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Progress in Southern Sudan 2005-2007

Presentation to the Sudan Consortium, Oslo, May 2008

Kuol Athian MawienMinister of Finance

GoSS

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Situation in 2005

• In 2005, Southern Sudan faced the following situation:– High levels of insecurity;– 4.5 million displaced people;– Damaged or destroyed infrastructure;– Almost no private sector or economic activity– Limited access to basic services such as clean water,

health care and education; and– Fragmented and low capacity governmental

institutions.

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JAM Expectations

• The JAM laid out a detailed set of broad-ranging targets for 2005 - 2007.

• Among other things, they expected: – Institutions to be established, staffed and functional,– Legal systems put in place, – Systems and institutions to be decentralised, and – A broad range of development activities to be

implemented within a very short timeframe. • In the absence of formal planning structures in the

South in 2005, targets were based on the JAM Clusters.

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Assessment of Progress

• GoSS made progress between 2005 – 2007 in:– Planning, policy and institution building;– Maintenance of security; and – Delivery of critical basic services and emergency roads.

• However, progress was less than expected in some areas, particularly:– Passing of legislation;– Recruitment and training of key staff, in particular skilled

basic service workers;– Decentralisation of core functions; and– Implementation of local private sector and rural

livelihoods development.

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Challenging factors

• The rapid progress envisaged in the JAM underestimated the challenges GoSS would face. These included:– The difficulties of establishing a civil service and

institutions to deliver services from scratch;– The slow start up of key donor delivery mechanisms

such as the MDTF; and– Shortfalls in GoSS revenues and donor financing.

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JAM Financing - Expectations

• The JAM estimated the South’s needs to be $3.6 billion over the period 2005-2007.

• Financing to Infrastructure and Basic Social Services was expected to amount to 57% of JAM expenditures.

• $1.4 billion of JAM expenditures were expected to be financed by donors, and the rest by GoSS.

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JAM Financing - Outturns

• GoSS revenues for 2005-2007 fell short of JAM estimates by $901m, mainly due to optimistic forecasts for oil revenue, and revenue arrears.

• Donor funding fell short by $886m.• GoSS maintained its JAM spending, and absorbed its

revenue shortfall by lower spending in non-JAM areas, and a lack of reserve accumulation.

• The donor funding shortfall meant that JAM spending estimates were not fully realised.

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JAM Financing Estimates and Outturns

 

Total 2005-2007  JAM Outturn + / -Total Revenue 4215 3314 -901JAM needs 3553 2706 -847 of which GoSS 2116 2155 39Non-JAM needs 2099 1156 -943Total Needs 5652 3862 -1790GoSS Financing 4215 3311 -904Donor Financing 1437 551 -886 of which MDTF   89   of which Other Donors   462  

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GoSS Cluster Spending.

• GoSS’s budget was not executed according to JAM clusters.

• However, a data comparison shows that GoSS managed to finance 50% of JAM spending in the Basic Social Services, Production and Infrastructure Clusters.– Our highest level of financing in absolute terms was for

Basic Social Services $310m.– Our highest level of financing in percentage terms was

for Infrastructure, which was 79% excluding national projects.

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GoSS Cluster Spending

Total 2006-2007

JAM Actual GoSS

% contribution

Basic Social Services 857 310 36%

Productive Sectors 253 146 58%

Infrastructure 318 253 79%

Total 1428 708 50%

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Sectoral Performance

• GoSS’s analysis of its performance is based on its ten Budget Sectors, which it has been using since 2006 for planning & budgeting purposes.

• The GoSS Budget Sectors are:

Accountability Natural Resources

Economic Functions Public Administration

Education Rule of Law

Health Security

Infrastructure Social & Humanitarian Affairs

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Accountability: Situation in 2005

• There were no systems, capacity or basic institutions for: – Public Financial Management (PFM)– Procurement– Anti-Corruption– Audit

• Aid was based around humanitarian needs.• Several currencies were in operation.• Socio-economic data was not available.• Capacity for development planning was limited.

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Accountability: Progress & Challenges

Annual budgets have been prepared & executed.

GoSS & State planning system is in place.GoSS Aid Strategy is in place. An orderly currency conversion took place.The Banking system is being set up. However, capacity for budget execution and

procurement still needs strengthening. Anti-corruption & audit activities need to be

strengthened.

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Economic Functions: Situation in 2005

• The private sector was very small, with limited opportunities for expansion.

• Word of mouth was the primary medium for communicating information.

• Telecoms infrastructure was very limited. • There was no commercial banking system to support

private sector activity, and almost no access to Micro Finance.

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Economic Functions: Progress & Challenges

20 FM frequencies have been allotted, and 3 mobile phone providers are in operation.

The Chambers of Commerce has been established.The informal private sector is expanding & cross-

border trade has increased.

A comprehensive, streamlined regulatory framework for private sector development needs to be established.

Microfinance schemes need to be scaled up to provide credit to entrepreneurs.

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Education: Situation in 2005

• The education system had a chronic shortage of skilled staff, infrastructure and equipment – 94% of teachers were untrained volunteers.

• Learning was often disrupted because of drought, disease, food shortages and conflict.

• Attendance, especially by girls, was negligible – only 18% attended school, and less than 1% completed studies.

• Textbooks were in serious shortage.• The was no unified curriculum, syllabus or

examination system.• Higher education was virtually non-existent.

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Education: Progress & Challenges

Primary school enrolment has tripled since 2005, with 1 million now attending school, a third of whom are girls.

Policies & curricula have been developed.Adult literacy campaigns have been very

successful.Nearly 5 million textbooks have been distributed.

However, teacher training needs to be increased. School construction is below target, and needs to

be accelerated.

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Health: Situation in 2005

• Southern Sudan’s health outcomes were among the worst in the world:– 1 in 4 children died before the age of 5.– The maternal mortality rate was extremely high.

• Basic health service coverage was estimated at 25%, with huge inequalities between urban and rural areas, and between genders.

• There was just one doctor for every 200,000 of the population.

• Awareness of HIV/ Aids was very low.

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Health: Progress & Challenges

Health policy, planning and monitoring are all on track.

Immunisation and pharmaceutical distribution targets have been met.

All targets on HIV/ Aids were met.

Southern Sudan still has insufficient trained health workers.

Infant & maternal mortality rates are still high. Access to service delivery remains limited.

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Infrastructure: Situation in 2005

• Roads were of poor quality and highly mined.• Air was the only way to travel and Juba had the only

functioning airport.• Equipment to generate electricity was absent or

dilapidated.• Water and sanitation management was absent or

poor in urban areas.

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Infrastructure: Progress & Challenges

2,000km of roads have been rehabilitated.Access to aviation has increased: – 5 airstrips have been rehabilitated (Torit, Bor, Aweil,

Yambio and Wau) – All State capital airstrips are operational.

Road infrastructure needs remain enormous. Rail & river transport needs to be developed. Electricity provision has increased, but is only available

in a few urban areas. Access to urban water & sanitation schemes is still

limited.

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Natural Resources and Rural Development: Situation in 2005

• Agriculture, forestry and wildlife all had huge potential, but were under-developed.

• Farmers had no access to formal credit, and limited access to markets.

• Crop & livestock development was reliant on traditional methods.

• Land policy was based on customary laws.• Almost all production was subsistence.

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Natural Resources & Rural Development: Progress & Challenges

Targets on access to safe water have been met, with 15%-20% of the rural population now having access.

Planning, survey and policy targets are largely on track.

The South is still reliant on food imports from neighbouring countries.

Access to improved production technology and to markets needs to increase.

Animal & crop disease remains a significant problem.

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Public Administration: Situation in 2005

• Southern Sudan had no single administrative or legislative system:– SPLM-liberated areas operated under Civil Authority

for New Sudan (CANS)– GoS-held areas operated under Coordinating Council

of Southern Sudan (CCSS).

• Capacity was extremely weak in both of these systems.

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Public Administration: Progress & Challenges

CCSS and CANS have been unified.Southern Sudan & State Assemblies are

established and functioningGoSS has established and equipped its ministries

and commissions.

Legislative oversight of Government requires strengthening at all levels.

State & County institutional capacity needs remain enormous.

The Public Sector is proving costly, and needs ‘right-sizing’ and ‘re-skilling’.

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Rule of Law: Situation in 2005

• Southern Sudan was heavily militarised and there was no formal legal system.

• The vast majority of litigation was handled by fragmented customary law.

• Institutions to uphold laws were weak: – Legal staff were extremely low in number and operating

under differing legal frameworks; – The police force was small and fragmented;– The prison system was weak.

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Rule of Law: Progress & Challenges

The Interim Constitution has been adopted. Courts & legal staff are in place.The Southern Sudan Human Rights

Commission has been established.

Capacity of legal personnel still needs strengthening.

Organised Forces have received excess SPLA personnel & need downsizing.

The Rule of Law is not fully observed, and community security is a challenge.

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Security: Situation in 2005

• About 20 different armed groups were in operation in the region.

• Around 1 million landmines and other remnants of war were estimated to remain in the South.

• No Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process was in place for former combatants.

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Security: Progress

Peace has prevailed in most parts of Southern Sudan since the CPA was signed.

59,000 troops from 12 armed groups were integrated into the SPLA & Organised forces.

JIUs were established as per the CPA.6,000km of roads were demined.

Implementation of DDR is behind schedule. 90,000 personnel require demobilisation &

reintegration into their communities.

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Social and Humanitarian Affairs: Situation in 2005

• Over 4 million people from the South were displaced, and half a million were refugees.

• Social cohesion was heavily affected by conflict.• The rights of women and children were not

protected, and gender inequality was significant.• There was no social protection system for vulnerable

groups.

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Social and Humanitarian Affairs: Progress

Over 1.2 million displaced people have returned home through organised and spontaneous means since 2005.

Basic services have been provided to returnee communities.

Emergency assistance needs to be converted into support for recovery & development.

Women empowerment is still a challenge. Protection needs to be provided to vulnerable

groups.

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Lessons learnt from the JAM

• __ _______ ____ _______________ _________ ____ ___ ___ _ ____ ____ ____ ___ _ _____ ____ ____

• _____ _______ ____ __ __ ____ _________ • ___ ____ ____ __ __ _______ ___________ • _________ _________ ___ _________ __ ________ • ________ _____ __ __ ____ ___________ – _ _____ __ _______ ______ _________ __ ___

________ ____________ ___ – _____ ____ __ ________ __ ______ ____

__________ __ ____ ____ _____ ___________

• The JAM targets were ambitious – they set out a long-term plan, not a three year plan.

• Future targets need to be realistic.• They also need to be clearly prioritised.• Financing needs to be more predictable:– GoSS intends to develop better estimates of its

revenues (particularly oil)– Donors need to pledge for longer-term

timeframes, and disburse in line with their commitments.

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Conclusion

• _______ ____ ___ ________ ____________ ________ _______ _______ __________ _____ ___ ____ _____ __ ___ __________ __ _____ __

• _______ __ ___ ________ ___ ___________ _______ ______ _ _______ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ____ ___ _______ _________ ___ ________ _________ ___ _________ ___ _______ ___________

• _ ____ _______ _ ________ ________ ____ ____ __ ___ _ ___ _____ ____________ ___________ ___ ________ ___________ ___ __ ___ ____ ___ ________

• _ _______ ___ ___________ ________ __ ______ __ __ ____ _____ ____

• Given the vast scale of the challenges we faced in 2005, we have made progress. But we still have significant gaps:• We need to consolidate our gains on the security front by

commencing the DDR process and improving community security.• Institutional capacity & service delivery remains a

challenge, particularly at State & County level.• Our infrastructure needs remain enormous, and

development of our road infrastructure is essential for increased economic activity.

• We request our development partners to assist us in this vital time.

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THANK YOU

FOR LISTENING!