1

Agenda?

0830-0930 Middleware Levelset

0930-1000 Middleware 201 (Directories)

1000-1030 Break??

1030-1200 Continue

1200-1300 Lunch

Internet2 Middleware

Drinking Kool-Aid From A Fire Hose

Michael R. GettesPrincipal TechnologistGeorgetown University

gettes@Georgetown.EDUhttp://www.georgetown.edu/giia/internet2

“Middleware is the intersection of what the Network Engineers and the Application Programmers don’t want to do”

- Ken KlingensteinChief Technologist, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder

Director, Internet2 Middleware InitiativeLead Clergy, MACE

PS of LC

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Internet2 Middleware

If the goal is a PKI, then you need to consider:• Identifiers (SSNs and other untold truths)• Identification & Authen process (“I & A”)• Authentication systems (Kerberos, LDAP, etc)• Lawyers, Policy & Money (lawyers, guns & $$$)• Directories (and the applications that use them)• Certificate Mgmt System (CMS) Deployment

–CA Certficate, Server Certificates, Client Certificates

• Authorizations (a real hard problem, Roles, etc)

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Internet2 Middleware

• Building Application/System Infrastructure

• What is missing in Internet 1

• Not “Network Security” (wire level)

• Assumes the wire is insecure

• Assumes the Application is insecure

If security was easy,

everyone would be doing it.

• http://middleware.internet2.edu

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MACE

Middleware Architecture Committee for Ed.

IT Architects – meet often – no particular religious affiliations

MACE-DIR – eduPerson, Recipe, DoDHE

MACE-SHIBBOLETH – global AuthN/Z

MACE-PKI HEPKI (TAG/PAG/PKI-Labs)

MACE-WebISO – Web Initial Sign-on

VID-MID – Video Middleware (H.323/SIP)

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MACE-ochists

RL “Bob” Morgan, Chair, Washington

Steven Carmody, Brown

Michael Gettes, Georgetown

Keith Hazelton, Wisconsin

Paul Hill, MIT

Ken Klingenstein, Colorado

Mark Poepping, CMU

Jim Jokl, Virginia

David Wasley, UCOP

Von Welch, ANL/Grid

Recently:

Scott Cantor, Ohio St

Euro: Brian Gilmore & Ton Verschuren

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MACE-DIR

Keith Hazelton, Chair, Wisconsin•eduPerson objectclass•LDAP-Recipe•Dir of Dirs for Higher Education (DoDHE)•Shibboleth project dir dependencies•Meta Directories – MetaMerge•Groups (Dynamic vs. Static; Management)•Afilliated Directories (Stitched, Data Link)•http://middleware.internet2.edu/directories

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MACE-DIR:eduPerson 1.0 (1/22/01 release)

• MACE initiated (Internet2 + EDUCAUSE)

• Globally interesting useful attributes

• Get community buy-in, must use it also

eduPersonAffiliation (DoDHE), eduPersonPrincipalName (Shibboleth)

• “Less is more”, how to use standard objectclasses

• http://www.educause.edu/eduperson

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MACE-DIR:LDAP-Recipe

DIT, Schema Design, Access Control, Replication, Name population, Good use of LDAP design and features, LDAP configuration, Password Management, eduPerson discussion, DoDHE expectations

http://middleware.internet2.edu (locate LDAP-Recipe)

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MACE-DIR:Directory of Directoriesfor Higher Education

Web of Data vs. Web of People

Prototype: April, 2000 (by M. Gettes)

Highly scalable parallel searching• Interesting development/research problems• Configs, LDAP libraries, Human Interface

Realized the need to:• Promote eduPerson & common schema• Promote good directory design (recipe)

Work proceeding – Sun Microsystems Grant

http://middleware.internet2.edu/dodhe

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MACE-SHIBBOLETH

Steven Carmody, Brown, Chair

A Biblical pass phrase – “password”• Get it right or “off with your head”• Inter-institutional Authentication/Authorization

• Web Authorization of Remote Sites with Local Credentials

• Authentication via WebISO• October, 2001 – Demo target• http://middleware.internet2.edu/shibboleth

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MACE-WEBISOWeb Initial Sign-on

Recently Formed

Based on University of Washington “pubcookie” implementation

Washington will likely develop and steward for next 2 years with external funding

JA-SIG uPortal, Blackboard, WebCT, Shibboleth – will do or are highly likely to do.

http://www.washington.edu/computing/pubcookie

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VID-MIDVideo Middleware

Recently Formed

Authentication and Authorization of H.323 sessions.

Client to Client

Client to MCU

Directory enabled

How to find video enabled people?

What is necessary to describe video capabilities?

Will likely extend to IP Telephony and so on…

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Technical Policy

PKI is1/3 Technical

and 2/3 Policy?

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HEPKI

TAG – Technical Activities Group• Jim Jokl, Chair, Virginia• Mobility, Cert Profiles, etc, etc, lots of techno

PAG – Policy Activities Group• Default Chair, Ken Klingenstein, Colorado• Knee-deep in policy, HEBCA, Campus, Subs+RP

PKI Labs (AT&T)– Neal McBurnett, Avaya• Wisconsin-Madison & Dartmouth• Industry, Gov., Edu expert guidance

http://www.educause.edu/hepki

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Bridge CA and Trust Paths

Verisign

CA-A CA-B

Bridge CA

CA-C CA-D

FedBridge CA

HE

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UNIVERSITY

GeorgetownUniversity

NIH

Peer-to-peer

USA GovernmentFederal

BCA

DoD

NASA

Peer-to-peer

USAHigher Education

BCA

UNIVERSITY

. . .

UNIVERSITY

University ofWashington

Peer-to-peer

USA Health Care"Health Key"

BCA

NCHICA

Special Relationships

Peer-to-peer

EuropeanHigher Education

BCA

UNIVERSITY

University ofEdinburgh

UNIVERSITY

SpecialRelationships

MayoClinic

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Bridge CAs

• Higher Education Bridge CA – FBCA peering

• We have a draft HEBCA CP (Net@EDU PKI WG) FBCA Compatible

• How many HEBCAs? (EDUCAUSE!)

• Do we really understand PKI implementations with respect to policy needs? (proxy certificates, relying party agreements, name constraints, FERPA, HIPAA, who eats who?)

• BCA seems to be the most promising perspective. Will each person be a BCA?

• Does ALL software (Client/Server) need to be changed?

• Mitretek announces new BCA deployment model 2/15/2001• Scalable & deployable

• Server plug-ins make client changes less likely

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domainComponent (DC=) Naming

• Traditional X.500 naming:

cn=Michael R Gettes, ou=Server Group, ou=UIS, o=Georgetown University, c=US

• domainComponent (DC) naming:

uid=gettes,ou=People,dc=georgetown,dc=edu

• HEPKI is issuing guidance and advice on DC= naming

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Attributes for PKI

Store them in a Certificate?• Attributes persist for life of Certificate• No need for Directory or other lookup

– The Certificate itself becomes the AuthZ control point

Store them in a Directory?• Very light-weight Certificates• Requires Directory Access• Long-term Certificate, Directory is AuthZ control point.

How many Certificates will we have?

Pseudonymous Certificates

We’re Building A

“Bridge Over The River PKI”

A word about “Portals”

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Portals: Authentication

• Security is not easy

if it was, then everyone would be doing it.

• Applications should not handle authentication• Don’t assume you will have access to passwords at the portal

• The portal is YAA (yet another application)

but portals have web servers to do the dirty work

portals can trust the web server to authenticate

and pass “identity” on to the portal

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Portals: Authorization

• Security is not easy

if it was, then everyone would be doing it.

• Applications should handle authorization

• The portal is YAA (yet another application)

Portals can decide access on their own by consulting

local and remote services to determine eligibility then

grant/deny based on response or otherwise by whim.

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Portal Issues

Authentication

WebISO

Authorization

Groups

Roles

Directories, Shibboleth

Vendor Independent Techniques

Shibboleth Update

Steven Carmbody, Brown UniversityProject Leader, Shibboleth

Michael R. Gettes, Georgetown University

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Target Web

Server

Origin Site Target Site

Browser

Authentication Phase

First Access - Unauthenticated

Authorization Phase

Pass content if user is allowed

Shibboleth ArchitectureConcepts - High Level

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Second Access - Authenticated

Target Web

Server

Origin Site Target Site

Browser

First Access - Unauthenticated

Web Login Server Redirect User to Local Web Login

Ask to Obtain Entitlements

Pass entitlements for authz decision

Pass content if user is allowedAuthentication

AttributeServer

Entitlements

Auth OK

Req Ent

Ent Prompt

Authentication Phase

Authorization Phase

Success!

Shibboleth ArchitectureConcepts (detail)

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Target Web

Server

Origin Site Target Site

Browser

AttributeServer Shib

htaccessplugin

Club Shib Server (holds

certs and contracts)

Shibboleth ArchitectureConcepts #1 (managing trust)

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Shibboleth Components

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Descriptions of services

1. local authn server - assumed part of the campus environment

2. web sso server - typically works with local authn service to provide web single sign-on

3. resource manager proxy, resource manager - may serve as control points for actual web page access

4. attribute authority - assembles/disassembles/validates signed XML objects using attribute repository and policy tables

5. attribute repository - an LDAP directory, or roles database or….

6. Where are you from service - one possible way to direct external users to their own local authn service

7. attribute mapper - converts user entitlements into local authorization values

8. PDP - policy decision points - decide if user attributes meet authorization requirements

9. SHAR - Shibboleth Attribute Requestor - used by target to request user attributes

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Shibboleth Flows Draft

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Target Web

Server

Origin Site Target Site

Browser

Shibboleth Architecture -- Managing Trust

TRUST

AttributeServer

Shibengine

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Personal Privacy

Web Login Server provides a pseudononymous identity

An Attribute Authority releases Personal Information associated with that pseudnonymous identity to site X based on:

• Site Defaults– Business Rules

• User control– myAA

• Filtered by– Contract provisions

My AASiteDefaults

Contact Provisions

BrowserUser

Middleware Marketing

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Drivers of Vapor Convergence

JA-SIG uPortal Authen

OKI/Web Authentication

Shibboleth Inter-Realm AuthZ

Local Web SSO Pressures

We all get Web SSO for Local Authentication and an Enterprise Authorization Framework with an Integrated Portal that will all work inter-institutionally!

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Middleware Inputs & Outputs

GridsGrids JA-SIG &JA-SIG &uPortaluPortalOKIOKI Inter-realmInter-realm

calendaringcalendaring

Shibboleth, eduPerson, Affiliated Dirs, etc.Shibboleth, eduPerson, Affiliated Dirs, etc.

EnterpriseEnterpriseDirectoryDirectory

EnterpriseEnterpriseAuthenticationAuthentication

LegacyLegacySystemsSystems

CampusCampusWeb SSOWeb SSO

futuresfutures

EnterpriseEnterpriseauthZauthZ

LicensedLicensedResourcesResources

EmbeddedEmbeddedApp SecurityApp Security

Got Directory?

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Techniques for Product Independence

Good/Evil – make use of cool features of your product.

• Does this make it more difficult or impossible to switch products later?

• Does this make you less interoperable? Standard?

• Does this limit your ability to leverage common solutions?

All the above applies to enabled apps as well.

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Groups, Groups, Groups

Static vs. Dynamic (issues of large groups)• Static Scalability, performance, bandwidth

• Dynamic Manageability (search based, but search limits)

Is there something neutral?

Indexed Static Groups• MACE-DIR consideration (Todd Piket, MTU)

• Index unique/member

• The likely approach, IMHO, doesn’t inhibit dynamic stuff

Group Math

(& (group=faculty)(!(group=adjunct)) (member=DN) )

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Roles

Is this an LDAP issue?• MIT roles DB – a roles registry

Are groups good enough for now?• Probably not, see next

Are your apps prepared for this? Maybe they need some service to consult? Will Shibboleth help here?

Vendors have proprietary solutions.

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Stitching disparate directories

How to relate to distinct directories and their entries. Kjk@colorado & kjk@ViDe -- are they the same?

Locate someone in a large directory (DoDHE) and then switch to their video abilities

Suggestion: define new object of a “data source directory”. Associate it with a Cert. Send signature of all data elements for an object, store in same. This allows for digital trust/verification. Still working this out. Not much work in this space? (the affiliated dirs problem)

X.520 AttributeIntegrityInfo Attribute – will it suffice?

Middleware 201Directories

Configuration & Operations

Michael R. Gettes

Principal Technologist

Georgetown University

Gettes@Georgetown.EDU

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How Deep?

Background

Site Profile - configuration

Applications

General Operational Controls

Schema

Access Lists

Replication

Related Directories

LDAP-Recipe – http://middleware.internet2.edu

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Site Profiledc=georgetown,dc=edu

Netscape/iPlanet DS version 4.11• 2 Sun E250 dual cpu, 512MB RAM

75,000 DNs (25K campus, others = alums + etc)

Directory + apps implemented in 7 months

Distinguished names: uid=x,ou=people• DC rap, “Boom shacka lacka”• Does UUID in DN really work?

NSDS pre-op plugin (by gettes@Princeton.EDU)• Authentication over SSL; Required• Can do Kerberos – perf problems to resolve

1 supplier, 4 consumers

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Authentication:Overall Plan @ Georgetown

Currently, Server-Side PKI self-signed

Best of all 3 worlds• LDAP + Kerberos + PKI

– LDAP Authentication performs Kerberos Authentication out the backend. Jan. 2001 to finish iPlanet plug-in.

• Credential Caching handled by Directory.• Cooperative effort – Georgetown, GATech, Michigan

– All directory authentications SSL protected. Enforced with necessary exceptions

• Use Kerberos for Win2K Services and to derive X.509 Client Certificates

• One Userid/Password (single-signon vs. FSO)

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Applications

Mail routing with Sendmail 8.11 (lists also)

Netscape messaging server v 4.15 (IMAP)• WebMail profile stored in LDAP

Apache server for Netscape roaming (no SSL)

Apache & Netscape enterprise web servers

Blackboard CourseInfo Version 5.5.1

Whitepages: Directory Server GateWay

DSGW for priv’d access and maintenance

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Applications (Continued)

Remote access with RADIUS (funk).• No SSL (3/2000); proper LDAP

binds (fix 8/2000)• Authenticates and authorizes for

dial-up, DSL and VPN services using RADIUS called-id.

• We want to use this for other access control such as Oracle

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RADIUS server

RADIUS + LDAP

NAS(terminal server)

DialupUsers

User calls202-555-1110

CalledId from NAS is mapped to guRadProf

DirectoryServer

Netid = gettesguRadProf = 2025550001guRadProf = 2025551110guRadProf = OracleFin

LDAP Filter is:guRadProf = 2025551110+ NetID = gettes

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Applications (Continued)

Alumni services (HoyasOnline).• External vendor in Dallas, TX (PCI).• They authenticate back to home

directories. Apache used to authenticate and proxy to backend IIS server.

• Email Forwarding for Life

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NET ID

TMS

HRIS

SIS

Alumni

LDAP Master

Client Browser

WWW

hoyasonline Content

PCI (Dallas)

Vendor-provided services

Other local hostsGU provided self-serviceapplications

LDAP Replica

OS/390

HoyasOnline Architecture

Gratuitous Architectural Graphic (GAG)

WayDownIn Texas

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Applications (Continued)

Access+• Georgetown developed• Web interface to legacy systems using Unix front-

end to custom made mainframe tasks. Many institutions have re-invented this wheel.

• LDAP authentication, mainframe doesn’t yet do SSL. Always exceptions to rules.

• Student, Faculty, Staff, Directory/Telephone Access+ Services. This technique keeps mainframe alive. (good or bad?)

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Applications (Continued)

Specialized support apps• Self service mail routing• Help Desk: mail routing, password resets,

quota management via DSGW• Change password web page

Person registry populates LDAP people data, currently MVS (mainframe) based.

PerLDAP used quite a bit – very powerful! (make sure version >= 1.4)

Now moving to Net::LDAP

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Applications (Continued)

Georgetown Netscape Communicator Client Customization Kit (CCK).• Configured for central IMAP/SSL and

directory services.• Handles versions of profiles. Poor man’s

MCD

Future: more apps! Host DB, Kerberos integration, win2k/ad integration?, Oracle RADIUS integration, Automatic lists, Dynamic/static Groups, Top-Secret, Bb – further integration.

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General Operational Controls

Size limit trolling (300 or 20 entries?)

Lookthru limit (set very low)

Limit 3 processors for now, MP issues still! (v4)

100MB footprint, about 8000 DNs in cache• Your mileage will vary – follow cache

guidelines documented by iPlanet.

24x7 operations

What can users change?? (Very little)

No write intensive applications

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General Ops Controls (cont…)

Anonymous access allowed

•Needed for email clients

•Anonymous access is good if you resolve FERPA and other data access issues.

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Schema: Design & Maint

Unified namespace: there can be only one!

Schema design and maintenance• Space/time tradeoffs on indexing• Eduperson 1.0 vs. guPerson• guRestrict, guEmailBox, guAffil, guPrimAfil• guPWTimebomb, guRadProf, guType,

guSSN• Relationships (guref)

Maintained by ldif file using ldapmodify

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Access ListsDesign & Maintenance

Access lists: design & maintenance• Buckley(FERPA) protection & services• Priv’d users and services• userPassword & SSN

Maintained by file using ldapmodify

Working on large group controls at GU• Groups vs. Roles• Likely easy to populate, hard to design & implement

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Replication

Application/user performance

Failover, user and app service

Impact of DC= naming (replica init)• Fixed in 4.13 and iDS 5.0

Monitoring: web page and notification

Dumper replica – periodic LDIF dumps

Backups? We don’t need no stinkin’ backups!• Vendor Specific• No good solution for backups (iPlanet)• IBM uses DB2 under the covers• Novell?

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Replication (Continued)

Application/users config for mult servers

Deterministic operations vs random

Failover works for online repairs

Config servers are replicated also

10 to 1 SRA/CRA ratio recommended

Cannot cascade with DC= (iPlanet)• Cascading is scary to me

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Normal Ops

Replica Structure

MASTER

DUMPER

WHITEPAGES MAILHOST

POSTOFFICE

NetID RegistryWeb Servers

Users

Users

Failure Ops

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Netscape Console

• Java program (FAT client).

• Used to create, configure and monitor Netscape servers.

• Preferred the web page paradigm of the version 3 products.

• Has enough bugs that it is only used by server admins, not for mere mortals.

• Demo???

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Other Directories

Novell – GU abandoning GroupWise.

Active directory??? Ugh!!!•Static Groups Only•Strict Tree Structure for Group Policy•No plans for MS to change this…

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Buyer Beware

• LDAP is LDAP is LDAP – yeah, right!

• “Sure! We support LDAP!” What does that mean?

• Contract for functionality and performance

• Include your Directory/Security Champion!!!

• Verify with other schools – so easy, rarely done.

• Beware of products that specify Dir Servers

• Get vendor to document product requirements and behavior. You paid for it!