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Islamic theology between tradition andchallenge of modernityNedžad Grabus aa Faculty of Islamic Studies , Sarajevo , Bosnia and HerzegovinaPublished online: 22 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Nedžad Grabus (2012) Islamic theology between tradition andchallenge of modernity, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 23:3, 267-277, DOI:10.1080/09596410.2012.686263

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Islamic theology between tradition and challenge of modernity1

Nedžad Grabus*

Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

A number of different approaches to the interpretation of cognition have always existed sideby side within Islam, from those relying mainly on the basic sources – the Qur’an and theSunna – to those that attempt to clarify the issue of cognition largely by way of rationaland logical argumentation, as is the case with philosophical texts. For this reason it isimportant to consider the literature that emerged in the classical period, which is stillbeing brought to light and which this article endeavours to make more accessible topresent-day readers.

The debate that took place between the main theological schools of the Muʿtazilīs,Māturīdīs and Ashʿarīs is of great significance for present-day readers, since it provides aninsight into the emergence and development of the substantive contents of systematicbelief in Islam. From the late eleventh to the early twentieth century, Muʿtazilism was seenas anathema in most of the Muslim world, and only the Māturīdīs and the Ashʿarīs wereaccepted among Sunnis. At the end of the nineteenth century, a critical traditionalistmovement appeared, led by Muh. ammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and Sayyid Ah.mad Khān (d.1898). Many scholars have associated the interest in Muʿtazilī learning in the earlytwentieth century with the renaissance (nahd. a) in Arabic literature in the late nineteenthcentury. The nahd. a emerged in response to the challenges of Western civilization’sirresistible cultural penetration into the Arab world, which was frozen in conservatism.Muh. ammad ʿAbduh, aware of the changes that had occurred in the Muslim world as aresult of Western colonialism, was trying to respond to the challenges with which socialand political change confronted Muslims, and in the ideas he articulated he revived someMuʿtazilī theses.

Keywords: Cognition; rationalism; traditionalism; modernism; ideology

As a rule, research in the area of acquisition of knowledge and possibilities of cognition withinWestern European thought and the history of philosophy is contextualized in and dated toAntiquity. It is a problem that the contribution to the development and formulation ofphilosophy provided by Muslim thinkers has usually been neglected or underrated. WilhelmWindelband expressed this by maintaining that in European thought there persists a mostregrettable lack of knowledge of Arab and Jewish philosophy and, consistent with that, lackof awareness of its influence upon the stream of Western thought at particular points. He isof the opinion that this could possibly constitute the most sensitive gap in exploring theorigins of philosophy. Knowledge of religious substance and issues dealt with by the mostprominent Islamic theological schools in the domain of the theory of cognition is even moreproblematically absent and inadequately covered within Western European thought(Windelband 1988, 100–1). It is particularly interesting that only literature from the domainof Islamic philosophy is referred to, while the major works of ʿilm al-kalām and ʿaqāʾid(theology) have generally been neglected.

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online© 2012 University of Birminghamhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2012.686263http://www.tandfonline.com

*Email: ngrabus@gmail.com

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We encounter several problems when trying to summarize the development and establishmentof the essential aspects of ʿaqāʾid. The first serious problem is the multiplicity and diversity ofviews regarding this issue, not only between the mainstream interpreters of ʿaqāʾid (theMuʿtazila, Ashʿarī, Māturīdī and Salafī schools), but also among the followers and thepromoters of the views of these schools. The second problem is of a more technical nature,namely the fact that no comprehensive and generally accepted assessment of the importance ofthe theory of knowledge in ʿaqāʾid and particularly in kalām (speculative theology) yet exists.Nevertheless, it is impossible to correctly understand this matter without at least a summaryreview of directly related works and topics, which means it is necessary to become acquaintedwith the general characteristics and individual features of the most prominent authors ofʿaqāʾid literature, and their exposition of the theory of cognition.

Every doctrine employs its own arsenal of terms. In kalām it very important to use the termsproof (dalīl), reasoning (naz.ar), knowledge (ʿilm) and presumption (z.ann). There is no particularneed to insist that understanding the concepts expressed by these terms is vital for theunderstanding of any epistemological form in kalām. A holistic insight into this discipline andconsideration of its epistemological form is certainly more important than understanding theterms in themselves. ʿAqāʾid covers not only strictly substantive theological issues, but alsothose that belong to the epistemological and methodological field. In any serious study ofissues in the field of Islamic belief, particularly theological issues, both these elements shouldbe taken into account for a correct understanding of the theoretical aspect of theology.

Synthetic ʿaqāʾid-philosophical teachings on cognition in Islamic theology as aforerunner of modern thought

Several hundred years’ experience of searching for answers to epistemological andmethodological questions in the domain of ʿilm al-kalām have resulted in the creation ofsystematized works encompassing all the concepts expressed to date. Specifically, works byFakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1984, 56–66), ʿAdud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rah.mān al-Ījī (n.d. 7–14) and Saʿdal-Dīn al-Taftazānī (1989, 187–204) feature considerably more articulate and systemizeddescriptions of the issues of ʿilm (knowledge) and maʿrifa (cognition).

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī2 endeavoured to master and reconcile various forms of thought ininterpreting the fundamental principles of Islam. His work Al-muh.as.s.al

3 is of particularimportance for the topic of cognition, since he did not simply try to list the teachings, butrather endeavoured to show what they had in common. Naturally, he restricted himself to thefield of kalām without delving into speculative and esoteric philosophy and wisdom,remaining within the scope of what could be treated through reason. In the teaching of kalāmin al-Rāzī’s work, the political and dogmatic problems were already eliminated. Due topolitical influence of the established authorities, earlier authors did not dare to rely on logicaland philosophical arguments in their interpretation of kalām. A dialectic approach became anintegral part of methodology of writing. Introductions into these works were much moreconsistent than the earlier works in this area. Nevertheless, the apologetic character of theseworks continues to be noticeable in prolonged digressions where the authorities on the subjectdefend the positions of Ahl al-Sunna. It seems that in these works it is exceptionally importantto prove the value of reasoning (naz.ar), knowledge and cognition.

In the introductory part of Al-muh.as.s.al, al-Rāzī acquaints us with the ‘fundamentals’ ofkalām. He believes that kalām rests on four foundations. The first consists of the firstprinciples, principationes (Al-muqaddima al-ūlā: fī al-ʿulūm al-awwaliyya), followed bythe process and definition of reasoning (Fī ah. kām al-naz.ar, taʿrīf al-naz.ar). The secondfoundation deals with the question of Being and its division according to the mutakallimūn

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(Taqsīm al-maʿlūmāt, taqsīm al-mawjūdāt ʿalā raʾy al-mutakallimīn). The third foundationaddresses rational theology and reasoning about the Being, attributes, actions and names ofGod (Fī al-ilāhiyyāt wa-al-naz.ar fī al-dhāt wa-al-s.ifāt wa-al-afʿāl wa-al-asmāʾ). The fourthfoundation contains issues based on transference and tradition of Revelation and the Sunna ofthe Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him (Fī al-samʿiyyāt). Al-Rāzī is of the opinion that inspeaking about the methodology of ʿilm al-kalām one should keep in mind the preliminaryprinciple of science, i.e. when we recognize the reality we should make neither negative norpositive judgements; this approach is a matter of conception, conceptio, idea (tas.awwur); if, onthe other hand, either a negative or a positive judgement is made, it then becomes a matter ofacknowledgement (aw nuh. kum ʿalayhā bi-nafy aw ithbāt wa-huwa al-tas.dīq) (Razi, 1984,120–41). He very articulately offers a thesis that conceptual knowledge can be defined as quiteclear and understandable in itself. He further considers that any matter in relation to which wepossess no knowledge whatsoever may become known to us only by way of acquisition ofsuch knowledge. For this reason it is impossible for anyone except a messenger of God toacquire knowledge through unveiling (li-anna mā ʿadā al-ʿilm yankashif illā bihi fa-yastah. īl anyakūn kāshifan). Al-Rāzī affirms this position, stating: ‘I am of necessity aware of myexistence because I know that I exist’ (wa-li annī aʿlam bi-al-d.arūra kawnī ʿāliman bi-wujūdī),and conceptual knowledge is a part of that. Therefore, conceptual knowledge is of a manifestnature. Al-Rāzī is likewise of the opinion that knowledge must necessarily be defined byknowledge and further maintains that it is wrong to negate knowledge. Negation of knowledgein itself means that knowledge as such exists (Rāzī 1984, 144–5).

In arguing for the importance of the concepts of knowledge, presumption, rationalspeculation and Shariʿa judgment (h. ukm sharʿī), al-Rāzī believes that knowledge as suchexists and is necessary. He endeavours to present a summarized review of the theory ofknowledge. There are numerous categories of knowledge. For instance, there is knowledgederived from sensuous perception and knowledge derived from feelings such as pleasure andpain. There is knowledge acquired by way of intuition and knowledge acquired by rationaljudgement. Again, there is knowledge derived from a combination of factors perceived bythe senses and the intellect. In addition, there are two types of such knowledge: one relatedto tradition transmitted by a number of reliable sources (mutawātirāt), relying upon theinterconnection of samʿa and ʿaql (tradition and intellect); and the other based on experienceand cognitive intuition (mujarrabāt and h.adasiyyāt) relying upon the interconnectionof reason and the other five external senses. Besides this type of knowledge, there arealso blind conviction (iʿtiqād muqallid), ignorance, doubt, presumption, assessment andconjecture (wahm).

The scholar al-Ījī4 collected and synthesized the most prominent views held on thedefinition of ʿilm in classical ʿaqāʾid literature; his work Al-mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalāmrepresents one of the most significant compendia of ʿaqāʾid (Islamic theology) teachings,covering the major issues discussed over the seven centuries’ history of the subject. This is athoroughly systematic and, considering the huge amount of material accumulated over time,extraordinarily concise work. Issues and topics are treated and divided in accordance withthe best ‘philosophical’ forms of thinking. The work is primarily concerned with issues thatconcern the theory of cognition and knowledge, and aims to indicate the groundedness ofreligious convictions (ʿaqāʾid dīniyya) by way of argumentation and elimination of doubts(yurād al-h. ujaj wa-dafʿ al-shubah). For al-Ījī, ʿaqāʾid without practical manifestations ofreligion are no more than empty ideas (wa-al-murād bi-al-aqāʾid mā yaqs.ud bihi nafs al-iʿtiqād dūn al-ʿamal). Al-Ījī points out that Man is endowed with innate intellect (ʿaqlgharīzī), essential knowledge (ʿilm d. arūrī) and the capacity for speculation and deductivereasoning or inference – illatio (naz.ar, istidlāl). His main purpose is to contemplate God’s

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creation in order to acquire knowledge of existence and of the Eternal Creator. He believes thatʿilm al-kalām is the most valuable science Man can study.

Al-Ījī’s first stance (mawqif) in Al-mawāqif addresses the question of the origin of knowledge.The philosophical tradition that had already been adopted by scholars requires him to begin with adescription of the discipline on the basis of categories that may also be applied to other scientificdisciplines, such as definition, subject, application, benefit, type, problems and denomination(designation). This is followed by the stances concerning knowledge. In the approach to thedefinition of knowledge, al-Ījī sets out three methodological approaches taken by philosophers.The first approach is that taken by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who, according to al-Ījī, consideredthat the acquisition of knowledge was necessary for two reasons. First, it is essential thateveryone should be aware of his/her own existence (inna ʿilm kull ah.ad bi-wujūdih d.arūrī).This is a very special kind of knowledge. Second, acquired knowledge does not exist withouteffort and is acquired in a particular way through learning and has nothing to do withconjecture. Learning, when we have no knowledge about something at a theoretical level,takes place by way of presumption and preconception about its essence. There is thus adifference between acquisition, presumption and preconception of knowledge. The secondapproach characterized by al-Ījī is that taken by Imam al-H. aramayn al-Juwaynī5 and al-Ghazālī (Ījī n.d., 12–19), who considered defining knowledge as unnecessary (innahu laysad.arūriyyan) (ibid., 9) and difficult. The method of attaining cognition is through division(divisio) and by analogy (qālā wa-t.arīq maʿrifatih al-qisma wa-al-mithāl). Consequently theybelieved that the mode of cognition is not the same for everybody, since knowledge isobtained using various disciplines and in a variety of ways. The third and final approach totheoretical knowledge identified by al-Ījī includes the views of certain proponents ofMuʿtazilism, its opponents such as Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī and al-Rāzī, and philosophers, andaims to prove that knowledge is not the same as simple conviction. These definitions arediscussed in the context of al-Bāqillānī’s polemic against the proponents of Muʿtazilism. Al-Ījīgives the following definition of knowledge: ‘This is an attribute whose existence requiresdistinction between several meanings that do not tolerate contradiction’ (innahu s.ifa tūjab li-mah.allihā tamyīzan bayn al-maʿānī lā yah. tamil al-taqayyud. ) (ibid., 11).

Al-Ījī divides the resulting knowledge into what is essential and what is acquired (al-ilm al-h.ādith yanqasim ilā d.arūrī wa-muktasab). However, where the method of achievement of properreasoning is in question, we should keep in mind that a perception may be either an individualprecognition or an assertion (wa-limā kāna al-idrāk immā tas.awwuran aw tas.dīqan); if itrepresents a method of conception, it is called a cognition (maʿrif), and if it is in the form ofan assertion, it is called a proof (dalīl), which encompasses both presumptive and categoricalproof. Al-Ījī maintains that the mutakallimūn considered knowledge to be a link between theknower and the thing revealed through argument, whereas philosophers believed knowledge tobe presumptive existence (wujūd dhihnī) (ibid., 140–1), and that it is to be judged asintelligibilities (maʿqūlāt), a thesis many mutakallimūn opposed. Knowledge is further dividedinto disjunctive (tafs.īlī) and universal (ijmālī). Al-Ījī’s work contains a most detailed depictionof ideas, interpretations, views and methodological forms of knowledge, such that it may beregarded as an encyclopaedic overview of material collected in this field up to that time. Withal-Ījī’s work, the idea of discriminating between the problem of defining and the problem ofproving and presenting evidence progressively crystallized. The aim of ʿilm al-kalām is toestablish and substantiate essential knowledge (ʿulūm d.arūriyya). The whole of essentialknowledge can be divided into instinctive (natural) knowledge (wijdāniyyāt), which is oflimited scope and consequence, knowledge acquired by way of sensuous perception (h. issiyyāt)and knowledge acquired through intuition (badīhiyyāt). Al-Ījī maintains that there are fourdiffering views regarding the source of knowledge obtained by means of the senses and

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intuition. Most of them recognize both of the above sources of knowledge. He indicates that thegroup that rejected the senses as a source of knowledge is that led by Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy andGalen. The others reject intuition as a source of knowledge. Some of them, such as the sophists(lā-adriyya), repudiate both sources and everything else that may lead toward knowledge. Likethe rest of the scholars (ʿulamāʾ), al-Ījī goes on to speak about rational reasoning in order toattain a desired aim. Reasoning is defined as being either certain or improper. Natural, certainreasoning leads toward knowledge. Similar to the earlier ʿulamāʾ, al-Ījī refers to the example ofthe followers of Shaivism, a branch of Hinduism in the Middle Ages, who rejected thepossibility that knowledge may be obtained by way of reasoning. The geometricians(muhandisūn) are of the opinion that reasoning may only lead to the acquisition of scientificmathematical knowledge (handasiyyāt), not metaphysical knowledge (see Rosenthal 1970,230). They are convinced that it is only in this sense that it is possible to speak ofpresumptions, preconceptions and relative thought. Al-Ījī further states that even the malāh. ida(some think that this applies to the Ismaʿili Shiʿa) reject speculation, which may lead toknowledge of God, without an imam, a guide or a teacher. He also discusses the methods bywhich knowledge can be achieved by reasoning, and the basic criteria for using speculation.According to al-Ījī, there is a general consensus that using rational speculation to obtainknowledge of God (maʿrifat Allāh) is the duty of every Muslim, whether that be by using theintellect, as the Muʿtazilis and al-Māturīdī believed, or by following tradition (samʿ), as al-Ījīhimself maintained. In fact, he considers this to be the primary obligation of every matureMuslim. According to al-Ījī, analogous reasoning is a fruitful method of rational speculation,and he refers briefly to using traditional evidence in the acquisition of knowledge.

Thus it is evident that the authors of kalām take over the interpretation of this matter fromphilosophy, as previously written by Ibn Sīnā. All knowledge or cognition is either conceptual(tas.awwur) or an assertion, which means presenting evidence about something by logicalargumentation (tas.dīq). Conceptual knowledge is primary knowledge that can be acquired bydefining. On the other hand, correspondent knowledge is that gained by presentingconclusions. An example of this is the assertion to the effect that the ‘created world has abeginning’. The above understanding is very close to the distinction, specific to modern logic,between ‘meaning’ and ‘true substance/meaning’. On the basis of al-Ījī’s work it is understoodthat aqāʾid is based on ‘knowledge’, while knowledge is adapted to aqāʾid.

Following the same line as al-Ījī, al-Taftazānī6 likewise discusses the definition of knowledgein his work Sharh. al-maqās.id. He is of the opinion that conceptual knowledge is necessary, sinceit is acquired, and we need it to help us learn the unknown. Without conceptual knowledge, theprocess of learning would require a prolonged period of time. That is why any being’s awarenessof its existence is directly obvious. This awareness is to be followed by general knowledge.Al-Taftazānī contested the notion of conceptual knowledge and its acquisition.7

Here a minor parenthesis may help us present a comparison between the understandings ofcognition in Western and Islamic thought. There is a major difference of approach to thismatter between, on the one hand, the ʿulamāʾ who were active in the milieu of Islamic cultureand civilization in the Middle Ages and, on the other, Christian theologians of the time, to saynothing of modern Western philosophy. As a result, every researcher is torn between twotrends in the theory of cognition: the rational and empirical approach of the West, andmainstream Islamic thought, which deals with this topic through tradition (transmission –

naql) and intellect – ratio (ʿaql), trying to work out the linkages between the two and/or toattain a synthesis, since the absolutization of the mind and the subject has never taken place inIslamic thought. This is why no radical interpretations emerged in Islamic thought that grantedreason priority over revelation, in contrast to European thought, where such interpretations didaccord a primary and absolute role to reason and the subject. Perhaps this is why the theory of

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cognition in the form developed within ʿaqāʾid has remained on the margins and has beeninadequately presented to the modern reading public and scientifically trained individuals.

Islamic theological texts in a modern context

In order to understand a given topic we should acknowledge the disputes that have markedIslamic thought in the twentieth century and led both to the further development of rationalideas within Islamic thought and to the emergence of ideas that have promoted ideologicaltheological doctrine. Through these ideas, Islam has been deprived of dynamism and theability to adjust to new circumstances, ignoring its tenets and principles of accommodation andaffirming lines of thought that simplify and reduce its teachings and theological interpretationto mere repetition and the proclamation of formalized attitudes and theological theses onsubstantive issues. Some examples follow here of the theological ideas of the most prominentauthors representing this trend.

In his article ‘The awakening of rationalism (Muʿtazilism) in Islam’, written in 1957 (seeMartin et al. 2003, 128), Rudi Caspar ironically noted the changing role of that school ofthought. Muʿtazilī schools developed in the eighth and ninth centuries to defend Islam againstits non-Muslim enemies and invaders. Later, the Muʿtazila would be defeated by the rising tideof traditionalism, which accused them of doctrinal innovation (bidʿa), and even unbelief (kufr).For almost two centuries, the Muʿtazila competed for supremacy with the traditionalists,represented by two new forms of thinking embodied in the Māturīdī and Ashʿarī schools ofthought. From the late eleventh to the early twentieth century, Muʿtazilism was seen asanathema in most of the Muslim world, and only Māturīdī and Ashʿarī teachings wereaccepted in the Sunni part of the Muslim world. In Sunni learning, disputes between theH. anbalī traditionalists and the Ashʿarīs continued. At the end of the nineteenth century, acritical surge in traditionalism took place. This movement was led by Muh.ammad ʿAbduh(d. 1905) and Sayyid Ah.mad Khān (d. 1898). Many authors, including Caspar, associated theinterest in Muʿtazila learning in the early twentieth century with the renaissance (nahd.a) inArabic literature in the late nineteenth century. The nahd.a emerged in response to thechallenges posed by the irresistible cultural penetration of Western civilization into the Arabworld, achieved by attacking traditional Islamic thinking, which was frozen in conservatism.Muh.ammad ʿAbduh was trying to respond to the social and political changes that had occurredas a result of Western colonialism, which he saw as a threat to Muslim civilization, and in theideas he sought to articulate he revived some Muʿtazilī theses.

ʿAbduh’s main thesis in his interpretation of classical Islamic texts was that Muslims wouldnot be able to resist modernity and the West until they acquired a modern education, includingin ‘rational’ science. In his Al-risāla al-ʿAdudiyya, published in 1876, ʿAbduh expressed hisinclination to Muʿtazilī learning, and presented Muʿtazilī ideas in his theologicalcommentary on the proposals of the Ashʿarī theologian ʿAdud al-Dīn al-Ījī. ʿAbduh laterfaced strong opposition while trying to reform the teaching curriculum at Al-AzharUniversity. Several authors have noted that ʿAbduh believed that, if al-Azhar underwentreform, Islam would be reformed too. ʿAbduh learned the primary emphases of earlyIslamic rational theological thinking from Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1877–1924), sincethese ideas were not part of the curriculum of either al-Azhar or any other universities.ʿAbduh had to go into exile, not because of his students, who are attended his lectures inlarge numbers, but because of the traditionalist ʿulamāʾ, who were then teaching in thefaculty and who were against any kind of change in the curriculum. The specific reasonfor his exile was a lecture that focused on rational interpretation of the ʿaqāʾid andthe methodological approach to interpretation set out in Al-ʿaqāʾid al-Nasafiyya with

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al-Taftazānī’s commentary (al-Nasafī is a Māturīdī theologian [mutakallim] d. 1389). Thework follows some lines of Mutaʿzilī thought and is highly critical of Ashaʿrī doctrine. Oneof the older traditionalists at al-Azhar, Professor Shaykh ʿUlaysh, publicly denouncedʿAbduh, asking him, ‘Did you abandon Ashaʿarī ʿaqīda form in order to follow theMuʿtazila?’ Abduh replied, ‘If I gave up blind imitation (taqlīd) of Ashʿarism, why I shouldblindly imitate the Muʿtazila?’ (Martin et al. 2003, 45).

After that, ʿAbduh spent 1885 in Beirut. His lectures on kalām were published under the titleRisālat al-tawh. īd, in which he demonstrated with examples the need to repeatedly redefineepistemological procedure in the discipline of theology. The special importance of ʿAbduh’swork lies in his understanding of the conflict between religion and reason that had been ragingin Europe since the publication of Darwin’s On the origin of species in 1859. ʿAbduhadvocated the rational construction and interpretation of text as an integrated message, not justfocusing on isolated parts of verses with narrow, specific meanings. In an important passage inthe Risāla, Abduh writes that reason (ʿaql) should not be undervalued when dealing withreligion (dīn), since reason leads people to pursue and accept what is proclaimed in religion.By accepting traditional theological interpretation as a legitimate alternative to the majority ofMuslim religious and educational institutions, ʿAbduh endeavoured to articulate an approach toopen dialogue between theological opponents. Since the debate that developed between thepostmodernists and the Islamists, along with the imposition of solutions from outside by theOrientalists, who were believed to rummage in Islamic history and constantly reconstruct theMuslim past, internal dialogue and debate among Muslims regarding the nature of theologicalissues were destabilized, while the postmodernistic theological discourse acquired a globalcharacter. The contemporary Indonesian thinker and influential professor, Harun Nasution,perhaps exaggerated in his assessment that ʿAbduh was a Muʿtazilī, not an Ashʿarī thinker.Nasution’s opinion is based on the importance that ʿAbduh gave to rational thinking and thepresentation of evidence (adilla), even where the sacred text was involved. ʿAbduh’s Risālatal-tawh. īd does in many passages reflect the rationalism of the early Muʿtazila, but otherpassages reflect the Puritanism of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. In fact, ʿAbduhtakes in both lines of thought, which is a response to the dichotomy in the history of Westerntheological thinking and the differences between liberalism and fundamentalism in the earlyyears of the twentieth century. If we consider ʿAbduh’s rationalism from the perspective ofWestern thought, we see that he seeks to come close to the religious liberalism and socialprogressivism that characterized European thinking from the late nineteenth century till thefirst half of the twentieth. When it comes to interpreting ʿAbduh’s theory of knowledge andcognition, as well as some other aspects of his intellectual work, it must be stressed that manyauthors expressed the opinion that he was merely reiterating the medieval debate on ʿaqāʾid.According to Ahmad S. Moussali (1993, 56), however, this does not mean that ʿAbduh’scontribution to the readjustment of the problems of ʿaqāʾid is insignificant, since he tried toreconcile the rational study of ʿaqāʾid with, or, in a certain sense, to restore it to, traditionalisteducational institutions and circles, at the same time linking these issues to the interpretationof modern science.

Most scholars who have worked in the second half of the twentieth century (both modernistsand postmodernists) do not identify themselves with the Muʿtazila as the early rationalists ofIslam, or as the circle that first seriously raised the issue of knowledge and theories ofcognition in ʿaqīda. Perhaps one could say that, for them, Muʿtazilism and free thinkingrepresented the ability of Muslims to face change, and external influences and challenges, in away that could be identified as Islamic. However, their selective use of certain aspects ofMuʿtazilī doctrine and intellectual theses, as well as historical elements in the debate, is notsufficient for them to be characterized as Muʿtazilīs. We should bear in mind the growing

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number of non-European thinkers, among them many Muslims, who are critical of Eurocentrism.Theories developed by Muslim thinkers in the postmodern era have been recognized asdemolishing the control of Euro-American scientists over the Islamic textual tradition. Amongthe most prominent thinkers to have sought to re-articulate the understanding of Islamicclassical texts is Fazlur Rahman (1919–88). In his book Islam, 1979, he emphasized theimportance of the Muʿtazilī call for speculative reasoning and their insistence on reason intheology. Fazlur Rahman admitted that Muʿtazilī thinkers succeeded in saving theMuslim umma from what Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), in a similar context fornineteenth-century Christianity, called ‘cultural contempt’ (Windelband 1988, 34). He furtherstressed that they conducted a ruthless, but nevertheless successful, struggle to defend Islamagainst attacks from Manichaeism, Gnosticism and materialism. In so doing, however, theyunintentionally built the first systematic school of thought regarding the principles of belief inIslam. According to Fazlur Rahman, even though the Muʿtazila, as constructive theologians,made a significant contribution to defending Islam from external attacks, they were not able tobuild a doctrinal system that would satisfy emotional orthodox Islamic piety. He ironicallyconcluded that, while they were opponents of H. anbalī traditionalism, they also caused thedevelopment of traditionalist extremism. He believed that the extreme rationalism of theMuʿtazila was responsible, in a sense, for the extreme rigidity and fideism of the reaction oforthodox Islam. Fazlur Rahman also believed that orthodox Islam, as he called it, eventuallywent to the opposite extreme to Muʿtazilī rationalism, and that ‘Islam took a path where itsdynamic formulations were only partially and indirectly related to the living realities of faith’(Rahman 1979, 175). Fazlur Rahman advocated overcoming the emphasis on historical,linguistic and excessively traditionalist approaches to belief.

An important role in post-structuralist interpretations of Islam and the quest forepistemological method has likewise been played by Professor Mohammed Arkoun, who seeksto make Islam relevant in the modern world, encouraging self-criticism and the restoration ofproper theological rationalism in the interpretation of the fundamental tenets of faith. UnlikeFazlur Rahman, who is a modernist, though he criticized modernist thinking, Arkoun is apostmodernist. He was inspired by the French school of post-structural deconstruction, which,like traditional Islam, suffered from the post-Enlightenment criticism of modernity. Islamicsectarian discourses usually considered post-Enlightenment secularism and modernity asWestern diseases that stemmed from colonialism, infecting and weakening the great Islamiccivilization. Even according to H. asan H. anafī, a prominent modern Egyptian thinker and a veryinfluential intellectual, postmodern criticism is regarded as being in opposition to Islamicrationalism. Arkoun’s opinion is interesting as it is not primarily critical of the traditionalreligious arguments in the context of modernity and Islam, but rather exercises postmoderncritical theory. He advocates that the scriptures – both the Qur’an and the Bible – should beopen to ‘historical, sociological and anthropological’ analysis (Martin et al. 2003, 203),although he does not want to challenge ‘all the sacred and transcendent interpretationsproduced by the traditional theological reasoning’, believing that such an analysis would‘demystify the phenomenon of the Books’ (ibid., 205). Thus he does not look for theapplication of the biblical criticism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whichdestroyed the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity. He explains the concept ofpostmodernist rationalism as follows:

The modern rationality re-establishes the psychological and cultural function of myth, developing aglobal strategy of knowledge in which the rational and the imaginary constantly influence eachother, to produce individual and historical existence. We have to give up the dual framework ofknowledge that juxtaposes reason and imagination, history and myth, truth and falsehood, good andevil, reason and faith. We have to postulate the plurality, change and welcome form of rationality

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that is consistent with the psychological functioning of the Qur’an positioned in the heart, and whatcontemporary anthropology seeks to re-introduce under the label of imaginary. (Ibid., 206)

Arkoun considers that not only the Qur’an itself, but also the great classical commentators such asal-T.abarī (d. 310/922) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī should be re-analysed using modern linguistictextual and interpretative theory. Arkoun argues that, in the modern age, it is not possible toestablish a genuine epistemological process based on the historical, theological and linguisticassumptions of traditional interpretations, because that would lead to confusion regarding thereliability of those teachings. It is therefore the duty of Muslim intellectuals today to undertakecriticism of traditional Islamic thinking, because it confuses historically-based interpretationswith the contents of divine revelation. While many traditionalist Muslims write of the‘Islamization’ of the social sciences and other disciplines in modern secular universities,Arkoun believes that Islamic habits of reasoning should be deconstructed and should preparethe way for the opening up of sacred texts to modern historical and linguistic research. Arkounbelieves that, unless there is an attempt to confront traditional thinking with modernapproaches, standards of knowledge about Islam will continue to weaken both among thetraditional ʿulamāʾ and among the Islamists.

Continuity of struggle between traditionalism and rationalism

Muʿtazilī rationalism and H. anbalī traditionalism as competing and conflicting trends and patternsof thought developed at the opposite ends of the Islamic spectrum, and tried to influence thereligious, intellectual and political centre. This conflict was somewhat stabilized, although notresolved, in the tenth and eleventh centuries with the growing influence of the Shāfiʿī andH. anbalī madhhabs, and Ashʿarī and Māturīdī kalām. In fact, theological and epistemologicalconflict between rationalism and traditionalism was never finally resolved, even after the fallof the Muʿtazila movement in the eleventh century. Because of centuries of decline and lack ofdynamic development and flow of ideas in the Muslim universities and centres of education,as well as among the ʿulamāʾ in general, traditional patterns of thought prevailed. We havealready discussed the response to ʿAbduh’s attitudes in the interpretation of ʿaqāʾid – a reactionbased on the conviction that ʿaqāʾid acquired a permanent and defined form and an integratedsystem of doctrinal teachings as early as the first centuries of Islam. The ʿulamāʾ defendedfaith and its tenets from external attacks and internal conflicts as well as from the sectarianfragmentation of the whole body of Islamic teaching. The writings of authors who lookedcritically at the Muslim past, especially Sayyid Qut.b (1906–66), reveal an effort to understandIslam as ʿaqīda (conviction and belief) and as a living doctrine. For Qut.b, ʿaqīda represented arevolutionary method with massive latent power to transform inactive people into devout,committed and goal-oriented beings. For him, ʿaqīda itself possessed historical and trans-historical traits and capabilities. In this approach, Qut.b deviated completely from theepistemological foundation of ʿaqāʾid, claiming that ʿaqāʾid constituted an ideology for themasses, with the well-known slogan that ‘Islam is/has the answer’ to all questions. Accordingto Qut.b, ʿaqīda is a life-driving force, the only latent force that a true Muslim in the twentiethcentury should live for. He continually pointed out that Muslims everywhere, including inEgypt, were in desperate need of a belief that would help them to consolidate their power.They needed a unified ideology (ʿaqīda) to enable them to face life and its problems, anideology to give them power against external and internal enemies. Qut.b was extremelycritical of the Azhari ʿulamāʾ, but not in the same way as ʿAbduh, who felt that the ʿulamāʾwere burdened with historical patterns of thinking, blindly following and imitating classicalauthority (taqlīd). Qut.b, on the other hand, accused the ʿulamāʾ of being associated with theruling elite, and of supporting a reactionary educational policy that failed to meet the

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requirements of modern times. In his view, the foundations of Islamic knowledge do not rely onthe interpretations and commentaries studied at al-Azhar; young scholars spend the best years oftheir life in such studies, but when they graduate become victims of contradictory approaches andbarren controversies (Karić 2002, 209). Qut.b ignored the entire Muslim literary experience andargued that the original sources of Islam could be found in the Qur’an and the Sunna of theProphet and his biography, which are alone sufficient to solve Muslims’ problems. Qutb canbe counted among the most prominent representatives of the ideological interpretation ofʿaqāʾid, but at the same time he neglected and suppressed the epistemological process andmethods of interpretation of ʿaqāʾid, which are important for understanding the fundamentaltenets and principles of Islamic belief.

In this thematic review of classical Islamic theological texts in the field of Islamic cognition ina modern context, we have tried to present the main trends in approaches to interpretation and themain proponents of ʿaqāʾid that have influenced the development of this area of thought. Therehave, of course, been tens of other Islamic scholars who have written on this theme, but thosereferred to in the present article are key examples of stages in the overall development ofapproaches to ʿaqīda.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the seminar ‘Modern Islamic thought’ at the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in Sarajevo, 24–25 May 2011.

2. Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzīwas born in 543/1149 and died in 606/1209. Of the Islamic disciplines, he wasparticularly interested in kalām, philosophy and tafsīr. He also practised medicine, astrology, alchemy andmineralogy (see Corbin 1978, 251–2).

3. Ibn Khaldūn’s first work was a commentary on al-Rāzī’s Al-muh.as.s.al, entitled Lubāb al-muh.as.s.al fi us.ūlal-dīn. It was written to answer certain questions in the domain of theology and philosophy (see Karić2008, 1191–2).

4. ʿAdud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rah.mān ibn Ah.mad al-Ījī was born about 700/1300 and died in 756/1355. Hiscontribution to kalām and the theory of cognition lies in the fact that he liberated them from theinfluence of ideology and in the fact that his work is systemized in a certain manner; since that veryperiod on, kalām has developed to become a scholastic and dogmatic theology taught in religiousschools (madrasas).

5. Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, known as Imām al-H. aramayn (d. 478 AH) (see Juwaynī 1995,15–25).

6. Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī was born in 722/1322 in Taftazan in Khorasan, in north-east Iran, and died inSamarkand in 729/1390. He wrote in the fields of tafsīr, fiqh, us.ūl, grammar, logic and ʿilm al-kalām.

7. Al-Taftazānī interprets the teachings of his teacher al-Ījī and those of mutakallimūn, particularly Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

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