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LNG journal November/December 2003 page 13

LNG journal

Is the LNG Industry Ready for Strict Liability? This is the final article in a series of four from King & Spalding LLP. It analyses the latest developments in the

ratification and implementation of the International Maritime Organization's Hazardous and Noxious Substances

Convention and discusses the likely effects of the Convention on the LNG Industry.

Philip R. Weems and Kevin D. Keenan, King & Spalding LLP (USA/UK)

It has been said that "a lie gets halfwayaround the world before the truth hasa chance to get its pants on" [1]. Itseems that misconceptions travel equallyas fast. One misconception that appears tohave spread throughout the LNG world isthat the International Maritime Organiza-tion's Hazardous and Noxious SubstancesConvention (the Convention) [2] will nev-er be of particular significance to the LNGindustry. On the contrary, the truth is thatthe Convention, an international treatyproviding more than US$350 million incompensation to victims of a casualtyinvolving hazardous and noxious sub-stances (HNS), is likely to become effectivein the very near future and, unlike any pri-or international treaty dealing with trans-portation liability, will have a directimpact on LNG shipments into countrieswhich adopt it. The Convention will sub-stantially increase, in any member state,the potential liability of LNG shipownersand of LNG cargo owners for damages tothird parties.

Because the International MaritimeOrganization (the IMO) completed itswork on the Convention almost eightyears ago, from afar it appeared that theConvention would simply die a slowdeath due to the lack of a sufficient num-ber of countries taking the requisite stepsto ratify it [3]. The reality behind thescenes is quite different, however, andrecent events evidence considerable gov-ernmental support for the Convention,including: (i) the issuance of EuropeanCouncil Decision 971/2002, which clearedthe way for and encouraged EU memberstates to ratify the Convention unilateral-ly; (ii) a June 2003 meeting of the HNSCorrespondence Group in Ottawa, Cana-da, during which delegates from a numberof HNS importing nations agreed on aconcrete governmental implementationplan; and (iii) an October 2003 meeting ofthe IMO's Legal Committee in London,during which the Legal Committee adopt-ed the Ottawa recommendations, smooth-ing the way for earlier ratification of theConvention.

As a result of these and other recentdevelopments, the Convention is arguablycloser to being a reality than one mightthink. Despite the fact that very few in theLNG industry know what it entails(understandably so given its complexityand, until recently, its relegation by manyto the obituaries column in the interna-tional conventions digest), so long as theConvention continues to gain the momen-tum which it has recently found, it couldwell be a reality in the very near future.Supposing it becomes a reality, whyshould the LNG industry care? Because,for the first time, an international liabilityregime will make LNG shipowners andcargo title holders strictly liable for acci-dents solely as a consequence of LNG

being classified as HNS. Because few inthe LNG industry appear to be taking theinherent commercial risks of the Conven-tion into consideration in current commer-cial dealings. Because, with the recentproliferation of terrorist activities world-wide, the LNG industry can no longer relyon sound technology and responsiblemanagement to avert casualties.

In an effort to highlight the importanceof the changes that will follow ratificationand implementation of the Convention,this article briefly discusses and attemptsto put into perspective the latest develop-ments on the road toward that end. Itexamines the LNG industry's historicalcontribution to the drafting of the Con-vention and provides a sneak previewinto how the Convention is designed towork. Finally, it discusses the likelyeffects the Convention will have on theLNG industry.

Convention Effectiveness- What Will it Take?

Twelve states must ratify the Conventionbefore it can enter into force and takeeffect [4]. In addition, four of those twelveratifying states must each have not lessthan 2 million units of gross tonnage intheir registered merchant marine, andHNS importers in the twelve ratifyingstates must collectively have received 40million tonnes of cargo that would be cov-ered by the Convention within the preced-ing calendar year. While these gross ton-nage and import tonnage requirementsmay appear to impede the Convention'sentry into force, their overall effect on fullimplementation is not as significant as onemight think given the broad scope of the5,000+ substances defined as HNS in theConvention [5], the shear volume ofimports across the entire range of HNS asso defined [6], and the size of the regis-tered shipping fleets in those nations thatare likely to ratify the Convention in thenear term [7]. Thus, it is not the objectivecriteria that impede adoption of the Con-vention; rather, the most vexing problemsarising since the IMO finalized the Con-vention in 1996 have been more in the sub-

jective political arena. That being the case,a crucial political hurdle to implementa-tion was very recently overcome througha decision within the European Union.

EU ratification clearedTo date, the Convention has been ratifiedby Russia, Angola, Morocco and Tonga[8]. Despite the fact that five EuropeanUnion (EU) member states signed theConvention when it was adopted by theIMO in 1996, no EU member state has yetratified it. Rather than an indication ofunwillingness to ratify on the part of theEU signatory states, this delay has largelybeen a result of legal and jurisdictionalproblems in the EU which resulted in EUmember states being unable to ratify theConvention unilaterally [9] despite anumber of states having reportedly begunthe ratification process [10]. However, arecent decision of the European Council

(the Council Decision) cleared the way forEU member states to ratify the Conven-tion without further authority from Brus-sels [11]. Thus, while only four nationshave ratified the Convention to date, theCouncil Decision is expected to acceleratethe accession of EU member states nowthat the outstanding legal issues havebeen resolved in Brussels [12]. Moreimportantly, in addition to clearing a pathtoward accession within the EU, theCouncil Decision set June 30, 2006, as atarget date for all EU member states toratify the Convention [13]. A widely heldbelief is that once certain EU memberstates - many with large and well-devel-oped shipping industries - accede to theConvention, a parade of ratifications willfollow from within the EU and abroad. Inparticular, John Wren, Chairman of theHNS Correspondence Group and Head ofBranch for Shipping Policy at the UKDepartment for Transport, argues that,given the Council Decision and the atti-tude toward the Convention in Brussels,all EU member states [14] will eventuallyratify the Convention [15]. Whether Mr.Wren's sentiment is an accurate predic-tion or not, the LNG industry can ill-afford to ignore the possibility.

Liability Under theConvention Generally

The Convention's liability allocationscheme consists of two tiers. The first tierimposes liability on the shipowner [16].The second tier imposes liability at largeon the various industries importing HNS.Most importantly, strict liability appliesunder both tiers. By definition, a strict-lia-bility regime imposes liability regardlessof fault. Thus, unless one of the limiteddefences under the Convention is avail-able, a shipowner whose ship washesashore in rough seas and causes a casualtyinvolving HNS will be liable in Conven-tion member states in accordance with theConvention's first-tier liability formulae,regardless whether it would otherwisehave been liable in accordance with gener-al principles of fault and negligence.Herein lies an important distinctionbetween the Convention and other limita-tions regimes. Where traditional regimesare invoked to limit a shipowner's liabilityin the event it is found legally to be atfault, the Convention actually imposes lia-bility regardless of fault.

Under tier one, the owner of a vesselcarrying HNS and suffering a casualty ina state having ratified the Conventionwill be strictly liable for an amount notexceeding a sum determined with refer-ence to the gross tonnage of the vesselinvolved in the casualty. Thus, with veryfew exceptions [17], the shipowner willbe liable for any damages caused by HNSduring transit, regardless of fault or neg-ligence. While there are many LNGtankers currently trading that will enjoylower limits under the Convention due totheir smaller tonnage, a 138,000 m 3 LNGtanker comes very close to the 100 millionspecial drawing right (SDR) [18] limit setout in Article 9(1) of the Convention.Given that the industry is moving contin-ually toward larger LNG tankers, for thesake of argument we shall assume thatthe 100 million SDR limit will typically bereached. Based on the value of the SDRtoday [19], the first-tier limitation of lia-bility for larger LNG tankers would besomewhere in the neighbourhood ofUS$143 million per event.

Not surprisingly, as a means to ensurethat shipowners carrying HNS have thecapacity to meet their tier-one obliga-tions, the Convention also mandates cer-tain minimum insurance coverage andrequires proof of cover upon enteringand leaving a port of a Convention mem-ber state [20]. Under the Convention,proof of insurance coverage must beissued by the state of the ship's registry ifthat state is a party to the Convention or,if the vessel's flag state is not a party tothe Convention, by any state that is a par-ty to the Convention [21]. Thus, to craft asimple example, suppose LNG is import-ed into Italy from Algeria on an Algerian-

..the IMO's Hazardous and Noxious Substances Conventionis likely to become effective in the very near future and,

unlike any prior international treaty dealing withtransportation liability, will have a direct impact

on LNG shipments into countries which adopt it.


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flagged vessel. Suppose also that Italyhas ratified the Convention but Algeriahas not. Before the tanker bringing LNGfrom Algeria could enter the Italian port,that tanker would be required to pro-duce, upon demand by Italian authori-ties, a certificate of cover issued by anycompetent authority in a Convention

member state [22].The second tier of the Conventionexists because of the view, heralded inthe early days of the Convention's con-sideration, that a shipowner would find itvery difficult to obtain liability insurancecoverage to meet the per-event SDR lim-its. As a means of sharing the load, theConvention's second tier of liabilityimposes burdens on HNS-importingindustries broadly by way of mandatorycontributions to a fund established by theConvention (the HNS Fund) and madeavailable in the event the liability limitsof the first tier are exceeded or in theevent the shipowner is unable to meet itsobligations under the first tier [23]. Whena casualty involving HNS occurs in aConvention member state, the shipownerwill first be liable up to the 100 millionSDR (approximately US$143 million) lim-it discussed above. To the extent thatdamages incurred in connection with thatcasualty exceed the first-tier limit, or tothe extent that the shipowner cannot

meet its first-tier obligation, claimantsmay be entitled to compensation from theHNS Fund [24], in each case up to a max-imum of 250 million SDR (approximatelyUS$358 million), inclusive of theshipowner's first-tier contribution, if any.

Thus, although the limits in the first tieralone will more than double the amount ofthe LNG shipowner's liability under the

widely adopted London Convention [25](applicable today in forty nations), it is thesecond tier that harbours the most poten-tial impact for the LNG industry. Whilethere could conceivably be a myriad ofcombinations, there are three baseline sce-narios under which the HNS Fund couldbe called upon to compensate victims of a

casualty involving HNS. To illustrate allthree, suppose a casualty (not necessarilyrelated to LNG) occurs in a Conventionmember state and the damages amount toUS$400 million in the aggregate. The firstscenario is the one where the shipowner isfully insured in accordance with the Con-vention. In this case, the shipownerwould bear the first 100 million SDR(US$143 million) of liability and the HNSFund would be called upon to pay out anadditional 150 million SDR (US$215 mil-lion). The second scenario is one in whichthe shipowner is uninsured and the entire250 million SDR (US$358 million) wouldbe payable from the HNS Fund. The thirdis where the casualty is caused by theintervening act of a third party (e.g., a ter-rorist organization) with intent to causedamage. While the Convention's tier-oneliability scheme exempts the shipownerfrom liability for casualties caused byintentional malfeasance of interveningthird parties [26], tier two contains no suchexemption. Thus, victims of a casualty

caused by an intervening third party in aConvention member state would be enti-tled to claim against the HNS Fund, inwhich case the HNS Fund would be fullyliable up to the 250 million SDR limit(US$358 million) [27].

Although the liability is limited in allthree of the above scenarios - stoppingin this example US$42 million short of

fully compensating the hypotheticalclaimants - the HNS Fund clearly has thepotential to significantly impact HNSimporters in Convention member states,especially in the latter two scenarioswhere the HNS Fund would in most cas-es be liable to the full extent of the Con-vention's liability limit.

The HNS Fund and itsEvolution

In response to now-infamous oil pollu-tion casualties such as the Torrey Canyon[28], the IMO has for decades concentrat-ed on liability regimes in the oil industrybecause of the significant risk of pollutiondamage. However, in advance of wide-spread public pressure expected to followa serious catastrophic incident involvingthe sea carriage of HNS, in particularharmful chemicals, the Convention wasfirst put on the drawing board in the late1970s. Like the CLC and the Fund Con-vention [29] which preceded it in thecrude oil pollution liability arena, theConvention contains provisions estab-lishing a fund into which importers ofHNS will be obligated to contribute fol-lowing a casualty, with the amount ofsuch contributions being based on,among a number of other factors, theamount of HNS imported by each suchreceiver in the calendar year immediatelypreceding the calendar year in which thecasualty occurs [30]. Unlike the CLC andthe Fund Convention, both of which arerelevant to the shipment of crude oil andcertain crude oil products only, the Con-vention cuts across four distinct indus-

tries (chemicals, LNG, LPG and crude oil/ crude oil products), each having a vast-ly different safety record and, thus,arguably covering vastly disparate risks[31]. On the one hand is the LNG indus-try, with an excellent safety record span-ning more than four decades [32]. On theother hand are the crude oil, chemical andLPG industries, all of which have far lessstellar safety records [33]. Clearly, havinga fund cutting across four separate indus-tries could - and likely would - lead to thesafer industry (i.e. LNG) subsidizing themore dangerous (e.g. toxic and pollutingchemicals).

Fortunately, while it took some time tokick-start the LNG industry into payingcloser attention to the subsidization risksunder earlier proposed versions of theConvention, representatives of LNG buy-ers and sellers began to recognize this andother potential problems with the Conven-tion and, to their credit, began to react con-structively. Beginning in the late 1970s, theIMO made development of a conventionon HNS liabilities a top priority; however,the IMO's first attempt at a one-tier HNSconvention funded by shipowners alonewas rejected in 1984 [34]. The IMO tookanother run at HNS at the end of the 1980s,presenting a two-tiered proposal it hopedwould be accepted. By 1991, the LNGindustry - in particular the Indonesian del-egation to the IMO - took notice of grow-ing support for the Convention and, moreimportantly, the fact that the LNG indus-try might be forced to pay for damagescaused by other industries [35]. In Febru-ary of 1992, the Indonesian delegation


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submitted a report to t he Legal Committeeof the IMO outlining some of the delega-tion's problems with the then current draft(the Indonesian Report). As the world'sleading producer of LNG, the Indonesiandelegation was in as strong a position thenas any to advocate for reform, and advo-cate it did. Ultimately, while there were a

number of elements to the delegation'sarguments, essentially itsobjections came down to thefact that the HNS Fund com-mingled LNG with morethan 5,000 other substances -mainly chemicals. As aresult, because levies paidinto the HNS Fund were tobe based primarily on ton-nage of cargo, there existed avery real likelihood thatLNG receivers would end upsubsidizing other, more dan-gerous HNS receivers. Topaint a simple example, evenback then far more LNG wastransported worldwide than,say, cyanide, vinyl acetate,hydrochloric acid or leadconcentrates. Yet such chem-icals clearly posed then - andpose now - a far greater riskto persons and the environ-ment than LNG [36]. Underthe 1991 draft of t he Conven-tion, receivers of such chemi-cals would make far fewercontributions to the HNSFund than would LNGreceivers because of the dis-parity in volumes shippedand, ultimately, LNGreceivers would likely endup compensating victims ofcyanide poisoning or anynumber of other ills resultingfrom the accidental dis-charge of such chemicals.Understandably, this wasnot particularly palatable.Indeed, from an LNG indus-try standpoint, the HNSFund would serve only toelevate costs unnecessarilyunless changes could bemade to the draft.

The Indonesian Reportserved as a wake-up call tothe LNG industry and, inMay of 1992, representativesfrom across the industry metin Kuala Lumpur to discussthe way forward. In atten-dance at the Kuala Lumpurmeeting, called by theIndonesian delegation, were65 representatives from Japan, Korea, Taiwan,Malaysia, Algeria, Nigeria,Italy, Australia, France,Brunei, Abu Dhabi, the U.K.and the U.S. [37]. One of theearly positions coming outof Kuala Lumpur and latermeetings called for theindustry to try to excludeLNG from the Conventionaltogether, while anothercalled for the LNG industryto pool together to form itsown voluntary liability

scheme akin to TOVALOP and CRISTAL(both of which served as interim liabilityregimes pending the widespread adop-tion of the CLC and the Fund Conven-tion) [38]. Ultimately, the industry suc-ceeded in advocating the establishment,provided certain LNG import volumesare achieved [39], of a separate account

for LNG within the HNS Fund and, in so

doing, provided for itself considerableinsulation from the historically higher-risk and far more accident-prone chemi-cal, crude oil and LPG industries [40].Although the LNG industry thus suc-ceeded in controlling its own financialexposure under the Convention, theactual operation of the separate LNG

account presents additional concerns vis-

-vis the various sellers, buyers and otherparticipants in the LNG value chain.These concerns are discussed at greaterlength below.

Effects of the Conventionon the LNG Industry

The most immediate and obvious effect of

the Convention on LNG buyers and sellers

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in Convention member states will beincreased costs - both in terms of the pre-miums for insurance cover againstincreased liability limits and in terms ofthe per unit cost of LNG when contribu-tions to the HNS Fund are factored intoexisting and prospective supply arrange-ments. The requirement that all ships car-

rying HNS must have proof of coveragesufficient to meet the vessel's tier-one lia-bility limits may help to ensure that thetier-two compensation scheme is littleused, but it nonetheless translates intoincreased costs for shipowners becausethe coverage amounts will need to be sig-nificantly greater than, say, those in placein countries not signatories to the Conven-tion. Insurance premiums will likelyincrease, partly to cover the costs incurredby the P & I Clubs in procuring adequatereinsurance [41] and partly to cover theincreased liability limits of shipownersand the additional liabilities of cargo titleholders [42].

While the P & I Clubs have indicatedthey will issue policies covering theincreased liability in Convention memberstates, the larger issue is the contingent lia-bility that arises from the Convention'ssecond tier. Under Article 19(1)(b) of theConvention, when LNG is imported into aConvention member state, the party hold-ing title to the LNG immediately prior todischarge will be the party responsible inthe event a contribution is required to bemade to the HNS Fund. As title transfer isa term universally agreed upon in the typ-ical LNG sale and purchase agreement(the SPA), and as most SPAs in the LNGindustry are long-term arrangements -some spanning more than twenty-fiveyears - there is a very real possibility thatbuyers and sellers of LNG could findthemselves and their projects taking oncontingent liabilities they had not antici-pated when the SPA was signed.

From the seller's perspective, the diffi-culty arises where the seller agrees to along-term ex ship price and, followingexecution of the SPA, finds that the coun-try to which the LNG is to be exported hasratified the Convention, thus making theseller potentially liable for any contribu-tions to the HNS Fund. Given the likeli-hood that the only agreement throughwhich the contribution can be pusheddownstream is the SPA itself, the LNGseller in this case is stuck with the liabili-ty - the contribution, if any, coming

directly out of its bottom line. Similarly,for LNG purchased on an FOB basis, abuyer may find it difficult to move theConvention's second-tier contingent lia-bility downstream if it already has long-term contracts in place for resale of thegas. In such circumstances, shifting liabil-ity downstream may be possible; it may

not. It all depends, of course, on the termof the agreement with the downstreamcustomer and the leverage of the partiesinvolved. As an interesting contrast, thisparticular problem was not nearly asacute in the crude oil business in the leadup to the implementation of the CLC andthe Fund Convention because crude oil isgenerally sold under so-called "ever-green" contracts - 90-day cancellable sup-ply arrangements - which, following a

contribution to the IOPC Fund (estab-lished under the Fund Convention) after acasualty, could quite easily be renegotiat-ed so as to push the per barrel price of thecontribution downstream to the end-useron subsequent volumes. Unfortunately,this approach is not so easily done in theLNG industry under the present long-term SPA model. Thus, parties mightconsider this issue when negotiating theirSPA, perhaps agreeing to split the cost ofany future contribution or otherwise allo-cating the risk in accordance with theirrespective positions of leverage. Buyers,of course, should also consider this issuewhen negotiating the terms and condi-tions under which their downstream cus-tomers will purchase natural gas from theregasification facility.

If an LNG cargo title holder (an LNGContributor) is responsible for paymentsto the LNG account, how much will theLNG Contributor be required to pay? TheConvention's operation in this regard maybe surprising to many. For each LNGContributor, the amount to be paid fromyear to year, if any, will be determined

with reference to the percentage of LNGcovered by the Convention which suchLNG Contributor held title to during theprior calendar year [43]. For example,suppose an LNG Contributor held title to15% of the shipments of LNG covered bythe Convention in the prior calendar yearand the HNS Fund were called upon to

pay out the full 250 million SDR (US$358million) under the second tier. Underthese circumstances, the LNG Contributorwould be assessed a liability under theConvention equal to 38 million SDR(US$54 million). While this examplemight seem unrealistic at first glance, itcould in fact be a conservative illustrationin the case where the Convention becomeseffective with just enough LNG importtonnage to activate the LNG account and

where, among the LNG-importing nationsparty to the Convention, a single LNGContributor has a significant share ofimport tonnage. As the Convention gainsmore widespread acceptance and the totalamount of LNG covered by the Conven-tion increases, contingent liabilities shoul-dered by individual LNG Contributorsunder tier two should diminish.

Turning back to the above example,because any major casualty involvingLNG in a Convention member state wouldresult in a levy by the HNS Fund on allLNG Contributors, the LNG Contributorabove would incur such liability regard-less whether the casualty involved LNG towhich it held title. Thus, the practicaloperation of the LNG account will resultin LNG Contributors subsidizing damagescaused by other LNG Contributors. To theextent it is the large-volume LNG Contrib-utors incurring the casualties, an argu-ment can be made that there is fairness inthe arrangement because, after all, theirshare of the total levy from the HNS Fundwill be significant. To the extent that thesmall-volume LNG Contributors incur the

casualties and the large-volume LNG Con-tributors pick up the lion's share of the bill,that argument becomes far less tenable.Thus, although cross-subsidizationbetween industries is avoided throughactivation and use of the LNG account,subsidization between larger and smallerLNG importers is a distinct possibility.

Moreover, because the number of LNGContributors may - and likely will -change from year to year and because thevolumes imported from year to year willfluctuate, ascertaining the extent of anindividual LNG Contributor's contingentliability under the Convention is a bit of amoving target.

ConclusionsUnlike existing maritime liability conven-tions applicable to LNG, none of whichactually impose liability following a casu-alty, the Convention does. Moreover,subject to certain defences available toshipowners and LNG cargo title holders,it imposes liability regardless of fault. Insuch a no-fault, or strict-liability system,the claimant need only show that the car-riage of HNS at sea was a causal factor inthe resulting injury, irrespective of who isto blame (i.e., proof of causation ratherthan proof of fault). Indeed, strict liabili-ty for LNG shipowners and cargo titleholders, a prospect which was once wellbeyond the horizon, now looks as thoughit looms just beyond the port bow. Ifrecent developments are any indication,the Convention will likely be a reality inthe near future. Four nations havealready ratified the Convention and,assuming certain registered tonnage andcargo volume thresholds are met, onlyeight remain before the Convention takeseffect. Recent developments in the EUmake those eight far more likely thanthey were even a year ago.

It was on the basis of a stellar trackrecord that the industry was able to effectthe significant changes to the Conventionthat were accepted by the IMO LegalCommittee between 1992 and 1996. Thattrack record, although well-deserved, isbased on a strict adherence to safety pro-tocols and a reliance on sound technologyand responsible management. Given thepolitical climate we find ourselves intoday and the increased likelihood ofthird-party malfeasance, the old rulesmay no longer apply and a belief that theConvention will not significantly impact

SHIPPING


The most immediate and obvious effect of the Conventionon LNG buyers and sellers in Convention member states

will be increased costs.


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the industry because of its historical safe-ty record may well be misguided. As aresult, the LNG industry - and those LNGbuyers and sellers who are at presentnegotiating contracts to grow the indus-try and expand its scope and breadth -would be well advised to begin thinkingabout ways in which the Convention's

implementation might impact theirrespective business models.From the potential to impactthe bottom line of an ex shipseller constrained by a long-term SPA to the ability topush downstream the costsincurred by an FOB buyeron the heels of a mandatorycontribution to the HNSFund, the Convention car-ries with it significant con-

tingent liabilities. In ourexperience, neither the con-tractual arrangements nowin effect nor those that arebeing presently negotiatedtake these contingent liabili-ties into account. At a mini-mum, we think businessleaders and their counselshould consider very care-fully the potential impact ofthe Convention on theimportation of LNG intostates which have ratified orwhich might conceivablyratify the Convention.

History has been kind tothe LNG industry because ofits close attention to safetyissues, its proclivity toembrace first-class technolo-gy, and its proactive stancetoward responsible manage-ment. Unfortunately, thesesteps alone may no longer besufficient in today's politicalclimate and, as a result,financial risks arise if theConvention is not adequate-ly considered. However, asit did in the 1990s when itrose to the challenge andadvocated segregation of theHNS Fund into separateaccounts, the LNG industry

will adapt to the impending liabilityallocation that will follow the Conven-tion's ratification. Indeed, the industrymay well adopt the mantra Sir WinstonChurchill held when he proclaimed:"History will be kind to me, for I intend towrite it" [44]

LNG journal


Philip R. Weems, a partner with King & Spalding LLP in Houston, specializesin the legal aspects of developing, marketing and operating LNG and cross-border natural gas projects.

Kevin D. Keenan, a senior associate with King & Spalding International LLP in London, specializes in downstream energy-related projects and transactions, including oil, gas and LNG.

...the LNG industry

would be welladvised to begin

thinking about waysin which theConvention's

implementationmight impact theirbusiness models.

Endnotes (references) continue on page 18


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