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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

MISSION REPORT

WASHINGTON D.C. AND MIAMI, FLUNITED STATES

26-29 JANUARY 2016

www.nato-pa.int April 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Despite the blizzard shutting down major portions of the United States’ eastern seaboard, the Defence and Security Committee (DSC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited Washington, D.C. and Miami, Florida from 26 to 29 January 2016. Nicole Ameline (France) and Michael R. Turner (United States) led the delegation in both Washington and Miami respectively. Clear priorities for the large delegation of 40 legislators from 19 NATO member states were the major issues facing the Alliance today, but throughout all of the high-level briefings, all sides agreed that in such a diverse threat environment, a strong transatlantic link remains vital.

2. In Washington, meetings focused on US NATO policy in the run up to the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The Warsaw Summit is seen as a key meeting for the Alliance in terms of meeting the pledged deliverable of the 2014 Summit in Wales and continued efforts to adapt the Alliance to the rapidly evolving European security environment. NATO is considered to be in a critical transformative era facing two distinct challenges to the east from Russia, and to the south as conflict and state failure are sowing discord in the form of refugees and terrorism inside of Europe. High-level officials of the US Defense and State Departments briefed the delegation on US priorities for the summit, their views on U.S. reassurance and deterrence efforts in Europe, as well as its evolving policy in the Middle East, particularly the military campaign against Daesh.

3. The delegation worked around a snow storm-induced US Government shutdown to salvage an abridged program of its planned meetings with the US Departments of State and Defence, as well as The Brookings Institution from 26 to 27 January. Members continued in Miami for the following two days for briefings at US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Coast Guard Air Station (Miami), Homestead Air Reserve Base, and US Coast Guard Station Miami where they were joined and led by NATO PA President, Representative Michael R. Turner (R-OH).

II. POLITICAL CLIMATE

4. At the start of the meetings with State Department officials, Nicole Ameline noted: “NATO is, at its heart, a collective security organization: Its continued existence today is testimony to its relevance and importance. To continue to be the strongest political-military alliance in the world, all member states must focus their energy and resources on the NATO Alliance once again. Europeans and North Americans alike must understand the importance of a strong transatlantic security alliance, as no single member can handle all of the challenges we face alone.” Chairwoman Ameline’s opening statement set a clear tone for the visit: the NATO Parliamentary Assembly believes in the vital importance of the solidarity of the transatlantic security community and invests a significant amount of its annual programme working to not only maintain but strengthen this relationship.

5. Tradition has it that the DSC kicks off its annual programme with a visit to Washington, D.C. and a US or Allied military installation in January. The Committee is focusing on three principal subjects this year for its reports: The implementation of the Wales Summit pledges and the prospects for Warsaw; the future role of naval forces in NATO; and, the international military campaign against Daesh. The Committee is also writing a Special Report on the continued progress of Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan and the progress of security sector reform in the country. As such, much of the briefings and focus of the meetings in Washington centered on these topics.

6. Both State and Defense Department officials made it clear to the delegation that NATO remained a clear priority for the United States, but that officials at all levels had a strong desire to see European Allies do more. High-level briefers noted that the United States is consistently reviewing its security investments in Europe to assess their readiness to handle any and all challenges facing the Alliance today. Still, they cautioned that the persistent transatlantic capability

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gap and the general fatigue with this reality. In many ways, the United States made it clear to the visiting delegation of European lawmakers that the United States would like to see a kind of European Reassurance Initiative to match the efforts it has been making since 2014 to demonstrate its continued commitment to its European allies.

7. The perception and challenging realities of a new and evolving European security environment drove briefings dominated by and discussions filled with mutual concern about a steadily worsening security situation to the east, south, as well as inside Europe. A common theme among the briefings and discussions were the calls for renewed solidarity and the push for a 360 degree approach to security.

8. As DSC Chairwoman, Nicole Ameline noted: “The transatlantic community of shared values, goals, and ideals has never been as threatened as it is today. As we know, in Europe there is a complex range of security challenges not just facing the eastern and southern flanks of NATO, but at home as well. My country, France, knows this all too well after the devastating terrorist attacks of 2015. Solidarity in the face of this new security reality is, therefore, essential.”

III. STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS

9. Despite the snowstorm-imposed government shutdown, the international secretariat and the State Department were able to salvage the afternoon’s programme. Unfortunately, the morning’s breakfast on Capitol Hill with the US delegation, the briefings by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the discussion with Senator John McCain were cancelled.

10. The afternoon’s briefings started with Lawrence R. Silverman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (DASD). The Committee had asked DASD Silverman for a briefing on the US counter-ISIL campaign and US priorities to push the Syrian war towards constructive peace talks. Silverman started by discussing the immediate diplomatic focus of the State Department vis-à-vis Daesh and Syria: the upcoming meeting of the Counter-ISIL coalition in Rome on February 2, and the subsequent donor conference for Syrian refugees and neighbours on February 4.

11. Silverman stressed to the delegation that, on the military side of things, the most effective way to rollback ISIL (in Syria or Iraq) for the US-led coalition was to lead a multi-pronged fight. Specifically, Silverman called the strategy “fighting along every leading edge”; which implied hitting Daesh everywhere, simultaneously as a means of avoiding a ‘whack a mole’ suite of tactics. This would lead them to be disrupted in their activities, he noted, and force them to retreat from their offensive efforts.

12. The US-led coalition would continue to include persistent airstrikes as well as to train, advise, and assist measures being taken on the ground with local forces. Silverman said Northeast Syria focus was a particular focus, from where US-trained and advised coalition forces on the ground would push west. Further, in the northeastern Syria, he continued, the United States is supporting Syrian Democratic Forces as they move to isolate Daesh in Raqqa – particularly important was the effort to restrict Daesh militants’ movement across the Euphrates river, and between Syria and Iraq.

13. As the Russian air campaign continued to intensify throughout the winter, Silverman continued, the campaign to push west had been significantly complicated. As such, the United States was working to be certain that high-level US and Russian military commanders in theater were able to ‘deconflict’ the competing West-East air campaigns over the skies of Syria.

14. Silverman lamented the reality on the ground that, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the Syrian regime in Damascus was not really focusing its military efforts against Daesh. The reason

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for this he noted was the direct benefits the regime received from the continued existence of Daesh in northeast Syria. He noted the realities of the wartime economy, wherein there was a relatively high-level of economic interdependence existing between the regime in Damascus and Daesh: the most basic level being the regime’s dependence on buying oil from the terrorist group, as well as continuing to pay the salaries of government officials trapped within the territory under Daesh’s control.

15. Regarding the Syrian peace talks, Silverman noted the United States supports the UN process under the leadership of Staffan de Mistura. Unfortunately, the long-term prospects of moving the High Negotiations Committee toward substantive talks and, therefore, progress on the ground, he said, is not looking very positive, as the HNC was still deciding whether or not to attend the peace talks. Ultimately, he concluded, the goal is a sustainable ceasefire, which has, however, the possibility of being disrupted by numerous spoilers on the ground.

16. When noting US efforts to mitigate the humanitarian disaster caused by the Syrian civil war, he noted that: “Only in the last couple of weeks have we seen some progress, and then again, the limited progress has been seen in only a few hard-to-reach areas.” Silverman continued by explaining that there were approximately 12-15 high-risk areas, most of which are under the control of the regime. The United States is encouraging a renewed effort to give aid to not only relief effort in Syria, but particularly those countries in the neighbourhood hosting the millions of IDPs.

17. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq, Joseph Pennington, then addressed the delegation with an overview of the situation on the other side of the Euphrates in Iraq. Mr. Pennington noted straight away that the military angle was the only way forward in Iraq at the moment. He noted that a full 40% of Iraqi sovereign territory that was held by Daesh after Sept 2014 is now back in the hands of the Iraqi government. This is a very positive sign he stated, as the group’s ability to launch offensives was clearly diminishing, putting them principally on a defensive footing in Iraq.

18. Still, Mr. Pennington reminded the delegation that huge challenges lie ahead. The campaign to move up the Euphrates toward the ultimate prize, the liberation of Mosul, will be very challenging at the planning, command and control, and ultimately execution levels. Daesh-occupied Mosul still has in order of about 1.5 million inhabitants and the difficulties of clearing and holding the city, in what will likely be a challenging urban engagement, are clear when considering the still relatively beleaguered state of the Iraqi military. What forces will be able to maintain the territory once it is back in the hands of the central government in Baghdad, he asked rhetorically. The degree of loyalty to the state of Iraq in an increasingly ethnically divided state will be difficult to assess, and only real political level reform will allow for unified military working to secure a united territory.

19. Referring to the environment in which US and partner forces are working to rebuild Iraqi capacity, Pennington noted at least a degree of optimism. There is a huge difference between Iraq and Syria, he said, as the government in Bagdad at least gives the U.S., its partners, and international organizations operating in the state a partner with which to work. The first focus, he continued, is stabilization.

20. Citing concrete examples, he noted that while the recapture and rebuilding efforts begun in Tikrit can be viewed as a relative success, Ramadi and Sinjar remain uphill battles, particularly due to the level of destruction left by Daesh and the ensuing battle to remove them: the damage is enormous. The estimated reconstruction costs for Ramadi are likely to be over $40 million. As a result, the international community will need to commit long-term resources to sustain the rebuilding efforts.

21. The humanitarian scope of the crisis in Iraq, though under-shadowed by its Syrian neighbours, is massive. The needs of more than 3 million IDPs, for example, must be met. This dynamic has the potential of destabilizing the Kurdish region in particular, as they do not have the

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resources to take care of these populations, particularly in the wake of the collapse of their oil revenues.

22. Mr. Pennington discussed the significant political challenges that still lay ahead for the Abadi government. He noted that, given the circumstances, PM Abadi is doing much better, though remains under pressure from a hardline core of Shi’a politicians hemming his margin for political manoeuvre. As a result, it is very difficult for Abadi to deliver services to the various communities within the country as a result; greater integration of the Kurdish and Sunni populations is the only way forward for Bagdad.

23. Encouragingly, he concluded, the willingness to work with Sunnis is present, despite what the perception is in the media. Still, to get there the principal challenge today for Abadi is economic, as the collapse of oil prices is crippling the margin for manoeuvre of the government in Bagdad, as persistent war expenses, a growing number of IDPs, etc. are draining the state’s coffers.

24. A round of questions from parliamentarians from the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey, and the Netherlands ensued. Particularly interesting to the delegation was the continued strength of the Iran-Iraq political link, the role of Saudi Arabia in the destabilization of Iraq, and the degree to which there is a push to engage the Gulf countries as partners in Iraq. A question was also asked about the degree of cooperation and how long the United States intends to leave its forces in Iraq, to which Mr. Pennington replied: “we will certainly leave if we are asked by the government in Iraq, but the U.S. continues to believe in upholding the sovereignty of Iraq.”

IV. US-NATO POLICY IN THE RUN UP TO WARSAW

25. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (PDAS) John A. Heffern followed the presentations by his colleagues’ discussions about the situations in Syria and Iraq. Mr. Heffern focused on the general European security environment and the challenges for the Alliance stressed to the delegation today’s global security environment need for NATO solidarity. PDAS Heffern began his remark by noting the importance of visits of parliamentary delegations to the United States – a key element to maintaining the transatlantic link. Heffern stated outright that solidarity today among NATO Allies was central.

26. While he continued by stating that such a sentiment may sound obvious, bringing it up at an official NATO PA meeting is an important means of repeating what is such a fundamental precept of the Alliance. Heffern reminded the delegation of the time of relative Alliance discord in 2003 during the US military campaign in Iraq, which he noted had a profound impact on NATO consensus at the time.

27. Consensus building, he continued, not only takes place at the inter-ministerial level, but member state legislators are also essential to having a democratic imprimatur of legitimacy. Parliamentarians, he continued, can be the glue of the Alliance working to communicate the necessity of the Alliance to their populations and to work with creating effective government policy toward the Alliance.

28. What now in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, PDAS Heffern asked rhetorically. He noted that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was in Washington a month prior to the NATO PA visit. During his stay, he continued, SG Stoltenberg gave an excellent speech, during which he noted the Alliance must get back to the basics of its core purpose. While the first 40 years focused on collective defence, it spent the subsequent 25 years working on other tasks, namely crisis response and cooperative security. All the while, the Alliance grew in scope and breadth.

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29. Today, he continued, NATO Allies need to do both at the same time. Collective defence and deterrence, while working to hone our crisis response and cooperative security, mean today’s focus should be on 360 degree security. This is another way of saying solidarity is the only way to handle the eastern and southern challenges at the same time. He announced that the Allies have seven main goals today:

1.) Bolster Collective Defense (improve readiness and resilience – each country and as an Alliance – hybrid threats, etc,).

2.) Ensure NATO unity on Russia Policy – while Allies all have different geography, history, and views on Russia, they must remain 28 Allies at the same table. Importantly, he stressed, Ukraine needs to be on the agenda, and it is important to have a NATO-Russia Council meeting in the next few months, during which we must push Russia to honour its Minsk commitments.

3.) Comprehensive Framework for Security in the South – What can be done collectively to handle this range of challenges, he asked rhetorically. Mostly a renewed focus on partnerships, Gulf Cooperation Council cooperation, and capacity building in places like Libya.

4.) Enhance Allied Defense Spending – which remains the key to readiness and deterrence.

5.) Reaffirmation of the Open Door – Maintaining this policy is important, he stressed, as it shows the credibility and endurance of the core ideals of the Alliance.

6.) Deliver on Wales Promises for Partnerships – especially enhanced partnerships in places like Georgia and Ukraine.

7.) Operations – It is important to begin the transition phase for some, and even maintain those as needed, but schedule those due for closure, i.e. Kosovo and the maritime operation in the Mediterranean.

Brookings Institution

30. The following day, despite a continued US Government closure in the morning, the delegation was able to assure its meetings at The Brookings Institution. Steven Pifer, Director, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and Senior Fellow, began the roundtable discussion with an overview of Russia-NATO relations in the wake of the Cold War and the efforts made by the transatlantic community to foster a cooperative partnership with Moscow. Today, he noted, the Euro-Atlantic community finds itself in clear competition with Russia. The degree to which Russia has become “oppositional to all things West is certainly disconcerting.” He concluded his remarks by noting that the theme The Brookings Institution had created for the delegation’s visit was to seek to understand the nature of the security threat posed by Russia to NATO.

31. A Foreign Affairs Specialist and Senior Advisor to NATO in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, began the afternoon’s briefings with a Pentagon perspective of US NATO Policy in the run up to the Summit. He noted that the United States has ambitious goals vis-à-vis the Warsaw Summit as Washington is trying to sow the seeds of a paradigm shift of European understanding of the security environment – moving Allies away from overreliance on the U.S. for high-intensity warfare possibilities.

32. Taking a strong tone when discussing the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), the Department of Defense officials stressed that it was not sufficient. He noted that Allies could not afford to plant any seeds of doubt in the minds of the Russians. Still, he noted that he felt confident that the United States would be able to bring the resources necessary in order to defend against a potential conflict with Russia in Europe. Still, he noted that the European Allies still have a long way to go to be ready for the security challenges they are facing today. In many ways, he noted that Washington was looking for its European Allies to adopt an attitude similar to Washington toward defence.

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33. In her briefing, Constanze Stelzenmueller, the Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Center on United States and Europe, noted that condemning the Europeans was perhaps not entirely fair. She noted that the U.S. still sends a mixed message about its presence in Europe, which, in many ways, encourages co-dependency. She cited the example of Germany, which after WWII and over the Cold War unlearned deterrence and territorial defence due to its move toward pacifism and overreliance on the predominance of the United States in the security of its European Allies.

34. The lack of German readiness, she continued, is evident by the hollowing out of German forces over the past several decades – a trend, that is only halting now. This leaves Germany on an uneven footing vis-à-vis the other major European powers when it comes to defence capabilities. She voiced concern about the overall European ability to handle the challenges of hybrid warfare they are likely to face, noting the example of the reporting of a fabricated rape story that led to an unprecedented level of civil disruption, as the perpetrator was reported to be of immigrant origins. The story had been pushed by Russian news media outlets, which made her question whether or not this qualified as an example of hybrid warfare.

35. The discussion that ensued between the two presenters and the NATO PA delegation was dynamic. Some members thought that the DoD official had presented a view that was perhaps a bit too myopic when considering the breadth of security challenges facing Europe, noting that just advocating a military solution missed the mark a bit. Other members asked for a better understanding of the real threat posed by the modernization of the Russian armed forces. Another question focused on how to think about more efficient Article 4 negotiations, as they were increasingly likely in an era of hybrid warfare. Finally, another member of the delegation reminded the delegation that parsing words and not standing strong together in our resolve to defend ourselves was missing the large, blatant threat facing the Alliance – noting that, like it or not, war is already in Europe (referring to Ukraine).

36. As the discussion turned more toward Russia, another representative of the Defence Department stated that the now-failed Russia Reset policy of the early years of the Obama Administration never predicated that Russia would attempt to establish a sphere of influence. Today, the administration is faced with demonstrating strength and resolve in the face of the regional and global dynamics of Russian military actions. Clifford Gaddy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, at Brookings reminded the delegation that the biggest difference between the Cold War and today, is that the Soviet Union did not want to be in our world order, while President Putin is actually seeking to make Russia a bigger player in it. The United States and its NATO Allies, he noted have significant leverage over Russia today, as it could never survive as an autarky.

37. He cited the military build-up in the Arctic as a compensation for economic weakness, stating that Russia has the relative advantage in the region. He even noted that: “Russia sees the Arctic as an extension of Asia-Pacific and sees it as deeply unstable as the Pacific without a coherent security architecture.” As such, he asked what NATO’s role in the Arctic could be. He concluded by stating Allies have to be very cautious as the High North is characterized by low tensions, and it is in the interest of the Alliance to keep it that way. All the while, NATO must be mindful of the capabilities Russia is developing in the region. He stated that NATO should avoid putting a heavy footprint in the region, and try to steer it in direction of becoming a global commons.

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), US Coast Guard Station, Homestead Air Reserve Base - Miami, Florida

38. Upon their arrival in Miami, NATO Parliamentary Assembly President, Michael R. Turner welcomed the delegation and took over as Head of the delegation. President Turner voiced his pleasure to host such a large delegation of important lawmakers from across the transatlantic security alliance, noting the important work for the Assembly at such a critical juncture for the Alliance.

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39. The United States delegation to the NATO PA devised a programme for the delegation outside of Washington to demonstrate some parallels between the United States’ experience in the Caribbean with various forms of trafficking and migration and that of the problems Europeans are having today in the Mediterranean. As such, the visit in Florida started with US SOUTHCOM where the delegations heard briefings on the command center and its mission.

40. At US SOUTHCOM, members learned the wide area of responsibility of the center and of the vast impacts of global transnational criminal activity and its links with global terrorism and human trafficking. The briefings also discussed the capacity building efforts the United States engages in with its partners in the region. A key element of the briefings and the discussions was the parallel experience in how the United States handles its refugee flows coming through the Caribbean, particularly the flow of Cuban refugees. The various push and pull factors driving trans Caribbean migrant flow can be compared with the Mediterranean at some levels. Briefers discussed the 1995 Cuban Adjustment Act, also known as ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’, which notes that: if a Cuban immigrant lands on US soil, after a parole process, they can stay; if they are interdicted on the water, they will be repatriated.

41. Later in the afternoon, the delegation visited Coast Guard Air Station, Miami. Again the themes of the visit remained consistent wherein they were briefed on Coast Guard responsibilities and cooperation with the DoD, as well as the efforts to mitigate the maritime migration problem in the region. The interdiction, care, and subsequent repatriation process of migrants in the Caribbean was discussed in detail.

42. The delegation was subsequently briefed on the responsibilities of the Homestead Air Reserve Base, shown a static display of some of its available equipment, and was then given a demonstration of the 125 Fighter Wing’s Alert Launch capabilities. The delegation concluded its visit to Miami with a visit to USCG-Sector Miami where they were briefed on the mission and mandate of the base by the Commanding Officer. The delegation was then taken out in Miami Bay on a Fast Response Cutter and given a live interdiction demonstration.

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