1 carnegie mellon university cert coordination center firewalls cert coordination center software...

25
1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center CERT CERT Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 1521 Tom Longstaff The CERT Coordination Center is sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. SM

Post on 21-Dec-2015

216 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

1

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Firewalls

CERT Coordination Center

Software Engineering Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh PA 1521

Tom Longstaff

The CERT Coordination Center is sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

SM

Page 2: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

2

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Definition

“A fireproof wall used in buildings and machinery to prevent the spread of fire”

The American Heritage Desk Dictionary

In an automobile, a firewall prevents the spread of fire while allowing control and monitoring connections to pass through

Page 3: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

3

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Network Firewall ConceptPUBLIC

NETWORK

FirewallSystem Your

DomainLegitimate Activity

Violations

Page 4: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

4

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Legitimate Activity

Regulated by policy

Defined by type of service (application), source, and destinationallow electronic mail to and from anyone

• allow news reading but not news posting

• allow login from inside to outside but not vice versa

• allow file transfer to a single system in your domain only

• do not give out the names of any systems in the environment

Page 5: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

5

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Violations

Violations are activities or behaviors not permitted in the policy

• these can be either explicit or implied

Firewall technology may help with the detection and prevention of violations from outsiders are intrusions

Page 6: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

6

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Firewalls and Policy

Firewalls automate the enforcement of a network access policy

Some firewall architectures may also provide• additional functionality

• monitoring

• public services

Firewalls cannot• determine intent

• prevent abuse of allowed services

• provide host security

• protect against violations through other pathways

Page 7: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

7

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Firewall Types

Filters• Restrict traffic based on packet header information

• Most common fields are type (tcp, udp, etc), src, dst, port/service

• Advanced filters may restrict traffic based on traffic patterns or other aggregate information

Proxies (or Application Gateways)• Restrict traffic based on packet content

• Is application specific

VPN/IPSec Gateways• Supports tunneling between networks

• Can support tunneling to mobile nodes

Page 8: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

8

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Filter Rules

Two philosophies• Allow all except those packet types that carry known

vulnerabilities

• Deny all except those packet types that are required by users

Some rules carry context• Connection-oriented

• Based on SYN/ACK protocol

Filters have problems with:• Malformed packets/fragmented packets

• Out-of-sequence protocols

• Backward client-server protocols (X11, FTP)

Page 9: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

9

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Gateways and Proxies

These are paths through your firewall to allow services

Proxies are intermediaries that regulate service through the firewall

Application gateways and proxies allow specific application interfaces through the firewall

Encryption is the bane of gateways and proxies

Page 10: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

10

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Firewall Architectures

Where to position firewalls?• between your domain and every access to the outside

• between administrative domains of dissimilar policy

• between networks where the boundary much be controlled

What architecture to use?• simple router

• router with multiple interfaces

• gateway/proxy services between dual routers

• a gateway separating dual routers

Page 11: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

11

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

The Simple Router (packet filter) -1PUBLIC

NETWORK

FirewallRouter

YourDomain

Page 12: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

12

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

The Simple Router (packet filter) -2

Advantages• cheap - usually a must-have anyway

• simple - only one configuration file to contend with

• verifiable - packet monitoring at the site will assure filtering is working

Disadvantages• no flexibility with applications - packet filter only

• only extreme for security

• limited logging capability

Page 13: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

13

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

A Router with Multiple Interfaces -1PUBLIC

NETWORK

YourDomain

SiteRouter

Page 14: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

14

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

A Router with Multiple Interfaces -2Advantages

• ability to segment a site into distinct domains

• flexibility to create logical architectures

• single configuration file to maintain

Disadvantages• single point of failure

• convoluted configuration file

• possible confusion over interfaces

• vulnerabilities associated with the router

Page 15: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

15

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Gateway/Proxy Services Between Dual Routers -1PUBLIC

NETWORK

YourDomain

FirewallRouter

SiteRouter

Proxy/GatewayProxy/

GatewayProxy/GatewayProxy/

GatewayProxies and Gateways

Page 16: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

16

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Gateway/Proxy Services Between Dual Routers -2Advantages

• ability to provide risky services

• application filtering possible

• allows you to hide many hosts behind the second router

• provides a good auditing point

Disadvantages• still a physical connection between routers

• may allow unprotected services and tunnelling throughrvice to “slip by” the proxy

• multiple configuration files to maintain

Page 17: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

17

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

A Gateway Separating Dual Routers (“belt and suspenders”) -1PUBLIC

NETWORK

YourDomain

FirewallRouter

SiteRouter

FilteringGateway

Page 18: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

18

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Gateway Separating Dual Routers -2Advantages

• provides both logical and physical separation

• restricts services not addressed by the proxy or gateway system

• provides controlled functionality through the firewall

• supports a limited access policy (e.g., email only)

• excellent central point for accounting/monitoring

Disadvantages• limits functionality to available gateway/proxy software

• causes a bottleneck for traffic

• difficult to setup and maintain

Page 19: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

19

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

The Future of Firewalls

Firewall technology relies on controlling access points to the network

When access to the network becomes more distributed and ubiquitous, control becomes difficult

Restrictive firewalls discourage network growth and development

Trust in firewalls may cause a false sense of security

Page 20: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

20

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Site Administrative Boundary

PC LAN

ISDN Telecomm Systems

MainframeWith Dial-up PPP

Multi-Protocol Router

Workstation Dial-ins

MobileComputing

Page 21: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

21

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Discussion

If your security policy does not allow Java applets to be run on an internal network, is a proxy or filter more appropriate? Why?

What are some of the issues involved in attempting to use a proxy to disallow Java applets?

Presentation Opportunity: CERT report on State of the Art for Intrusion Detection Systems

Firewall papers (many)

Research CISCO PIX firewall product family and describe the features, performance, and reliability. Also describe how the PIX is configured and determine how easy this would fit into a complex architecture

Page 22: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

22

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Intrusion Detection

CERT Coordination Center

Software Engineering Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh PA 1521

Tom Longstaff

The CERT Coordination Center is sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

SM

Page 23: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

23

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Intrusion Detection Types

Pattern Detection

Anomaly Detection

Policy-Based Detection

handout

Page 24: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

24

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

Main Points on IDS

Most do not add any protection at all, but can help with recognition

Not a lot of science involved in IDS design

Measurement is problematic

The future of IDS is uncertain

Real key is to focus on incident response

Page 25: 1 Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center Firewalls CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh

25

Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination CenterCERTCERT

IP Spoofing Attack

Also called sequence number guessing

Original attack relies on trusted relationship between two systems

Details...