1 icn cartels working group application of leniency to individuals stephen blake cartels and...
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ICN Cartels Working Group Application of leniency to individuals
Stephen BlakeCartels and Criminal Enforcement Group
UK Office of Fair Trading
27 January 2013
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Contents
• Essential ingredients for an effective leniency policy
• Background – UK cartel regime and leniency programme
• Meeting requirements for an effective policy
• Challenges
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Essential ingredients for an effective leniency policy
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Leniency – essential ingredients●Maximum ‘up-front’ certainty for
applicants
- Especially for those blowing the whistle
●Trust in the authority
- Transparency – including published guidance
- Reputation for fairness, accessibility and approachability
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●Incentives to maintain cooperation
●Record of robust enforcement
- Track record of successful cases and stiff penalties
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Background
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UK cartel regime
• Dual regime
- Civil (administrative) regime directed at ‘undertakings’• Article 101 TFEU and/or Competition Act 1998
- Criminal regime directed at individuals• Enterprise Act 2002
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• Regimes complementary
- Enforcement action may be taken under both regimes• Against undertakings AND individuals• May include parallel UK criminal enforcement where
Article 101 is being applied by the European Commission
- Or only under one regime
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UK Leniency programme - outline• Scope of leniency programme
- Limited to cartel conduct (but including RPM)
• Corporate immunity or leniency
- Immunity from fines or fine reduction (civil)
• Individual immunity
- Immunity from prosecution (criminal)
- Immunity from director disqualification
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●Conditions
- Genuine intention to confess
- Evidential threshold – depends on whether there is a prior OFT investigation
- Complete and continuous cooperation
- In the case of immunity, the applicant must not be a coercer
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Criminal immunity for individuals●Where undertakings apply – three
types of applicant
- Type A – ‘First in’ and no pre-existing investigation: automatic immunity (not available for coercer)
- Type B – ‘First in’ but pre-existing investigation: discretionary immunity or leniency
- Type C - Not ‘first in’ and pre-existing investigation: reduction in fine up to 50%
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●Availability of individual immunity where undertakings apply
- Automatic ‘blanket’ criminal immunity for cooperating employees in Type A cases
- No automatic ‘blanket’ criminal immunity in Type B cases – may be available on a discretionary basis
- No automatic criminal immunity in Type C cases but scope for individual immunity
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●Where there is no guarantee of individual immunity
- Availability of confidential guidance • Whether the case is being or likely to be investigated
criminally• Whether individual immunity may be available
●Individuals may apply in their own right
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Director disqualification
●Immunity from director disqualification
- For all cooperating current and former directors
- Irrespective of whether applicant is Type A, B or C
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Meeting requirements for an effective leniency policy
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Maximum ‘up-front’ certainty
●Clear guidance on evidential thresholds and other conditions
- Including when individuals will be required to admit participation in cartel offence, including dishonesty
- Narrow definition of when an undertaking or individual will be considered a ‘coercer’
- OFT in the process of revising its leniency guidance to make the process as clear and accessible as possible
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●Maximum certainty on interaction between the regimes for undertakings and individuals
- Including in Type A cases guaranteed immunity for all cooperating current and former employees and directors
- Even if an undertaking is found to be a coercer, individuals within the undertaking who did not play coercing role will not be denied criminal immunity
●Availability of informal ‘no names’ guidance
●Availability of markers
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●Scope for anonymity when exploring availability of immunity
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Trust in the authority
●Transparency
- Detailed published guidance
- Separate ‘quick guide’ to leniency for individuals currently being drafted
●Accessibility and approachability
- Informal ‘no names’ guidance available
- Leniency contact persons named on OFT website
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●Fairness
- Commitment to erring in favour of the applicant where there is genuinely a ‘close call’
- Stated aim of achieving reputation for fairness in application of published guidance
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Incentives to maintain cooperation ●Clarity regarding scope of
requirements
- Must be genuinely to assist the agency in efficiently and effectively detecting, investigating and taking enforcement action against the cartel
●Clarity regarding consequences of failure to maintain cooperation
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●Timing of leniency agreement/no action letter
- Shortly prior to issue of SO or charging with cartel offence
●OFT considering requirement for a senior representative of the applicant to sign a written commitment to cooperate at marker stage
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Robust enforcement record
●Civil enforcement against undertakings
- Examples of recent fines: • BA fined £58.5 million in Airline fuel surcharges case• RBS fined £28.5 million in Loans for professional
services firms case
●Criminal enforcement against individuals
- Two prosecutions to date
- Convictions in Marine hose cartel – prison sentences of between 2 ½ and 3 years
- Further cases in pipeline
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●Director disqualification
- Between 5 and 7 years in Marine Hose case as part of criminal proceedings
- No standalone director disqualification cases to date
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Challenges
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Challenges
●Non-alignment of incentives – individuals vs undertakings
- Current requirement of ‘dishonesty’ for criminal offence
- Absence of ‘plea bargaining’ for Type C cases
- Obtaining cooperation from former employees, in particular if they are now employed by a competitor not covered by leniency
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●Maintaining integrity of evidence
- Electronic evidence
- Witness evidence
●Reliance on accomplice evidence – credibility
●Creating an enforcement record
- ‘Chicken and egg’
- Avoiding sole reliance on leniency
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ICN Cartels Working Group Application of leniency to individuals
Stephen BlakeCartels and Criminal Enforcement Group
UK Office of Fair Trading
27 January 2013