1 oposa v factoran

8/10/2019 1 Oposa v Factoran

1/64

#1 OPOSA versus FACTORAN

224 SCRA 792

FACTS:The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents,

filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and tocease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timberlicense agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, butthey are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept ofintergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology isconcerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitionerspresented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmentaltragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide,otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remainingforest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellantshave exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to

cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

ISSUE/S:Whether petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation orimpairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys

vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth

RULING:Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right toa balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutionalhistory, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec.16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding sectionof the same article:

Sec.15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instillhealth consciousness among them.While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration ofPrinciples and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is lessimportant than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a rightbelongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners theadvancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As amatter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they areassumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in

the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless therights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies bythe Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing uponthe state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, theday would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, butalso for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earthincapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty torefrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who


2/64

has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause ofaction. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done withgrave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence,the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.


3/64

MERIDA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

554 SCRA 366

FACTS:Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705

for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which theprivate complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during themeeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so withthe permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongcoin October 1987 under apacto de retrosale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk intolumber.

He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating hisdefense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdictionover the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer asprovided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered theseized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court'sfinding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree inthe Mayod Property without any DENR permit.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 eventhough it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer;

2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.3.Whethere the narra tree is a timber.

RULING: 1. YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

(NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmentalcases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation isdone by the prosecutor.]

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x xReports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in

this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of thedeputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officerassigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereuponreceive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigatingforest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized bylaw to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.(Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development

or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting inthe Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the MayodProperty. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation todetermine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or theRevised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner'salleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctlytook cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive originaljurisdiction.


4/64

2.YES. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut anarra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However,when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. The Court sustain the lowercourts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.

3. YES. The closest the Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to

provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions

or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, theCourt was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 -"lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. Inruling in the affirmative, the Court held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary orcommon usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber."

The Court see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable forbuilding or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are toosmall for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.

Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber"fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of

PD 705, as amended.The complaint is dismissed.


5/64

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. v. HON. DEMETRIO BATARIO

FACTS: Provident Tree Farms, Inc. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrialtree planting. It supplies gubastrees to a local match manufacturer solely for production of

matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage inindustrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entitieslike PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and"wood-derivated" products.

Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers ofmatches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs released and 2 more containers ofmatches from Singapore.PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages withprayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs andAJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and theCollector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Commissioner of Customs under Sec.1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to

determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed bylaw for an importation have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detentionor release of property affected;"

The court dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determinewhat are legal or illegal importations. Hence, this present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegalimportations.

RULING: No. A ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated productis to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code,the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the RevisedForestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse ofpetitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce theban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner toimpound the imported matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with theexclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An orderof a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination anddeclaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative andan encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import banunder the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of theBureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is notforeclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the

power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this(Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary ofFinance."Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require anyparticular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency mayadopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."


6/64

5. People of the Philippines v. CFI OF QUEZON, BRANCH VII

FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as

the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The named accused filed a motion to quashthe information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute anoffense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribedform.

The trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and thereconsideration sought was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the information charged an offense.

RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the information substantiallyalleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 ofPD 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the takingof the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said

information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carryaway therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under alicense agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ."Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilizationof forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that theasportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without theconsent of the state.

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or otherforest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to anyprivate individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without

authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect orremove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In thejust cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained underthe principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No.705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products isnot material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority orlicense from the government.


7/64

6. AQUINO versus People of the Philippines

FACTS:On behalf of TeachersCamp, Guzman filed with the DENR an application to cutdown 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City to be used for

the repairs of Teachers Camp. Before the issuance of the permit, a team composed ofmembers from the CENRO and Mr. Cuteng, a forest ranger, conducted an inspection of said

trees.Thereafter, Mr. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing

the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions: As replacement, thepermittee shall plant 140 pine seedlings and violation of any of the conditions set hereof ispunishable under s68 of PD 705 and that non-compliance with any of the above conditionsshall render this permit void. This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire 10 days fromissuance.

Forest Rangers received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers

Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found petitioner, aforest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. The forestrangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. Thevolume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the treescut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. Hence an Information for violation of section

68 of PD 705 was filed against petitioner.The sawyers alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he

was not given a copy of the permit. Because they were in possession of the necessarypermit. He stated that 3 of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were notfit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas werepresent.

Cuteng testified that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.Petitioner alleged that he was not aware of the trees covered by the

permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of thevicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could notprevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago wereaccompanied by 3 men.

The RTC finds and declares the accused guilty because the trees cut exceeded theallowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that thecutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit. Petitioner, appealed.

The CA ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner hadthe duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with theterms of the permit which only he possessed. The CA further rejected petitionerscontention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in thiscase there was a permit for cutting down the trees.

Issue: whether petitioner Aquino who supervised the cutting of the pine trees is guilty ofviolating section 68 of the revised forestry code.

HELD: No. Aquino is not guilty of violating section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.Section 68 of PD 705 clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or

remove forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable publicland, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged byCENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut,gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by TeachersCamp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit theoffense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.


8/64

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers fromcutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. If at all, this could only makepetitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as

he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting,gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.

The petition is granted.

Daylinda A. Lagua, et. al versus Hon. Vicente N. Cusi Jr., et al 160 SCRA 260

FACTS: Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to

the Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing them to prevent the passage of

Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks

hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel wasdisembarked. In compliance, Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and

other equipments and effectively prevented their passage while the vehicles and trucks of

other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passage on the same road. It

resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued.

Aspiras addressed a letter to the Resident Manager of Eastcoast with instructions to

open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them

(but not to others) by Eastcoast. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, resident manager of

defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to their chief security guard for the latter to comply

with the Aspirasletter. These events, however, took the whole day of January 2, 1976 so

that notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure no hauling of logs could be made byPlaintiff Laguas on that day.

When plaintiff Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards

the Japanese Vessel, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be

opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by defendant Eastcoast's

security men upon a radio message order of defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S

"Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing

laws, rules, and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard.

The illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the

Eastcoast through the order of Maglana Laguas had to depart postpaste Davao Oriental,from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance

of the PC thereat. Thus Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC

Detachment Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by Eastcoast.

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack

of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action. The private respondents extended that as the

acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent


9/64

Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in

the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally

within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

705.

The trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners' complaint. TheCourt agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest Development has

the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their use

is in violation of laws. Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiffs

arose from the alleged illegal closure of a logging road.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D no. 705 vests Bureau of Forest Development the power to

determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such

determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.

RULING: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any

power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of alogging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an

action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the

petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road.

Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the

petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should

appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority

of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,

much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity

inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

8. Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

257 SCRA 430

FACTS: Mustang Lumber Inc., was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of

Forest Development (BFD). Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and

respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during the Secretary of the (DENR) and the Chief

of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.

The SAID of the DENR were informed that huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and

slabs were lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, SAID organized a team of foresters

and policemen and conducted surveillance at the said lumberyard. Surprisingly, they saw

coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga

lumber. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents,

the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR

compound in Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because

of the refusal of the owner.


10/64


11/64

Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of

ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or

purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day

or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was

interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is

still within the ten-day period.As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of

lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,

as amended, since lumberis neither specified therein nor included in the term forest

product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.


12/64

9. Alejandro Tan v. People of the Philippines

290 scra 117

FACTS: In the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards

Panadero and Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narraand whitelauanlumber

which was driven by petitioner Moreno, an employee of A & E Const., owned by Tan.

Four days after, on Brgy. Cambajao, Panadero and Rabino apprehended another

dump truck driven by Cabudol, an employee of the same company, consisting of tanguire

lumber. Both confiscated lumber are illegally obtained without proof of legal possession.

Tan, Moreno, Cabudol, and Ramilo was charged of violating Sec.68 PD No. 705, as

amended by EO No. 277 by virtue of separate information for the 2 apprehended trucks.

Prisco Marin, who claimed to have been the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Bureau of

Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the seized pieces of lumber were legallyobtained by Tan to an authorized dealer of lumber (Matzhou Devt. Co.)

ISSUES : 1. Whether or not Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended is constitutional.

2.Whether or not lumber is within the meaning of timber or other forest product

under PD 705, which requires the necessary legal documents.

RULING: 1.One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the

constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict

of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As respondent Court of Appeals correctly

pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the unlawful possession of firewood, bark,

honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion

of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to

petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial

determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear

and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said

provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the

ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

2. The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705,

as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appealsin which this

Court expressly ruled that,lumberis included in the term timber.We quote at length the

Courts discussion:


13/64

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timberor lumber. While theformer is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter isfound in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant, whichreads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for

the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber,veneer, plywood,wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumberis a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,the Code uses the term lumberin its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyrightedition of Websters Third New International Dictionary,lumberis defined, inter alia, astimber orlogs after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is aprocessedlogor timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases usedin a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofaras possession of timberwithout the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of

P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neitherdo we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.


14/64

10. Amado Taopa versus People of the Philippines571 SCRA 610

FACTS: On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office ofVirac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver,Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.

On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalescoas the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 ofPresidential Decree (PD) No. 705. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty ascharged beyond reasonable doubt.Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to theCourt of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecutionfailed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in thetruck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Taopa should be convicted and what is the appropriate penalty to beimposed upon conviction.

HELD:

Taopa should be convicted because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's activeparticipation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA foundthat the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa andOgalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumberwere seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and controlover the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal

documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of thepolice was likewise largely indicative of guilt.However, as to the penalty imposed on Taopa, Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,

refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to beimposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished asqualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or otherforest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony ofqualified theft.


15/64

11. Perfecto Pallada vs. People of the Philippines385 PHIL 195

Facts:In the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in

Bukidnon received reports that illegally-cut lumber were being delivered to the warehouseof Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon, a company engaged in ricemilling and trading.

On the strength of a warrant issued by the RTC, the warehouse was raided and alarge stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by chainsaw was found and later on seized.Petitioner Perfecto Pallada, the general manager of Valencia, produced two receipts issuedby R.L. Rivero Lumberyard but the same were not given credence as R.L. Rivero's permit tooperate had long been suspended and moreover, the pieces of lumber were cut by chainsaw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.

During the trial, petitioner Pallada presented, among other documents, Certificates ofTimber Origin (CTO) to establish the legality of Valencia's possession of the seized lumber.

Petitioner Pallada and Francisco Tankiko, were found guilty by the trial court ofconspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, of willfully,

unlawfully, and criminally possess lumber without any authority, license or legal documentsfrom the government, in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. TheCourt of Appeals then affirmed the conviction of Pallada.

Issue:Whether or not the Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO) was the proper document to

justify Petitioner's possession of the squared timber or flitches.

Held:No. the CTO presented by the petitioner is not the proper document to justify his

possession since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates ofLumber Origin, in accordance with BFD Circular No. 10-83 which read in parts:

In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and

responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin

thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this

circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers .

xxx

5. Lumber xxx transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber

Origin (CLO) xxx as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from

illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in

accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

The Court finds no merit to the contention that the term timber includes lumberand therefore, the CTO and attachments of the petitioners would suffice to establish the

legality of their possession, invoking the ruling in Mustang Lumber Inc. v. CA. The

statement in Mustang Lumberthat lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the

word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case

that the phrase "posses timber or other forest products" in section 68 of P.D. No. 705

means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents

required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the


16/64

other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be

issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber,

lumber and non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD

Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for

lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of

lumber...and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for

Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in

convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the

documents presented by the latter.


17/64


18/64

12. Lt. Gen. Alfonso Dagudag vs. Judge Maximo Padaranga

555 SCRA 217

Facts:

Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan,

filed a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge againstJudge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional

Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container

Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de

Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid

inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and

other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR.

Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable

period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, the Provincial Environment

and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) OIC, Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMCContainer Lines, Inc. After notice sent to the company, nobody appeared during the

adjudication. Thus the adjudicating office recommended to DENR Regional Executive

Director that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.

In a complaint filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayedthat a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, andothers to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering thedefendants to pay him moral damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. Judge

Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possessionof the forest products.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge correctly issued the writ of replevin.

Held:No. The forest products were legally and validly seized by DENR which is the agency

responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192

states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation,

management, development, and proper use of the countrys natural resources. Section 68

of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that

possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A

states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the

confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or

abandoned. In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC ContainerLines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown

owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.


19/64

13. FACTORAN VS CA, 320 SCRA 530

FACTS

On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station

III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of

narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truckdriver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel

Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR

Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAIDinvestigated

them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber

which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. Such

omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known

as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure

order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. On March 30,

1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary

restraining order (TRO). On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO

into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount ofP180,000.00.

ISSUE

WON the court injunction on the DENR lies, considering that exhaustion of

administrative remedies were not followed.

RULING

NO. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or

upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall

be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrievedparty of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department

Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari

and prohibition.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for

reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available

administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been

given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in

the administrative forum.


20/64

14. BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, ET AL VS. DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN,

311 SCRA 259

FACTS

The forest employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region tasked with the

enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with narra flitches

wrapped in nylon sack. The driver of the van could not produce any legal permit authorizing

him to transport the narra lumber. The vehicle and its load of narra flitches were

confiscated. A criminal complaint against driver Martinez was filed for violation of Sec. 78 of

P.D.705 (2) as amended, and implemented by DENR Administrative Order No. 59. After due

notice and opportunity to be heard, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was

issued by the DENR Regional Office pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority. Thereafter, San

Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, filed a case for recovery of personal property

and damages with application for writ of replevin with the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The

trial court issued a warrant of seizure of personal property which was enforced by DeputySheriff Magumun despite the refusal of the DENR employees and officials on the ground that

it had already been forfeited in favor of the government and was now in custodia legis. The

sheriff took the van without permission and turned over to SMC representative.

ISSUE

Whether or not the deputy sheriff committed a grave misconduct in taking hold of the

personal property which is already in custodia legis confiscated by other government

agency.

RULING

Yes. The deputy sheriff is found guilty of grave misconduct and ordered to pay the fine

of P5,000 for arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal property and for

ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the personal

property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government

for violation of forestry laws.

A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the

parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property; much less does he have any

discretion to decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at

hand. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any

instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to executeit according to its mandate.

However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in

instances where there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. In

this case, the prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the

warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.


21/64

15. PAAT VS. CA, 266 SCRA 167

FACTS

The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR

personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required

documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,

CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private

respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director

Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of

the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal,

private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and

Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter

alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review

on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for

replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE

WON the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

WON an action for replevin propsper to recover a movable property which is the subject

matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to section 68-A of

PD 705.

HELD 1. The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party

is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have

availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within

the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer

concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then

such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The

premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and

uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded

when there is violation of due process, when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction, when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

when there is irreparable injury, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts

as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, when

to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, when it would

amount to nullification of a claim, when the subject matter is a private land in land case

proceedings, when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and

when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.


22/64

2. No. A crime was committed and the tools of the crime are under custodial egis.

With the introduction of EO 277 amending section 68 of PD 705, the act of cutting,

gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes

a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under article 309.

It is clear that a suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for thesubject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings pursuant

to section 68-A of PD 705 as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of

action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should

have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction

over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

16. ALVAREZ VS. PICOP

508 SCRA 498

FACTS:

PICOPS predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber

License Agreement (TLA) No. 43. (TLA) No. 43, as amended, expired on April 26, 1997. Itwas renewed on October 7, 1997 for another 25 years to terminate on April 25, 2002.

On November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297,

EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED

FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESRVATION AND AS

ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA. The excluded consists of 8, 1000 hectares, more or

less, which formed part of PICOPs expired TLANo. 43, subject of its application for IFMA

conversion.

On January 21, 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the

aforesaid presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order.

In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Oder (TRO) enjoiningrespondents therein from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and

her co-respondents in said case filed on February 6, 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) to

Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated February 3, 2003; and (2) To Dismiss.

ISSUE:

WON the presidential warranty was a contract.


23/64

RULING:

NO. PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is supposed contract

entered into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated July 29, 1969

issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refuses this

claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential

Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non- Impairment Clause.

The Supreme Court disagrees. Such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in

the countrys forest cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government

regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.

17. ALVAREZ VS. PICOP

606 SCRA 444 (December 3, 2009)

FACTS:

PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)

No. 43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus

against then DENR Secretary Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and

execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal

requirements for the automatic conversation of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The

cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial

court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then

President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement

(IFMA) with PICOP.

ISSUE:

WON the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause

by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA).

RULING:

NO. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment

clause is edifying.


24/64

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. cannot be invoked.

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking

assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an

interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the

sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of thenatural resources in the area.

18. MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

263 SCRA 490

FACTS:

In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses

under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7

stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later

petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approvalof MLEs petition, Davao

Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)

alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber concession.

The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the

Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural

Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR

Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR

and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay

the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of

execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The


25/64

RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the

execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a

separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made

not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without

any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights underthe due process clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MIWPIs right todue process has been violated.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall

be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not boundby judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only

against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for

the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without

giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the

issuance of awrit of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all

furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers

decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the

respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,

apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without

hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not

included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment

in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic

tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the

procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make

conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24).

19. SOLEDAD DY versus COURT OF APPEALS

304 SCRA 331

FACTS

On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01

creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of

and/or port of illegal cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products.

Respondent Lausa was a member of the team.


26/64

On July 1, 1993, members of the team received confidential information that 2

truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City. Accordingly, they set up

a checkpoint. The 2 trucks approached the checkpoint but instead of stopping, they

accelerated their speed hence, the team chased them and finally caught up the 2 vehicles.

The owner/caretaker however failed to produce any document as proof of the legality of the

possession of the forest products.

The DENR issued temporary seizure order, but the owner/caretaker refused to accept

them, so the vehicles as well as the seized forest products were taken and placed in the

custody of respondent Lausa. The CENRO issued a notice of confiscation. For lack of

claimants, DENR Regional Director issued forfeiture orders and after 2 months, petitioner,

claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the RTC of Butuan City

which was approved. Respondent then filed a motion for approval of counter bond which the

trial court denied. On appeal, the CA granted the petition to approve the duly qualified

counter bond.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appeal made by respondent Lausa is meritorious.

HELD

The appeal is without merit. As an established rule, the party must exhaust all

administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. As petitioner clearly failed to

exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the

assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioners application for a writ of replevin and

denying private respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited properly, the lumber

properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking recover possession

thereof should be directed to that agency.

The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent

of the DENR to file a counter bond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be

disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For

indeed what should have been done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner

filing her claim before the DENR.


27/64

20. PICOP Resources vs BASE METAL

510 SCRA 400

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines Operating

Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation Pursuant to the terms of the

Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining

claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines

Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within itsmining claimsSince a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner

PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered

into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to

the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its

mining claims Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its mining claims to applications for

Mineral Production Sharing Agreements.

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to

sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven mining claims in favor of private

respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The

transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as

well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed

of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made

by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private

respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims On November 18, 1997, petitioner

PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an

Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the

following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS

WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty

of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the


28/64

timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate

possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the

Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The

Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did

not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-

impairment clause finds no application. Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOPthe exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If

that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control

and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural

resources.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the impairment of contracts apply.

HELD:

No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement an examination of the Presidential

Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment

to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful

and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw

materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut,

collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of

other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The

Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking

assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an

interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the

sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the

natural resources in the area.

21. ASAPHIL versusTUASON

488 scra 126

FACTS

Respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of

Perlite Ore with Induplex, Inc., wherein Induplex agreedto buy all the perlite ore that may

be found and mined in Tuasons mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange,

Induplexwill assist Tuason in securing and perfecting his right over the mining

claim.Thereafter, Tuason executed on May 29, 1976, an Agreement to Operate Mining

Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction andDevelopment Corporation.Later on,


29/64

Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR), a complaint against Asaphiland Induplex for declaration of nullity of the two

contracts, namely, the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, and the Agreementto

Operate Mining Claims. Tuason alleged in his complaint that the stockholders of Induplex

formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources, Inc. (Ibalon), an entity whose purpose is tomine any and all kinds of minerals, and has in fact been mining, extracting andutilizing the

perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim; that this is in violation of the condition imposed by the

Board of Investments (BOI) onInduplex in its Joint Venture Agreement. The DENR, through

the Regional Executive Director, found merit in Induplexs arguments and dismissed the

complaint.

ISSUE

Does the DENR have jurisdiction to rule on the claim?

HELD

With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the DENR Regional Executive Director opined

that the DENR does not have jurisdiction over thecase, while the MAB ruled that the DENR

has jurisdiction.The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional Executive Director that

the DENR does not have jurisdiction over Tuasonscomplaint.At the time of the filing of the

complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed

by P.D. No.1281, entitled "Revising Commonwealth Act No. 136, Creating the Bureau of

Mines, and for Other Purposes." Particularly, P.D. No. 1281vests the Bureau of Minesof

the DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or

applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,

including mining service contracts and service contractorsinsofar as their mining activities

are concerned. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281, the Bureau of Mines also has quasi-

judicial powersover cases involving the following:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the

claim holder thereof with several mining operators;

(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an

operating agreement has not been placed into actualoperations within the

period stipulated therein; and


30/64

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal

of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms andconditions thereof.

The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or

controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR.While the Agreement to Operate Mining

Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is

notdue to Asaphils refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due

to Induplexs alleged violation of the conditionimposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture

Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale

andPurchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a

judicial question, which is proper for determination by the regular courts. A judicial question

is raised when the determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial function;

thatis, the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights

of the parties are with respect to the matter incontroversy

22. Dipidio Earth-Savers versus Elisea Gozun

485 SCRA 586

Facts:

In 1987, President Cory Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 279 which employed

DENR to stipulate with foreign companies regarding technical or financial large scale

exploration or mining. In 1995, President Ramos signed into law Republic Act (RA) 7942 or

the Philippine Mining Act. On 1994, Pres. Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining

Co., an Australian Company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000

hectares of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy. Dipidio. After the passage of

law, DENR then issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

In seeking to nullify RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners

reasoned that these in effect allow the unlawful and unjust taking of property for private

purpose in contravention with section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, mandating that

private property shall not be taken except for public use and with the correspondingpayment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the

Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot on its own, permit entry into

a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Public respondents on the other hand, avers that section 76 is not a taking provision

but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the State may prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general


31/64

welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the

public good and it endeavours potential for the use or economic exploitation of private

property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all circumstances

would compel the government to regulate by purchase.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State, through the Philippine Mining Act and the CAMC FTAA,

abdicated its primary responsibility to the full control and supervision over natural

resources.

RULING: No. The State has full control and supervision over natural resources. In La Bugal-

BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Mining

Act provides for the States control and supervision over mining operations. Sections 8, 9,

and 66 provide for the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations

as well as reportorial requirements. The Philippine Mining Act and its Implementing Rules

and Regulations provide the stipulations confirming the governments control over mining

enterprises, such as the following:

-For violation of any of its terms and conditions, the government may cancel an FTAA.

-An FTAA contractor is obliged to open its book of accounts and records for inspection by

the government.

-MGB is mandated to monitor the contractors compliance with the terms and conditions of

the FTAA; and to deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of the Philippine National

Police, the barangay, or the DENR-accredited nongovernmental organization to police

mining activities.

-An FTAA cannot be transferred or assigned without prior approval by the President.

-A mining project under an FTAA cannot proceed to the construction/development/utilization

stage, unless its Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility has been approved by the

government.

-The FTAA contractor is obliged to submit reports (on quarterly, semi-annual, or annual

basis as the case may be; per section 270, DAO 96-40) pertaining several matters.

-An FTAA pertaining to areas within government reservations cannot be granted without a

written clearance from the government agencies concerned.

- An FTAA contractor is required to post a financial guarantee bond in favour of thegovernment in an amount equivalent to its expenditures obligations for any particular year.

This requirement is apart from the representations and warranties of the contractor that it

has access to all financing, managerial, and technical expertise and technology necessary to

carry out the objectives of the FTAA.

It is readily apparent that the requirements, regulations, restrictions, and limitations

do not support petitioners contention that the State is a passive regulator of the countrys


32/64

natural resources. The Philippine Mining Act and its IRR grant the government with sufficient

control and supervision on the conduct of mining operations.

23.

Republic versus Rosemoor

426 SCRA 517

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted

permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel,

Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial

quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau,

for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly

thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating that their

license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there

was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license.

The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this

law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded byProclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national

park.

ISSUE :

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

HELD:

Yes. The Court cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder;

that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that

QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the

cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription

against bills of attainder.


33/64

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is

settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.

Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national

park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was

still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section

1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution,

granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new

Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in

Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

24. La Bugal-B-Laan v Ramos

421 SCRA 148

RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before theeffectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,covering close to 100, 000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao delSur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramosissued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative

Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, itsimplementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declaredunconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP toexploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XIISection 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, MMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company,sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved thetransfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailedthe same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR toaccept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreigninvestors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for

large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriaterecommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the president may execute with foreignproponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treatybetween the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australianinvestments.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources.


34/64

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that

permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit Philippine mineral resources.

RULING:1. RA 7942 is Unconstitutional. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is

unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippinenatural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained theRegalian doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, allforces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, andother natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that,exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the

full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutionsauthorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilizationof inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer

allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Under the concession system, the concessionairemakes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resourcewithin a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire overthe countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit aparticular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other formsof assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical andfinancial assistance. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign

contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters ofthe 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President toenter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural

resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construedstrictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as saidact authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and

technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisionsactually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership toforeign contractors contrary to thefundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractormanages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. Byallowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation,RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources tothese contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of

the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations orassociations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine naturalresources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that thelegislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisionsthat are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.


35/64

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations arelimited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scaleexploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

2. RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract. The FTAA between WMCP and thePhilippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a

device contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusiveright to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may beproduced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP

shall provide all financing, technology,management, and personnel necessary for theMining Operations. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA takentogether, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong tothe State and are intended for thebenefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent tothe 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid,the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring mustbe struck down.

25. La Bugal-B-Laan V Ramos

445 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the

unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed

between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited

by the 1987 Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though

permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the

principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the

exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:


36/64

Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of

petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only?

HELD:

Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-

scale activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided

that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and

actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of

directors of a private corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and

other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board

retains full residual control of the business

26.LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. WMC RESOURCES

INTERNATIONAL PTY. LTD., and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.,

Facts:

In a contract denominated as Tampakan Option Agreement dated April 25, 1991,

WMC Resources International (WMC), a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining

Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration

company, through its local subsidiary Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc.

(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, acquired the mining claims in

Tampakan, South Cotabato of Southcott Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation,

and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Tampakan Companies).

The Tampakan Option Agreement was amended by subsequent agreements

including Amendatory Agreement dated July 15, 1994 under which the Tampakan

Companies were given preferential option to acquire the shares of WMC in WMCP and

Hillcrest Inc. in the event it (WMC) decided to sell them.On March 22, 1995, then President

Ramos on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines entered into a Financial and Technical

Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP for the large scale exploration, development and

commercial exploitation of mineral resources in 99,387 hectares of lands in South Cotabato,

Sultan Kudarat, Davao Del Sur and North Kotabato.

On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement sold to herein petitioner

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for

$10,000,000.00. The sale was subject to certain conditions including the Tampakan

Companies failure to accept WMCPs offer to sell the same shares, under the companies

right of first refusal provided for in the Tampakan Option Agreement and its amendments.

By letter of July 13, 2000, WMCP tendered to the Tampakan Companies its offer for

the latter to purchase WMCs shares of stock in it (WMCP) and Hillcrest, Inc.


37/64

In the meantime or by letter of August 28, 2000, petitioner requested the approval

by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer

to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on account of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs

shares of stock in WMCP, which approval of transfer was required in the FTAA agreement

forged between then President Ramos and WMCP.

As the Tampakan Companies later availed of their preferential right under the

Tampakan Option Agreement, a Sale and Purchase Agreement was concluded on October

6, 2000 between WMC and the Tampakan Companies over the same shares of stock priory

purchased by petitioner.

On October 12, 2000, the Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines

and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of their preemptive right to buy

1 oposa v factoran

Documents