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A icl

9 Fighting LawfareOur enemies are increasingly using lawsuits to tie up U.S. re-

sources and sway world opinion. While lawfare presents unique

challenges, this article proposes tactics and lessons learned that

can help tactical commanders adapt to the threat.

16 Civil Affairs Support to the SurgeThe 95th CA Brigades support to the surge in Iraq demonstrates

CAs capability to support conventional forces and yields lessons

for units conducting civil-military operations.

24 Meeting the StandardsTraining in Special Forces advanced skills is highly sought-af-

ter, yet every year, prospective students arrive for training only

to be turned away because they are not quali ed or ready. To

save time and money, the unit responsible for conducting SF

advanced-skills training explains how units and Soldiers should

prepare before they arrive.

DepArtments

4 From the Commandant

5 Update

28 Career Notes

30 Book Reviews

ON THE COVERA member of the

96th Civil Affairs Bat-talion shares photos

of his family withIraqi children. The96th CA Battalion

was in Iraq to sup-port the Surge.U.S. Army photo

2

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Special WarfaSpecial WarfaCommander & Commandant

Major General James W. Parke

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorJanice Burton

Graphics & DesignJennifer Martin

WebmasterEva Herrera

16

e-mail:[email protected]

Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a speci c operation should be reviewed for security through the authors chain of command.

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America is ghting an enemy that is tenacious and adaptable.

As we take the ght to them, they alter the way they operate. We

know that the special-operations Soldiers we train are just as

tenacious and adaptable as our nations enemies. Its our job to

make them even more so a job taken seriously by the military

and civilian team at the Special Warfare Center and School. Feed-

back from commanders and Soldiers in the eld, often showcasedin this professional journal, allows us to look at the operating en-

vironment and adapt our training and doctrine to keep our forces

the most effective unconventional warriors in the world.

Over the past three years, we have updated record amounts

of Army special-operations forces doctrine and put every aspect of

training at the school house under a microscope. Weve examined

not only the content of our training but also the method in which

we deliver it. It is our goal to provide the very best training in the

world to the Soldiers we know we are sending into harms way.

In this issue of Special Warfare , Captain Peter Dungan

explains how insurgent and terrorist forces around the world at-tempt to use the U.S. legal system against our forces as a means

of diverting resources, tying up commanders time and swaying world opinion against U.S. actions. The emerging

asymmetric tactic, lawfare, poses problems for commanders at all levels. The lesson learned is that it is essential

that commanders include the JAG in planning, consider the legal aspects and rami cations of their operations,

and maintain the support of the local populace.

Another lesson reiterated time and again from the eld is that Civil Affairs cannot be conceived and executed

only upon the completion of combat operations. CA forces must be included in the planning process for combat

operations and beyond. In his article, Major Ross Lightsey discusses how 95th Civil Affairs Brigade plans and

operations were a key component in successful conventional-force operations in Iraq during 2007. The 95ths

capabilities to provide nonlethal options helped their supported units achieve mission success and win/maintain

popular trust and support.As the operational environment has changed, so have many of the skills required of special-operations forces

warriors. As mentioned above, the center and school continues to update old courses and develop new curricula to

meet this need. The Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations quali cation courses have all been

transformed during the last two years and are producing entry-level ARSOF Soldiers in the numbers and qual-

ity required by the force. As these battle-proven troops return from the ght, it is essential that we consider and

develop their graduate-level skills. This issue of Special Warfare contains a helpful guide that explains available

courses and the prerequisites for Soldiers to attend. Many of these courses have been redesigned in response to

battle eld lessons learned. Soldiers and commanders who want to improve their professional capabilities and

those of their unit should nd the enclosed primer to be a helpful summary for preparation and attendance.

At no time has ARSOF been called upon to shoulder a heavier load. Your ability to adapt and succeed has

become your hallmark. At the center and school, we are working hard to match your creativity, meet your trainingrequirements and bolster your success on the battle eld.

Major General James W. Parker

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Colonel Darsie D. Rogers Jr. accepted com-mand of the 10th Special Forces Group fromColonel Kenneth E. Tovo during a ceremony atButts Army Air eld, Fort Carson, Colo., Nov. 29.

Tovo had commanded the group since2005 and through two combat tours in supportof Operation Iraqi Freedom as the commanderof the Combined Joint Special Operations TaskForce Arabian Peninsula.

During the traditional change-of-commandceremony, Tovo passed the group colors andthe responsibility of the units Soldiers to Major

General Thomas R. Csrnko, commander of theUnited States Army Special Forces Command.After a few words of congratulations, Csrnkopassed the colors to Rogers, who returnedthem to group Command Sergeant MajorCharles Sekelsky.

You are in charge of taking care of thisgreat organization, the Soldiers and theirfamilies, Csrnko said to Rogers during hisremarks. Be prepared to deploy into combatand succeed.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner,

commander of United States Army Special Op-erations Command, and former 10th SF Groupcommanders Brigadier General Charles Cleve-land, commander of Special Operations Com-mand-South, and Brigadier General MichaelRepass, commander of Special OperationsCommand-Europe were also in attendance.

I could think of no better officer thatI could have passed the colors to today,said Tovo, who praised the work of the 10thSF Group.

The Soldiers in this group have made a

strategic difference in the war on terrorismin Iraq, Africa and Afghanistan, Tovo said.Regardless of the location, 10th SpecialForces Group warriors have fought heroically,risking their lives to protect our way of life. Ithas been my honor to serve beside each of youin the 10th Special Forces Group, and it wouldbe my privilege to ght alongside any of you inthe future.

As we continue to ght around the globe,I challenge you to carry on the 10th SpecialForces Group tradition of high standards,

discipline and courage, he said, and live andie our motto De Oppresso Liber.

Rogers previous assignments includedetachment commander, company com-mander, battalion operations of cer, battalioncommander and executive of cer with the 10SF Group; as well as SOF observer/controllethe Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort PolLa.; staff of cer for the deputy director of Spcial Operations, the Joint Staff, Washington,D.C.; and executive of cer to the commandingeneral of United States Army Special Opera

tions Command. He is a veteran of OperationDesert Storm/Desert Shield, Operation ProviComfort, peacekeeping operations in Bosniaand Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Rogers has masters degrees from Loui-siana State University and the Air War Colleand is a graduate of the Joint and CombinedWar ghting Course and the Army Commandand General Staff College.

Tovos next assignment will be with theUnited States Army Special Operations Command, based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Rogers takes command of 10th Sf group TakiNg COmmaNd Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo relinquishes command to Colonel Darsie D. Rogers during a Nov. 29 ceremony at Butts ArmyAir eld, Fort Carson, Colo. U.S. Army photo.

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Language Institute announces updates to DLPT V testThe Defense Language Institute, or

DLI, has announced release dates for newor revised tests for four of the languages in-cluded in the Defense Language ProficiencyTest V, the test used by the Department ofDefense to test the language skills of itsSoldiers and civilians.

DLPT has long been used by DoD to mea-sure language pro ciency and assign ratingson a scale that indicates a persons level of

uency in reading, speaking and understand-ing. DLPT V, which DoD began using in 2006,is a computer-based test that uses contentfrom a variety of subject areas to measurethe reading and listening skills of its users.

Release dates for the new and revised

tests are as follows:Modern Standard Arabic. In September

2007, the Defense Language Institute pulledthe Modern Standard Arabic DLPT V as thetest of record, pending an external review.As of Dec. 3, 2007, the external review hasbeen completed, and DLI has implementedthe changes recommended during the review.Validation of the new DLPT V for Arabic isscheduled to be complete by early spring, andthe test will be re-implemented not later thanMay 2008.

Persian Farsi. Pending an externalreview, the DLPT V for Persian Farsi isscheduled to be released not later thanSeptember 2008.

French. The DLPT V for French is sched-uled to be released before the end of June 2009.

Korean. The Korean DLPT V is scheduledto be released by early summer 2009.

In the future, all DLPT V tests will receivean external review before they are implement-ed as the DoD test of record.

Soldiers can get more information on theDLPT V by visiting the DLI Web page: http:// www.dli c.edu/ or by visiting their command-language-program training facility. Informationis also available from Terry Schnurr, the U.S.Army Special Operations Commands sustain-ment program manager, at [email protected] or Rusty Restituyo, USASOC contingencyprogram manager, at [email protected].

Colonel Sean P. Mulholland ac-cepted command of the 7th SpecialForces Group from Colonel Edward M.

Reeder Jr. during a ceremony at FortBraggs, Meadows Field Dec. 7.As the commander of the Com-

bined Joint Special Operations TaskForce-Afghanistan, Reeder led thegroup through two combat toursin support of Operation EnduringFreedom. Also, during his tenure ascommander, hundreds of the groupsSoldiers were deployed throughoutLatin America and Iraq.

Welcome back to the 7th SpecialForces Group, Major General Thomas

R. Csrnko, commander of the UnitedStates Army Special Forces Com-mand, who of ciated at the ceremony,said to Mulholland during his re-marks. You are the right commanderto lead this unit. We know that youwill not only prepare this unit but alsosuccessfully deploy them in combat.Welcome home.

During his remarks, Reederpraised the groups Soldiers for thework they have done around theworld. Look around the battle eld,Reeder said to the Soldiers who stoodbefore him. Nobody does what youdo, nobody can do what you do, andnobody does it better than you.

Im extremely proud to have beenyour commander, and Im honored tostand amongst your ranks, Reeder

said. You are the greatest ghtingforce on the face of the earth, and be-ing a member of the 7th Special ForcesGroup will always be the height of mycareer.

Mulholland expressed enthusiasmfor his new position. As a team leader17 years ago, I could only faintly hopeto ever become the 7th Special ForcesGroup commander, but by the graceof God, here I am, he said. I feelblessed, honored, humbled, to be incommand of such a superior Spe-

cial Forces unit. In a few months, wewill go back into the breach. You willbe asked again to do the impossiblewithout reservation or hesitation. Wewill get through this as a unit. I lookforward to working with all of you.

Mulholland has extensive experi-ence with the 7th SF Group, havingmoved between several 7th SF Grouppositions and many other assignments.He has served extensively in South andCentral America with the 7th SF Groupand with other units, most recently asthe commander of Special OperationsCommand-South (Forward.)

Mulholland has a bachelors inbiology from the Catholic University

of America in Washington D.C., anda masters degree from the Naval WarCollege in national security and stra-tegic studies.

Reeders next assignment will bewith the United States Special Opera-tions Command, based at MacDill AirForce Base, Florida. USASOC PAO

Mullholland takes helm of 7th sf group

iN COmmaNd Colonel Sean Mulhollandaccepts the colors of the 7th Group fromMajor General Thomas Crnko. Photo by USASOC PAO.

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The United States Army SpecialOperations Command welcomed a newsenior enlisted Soldier Dec. 11 duringa change of responsibility ceremony atMeadows Field.

Command Sergeant Major Parry L.Baer assumed responsibility of USA-SOC from Command Sergeant MajorMichael T. Hall during the ceremony.

Thanks to all of you for allowingme to be the sergeant major I thinkthe command needed, Hall said. Iwas thrilled when Command SergeantMajor Baer was selected for the SpecialForces Command. (He was) the rightman then, and now I can think of noother man I would want to hand myresponsibilities over to than Parry.

Baer, a native of Croswell, Mich.,comes to USASOC after serving as thecommand sergeant major of the U.S.Army Special Forces Command (Air-borne) since April 2006.

He has served in Special Forcesfor the last 27 years, 20 of which werewith the 5th Special Forces Group, FortCampbell, Ky. Baer has participatedin several combat operations through-out his career, ranging from Operation

Desert Storm to the current Global War

on Terrorism.I can say without reservation that

youve (Hall) done more for specialoperations over the past six yearsthan any single predecessor, Baersaid. You always pushed to get thecapabilities that we needed out there

in the eld and took those issues to

the forefront. I want to thank you onbehalf of all the Soldiers in USASOCfor your tireless effort as the USASOCsergeant major.

Hall, the command sergeant majorof USASOC since November 2001, isscheduled to retire after 31 years of

military service.

Baer takes responsibility for usasoc enlisted soldiers

TakiNg REspONsibiliTy Command Sergeant Major Parry L. Baer, incoming USASOC com-mand sergeant major, shakes hands with Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall, outgoingcommand sergeant major during a Dec. 10 ceremony at Meadows Field. Lieutenant General RobertW. Wagner, commander of USASOC, looks on. Photos by Private First Class Anthony Hawkins, Jr.,USASOC PAO.

20th Special Forces group Soldier Earns Silver StarValiaNT sERViCE MajorGeneral William E. Ingram Jr.,the Adjutant General of the N.C.National Guard, pins the SilverStar Medal on Chief WarrantOf cer James B. Herring ofCompany B, 3rd Battalion, 20thSpecial Forces Group, while hiswife Michelle watches. The cer-emony was held at Halifax Com-munity College in Weldon, N.C.Herring received the prestigiousaward for combating insurgentsand leading his patrol of GreenBerets and Iraqi soldiers out of acomplex ambush near Baquba,Iraq, on Dec. 23, 2006. This isthe second Silver Star Medalearned by a N.C. Army NationalGuard Soldier in the Global Waron Terrorism. U.S. Army photo.

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Doctrinal Products Update

Joint and Army Doctrine DivisionFM 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces September 2006FM 3-05.60 ARSOF Aviation Operations October 2007FM 3-05.120 (S//NF) ARSOF Intelligence July 2007FM 3-05.132 ARSOF Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Ops August 2007FMI 3-05.140 ARSOF Logistics February 2007FM 3-05.160 ARSOF Communications Support July 2006

SF Doctrine Division:FM 3-05.20 (C) SF Operations (U) October 2006FM 3-05.701 (C) SF R & E (U) March 2007FM 3-05.201 (S/NF) SF UW (U) September 2007FM 3-05.202 (U) SF FID (U) February 2007TC 31-16 (S/NF) SF Guide to PE (U) June 2007FM 3-05.221 (C) SFAUC (U) July 2006FM 3-05.204 (C) SF SR TTP (U) October 2006FM 3-05.214 (C) SF Vehicle Mounted OPS (U) October 2006

CA Doctrine Division:FM 3-05.40 CA Operations September 2006FM 3-05.401 CA TTP July 2007GTA 41-01-001 CA Planning and Execution Guide January 2008GTA 41-01-002 CA Arts, Monuments and Archives February 2007GTA 41-01-003 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance March 2005GTA 41-01-004 Joint CA Planning Guide September 2007GTA 41-01-005 Religious Factors Analysis January 2008GTA 41-01-006 Working with OFDA October 2007

CA Reference CD January 2008STP 41-38A-14 CA Specialist Soldiers Manual and Trainers Guide January 2008

Collect ive Task Exportable Package December 2007

PSYOP Doctrine DivisionFM 3-05.301 PSYOP Process TTPs August 2007

ST 3-05.303 MTP for the PSYOP Product Development Co. October 2007ST 3-05.302 MTP for the Tactical PSYOP Co. October 2007STP 33-37II-OFS Of cer Foundation Standards II, July 2007ARTEP 33-712-MTP MTP for HHC of the PSYOP Group and Battalion April 2006GTA 33-01-001 PSYOP Leaders Planning Guide November 2005

do go o wa wi h ou da d doc iRecent changes in doctrine have

resulted in a series of updated man-uals. To ensure that you are keeping

with the approved doctrine, pleasecompare your current manuals withthe following list.

The following is a list of theArmy special-operations forces field manuals and other doctrinal

products most recently released bythe doctrinal and training divisionsof the JFK Special Warfare Center

and Schools Directorate of Train-ing and Doctrine.Many of these versions are avail-

able through the Reimer DigitalLibrary (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/), Army Knowledge Online, the

U.S. Army Publishing Director-ate (http://www.usapa.army.mil/),the ARSOF Training and Doctrine

Library (https://portal.soc.mil/C1/C18/ARSOF%20Doctrine%20Library/default.aspx) and the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and Schools AR-SOFU Web portal (https://arsofu.army.mil/).

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by Captain C. Peter Dungan

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While it is not a new concept, lawfare has becomean especially important method of warfare used by ourenemies in the war on terrorism. A popular de nition of lawfare is the one developed by the United States Councilon Foreign Relations: A strategy of using or misusing lawas a substitute for traditional military means to achievemilitary objectives. 1

The enemy uses lawfare as an asymmetric means of abusing our complex legal system to tie up resources, shiftmomentum and, most importantly, sway world opinion tohis cause. Examples of lawfare include habeas corpus law-suits by terrorist detainees and complaints to internationalorganizations regarding violations of the Law of ArmedCon ict, or LOAC.

Some legal engagements, such as the Supreme Courtdetainee cases, actually seek to change the rules that gov-ern how our forces ght on the battle eld. Most instancesof lawfare, such as the more than 400 habeas corpus law-

suits led by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,2

simply seek to harass and burden our legal mechanisms.Like a computer virus or a hackers denial-of-service attackon a network, meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a halt.

Lawfare in its most visible form engages U.S. forceson the strategic level of warfare. Supreme Court battlesand complaints through organizations like Human RightsWatch seek long-term effects on a global scale. Insurgentsalso use lawfare at the operational level of war to seek me-dium-term effects against a theater or regional command.For instance, insurgents often use puppet local leaders to

complain of cially about a particular tactic or procedureused by a brigade combat team or regional command. Thismay serve to change an operational-level commandersdecision-making calculus or to turn local opinion in a par-ticular theater against a command.

Recently, insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan havebeen waging a legal battle against tactical-level forces toextend the lines of operation of their leaders lawfare ef-forts and to attempt to blunt Americas tip of the spear.For instance, detainees may make claims of abuse at thepoint of capture by indigenous forces, claim abuse againwhen transferred to an American detachment or team, andthen claim abuse once again when they reach the deten-tion facility of the special-operations task force, or SOTF.Knowing that U.S. forces are duty-bound to investigate allclaims of detainee abuse, insurgents can effectively burdenleaders at three different levels of tactical command withdetailed investigations.

While U.S. doctrine and lessons learned publicationsare addressing the problem of lawfare at the strategic andoperational levels of war, our tactical-level units are onlybeginning to learn how to counter this asymmetric threat.This article proposes tactics and techniques for combating

lawfare, encapsulating lessons learned by the commandand staff of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group,while organized as a SOTF headquarters in southern andwestern Afghanistan from August 2006 to April 2007. Byadapting to the asymmetric threat of lawfare, SOTF-31was able to counter it effectively and keep the insurgencyfrom placing the command in legal paralysis. That allowedSF detachments to concentrate on their core competency:advising and assisting indigenous forces to defeat the in-surgency.

Identi ying the threatAs stated previously, lawfare at the tactical level may

not be as visible as those aspects of legal warfare thatmake the news. Indeed, the commander of a detachment;advanced operating base, or AOB; or SOTF may be en-gaged on the legal battle eld without even realizing it. Forexample, during SOTF-31s tour in southern Afghanistan,

a detachment commander detained someone who seemedto be a relatively unimportant individual carrying contra-band. Within an hour of transporting the detainee to thedetachment rebase, the detachment commander receiveda phone call from the local police chief demanding thedetainees release.

The seemingly unimportant detainee turned out to bean unof cial local leader who was well-liked (or feared)by the town but previously unknown to the detachment.The police chief threatened that unless the detainee wasreleased, he would tell organizations like the United Na-tions Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, and

the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, orAIHRC, that the Americans were abusing the detainee.The chief also threatened to have a rabid crowd of towns-people massing at the rebase gate decrying the Americans abuses. Although the detachment commander thoughthe was simply detaining a small-time gun-runner, he wasunwittingly being thrust into the lawfare arena.

At the tactical level, lawfare engagements by the enemytend to fall into a few basic patterns. The most commoncharge leveled against American forces at the tactical levelis detainee abuse. Intercepted Taliban communications,captured documents and interviews with jailhouse infor-mants at theater-level facilities con rm that it has becomeTaliban standard operating procedure to claim abuse everytime a detainee moves from one facility to the next. Usual-ly, the claim is leveled during initial inprocessing into the

eld detention site or SOTF detention facility, either duringthe initial medical examination or during the rst inter -rogation. Intelligence indicates that Taliban leaders knowAmericans must fully investigate claims of abuse leveledby detainees, and that those leaders also know or suspectthe potential burden those inquiries place on a commandstime and resources.

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As American units have learned to deal with allega-tions of detainee abuse, the enemy has adapted histactics, techniques and procedures to maintain a relevantand credible lawfare threat. For example, Afghan enemycombatants have virtually stopped claiming abuse byAmerican Soldiers and instead are charging Afghan forcesaccompanying Special Forces with beatings and physical

torture.Taliban detainees know that claims of abuse by Afghan

soldiers are more credible because of the perceived relativelack of respect for human rights by the Afghan military.The enemy also knows that SF Soldiers are required to in-vestigate claims of abuse by the forces they advise and as-sist. The ever-present duty to investigate, coupled with theperceived increased credibility of the allegation, directlyincreases the amount of time an investigator will likelyhave to spend validating or discounting charges of abuse.

While most allegations of detainee abuse are leveledby the detainees themselves, some charges of beatingsor torture come from international organizations or theindigenous government. The fact that the internationalmedia have greatly sensationalized some of the perceivedabuses and rights violations at Guantanamo Bay and theactual abuses at Abu Ghraib means that the enemy canuse these organizations to lend credibility to allegationsthat would normally be too implausible to forward. Forinstance, during SOTF-31s recent deployment, the task-force commander received a complaint forwarded by higherheadquarters from UNAMA. It alleged that an SF team rap-pelled from a eet of unmarked black helicopters onto a

rooftop, broke through the roof into the house of a memberof the AIHRC, blindfolded that individuals entire family,tied their hands together with detonation cord, placed atime fuse on the det-cord, threatened the family thatthey would activate the fuse if anybody tried to move, andthen quickly left the house, leaving thousands of dollars of property damage in their wake.

Notwithstanding the fact that multiple higher and adja-cent headquarters had full visibility on our operationsand knew that we had no forces in the area in which thecomplaint alleged the abuse had taken place, and thefact that the complaint, on its face, looked like it had beentaken out of a Tom Clancy novel, the burden fell on SOTF-31 to answer the mail. Properly responding to the allega-tion diverted two days of time and resources away fromthe command group, operations center and legalsection that could have been better spent supportingcombat operations.

Countering the threatAccording to the Armys new counterinsurgency man-

ual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency , tailoring the design of the counterinsurgency task force may very well be themost important aspect of countering an insurgency. 3 Proper task organization is essential to countering theinsurgencys lawfare efforts at the tactical level. Havingthe right people in the right place, performing the righttask, is essential to getting ahead of false allegations andmedia mistruths. SOTF-31s efforts in task organizationinvolved actions on several levels, including staff embed-

THiNk TaNk Proper task organization is essential countering the insurgencys lawfare efforts at the tactical level, whichmeans have the right people in the right place, at the right time. U.S. Army photo.

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ding, rebase combined operations, coalition involvementand engagement, and direct involvement by the task-forcecommander. The commanders leadership in crafting andmodifying the task forces organization is often the mostimportant aspect of the process.

At the staff level, the legal section is tasked with manag-ing the task forces day-to-day efforts to combat lawfare.The SOTF judge advocate and paralegal NCO are integralmembers of the SOTF staff and advise the command on alllegal aspects of current and future operations. Althoughhistorically referred to as a special staff member, the SOTFjudge advocate has increasingly taken on operations-staff functions to provide added value and integrate himself intothe task force. In Afghanistan for instance, the SOTF judgeadvocates serve as of cers in charge of detainee operations,actually managing detainee operations instead of simplyadvising other staff members on their legal implications.SOTF judge advocates write operations reports, make rou-

tine decisions on the movement of detainees, and managethe establishment and maintenance of detainee facilities.The location of the SOTF judge advocate is critical.

Traditionally, a unit judge advocate maintains his of ce inthe unit administrative area. However, this arrangementis inadequate for responding quickly to lawfare offensives,such as public allegations of LOAC violations. Hours count;

often the rst side to reach the mainstream media wins theability to publish its version of the truth. A judge advo-cate cannot respond adequately if he is buried in a cubiclereviewing reports. SOTF-31 made it a practice during its

rst tour in Afghanistan to place the judge advocate in theoperations center, or OPCEN, so that he could provide in-stant guidance for current operations. That location provedinvaluable during SOTF-31s most recent deployment.

For example, one night, a detachment commandercalled the OPCEN by satellite phone seeking authorization

to bomb a compound suspected of holding a large contin-gent of armed Taliban ghters. Sitting next to the battlecaptain, the author talked to the commander and advisedhim to request additional imagery assets and further de-velop the situation before engagement. The commander fol-lowed this advice, and after several hours of developing thesituation, he became reasonably certain of the occupants hostile status and the low probability of collateral damage.Ordnance was dropped and the target was destroyed.

The enemy quickly ramped up his lawfare efforts andmade various allegations of LOAC violations. Although

Afghan of cials originally validated the claims, they, thecoalition partners and the mainstream media sourceseventually agreed that the allegations were false. One of thekey factors cited by the various investigating was the factthat the detachment commander talked to the SOTF judgeadvocate via telephone before dropping ordnance. That op-portunity would have been missed had the author not beenin the right place at the right time, performing the righttask.

Properly resourcing the legal section is key to suc-cess in the lawfare arena. This applies to personnel andequipment. Traditionally, judge advocates have beenpermanently assigned only to the group headquarters. 4 If a forward operating base, or FOB, was geographicallydetached from the group headquarters, an Army Reservejudge advocate was given the assignment. The 1st Battal-ion, 3rd SF Group, was the rst SF battalion to eld a full-time, active-duty judge advocate. The experiment proved

successful, and today all SF battalions eld active-dutyjudge advocates.Having an experienced paralegal NCO has also proved

invaluable. For instance, although SOTF-31s judge advo-cate was new to the unit and to Afghanistan, the paralegalhad been in the unit for three years and was on his thirddeployment. The paralegal was able to provide the judge

advocate and the rest of the staff with invaluable institu-tional memory and operational experience.

Resourcing the legal section with adequate equipmentis essential to the units counter-lawfare efforts. In the OP-CEN, the judge advocate must be able to monitor classi edmessage traf c, intelligence reports and open-source newsreports to stay ahead of the enemys lawfare operations.This requires access to dedicated secure and nonsecurecomputer workstations inside the OPCEN. On two occa-sions, the author was able to monitor news reports on the

Internet about an LOAC violation or an abuse allegationbefore the operational detachments themselves were awareof them.

He was then able to communicate with the detachmentsinstantly via a secure network to advise them and beginworking on a plan to counter the allegations. These detach-ments were able to engage Afghan leaders and persuadethem to agree publicly that the allegations were false, elimi-nating the need for the unit to conduct lengthy, resource-intensive investigations.

In addition to the OPCEN duties, the judge advocate has

t y us s s sy c s o bus ouco p x sys o up sou c s, s o u d,

os po y, s y o d op o o s c us .

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traditional duties, such as legal assistance and administra-tive law review, that require an of ce outside the OPCEN.Indeed, many state bars might consider a judge advocateguilty of malpractice if he counseled Soldiers within ear-shot of others or maintained legal-assistance les outsideof a lockable of ce.

While the judge advocate maintains primary responsi-bility for day-to-day counter-lawfare operations, other staff sections also play a key role. Some staff sections, like theS3, are traditionally located in the OPCEN and can there-fore integrate seamlessly with the judge advocate. DuringSOTF-31s most recent deployment, it was common forthe judge advocate to meet with the S3/OPCEN director10 times or more during a single day regarding separateissues.

Other staff sections have a less traditional but equallyimportant role. For example, SOTF-31 established a posi-tion for a liaison of cer, or LNO, from the PSYOP task

force of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan so that their PSYOP messages and operationscould be synchronized with SOTF-31s operations. Such aposition was not authorized, but the command recognizedthe need and lled the position out of hide. The arrange -ment proved invaluable: The PSYOP of cer was able todraft messages and have the Afghan media release theminstantly after every major operation. Other key staff mem-bers included coalition LNOs from all countries conductingspecial operations in the area, as well as LNOs from federalagencies. Coalition LNOs were able to verify the falsehoodof Taliban abuse allegations instantly and communicate it

to their home countries. LNOs from federal agencies, suchas the U.S. Agency for International Development, wereable to provide the task force with key contacts and groundtruth essential in countering charges of LOAC violations.

The central driving force behind the design and con-stant re-design of the task force is the commander. No taskforce ever has enough people or equipment. It requirescommand vision and involvement to prioritize positionsand energize higher and adjacent headquarters to ll them.For example, SOTF-31 was not authorized any LNOs fromcoalition partners, federal agencies, or PSYOP and CA unitssharing our battlespace. It required constant commander-

to-commander engagement to ensure that the right person-nel manned the OPCEN not only during major operationsbut also during the day-to-day operations, when abuseallegations by the Taliban were most likely to pop up.

The commander also energizes the staff and subordi-nate units to respond properly when the enemy conductslawfare against the task force. When allegations of detaineeabuse or violations of the rules of engagement, or ROE, en-ter the OPCEN, the reputation and combat effectiveness of the task force are on the line. By being personally involvedin the response efforts and placing the nger in the chest

of the right staff of cers and subordinate commanders, thetask force commander can ensure that the unit properlyand truthfully responds to lawfare engagements in minutesinstead of hours or days.

Documenting the truthMilitary units rely on honesty and integrity as a bedrock

on which to base the exchange of communication. A sub-ordinate commanders word is assumed to be the truth un-less proved otherwise. Units rely on verbal reports to satisfya variety of information requirements. Unfortunately, in thelegal arena, a persons word is often useless unless backedup by suf cient evidence. A unit cannot simply tell higherheadquarters that it did not raid a particular site or didnot abuse a speci c prisoner; it must be able to prove it,as well. Indeed, Army Regulation 15-6 requires investigat-ing of cers to base ndings of fact on suf cient evidence. 5

This means that in order to discount abuse allegations, an

investigating of cer must be able to support that ndingwith either documentary exhibits or corroborating swornstatements.

Documenting operations, especially at the lowest level,highlights a key difference between special-operationsforces and conventional forces. Because of the high levelof training, maturity and operational experience of specialoperators, they are usually less likely to lose discipline andcommit ROE violations or detainee abuse than convention-al Soldiers. However, because special operators are used tothinking outside the box and departing from a checklistmentality, SOF Soldiers are sometimes less likely to docu-

ment the fact that they are in compliance with all policiesand procedures.

Further compounding this is an unfortunate percep-tion by some conventional-force commanders that specialoperators, because of the fact that they are not strictly regi-mented, somehow lack the discipline to remain in compli-ance with various ROE or LOAC requirements. Thus, somecommanders are inclined to agree to launch time-consum-ing, resource-intensive investigations that rob SOF units of their operational momentum.

To combat that institutional inclination to investigate, theSOTF must be able to produce documentation within minutes of

an allegation to essentially make any investigation moot. SOTF-31 was able to produce a professional, above-board and com-prehensive investigation into detainee abuse within 12-24 hoursof receiving an allegation, many times having the investigationcomplete before staff of cers at higher headquarters were able tobrief their commanders that an allegation even existed.

Developing that capability requires proper equipment andstrict adherence to documentary requirements. Every detach-ment at every rebase must have access to a scanner, digitalcamera, and secure-network connection to the OPCEN. Thedetachment cannot wait to send a detainees paperwork out on

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the next ight to the FOB; waiting even 48 hours can mean theenemy will win the lawfare battle regarding a particular allega-tion. The detachment must use these tools to properly docu-ment its actions.

For instance, every operational detachment was required tophotograph detainees and perform a documented medical ex-amination and immediately send the les via secure network tothe judge advocate. Later, if the detainee claimed abuse by ourtask force, we were able to instantly e-mail the documents andrefute the allegation.

Other skills are essential to properly documenting thatoperations are conducted in accordance with policies andprocedures. All operators must be pro cient in executing swornstatements. The sworn statement, usually produced on a DAForm 2823, provides the best method of providing a legitimateand legally binding document of eyewitness testimony.

Unfortunately, Afghan and Iraqi authorities are likely todismiss sworn statements by anyone who is not a Muslim.

Therefore, units should also make it standard procedure tosecure statements from indigenous soldiers accompanying theU.S. force. Additionally, OPCEN personnel should keep a readyelectronic archive of operational products, such as past concepts

of operation, situation reports, operations reports, and force ar-rays, ready to allow higher headquarters and, when appropriate,coalition partners and outside agencies, to rapidly respond tobogus charges of abuse.

Getting the truth outSimply packaging products for higher headquarters is not

suf cient to ght the lawfare battle effectively. In order to retainthe high ground, the tactical-level unit must be able to mar-ket its story effectively to the populace and the internationalmedia. When a higher headquarters takes 48 hours to issue anapproved press release, that is 47 hours too long. Aggressiveinformation operations conducted using the SOTFs organic andattached assets are key to maintaining the momentum in thelawfare ght.

The following example highlights the IO lawfare challengesthat SOTF-31 faced during its deployment and the proceduresit developed to combat them. The detachment commander citedabove dropping ordnance on a con rmed Taliban compoundconducted a sensitive-site exploitation the next day. Unfortu-

nately, his team discovered three dead civilians under a tentthat had been hidden from the view of multiple imagery assetsairborne at the time of engagement. The team immediately re-ported the fact to the OPCEN.

Within hours, the Taliban lawfare machinery ramped up itsoperations. That afternoon, a leader of the local parliament toldthe press that SF had killed more than 100 unarmed civiliansthat night. The erroneous reports made network newscasts asmain stories before SOTF-31 and higher headquarters had achance to respond. More than four investigations arose fromthose news reports; investigations by higher headquarters, coali-tion forces and the Afghan government. All of them concludedthat the bombing was justi ed, that the casualty count wasmuch lower than initially reported, and that the bombing, whileresulting in unfortunate casualties, was a classic case of a bal-anced and measured response that took every effort to minimizecollateral damage.

Within a couple of weeks, media organizations printed small

retractions, but the damage was done. Whatever the facts were,the local populace and the world were left with the impressionthat SF were indiscriminately bombing civilians. More impor-tantly at the tactical level, SOTF-31 was undergoing the most

intense of its 10 investigations in its rst two months in theater.Recognizing that the enemys lawfare efforts were severely

burdening the resources of the command group and staff, theSOTF-31 commander decided that the unit needed to seize theinitiative in information operations, or IO. He placed the S3/OPCEN director in charge of spearheading an IO crisis-manage-ment group that would meet during any lethal event. The work-ing group consisted of the S3, plans of cer, current operationsof cer, judge advocate, PSYOP LNO, Civil Affairs LNO, S2 andthe AOB commander from the province in which the operationtook place.

This group executed a rehearsed battle drill that included thefollowing tasks: First, the group met to craft a message, decidingwhich facts were key to emphasize. Often, because of his experi-ence in dealing with the media and local Afghan leaders, theSOTF commander crafted all or a portion of the message, withthe advice of the working group.

Second, the message was then pushed back down to thecommanders of the AOB and the detachments. The AOB com-mander would meet with the governor of the affected province

fighting lawfare

i o d o ou d, c c - v u us b b o ks s o y c v y o popu c d o d . w

d u s k s 48 ou s o ssu pp ov d p ss s , s 47ou s oo o . a ss v o o op o s co duc d us SOtfs

o c d c d ss s k y o o u .

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to tell his side of the story before that leader was engaged by theTaliban. Simultaneously, the operational detachment would,as soon as the tactical situation permitted, hold a shura withvillage elders to discuss what had happened and come to anagreement on the facts.

During these events, the judge advocate and current-op-erations of cer were gathering documentary evidence to feedto higher headquarters and preparing unclassi ed versionsfor coalition partners and the media. The judge advocate alsoprepared for any investigations that might develop despite the IObattle drill. The plans of cer and the PSYOP LNO further re nedthe message and immediately released it to the Afghan mediafor dissemination to the populace. Because of regulatory andtimeline restrictions, using the Afghan media instead of organicassets like our own PSYOP teams that had to follow approvedmessages was the most ef cient way of disseminating messages.

The CA LNO would then plan follow-on humanitarian as-sistance for the area affected by the strike. Throughout this

process, the S3 and SOTF commander conducted high-leveltalks with Afghan government leaders and senior leaders of thecoalition and U.S. forces. As a result of the new IO strategy,during the SOTFs remaining time in country, it did not haveto conduct a single investigation that resulted from a bogus al-legation by the Taliban. Any time a reporter would approach anAfghan leader to con rm an allegation fed by the Taliban, thatleader would respond that SF acted appropriately, and the storylost momentum before it was ever printed.

Indigenous capacityThe most important element of ghting an insurgency is

developing the indigenous armed forces ability to ght and win.After all, this ability is the ticket home for U.S. and coalitionforces. SOTF-31s efforts to develop that indigenous capabilityfocused on providing training and assistance to partnered unitsat the brigade-staff level. The judge advocate was key in theprocess.

Early during its deployment, SOTF-31 recognized a markeddecrease in the ability of its partnered units to plan and conductbattalion- and brigade-level operations, as compared to that ob-served during previous deployments. This included the inabilityof the Afghan National Army to respond effectively to allegationsof abuse or LOAC violations.

A major cause of this was staff of cers who were not properlytrained in the military decision-making process and other keystaff tasks. SOTF-31 also assessed that while embedded trainingteams, or ETTs, were making headway in training company-level troops, ETT staff-of cer mentors did not have the timeavailable to properly mentor staff of cers, including the Afghanlegal adviser, at the brigade level.

SOTF-31 established a staff-assistance program that part-nered staff of cers, including the judge advocate, with counter -parts in the ANA brigade. The judge advocate was able to meetweekly with the ANA brigade-legal adviser to supplement the

monthly training meetings conducted by the ETT judge advo-cate. Thus, SOTF-31 was able to extend the lines of operationof the ETT and provide tactical-level experience to the ANA legalstaff. With ANA legal advisers better able to respond to law-fare engagements by the Taliban, SOTF-31 noticed a markeddecrease in the number of abuse allegations. The task forceattributed the decrease to an increased capability of the indig-enous force to quash the allegations before they gained visibilityof U.S. forces.

ConclusionThe lawfare ght is one of many important lines of opera -

tion that the SOTF must consider in developing and executingits campaign plan. Units that properly prepare to combat theenemys lawfare efforts experience increased freedom of maneu-ver and increased leader resources to spend on the core missionof assisting the indigenous military in taking the ght to theinsurgency.

Units that ignore the lawfare battle see their time andresources consumed by unfounded investigations. During its re-cent deployment, SOTF-31 applied lessons learned to effectivelyneutralize the tactical lawfare threat in its area of operations. Byorganizing properly to ght the lawfare battle, documenting itsactions carefully, winning the IO battle through swift messagedissemination and training up an indigenous counter-lawfarecapability, a tactical-level unit can stop investigations beforethey start.

Notes:1 Council on Foreign Relations, Law are, the Latest in Asymmetries,

Transcript o Proceedings, March 18, 2003, on http://www.c r.org/publicathtml?id+5772 (last visited Feb. 2, 2008, on fle with author.)

2 Warren Richey, New Lawsuits Challenge Congresss Detainee Act,The Christian Science Monitor , Oct. 6, 2006.

3 Field Manual 3-24,Counterinsurgency , para. 4-28 (Dec. 2006).4 Field Manual 3-05.230,Special Forces Base Camp Operations , appendix D

(July 2003).5 Army Regulation 15-6,Procedures or Investigating O fcers and Board

O fcers , para. 3-10b (Oct. 2006).

Captain C. Peter Dungan currently serves as the bat-talion judge advocate for the 1st Battalion, 3rd Spe-cial Forces Group, and he has deployed to Afghani-stan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Heholds a bachelor of science degree from the UnitedStates Military Academy and a juris doctor degreefrom the University of California at Los Angeles. Hisprevious assignments include claims judge advo-cate; aviation battalion S2, with duty in Kosovo; andattack helicopter platoon leader, with duty in Bos-nia-Herzegovina.

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Ca SUPPOrt tO COnVentiOnal UnitS in the SUrge

In the spring of 2007, the United States Army SpecialOperations Command was called upon to support the surgein Iraq with Civil Affairs forces. It employed the newly-formed 95th CA Brigade to support conventional brigadecombat teams, or BCTs, in Iraq. The CA missions there insupport of civil-military operations, or CMO, were crucial,

and national attention would be directed at their suc-cesses and failures. In the end, the 95ths support to CMOachieved the commanders intent and demonstrated CAscapability, strategic utility and exibility as a member of Army special-operations forces and yielded valuable lessonsregarding CMO.

Combating insurgents in Iraq is complicated and contin-ues to evolve. De ning the role of the 95th CA Brigade andits Civil Affairs teams, or CATs, in an area of such turmoilis complex, primarily because of the dif culty in conduct -ing CMO, whose requirements vary from province to prov-ince. When direct-combat counterinsurgency operations areongoing, the planning and execution of Civil Affairs mis-

sions may appear to be questionable: Why should we starta road-paving project when insurgents destroy the roads?Why open a police station when potentially corrupt authori-ties may well use it for their personal gain? Why conduct acooperative medical exercise when the doctors may very wellbe ambushed or threatened?

Those questions are representative of the challenges toCMO in combat areas. Despite the dif culties of accomplish -ing CMO in a nonpermissive setting, they are a valuableresource that can help quell the violence and insurgentactivity in Iraq.

BackgroundThe vast majority of U.S. CA forces are found in the U.S.

Army Reserve, in units assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Af-fairs and Psychological Operations Command. The smallpercentage of CA forces on active duty, assigned to the U.S.Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, provides arapid-deployment capability; highly trained, tactically skilledARSOF Soldiers; and a history of achieving success in work-ing with combined, joint special-operations task forces, orCJSOTFs.

Because of increased CMO requirements in the GWOT,the Army activated two new active-duty CA battalions inMarch 2007. Prior to that, the Armys only active-duty CAbattalion was the 96th. At the same time the 97th and the98th were activated, the 95th CA Brigade was activated asa headquarters for the three existing battalions. A fourthbattalion, the 91st CA Battalion, is scheduled for activa-tion later this year. All four active-duty CA battalions will beregionally oriented, and all are scheduled to be fully opera-tional by the end of scal year 2008. There are also plans toactivate a fth CA battalion with the activation of the U.S.Africa Command.

In Iraq, the 95th CA Brigade supported the surge byoperating with conventional Army units. The 96th CA Bat-talion supported units from the 2nd Infantry Division, the

3rd Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 82ndAirborne Division. Most of the 96ths companies deployed tothe Baghdad area, attaching their teams to units at the BCT and battalion levels.

The authors team supported the 2nd Squadron, 1stCavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division; a

Fort Lewis, Wash.-based reconnaissance, surveillance andtarget-acquisition squadron. Our area of operations, or AO,was near Baqubah in the Diyala Province. The commanderof the 2-1 Cavalry Regiment knew both the importanceof CMO and CAs capabilities, and we worked to meet hisintent.

Tactical strategyUsing CA capabilities to a strategic advantage required

creativity. Our strategy was to provide the ground truthof the civil situation to the commander of the 2-1 Cav andadvise him of his civic responsibilities. By interacting withleaders and key players in each town the spheres of in u -

ence, or SOIs, CA Soldiers could assess the human terrainand furnish the commanders of battalions and BCTs withthe information they needed to make their operational deci-sions.

For example, we were able to provide ground truth onthe attitudes of local nationals toward coalition forces byconducting civil reconnaissance immediately after cordon-and-search missions. During a cordon-and-search opera-tion, it is critical that coalition forces maintain a balancebetween civility and aggression. CA teams help to ensurethat balance, and by conducting daily SOI engagements,they can gain the peoples respect and help maintain theirtrust.

It became standard operating procedure for the CAteams to conduct dialogues with the populace followingcordon-and-search operations and to provide commanderswith immediate information. Frank discussion is criticalto gaining truthful and time-sensitive information. For themost part, the Iraqi people are eager to engage in discus-sions regarding their towns infrastructure, their securityconcerns, the U.S. presence, etc.

Experienced and dedicated CATs can greatly enhancerapport between the ground forces and the Iraqi citizens.During the summer of 2007, there was a major offensivecampaign, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, focused on push-ing al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, out of Baqubah, the provincialcapital of Diyala province. During the operation, the 96thsCA Soldiers supported conventional forces by:

Providing face-to-face interaction with local leaders andthe populace.

Making themselves approachable to the public bybuilding rapport.

Coordinating immediate cash pay-outs for damages. Negotiating temporary rental agreements for coalition-

forces occupation. Gaining in uential and popular support by providing

immediate medical care.

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Providing quick-impact projects to jump-start localeconomies.

Providing limited humanitarian assistance to Iraqicitizens in need.

Once cavalry and infantry forces had searched and occu-pied populated areas, CATs began conducting SOI engage-ments to gain rapport with the local villagers. Over the pastfew years, conventional forces have become good at gainingfeedback from the populace. However, when commanders

are conducting chai sit-downs, it takes them out of theght. Todays commanders know the importance of dealing

with the populace, but they also have a unit to manage. CAcan help commanders focus on security, tactics and ma-neuvers by conducting the interactions and providing dailybrie ngs to the commanders on the civil situation.

Lethal vs. nonlethal operations . Conventional forces havelearned CAs versatility, particularly in averting combatoperations. In one instance, the 96th helped avert a poten-tially large-scale lethal operation on a suspected stronghold.The CAT conducted civil reconnaissance in a town thatwas planned for a forced occupation. The CA team discov-

ered the town was productive, cooperative and receptive tocoalition forces. At rst, the locals were leery of the teamspresence it was their rst interaction with the U.S. Army.During the teams second visit, the locals warmed up tothe teams presence and engaged in positive dialogue. CAplanned and conducted humanitarian aid missions de-livering meals and much-needed water. We elevated theposition of the mokhtar (mayor) by having him assist in fooddistribution to his people. The gesture gained the peoples

trust in our peaceful intent, and they became even morefriendly and receptive to coalition forces.

We used our CA medics on a daily basis to treat U.S.soldiers during combat operations and to provide aid toin uential leaders and the public. CA medics are typicallytrained in the Special Operations Medical Course at the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School. Their skills allow CATsto deploy and operate independently without a signi cantmedical infrastructure. These highly trained and seasonedNCOs give CA much more exibility and local impact thanstandard Army medics. For example, our CA medic advisedseveral local-national doctors on ways of improving their

wiNNiNg REspECT A medic attached to the unit provides medical care for an Iraqi child. U.S. Army photo.

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clinics and hospitals.When combat units become heavily engaged and com-

mitted to the ght, it is easy to forgo CMO and focus onlethal operations. In those cases, CMO plays a secondaryrole, but if CMO falls completely by the wayside, command-ers could lose their connection with the Iraqi people, whomight reject U.S. and Iraqi government interests in favorof the insurgents. Thus, it is imperative that a maneuvercommander dedicate a platoon to accompany a CAT ondaily SOI engagements, CMO and other related CA tasks de-signed to separate the populace from the insurgency.

If coalition forces neglect to build upon their newly

founded relationship with the people, then AQI will step inand build its own relationship. Power in Iraq moves throughinterpersonal relationships, and AQI knows the importanceof maintaining interpersonal connections with the populace.During Operation Arrowhead Ripper, AQI activities includedits own version of meeting the needs of the people.

There is a proverb that says, Bread bears no name.If AQI provides bread to the people of Iraq, and we do not,then to the people, AQI appears to be relevant and benevo-lent. We know of AQIs atrocities and its hidden agenda, butdo the people?

Movement around the batt lefeld. Movement on the bat-

tle eld was by far the biggest problem for us to overcome.Traditional CMO tasks infrastructure improvement, civilmanagement, humanitarian actions and key-leader engage-ment require freedom of maneuver. In some cases, CATsblended into combat operations and proved bene cial; how -ever, it is extremely dif cult to carry out CMO tasks whenIEDs, small-arms re and ambushes are ever-present.

The 96ths CA teams were used to operating in thecompany of a small SF detachments. That makes the CAmission set of conducting civil reconnaissance fairly easy,because members of the populace are more prone to acceptmembers of a small contingent. But they are less likely

to accept CA teams who are travelling in convoy with thelarger contingents of conventional units, especially whenthose units are in the business of clearing homes ratherthan sitting down and talking. To lessen the intimida-tion, the CA team leader would usually greet leaders withsmiles, handshakes, waves and a welcoming posture. Theteam sergeant would behave similarly, but he was moreinvolved with internal security, internal communications,contingency management and maintaining overall situ-ational awareness.

Power vs. force. The platoons that support civil recon-naissance usually perform outer-security duties walking


gROuNd TRuTH A Civil Affairs Soldier talks with village youth while on patrol. The team is able to gain ground truth by their interaction withthe villagers. U.S. Army photo.

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around the houses, up and down streets and displayingpower rather than force. Displaying power vs. force can beas simple as having all security measures in place but alsoconducting low-key interaction with curious locals. Thesecurity platoons avoid distraction by continually mov-ing around the secured area, which prevents their beingswarmed by children or crowds that can lower their guardagainst insurgent attacks.

DIME principleCommanders in the 21st-century Army are familiar

with the DIME principle that diplomatic, informational,military and economic factors are key to in uencing other

nation-states and recognized factions. CMO can assist com-manders in accomplishing all four of the DIME factors.

Diplomatic. CA units are highly trained in regional rela-tions, cross-cultural relationships and in arbitration andmediation between warring factions. Reconciliation meet-ings are the best tools for bringing together warring factionswithin a battalions sector to establish a peace plan. Thesecan serve as a micro-scale diplomatic model.

Informational. CMO can best be used as part of an infor-mation-operations campaign aimed at the populace. MostIraqi ideological views are formed through word-of-mouthcommunication rather than from published media.

Military. The U.S. military currently dominates anyhead-to-head conventional operations in Iraq. Tacticallyspeaking, no organized insurgent forces larger than a squadwill directly engage U.S. patrols or bases. At the same time,CATs typically do not conduct direct offensive operations.

Economic. The U.S. dollar can be the most effective in-strument in the ght against terrorism, if it is used success -fully. When used ef ciently, CATs and provincial recon -struction teams have the overwhelming monetary power toin uence economically depressed areas and to jump-startlocal economies.

Infuential key leadersIt is crucial that CATs and commanders conduct their

terrain-analysis knowing the human element priorto their deployment to a given area. The foundation of Iraqisociety is the family and its ties to the community. Iraqisociety has witnessed many changes because of the variousregimes that have controlled the tribal communities.

Al-Usrah (the family). The family is the main pillar of Iraqi society. In accordance with Islamic doctrine, the fatheris the head of the family and has the authority to make allfamily decisions.

Qabeelah (tribe). The tribe is composed of manyasheerahs (multiple, blood-related families), but the con-

ON Call A medic from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion checks the health of an Iraqi child. By meeting the physical needs of the populace, CivilAffairs Soldiers are able to earn popular support. U.S. Army photo.

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nections within the tribe are not as strong as within theasheerah, because they may not be blood connections.

Sheik (tribal head). The sheik, the head of the tribe, dealswith all issues concerning daily life, as well as economic,social and war-and-peace issues. The sheik mediates con-

icts, exerts in uence within the tribe and can even wieldin uence at the national level. It is common for Iraqis tocall any respected man in the community a sheik, and thatloose usage of the term can be confusing. Nevertheless, weaccommodated and honored them by calling them sheiks.

Mokhtar (mayor). This is the primary SOI gure thatCATs and maneuver units encounter. The mokhtar is muchlike the chief of the village. Although he also records places

of residence and births, he is not like a sheik, because heis sometimes appointed by the government to control thecivic affairs of the village. He has an of cial capacity in thegovernment, whereby he can make some decisions andjudgments.

In our area of operations, we encountered one sheik. Hewas in uential and af uent, and his words carried greatpower within his personal sphere of in uence, which in -cluded at least 250 Iraqi key leaders and village mokhtars.He probably in uenced more than 50,000 Iraqis. DuringCOIN operations, a CAT can bridge the gap between thesheik and the commander. The continual interaction will in-

crease the ow of dialogue and greatly bene t conventionalforces interests.

Key leader reviewThe Analyst Notebook Program, or ANP, serves as an

aid to the CAT in organizing its contacts with key leaders orSOIs. The ANP is essentially a database. We consolidatedcontact information and standard biographical data. Ona daily basis, the unit staff would approach us to get lo-cal-leader information in preparation for a key event. Thesystem proved so bene cial that we constructed maps thatincluded leader photos and quick-reference information.The data in the ANP proved bene cial in conveying the po -

litical landscape.

Neighborhood watch programAnother nonlethal approach that CATs helped develop

was the formation of a neighborhood-watch programthroughout Iraq. The neighborhood-watch program is com-posed of concerned local citizens who are frustrated withextremists such as al-Qaeda and Shiite extremists. Theyare not vigilantes but Iraqis who want to reclaim their townsand volunteer to help stop the violence, shootings and kid-nappings. Most of the violence in Iraq is Arab-on-Arab, oftenin retribution for acts committed decades or centuries ago.


HumaNiTaRiaN aid Deliveries of food supplies and water helped gain the trust of the populace in the peaceful intent of U.S. forces and madethe people more receptive to working with the coalition. U.S. Army photo.

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HidE aNd sEEk A concerned local citizen looks inside a culvert for signs of hidden improvised explosive devices during a joint clearing opera-tion with Iraqi National Police and U.S. Army Soldiers. U.S. Army photo.

There are some caveats to observe when forming neigh-borhood-watch groups. First, we insisted that they refrainfrom calling themselves a militia. Second, they were notto engage in any offensive actions; they were only to protectkey infrastructure in their towns. Third, they were to af rmthat they would join the Iraqi police after the neighborhood-watch program expired. As part of protecting the key towninfrastructure, they would operate tactical checkpoint op-erations at critical intersections to hinder AQI and extremistmovement along the routes into their towns.

There are risks inherent in arming locals; however, ouroptions were limited, and we had to rely on non-vetted

locals to take charge of their towns. At some point, we mustrely on the locals who want to reclaim Iraq and help stopthe insurgency, by arming them and expecting that they willdo the right thing. This is a grass-roots approach.

The neighborhood-watch program is extremely suc-cessful and is quickly becoming effective throughout Iraq.When starting a program, it is extremely important to traingroup members on ethics, checkpoint procedures, weaponsreadiness, uniform clari cation, friendly- re mitigation andcommunications planning.

It is also important to note that conventional forces

neither arm nor support rogue elements that are not sanc-tioned by the government of Iraq.

ConclusionThe CATs from the 95th CA Brigade were resourceful

in providing CA exibility and adaptability to conventionalforces throughout Iraq. CATs engaged key leaders, assistedwith neighborhood-watch programs, assisted command-ers in CMO and helped incoming reserve-component CATstransition to supporting the surge BCTs. Through theiractions, the CATs demonstrated the capability of all Civil Af-fairs forces to operate successfully with conventional forces

and to provide numerous nonlethal options to an otherwiselethal operation.

m jor Ro F. l ht e is assigned to the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand. Major Lightsey has served in officer as-signments in Infantry and Special Forces, and heis a 2007 graduate of the Civil Affairs QualificationCourse. He has served tours in Iraq in support ofOperation Iraqi Freedom, as well as numerous toursin the Balkans.

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Meeting the StandardsPreparing for Advanced Skills Training

One of the hallmarks of Army spe-

cial-operations forces are their highlydeveloped skills, and their advancedskills put an even keener edge on thetip of the spear.

Ranging from advanced shootingskills, military free-fall, combat divingand close air support to intelligenceand information operations, advancedskills enhance the abilities of ARSOFSoldiers to ght, survive and prevailon the battle eld. Advanced skillsare taught by the 2nd Battalion of the JFK Special Warfare Center andSchools 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup.

Slots in advanced-skills coursesare highly sought-after, but given theoperational tempo of the units in the

ght, units occasionally send Sol -diers who would bene t from furtherpreparation prior to enrollment. Tobe successful, in the career-enhanc-ing professional-development coursesoutlined below, Soldiers must seekand units must afford an appropriateamount of time and effort to meet-ing speci ed prerequisites. Whenin doubt about the preparation and

documentation outlined below, unitschools NCOs are encouraged to con-tact the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School for clari cation.

Company ACo. A conducts two advanced-skill

training courses: Advanced SpecialOperations Techniques, or ASOT, andthe Special Forces Intelligence Ser-geant Course, or SFISC. Graduates of these courses are capable of plan-ning, directing and supervising intel-

ligence activities, combat operations

and collateral activities from the SFdetachment level to the uni ed-com -mand level. SFISC is taught at FortBragg, N.C.; ASOT is taught at FortBragg and at Fort Lewis, Wash.

SFISCPrerequisites: Students must be

active- or reserve-component SpecialForces enlisted personnel in the rankof E6 or E7.

Special instructions: At class in-processing, students must have theirmedical records and a memorandumfrom their security manager, dated

not earlier than 30 days prior to theclass start date, verifying their secu-rity clearance.

ASOTPrerequisites: Students must

be graduates of the Special ForcesQuali cation Course or SEAL Quali -

cation Course in the rank of E6-E8,W1-W3 or O2-O4 and have a vali-dated mission requirement.

They must have at least two yearsof SOF experience at the tactical

level; i.e., SF detachment or SEAL platoon. At the time of in-processing,service members must also have aletter from the rst O5 in their chainof command certifying that they havecompleted a USASOC-validated LevelII training program.

Special instructions: Candidatesmust be U.S. citizens and have atleast a secret clearance. The 1stSWTG S2 will verify all clearances,and individuals without a veri edclearance will not be admitted into

the course. Candidates must have a

valid state drivers license.They must be assigned to or

on orders to a two-year utilizationassignment that requires ASOT Level III. Candidates must also beairborne-quali ed, on jump statusand able to participate in airborneoperations.

Company BCompany B trains ARSOF and

other Department of Defense per-sonnel in the Military Free-FallParachutist Course, or MFFPC;the Military Free-Fall Jumpmaster

Course, or MFFJMC, and the SpecialOperations Terminal Attack Control-ler Course, or SOTACC. It conductstraining at Fort Bragg and at YumaProving Ground, Ariz.

MFFPCPrerequisites: Students must be

active- or reserve-component DoDpersonnel in the rank of O1-O3, W1-W3 or E3-E9, DoD civilian personnelor selected allied personnel. Theymust be assigned to or on orders to

a military free-fall coded position.Requests for exceptions to the abovemust be endorsed in writing by the

rst O5 commander in the applicantschain of command.

Applicants must be quali edmilitary static-line parachutists andcannot weigh more than 240 pounds.They must have a current ClassIII ight physical examination, inaccordance with AR 40-501, datednot more than two years before thecourse completion date.

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They must report with completemedical records, including a cur-rent Physiological Training Record,High-Altitude Parachutist Initial (AF

Form 1274; AF Form 702, Navy Form1550/28-NP-6 card; or USAAMC AAForm 484).

Special instructions: InitialMFFPC training in the vertical windtunnel is conducted at Fort Bragg,with follow-on training at Yuma Prov-ing Ground. Students itinerary willbe from their home station to FortBragg to Yuma Proving Ground anda return to their home station or thenext duty assignment. Students must

provide their own transportation toand from the Yuma airport.

MFFJMC

Prerequisites: Students must beactive- or reserve-component of cers,warrant of cers, NCOs or enlistedpersonnel of the U.S. military ser-vices, or selected students of alliedforeign countries. They must be as-signed to or on orders to a militaryfree-fall position.

Students must already havecompleted a static-line jumpmastercourse and a military free-fall para-chutist course that are recognized

by SWCS. They must have served asa military free-fall parachutist for atleast one year and have completedat least 50 military free-fall jumps.They must be rated Military Free-fallParachutist Level III IAW USASOC350-2, 27 September 01. They musthave a current class III ight exami -nation, IAW AR 40-501, dated within

ve years of the course completiondate, if they are on military free-fallstatus. Students must have a cur-rent Physiological Training Record,High-Altitude Parachutist Initial(AF Form 1274; AF Form 702; NavyForm 1550/28-NP-6 card; or USAA-MC AA Form 484). Their weight can-not exceed 240 pounds.

Special instructions: Students orders must state that they are at-tached to Co. B, 2nd Bn., 1st SWTG,for the purpose of attending theMFFJMC. Their itinerary will be fromtheir home station to Yuma ProvingGround and a return to their homestation or to the next duty assign-ment. Students must provide theirown transportation to and from theYuma airport. Co. B will providetransportation to and from the dailytraining events.

SOTACCPrerequisites: Students must be

male, active- or reserve-componentof cers, warrant of cers or NCOswho have at least one year of expe-rience in an operational unit. Theymust be assigned to or on ordersto an SF detachment or the RangerRegiment. Students must not haveany medical condition, such asdyslexia, that would prohibit themfrom performing the duties of a jointterminal air controller.

Company CCo. C trains SF and other U.S.

SOF, DoD and U.S. governmentpersonnel in three courses: theSF Combat Diver QualificationCourse, or SFCDQC; the SF Com-bat Diving Supervisor Course, orSFCDSC; and the SF Diving Medi-cal Technician Course, of SFD-MTC, Training is conducted at theKey West Naval Air Station, Fla.

ON THE liNE A student at the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course calls inre over the Arizona desert. Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt.

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SFCDQC

Prerequisites: Students must bemale service members of units of theU.S. Special Operations Commandand must be assigned to or on ordersto an authorized combat-diver posi-tion. Students must ful ll the fol -lowing requirements IAW AR 611-75Management of Army Divers , Para-graph 2-18: Meet the medical tnessstandards of AR 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness , Paragraph 5-9, withthe examination completed within24 months of the course completion

date, and ensure that DD Forms 2808(Report of Medical Examination) and2807-1 (Report of Medical History) aresent to the CG; USAJFKSWCS; Attn:AOJK-OP (G3); Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610. Students must pass a PT testthat requires at least 52 push-ups;62 sit-ups; seven forward-grip pull-ups; a two-mile run in 14 minutes, 54seconds or less; a 500-meter open-water swim in BDUs using a side orbreast stroke; and a 25-meter sub-

surface swim. Students must present

a memorandum signed by the rstO5 in their chain of command statingthat they have passed all the PT re-quirements. The memorandum mustbe dated within six months of thestart date of the SFCDQC. Completionof the PT requirements must also beveri ed in writing by the individualsunit commander. Students must passan oxygen intolerance/hyperbaricchamber pressure equalization teston the rst day of the course, in ac -cordance with the requirements of AR

40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-9W.

SFCDSCPrerequisites: Students must be

graduates of the SFCDQC or theBasic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Course and in the grade of E6 orabove. They must have a current SFdiving physical examination, in ac-cordance with the requirements of AR40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness ,Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-9, completed

within 24 months of the course

completion date. Students must havetheir medical records and originals of the physical-examination documentson the day of course in-processing.

They must pass a physical- tnesstest conducted in accordance withthe provisions of FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Training, consisting of at least52 push-ups; 62 sit-ups within a two-minute period; and a two-mile runcompleted in 14 minutes, 54 secondsor less for all age groups, IAW AR611-75, Management of Army Divers ,

Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-19B. Stu-dents must report with a certi cationthat they have passed the physical-

tness test signed by a commander inthe grade of O5 or higher.

Special instructions: Studentsmust be pro cient in the use of divetables and in the theory of divingphysics and diving physiology. Theywill be given a written test on the rstday of the course, covering subjectstaught in the SFCDQC.

reqUiSite reqUirementS

ON dECk Students at the Underwater Diving Facility workout on the pool deck. U.S. Army photo.

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SFDMTCPrerequisites: Students must be

male, active- or reserve-componentDoD enlisted personnel. They mustbe quali ed SF or Ranger medics whohave graduated from the Special Op-erations Combat Medic Course, U.S.Navy SEAL corpsmen, U.S. Air ForcePara-Rescue medics or other DoDmedical personnel assigned to or onorders for duty as SOF medics.

Candidates not on dive statusmust pass an initial SFCDQC physi-cal examination completed not morethan 24 months before the start dateof the scheduled SFDMTC, IAW AR40-501, Paragraphs 5-9 and 8-14a(7).Candidates on dive status must havea current SFCDQC physical exami-nation completed not more than 36months before the start date of theSFDMTC, IAW AR 40-501, Paragraphs5-9 and 8-14a(7).

All candidates must report to in-processing with their medical recordsand original DD Forms 2808 and2807-1. They must have passed anArmy Physical Fitness Test within sixmonths of the course completion dateand administered IAW the provisionsof FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Train- ing , Chapter 14, and they must have

scored at least 70 percent in eachevent according to the 17-21 year-old standards, regardless of their age[AR 611-75, Paragraph 2-18d(2)].They must pass a swim test consist-ing of swimming 300 meters usingany stroke [AR 611-75, Paragraph2-18D(3)]. Students must report forin-processing with a certi cation thatthey have passed the AFPT and swimtests signed by their unit commander.

Students must pass an oxygenintolerance/hyperbaric chamber pres-

sure equalization test on the rst dayof the course, in accordance with therequirements of AR 40-501, Chapter5, Paragraph 5-9W.

Company DCo. D trains SF Soldiers in ad-

vanced combat techniques and trainsSF and other SOF personnel in snipertechniques. Its two courses: the Spe-cial Forces Sniper Course, or SFSC;and the Special Forces Advanced

Reconnaissance, Target Analysisand Exploitation Techniques Course,or SFARTAETC, are taught at FortBragg.

SFSCPrerequisites: Students must be

active- or reserve-component of cersin the grades O1-O3, SF warrant of-

cers or enlisted personnel in gradesE4-E8, who are SF- or Ranger-quali-

ed and assigned to or on orders toan SF detachment or Ranger com-pany. Selected DoD personnel mayalso attend.

During class in-processing, stu-dents must have a memorandumfrom their security manager verify-ing that they have at least a secretsecurity clearance. No interim secu-rity clearances are allowed. Studentsmust also have their medical recordsand a psychological evaluation(MMPI or CPI) administered within 12months of the class start date.

Students must have quali ed asexpert with the current service ri ewithin six months of the class startdate, as certi ed in writing by theirunit commander. They will have topass a diagnostic shoot, ring ve

ve-round groups from 25 meters, in

the prone supported position, us-ing the current service ri e with ironsights. To pass, three of their ve-round groups must be equal to or lessthan 1 1/4 inches in diameter.

Students must not have a medicalpro le that would prohibit participa -tion in training, and they must not betaking any medications that might af-fect their re exes or judgment. Theirvision must be correctable to 20/20in each eye, and they must be onjump status and able to participate in

airborne operations.

SFARTAETCPrerequisites: The U.S. Army

Special Operations Command G3 se-lects Soldiers to attend SFARTAETC.Eligibility is limited to SF enlistedSoldiers, warrant of cers and of cerswho are assigned to speci c SF units.Students must have orders assigningthem to the designated unit or have amemorandum from their group com-

mander or command sergeant majorverifying that they will be assignedto that unit following the course. Thememorandum must also verify thatthe Soldier has completed at least oneyear on an SF detachment. This canbe waived by the commanding generalof the Special Forces Command.Students must meet the height andweight standards outlined in AR 600-9. They must have their medical re-cords with them at in-processing, andthey must not have a medical pro lethat would prohibit their participationin training.

Students must have quali ed asexpert with the M-4 ri e and M-9pistol within six months of the coursestart date and have a memorandumsigned by their company commanderverifying their score. During in-pro-cessing, students must qualify asexpert with the M-9 pistol. If theyfail to qualify as expert, they will bereturned to their parent unit.

Special instructions: At classin-processing, students must havea memorandum from their securitymanager verifying that they have atleast a secret security clearance. Nointerim clearances will be allowed.Clearances will be veri ed during

in-processing, and students withoutvalid clearances will not be allowed tobegin training.

WaiversAny variations from the above

listed standards for any of the cours-es require a waiver from the CG,USAJFKSWCS. All waiver requestswill be sent to: Commanding General;USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-OP (G3);Fort Bragg, NC 28319, no later than45 days prior to the class start date.

For more information, call theS3, 2nd Bn., at DSN 239-4011 orcommercial 910-432-4011. Courseprerequisites, packing lists and otherhelpful information may be obtainedfrom the candidates battalion schoolsNCO.Soldiers can also downloadcourse information from the ATRSSCourse Catalog, located at www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/, or on the USA-SOC portal at USAJFKSWCS/1ST SWTG(A)/2ND BN.

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EnlistedEnlisted

ke n eve o ento t on r wO th

to cceThe newly released DA Pam

600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Man-agement , de nes career pathsfor SF warrant of cers, clari eskey and developmental positionsthroughout the SF warrant of cerscareer and serves as a basis forestablishing further guidance andpolicies.

Notable changes in the latest

revision of the pamphlet include therequirement that all active-compo-nent CWO 3s complete the War-rant Of cer Advanced Course, orWOAC, prior to promotion to CWO4 and that all active-componentCWO 4s complete the Warrant Of -cer Senior Course, or WOSC, priorto promotion to CWO 5.

The changes do not apply towarrant of cers in the Army Na-tional Guard. In the ARNG, CWO2s must complete the WOAC tobe eligible for promotion to CWO

3, and CWO 3s must completeWOSC to be eligible for promotionto CWO 4.

SF warrant of cers are encour-aged to attend WOAC and WOSCas soon as they are eligible, sothat they will be competitive forpromotion.

All SF warrant of cers are en-couraged to visit the Army Publish-ing Directorates Web site to viewand download a copy of the revisedDA Pam 600-3 (http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdf les/p600_3.pdf).

aRsOF NCO ho re refor ro ot on o r

The scal-year 2008 SergeantMajor/Command Sergeant MajorPromotion-Selection Board will meetJune 3-24. Master sergeants whowill be considered for promotionshould begin updating their recordsand ensure that their DA photo isup-to-date.

While the board will give specialconsideration to civilian education,the greatest single determinant forpromotion is operational experienceand performance. For more infor-mation or assistance in updatingtheir records, Soldiers should con-tact their S1 or personnel servicesbattalion.

The 2009 Master SergeantPromotion-Selection Board will meetAug. 5-28 rather than in October.The change is due to the eldingof the Defense Integrated MilitaryHuman Resources System in Octo-ber. With the continuing increasedoperational tempo, Soldiers shouldkeep their Of cial Military Person-nel Folder, DA photo and EnlistedRecord Brief updated as part of acontinuous process.

Taking care of records while notdeployed pays dividends by ensur-ing that a selection board will seea Soldiers true picture. The selec-tion-board schedule is available

on the Army Human ResourcesCommands Enlisted Selections andPromotions Web page: https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/En-listed.htm.

For additional information, tele-phone Sergeant Major Jeff Bare atDSN 239-7594, commercial (910)432-7594, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

sche e ch n e for ct v t onof ne sF tt on

The schedule for the activation ofa fourth battalion in each of the SFgroups has changed. The 4th Bat-talion, 5th SF Group, will still activatein August, and the 4th Battalion, 3rdSF Group, remains scheduled foractivation in August 2009. However,the 4th Battalion, 10th SF Group, isnow scheduled for activation in Au-gust 2010; the 4th Battalion, 1st SFGroup, is scheduled for activationin August 2011; and the 4th Battal-ion, 7th SF Group, is scheduled foractivation in August 2012.

Ca NCO e efor re-en t ent on

Under the Bonus Extension andRetaining program, some NCOs inCareer Management Field 38 (Civil

Affairs) are eligible for re-enlistmentbonuses. Soldiers in the rank of ser-geant are eligible for a bonus of up

to $15,000; staff sergeants are eli-gible for $10,000. The Critical SkillsRe-enlistment Bonus for sergeants

rst class and master sergeants isstill pending approval by the Of ceof Secretary of Defense.

For more information on the bo-nuses, Soldiers should co

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