročeprkam malo po našim forumima, blogovima i ostalim čudesima, ja se zapanjim. I da se razumemo, to nije pitanje političkog opredeljenja. Stvari koje se na internetu mogu naći o ljudima koji su mi politički krajnje nesimpatični, uopšte mi se ne dopadaju, dakle, nije to samo pitanje toga da sad, ne znam, postoje naši i njihovi, ne, ne, ne...Sama ta forma, ona uzgaja ono najgore u čoveku. E sad, jedan će vređati Teofila Pančića, drugi će, ne znam, analizirati, ono, da li je Đorđe Vukadinović ružan ili lep. Pa izvini molim te, ja ne mislim da je čovek koji raspravlja o tome da li je Đorđe Vukadinović ružan ili lep, da je on antifašista zbog toga. Nije on antifašista, on je kreten! Mislim, ako je tebi u životu bitno da sad govoriš da je Đorđe Vukadinović ružan, i da je debeo i da ima ružne

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naočare, ti nisi antifašista, nit’ si levičar, nit’ si demokrata, nit’ si liberal, ti si idiot! I ta vrsta idiotizma je nešto što je ohrabreno formom. Ključ je u anonimnosti. Anonimnost je alfa i omega cele priče. Ideja da možeš virtuelizovati svoj identitet, da se možeš bezbedno, udobno ušuškati u neki jebeni, kretenski nick name i iz njegove pozicije delovati, fašistički, antifašistički, liberalno, antiliberalno, populistički, elitistički, uopšte me ne zanima, je sama po sebi bolesna. Ona ne može da izrodi ništa dobro. Ona ne može biti dobra, ona kretenizuje javni diskurs, ona spušta sve kriterijume, ona sve uvalja u svoje blato, ona u svoj prosek uvalja sve. Ali, kažem vam, ovo je naprosto vreme kada svaki klasični medij trpi tu etiketu da je on na neki način konzervativan jer, bože moj, ima urednika, pa, ne daj bože, ima i vlasnike i svašta ono, je l’ te, što ta internet sloboda nema. Međutim, to lepo zvuči kad se tako kaže, ali znate šta, ti drugi mediji imaju neku vrstu profesionalnog standarda, koji doduše često krše, daleko od toga da je to idealno, ali neki elementarni regule postoje. Da li vi znate nekog čoveka, ajde zamislimo ovakvu situaciju: da bi čovek, recimo, pisao nekakvu kolumnu za novine, mora da postoje neke novine, dobre ili loše, čijem uredniku i vlasniku padne na pamet da baš tog čoveka angažuje, pa ga onda plati nešto, mislim, tu postoji nekakav kriterijum, tu postoji neka procedure, tu postoji nešto, pa onda taj čovek imenom i prezimenom, često i sa fotografijom, da može posle svaka baraba da ga zapljune na ulici. E sad zamislite nekog čoveka koji je potpuno frustriran što njega niko ne zove da piše kolumnu za novine. I zamislite da postoji hiljadu takvih. I svih tih hiljadu veruju da su neshvaćeni geniji kojima zli establišment ne da, jer je zao, da se dokažu. Znate šta onda biva? Svih tih hiljadu ljudi počnu, recimo, da pišu blog, jer da bi pisao blog ne treba, mislim znaš, jednostavno, otvoriš svoj blog i vozi Miško. Od tih hiljadu ljudi moguće je da je jedan, moguće je da je jedan zaista neshvaćeni genije. Postoji takva mogućnost. Ali onih preostalih 999 su dokazani moroni, a sad ti meni reci kao korisnik interneta kako ćeš se probiti kroz tu šumu, kako ćeš naći tog jednog genija u prašumi od 999 morona koji svakog dana nastaju, pa sutra opet novih 999, pa prekosutra opet novih 999, i tako dalje? Tu kraja nema. Dakle, ovime završavam ovaj sololokvij,sve dok je anonimnost učesnika, subjekata, nazovi to kako god hoćete, sve dok je anonimnost osnovna pretpostavka interneta, sloboda koju on nudi nužno će se u ogromnom broju slučajeva pretvarati u svoju karikaturu koja će užasno često biti otužna, smešna i bedna, a kada se bavi govorom mržnje, onda bogami i opasna.

Tomislav Marković: Uh, teško je posle ovoga...To je tačno. Pošto smo mi na internet

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mediju, mi smo svakog dana izloženi komentarima najrazličitijih vrsta i onda se vrlo često dešava da umesto da ljudi komentarišu tekst, oni vam kažu da ste budala, da ste idiot, zato što vi eto kritikujete crkvu, a on nešto mnogo obožava crkvu i to mu predstavlja sve u životu. I sad ima tu već nekih pacijenata koji se javljaju, to je onako zanimljiv proces, da se to prati...Ima neki Istok koji se meni uvek javi kada pišem o crkvi on mene najviše voli, tako da je to prosto neverovatno, to je postalo onako jedna patološka veza. Doduše mi ga uvek izbrišemo kad počne da vređa, kad stavi nešto što nije uvreda onda ga kao prosto ostavimo, a s druge strane ono što je Teofil spomenuo, ja bih samo da se nadovežem na ono što je Teofil pričao, to je značajno za neke ljude koji se bave literaturom pa preko bloga misle da valjda objavljuju. Bio sam na Krku ove godine, na festivalu Pontes, i o tome je pričao Valerij Jurešić i to je dosta zanimljivo, o tome nisam preterano razmišljao, a problem je u tome što na blogu nemate urednika. To je ključni problem. Nema objavljivanja bez urednika. On kaže bolje objavite u časopisu Reč, pročitaće 20 ljudi, nema veze, ali ste objavili, prošli ste filter Dejana Ilića koji je jedan od najstručnijih, znači tu nešto postoji, u vama ima nekog talenta. S druge strane, opet, internet može da se iskoristi na razne dobre načine. Čini mi se da je Ivan Tobić to uspeo, on je radio nekakav blog, pa je preko toga počeo da piše roman, pa sad, sa manjim ili većim uspehom, ali prosto iskoristio je tu formu, zapravo taj medij, da napravi nešto, ali pod svojim imenom i prezimenom. Naravno, ta anonimnost jeste veliko iskušenje, tako da to ide do nekih sumanutih devijacija i govora mržnje koji se širi na sve strane, pa je na facebooku su postojale one čuvene grupe, neke postoje još uvek, čas se zatvore, čas se otvore, bila je ona „nož, žica, Srebrenica“ koja je zatvorena pa ponovo otvorena ovih dana, gde, ne znam, postoji onako neka odrednica ispod imena te grupe koja kaže da je to grupa za sve one koji misle da su Muslimani najbolji na ražnju i dok plivaju u sumpornoj kiselini. To je onako eklatantan primer govora mržnje i poziva na nasilje i to regularno postoji zato što niko ne može da ih spreči, zato što tu postoji ta sloboda koja je potpuno podivljala koja nije više sloboda, koja je negacija slobode. A jedan od najzanimljivijih naslova tih čuvenih facebook grupa je bio „ubij Hrvata da Šiptar nema brata“, eto bili su malo dovitljivi. Ali tu se širi ista vrsta ludila. Osim toga, tu sad postoji niz tih internet foruma gde se oni okupljaju, i tih socijalnih virtuelnih grupa, Stormfront je verovatno najpoznatiji... Tako da je internet nekakav prostor gde se to širi užasnom brzinom, na sve strane, po svim mogućim forumima, pa otvaraju svoje internet strane, kao što ima Firer, kao što ima, ne znam, onaj Lučić kojeg ste malo pre pominjali. Mislim, to

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je gomila sa kojom prosto ne znate šta da radite. Njihov uticaj čini mi se raste, to se prosto nekako širi na sve strane, i ja mislim da je malo problem što, koliko ja znam, to nije ni pravno uređeno, tako da će tu zapravo morati neki koraci da se preduzmu. Ono što važi u stvarnom svetu, valjda bi trebalo da važi i u virtuelnom.

Teofil Pančić: Da, ali vidi problem je u tome što su ljudi tu stvar prihvatili zdravo za gotovo, prihvatili su je kao svoje demokratsko pravo. I to je veliki problem. Recimo, dakle, taj konvencionalni medijski filter, znači u neko pred internet vreme, ti pišeš pismo čitaoca novinama: treba se pre svega potruditi; kupiš pismo, ono, hartija, pa napišeš, pa onda zalepi, pa markica, pa onda odnesi do poštanskog sandučeta, do tad te već prođe bes. Al’ dobro, recimo napišeš pismo, jebeš kevu nekome i to dođe do urednika, urednik to pogleda i baci u đubre, jer je to koještarija, to nije za objavljivanje po definiciji, i niko se tu puno ne buni. Ovaj nije ni očekivao da mu se to objavi, ovaj praznio se čovek, ali realno znao je da nema šanse da mu se to objavi. Isto tako ovi, preteča internet foruma - kontakt programi na radiju i televiziji, pa kad počneš mnogo da sereš i da vređaš, onda te ovi, je li, otkače. Prosto, problem je u tome što ljudi koji šalju komentare, znači, kada imaš internet izdanja novina, pa su tu ti komentari, ili kada imaš kao u e-novinama, tako dalje, i sličnim medijima, znači, one komentare ispod, kad god nekoga banuješ, je li, ovaj cikne, uvređeno, najstrašnije, bez obzira šta je on, koju je glupost napisao, on po defaultu smatra da ne smeš njega da banuješ, jer samo banovanje kao takvo, bez obzira na razloge, povod, na bilo šta, samo banovanje po mišljenju mnogih negde se suprotstavlja toj bezobalnoj slobodi interneta. I to je taj veliki problem. Zato ta masovna percepcija interneta kao jednog onako neograničenog prostora za bilo koju vrstu iživljavanja nužno negde dovodi do toga da ti ljude frustriraš, jer prosto si im obećao da se sve može. Sve se može. Onda si im rekao pa ne može se baš sve. I tu sad zapravo internet mediji još traže sebe, traže neku meru, nešto gde bi se zapravo negde smestili da ne bude skroz ni ovako ni onako, a ja nisam siguran da će uspeti tako skoro, jer je ljudima obećana utopija apsolutne slobode iskaza koja naprosto ne može biti ostvarena, a da ne trpi elementarni nivo javnog diskursa.

Miloš Perović: Pitanja iz publike, ako nema da završavamo...

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Pitanje iz publike: Imate li neki komenatr u vezi Građanskog lista i vojvođanskih medija...

Teofil Pančić: Ja ne znam o tome bog zna šta i mimo činjenice da je Građanski list promenio dakle vlasnika, promenio vlasničku strukturu i da su ti vlasnici pre nekog vremena zapravo sproveli prilično radikalnu promenu uređivačke politike, u skladu s tim je mnogo ljudi otišlo, da li dobrovoljno ili su bili primorani da odu iz te redakcije, došli su neki drugi. Ja sam jedno vreme bio potpuno fasciniran apsolutnom prazninom koju su emitovali, dakle, ja uzmem pa prelistavam i ni na jednoj strani ne nađem ali bukvalno ništa, čak ne nađem ništa ni što bi me nerviralo, ne nađem ništa što bi mi bilo negativno, ne nađem naprosto ništa! Nađem agencijske vesti i servisne informacije. Ništa! Ničega nema. Nema govora mržnje, jer nema govora! E sad, ne znam u poslednjih jedno mesec dana nisam u toku, čekaju me ti brojevi novi al’ nisam došao do njih tako da ne znam da l’ se nešto promenilo u međuvremenu, ali očigledno je da je nečija ideja bila da onaj Građanski list kakav je postojao valja ubiti, a da nije imao ideju šta bi on to na tom lešu, je li, izgradio i pretpostavljam da je to to. Ali meni se samo čini da će ti vojvođanski lokalni mediji jako loše proći u ovom tumbanju, jer se s jedne strane, ova izdanja Dnevnika lokalna, znači Subotičke novine, Zrenjaninske novine se gase, ili se na neki način prodaju, je li, ovoj strukturi koja je kupila Građanski list. To će se završiti tako da će se tamo gde je postojala konkurencija, tamo gde su bila po dva lista, ostati samo po jedan, a taj jedan će biti kontrolisan od te strukture o kojoj sam malo pre govorio i mislim da to će naprosto biti jako loše za ono nešto preživelih štampanih medija u manjim gradovima u Vojvodini.

Pitanje iz publike: Mene zanima vaše mišljenje o namernoj kretenizaciji, svih medija jer uveren sam da postoji tu neka kampanja kretenizacije svega. Zanima me vaše mišljenje dokle će to ići i da li će se ponovo desiti nešto pozitivno, ili će se zaista ići na ono totalno spuštanje kriterijuma po svakom principu. Zašto je nestao Feral Tribune?

Teofil Pančić: Ovaj, pošto svi nešto sležu ramenima, ajde da opet ja...Naime, i sam radim u glavnom za medije koji spadaju, pre svega za Vreme naravno, a i za neke druge koji spadaju u te nekakve malo litražne i malo tiražne medije koji su takvi u ostalom, manje više, od samog svog početka i koji predstavljaju neku vrstu, ajde tako

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da kažem, možda i elitističkog koncepta, zašto da ne, ja ne mislim da je to dirty word ako se pravilno upotrebljava, naravno, i u društvu u kojem tržište diktira sve, čak i kad je to tržište mnogo bolje od ovog našeg koje je po mnogo čemu paratržište, dakle čak i kad je mnogo bolje od ovog ovakvog, onaj ko hoće da traga za kvalitetom, za ozbiljnošću, da ima takve neke bezvezne stvari kao što je recimo kulturna rubrika, zamislite, i slične budalaštine, piše o knjigama jebo te, mislim svašta, ono, znači on je negde nužno samoosuđen na jednu vrstu marginalizacije, na jednu vrstu siromaštva. To siromaštvo je recimo u zapadnim medijima relativno. Na primer, Guardian je siromašan u poređenju sa Daily Mailom, ali đavola je Guardian siromašan. E, ali kod nas je to siromaštvo bukvalno. To siromaštvo, to znači da ljudi koji rade u takvim medijima žive od nekakvih mizernih plata i honorara, u potpunoj egzistencijalnoj sigurnosti, da uopšte ne znaš dokle će to sve da nekako gura i da kotrlja, i tako dalje, i to je ta pozicija u kojoj se nalaze mediji u famoznim društvima u tranziciji, a naročito u ovako uništenim, elementarno razvaljenim društvima kao što je srpsko i većine eks jugoslovenskih društava, i tu naravno, šta prvo strada, strada svaki pokušaj da se nekakav kvalitet i standard održe. I to nema veze recimo kakva je predistorija tih medija i da li su oni politički nekome simpatični ili nesimpatični. Pogledajte vi recimo RTS i B92. To su dva medija koji nose neku vrstu sasvim različitih međusobno političkih konotacija. Međutim, danas ako izuzmete jedan deo informativnog programa, sve druge emisije jedne televizije mogli bi ste zamisliti i na onoj drugoj, plus Pink, već bogami i većinu, ceo zabavni program B92, tv B92, radio hvala bogu se još donekle drži, ovaj, bi se mogao zamisliti na Pinku. Dakle, u ime nekakvog tržišnog diktata i opstanka, koji da se razumemo nije naivna stvar, naravno ja to apsolutno mogu da razumem, ali ne mogu da razumem, opravdam to da se smatra da je jedini način da se opstane na tržištu ideja da su ogromna većina ljudi naprosto kreteni koji ne mogu ništa da svare osim takvog sadržaja. To elementarno ne stoji. Postoji mnogo ljudi koji bi, ja to tvrdim, ja se često raspravljam i sa kolegama i tako, postoji mnogo ljudi koji čeznu recimo za istinski kvalitetnim dnevnim novinama. Ja sam već 500 puta pisao, popeo se već svima na glavu da u Srbiji od kad ne izlazi Naša Borba nema, naprosto nema dnevnih novina koje bih ja mogao da čitam bez velikog zazora i bez ogromnih fundamentalnih primedbi. Naravno, jedna vrsta primedbi je koje bih uputio, ne znam, Politici, druga je vrsta primedbi koje bih uputio Danasu, recimo. Navodim ta dva primera, jer su to dva najozbiljnija dnevna lista kod nas, je li. Ali meni treba nešto što će naprosto biti jedan list koji ja mogu da čitam i da ono kad ga stavim negde na sto

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u kafani da kažem: „da ja čitam ovo, to je deo mog identiteta“, kao što će u Engleskoj neko da stavi Guardian ili će da stavi Independent ili kao što će u Parizu neko da stvai Le Mond, to nešto znači. Ovde to više ništa ne znači. Ništa ne znači, jer su mediji zapravo negde upali svi manje više u tu neku vrstu potpuno neravnopravne tržišne utakmice, a ako želiš da budeš negde po strani nužno si osuđen ili samoosuđen na marginalizaciju i na siromaštvo. Pa ti vidi.

Tomislav Marković: Ja bih samo da se nadovežem, skoro sam pričao sa Viktorom Ivančićem i on je nešto slično rekao. Samo na zapadu postoji ta margina i ti imaš nekakvog prostora i ta margina je prilično široka, a ovde je baš svedena na nulu. A taj slučaj sa „Feral Tribuneom“, tu ima svašta. Njima su ljudi svašta zamerali, ali je činjenica da su EPH i država uložili silne pare da njih ugase i da oni nisu mogli da dobiju nijedan oglas pre toga, iako su imali relativno pristojan tiraž, ali očigledno, država je bila protiv njih. Kod nas je stanje malo drugačije jer je šarenoliko, ne postoji ta vrsta medijskog monopola kao u Hrvatskoj, gde sve drži nekoliko ljudi. Nakon što se „Feral“ ugasio, Predraga Lucića i Viktora Ivančića su zvali iz „Novog lista“ i onda su se oni kao dogovorili da Viktor počne da piše za „Novi list“, a Predrag Lucić da počne da piše za nekakav tjednik koji je trebalo da bude pokrenut nakon dva ili tri meseca. Samo sad taj nedeljnik nikako da se pokrene, a Viktoru su rekli, čekaj, odmori ti još malo, onda su oni otišli na taj sastanak, gde je bio novi vlasnik „Novog lista“, neki naftaš Ježić, i onda su se raspravljali i pitali su ga na kraju, pa dobro zašto mi ne možemo da pišemo odmah? Jer oni će dobijati kao plate i sve to, a ne moraju da pišu. To je dosta zanimljiva situacija. Onda su oni rekli, pa mi ne možemo da nasledimo vaše neprijatelje, mi ne možemo da uzmemo vaše neprijatelje. Taj odnos je, mislim, već raskinut, to nije dugo trajalo, to je neki kao sumanuti odnos, da vas plaćaju da ne pišete, ali je indikativan još jedan primer: dopisnica „Novog lista“ iz Zagreba je pisala o nekakvim kesama koje se valjda prodaju ili su lošeg kvaliteta u „Konzumu“ i poslala je to, tako jedan bezazlen tekst uredniku, i urednik je nju zvao i urlao na nju 10 minuta, zašto? Ona prosto nije mogla da shvati o čemu se radi, pa pisala je o kesama, bezazlena potpuno tema, benigna. Onda je on nju pitao: „da li ti nesrećo znaš ko pravi sve kese u Hrvatskoj?“ Ona je rekla „pa ne znam“. „Pa naš novi vlasnik“.

HATE SPEECH IN MEDIA

Publisher:CENZURA

Branimira Ćosića 5, Novi Sad

Production:Youth Center CK13

Vojvode Bojovića 13 Novi Sad

Realization:Alternative cultural organization – AKO

Vojvode Bojovića 13, Novi Sad

Center for Social Researches CSIVojvode Bojovića 13, Novi Sad

Editor:Željko Klarić

Translation:Vincent Spevak

Petar Atanacković

Logo design:Hanna Blank

Design and prepress:Mirjana Popović

Print:Daniel Print, Novi Sad

Novi Sad, 2009

Project support:National Endowement for Democracy

All copying and further utillization of texts from this publication is welcome, except in cases of commercial use and of their utillization within fascist, racist and sexist context

HATE SPEECH IN MEDIA

CENZURANovi Sad, 2009

CONTENT

Petar AtanackovićHATE SPEECH IN MEDIA: INTRODUCTION..............................................................69

Hanna BlankWAR-TIME PROPAGANDA: MEDIA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MANIPULATION........72

Transcript of the panel discussion:HATE SPEECH IN MEDIA: WARS OF THE 1990’s......................................................79HATE SPEECH IN MEDIA: SERBIJA AFTER 5th OF OCTOBER 2000th......................101

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Petar Atanacković

HATE SPEECH IN MEDIA: INTRODUCTION

Research of the hate speech represents important part of analyzes of public discourse in contemporary Serbian society. War experiences form the 1990s and undeveloped political culture in Serbia had influence on the wide spread hate speech, which represent dominant form of discourse in some parts of public. But, there are certain problems with definition of hate speech, which were further influencing on relationship of public toward some of it manifestations. On the one hand, there is clear intention to define as hate speech any kind of intolerant, rude and primitive relationship toward different, mostly political opinions, with which hate speech can be transformed in to pointless concept. On the other hand, typical examples of hate speech are often seen as “simple”, emotionally stronger manifestations of patriotism and expressions of “developed” national conscience, with which, again, results i.e. effects will be the same. Typical approach for the public figures, when they denying reproaches about hate speech, is their reference on freedom of speech. Truth is that freedom of speech represents basic civil right, but it can’t be misused for endangering the rights, freedom and even physical safety of the other people, individuals and social groups.

Its necessary to try to define hate speech, and one of the possible definitions goes like this: under hate speech we can imply propaganda, praising and justification of the crimes, as well as instigation of crimes over social groups and individuals, based on their race, skin color, religion, nationality, sex (gender) or sexual orientation. Propagation and transferring of ideas about superiority or minority of one social group or its members, as well as usage of symbols which are stimulating hatred and promoting superiority or minority of social groups and their members, can be also recognized as hate speech1.

Why at all to point out the problem of hate speech in Serbia? Experience from the wars in the last decade of 20th century, wars which started as “wars of words” and different degradations of the other ethnical and religious groups, represent clear

1 “Hate speech in Serbia”, Newsletter No. 1, YUCOM Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Belgrade, 2008, page 1.

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warning how the hate speech in media can serve as introduction in to the conflicts and war crimes connected with them. Population of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia were brought in to the state of madness by permanent chauvinistic propaganda, instigation of fears, prejudices, religious, national and even racial intolerance in the beginning of the 1990’s. in this situation everything was possible and every war crime had explanation and justification: murders, mass raping, ethnic cleansing or concentration camps… Even the worst possible war crime – genocide, find some justification and its own logic place inside wider concept. Genocide in Srebrenica in year 1995 wouldn’t be possible without intensive propaganda activities before. Instigation of old fears, ethnical and religious intolerance and exclusivity, permanent historical and religious references (permanent reminding on “centuries of Turkish rule”, “wall of Christian Europe” etc.), together with spread of racism, at the end resulted with genocide. This shocking war crime couldn’t be “implemented” and justified without months and years of intensive propaganda based on hate speech. So its important to point out that main characteristic of hate speech is that hate speech never represents only verbal activity, because it has immanent practical moment. In other words, practical realization of verbal moments represents basic characteristic of hate speech.

Examples from the time of conflicts in Yugoslavia represent the most obvious manifestation of hate speech and its influence on the society. But, cases of spreading the hate speech, instigation and justification of violence over different social groups and individuals because of their ethnical, religious, sexual, age or some other characteristics are present on almost daily basis in public discourse in today’s Serbia. Last in the series of examples – campaign against HC for human rights and Sonja Biserko2 in September 2008th, as well as chauvinistic incident of ex-minister Velimir Ilic connected with celebration of National state day in February 2009, just confirms our thesis. Obviously parts of public still didn’t manage to conclude anything from the war-time experiences, or they didn’t want to conclude anything, which can be important fact for the future…

Project Hate speech in media is started with idea to research hate speech phenomena and its place in public discourse, first of all in media, as social factor of great importance, factor which can mostly influence on the public opinion and

2 Report about this case is published in “Hate speech in Serbia. Attacks on Sonja Biserko as classic example of hate speech toward human rights defenders”, Newsletter No. 1, published by YUCOM

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behavior. Through the series of public debates, held in Youth Center CK13 in the December 2008th, as well as through individual researches, group of authors, journalists, linguists and historians, tried to define concept of hate speech, to analyze its manifestations in the 1990’s, as well as to research its manifestations on public scene after democratic changes in October 2000th.

Basic idea of the project, which didn’t had big pretensions, was to define and research this problem from the angles of different experts, but mostly journalists, as the main actors on the media scene and, by that, public opinion makers. Method of public dialogue was favored in comparing the method of individual and group researches, so basic of this publication are transcripts of two public debates.

Main intention of authors, as well as intention of editors of publication, wasn’t to finish or to give final conclusions about this topic or researches of it. In that way readers should understood material from this publication: it is just an Appendix to the researches of the hate speech phenomena. From this reason, publication does not represent our final word in this area, but instead of it, it’s just a hint for further studies and analyzes.

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Hanna Blank

WAR-TIME PROPAGANDA: MEDIA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MANIPULATION

Introduction

Media are playing a very big role in the conflicts and wars. Indeed media alone can not create a war itself, but their systematic manipulation plays an intrinsic role in strategies of various leaders. The influential media were used to obtain public support or public tolerance for policies which is, in the best case, threat to peace and security. This support or tolerance “could not have been assured unless the public accepted that armed conflict would not be an excessive price for the pursuit of nationalistic objectives […] the media were essential to procure such acceptance.”1

Furthermore the usage of the media as a suppressing tool is nothing new. The continuous tradition of authoritarianism in the media is explained in the words of Konstanty Gebert: “[W]hen you translate from the language of communism into the language of democracy, you need to change both the vocabulary and the grammar […] if you want to translate from the language of communism into the language of nationalism, all you need to change is the vocabulary. The grammar remains the same.[…] it is inclusion versus exclusion, and violence as a legitimate way of achieving previously ideological, and now national, goals.”2 The justification of authoritarian ruling was implemented through the manipulation of fear of the people. Regimes in Yugoslavia were developing systematically fear of political process, because they knew that “as long as they could prevent the masses from partaking in civil life, they could continue with their own ‘politics’.”3

The methods & principals of war propaganda in the media

The fact is that public does not want conflict or war. But this general position of the public can be changed with different mechanisms. First one is to convince public that the only guilty part for conflict and/or war is the other side, that conflict/war is imposed by the enemy and now must be accepted. Conflict or war wasn’t “our”

1 Thompson 1999, p. 291f2 Thompson 1999, p. 293 (K Gebert)3 Thompson 1999, p. 294 (Blagojevic, S and Demirovic, H: Erewhon 1994 Amsterdam)

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choice, but “we” have to defend our self from “them”, to confront “our” not self-serving goals and good cause to “their” selfish and bad causes. That was the situation in Serbia (and other ex-Yugoslav states) in the 1990s.On the one hand politicians are stressing their will for peace, but on the other hand they further argue that they would have been forced to the war, that the attack came first from the enemy, that they had to act in self-defense, that they have to perform international duties, etc… 4

According to this logic there was a clear picture in Serbian media, because “the Serbian side never attacks; it responds to enemy provocations, assaults, crimes or genocide.”5 In the media Serbian forces were displayed as “unarmed defenders of centuries-old hearths”, or often simply shortened to “defenders” or simultaneous “liberators” of towns and territories. For two month media didn’t mentioned that Sarajevo was bombarded by Serbian forces. On the contrary – according to the reporter Rada Djokic – Muslim authorities were holding Sarajevo under siege from within, so that the Serbs were in the position to defend their century-old hills around Sarajevo.6

One special example can be found for this thesis in western media propaganda during the NATO war in 1999. On the basis of the principle “the other, the other who started”, argumentation followed the pattern: because the enemy despises and underestimates our power, we can’t be any longer observant, but we are forced to demonstrate our power.7 In the same manner, western propaganda in 1999 argued that Yugoslavia was provoking the NATO and forced the NATO to react with military force. On January the 18th 1999 French newspaper Le Soir wrote that Yugoslavia has provoked the NATO with unbelievable cynicism and asked how long the worldwide largest army can justify her observant position.8

Usually there is a big gap between official and unacknowledged war aims. In case of NATO-war or so called “intervention” the official aims have been to preserve the multiethnic character of Kosovo, to prevent the mistreatment of minorities, to implement democratic system and to bring down the government. After the war it was obvious that most of the official aims haven’t been realized. Still nonofficial economic and geopolitical goals have been fulfilled, but never have been mentioned before the

4 Morelli, 2004, p. 155 Thompson 1999, p. 906 Thompson 1999, p. 90 7 Morelli 2004, p. 298 Morelli 2004, p. 30

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war. After the war NATO gained much more influence in the southeast Europe. NATO has now bases in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. Further proposals of Conference in Rambouillet (conference was held before war) before have foreseen to implement free market economy and opening to the free capital flow on international market for Kosovo.9 In the end the bombs, which destroyed the Yugoslavian post-socialistic economy were the last step to open the market for foreign enterprises in the region. According to NATO-speaker Jamie Shea, the costs of the military actions against Yugoslavia would be gained back by the profits which enterprises could make in the region in the long run.10 Quite sure is that the war wasn’t motivated by humanistic or altruistic aims, but exactly this motifs have been propagated to influence the public opinion and to get the acceptance for the war.11

Second important moment for mobilization of public is creation of fear. To gain the acceptance of a military action and involvement into a war it is very important to get the acceptance of the population for a war. That’s why propaganda has to persuade the people that their independence, honour, liberty, even life is in danger and that the war forces the implementation of undisputable values.12 Through the permanent display and repetition of the threat of the enemy a scenario of an omnipresent danger is set up. Description of the enemy as a demonic character aims to morally justify the war and to open up the categories of the good (= we) and the bad (= the enemy). For example, Yugoslav news agency Tanjug used in 1992 prejudicial and polemic terms for the armed forces of Bosnian government: “Muslim forces, mujahidin, Muslim-Croat forces, Muslim extremists, Muslim paramilitary organizations, etc.13 The aim of this demonisation of the enemy was to create an overall perspective “that a Muslim-Croat coalition had caused the ‘inter-ethnic’ war by obtaining independence without ‘Serb consent’; and that the Bosnian Serbs had only reacted to a blatant threat and were defending themselves […].”14

Important moment is need for personalizing of the enemy. Usage of hostile stereotypes to describe the enemy-side routinely appeared in Croatian as well

9 Morelli 2004, p. 5610 Morelli 2004, p. 57 11 Morelli 2004, p. 5812 Morelli 2004, p 4513 Thompson 1999, p. 2614 Thompson 1999, p. 26

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as in Serbian press, radio and television. On one side “Serb terrorist” or “Serbo-Communist army of occupation”; on the other side Croatian forces were called “Ustasha”, equalizing them with the army of Hitler’s wartime puppet state.15 War propaganda was quite often using racist rhetoric to incriminate enemy, and that was typical for both Serbian and Croatian propaganda in the Balkan wars. Use of language in generally plays important role in media during the conflicts and wars. For example, “vampirical” was one of the most favourite epithets in Serbian war propaganda. For example, Radovan Karadzic, war leader of Bosnian Serbs, “described the war in Croatia as war against a ‘vampirized fascist consciousness’.” (N Malcolm (1994): Bosnia. A Short History. London, 228)16

This propaganda method presents the war as a conflict between barbarity (enemy) and civilization (oneself). And “for this purpose you have to substantiate in advance to the population, that the enemy is systematically and on his own free will committing cruelties, while the “mistakes” of the own side are happening coincidental and unintended.”17 In this way the extreme form of criminality, which is with no doubt part of any war, becomes the exclusive attribute of the enemy’s army. This army then is described as consisting of unscrupulous and anarchic beasts.18

Key role in war-time propaganda is blockade of information i.e. control, censorship and adaptation of information for the public. For the constant support of the war by the population certain information and interpretations have to be “adapted”. The range of methods reaches from rewriting over simple disinformation: describing the own losses as low, while the ones of the enemy are enormous to merely omission of negative and unwanted news. Anyhow media coverage is characterized by lack of adequate detail or with balance presenting important information, prejudical commentaries, sheer hate speech and glossing over of controversial events.19

For example, the NATO tried to justify their bombardments during the war against Yugoslavia among other things with the proclamation that a vast number of thanks of the Yugoslavian army have been destroyed successfully. A report of the pentagon from June 1999 is estimating the real number of destroyed tanks up to 14 (and not

15 Zimmermann, W. In: Thompson 1999, p. 32816 Thompson 1999, p. 2317 Morelli 2004, S. 5918 Morelli 2004, S. 6119 Thompson 1999, p. 200

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how before claimed 120).20 Further, the Royal Air Force admitted in 2000 that only 40 % of munitions, which has been dropped over Yugoslavia, hit their intended destination.

On the other side the Yugoslav media published regularly again and again the same picture of three American soldiers, which have been captured in the beginning of the war. Obviously the aim was to persuade the readers that even more soldiers have been captured. Near the end of the NATO-Bombardments the Yugoslavian commanding General attested that NATO-forces had losses of dozens of airplanes, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UVA) a s well as hundreds of Cruise missiles.21 On both sides this kind of information intends to strengthen the moral of the own troops and to persuade the own population that the conflict has a legitimization.

In case that foreign media coverage of an incident requires a response and can’t be ignored or re-edited, for example Serbian state television RTS launched different tactics to limit the damage. Denial of the foreign report, spoiling the effect of the story by careful preparation and presentation, moving it to the end of the news program or sending parallel reports to detract from the authentic news have been used methods to keep negative information out of the news.22

Further common practice was instruction of the media and news agencies. For example in 1999 the Serbian Ministry of Information gave concrete instructions how to refer to several things: for example actions of police or army should be referred to as “defensive activities”, or NATO forces had to be referred to as “the aggressor”.23 Similar code of correct titles and terms was set at Croatian HTV in 1991. The same linguistic terms as in Serbia’s TV Belgrade (later RTS) have been used in Croatian news when reporting about the “Serb forces” or only “the Serbs” which were active in the occupied parts of Croatia.”24

Wars and conflicts are often having a religious character i.e. receiving religious dimension. In the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians religious feelings were also abused to create “we” and “the other” division. For example, Serbian

20 Morelli 2004, S. 9321 Morelli 2004, S. 9422 Thompson 1999, p. 9223 Thompson 1999, p. 11724 Thompson 1999, p. 159

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propaganda was referring to a war between the half moon and the cross. The orthodox believe, as one of the basics of the Serbian identity, raised in importance for the reason also to unify the Serbs against the NATO.25 So or so there is a big involvement of church organizations. For example some bishops of western European countries supported the actions of the NATO in Yugoslavia. On the other side Russian and Greek Orthodox Church were supporting their Serbian-orthodox brothers.26 But, its important to notice that religious motif for the war is going to be used only if it serves the own mission.27

War-time practice shows that journalists can easily come into the situation to be seen as traitors. Already if they are doing their job, hearing first arguments of both sides and after that conceiving an own opinion or may doubt the official presentation of the facts, they are seen as accomplice of the enemy.28 Most of the journalists in the western NATO-states had the choice between simply passing the information which they get through the daily briefings of NATO-speaker Jamie Shea or to at least question this information and comment it critical. The few one’s who didn’t take the easier way, quickly had to face verbal assaults of being anti-western, anti-democratic or even follower of Milosevic.29

In the same manner Albanian Intellectuals from Kosovo who had criticized criminal acts towards non-albanian population in Kosovo, have been accused of being traitors by the official news agency, which was close to the UCK in this time.30 The French weekly newspaper L’Evenement published on 29th April 1999 under the headline: “The accomplices of Milosevic” pictures and names of French intellectuals, authors and singers, which have been critical or skeptical about the NATO-politics. And even further L’Evenement was attacking other media who gave these persons public space.31 Also in Croatia and Serbia journalists had to face big pressure not to criticize or even question the government originating from the ruling party as well as from other journalists. In the government-controlled media discredit of journalists as “disorientated” and “unpatriotic” became common practice.

25 Morelli 2004, S. 11726 Morelli 2004, S. 11827 Morelli 2004, S. 11928 Morelli 2004, S. 12429 Morelli 2004, S. 12530 Morelli 2004, S. 12631 Morelli 2004, S. 127

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Independent media are playing important role in the times of wars and conflicts. During the wars in 1990s population in some parts of Serbia, mostly in Belgrade, had some access to the independent media products, like statements of opposition politicians and even direct criticism of Milosevic’s policies, like in the newspaper Vreme, TV Studio B and Radio B92. But area of influence of this independent media very limited. Every attempt to spread influence was sabotaged or directly stopped with usage of different methods: manipulation with taxes and costs for independent publications or broadcasters, refusal of distribution of publications outside Belgrade, massive pressure on independent reporters by state media as well as permanent danger of being physical attacked, arrested or even killed.32 But despite all the limitations, pressures and attacks, independent media have managed to survive and they played the key role in bringing down Milosevic’s propaganda and his political regime.

Bibliography:

Morelli, A. (2004). Die Prinzipien der Kriegspropaganda. Klampen Dietrich.

Thompson, M. (1999). Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina. University Of Luton Press.

32 Thompson 1999, p. 140

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Transcript of the panel discussion:“HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA: WARS OF 1990’s”

December 8th 2008Youth Center CK13

Participants:Miloš Pankov (linguist, Novi Sad)

Senka Gavranov (linguist, Novi Sad)Dinko Gruhonjić (journalist, Independent association of journalists of Vojvodina,

Novi Sad)

Moderator:Zoran Petakov (historian, Novi Sad)

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Zoran Petakov: Welcome to the first out of two panel discussions sponsored by the “Hate Speech in the Media” project. This project has been initiated by the Alternative Culture Organization and as a part of that initiative we will attempt to touch on some of the issues as well answer several questions since the influence of the media on the collapse of Former Yugoslavia is well known. Another subject we will try to open up concerns the events following the so called democratic changes of the year 2000. Has the role of media in society changed or have they merely altered their rhetoric. To help us with these issues tonight we have with us Dinko Gruhonjić president of NDNV (Independent Association of Journalists in Vojvodina) and a reporter for BETA, Mr. Miloš Pankov m.a. in linguistics and Senka Gavranov m.a. in the English language. My name is Zoran Petakov.

Miloš, you have been dealing with this issue for a long time and still continue to do so. So first let us define this term that is seeing so much use in everyday speech, “Hate speech”. What is it? What does it entail? How and why did it all start? You have the floor.

Miloš Pankov: Thank you. First I would like to cover some basics like the role of media in modern society and then move onto the terms we are dealing with. What is hate speech, how is it defined, how is it used and how does it spread via the mass media.

The role of mass media in modern society

Mass media are often wrongly associated exclusively with entertainment and, as such, they are considered marginal by the majority of people. However, mass communication channels are a part of society’s general activities. One of their basic tasks is to inform but also to take a critical stance towards topics and events of public interest by which they influence the creation of the public or rather the public opinion. Not only because they influence our views but also because they represent the means of approaching various areas of human knowledge. In earlier communication theory the media are portrayed as intermediaries in the process of relating news/messages but with the growth of electronic media and the development of information technologies that enable viewers to become immediate witnesses of events happening across the world their ability to shape the contents of messages

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they relate has also grown. This phenomenon has led McLuhan to conclude that the communication chain of modern society has been transformed so that the medium is the message. Influence and ownership of media have become key elements of political and financial power due to the media’s ability to mold the public opinion and present a version of events in a very persuasive and suggestive way.

On the other hand some of the modern theories on general public (by Jürgen Habermas also supported by the local sociologist ZoricaTomić) propose that the very expansion of mass media and entertainment has turned the public sphere into a mere sham. The public opinion is not formed through open discussion but rather through manipulation and control. According to Baudrillard the appearance of mass media, especially of the electronic kind, has changed the very nature of our lives because not only do they portray the world, they define for us what the world is like. He believes that an age where the media are omnipresent creates a new reality – a hyper-reality where human behavior and media images intertwine. Appearance of new media outlets has also restructured our private and public lives. New media technologies like the internet have contributed to the democratization of the media and the fact that one person’s opinion or experience presented on some forum can be available to millions of people all over the planet. At the same time this has also given birth to a TV audience that believes that any, even the most intimate part of somebody’s life should be legitimately available to the media audience through the TV cameras as is already being done in the “Big Brother” reality show.

Political discourse & media discourse

Discourse analysis has been established as a method for analyzing the use of language. It is a discipline that studies the use of general language units in a certain context. One of its largest areas of application deals with media language and speech as well as different social spheres of language use like politics. Modern theoreticians studying media discourse have very much been dealing with the contents of media messages and their relation to the social context and significance. Based on Teuen Van Dijk’s sociocognitive model, bringing news into a social context brings about a realization of social relations and processes on the micro-structural level of language. Norman Fairclough’s approach is in many ways similar to Van Dijk’s the difference being that Fairclough attempts to incorporate elements of intertextual analysis

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into his model by determining origins and meanings of different speech (discourse) genres within a media sample. He has set three areas of media text analysis with the goal of understanding the relationship between the communication process and the sociocultural environment. These are the issues of:

- representation (the way in which the world or an event are depicted)- identity (the way in which the identities of the participants are represented in a

journalistic text)- relationships (analysis of relationships that make the media chain of

communication: media – audience, politician – audience etc.)

The bond between political discourse and media texts or shows is generated thanks to the fact that acquiring and preserving social influence and power is efficiently accomplished through the media. Access to and control of the media allows the speaker to propagate his messages to an audience numbering in the millions. Therefore the contents and the means of shaping political speeches are coming into an ever tighter relationship with the choice of media and media genres as their direct communication channel.

The intermingling of the participants’ speeches in a media text or show is very significant during the analysis of the entire media message. The viewpoint of the media or rather the journalist’s speech needs to be distinguished from other types of speech (especially political speech) that are being conveyed directly or indirectly.

Hate speech

In recent times hate speech has become a very worn out and semantically undefined term. People and political groups who most often utilize hate speech very frequently claim to be its victims managing quite skillfully to relativize its meaning. The basic meaning of hate speech as a term, as best described in domestic literature by Ranko Bugarski, is public labeling, disqualification and satanization of a specific social group which can often (especially under conditions of war) imply physical liquidation. Thus defined, hate speech is a tool used by political speech for mobilization purposes with the goal of silencing or removing opponents, often during war preparations or during the war itself when hate speech takes on a leading role in orchestrating the war-time rhetoric. Some examples of hate speech could certainly be found in the racist propaganda of the Third Reich but our own closest and most obvious example is the

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spread of hate conducted by the media that preceded the wars fought on the soil of former Yugoslavia. The structure of hate speech requires two opposed sides where the speaker, whether it is a politician, a journalist, an editor or some other public figure, is the bearer of a certain identity and is the representative of the “US” group (consisting of him and his supporters) whereas the opposition falls into the “THEY” or “THOSE OTHER ONES” category. In its basis hate speech leaves no room for tolerance, respect for differing opinions, cultures or identities. In his research Ranko Bugarski has identified different phases of hate speech use in Serbian media. In the beginning the war mongering propaganda the US group consisted of Serbs, presented as patriots, defenders of ancestral hearths, victims of imposed war, people of heaven etc. On the other side were all the others who would come into conflict with the politics of Milosevich’s regime: other Yugoslav peoples, later described as Ustasha butchers, jihadist warriors, Shqiptar terrorists etc. In the second phase US no longer incorporated the Serbian people but rather the Serbian regime and the targets were THEY in the form of Western forces and internal enemies (Serbia’s opposition parties). This is how, for example, the participants of the 1996 protest following the opposition victory in local election became: hooligans, traitors and foreign spies, pro-fascist elements, quislings and as the conflict escalated with power slipping away from the regime, their media resorted to an even more aggressive rhetoric with expressions like: NATO-fascist scum, handful of new janissaries, degenerates, moral freaks…

These are certainly the most obvious examples which will forever remain embedded in our memories since a large part of the population felt personally called out and threatened. However, perfidious ways of packaging media messages and recognizing hate speech in societies that are not dictatorial or when coming from media that are presented as democratic is a field of intense scientific study. In western media hate speech is considered to be any negative characterization or rather the spread of stereotypes through media targeting marginalized groups like: foreigners, minorities or women. Violation of these rules is considered to be a breach of human and civil rights and there are precisely defined codices media must adhere to in order to avoid such incidents. In the works of Van Dijk and Ruth Wodak we come across a systematic analysis of racist speech that was particularly apostrophized during Haider’s rule in Austria several years ago when the whole incident exposed Austria itself to sanctions by the EU. In political discourse any mention of a community or people as less worthy

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than one’s own or listing of some of their defining characteristics in the same context is considered racist. Racism can be explicitly conveyed through the media as in this example:

…Croats are a genocidal people

…but sometimes its detection may require a deeper semantic analysis

I have nothing against Chinese people but the fact is that their coming here is taking jobs away from our workers.

Ethnicism in language was fairly common during the wars fought on former Yugoslavia territory. Ruth Wodak defines this type of discourse as a softer form of verbal aggression than racist speech, listing the Serbian-Croatian relations as an example. Serbian and Croatian media often exchanged hard accusations but they could not be classified as racist propaganda due to the common language and origin that did not lend themselves to biological superiority theories.

Paul Chilton describes a special strategy used by right wing parties and their supporting media in the form of implications that contain no negative messages from a purely formal standpoint. However information by which, for example, the nationality of the event’s participants is emphasized may manipulate the public into thinking that an incident was ethnically motivated. Example:

Chinese assailants beat up four people in Belgrade. (Kurir, 2006.)

When it comes to American media the events of September 11. are also frequently manipulated as are the government organizations that often violated human rights hiding behind the war on terrorism, followed by anti-Islamic attitudes or accusing one’s political opponents to be indirect terrorist collaborators. Very important in Van Dijk’s observation is that the manipulation of public opinion is more efficient when all key media are controlled by the manipulator while democratization of the media significantly limits opportunities for manipulation.

As a way of avoiding discriminatory language I would like to mention the guidelines proposed by Dubravka Valić-Nedeljković in her “Praktikum novinarstva” (Guidebook for Journalists) that can also serve as a reader/viewer guide for recognizing hate speech. It also contains a Code for Unsexist use of Language by Svenka Savić and advice on undiscriminatory reporting in regard to race:

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Mention somebody’s race only if it is very important.

Avoid words that members of a certain race might find offensive (half-breed, coloured...).

Do not speculate about a person’s cultural background.

As a part of an international research project “Spinning out of Control” (going by the name Public Intimacy, “Intima javnosti” in Serbia) a collection of studies was published that examined the media’s treatment of opposing sides during all of the conflicts that took place in former Yugoslavia. An especially demanding area of this research project was to incorporate as much of the language used as possible. Reports from multiple media (Serbian and Croatian for example) were analyzed including their ways of portraying the opposing side during a war. One of the starting hypotheses in this collection was the fact that the awakened aggressive energy that becomes the language of state propaganda often spirals down into violence making the politicians themselves prisoners of their own discourse.

In the part of the project I participated in as one of the authors, which deals with the conflict between the former Yugoslavian federation and Slovenia on its way to independence, an important methodological step was to differentiate between the journalists’ speech and that of the other news participants and focus on analyzing the language of the media themselves as one of the indicators of the media’s policies. By analyzing the way TV Ljubljana and TV Beograd depicted the opposition, the starting phases of hate speech could be observed in the spreading of stereotypes about the people with whom we were still (as in the decades before) living in the same country. As a part of war preparations a media strategy was employed just before the military intervention where blame and responsibility for specific events were being systematically transferred from individual politicians to the whole country and its people (Slovenia and Slovenians).

Another study I was involved with referred to the Markale massacres. Here the war propaganda machinery was fully utilized so that together with military units whole peoples were proclaimed as hostile along with the spread of ethnic stereotypes. At the same time a unity was established between the media audience, the media themselves and the people whose interests were being propagated along with their political leaders and military units who enforce such policies.

In the third conflict analyzed the attitude towards the military and political leadership of RSK (The Republic of Serbian Krajina) had changed. Previously supported as a part

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of the Serbian side in the conflict the media was no longer giving them unconditional support for continuing the war while the attitude towards the opposition (They) continued to be based on spreading hostility against their military units, people and political leaders.

The most efficient motivational asset used by the media on that occasion was to identify opposing politicians with criminal symbols, movements and ideals from the period of World War II, extremist and terrorist organizations using the people’s historical memories and deeply rooted fears as means of manipulation.

When it comes to modern times my colleague is going to tell you something about potential sources of hate speech. It is very important to know whether there is a defined codex, a journalistic one for example, that is going to prevent journalists or rather advise them on how not to use hate speech, as well as tell them whether it is sanctioned by law and whether some higher legislative acts provide incentive for such speech. I thank you.

Zoran Petakov: Thank you Miloš on your thorough presentation. Dinko, those of us who are old enough to remember the early 90’s and domestic media’s reports on the beginning of ex-Yu conflicts also remember Dnevnik’s supplements that lasted for hours showing very explicit images of corpses , people fleeing their homes etc. We watched it from the sides as consumers but what makes you an interesting conversationalist is that you were an active journalist during that time and are familiar with the people involved having had an inside look at the situation. So I would like you to familiarize us with that process, as it developed within Serbian media, and its participants. It is clear that lustration has not been conducted or ever will be nor is it possible at this time but it is not talked about.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Thank you. Good evening everyone. I was too young to be a journalist in the late 80’s and early 90’s but as a passionate admirer of the media I knew I was going to become one. Miloš’s mention of his research projects and the Slovenian war has jolted or rather refreshed my memory. Preparation for that war began a long time ago, I was in the military at the time. After that famous moment when Slovenian officials walked out of the Communist League congressional session they were being branded as Austrian stablemen, separatists etc. Even then did people in Serbia, I don’t know if you remember that, but there were actually cases of people

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throwing “Gorenje” brand refrigerators and washing machines out of windows. So we lived through such times too. We also lived through what you mentioned in regard to war preparations against Croatia with the focus on TV Novi Sad, today’s so called “Public service of Vojvodina”. Then all the way up to the events of 1995., I remember it like it was yesterday, also I know that when the Croatian operation “Storm” began on August 4th RTS1 was broadcasting a Russian Circus as if nothing was happening. Lines of tractors were still waiting at the border crossings because Sloba (Slobodan M.) hadn’t let them in yet since he was still deliberating whether to let them into Vojvodina or redirect them towards Kosovo. Now that I’ve mentioned Vukovar, it’s reminded me of something I’ve heard recently. There’s an exhibition being opened tonight as a part of the Vivisect human rights festival. The topic is “dictatorial regimes” and among other things the archives of the Novi Sad Dnevnik were searched for photographs. Dnevnik has a great archive of photographs dating to all the tumults of the ‘80s and ‘90s, not only on ex-Yu territory but the whole Eastern Europe. But the photographs were simply gone, well they were destroyed. Not on purpose but due to sloppiness and lack of consideration for what was a great cultural and historical heritage. So now one of the richest journalistic archives in Serbia no longer exists. The negatives are gone too, they’ve been destroyed by sloppiness and inadequate keeping. A still unconfirmed story is that the video archive has been destroyed too, a large part of TV Novi Sad’s video collection. That was obviously destroyed at the orders coming from above in order to remove any compromising material from the Vukovar, Slavonija and Srem (Syrmia) battlefields. There were some very interesting faces there, evidence that would certainly be of use to the war crimes tribunal. I assume you’ve had the opportunity to read the analysis of the media going by the name “War started in Maksimir”, the famous Dinamo-Red Star soccer game. I was in the military and stationed at Zagreb at the time and luckily we were forbidden from going out so I couldn’t attend the match. Horrible fighting broke out between fans, between players and even players and the police, you couldn’t tell who was beating on whom. It was interesting to see Marko Marković report from the studio in Belgrade and Boris Mutić, one of my idols in sports commentating up until then, report from Zagreb. It was completely obvious that they had already taken the side of Tuđman’s or rather Milošević’s regime and were without a doubt accusing the other side for what had happened. There are also valuable films by Lazar Lalić who unfortunately disappeared without a trace, well not really without a trace. That is another example

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of how people of principle are treated in this country. Lazar Lalić had gathered and organized a collection of Dnevnik RTS (called RTV Beograd at the time) videos which were made into films named “Year One”, “Year Two” and “Year Three”. The films contained no comments only Dnevnik clips that allowed you to follow the process of hate, dissolution and crime if you will. So anyone who wants to take a look at the films can find them. I like to show them to my students because even then in the ’89 – ’91 period the key word was, you guessed it, Kosovo. And then the students say to me, “Professor, this has to be a joke, this is new,not from the year ’89”, to which I respond, “No, no, it’s a ’89 Dnevnik broadcast when Kosovo’s autonomy was restricted and police raided the premises of Rilindija, a Prishtina news paper agency. The only thing different are the police uniforms but the commentary and everything else is the same, Kosovo, then too, was that sacred Serbian word.” We can say whatever we want, I am nostalgic for Yugoslavia, but speaking in the media sense the media were never free in former Yugoslavia. They were subject to a very clear ideological dogma when it came to politics. In regard to culture and other areas of life the media had many freedoms which they used to create worthy shows, movies, documentaries but within the informative sphere there was obvious censorship conducted by the SKJ (League of Communists of Yugoslavia). So when you have that kind of drilling and indoctrination happening for 45 years (which is how long the communist regime lasted) it’s perfectly clear that when dealing with information and domestic politics you don’t need censors because you already have an automated censorship chip inside you that makes you submit to whoever is currently in power.

Zoran Petakov: Is this connected to the fact that only in Vojvodina 35 thousand people lost their jobs the second Milošević came to power. Because many of those people were proficient in their work yet they were simply purged from all media. That must not be forgotten.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Unfortunately you are right. Still that is a minority of journalists. A

really small minority who had the courage to oppose the nationalistic madness. They were not only great intellectuals but also professionals of integrity who would not stand for it. I believe that anyone who had half a brain realized what was going on. I don’t say this because I’m the president of NDNV but we are the first independent coalition of journalists on ex-Yu territory. We were formed in the year 1990 by the

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very people, some of which are here in the audience, who wouldn’t go along with that kind of dictatorship and censorship. The rest had obviously taken the path of lesser resistance or had simply followed ambition believing that with the best out of the way, they too could muddle their way to become reporters in uniform wearing a helmet. There were all kinds of surprises from people whom we believed to be honorable and honest but ended up becoming some kind of monsters and warmongers. The rest were more or less slimes who saw war, like any other area of life, as an opportunity to claw their way to editorial positions.

Zoran Petakov: There are a few things you haven’t mentioned. You were, and still are, a BETA correspondent, a non-government agency. We have all read about the pressures enacted by the regime ranging from the closing down of the so called free media that were not in line with the regime, threats all the way to murders of certain journalists that to this day have not been resolved. There was always a bond between those people and the opposition that was merely using a political moment to assert itself as an opponent of the regime. But in some cases people were left completely unprotected and there was no one to raise a voice when that happens. Several days ago was a ten year anniversary since the shutting down of Naša Borba. It was then that you said, and I agree, that it was one of the most democratic and free media of the time but the fact is that it was shut down with almost nothing happening after that incident. Nobody protested much. The question is what does it feel like to do the job you love but end up abandoned by everyone and left to fight alone?

Dinko Gruhonjić: Well, I already said in that discussion that, in my opinion, Naša Borba was easily the best daily newspaper we ever had, the best in the history of Serbian print journalism. I don’t know how much you remember that newspaper but it was worthy of a much greater country with an established democratic system. Another detail comes to mind, let us make another small digression and compare those times with today. What I had forgotten but was reminded of in that discussion was that Naša Borba had something called the tolerance award. The first tolerance award was received by the late Aleksandar Tišma. The second one went to the student protest of ’96. / ’97. while the third tolerance award was given in Belgrade to, listen carefully now, the Albanian student union from Prishtina. It

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sounds astonishing because it’s almost unbelievable that today, near the end of 2008., a Serbian daily newspaper would present an award to a union of Croatian students or anyone connected to one of the countries in the region. I unfortunately cannot see that happening and this is what Mrs Latinka Perović said about it being a fact that Naša Borba has been shut down and what you said, that there not being (then or now) any ideas to resurrect it means that the society has no need for it as such. Despite my optimism it seems that, in the media sense, things are much worse today than they used to be despite these eight years of so called democratic reforms. It is true that we no longer have the same kind of political repression that we used to have under Vučić’s Information Law but even today we see Aleksandar Vučić on all the media. We no longer have the political pressure that we used to have during the ’90s but we have a sophisticated economic pressure that is very simple to explain. In Serbia there exists an artificial market that isn’t really a market. It is the equivalent of what the history of economics calls a pre-accumulation of capital with focus on monopolies. We are in this phase of economic development right now. We have Mišković’s monopoly on wholesale trading, Babić’s monopoly on medicines, wherever you turn there’s a monopoly. And now, the so called large media like B92, TV Pink or Belgrade’s daily newspaper are trying to survive in such a market. But since it’s impossible to survive on market basis if you don’t have an actual market you begin to face problems that if you try to write about the origin of Miroslav Mišković’s or Miodrag Babić’s money your media is left with no ads. And then we wonder why there is no investigative journalism in Serbia. Very simple, because Veran Matić won’t allow a journalist to do an investigative report because he’s going to lose several hours of ads and commercials from companies like Delta or Hemofarm. During the ‘90s we had media that kind of stood out in that sense. We were a phenomenon worthy of study not only in the area of hate speech but also because we had Naša Borba, B92, Nezavisni and Vreme. Nezavisni no longer exists and I stopped reading Vreme in 1999., except occasionally, since I became disappointed with it. A victim of circumstances B92 has transformed into a commercial TV station and Naša Borba is also gone. But those were honorable examples of journalism and people of courage who, during very difficult times reported on the worst possible things. In 1995., while whole of Serbia was turning a blind eye to the events in Srebrenica, Vreme had the story presented on its cover page. Dada Vujasinović’s texts and reports were being published in Duga that wasn’t really democratically or liberally oriented yet the reports

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were allowed. Those were war time reports by Dada Vujasinović that are today being used as evidence before the Hague Tribunal. You can even find them on her web site www.dadavujasinovic.com, all collected and published by her sister. So this woman wrote about all the things that we later supposedly began finding out about, like in 2006. when we “discovered” that the Scorpions safeguarded oil for Goran Hadžić and his group in Slavonija. Dada already wrote about all those things back in ’92. It was all apsolutely clear. Those are examples of the kind of journalistic honor that is lacking today I think. What we have today is the so called media pluralizm that is in some way very similar to global trends. More or less all of us have cable TV at home and we often find ourselves in situations where we go through all of those seventy channels without finding anything of interest. It’s because all of the programs are variations of the same theme not counting Discovery or National Geographic and other such interesting non-profiting channels. It’s the same case in Serbia, different frequencies, everything’s great, democracy is flourishing with a million different media but you can’t really publish anything. In Autumn 2006. I was faced with the worst kind of censorship in my journalistic career. During the Serbian constitutional referendum of 2006., I am ashamed to admit, there wasn’t a single media outlet that hadn’t made a deal with the government promising not to stir things up. Not one, I had to conduct guerrilla operations from my home and make deals with editors I knew were normal to report the unconstitutional news after midnight while the other editors were asleep. Something like that never happened during Milošević’s regime. Today when I look at the issues of Nezavisni from the ’97.-’99. period I often think we’d be led before the firing squad because of the things we used to publish. Those were the times when I think about all the people who used to write for Nezavisni from Indira Vlasi to Esad Kočan and other honorable names. None of that exists today, all we have today is manipulation of the media pluralizm which is a consequence of lustration not being conducted and the general social trend of sweeping everything under the rug because we signed the Declaration of Political Reconciliation so everything’s dandy, we have both the “Progressives” and a bright future.

Zoran Petakov: Thank you Dinko. I don’t think you could have given us a better introduction than the constitution since Senka has something to say on that very subject.

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Senka Gavranov: Instead of talking about the media I have decided to begin with a document that also has to do with public speech and is also constitutional in this country. I am going to do an analysis, it shouldn’t be too strenuous, I merely want you to see what’s going on and what layers lie beneath superficial language structures. We’ll go over the Constitution preamble and the first article. In regard to hate speech I just want to mention article 49. of the 2006. Constitution titled “Prohibition of inciting racial, ethnic and religious hatred” that says: “Any inciting of racial, ethnic, religious or other inequality or hatred shall be prohibited and punishable.” Remember that inciting of racial hatred is also prohibited but right now we’re focusing on ethnic hatred so let us go back to the preamble. The Constitution preamble says: “Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people and equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia…” and then comes the famous Kosovo part that begins by saying that the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia and that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations, the citizens of Serbia adopt. What I’m now curious about is that the article 49 forbids any incitement of ethnic and religious intolerance and inequality but the preamble and the first article do not really support that. What they do is allow for certain kinds of speech because the Constitution differentiates between two groups of people. The preamble says this “Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people…” which is a starting principle, meaning tradition. The second principle is “…and equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia…”. The third principle is Kosovo but that doesn’t interest us right now. What interests us is that the Constitution makers talk to us about “…the state tradition of the Serbian people…” but we don’t know what that is, it is not defined. It most likely has to do with some kind of continuity but I can only imagine what that is. I haven’t researched it but I’m guessing it has to do with the year 1918 or the Nemanjići. That could be interpreted as a state tradition of the Serbian people. Also, the second principle is the “…equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia…”, and I don’t know whether this was the Constitution makers’ aim and if I’m being too picky, but the equality of all citizens and ethnic groups in Serbia simply does not rest within the concept of state tradition. But that’s ok, we can admit our mistake and say that

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the idea of ethnic equality didn’t exist in 1918. But then we arrive at the first article that reads “Republic of Serbia is a state of the Serbian people and all the citizens who live in it…”. Does this mean that Serbs are not included among “all citizens” and vice versa? “Vice versa” actually makes sense since not all of the citizens are Serbs. But since we already mentioned Serbs separately, and I don’t know why we did, they have to be included among “all citizens”, it is only logical. I don’t know if lawyers occupy themselves with such matters but they really should, especially when the country’s most important legal document is concerned. The problem with such a division is that the Serbian state acts as a unifier to all this. “The Republic of Serbia a state of the Serbian people and all the citizens who live in it…”, ok, “…based on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy…”. How is it based on principles of civil democracy and how do the Constitution and its makers define civil democracy if Serbs aren’t even citizens? Between the preamble and the first article that reads “Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people and equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia…” and the Kosovo part it goes on to say “the citizens of Serbia adopt the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia”. If we defined the citizens of Serbia as all non-Serbs does that mean that the Constitution is adopted by the citizens of Serbia who, by the Constitution’s definition, aren’t Serbs? What I really want you to pay attention to is that if you want to claim to have a civil society you cannot divide people on ethnic principles. You singled out Serbs on ethnic principles but claim that your state is a civil democracy, so why the ethnic principle? And then we wonder why journalists write as they do. Why is a criminal of Roma nationality described as such while, in case of Serbs, ethnicity isn’t mentioned. So whenever you read a newspaper you read about Albanian and Roma criminals, thieves and rapists which you begin to remember as a kind of a template that becomes a part of social awareness by which Roma, Albanians and the rest commit murders etc. In the end why does someone’s ethic origin even matter? When is that relevant? What is relevant is when someone is a victim of a hate crime, when someone is beaten up for being Roma. I believe that if someone conducted a serious language analysis it would become clear which political structures insisted on introducing the terms like Serbian, Serbian people etc. It was most likely DSS attempting to reconcile the so called civil democratic ideology of the Constitution makers, with the nationalistic one. If you put together an article 49 that forbids one thing but then allow for people to be divided on ethnic grounds you’re digging your own hole. This isn’t hate speech,

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I’ll say it once more, the preamble and the first article of the Constitution aren’t hate speech but they support a view of the world, state and society that allows hate speech to develop. So much for now.

Zoran Petakov: Thank you Senka. I would like to ask you one more question because I know you’ve dealt with it and now you’ve touched upon the issue during your speech. When, for example, two groups of young men in Serbia come into conflict and someone ends up beaten up or stabbed, the news report that in a conflict between two groups of youths cold weapons were used injuring two people. However when the conflict occurs in a mixed population area then it wasn’t two groups of young men but, for example, Serbs and Hungarians. So what you have observed can be seen daily in some media. What effect can it have on someone who reads, hears and absorbs such stories every day? You touched upon that issue and I would like you to elaborate a bit more.

Senka Gavranov: Constitution articles dealing with preventing discrimination are very good. However, if you have a preamble and a first article that define your country one way it seems hypocritical to make a different claim later on. As for the discourse practices in the media whenever there’s an incident based on ethnicity, race, sexual orientation or otherwise there are several strategies in use. One of them is manipulation of the active and passive moods. For example, if Americans bombed Iraq and we want to correctly convey the news through the media discourse we’ll say: “Americans bomb Iraq”. That way it is known who carried out the act and where the responsibility lies. If we want to avoid that we can say: “Iraq has been bombed”. Simply put the sentence into passive mood. If we want to erase any trace of responsibility we can simply use some impersonal form and say: “Bombardment of Iraq takes place”. You’ll hear the same things about the former Yugoslavia conflicts like: “A war occurred”. A war doesn’t “occur”. There are participants and victims. That’s manipulation of the active and passive mood as well as nominalization. Verb to bomb, “Americans bombed…” is transformed into a noun bombardment, a gerund or rather a verbal noun. This is easily avoided by simply saying who did what. One needs to stand behind his or her words and take responsibility, people don’t beat themselves up. Another example can be seen in sexist speech. Imagine a husband who beats up his wife, she’s laying on the floor unconscious, he call the ambulance

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and doesn’t say “I beat up my wife” but “My wife has been beaten up”. He is avoiding responsibility for his actions.

Zoran Petakov: Thank you Senka. Now’s the time for questions so if you have any please ask.

Question 1 (Branislava Kostić): Let’s go back to hate speech. We’ve heard some great presentations here but I would like to return to the topic at hand. So let’s start with tonight’s examples. Problem with hate speech is that it really sticks on and creates a hate speech context. What’s the problem here? First, the media exist in a market and, as you said, certain resources are necessary. In dictatorial regimes they the media are financed by the regime itself while in supposedly democratic societies they are sustained by the market. Dinko, why were the media able to publish all the things we wrote about in ’95 for all those years? Because they were financed from abroad of course. Today that money is gone so B92 has to broadcast things like Big Brother, Trijumf etc. Is there perhaps confusion regarding the importance of hate speech? How did it contribute to the collapse of Yugoslavia? It did one key thing in ’89. Near the end of ’89 a public opinion analysis was conducted on the entire ex-Yu territory. A valid sample taken from all republics and provinces showed that 79% of SFRJ citizens wished for Yugoslavia to remain united. National animosity was marginal except towards Albanians and the Roma but even that didn’t hold true for all regions. So science would say that there was no real possibility for ethically motivated conflicts. That was also true for Bosnia. But was there a bloody war in Bosnia? Yes. How did it happen that, in just one year, those same SFRJ citizens began killing each other? That’s the problem. That’s the issue of hate speech. How did it become so powerful? How could the media completely overturn the public’s mind set so quickly? How did they do it? Dinko explained a part of it. What’s the problem with today’s media speech? Hate speech seams to be allowed in our society and that’s only because it is allowed in the media. Now let us be clear. Hate speech in Serbia is prohibited by three constitutional laws: The Law on Radio-Diffusion, The Telecommunication Law and The Public Information Law. They all explicitly prohibit hate speech but, and it’s a big but, there are no sanctions for it within the law. When hate speech appears on one side it automatically begins to multiply on the other sides too. The Serbian media system, as well as that of the Croatian and other Yugolsavian

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media, was formed in conditions of war and as a consequence it was normal that, in time of war, the enemy would become something that is opposite to your people to whom it must be explained that it is honorable, important and a matter of duty to fight the enemy. In all wars the enemy is always the embodiment of evil and it is important for the public to perceive them as such. What happened in SFRJ during the period of ’89 - ‘90 was that every independent state (a former republic) had only one goal and that was to stigmatize the other side as the embodiment of evil even if it meant making up new terms. So, in the Croatians’ view Serbs were butchers and from the Serbian perspective Croatians were the butchers even though they charged each other to the same music. You know that song that is sung in Serbia to the words “Marširala, marširala kralja Petra garda” (They marched on, marched on, King Peter’s guards) that was also sung in Croatia to the same melody but with the words “u boj u boj za narod svoj” (to battle, to battle, for your people). The goal of the media or rather hate speech was, and is, to portray the other side as something evil that any honorable man should resist and fight. Hate speech is always a signal and very often a trigger for allowing harm to be inflicted upon the other side. The problem with hate speech is always the same. The one who is opposite from us, who is a member of THEY regardless of his religion, ethnicity or opinion, always needs to be characterized as evil. Evil that our side needs to fight with all our strength. That kind of speech is still present in our political discourse but unfortunately also in our public speech because that relic of war-time speech still endures and by which anyone who doesn’t think the same way is automatically the enemy and subsequently not a worthy human being.

Dinko Gruhonjić: You certainly remember, and I as a Bosnian know, that one of the first goals of ex JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was to capture the tv repeaters. I’ll repeat, first they captured the transmitters and then followed the events in Prijedor, Sarajevo and Srebrenica. In my Banja Luka where, out of geographical convenience, we were watching TV Sarajevo 1 & 2 and Zagreb 1 & 2 suddenly in Autumn of ’91 we started receiving TV Beograd (TV Belgrade). I don’t like to blame the media, they were merely tools in the politicians’ hands. Why did they go for the transmitters? Recently I heard that, according to some research, people in Serbia, on average, watch TV less than 5 hours a day. To me that’s frightening. That means that television has, as it did then, a profound effect on our lives. Traditionally, peoples

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who are exposed to such media controlled by dictatorial regimes equate television with government authority. That’s because they perceive television as an undeniable authority through which the president addresses them. And in the tradition of these peoples the country is their mother and mother needs to be obeyed hence the TV needs to be obeyed. So even today you’ll hear some simple man tell an outrageous story and when you ask him where he heard it he’ll say: “It was on TV”. Notice the impersonal and neutral “it”. That “it” is the reason they captured the transmitters first, so that all that followed in BiH and Croatia could transpire.

Criminal responsibility of journalists is an issue that we as an association attempted to touch upon after October 5th. Except Florens Artman who is to appear before tha Hague Tribunal this Spring, albeit for completely different reasons, none of the former Yugoslavia journalists have been charged with any kind of crime. I spoke to the people from the Tribunal and they said there were attempts to compile charges against advertisers of war propaganda who were, unfortunately, quite numerous. However, according to their legislative thinking, the problem is that their criminal responsibility needs to be proven. Allow me to point out the relationship between what Miljana Baletić said when she came to do a report over Dubrovnik and the victim of the grenade that soldier fired. Now that’s the legal catch when journalists are concerned. Unlike former Yugoslavia, the Rwanda Tribunal convicted two journalists. There was a radio station that openly called for genocide. Our journalists were always making some vague statements but the ones in Rwanda were very open with exclamations like “Kill them like cockroaches…”, or “Don’t shoot them, use the machetes…” so there were no problems with rising charges against those two idiots. There were no problems because there was plenty of evidence and clear lines could be drawn between what they were saying and what happened on the field resulting in almost a million deaths.

As for hate speech and what you’re saying I must admit I disagree with some details. There was a wonderful little “incident” in Helsinki Committee’s school of democracy when Pera Luković, believe it or not, came to hold a lecture to young students about hate speech. Pera went on a tirade cursing everybody’s mother and father and these kids 17 and 18 years old were listening and they couldn’t believe what they were hearing. They didn’t know who Pera Luković was or what the case was about and once he was finished he said: “Ok, any questions?”. One boy shyly raised his hand and said: “Excuse me Mr. Luković but, what you were saying, was that

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hate speech?” and Pera said: “No, you’re telling me I was using hate speech?”, and even started to attack the boy. Pera is actually a kind of a loudspeaker for what we’re all thinking. I live with pretty interesting company, my neighbor who lives below me, an ex TVNS journalist, is a well known warmonger, now living in my building enjoying his retirement days. The neighbor above me is an ex officer of the Užice corps and I won’t waste words talking about things he did. So I live in a sandwich between a warmonger and a lieutenant-colonel and now I’m not supposed to use hate speech. Well I wouldn’t use it if they had answered criminally or morally but as a human being I have to use such speech. So I always remember that and use it as a convenient counter-argument in situations like, for example when Thomas Mann was asked about the Nazis he would always swear. Why? When he was asked about why he was using profanities, being the father of modern German literature and language, he said it was because it was the only language the mob and riffraff could understand. We are still suffering the consequences of our society’s lack resolve to conduct a lustration. We live in a society where it’s perfectly normal to invite Mladen Obradović from “Obraz” or Firer (The Fuhrer) to the Rex movie theater and then even call on me to represent the other side. What other side? Even the Serbian MUP, being the way they are, have characterized them as clero-fascist and neo-nazi organizations. Upholding the freedom of speech does not mean allowing fascists to speak. Fascists are enemies of democracy who deserve the police baton, not to be brought to the media where they can accuse me of using hate speech against thugs. Well, I’ll use it always. The fact that Komrakov wasn’t lustrated or held responsible for his crimes, not to get all pathetic over all the children they murdered, isn’t my fault. But since I know what happened, being a witness to the times, as a citizen I have the right to at least say who that man is in public without being accused of spreading hate speech. Thank you.

Senka Gavranov: It needs to be clear that hate speech is directed against individuals and groups based on their ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, age or even language. I, for example, could never offend anyone and use words like stupid cow, worthless dog etc., I just couldn’t but it is still just an insult, not hate speech. What I’m afraid of is trivialization of hate speech. In the case of Dinko Gruhonjić you can call him out on manners, courtesy, respect, ethics, whatever you want but you can’t say he’s using hate speech. I agree with not using insults and curse words but you mustn’t call them

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hate speech because then you trivialize it.

Branislava Kostić: Linguistic analyses of hate speech show that there is indeed a lot of confusion among our people when it comes to differentiating between private remarks and hate speech. Still, our media laws are very clear in their definition of hate speech. I repeat, our problem is, and Dinko is right in pointing it out, that not only was there no lustration but our public wasn’t ready to analyze the media’s effect in a transparent way. I completely respect Dinko’s justification but on the other hand, at some point, someone will probably gather the courage and ask. Does Pera Luković, in the name of all he’s done for us and our debt to him, have the unrestrained right to insult anyone who comes his way? But that’s not the topic of this discussion.

Dinko Gruhonjić: Pera Luković created his own genre during the ‘90s, he’s always been like that. Now I’m not going to play his defense lawyer here but what I want to say is that, in post October 5th Serbia Miodrag Popov won a legal case against Pera Luković. The same Miodrag Popov who did that report wearing a uniform and helmet. So Pera, being who he is, said: „Are you people crazy, that man was a warmonger!“. That’s the scream, the wail, that instead of me he had the courage to let out. And this guy sues him for defamation, wins the case and no one makes a sound. Not only does no one make a sound but, following October 5th, Pera Luković is unable to publish his work anywhere in Serbia. Nobody would publish his texts. So he published in Feral, in BiH Dani and now he has an e-paper. So I come back to the unjustice, but that was always his style. And if you remember that Ćorava kutija (The Blind Ballot Box) in Vreme, that was “sotire”, special kind of literary genre. It was a kind of heavy satire where Pera handed out roles to politicians and then made fun of them in a very amusing way. Feral published a book of his called “Godine raspada” (The Years of Dissolution) that can serve as a kind of a fascinating historical account of former Yugoslavia. He always wrote that way, I could even defend him on literary grounds and say that it wasn’t hate speech.

Miloš Pankov: I would also like to answer a part of the famous dilemma about how did all those peoples suddenly become victims of hate speech. One part of my research dealt with that question which I didn’t mention in my opening presentation. If we’re going to be discussing this there is a more precise chronological line depicting

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the phases of stereotype development. In the first phase when we’re analyzing specific participants in the conflict and their actions and starting with neutral journalistic forms, it is normal to say that military units conducted certain operations or that two army groups are engaging on the battlefield, that is a completely neutral situation and isn’t something unreasonable. Those kinds of war journalism also exist. However, the first signs of hate speech appear when instead of reporting on specific factors generalization start to be made. For example, in regard to the Slovenian War and Slovenian leadership: “Slovenians don’t like us, they want to separate…” and gradually those sentiments get applied to the whole country and its people. On the other hand we also have the Balkanism phenomenon. The western media and the whole western discourse applied this phenomenon of orientalism, as Said named it, which also included the former Yugoslavia territories giving birth to the Balkanism stereotype which made the citizens of Serbia and other allegedly primitive republics its victims. It portrayed them as primitive peoples unworthy of Europe and European society and was also used by Slovenian television. That’s as far as it got during the Ten-Day War which lasted a very short time and ended with politicians on both sides (Slovenian and Serbian) acting as if they wanted to simply forget it ever happened. The territory was divided, the military also and everyone went their own way. Further phases were reached in BiH and Croatia in such a way that the accountability of whole peoples and states became a kind of metaphor. So Muslims weren’t Muslims anymore but Mudzahedins, Serbs became Chetniks etc. Let me go back to Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive theory. One observation of mine that relies on his theoretical suppositions is that the motivation for hate speech indeed lies in the peoples’ rooted fears and historical memories. Certain expressions and motifs were deliberately used to, for example, allude to World War II with the goal of once more triggering those fears and using them to saw hate. Of course not before adequate military and media preparations were made.

Zoran Petakov: Ok, I don’t believe there are any more questions or floor requests? No. Very well. Thank you all for coming. Next week at the same time and place we will again be talking about hate speech but we’ll be concentrating on its use after the October 5th 2002. and the way it continues to be used in our media even after the so called democratization of our society and the democratic electoral victory of 2000.

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Transcript of the panel discussion:“HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA: SERBIA AFTER 5TH OF OCTOBER 2000TH”

December 16th 2008Youth Center CK13

Participants:Teofil Pančić (journalist, magazine Vreme, Belgrade)

Tomislav Marković (journalist, web magazine e-novine, Belgrade)Petar Atanacković (historian, Novi Sad)

Moderator:Miloš Perović (sociologist, Novi Sad)

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Miloš Perović: Good evening and welcome to the second panel discussion on hate speech organized by the CK13 Youth Club. This time we have with us Teofil Pančić, journalist and columnist of the Vreme weekly paper, Tomislav Marković, also a journalist and an e-paper assistant editor and Mr Pavel Domonji who was prevented from attending and will this time be replaced by Petar Atanacković, historian and also an e-paper correspondent. Last time we defined the notion of hate speech and talked about its presence in the media, especially during ex-Yu conflicts and we saw how something that starts with public speech may grow into actions with terrible consequences. So, having went through that period of recent history, today we’ll be talking about the presence of hate speech in the media following the year 2000. and its so called democratic changes within Serbian society. The first question I would like to begin with and direct it at Mr Pančić is what has changed in public speech after the year 2000. since its form seems to have changed but not the essence. Sometimes the situation seems to be even worse than it was in the ‘90s and today it look like it’s even more dangerous to take a critical stance towards the nationalistic ideology and its agitators in the media. So, have there actually been any significant changes in public speech since 2000?

Teofil Pančić: It would be difficult for me to answer that question with a simple yes or no and then expand upon that answer with just a few sentences. In my opinion these things are far more complicated. On one hand the period following October 5th has been marked by a higher degree of freedom in public speech a more expressed media pluralism and the fact that, conditionally speaking, some of the harder walls erected around the media by the old regime have fallen so a degree of success seems to have been achieved. And this seemed to work for a while after October 5th. However it quickly became apparent that the empire was striking back quite successfully and in several ways. One of those ways is the appearance of these poisonous, pseudo-political tabloids that have infected the media space. If you think back these tabloids were practically non-existent during the ‘90s. They’re all phenomena of the post 2000 period. Take for example papers like Kurir, Nacional, the now late Press and others, they all came to existence in the period following October 5th and most of them actually appeared after the death, or rather murder, of Zoran Đinđić. So all that used to be propagated via RTS or Politika has now moved onto the tabloids and in a different way to the internet but we’ll talk about that later,

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right? And I believe, that by moving into this kind of underground, hate speech has actually gained a new momentum and a new form directed at the masses’ lowest instincts making it in a sense even more powerful and penetrating that it was. So, in that sense, it could be argued that a step backward has been made. Of course someone could say that’s one of the side effects of freedom and there is some truth to that. But that kind of freedom lacks any kind of regulations. It’s like equating a soccer match that follows certain rules in both teams’ interests with 22 hooligans meeting on a grassy field to beat each other. And now you could say it’s legitimate, if people want to fight they have a right to. Well, they don’t! I mean, if we want to live in an ordered community they really do not have that right. Some basic rules have to exist, not in the form of censorship but in the sense that it has to be known which things are impermissible in ethical and civilizational contexts, which are the things you simply cannot do to other people. And that is where the Serbian media failed. They failed in a sense that they allow for one childish answer for everything. That answer is “well, that’s what the people want” or “everyone has a right to an opinion” so some people are pro-genocide, some are against and we’re supposed to discuss them as equal points of view. That kind of nihilistic pseudo-debate where all values are equal is nothing more than an invitation for a society to not have any values at all. That, for me, is the general image of the post October 5th period. So if before October 5th we had one terrible center of power that was dictatorial, domineering and full of censorship which we could safely hate, after October 5th it has become decentralized and has moved into the so called private sector where it’s much less vulnerable. This is because it doesn’t have just one head, there is no single, fixed and clearly outlined enemy like Milošević was so it’s free to spread all over. Of course, just so it’s clear, that kind of speech still has plenty of consumers which is not to be ignored.

Miloš Perović: A part of this answer was a good introduction for my next question which I will pose to Mr Atanacković and which is related to the aspect of the post 2000 period Teofil was just talking about. After the year 2000. there was an explosion of the so called political tabloids in which we can find some of the most extreme examples of hate speech. In your opinion what social movements stand behind these kinds of media and how large is their influence on public opinion?

Petar Atanacković : It is difficult to say which movements are behind that. Teofil just

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said that after the year 2000. there was a shift from the state to the private sector. So it’s no longer the state media but the private media which naturally raises the question of the source of those media’s capital. It also raises the question of the methods they use, the papers like: Kurir, Glas Javnosti, Press, Pravda etc. Methods which are not only far away from professional ethics or the journalistic code but any kind of ethics. I believe they are the first who introduced the method of ordering custom texts where you basically pay the media and they write and publish the text, lead the campaign, it all depends on the size of the investment. We can only guess who’s behind that. They are some kind of para-organizations that became especially prominent during the first and second term of Vojislav Koštunica although their beginnings can be traced to Zoran Đinđić’s government. Besides, these media played a significant role in the campaigns led against Đinđić and we all know how they ended, with murder.

As far as yellow press goes it is not new to Serbia although it hasn’t been active in this form for decades. To tell the truth, something similar to this did exist between the two World Wars, tabloids like the Beogradski dnevnik and Balkan. If we all go back a few years we’ll remember that there existed a paper with the same name and similar yellow press tendencies. I had the opportunity to go over those old Balkan issues from the ’35, ’36 and ’37 and compare them to today’s tabloids and it seems to me that some of their editors and financiers have actually read some of those old yellow press papers. Still, it’s quite possible that’s not the case but rather, as Toma recently said when we talked, that the whole pattern is simply being repeated. So, during the ‘30s the tabloids’ writing style was very similar to the one used today. They led their campaigns in similar ways against politicians by spreading hate speech with the difference being that back in the day the tabloids were dominated by an antisemitic theme which is, in a way, logical due to the Nazis’ triumphs in Germany at the time. So even then, the Yugoslavian papers, especially Balkan constantly wrote about, for example, who’s to blame for the decline of our shoe makers, how Jews were sabotaging our economy, things like that. If we look at things that way hate speech is hardly new. What is worrying is that 70 years have passed since Balkan published their paper but we still see the same patterns, the same kind of speech which is very disturbing. Of course the public opinion is as it is, the data shows that the illiteracy rate in Serbia is 3-5% but how many of those 95% are truly functionally literate and able to understand the context of what they read? It is the social context of media activity and the general backwardness and semi-literacy that are the real

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problem in my opinion because such circumstances are ideal breeding ground for the aforementioned para-organizations and movements.

Miloš Perović: Yes, now that you’ve mentioned those campaigns the tabloids use as an example of hate speech, recently we have had an opportunity to witness one such campaign directed against the Serbian Helsinki Committee or more precisely against its president Sonja Biserko who was exposed to the most obvious kind of hate speech coming from those very tabloids. The occasion for those attacks was the Helsinki Committee’s annual report on human rights in Serbia for the year 2007. So I direct this question at Mr Marković: What was it, in your opinion, that provoked these attacks, from what social circles did they come from and what was their methodology? Can you give us an analysis?

Tomislav Marković: Well, actually that HC report stood on display for months on the HC website and nobody made a fuss about it until the moment Slobodan Antonić also known as “Ruho” ran out of ideas or acquired some deeper reasons for starting that campaign. He is generally well known for finding enemies in need of extermination at every step. I found his previous campaigns against Peščanik quite interesting when he branded all listeners of Peščanik as a sect. It was an interesting choice of words. He claimed that listeners of Peščanik gather on Friday nights to listen to Peščanik. That sounds quite bizarre to me since a gathering is when a group of people gathers in one place but Peščanik is listened to over the radio, not played over loudspeakers on Rebublic Square…

Teofil Pančić: For now…

Tomislav Marković: For now, but there are indications that’s about to change. It’s interesting that he used the term “sect”, the appropriate term would be “small religious community”, not “sect”. He used that term to portray them in a negative light, to proclaim them an enemy to be eradicated. Not only are they political opponents gathering around a radio show but they’re also a sect, a parallel pseudo-religious organization which needs to be dealt with in an obvious way. Another interesting example is when he referred to the members of “other Serbia” as “zombies”. That was another attempt to portray those who do not share his opinions as a kind of

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non-humans, something outside the political framework. Nazis did the similar thing in their anti-semitic campaigns during the ‘30s. They described the Jews as different kinds of critters that need to be eradicated. That kind of rhetoric is very common in our extreme right wing movements. Something similar was used by Emir Kusturica I think, his example was interesting too. In that famous “Kosovo is Serbia” meeting he referred to people as mice and mice, as we all know, aren’t human, they’re pests, mice need to be exterminated. So that kind of rhetoric is interesting indeed. Now let’s go back to the story of Sonja Biserko and the Helsinki Committee, it’s a recurring motif of our media lives anyway. Slobodan Antonić published a text in Glas javnosti where he claimed that Sonja Biserko and the HC hound our intelligence, our national, cultural and other elite, how they’re the enemy working at the behest of their foreign financiers and supervisors and how they oppose Serbian interests and that was the trigger. The day after a number of media like Večernje Novosti, tabloids etc. all emerged from the woodwork to call those national dignitaries to ask for their opinion. Their reaction was to bring all guns to bear on Sonja Biserko. And it really is fascinating, the choice of those supposed dignitaries, what was in that HC report and why did they get so angry. They were upset because Sonja Biserko and her associates who worked on the report quoted what they had said. So they merely quoted what was said about the spread of nationalism that is still strong in Serbia and seems pretty unstoppable and is a kind of an obstacle to our European integration. Basically they were angry for having been quoted. Nobody made any false statements, nobody used the method of lying like Slobodan Antonić did with his editing and placing words out of context to create a false impression about what was said. All of this went pretty far so, for example, Dule Savić made a statement which was used as a title in a sports journal, the Sport maybe, and which said: “They want to kill me”. As if Sonja Biserko had some kind of a special ops unit. They basically reversed the roles. They did everything they could to present themselves as victims when in fact they have profiteered from the whole process that went on during the ‘90s. Except for this Dule Savić, who’s a big patriot now, a member of the RTS’s managing board and other institutions and who bravely led the charge fighting for something in Paris as far as I remember, the second most interesting case is that of Vasilije Krestić. He is an academic, one of the authors of the “Memorandum”, the man who coined the famous phrase “genocidal people” and proclaimed Croatians as genocidal and is also one of the cartographers of Great Serbia and that whole story that started all the

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hate and wars. I’m talking about the story of theirs that Milošević who until then was just a communist apparatchik assumed as his own and then imposed during the ‘90s. He was serious about it for a while but later they became disappointed with him because, there you have it, he wasn’t dedicated enough to the wars so they all became this great opposition, Matija Bećković, Dobrica Ćosić and others. Anyway, all those people were angry for being quoted but that wasn’t the end. The Faculty of Law was mentioned in the HC report as the nesting place of the anti-Hague lobby so the following day the faculty published a great article in their defense in Politika and Večernje Novosti listing all the good things that are being done at the faculty and that is all true but that’s not all there is. People like Kosta Čavoški and Oliver Antić teach at the faculty and the famous panel discussion under the name “Istina o Srebrenici” (The Truth About Srebrenica) was also held there. The discussion only managed to be held on the second try because the first try was supposed to have been some kind of a celebration of the liberation of Srebrenica, some kind of an anniversary maybe. They don’t believe any kind of genocide happened there, in their view Srebrenica was merely liberated from civilians very efficiently and during the “Istina o Srebrenici” discussion, among others, Ljiljana Bulatović also spoke telling a pretty morbid tale about how their graves are on Serbian land now and how Muslims should transfers those graves to their land because it’s obstructing fertile Serbian soil that’s waiting to be domesticated and developed. Now I really don’t believe that a bunch of bones could get in their way, it’s not like lettuce isn’t going to grow right which would really bother them. It’s one of the most morbid things I heard coming from there. But the hunt for Sonja Biserko doesn’t end there. There were some reactions in other media, Teofil wrote about it, we wrote something in the e-paper and there were some reactions against that hunt in other media but all of that resulted in that march. In those days protectors and defenders of Radovan Karadžić still marched and gathered on Republic Square to protest his arrest. They are obviously people who support genocide and military operations of Radovan Karadžić. So they made a little stop outside the HC building, shouted some slogans and stuck a swastika. That’s also interesting. People who support a fascist ideology stick a swastika and proclaim you a fasist. Finally two unknown men waited for Sonja Biserko outside her apartment, she called some of her friends who quickly showed up and in the end nothing happened but there was certanly potential for a physical showdown.

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Teofil Pančić: It’s important to mention that her adress was published allowing them to find her.

Tomislav Marković: Her personal adress was released in the media. That’s the kind of witch hunt that is consistent with what I wrote about S.Antonić – whatever he looks to, the Obraz jump to, whatever he writes about, they strike at. That’s actualy his intention but he presents himself as the endangered party which is, in my opinion, an interesting twist. Things have changed today but during the ‘90s anything could have happened. When that famous text about Ćuruvija was published he was murdered soon after. That doesn’t happen today, instead they scare you a little, attack you a little but these things shouldn’t be taken lightly. Under different circumstances if the situation got a bit more radical violent incidents would almost certainly occur. That’s what they actually want but S. Antonić is playing Mr. Nice so he doesn’t quite want to put it that way.

Teofil Pančić: I would only like if you’d let me... I just realized that I forgot to answer the second part of your question so before you ask me another I would like to add something and, in a way, build upon what you just said. Basically what you asked was, “Was it more dangerous to speak against nationalism then than it is today”? Well, the structure of fear has changed or rather the direction danger is potentially coming from. One could say that during the ‘90s it was the state we had to fear, UDBA (State Security Directorate), military, paramilitary, police and pseudo-police structures. War, crime and the mob, it was all bundled up together and we, as people involved with the media, can testify to that with the examples of our murdered colleagues like Dada Vujasinović and Slavko Ćuruvija. So first of all it was fear, fear of the state and its opressive apparatus. After October 5th that fear of the state has decreased immesurably which is logical and thank God for that. If we hadn’t managed to gain at least that then it would have all been for nothing. Today, on the other hand, the old fear has been replaced by fear of society so to speak. Just one part of society of course, the part that leans towards extreme rightist behavior and that is, today, a lot more brazen in that behavior than before. Why is that? Partly it’s because Milošević’s regime itself contained nationalistic movements so propagation of nationalistic ideas meant being a person of the regime by default which didn’t appeal to some of the right wingers. But after October 5th the situation became such that the governments

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became pro-European, democratic etc. This allowed any malcontent to proclaim himself a great opponent of the government system by throwing accusations at traitors, foreign mercenaries, non-Serbs etc. which creates an atmosphere of anger and frustration which should not be underestimated because, as history has shown us, such a situation is a breeding ground for fascist movements and all that. And when you see all those young people full of rage, hate and unbound aggression but also, it has to be said, boundlessly illiterate and ignorant yet very confident at the same time, what you see is a product of Milošević’s era but also of the post-October 5th political formation. They believe that any advocacy of democratic ideas is “sort of mainstream”, not the real thing, not radical enough. Since the radical left is something that only exists in traces the only direction left to go in, as in most east European countries, is the radical right. They all think it’s very “hip” but realistically what they find to be hip can turn into a big problem for society. I think it needs to be emphasized that what was coming from the direction of the state regime during the ‘90s has stopped or become marginalized and is now primarily coming from people whom I call freelance nut jobs. The kind of people who run into you in the street, and that doesn’t mean that someone from the BIA (Serbian Intelligence Agency), or some such organization, ordered that person to…, no they simply do it on a whim.

Miloš Perović: So the danger is no longer coming from the top but the bottom?

Teofil Pančić: Exactly, and that’s the problem.

Miloš Perović: Yes, it’s been mentioned a few times and after the year 2000. those so called democratic governments have gone through several transformations. Members of those radical movements continually call upon all kinds of freedoms, I don’t know where they get the idea but ok, so freedom of speech keeps being mentioned and flipped around without there being a clear definition what freedom of speech entails. That is why we get numerous examples where freedom of speech is being used to justify the advocacy of various fascist organizations and individuals. Do, does the propagation of fascist ideas in public speech fall within the definition of free speech?

Teofil Pančić: It very much depends on a country’s historical context. Our extreme

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right wingers often call upon examples, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, where tolerance towards a certain kind of fascist public speech is much greater than in continental Europe. The reason for that is that the Anglo-Saxon world has no experience with organized fascist movements, they never lived through something like that. It’s much easier to be tolerant towards something that hasn’t traumatized your society. But it was certainly traumatic in America, the birthplace of the famous politically correct speech where not only can you not use the word nigger since it’s considered offensive but you can’t even say “black person” anymore. Instead you have to say “African American” which is sometimes a bit comical. If I see a black person coming towards me how am I supposed to know he’s an African American, maybe he just came from Chad, right? Still, my point is that they are trying very hard to break off from their own trauma and frustration. That is why they pay so much attention to mentions of race etc. Of course, here in our own continental Europe and especially in Germany that was the epicenter of Nazism, the laws are much more strict. And it is logical for Germany to have the harshest laws against fascist ideologies, we have to approach those things differently because that is something that took away millions of lives here. We can’t afford to look at it simply as an abstract academic discussion on the limits of free public speech. Abstract discussion stops where killing starts. Since we have lived through that experience we simply cannot afford to be lax when it comes to such things and that’s why it’s not contradictory to anyone’s liberal, democratic, social-democratic or whichever convictions to, for example, forbid the display of Ustasha symbols in Croatia or Ljotić ones in Serbia or any kind of generally Nazism related symbols. It’s perfectly normal in the context of this society since people died because of it. They were slaughtered for it, driven to camps and out of their homes. It’s not a matter of simply disliking certain things and deciding it should be forbidden to talk about them. No. A society safeguards its democracy by forbidding the most extreme forms of symbolic and later physical justification for conducting organized violence on other groups of people. Fascism is never a merely abstract viewpoint. Let’s imagine that someone abstractly believed that Jews are an inferior race. Can you imagine a situation where the next step of that belief wouldn’t suppose that, being an inferior race, the Jews should suffer some consequences because of it? It’s never without consequence, it never remains on the level of abstract belief. Please excuse me, but if Jews are an inferior race the least that should happen to them, for example, is for them to not be allowed to do

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the same jobs as you and me and with subsequent generations, my god, it all ends with concentration camps, and where else could it end except in the concentration camps? It’s always an exchange of theses. When somebody says that prohibition of hate speech is an infringement on freedom of speech and thought it’s always an elementary exchange of thesis. It comes down to a society acting in self-defense to prevent what is always the first step towards violent behavior towards other people.

Miloš Perović: The next question is for my colleague , Mr Atanacković. Speaking of the members of our Serbian political and intellectual elite, how aware are they of the potential impact of publicly spoken words? I ask this because today, and I’ll say it without reservation, we have a crazed foreign affairs minister Mr Jeremić who managed, through a single statement of his, to damage the already fragile relations of in the region. He is supposed to be a member of the Democratic Party which is suposed to be all democratic and non-nationalist. Is it even possible to overcome this pattern of behaviour in Serbia’s public speech that’s seemingly been repeating itself for the past 25 years?

Petar Atanacković: It’s obvious that the political elite is completely unaware of the words’ weight. Their basic problem is that they don’t realize that in a civil society, if we wish to call it that, there is a difference between the public and private sphere. So there is a difference between what Vuk Jeremić thinks when he’s in a bathroom and what he says as a minister. To a degree that’s also the problem of free speech. Teofil spoke about the conviction of some of those pro-fascist circles that their freedom of speech is being infringed upon. Well, nobody is forbidding them to think whatever they want in their private lives and do whatever they want in their private space but they simply cannot be allowed to make such statements publically. Vuk Jeremić is a typical example of non-differentiation between the private and public spheres of life so naturally he also lacks awareness of the words’ impact. I was recently in Berlin for a different occasion and there I found out what the opinion is on Vuk Jeremić and the opinion is that his best quality, if you can call it that, is that he is able to pronounce the phrase “national sovereignty and territorial integrity” faster than anyone, and in English too. That’s his main diplomatic feature. So the image is that of a caricature of a man who behaves like a cowboy. Texts have been published in newspapers

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about how he treats other diplomats. And this negative focus of his on Croatia – well obviously he’s decided to score political points for himself by unnecessarily eroding Serbia’s relations with that country. He’s using foreign policy to enhance his domestic political standing. He himself is not aware that he’s seriously jeopardizing Serbo-Croatian relations so he’s basically the champion of that type of ignorance.

Personal interests are replacing general ones, as Milan Kangrga used to say, it is exactly that kind of exchange of the general with the personal that is in philosophical ethics defined as evil. I don’t think that Vuk Jeremić is the only example of this phenomenon: there was a minister by the name of Milan Parivodić who was responsible for the economy and who used to say on public TV that whenever someone mentions Milan Nedić everybody should stand to attention. I wonder what does the minister of international commerce know about Milan Nedić and why is his opinion on him relevant but obviously he had a need to say it. Then there’s an even more famous story about an even more famous minister. We all remember the minister of culture Dragan Kojadinović who, and I heard this from verified sources, during a meeting with representatives from the German embassy and media, stated that there is a great closeness and interest for mutual cooperation between Germany and Serbia etc., which was apparent even back in the 1941 – 1945 period. This resulted in a large diplomatic scandal provoked by the stupidity of this illiterate minister of culture. The ambassador had to explain that Germany was an anti-fascist country and that he wasn’t in the presence of a representative from the Third Reich but the Federal Republic of Germany etc. I doubt that Kojadin understood.

Miloš Perović: It’s difficult to get one’s bearings after this but ok… I would now like to open a question that I believe has never been the focus of our public when it comes to hate speech. It has never been talked about as far as I’ve heard but recently a masterful text by Viktor Ivančić was published in the e-paper titled “Nula od čovjeka” (The Zero Man). The text talks about a type of hate speech that goes practically unnoticed in public speech. To be more specific, in the text, Ivančić describes an advertisement for the Balkan edition of the Forbs magazine the slogan of which says “don’t be a zero, be seven zeros”. He points out the class based hatred represented by the first issue of this magazine. That slogan and the magazine’s content propagate the idea that you’re worth less unless you’re at least a millionaire or somebody like Mišković or Teodorović or any of the Balkan tycoons.

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So I would ask Mr Marković to comment on this so we could open up this topic a little.

Tomislav Marković: I would only like to add something to what Petar said. It doesn’t seem to me that Jeremić is failing to keep apart the private and public sphere by mistake. If he had said something that wasn’t to Tadić’s liking somebody would have complained. It is obvious that he is acting in concordance with government policy. The difference is that he’s the loudest and most aggressive one. I mean, he is Tadić’s cabin boy, it’s not like he’s doing anything on his own accord…

Teofil Pančić: He is this administration’s Velja Ilić.

Tomislav Marković: Younger, handsomer and with more potential plus Tadić likes him more because he used to be his student so I don’t think that there’s any collision between them. Unfortunately. It would be nice if they believed that Croatia shouldn’t be accused and our relations with them compromised but that seems to suit them. I would like to remind everyone that in regard to that Srebrenica discussion at the Law Faculty Tadić said that everyone has a right to express their opinion negating everything we’ve been talking about tonight. Yes, there are no limits to free speech. It would seem that Tadić is more liberal than we are. And yes, this text by Viktor Ivančić “Nula od Čoveka” is very interesting because it shows how hate speech enlarges the field of battle. Actually, it seems to me that things have reversed in this situation. In the recent examples of hate speech we mentioned it was the rich, the powerful and the connected who were the minority. I mean fighters for human rights are a minority, the Roma are a minority, people who listen to Peščanik are a minority, the leftists also etc. But in this add announcing the Balkan Forbs Ivančić has found something completely opposite. It is actually the minority who hold all the power and wealth in their hands, who are well connected and who devalue and spread hate speech among the majority, some 90% of the population, the working class. There is an interesting twist here. All these groups we spoke about have some means of fighting for their rights which is legitimate, natural and normal so nobody from our side asks any questions. But, for example, Ivančić claims that workers aren’t really aware of their status and that they have a kind of invested interest in those in power. It’s kinda like that western “hatchet and scalpel” expression but things are different

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here. Everything is known here, we more or less know how those seven zero people came to their wealth and that it happened under some pretty illegal circumstances. It has all mostly been legalized today but in that first Forbs issue they give themselves the right to depict everyone else as some kind of non-humans. That is where Ivančić draws a parallel between Nazi propaganda that placed Jews outside the social order as something other than human. Now the criteria have changed. If you have money you’re human, if not you’re nothing and we can do whatever we want with you. I believe that it’s a problem with our society that people don’t complain and rise up against such things. Speaking about those magazines like Kurir or Pravda, I remember watching a celebration of Pravda’s 100th issue or something like that on TV, I believe it was that Bajatović’s channel. So there they were, Dragan Đilas and that whole company, all cheerful, celebrating the circulation of 50.000 copies that the magazine had reached in 3 months. That’s a large circulation rate so people obviously approve of it. It is my impression that during the ’90s violence, armed threats and all kinds of torture have created a behavioral pattern in the people here that doesn’t really make them keen on complaining and fighting for their rights. I also think that pattern is continuing to spread. A friend of mine is doing a research on prejudice exclusively in Belgrade’s central high schools and we’ll be publishing the results in the e-paper once it’s done in 5 or 6 days. The results are pretty damning. On an ethnic prejudice scale of 1 to 3 in one class they… (text missing 44:30), which translates to “kill them, slaughter them”. In 2005 I spoke to a group of 16 year olds in one of Belgrade’s suburban municipalities. We were talking about Albanians and the class became divided into two groups, boys and girls. The boys were in favor of the swift and brutal solution, simply killing them all, while the girls were somewhat gentler, in line with the fairer gender stereotype, they merely wanted them all banished. We struggled to explain to them that Albanians are people too so that’s something at least. This is all, I mean it’s pretty frightening. Now I don’t want to sound like some harbinger of doom but it seems to me that the seed of evil that was sawn during the late ‘80s and has later again been unearthed from some other cultural patterns by our nationalistic intelligence has given fruit we’ll be fighting against for a long time to come. In Croatia they seem to be gradually moving on to some other topics and I would like for the same to happen here but as soon as we take a step forward some so called pro-European and democratic government pops out with the likes of Jeremić and sets us back to the beginning. This means we have to deal with the same old issues and

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topics which is boring. I’m tired of writing about Jeremić and other similar things. They keep repeating the same old stories, never moving on to something else. They don’t seem to be sympathetic with our journalistic problems.

Petar Atanacković: I would only like to add something to the question of Viktor Ivančić and the Forbs magazine. The Feral used to follow the story of the Balkans’ “enlightened” newly created wealthy elite. Forbs is the Balkan edition of this magazine, merely the latest thing. Feral had an article about the first Serbian issue of Glorija and it was followed through by an excellent text. They wrote about the streams of champagne, caviar etc. and they recognized in all that a kind of class-nationalistic alliance since those were all the heavy nationalistic movements from Croatia and Serbia, from Tonči Huljić to Duška Jovanović who made any semi-well known Serbian person into a globally relevant and historic phenomenon. So those are all those nationalistic structures who became united after the tycoons newly gained class awareness so the nationalistic alliance gained a new class component so to speak although it was always in a twisted and completely perverted Balkan way.

Miloš Perović: I would like to ask our guests one more question after which I will give the audience the opportunity to do the same. So, the internet is the new medium with which we don’t have much experience. It is well known that the internet is not subject to control and that one can find a plethora of examples of hate speech and fascist as well as pro-fascist web sites on it. There is simply no legal regulation of this medium. So, is legal regulation of this medium needed and should it even be touched by legislation since, as everyone knows, the internet has not only negative aspects in this regard but also many positive ones. Please comment.

Teofil Pančić: I’m not a lawyer so I would rather not get into whether internet can or should be regulated but we may come to that issue via a different road. To be honest I have no idea what the internet is and if it can even be called a medium. Before all how do we define the media? If the internet is a medium then it’s completely different than any other media that came before it. Now there’s a whole series of problems. I have to admit that I’m a kind of internet skeptic which is probably one of the most unpopular stances one can take in this day and age because everyone adores the

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internet. Fascists - antifascists, leftists -rightists, the rich – the poor, city dwellers – farmers, the intelligent – the stupid. God forbid that someone should speak out against the internet as it is. Of course it would be senseless to speak out against any medium as such because it would be like speaking out against the TV or newspapers yet they continue to exist. So what’s the problem with the internet? I’m looking at it from the perspective of a man who not only himself works in the media but has also been a great consumer of media his whole life, especially their written form. With all of you here being quite younger than me you probably don’t remember but until some 20 years ago it was impossible to publish reader mail without also publishing their name and address. You know the whole deal, Pera Perić, Vojvode Bojovića street, no. 13, 21000 Novi Sad so go ahead brother and tell us what’s on your mind. Today not only is there no address, name or image, there’s nothing, not even you. You can call yourself whatever you want, you can be some old man pretending to be a gorgeous blonde doing who knows what on the internet. That degree of virtualization where personal identity can be completely pushed aside is very appealing to people. We see it as the land of unrestrained freedom. I can do whatever I want, say whatever I want, communicate with whomever I want all over the world, and that’s all great. However there’s the other side and it is often the more pronounced side I think. It allows people to do all those bad and ugly things to other people, especially in the context of hate speech, while feeling perfectly safe and anonymous. It’s an ideal situation for all kinds of maniacs and psychos. Internet is the realization of their utopia. Why? Exactly because it lacks any kind of filtering while we’re being raised in a culture of permissiveness where any kind of regulation is naively perceived as censorship. Because every classical medium, be it newspapers, television, radio or even the internet if it’s indeed a medium, they all have editors, people who provide quality assurance and filter out inappropriate material. The internet does away with all that, puts everything in a nice little package and says: “Here you go, equal freedom for everyone, for geniuses, for jerks, for this guy or that guy, for love and hate, for intelligence and stupidity, everything is free, everything is equal so knock yourself out. I have to say that I find the degeneration of internet communication in our country insulting. I try not to delve too deeply into that trash heap but every once in a while when I forget myself and end up scouring our forums and blogs I am amazed. Just so we’re clear, it’s not a matter of political orientation. Many things I find on the internet about people whom I dislike politically don’t appeal to me at all. So it’s not about our

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side and their side but the very structure of the internet that brings out the worst in a person. Now someone might insult Teofil Pančić while somebody else might analyze the physical appearance of Đorđe Vukadinović. Please excuse me but I don’t believe that discussing the appearance of Đorđe Vukadinović makes one an anti-fascist. It doesn’t make you an anti-fascist it makes you a fool! I mean, if it’s relevant for you to talk about Đorđe Vukadinović being fat or having ugly glasses, you’re not an anti-fascist, you’re not a leftist nor are you a democrat or a liberal, you’re an idiot! And that kind of idiocy is encouraged by the internet. Anonymity is key. Anonymity is the alpha and the omega of this whole story. The very idea of virtualizing your identity, safely tucking yourself in some idiotic nick name and acting from that position whether your ideas are fascist, anti-fascist, liberal, anti-liberal, populist, elitist or whatever, is sick. Nothing good can come from it. It dumbs down public discourse, lowers all criteria, smothers everything in its muck and infects it all with mediocrity. This is simply the time when all classical media have to suffer being branded as conservative simply because they have editors and, God forbid, owners, all the things that internet freedom doesn’t have. It all sounds nice when you put it that way but you know what, those other media posses certain professional standards which admittedly they often break so it’s far from being ideal but some elementary regulation does exist. Imagine a man who writes a newspaper column. He has to be accepted and hired by an editor, he needs to be paid, there are procedures, and in the end his name, and often a photo, are open to the public so any punk on the street can spit on him. Now imagine a man who is utterly frustrated because nobody is inviting him to write newspaper columns. Also imagine there are a thousand people like that and they all believe themselves to be misunderstood geniuses whose chance at proving themselves is being stifled by the evil establishment. You know what happens then? Those thousand people start writing blogs since you don’t need any qualifications to do that, you simply open up a blog and type away. Out of those thousand people one may actually be a misunderstood genius, that possibility always exists, but the remaining 999 are proven morons. Now tell me, as an internet user, how are you going to find your way through that jungle to find a single genius in a sea of 999 idiots with a new 999 popping out every day? There’s no end to it. With this I end my soliloquy. For as long as anonymity of participants, subjects, call them whatever you want, remains the basic premise of the internet, the freedom it offers will almost always transform into a sad, laughable, pathetic and when hate speech is concerned,

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dangerous caricature of itself.

Tomislav Marković: Ah, it’s difficult to continue after this… Yes, it’s true. Since our e-paper is based on the internet medium, every day we’re exposed to various comments and often, instead of commentating on the text, somebody will call you a fool or an idiot for criticizing the church as if he was a big fan of it. There are all kinds of disturbing people leaving comments and reading them can be an interesting process. There is a guy called Istok (East) who leaves a comment every time I write about the church, I’m his favorite, it’s unbelievable, a kind of pathological relationship. We always delete his comments if he becomes offensive but we tend to leave all non-insults. But I would like to add something to what Teofil said. I’ve been to Krk this year where I talked about the issue which was interesting because I never thought about it much before. Many people who dabble in literature or something similar get the idea to publish their work on a blog but the problem is that a blog has no editor, there is no publication without an editor. That’s the main problem. Teofil said that it’s better to make your publication in the Reč magazine. It probably won’t be read by more than 20 people but it doesn’t matter, you still managed to publish something, you went through the filter of Dejan Ilić, one of our most proficient editors which means there is some talent in you, it all means something. On the other hand the internet can also be used to good effect. I think Ivan Tobić managed to do that, he had a blog on which he started writing a novel with some success but he managed to use that form, that medium, to create something but under his own name. Of course anonymity is very tempting which can result in extreme deviations and instances of hate speech that spread all over. There were several famous groups on Facebook, some still exist, that would open, then close, then open up again, like “Nož, žica, Srebrenica” (Knife, Wire, Srebrenica) which was closed than opened again recently with a description for the group saying that it is a group for all people who believe that Muslims are best when skewered or swimming in sulfuric acid. That’s a pretty clear example of hate speech and invitation to violence but no one can stop it because the freedom there is rampant, it’s actually not freedom anymore but a negation of freedom. One of the most interesting Facebook group slogans was “ubij Hrvata da Šiptar nema brata” (kill the Croats so Shqiptars would have no comrades), as you can see they were quite witty here but it’s the same kind of madness. Besides that there are now many forums and internet social groups where they gather, Stormfront is

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probably the best known… As we can see the internet is a surrounding where this kind of things spreads very fast all over, on all possible forums. They open their own websites like the one Firer has or that man Lučić you just mentioned. I mean that’s a bunch of people you just don’t know what to do with. Their influence is growing I think, expanding all over, and the problem is, as far as I know, the lack of legal regulation so some steps in that area will have to be taken. What applies for the real world should apply to the virtual one as well.

Teofil Pančić: Yes but the problem is that people are now taking the internet for granted and see it as their democratic right. For example, in some pre-internet era, if you were a reader writing a letter to a newspaper first you’d have to buy an envelope and a stamp, get a piece of paper, write the letter, close the envelope, stick the stamp and finally take the letter to a mail box. By the time you did all that your anger has would have probably passed. But let’s say you’ve written your angry letter, it’s reached the editor, he reads it and throws it away since, by definition, it’s not publishing material. No one is going to make a fuss about it, the guy who sent it never really expected it to be published, he just needed to blow off some steam. It’s the same with those early versions of internet forums like contact talk shows on radio and television. Whenever someone became too offensive or got out of line they simply cut him off. The problem with comments made on the internet, whether it’s on your e-paper web site or some similar medium, is that whenever you ban someone for being out of line they become outraged because, in their view, the very concept of banning, blocking out somebody’s opinion, no matter the reason, goes against that boundless freedom of the internet. That is why that mass perception of the internet as an open ground for all kinds of shenanigans would unavoidably result in frustration because people were promised complete freedom but then, suddenly, that freedom turns out to be less than complete. Right now the internet media are still trying to find their place, some kind of middle ground, and I’m not so sure that’s going to be achieved quickly because that promised utopia of absolute free speech cannot be attained, without compromising the fundamentals of public discourse.

Miloš Perović: Any questions from the audience? If not we’re done…

Question from the audience: Tell us something about Građanski list and the media

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in Vojvodina…Teofil Pančić: I don’t know much about it except the fact that Građanski list

changed ownership or rather its ownership structure and that, some time ago, the new owners made some radical changes to the paper’s editorial policies causing many people to leave. I’m not sure if they left voluntarily or were forced out, in any case new people have been hired to replace them. I was fascinated for a while by the sheer emptiness of their content. I would take an issue of the paper and start reading through it only to find literally nothing, not even something to upset me or something negative, simply nothing! All I could find were agency news and things like the TV guide and weather forecast. Nothing else! There was no hate speech because there was no speech, period. Now I haven’t been following the paper’s progress during the past month so I don’t know if anything’s changed but obviously someone thought that Građanski list, as it was, needed to be killed without having any idea what to build on its corpse. It seems to me that Vojvodina’s local media aren’t going to fly too smoothly through this turbulence. The local Dnevnik, Subotičke novine, Zrenjaninske novine are all shutting down or being sold to the same group who bought the Građanski list. Basically where there was competition, where there were two newspaper agencies, there will now be only one and that one will be controled by the same group I mentioned just now. All in all it’s going to end very badly for the few surviving media in Vojvodina’s smaller cities.

Question from the audience: I am more interested in your opinion on the deliberate dumbing down of every form of media. I am convinced that there is an over-simplification campaign already under way. I am curious to know how far this might go and if anything positive is going to happen again or are we going to experience a total criteria decrease in every aspect of the media? Why was the Feral Tribune shut down?

Teofil Pančić: Since everyone seems to be hesitant I’ll go again… I have always worked for the media, Vreme is my first and foremost of course, that are somehow on the fringe with low circulations and that have, since their beginning, always been, let’s say elitist. Why not, I don’t believe it’s a dirty word if used properly. In a society where market dictates everything and even if that market is better than the one we have which is a kind of a pseudo-market, whoever wants to search for quality,

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seriousness and silly things like a cultural column or a book review, imagine that, is self-condemned to marginalization, a kind of poverty. That poverty is pretty relative in the western media. For example, The Guardian is poor compared to the Daily Mail but The Guardian is hardly impoverished. Well, over here, that poverty is literal. That poverty means that people who work in such media live on lowly wages and fees and it’s impossible to tell for how long it can go on. That’s the position of the media in transitional societies, especially wrecked and fundamentally demolished ones as is the case in Serbia and most ex-Yu countries. In such cases the first thing that suffers is any attempt to keep up some level of quality and standard. That even doesn’t have anything to do with the media’s history or political affiliation. Take a look at RTS and B92 for example. Those two media have completely different political connotations. Today however, if you exempt a part of their news programs the content of one TV station might as well belong to the other one. B92 radio is still holding its’ own, thank God, but none of B92’s entertainment content would make any less sense if seen on PINK TV. So, as a matter of survival, the TV stations have resorted to deteriorating their content in the name of market demand, which I can understand, but I can’t believe that the only way to survive the market is to submit to the idea that the vast majority of people are simpletons who can’t absorb anything except the kind of low-brow content we see today. That is fundamentally untrue. There are a lot of people, I often discuss this with my colleagues, who crave a truly worthy daily newspaper. I’ve already written about it and gotten on everyone’s nerves but since Naša Borba shut down we haven’t had a daily newspaper that I could read without great reserve and large fundamental objections. Of course the objections I would direct at Politika are different from the ones I would direct at Danas. I mention those two examples because those are the two most serious daily papers we have. What I need is a single newspaper that I can read and then later on place on the table in some café and say: “Yes I read this, it is a part of my identity”, just as someone in England would do the same with The Guardian or The Independent or someone in France would with Le Mond, that means something. Here it doesn’t mean anything anymore. It doesn’t mean anything because all the media have become trapped in the same unfair market game and if you want to exist on the side you’re automatically condemned to being marginalized and impoverished. So chose.

Tomislav Marković: I would also like to say something. Recently I spoke to Viktor

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Ivančić and he said something similar. The difference is that in the west there’s a margin and it’s pretty wide but here’s it’s been reduced to zero. And this case with the Feral Tribune, all kinds of things happened there. People had all kinds of objections to that paper but the fact is that EPH (Europa Press Holding) invested large amounts of money to shut them down and even before that they couldn’t get a single ad despite having decent circulation. The state was obviously against them. The situation is a bit different in Serbia because there’s more variety, we don’t have the same kind of media monopoly like Croatia. After Feral ceased operations Predrag Lucić and Viktor Ivančić were invited by the Novi list and there was a deal that Viktor would begin writing for Novi list while Predrag would write for some weekly paper that was supposed to start out in two or three months. The weekly paper ended up being constantly delayed and Viktor was told to wait a little longer and “chill out” a bit more. Later they went to this meeting with the new owner of the Novi list, some oil tycoon Ježić, they argued for a while and eventually asked him why couldn’t they begin writing immediately. As it was they were supposed to get paid without actually writing anything which was pretty interesting. They were told that the paper couldn’t afford to inherit their enemies, take on all the people on whose toes they had stepped on. Obviously that professional relationship didn’t last long, it was all really bizarre, being paid to not write. There was another similar example with a Novi list correspondent who wrote about some bags that were supposedly of poor quality but were being sold at the “Konzum”. She sent that pretty trivial text to her editor who ended up calling her and screaming at her for 10 minutes. Why? She simply couldn’t understand what was going on and why were the bags such a big deal and then he asked her: “You poor thing, do you know who owns the manufacturing of all bags in Croatia?”, she said, “Well, no.”, “Well, our new owner does”.