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Is Science Marketing?Author(s): J. Paul Peter and Jerry C. OlsonSource: The Journal of Marketing, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 111-125Published by: American Marketing AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1251404

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J. Paul Peter & Jerry C. OlsonScience is analyzed as a special case of market-ing-the marketing of ideas in the form of sub-stantive and methodological theories. The mar-keting mix, target markets, and marketingobjectives are developed for the scientific arena,and a formal analysis of a relativistic/construc-tionist view of science is used to support the ap-proach. This view is contrasted with the positiv-istic/empiricist perspective of science currentlydominant in marketing and other social sciences.Recommendations are offered for improved meth-ods of developing knowledge.

FOR more than 30 years, marketing scholars havedebated whether or not marketing is a science (e.g.,Alderson and Cox 1948, Bartels 1951, Baumol 1957,Buzzell 1963, Converse 1945, Hunt 1976, O'Shaugh-nessy and Ryan 1979, Taylor 1965). The typical ap-proach has been to offer a formal definition of scienceor describe prototypic methods used in science andthen compare marketing's key features and/or its de-velopmental progress against these standards. Despitethese fairly intense analyses, a consensus regardingthe scientific status of marketing has not yet beenachieved. Some believe that marketing is a science,while others believe that although scientific proce-dures are employed in marketing, on the whole, mar-keting is an art. In contrast to these two segments,many other marketing scholars seem to be withhold-ing judgment, perhaps awaiting more compelling ar-guments one way or the other.Although well-intentioned, we believe the debateregarding whether or not marketing is a science has

J.Paul etersAssociaterofessorfBusinesst heUniversityfWis-consin-Madison,ndJerryC.Olsons Professorf MarketingndCharlesndLillian inder acultyellown BusinessAdministration,PennsylvaniatateUniversity.heauthorshankPaulAnderson, ilChurchill,altNord, omPage, nd heJMreviewersor heirusefulcommentsnd uggestions.

I s ScienceMarketing?

been largely unproductive. For the most part, we at-tribute the current confusion to the somewhat naiveconceptions of science that have informed the contro-versy. In particular, we consider the typical beliefsabout how scientists do scientific work and how sci-entific progress is achieved to be inconsistent withcurrent views about such issues in the disciplines ofphilosophy, sociology, and history of science. Thatis, in asking, "Is marketing a science?," marketingscholars have been comparing theory development andtesting in marketing to inappropriate standards whichhave little to do with the conduct of scientific inquiryin any field.This article presents a relatively new and moreuseful conception of science than has been consideredto date in the debates regarding marketing's scientificstatus. To do so, we turn the tables in this long-stand-ing debate by asking the more fundamental and in-teresting question, "Is science marketing?" In this ar-ticle we consider whether science can be effectivelyanalyzed as a special case of marketing-the market-ing of ideas.'

'For this purpose, we adopt the currentlypopular definition of mar-ketingas "humanactivitydirectedat satisfying needs and wants throughexchange processes" (Kotler 1980). This is consistent with the ar-guments of Bagozzi (1975) and Hunt (1983) that exchange is a key,unifying concept for the field. We suspect that most marketing schol-ars accept this definition.

Journal of MarketingVol. 47 (Fall1983), 111-125. IsScienceMarketing? 111


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The articlehas two majorsections. In the first weanalyzecommon scientific practicesin termsof con-ventional elements of marketing strategy. Specifi-cally, we considerthe elementsin the marketingmix,targetmarkets, and marketing objectives. Althoughwe can consideronly a few of the majorconcepts inmarketing, he examplesin this briefanalysis provideinitial supportfor our contention that science can beviewed as a special case of marketing.In the secondsection, we discuss a relativistic/constructionistper-spective derivedfrom recentwork in science studiesthatprovidea conceptualrationalefor analyzingsci-ence froma marketingperspective.We point out keydifferencesbetween this emerging approachto sci-ence and the traditionalpositivistic/empiricist viewthatstillpervadesmarketingsee Hunt 1983) andothersocial sciences (see Koch 1981). Again, due to spacerestrictions,we focus only on majorpoints of depar-turefromthe traditionalview andcite majorworkstowhich readerscan referfor additional nformation.

MarketingScientific TheoriesWhat makes a scientific theory successful? Simplystated,a successful theoryis one which is treatedse-riously and studiedby a significantportionof a re-searchcommunity. Such theories may even be em-ployed by practitionersas a framework or analyzingimportantproblems.In otherwords, a successfulthe-ory is one thathas been adoptedby a substantialmar-ket segment, just as is the case of a successful con-sumergood. We arguethat to successfullyachieve anadequatelevel of adoption, scientists must (at leastimplicitly)developandcarryout a marketing trategyto promote heirtheories. In this section, we considersome of the concepts and strategiesinvolved in thisprocess.First,we describescientifictheoriesin termsof the four basic elements of the marketingmix-product, hannelsof distribution, romotion,andprice.Thenwe discuss the idea of marketsegmentationfortheories. Finally, we consider the marketingobjec-tives for scientific work.Theories as ProductsIn the broadestsense, the majorproductsof scienceare ideas. Scientific ideas consist of invented con-structsandhypothesizedrelationshipsamongthem. Asystemof such deasabouta phenomenonmaybe calleda substantive heory.Scientistsalso createideasaboutmethodsof obtaining,analyzing,andinterpretingata.These are methodologicaltheories of measurement,sampling,anddataanalysis. Regardlessof the type ofideaor theory, it shouldnot be forgottenthatthe en-tire theoryproduct s inventedor constructedby oneormorescientists,just as ideasfor consumerproducts

areinventedor constructed.2Like ideas for consumerproducts and the products themselves, substantiveand/or methodologicaltheoryproductsmust also bemarketed.At some point in the developmentof a theorythescientistusuallyproducesa manuscript hatdescribesthe idea. The manuscriptmay also presentempiricaldata that illustratethe idea and/or provide tentativesupport.A manuscript s a tangiblerepresentationofthe inventedsystem of ideas. Marketinga theory asa tangiblemanuscripts botheasierandmoreeffectivethanpromotingan intangibleset of ideas, for at leastfour reasons. First, the theory productcan be storedby potentialadoptersfor use (study) at a more con-venient time. Second, because the manuscript s al-ways available,potentialadopterscan reexamineandreflecton the theoryandpossibly come to appreciateits value. Third,the relativepermanenceof a manu-scriptallows wider disseminationof the theory to asecondary,pass-along audience (e.g., students). Fi-nally, a tangiblemanuscriptmay be used to establishthe scientist/marketeras the inventorof the theoryoras the first to borrow he theoryfromanotherareaandapplyit in a new field.Overits life cycle a theorymay undergoa numberof modifications n responseto a varietyof potentialmarketingproblems. Customercomplaintsregardingmeasurement ifficultiesor lack of conceptualclarity,and competitive theory productsmarketedby otherscientists,areamongthe manyproblemsa new theorymayface in tryingto capturea viable marketshareofscientists. Perhapsthe most serious problem occurswhen a test of a theory fails to predict adequately.This means that the theory is not meeting the needsof the largest segment of researchers-those con-cernedwith predictionand methodologicaland em-pirical rigor. If the researchcommunity cannot beconvincedhat heempiricalestprocedureswerefaulty,eitherthe inventorscientist or anotherscientist whohas adoptedthe theory may change specific charac-teristics of the theory product in response to suchproblems.However,themodifiedtheory s seldomre-named, as this might lose loyal customers. Many ofthese modificationsare made to seem minorand thechangeprocessmay be quite gradual,often so muchso thatthe changes are not always recognizedby thetargetmarketof scientists. However, it shouldbe em-phasizedthat any change in a theorycreatesa mod-ified product-i.e., a differenttheory. For instance,researchersmade a numberof seemingly minorcon-

2Clearly,an understanding f the processes and/or accidentsby whichnew theories are created is critical for an understanding of science.While we will not review the extant literature on the creation of sci-entific or other products, i.e., "marketingR&D," interested readersshould see Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring (1982) and Stein (1974,1975).

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ceptualchangesin the Fishbein-typeexpectancy-valuemodelsduringthe periodof major nterest n the mar-keting literature (1969-1975), yet only the mostknowledgeable consumers were aware that thesechangescreateddifferent theories(e.g., Cohen, Fish-bein, and Ahtola 1972).Product Attributes. As with consumer products,severalkey attributesof a theory have a large effecton marketing uccess. A majorcharacteristic oncernsthe topic, issue, problem, or phenomenonthat is ad-dressed.A theory may concern an issue of majorim-portance,a "big"problem,or a relatively"small"is-sue of little theoreticalor practical mportance Olson1982). In some ways it may be easier to marketthelattertype of theory. For instance, the most widelyadoptedtheories tend to be those that are easiest tounderstandndresearchempirically,especiallyin longperiods of normal science (Kuhn 1970). If researchon a theory requiresspecial equipment (e.g., poly-graphs or the studyof brainwaves) or special subjectpopulationse.g., managersor purchasing gents),thattheoryis not likely to be widely researched. In con-trast,theoriesthat areeasily researchedwith conven-tional measurementprocedures(e.g., self-reportrat-ingscales)andeasilyaccessiblesamples(e.g., students)aremore likely to achieve higher adoptionrates.A second importantattributeof a theoryconcernsthe professionalcredentials andstatus of the inventoror the borrower.Scientists who are well-known andrespected,based on their previouscontributions o afield, have a betterchanceof successfully introducinga new theorythando less well-knownresearchers.Thecredibilityof the scientist/marketermay add a haloeffect to the theory product. Inventors or borrowerswho do not enjoy a strong reputation n their fields(e.g., doctoral students) may need to attractestab-lished researchers("celebrityscholars")to help mar-ket theirtheories.Third,theories hatareborrowedandadapted rommoreestablished,familiarfields seem to be moreeas-ily marketedthan theories gleaned from unconven-tional areas or that are constructed"from scratch."Forexample, it is probablyeasier to promotetheoriesfor use in marketing hatare borrowedfrom psychol-ogy andeconomics rather hanfrom areassuch as an-thropology,religion, or art.Fourth,theorieswhich containfamiliar,common,everyday concepts, words, meanings, and relation-ships(e.g., needs, attitudes,personality)may be eas-ier to marketsuccessfully thantheorieswhich requirelearningnew words,meanings,andrelationshipse.g.,shaping,aestheticresponse, semanticrelatedness,co-herence analysis, negative reinforcement). Familiarconceptswhich are learned in childhoodand are fre-quentlyused in everydaylanguagemay be consideredas highly importantconcepts to be researchedand

understood.However, in othercases, new words andmeaningscan be useful for marketing heories, sinceknowledgeof them may give a scientistadmissiontothe cognoscentiof a researchcommunity.Fifth, theoriesthatareconsistentwith currentpo-litical and social values are easier to market(Barnes1977, Gould 1982). Forexample, a theory advocatinggenderdifferences in cognitive abilities is difficult tomarket n the currentenvironment,even with impres-sive empirical upport see StanleyandBenbow 1982).In addition,since political andsocial values often de-termine unding priorities,theoriesdealingwith prob-lems for whichampleresearchsupport s availablearemoreeasily marketed o potentialscientist adopters.The sixth (andpurposefully ast) productattributeis the preliminary mpiricalevidence thatcan be mar-shalledto supporta theory. Strong empiricalsupportis a highly desirable attributethat will enhance themarketability f a theory. However, strongempiricalevidence is neither necessary nor sufficient for thesuccessful disseminationof a theory. A number oftheorieshavebeen fairlywidely adopted,despitepoor(orevenno) initialempirical upporte.g., earlyatomictheoryor Freudianpersonalitytheory). Of course sci-entistsdifferin the extentto whichthey areconcernedaboutthe "fit"betweendataandtheory;thus, the im-portanceof empiricalsupportfor a theoryis likely tovaryfor differentscientists (see Mitroffand Kilmann1978).TestMarketing. Quiteoften, scientiststest markettheirtheoriesbefore attemptinga full-scale introduc-tionviajournalpublication.Theirmajorgoal is to gaugethe reactionsof potentialadoptersof the theory andto identify and correct any glaring flaws before thetheoryis introducedon a majorscale. One way to dothis is by circulating working papers among col-leaguesandfriends n the "invisible ollege"(see Crane1972). In addition, colloquia and seminars may bepresentedto colleagues and studentsand their reac-tions sought. At least threeresultsarepossible. First,andleast likely, the theoryproductmay be judged tobe irretrievablylawed.This seldomoccurs,sincemosttest marketpresentationsare made to other scientistswho not only share the same world view as the in-ventor,but are also social friendswho respectthe in-ventor.Normally, such groupsarereluctant o totallyrejectthe theoryproduct. However, test marketpres-entations to less hospitable groups occasionally doproducesuchan extremerejection.Second, in equallyrarecases, the productmay be viewed as a majorac-complishmentwith no seriousproblemsandjudgedtobe readyfor introduction.Instead,the results of test marketingare likely tosuggesta varietyof modificationsto the theory.Thesemay involve addingor deleting constructs,clarifyingandredefiningconstructs,or changingthe theoretical

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relationshipsbetweenconstructs.At a minimum,cos-meticchangesmay be made in the theory's packaging(wordsand labels used) or suggestions may be madefor repositioning he product.As with traditional on-sumerproducts,the scientist/marketermust considerwhether changing the theory according to the rec-ommendationsderived from test marketingwill im-provethe chancesof successfullymarketing he prod-uct.Channels of Distribution for TheoriesTherearemanychannelsby which scientific theoriesmay be disseminated to potentialadopters.The var-ious channels of distributionhave differentlevels ofeffectivenessand may be differentiallyappropriate tdifferentstages in the developmentandtesting of thetheory.In the early stages of development,most the-ories are disseminated via presentationsat colloquiaand conferences, and throughinformallydistributedworkingpapers.While conferenceandcolloquiapre-sentationsareespeciallyvaluable in thatthey providedirect feedback to the scientist/marketer,not manyscholarsarelikely to adopta theorydistributedn thisway. Forone thing, relativelyfew scholarscan be ex-posedto the theorythrough hese inefficientchannels.Before widespreadadoptioncan be anticipated,mosttheoriesmust pass the muster of the gatekeepersinthediscipline(thereviewersandeditorsof prestigiousjournals)andtherebyachieve both legitimizationandwidespreadxposure.A theorythat is evaluatedpoorlyin test marketingmay go no further han being pub-lished in a conferenceproceedings,if at all. The the-orymaylanguishtherefor severalyearsbeforefinallyfadingaway or being resurrectedby anotherscientistwho happens o stumbleacrossit. Occasionallya the-ory is publishedfirst in a proceedingsand later in ajournal,but this is generallyconsideredbad form un-less majorchangeshave occurred n the manuscript.Some marketersbegin the disseminationprocessby submitting he manuscriptdirectlyto the key chan-nel, a major ournal.If the manuscripts rejected roma number f major ournals, he inventor/marketermayattempt o disseminatethe theorythroughotherchan-nels, perhaps less prestigious or highly specializedjournals. Using these channels to distribute a theoryreduces heprobability hatthe theorywill enjoyrapidacceptance,althoughpublicationper se does enhancethe chancesfor eventualsuccess. Publication n evenan obscureor specializedjournalmay still reach themost interestedtargetmarketof researcherswho maythenbe influential n furtherdisseminatingthe theorythroughouthe researchcommunity. Alternatively,ifthetheorycannotbe publishedn a major ournal,somemarketersmay try to publishthe theoryin book form

or as a chapterin a book. However, this channel isnotreadilyor equallyavailableto all scientists. Thus,themorelikely outcomeis thatthe marketerwill pres-ent the theoryat one or moreconferencesandpublisha paper n a proceedings,if available. Of course, thechancesof successfullymarketing he theorydecreasewith the use of morerestricted, ess prestigiouschan-nels of distribution.Promotion of TheoriesThroughout he life cycle of a theory, from creationto test marketing o publication n a major ournaltothe widespreadadoptionand use of a theory by theresearchcommunity,promotion s a key factorin suc-cessfullymarketing theory.As withconsumergoods,a varietyof promotional echniquescan be used. In-terestingly,and contraryto popularbeliefs, theoriesthatdo not provideimpressiveempiricalresults, pro-duce a potentialresolutionto a majorproblemin thefield (Kuhn 1970, Popper 1959), or generate novelpredictions Lakatos1978), can still be marketed uc-cessfully.Althoughstrongempiricalresults are very usefulin promotinga theory, they are not absolutely nec-essary. For example, personalityresearchin market-ing in the 1960s andearly 1970s seldomsurpassed herelativelytrivial hurdleof obtainingstatisticallysig-nificantcorrelationsbetweenmeasuresof personalityand a varietyof otherfactors (Kassarjian1971). Yetpersonalitytheoryenjoyed wide popularity.Becausethe weak empiricalresultswere usually attributed omethodologicalproblems, most researchersdid notconclude hattheunderlyingheorywas wrong.In fact,manymarketingresearchersstill believe in personal-ity theorydespite the generallydisappointingempir-icalresults.Recently,newmethodshaveproducedmoreimpressive mpirical upportor personalityheory(seeEpstein1979, 1980), althougha resurgenceof interesthas not yet occurred n marketing.It is also possible to successfully marketa theorythatmakes no unusualor novel predictionsand is infact quite similarto othertheories. Of course, a sci-entist's promotiontask will be easier if the theoryproducthas unique features(e.g., it generatesnovelpredictions)or it has desirable attributesof a com-pelling logic coupled with strongly supportivedata.However,as long as the new theoryis relativelycon-sistent with the world view of at least a segment ofthefield, it can be successfullypromoted.A new the-ory thatis based on a differentset of metatheoreticalassumptionsthan those held by most membersof aresearchcommunitycan be difficult to successfullypromoteand market.This is similar to situations inconsumergoods marketingn whichdiscontinuous n-

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novationsthat areinconsistentwith consumers'socialvalues and behaviorpatternsare often hardto sell.3In additionto "directadvertising"via publicationinjournals,books, andproceedings,a theorycan alsobe promotedthrough publicity and personal selling.Publicityfor a theoryincludesnotices of forthcomingarticles in journals, abstracts of published articlesprinted n otherjournals, and notices of working pa-pers in association newsletters. Occasionally, a sci-entist/marketercan get otherscientiststo cite the newtheory, perhapswhile still in working paper form.Scientistsmay be able to generatediscussion of theirtheory n nonscholarlypublicationssuchas MarketingNews orPsychology Today.Finally, if dissertationre-search testing the theory wins awards or other rec-ognition, the resultingpublicity can be very helpfulin the overallmarketingeffort. Publicity may performa useful informationalor reminderrole, but is likelyto be less persuasivethan other forms of promotion.However, a "bandwagoneffect" for a theory mightbe enhancedthroughthis kind of promotion.Personal selling is an importantelement of thepromotional trategyfor theories. Personalselling oc-curs duringformal or informal presentationsof thetheoryas well as in directone-on-onediscussionswithpotentialadopters.Moreover,salesmanship s an im-portantaspect of dealing with editors and reviewersin the revision process. Direct selling can be an ef-fective methodof persuasionsince the scientist/mar-ketercan addresscounter-arguments f the potentialbuyerheadon andcan offerad hoc hypotheses o covermany of the perceivedweaknesses in the theory. Fi-nally, a personalselling strategycan be particularlyeffective with one's doctoralstudents.Price of TheoriesThe scientist who adopts a new theory must pay aprice that involves time and money as well as psy-chological and behavioralcosts. Part of the price ofadoptinga new theoryinvolves the time spent learn-ing the new theory and its methods, as well as theassociatedopportunitycosts. The adopterof a newtheory may also incur financial costs in purchasingnew equipment(e.g., a physiology lab) or in educa-tion/trainingcosts (e.g., attendingseminarson causalmodeling). Othercosts include the psychological ef-

3Strictlyspeaking, no scientific theory is constructed of totally newconcepts created in isolation from earlier concepts and theories. Pre-vious research and theorizing certainly has an impact on the scientist/inventorwho is trying to create a "new" theory. However, some newtheories are seen as more creative and less continuous with previouswork than are others. We are merely arguing that it is more difficultto market the more discontinuous theories. This discussion should notbe taken to imply that scientific work is cumulative in the sense thata sequence of theories will ultimately lead to a valid general theory.

fort and disruption nvolved in changingone's exist-ing beliefs andestablishedresearchbehaviors.A ma-jor componentof the price of adoptinga new theoryinvolves the behavioraleffort of actively researchingthe theory, writing about it, and performingthe be-haviorsnecessaryto get the resultspublished n majorjournals.Like consumerproducts, theories vary in price.Low-priced heoriesarethose thatareconsistentwiththe worldview andexisting researchskills of the tar-get marketof scientists. Adoptingsuch theoriesis rel-atively inexpensive, as learningtime is shortand be-lief and behaviorchanges are minimal. That is, theprice is within easy reach of many potential con-sumers.Thus, the scientist/marketerwho prices his/her theoryat the low end enhancesthe chances thatthe theorywill penetrate he mass market.In contrast, heories hatareradicallydifferent romthe establishedworldview of the researchcommunityand/orfromtheresearchproceduresommonin a fieldcarrya higherprice tag. Adoptingsuch theoriesmayrequireconsiderablelearning time, extensive beliefchanges, and major changes in research behavior.Therefore,such high pricedtheoriesneed to be mar-keted carefullyand well. The marketingeffort is fa-cilitatedif the scientist can articulatethe benefits tobe providedby the new theory.Becausethesebenefitshave to be perceivedas substantial o justify the highprice, some scientistssubstantiallyoversell theirsub-stantive or methodologicaltheoriesin orderto attractconsumers(see Churchilland Perrault1982). For ex-ample, it appearsthat structural quationsmethodol-ogy has been substantiallyoversold in the social sci-ences (see Cliff 1983, Fornell 1983).

A variety of situationalfactors can influence thesuccess of a high pricedtheory, primarilyby makingit seem worth the cost to early adopters. First, it ishelpful if the world view incorporatedn establishedtheories is recognizedas problematicby a segmentofthe researchcommunity.In fact, Kuhn(1970) arguesthata scientificrevolutioncannottakeplace unlessthetraditionalview is recognizedas failing and an alter-nativetheoryis available. Second, the availabilityofresearch undsto investigatethe new theoryis a pow-erfulmotivator orpursuinga new theoryproduct.Forexample, funding for researchon the effects of ad-vertisingon children oweredthe priceof enteringthisnew area. Third, in some situationsresearchersmaybe boredwith the traditionalapproachand, therefore,are willing to incur the cost of adopting more pro-vocative theories. Similarly, some researchersmaysimplyfeel they can makelittle marginalcontributionto thetraditional iew andareseekingto invest in newtheorieswith greaterpayoff potential. In sum, thereareparticular ituationswhen high pricedtheoriesare



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more likely to be adoptedby a researchcommunity.From a marketingstrategy perspective, these situa-tionsarestrategicwindowsthatthe scientist/marketercan use to advantage n introducingan expensive the-ory product.A final considerationregarding he price of a the-ory concernsthe fact that not all researcherscan af-ford to pay the price requiredfor adoptionof a newtheory. A prime determinantof what price an indi-vidual scientist can afford to pay is his/her place inthetenuredecisionprocess.Youngerpre-tenurecholarsmay not feel they can afford a high priced theory.Theymayneedless expensive heories hathave a fairlyhigh probabilityof producing rapidbenefits, such aseasily publishable ournalarticles. High priced theo-ries, by theirvery nature,tend to offer benefits witha longertime horizon.Moreover,a fairlyhigh degreeof risk is associated with most high priced theories,andmanypre-tenure cientistsmay not wish to incursuchrisks. Therefore,more senior, post-tenureschol-ars may be more willing to invest in higher pricedtheories. Occasionally, beginning scholars, such asdoctoralstudents,who have relativelylittle time andeffort nvested n traditionalheoriesandmethods,mayadopthigherpricedtheories, especially if encouragedto do so by their post-tenurementors. However, inthesecases, thetheory s probably lreadyn thegrowthstage of the productlife cycle, or at least appearstobe a theorywith a high probabilityof success, basedon its attributes.TargetMarkets for New TheoriesA researchcommunitycan be segmentedin a numberof ways. As just discussed, scientists can be dividedin termsof theirposition n the career ife cycle. Threedistinctgroupscanbe identified:doctoral tudents,pre-tenurescholars, and post-tenurescholars. The lattergroupmightbe furtherdividedby rankinto associateand full professors. Theory products will differen-tiallyappeal o thesegroupsand,as noted,thesegroupscan affordto pay differentprices for theoriesand arewillingto incurdifferent evels of risk. Of course, dif-ferentmarketingstrategiesmay be requiredfor eachof these segments.A prime targetmarket for a scientist's theory ishis/her own doctoralstudents, althoughthe studentsof otherscholarsare of interestas well. Usually thesepotentialcustomersareseekingexactly whatthe mar-keterhas to offer: a new theoryor methodin need ofempiricalresearch n a discipline-related ontext. Ide-ally, the theoryshould be somewhatnew in ordertoestablish hatthe dissertations a "contribution"o thefield.As mentionedabove, thistargetmarketmayreactless negatively f the theorydeviatessubstantiallyromtheacceptedview in the field, partlybecauseits mem-bershave not yet become fully committedto thatper-

spective. Additionally,doctoralstudentsconstituteanimportant arget marketbecause they (1) often be-come apostlesfor the theoryonce they have investedthe time to learn it and begin to researchit, (2) areentering he most active stageof theirresearchcareersand may help marketthe theory throughtheir writ-ings, and (3) may be more easily persuadedas theyhave little investmentin competingtheories.The secondimportant argetmarket or a new the-oryis thegroupof activeresearch cholars n the field.Thisgroupcanbe further egmentedntopre-andpost-tenureresearchers,andeach of these segmentscan befurtherdivided into adopter categories of opinionleaders, followers, and laggards. Of these, the opin-ion leadersarecriticallyimportant.A single studyona new theoryby an opinion leadermay be sufficientto create widespreadinterest. Opinion leader scien-tistsarealso likely to be mentorsfor high qualitydoc-toralstudentswho can be encouragedto researchthetheory.In addition,opinionleaderscan often directlyinfluenceotheractiveresearcherso considerstudyingandusing the theory, therebyincreasingits adoptionrate and eventual market share. Finally, studies byopinionleadersaremore likely to be featured n text-books which also helps to establishthe theory.4The scholars east likely to adopta new theoryarethose who remainloyal to a previoustheory, partic-ularly if it is their own or one in which they haveinvestedheavily. In fact, members of this group aremorelikely to criticizethe new theoryandattempt oremove it from the market.Such attemptsmay welltakethe form of "replications"which are intendedtodiscredithenew theory.Oftentheseattempts repartlysuccessful since most theories have numerousprob-lems in the earlystage of development.For example,because constructsused in the theory have surplusmeaning, partsof the theory can be interpretedn amannerwhich reveals inconsistencies and ambigui-ties. It may be fairlyeasy to show thatthe theoreticalconceptshave differentmeaningsthan ntendedby theinventor/marketer, hus adding to the confusion re-gardingthe theory. Second, since the skeptical re-searchernow controlsthe method in a replication, he/

4Oncea theory has achieved "textbook status," it tends to becomepartof the discipline's body of "knowledge." Regardless of whetherthe measures are subsequently invalidated or empirical results evershow impressive relationships, such theories are seldom purged en-tirely from the literature.Over time the theory may lose followers andinterest as new theories are offered which are perceived to be betteror deal with what seem to be more importantor interesting problems.Although some laggardresearchers will continue to investigate the oldtheory, only occasionally will this work be published in a major out-let. When it is, it may still be employed in textbooks for the purposeof giving a fresh reference to an old chapter and for exemplifying thesupposedlycumulativenature of scientific inquiry. In fact, Kuhn (1970)argues that textbooks rewrite the history of theories in order to makescience appear to be cumulative.



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she can usually generateresults inconsistentwith thenew theory. For example, the design could includetoo few subjects to allow sufficient statisticalpowerto detect heeffect, or a research etting nvolving manyuncontrolledourcesof variance ould be used to "washout" an effect. In sum, an antagonisticscientist canoften demonstrate hata new theory's predictionsarepoorer than previously reported, or even that "dis-confirming"effects are obtained.Finally, because allresearchrequiresa myriadof subjectivedecisions, thecompetitorcientistcan usually arguethat at leastsomeof the original methodological decisions were inap-propriateand thus produceddata that were biased infavor of the theory. In such controversies,comments,replies, andrejoinderscan continue back and forthtothe limits of the tolerance of editors, reviewers, andthe researchcommunity.The market for a new theory can also be seg-mented in terms of psychologicalcharacteristics.Sci-entistshave differingviews aboutwhat counts as im-portant,nterestingheory,andthesevalues andbeliefsinfluencetheirevaluations of a new theory. Based onsuch attributes, Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) haveidentified four types of scientists. Two of these areparticularlyrelevant for segmenting scientific mar-kets. The analytical scientist (AS) is mainly con-cerned with tightly controlled, highly rigorous re-searchdesigns ntended o testwell-specifiedhypothesesdeducedfromtheory.This groupseems to be the larg-est segmentin marketingand in most otherfields. Incontrast, the conceptual theorist (CT) is more con-cernedwith abstract deas, how they fit logically to-gether,and with theirheuristic,generativepower forcreatingotherideas. This groupis small in both mar-keting and in most other disciplines. Obviously, thecharacteristics f a new theorywill stronglyinfluencewhich of these groupswill be moreattracted.The CTgroupmay be more likely to adopta new theoreticalperspectiveif it is quite differentfrom existing per-spectives and offers promise for dealing with impor-tant, complex phenomenaand problems. CT's tendnotto be concernedabouta lack of empiricalsupport,especiallyearly n a theory'sdevelopment.Ontheotherhand, an AS is not likely to adopta new theoryuntilit has been developedto the stage wheremethodsandmeasurescan be relativelyunambiguouslyappliedtotest specific aspectsof the theory. Moreover,the pre-liminarydatashould look promising.Marketing ObjectivesAlthoughthe marketerof a scientific theoryprobablyhas objectives or goals in mind for that theory, andfor his/her careeras a scientist, these goals are notoften explicit. For purposes of discussion, we haveroughly categorized scientists' objectives into threegroups:noble, curiosity, and self-servinggoals. Con-

ceptually, these threeclasses are mutuallyexclusive;however, more than one type of objective can beachievedwith the same marketingstrategy.Noble objectives are those most commonly asso-ciated with science. Includedare such lofty goals asseeking knowledge, attemptingto understanda phe-nomenon, and contributingto a discipline or to so-ciety as a whole. Normallysuch goals areconsideredto be beyondreproach.Note, however,thatthesegoalscan only be accomplishedby a scientistwho marketshis/her work to the scientific community (or getssomeoneelse to do the marketing).A theorycan makeno contribution f the work is kept hidden in a filedrawer.Thus, scientistsmust market heirtheoriestoachieve even noble goals.Curiosityobjectives refer to seeking answers toone's personalquestionsaboutthe subjectof inquiry.Curiositygoals areclosely relatedto noble goals, andthey differprimarily n the degree to which the workis performedor self versusothers.Doing research orthe fun of it and the sheerjoy of learningnew thingsarenot unknownas motivators n science. However,if the scientistneedsno cooperation romothers,con-tents him-/herself with the findings, needs no coop-erationfrom others, and shares them with no one,marketings not involved. Only when the theoryandthe findings are exchanged with someone else doesthemarketingprocessfor the theorybecomerelevant.Self-servingobjectivesarewell-knownwithinsci-entific communities but are not widely recognizedamong the generalpublic, nor are they usually con-sideredby professionalphilosophersof science. Self-servinggoalsleadresearcherso perform cientificworkprimarilyfor the purpose of personal gain. The re-wardsfor being a successful scientistcan be substan-tial:promotions, ob security, money (in the form ofsalary,grants,andconsultingfees), releasetime fromotherduties, prestigeandrecognition n the field, andspecific awards and honors. While these gains areusually ntended or scientistswho pursuenoble goals,theyoften areawarded o those who seek mainlyself-servinggoals. Occasionally,scientistswho pursueonlyself-servinggoals, especially in a blatantmanner,arerecognizedas such and may be denied at least someof the soughtrewards.The researchcommunitymayinferthat a particular esearcher s seeking only self-servinggoals based on the researcher'sverbalreportsof objectives, and frompracticessuch as producingalargenumberof marginaltheory/researchpapers, orrelabelingand publishingthe same paperin multiplechannels.

Clearly, different goals may lead researcherstoadoptdifferentmarketingtrategies.Forinstance,somescientistswho pursuenoble goals may naively believethat overt marketingeffort is unnecessaryand evendemeaning, since an obviously superiortheory will



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"sell itself." Of course, sophisticatedmarketerscaneasily recognizethis perspectiveas a sign of a strongproductorientationandnot a particularly iable strat-egy for long-termsuccess. It is also clear thatdiffer-ent goals may lead to the same strategy, i.e., devel-opmentandmarketing f a high quality heoryproductwith a high quality marketing plan. Moreover, sci-entistsmay have multiplegoals which are consistent.Perhapsit would be worthwhile to study scientists'goals, their hierarchicalrelationships,and their im-pact on scientific progress.However, the main pointhere is that accomplishing scientific objectives de-pendson the qualityof the marketing trategyandtheeffortexerted.SummaryIn the first partof this article we have demonstratedthatbasic marketingconcepts and principlescan ac-countfor manyaspectsof scientific activity. Thusfarourargumentshatscience is marketinghave been in-formal.We have shown thatmany aspectsof scienceinvolve social exchanges, and in particular,the ex-changeof ideas in the formof theories.Therefore,asthe discipline most concerned with exchange pro-cesses, marketingprovidesa relevantperspectiveforunderstanding cience. In addition, we have shownhow certainmarketingconcepts are or could be usedby scientiststo develop effective marketingstrategiesthatcould influenceotherscientiststo adopttheirthe-ories.Intheremainder f thearticlewe developourclaimthatscience is marketingalongmoreformallines. Weattempt o show how currentviews on the natureofscience also lead to the conclusion that much of theactivityof science involves marketingprocesses. Thekey theoretical deas used in our argumentsconstitutea set of metatheoreticalassumptionsaboutthe natureof scientific knowledge and how that knowledge isachieved. Many of these ideas are radicallydifferentfromthose thatunderliethe philosophicalperspectivecurrentlyprominentn marketingandothersocial sci-ences.

MetatheoreticalAssumptionsabout ScienceScholarshaveproposeda varietyof philosophicalper-spectivesregardingscience (see Brown 1977, Suppe1977). These pointsof view arecharacterizedby ma-jor as well as subtledifferencesandby a profusionofterminology(logical positivism, logical empiricism,instrumentalism,ealism, falsificationism,relativism,etc.). We attemptto sidestep much of the resultingcontroversyand semanticconfusion in the remainderof this article. First, we briefly describethe reigningphilosophical pproachn marketingwhich we call the

Positivistic/Empiricist(P/E) perspective(see Ander-son 1983 for a moredetailedreview). Then, we con-trastthis view with a newer, more useful philosophyof science which we call the Relativistic/Construc-tionistapproachR/C). Ourintent s to introduceheseideas at a broad, general level and avoid becomingmired n technical argonand subtledetails. Thusourcoverageof these issues is necessarilyan overview.ThePositivistic/Empiricist ApproachThe philosophy of science that presently dominatesmarketings a descendentof logical positivism, com-monlycalledlogical empiricism(cf. Broadbeck1982,Hunt 1983).5The term "positivism"usuallyreferstoa typeof strictempiricism n whichonly thoseknowl-edge claimsthatarebaseddirectlyon experience i.e.,empiricalobservations)areconsidered mportant,use-ful, and/or scientifically meaningful. Coupled withthis strongemphasison empiricaldata, positivismre-lies heavilyon formalsymboliclogic as a tool of anal-ysis. Thus, positivists claim thatthroughformallog-ical analysis of theories and by means of unbiasedobservations,the truthof any (meaningful)proposi-tion can be determinedabsolutely.Logicalempiricism s a somewhatmore moderateversionof positivismdevelopedto avoidthe inductionproblem-namely that no universalpropositioncanbe conclusively verified by any set of observations,no matterhow large. Thus logical empiricismtendsto favor a view that although scientific propositionscannotbe conclusivelyverified, they can be "increas-ingly confirmed," again using careful observations(e.g., in experiments)and the rules of formal logic.In thisview, for instance,theoreticalermsderivetheirmeaningsthrough"correspondenceules" that "con-nect" them to direct experience (empiricalobserva-tions). These observationsgive meaningto the theo-retical terms. The logical empiricist point of viewdominatescurrentmarketingresearch n thatmuch ofourresearchmethodologyand approachare based onthese philosophicalassumptions.Popper(1959) proposeda "falsification"strategyto avoid the inductiveproblemsof the confirmationapproachof logical empiricism. However, as inter-pretedby manyphilosophersandmarketingscholars,falsification s merelya somewhatmore sophisticatedbrandof logical empiricism(cf. Calder,Phillips, andTybout 1981, 1982; Lynch 1982).6This approach oscience, termed "naive falsificationism"by Lakatos(1970), requires hata researcher onsider a theoryas

SSuppe 1977) and Brown (1977) provide thorough historical anal-yses of how these positions have evolved.6However, other, less well-recognized aspects of Popper's thinkingare fairlyconsistent with the perspectivewe are advocating (see Brown1977, Chapter 5).



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false if a key deductively-derivedhypothesis is re-jected by empiricalobservations.7In sum, the P/E approach hatcurrentlyunderliesresearchn marketing mphasizes(a) the developmentof axiomatic theory throughthe use of deductively-derivedhypotheseswhich aremanipulatedvia formalrules of symbolic logic, and especially (b) objectiveempiricalobservations that give meaning to the the-oretical propositionsand are used to rigorously testthem, perhapseven falsify them. Thus, many peopleconsiderthe P/E approach o be rational(in the for-mal logical sense).The Relativistic/ConstructionistApproachIn the P/E perspectiveof science, certain factorsareexcluded fromconsideration,includingthe effects of(a) social interactionand influence among scientists,(b) the idiosyncraticbeliefs and values of individualscientists,and(c) scientists' subjectiveinterpretations

7It houldbe notedthatLaudan 1965) clearlydemonstrateshe im-possibilityof falsification.

of observationaldata. These factorsare not a partofthe unbiasedobservationsand formal symbolic logicof the P/E approach; hus they are usually rejectedfromconsiderationas irrelevant or an understandingof scientificprogress.However, in termsof the R/Cperspectiveadvocatedbelow, these factors areof crit-ical importance in understanding how scientificknowledgedevelops.8This articleis not the place to presenta completediscussion and defense of the R/C approachto sci-ence. Othershave done so effectively (see Collins andCox 1976, Feyerabend 975, Knorr-Cetina981, Kunn1970, Munevar1981). Instead, in the rest of the ar-ticle we identify and briefly discuss some key dis-tinctions between the P/E view of science and theR/C perspective.A summaryof these distinctions isprovided n Table 1.8Wecastthedifferencesbetween heseapproachesn simpledicho-tomous erms n order o distinguish hemandmakeourpointsmoreclearly.However,a varietyof finer, moresubtledistinctions anbedrawn.See Brown(1977) for a reviewof the issuesinvolved n this

controversy.

TABLE1Major Differences between Positivistic/Empiricist and Relativistic/Constructionist Views of SciencePositivistic/Empiricist Science Relativistic/Constructionist ScienceScience discovers the true nature of reality. Science creates many realities.

Only the logic of justification is needed to understand The processes by which theories are created, justified,science. and diffused throughout a research community areneeded to understand science.Science can be understood without considering Science is a social process and cannot be understoodcultural, social, political, and economic factors. without considering cultural, social, political, andeconomic factors.Science is objective. Science is subjective.Scientific knowledge is absolute and cumulative. Scientific knowledge is relative to a particularcontextand period of time in history.Science is capable of discovering universal laws that Science creates ideas that are context-dependent, i.e.,govern the external world. relative to a frame of reference.Science produces theories that come closer and closer Truth is a subjective evaluation that cannot beto absolute truth. properly inferred outside of the context provided bythe theory.Science is rational since it follows formal rules of Science is rational to the degree that it seeks tologic. improve individual and societal well-being byfollowing whatever means are useful for doing so.There are specific rules for doing science validly (e.g., There are many ways of doing science validly that arefalsification). appropriate in different situations.Scientists subject their theories to potential Scientists seek supportive, confirmatory evidence infalsification through rigorous empirical testing. order to market their theories.Measurement procedures do not influence what is Nothing can be measured without changing it.measured.Data provide objective, independent benchmarks for Data are created and interpreted by scientists in termstesting theories. of a variety of theories, and thus are theory laden.

IsScienceMarketing?119


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RealityIs RelativeA key difference betweenthe two approaches o sci-ence concernsthe assumednatureof realityand howscientists relate to reality throughtheir theories andobservational vidence (see Hooker 1975). Research-ers with a P/E orientationusually take a realistpointof view. Althoughthereare varioustypes of realism,most P/E researchersappear o believe thatan exter-nal world exists (usuallyone world in one way), andthat it is possible to come closer to knowing the truenature of that world throughempirical observationsobtained hroughrigorousmethods andanalyses.The-ories, then, aretreatedas generalstatementsabouttherealworld. The goal is to develop theoriesthatcomeincreasingly loser to beingtruestatementsaboutreal-ity. Alternatively,researcherswith an R/C orienta-tionconceive of many possiblerealities,each of whichis relativeto a specific context or frameof reference.According to this view, scientists construct "realities"by developinga degreeof social agreementaboutthemeaningsof theirtheories andempiricalobservations(e.g., Collins 1975, Collins and Cox 1976, Elkana1978, Feyerabend 975, Gilbert1976, Munevar1981).Science Is a Social ProcessScience is an activityperformedby interactinghumanbeings, and thus obviously is a social process. Webelieve these social interactionprocessesarevery im-portantfor understandingscience. In fact, the ex-changesthat take place duringthese social processesconstitutea majorreasonfor our contentionthat sci-ence is marketing.Until recently, few philosophersof science haveconsideredthe social interactionand social influenceprocessesinvolved in scientificprogress.P/E philos-ophers endto ignoresuchsocial factors oreven claimthat such processes are unimportant or "irrational")and, thus, not worthyof study. Insteadthey continueto be concernedwith rather ormallogical models forthe justificationor testing of theories. That is, P/Ephilosophershave focused on how theories are pre-sumed to be verified, corroborated, or falsified, andpresumed to be converted to scientific knowledge.In contrast,philosopherswith an R/C orientationhave been willing to considerthe (less formal) socialprocesses n science. Forexample,Kuhn(1970) notedthe importanceof social influence in evaluatingalter-nativetheories:"The superiorityof one theoryto an-other is somethingthat cannot be proved in debate.Instead,I have insisted, each partymust try, byper-suasion, to convert the other"(p. 198, emphasis added).Mitroff (1974), in his analysis of the Apollo moonscientists, found that certain scientists are so highlycommittedto their theories that they resist all persu-asive attempts o change theirbeliefs and continually

try to convertother scientists to their point of view.Recently, sociologists of science have been activelyinvestigatinghow social interactionprocesses affectthe developmentof social consensusregardinga sci-entificmethod,a theory,oreven the appropriatenter-pretationof empiricalevidence (e.g., Collins 1981,Latour1980, Pinch 1981). Developing a high degreeof social concensus among scientists is a major ob-jective of marketingstrategiesfor scientific theories.Science Is SubjectiveThe presumedobjectivityof science is a key charac-teristicof the P/E approach hatcurrentlydominatesmarketing and related social science disciplines.However, this aura of objectivity has been steadilyerodingfor years acrossall sciences, including phys-ics (see Zukav 1979). All pretensionsto objectivity(in this narrowsense) disappearon adoptingan R/Cperspectiveon science.P/E approachestend to treat scientists' percep-tions or sense impressionsnaively as providingob-jective, unbiasedrepresentationsof the real world.Thus, empiricalobservations(manifestationsof sci-entists'sense impressions)aretreatedas objectivedatathat are independentof any theory. In contrast, theR/C perspectiverecognizesthateven so-called directperceptionsare not objective but are influencedby amultitudeof factors, including relevantpast experi-ences andtraining.Forthis reasondifferentscientistsmay examinethe same dataandperceiveentirelydif-ferentmeanings(Stent 1975).Here we considerthe process by which scientificmeaningis developed. There are two aspects of thisprocess,one psychologicalandthe othersociological.No less a scientistthanEinstein(1936) has noted thepsychologicalaspectsquite clearly:

Outof themultitude f oursenseexperienceswe take,mentallyandarbitrarily,ertain epeatedly ccurringcomplexesof sense impressions . . andwe attrib-ute to them a meaning-the meaningof the bodilyobject.Consideredogicallythisconcept s not iden-ticalto the totalityof sense impressions eferred o;butit is an arbitrary reationof the human or ani-mal)mind . . . The secondstep . . . we attributeto this conceptof the bodily objecta significance,whichis to a high degreeindependent f the senseimpressionwhichoriginallygives rise to it. This iswhatwe meanwhenwe attributeo thebodilyobject'a real existence'(p. 60, emphasisadded).The sociological aspect refers to the social interactionandpersuasionprocessesused to generatea degreeofsocial consensus regardingthe scientific meaning ofan observationor a theory. Marketingstrategiesareused to influence both the psychological (individuallevel) andsocial (grouplevel) aspectsof the meaningdevelopmentprocess.Our point here is that all meanings-including thespecific, technical meanings that constitute much of



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scientific knowledge-are subjectively determined.Moreover,an R/C approach o science explicitly rec-ognizes that meaning is never absolute. Meaning isalways meaning in context, i.e., relative to some frameof reference(Mischler 1979). In science, theoriesarean important ource of context. If the contextchanges(perhapsbecause the theory is changedduringa par-adigmshift), so does the meaningof the relevantem-piricalobservations.P/E approaches end to denythissubjectiveaspectof science by claimingthat the rulesand proceduresfor doing science produceobjective,absolutemeanings. The R/C perspectiverecognizesthe inherentsubjectivityin science and accounts forit in a relativistic,context-dependentmanner.Science Is RationalContrary o the protests in the P/E literature(e.g.,Suppe 1977), the precedingdiscussion does not leadto the conclusion that science is irrational.Individualscientists can reasonably be assumed to attempt toachieve theirobjectivesin a rationalway. Thatis, sci-entists borrow or createthose theories which they be-lieve can accomplish their noble, curiosity, or self-servinggoals. Theirbeliefs may be found on the basisof what the "hot topic" is in a discipline, whetheraparticular heory fits well with their values and pre-dilections, or how easily a theory can be marketed,amongother factors.Rationality n science does not requirethe use offormalrules of symbolic logic. Nor must the objec-tives and standards or judging progressbe absoluteandfixed. In fact, it is quite clear fromthe historyofscience thatstandardsandobjectivesvary acrosstimeandacrossresearchcommunities.Similarly,scientificrationalitydoes not require hatresearchbe conductedunder he guidelinesof a single scientificmethod suchas falsification. Feyerabend(1975) arguesthat manymajordiscoveries in science could not have occurredby following "the"scientificmethodandpersuasivelyarguesagainst a single approachto science. In fact,Feyerabendrecommendsthat "anythinggoes"-i.e.,any methodology or theory, no matter how uncon-ventional, can contribute o scientific progress.9Theories Are Not UniversalA theory has meaning only within its own context,i.e., withinits own set of metatheoretical ssumptions(Hooker 1975, Mischler 1979). As these presuppo-

9Theproblem, of course, comes in marketing unconventional meth-ods and theories to an unappreciativeaudience. Many researchersmaybe committed to a P/E perspective and majorjournals may reject un-usual approachesto developing knowledge. Generating acceptance ofnew methods which challenge engrained beliefs and established re-searchproceduresis often difficult. In fact, this problem may generatethe need for new channels (journals or books) to provide outlets forsuch radical work.

sitions change, so does the meaning of the theory.Moreover,a completely valid, causal explanationofa phenomenon i.e., a truetheory)cannotbe producedsince all rival alternativehypotheses can never beeliminated(i.e., falsified). In fact, scientists are sel-dom aware of all the existing hypotheseswhich couldbe used to explaina phenomenon,and, of course, sci-entists cannot know of hypotheses and explanationsyet to be invented.Muchof the logic underlyingthe extensive use ofexperimentation,representativesampling, and infer-ential statisticsin marketingresearch s based on theP/E goal of developing universaltheoriesand laws.However, even statisticalinferencesdrawnby scien-tists who believe in statistical theory are relative totheassumedpopulationsof people, stimuli, measures,etc., being sampled. It is also clear from the historyof sciencethat no universal aws or theorieshave everbeen advancedthatmeet strictP/E requirementsseeFeyerabend1975, Munevar1981). In marketing,evensimple strategicplanningmodels have been shown tobe restrictedto particularsituations (see Day 1977,Wensley 1981). Thus, the P/E view of science whichpursues objectives, such as universal laws, seemsmisguided.In contrast,the R/C perspectiveexplicitlyrecognizesthe "boundedness"of theories andthe re-lativisticmeaningof observations,and seeks to spec-ify the limitsof theirgeneralizability.In sum, theoriesarelimited to (relativeto) specific times andparticularcontexts.Usefulness of TheoriesTheoriescan be evaluatedin terms of their truthcon-tentor theirusefulness. P/E approachesusuallyfocuson truthcontent. However, no defensiblemethod forestablishingthe truthof a theory has ever been ad-vanced (Peter 1983). Therefore, from an R/C per-spective, usefulness seems to be a more appropriatecriterion or evaluatinga theory.Usefulness is a prag-maticcriterionconcernedwith the differenceit makesto follow the theory'srecommendations.Herethe em-phasis is on the performance, or potential perfor-mance of a theory (Munevar1981). Usefulness canbejudgedin termsof how effectively a theoryenablesthe user to "get along" in the world or accomplishsome specific task. For example, if applicationof amarketingheoryleadsto an increase n long runprof-its for a firm, then it may be inferredthat the theorywas a good one; thatis, it was useful in thatsituationand context, given that objective. Note that the use-fulnesscriterionof the R/C approachprovidesno di-rectevidenceof the truthcontentof the theory; n fact,truthcontentis basically irrelevant rom an R/C per-spective (Olson 1982).Theories can be useful in a variety of ways. Forexample, theories may include new concepts which



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offer more interestingor precise descriptionsof phe-nomena thanpreviously popularconstructs.Descrip-tions of certainconsumerbehaviorsin terms of "at-tributions"or "semanticprocessing" seem so muchmoreprecisethan "attitudes"r "perceptions."n fact,within the context of currentcognitive theory, theseare more precise terms. Theories can also be usefulin a heuristic sense for generatingother theories orideas(Gergen1978). Ultimately, though, a pragmatichumanistcriterion seems critical, i.e., what does thetheorydo to increasesocietalwelfare?Humanisticcri-teriaaremuchmoreeasily integratednto sciencefroman R/C than from a P/E perspective.Data Never Speak for ThemselvesManyP/E philosophersandscientistsseem to believethatdataareindependentof the theoriesthey areusedto test. Thatis, empiricalobservationsareassumedtoprovidean objectivebenchmarkagainstwhich to testand comparetheories. Yet, philosophersof sciencehave repeatedlyshown that there is no pure obser-vationallanguage, i.e., all dataare theory-laden seeFeyerabend1975, Kuhn 1970, Lakatos1978, Popper1959, amongothers).This point is madeclearer f weremember hatdata (empiricalobservations)are con-structed ust as theoriesare. Data do not exist in the"realworld"waitingto be gathered.Rather,dataarecreatedthroughthe measurementoperationsused byscientiststo producethem. Clearly, the scientist se-lects the theory, hypotheses, research setting, teststimuli, subjects,measures,and statistics to be used.In fact, the entireproductionof researchdatais con-trolledby the scientist (Peter, in press).The point is that scientists control the process ofgeneratingesearchdata,andalmostalwayshavebiasesabout what they want to find and how the data areinterpreted. f "negativeresults"are found which areunpublishable,a new studynearlyalwayscan be con-ducted o produce"appropriate"esults.Althoughsuchattemptswill not alwaysbe successful n the shortrun,we suspect that long-termperseveranceoften yieldsthe desiredresults,especially if combinedwith an ef-fective marketingstrategyto generateat least a min-imumlevel of consensusas to the value of the work.However,if, aftera numberof trials,a researcher tillcannotgenerateempiricalsupport or a theory,the re-searcherrather hanthe theorymay warrantcondem-nation. Alternatively,it may be that the methodsre-quiredto provide the desired empiricalobservationsandresultsare not yet available.

RecommendationsOurR/C view of science as the marketingof ideasconflicts sharplywith what Mitroff (1972) calls the"fairytaledescriptionof science" (i.e., the P/E view)

frequently dvocatedand apparently elievedby manymarketing cholars.We view the P/E accountsof ob-jective theorytesting and the relianceon strictmeth-odologicalrules such as falsificationas stifling crea-tive science ratherthan facilitatingit. The followingrecommendations reofferedin the hope thatthe out-datedP/E approacho sciencecanbe replacedby morecreative,insightful, and useful styles of inquirycon-sistentwith the R/C perspective.Scientific TrainingIt is clear that far more effort is exerted in trainingscientists n methodsof testing hypothesesrather hanencouragingthem to create important, provocative,meaningful,or useful theories. The typical doctoralprogramn marketing ontainsmanycoursesintendedto prepare tudentsto test hypotheses, yet embarrass-ingly little attention is given to how to create hy-pothesesand evaluatetheirmerits. In fact, creativitymaybe stifledin the rush to ensurethatstudentshavethe requisitemethodologicaland statistical skills toproducethe empirical demonstrationsdemandedbythe P/E approach o science. While it seems unlikelythatcreativitycan be taughtdirectly,more hospitableenvironmentscould facilitate such learning. Variousscholars, including Davis (1971), McGuire (1973),Webb (1961) and Zaltman,LeMasters,and Heffring(1982), have suggested a numberof ideas for gener-ating nteresting, nsightful,usefulresearchquestions.In essence, creativeinsights are a functionof theamount,quality, and content of what the individualscientistthinksand does.10At present, the majoref-forts in marketingare devoted to designing researchto test ideas borrowedfrom other disciplines, ratherthan creatingand developing theoreticalideas aboutmarketing phenomena and problems (Sheth 1982).Clearly, "replications"n a marketingcontext of re-search deasgleanedfromotherfields has some value.However, it is unlikely that marketingwill advanceveryrapidlyor very faras long as we dependon otherscientists,uninterestedn ourfield, to carrythe majorresponsibility or creatinganddevelopingthe theorieswe use. We needto adaptandfurtherdevelopthe the-ories we borrow.In addition, ratherthan startingresearchwith aborrowed heoryor construct,it may be more usefulto begin with a marketingphenomenonor probleminwhich we are interested,andthen attemptto developour own theoriesabout it. While insights from otherfields may aid in investigating the phenomenonorproblem,we should guardagainst letting them dom-

'"Forexample, see Gruber's (1981) fascinating account of CharlesDarwin's creativity.



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inateanyideas we have on our own. Further,we shouldnot constrainour searchfor additional nsights to tra-ditionalareas of borrowing,suchas economics, socialand cognitive psychology, and statistics. Many dis-ciplinessuch as history, anthropology,sociology, andclinical psychology have useful ideas to offer.Values in ScienceWe must stop deluding ourselves and others that asempiricalscientists, we are impartial o the outcomesof ourresearch,that ourresearch s objective, andthatwe are dealing with establishedfacts rather than in-ferencesof varyingquality. Clearly, scientistsare ad-vocates for theirtheories, hypotheses, anddata. Usu-ally "positivefindings"must be produced o persuadeothersand to successfully market scientific work. Toarguethatall "scientific"researchshouldbe designedto falsify specific hypotheses is misleading and dys-functional or ourprogress.Empiricalresearch s cer-tainlyvaluable. However, data shouldnot be viewedas providingan objectivetest of a theory'struthvalue.Empirical videncemay be more appropriatelyiewedas demonstrating he usefulness of a theoreticalideain a particular ontext.Scientific BehaviorIt should be clear that studying science as a socialactivitycan producenew knowledge, not only aboutscience butalsoabout hebehaviorof scientistsas well.For example, Mitroff's (1974) classic study of theApollo moon scientists, Knorr-Cetina's 1981) inves-tigation of laboratoryphysicists, Latour and Wool-gar's (1979) descriptionof biology scientists at theSalk Institute, and Zukav's (1979) insights into theconduct of researchon quantummechanics providedetaileddescriptionsof the social nature of science.These analysesclearly show that scientists are socialbeings with social needs, not automatonsfollowing aprogramof formal logical analysis. In addition, in-vestigationsof collaborativeresearchpractices(Over1982), secretivenessand competitivenessfor priorityof discoveryby researchers Gaston 1971), referenc-ing behavior(Gilbert 1977), and outrightfudging ofresearchresults, such as the case of Cyril Burt andJ. B. Watson (see Samelson 1980), provide insightsaboutscientificprogressandthe social behaviorof thescientists involved. Finally, studying the marketingplans of successful scientists could improve ourknowledgeof the effectiveness of various marketingstrategies and tactics in producing scientific prog-ress.

"For example, see Feyerabend's (1975) analysis of the strategiesfollowed by Galileo in marketing his radical views on astronomy.

Context-Specific MeaningWe needto investigate meaningin contextrather hanstrive to produceuniversallaws and theories. Someproceduresfor such researchare suggested by Mis-chler(1979) andMorganandSmircich 1980). In fieldssuch as sociology and organizationalbehavior, con-siderablework is currentlybeing done on the devel-opment of new methods of context-specific inquiry(e.g., Knorr-Cetina ndMulkay 1983, Morgan1983).At a minimum,considerationof these workspointstotheneedto morefully observeandreportresearchde-tails in currentapproaches o researchandto criticallyevaluate currentresearch methods which were de-signed for seeking universalgeneralizations.In gen-eral, less emphasis on following normativerules ofresearchconductgarnered rom P/E accountsof sci-ence may aid in the developmentof better methodsandtheories.

Summary and ConclusionsWe have shown thatmany aspectsof scientific activ-ity are consistent with basic marketingconcepts andprocesses.We have impliedthatastutescientistscouldmake good use of basic marketingprinciplesto de-velop effective strategies or promoting heirtheories.In addition,we have shown that the "science is mar-keting"perspective s moreconsistentwith the "new"R/C philosophy of science than with the outdatedP/E orientationthat currentlydominates marketingresearch.We have also arguedthatadoptingan R/Capproach n marketingcould producemore creativeanduseful theories.Whilewe believe thatmarketingprovidesa usefulperspectivefor analyzingscience, otherviews of sci-ence areusefulas well. Forexample, science can alsobe analyzed as art and theater (Feyerabend 1968),rhetoric Gusfield1976), communication(Edge 1979),and cognitive psychology (Tweney, Doherty, andMynatt1981). Moreover,aspects of science are sim-ilar to mysticism (Capra 1975) as well as more for-mally organizedreligion (Feyerabend1968). In somesituations,even the positivistic/empiricistperspectivemay offer useful ideas aboutscience. Futureresearchon science might identify and create new perspec-tives, combine and comparealternativeperspectives,and specify the contexts and situationsunderwhichone perspectivemay be more useful thananother.Finally, t is reasonable o askwhatwe have learnedabout the question, "Is marketinga science?" Whilewe recognize that no defensible criterionfor distin-guishingscience fromnonscience haseverbeenfound(Laudan1982), we believe that the main task of sci-ence is to createusefulknowledge. To the degreethatmarketinghas done so, then it can be labeled a sci-ence. As marketing cientistswe shouldbe concerned



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to make our discipline more effective in creating use-ful knowledge about our subject matter. We believethat such improvements are best achieved by adoptingthe relativistic/constructionist approach to science ad-vocated here. Recognizing the social processes of sci-ence, the context specificity of scientific knowledge,and other features of the R/C program can give mar-

keting scholars the freedom and confidence to createnew conceptual schemes and perspectives. Thisis in contrast to following the outdated rules of theP/E approach that focus only on testing theories wealready have. A creative science of marketing is morelikely to flourish by taking a relativistic/construction-ist approach.

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