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N C , Form 364 U s. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMuis& SONsuAPPROVED OMS alO 3190-010.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '"a'a's : 3i es

F ACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET NUMOER I2I PAGEi3

Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Unit 1 0 |S | 0 |010141410 1 |OF| 0 | 3TaTLE tes

Procedure Errors Cause Emergency Recirculation ActuationsEVENT DATE ISI LER NUMBER 461 REPORT DATE E7) OTHER F ACILITIEs INVOLVED 181

SEG ia'MONTM Def YE6R YEAR MONTM DAY YEAR P ACiuTv Nawas DOCEET NUMSERr51g n ,

015l010f0 ! I l

0|8 l!6 8 6 8|6 0|4|7 0|0 0|9 1 |2 8|6 o isto 1 0 oi t I ,

oPERATiNO '"'s REPORT is susMiTTED PURSUANT TO THE REOuinEMENTs Op 10 CFR I rea.c ., we er ,a. n * .,) liin'

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POWER 20 436 feH tibi 60 34(eH1) 50 73teH2Hol 73.711elLEVEL

(10' 01010 20 *0*ieH'Han 50 3steH2) n0 73'eH2H >- O.THE a.nd on T nt. NMC Fo,eIsa e* 'a A*streer

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20 406(aH111m) 60 73(eH2Hal 60 73< ell 2HemiISI

20 40stell1Het 50 73(eH211nd 50 73teH2Hel

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TMit LER 1121NAYE TELEP"ONE NLvtER

AAE A CGDE

Paul Russ. Compliance Engineer, ext. 6472 21 116 215 | 91- 13171317COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACM COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRIGED IN TMis REPORT 1131

"E'h"h';8f E"" "C'y CAUSE Sv5'EY CCYPONENT V'7

AC A CRia LECAv$E Sv3TEv CovPONENTg pn

I I I I I I I I i i 1 ! I i

i l I I I I ! I I f I I I fSUPPLEMENTAL REPORT E XPECTED 114 MONT DAY vEAR

St,69 55 0%

YE5 fl* v.s cO*o r. EMPECTED SG0wsstDN CA rti %O| | |

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On August 16, 1986, train "A" of the Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air

Conditioning (CRHVAC) system momentarily started in the EmergencyRecirculation Mode during performance of a Diesel Generator (DG) surveillancetest. The actuation was determined to be caused by DG exhaust tripping aCRHVAC Ethylene Oxide monitor. The precautions in the CRHVAC System OperatingInstruction (SOI) and the DG Surveillance Instruction (SVI) did not adequatelyprescribe the measures to be taken to prevent the CRHVAC train f rom startingin the Emergency Recirculation Mode.

The precautions in the CRHVAC system SOI and the DG SVI's are being revised toindicate that prior to starting a DG, both CRHVAC trains should be running inthe Emerdency Recirculation Mode. .

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8609170255 860712{DR ADOCK 05000440

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NRC form 3644 U.S. NUCLEAA KE1ULATORY COMW$stON' ' ' 'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AerRovEc oMe No. siso-oio.

EXPIRES: $/31/08

F ACILITV NAME Op DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUM8f R (6) 9403 (3)

5'W.L'' "E*,0"^a

P*rry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 0 |5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 410 8|6 -- Ol4 | 7 -- Ol0 0|2 OF 0 |3,

FEXT (#mo<w spece e renewed, ese emoonaf MC Form J8ENst H7)

On August 16,1986 at 1605 train "A" of the Control Room Heating Ventilation

and Air Conditioning (CRHVAC) system momentarily started in the EmergencyRecirculation Mode. At the time of the event the plant was in Operational

Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown). Reactor vessel pressure was atmospheric andtemperature was 137 degrees.

The System Operating Instruction (S0I) for the CRHVAC system contains aprecaution that prior to starting the Diesel Generator (DG){DG} , any CRHVACtrain that is not in a secured status should be placed in the Emergency

Recirculation Mode. The Surveillance Instruction (SVI) for the DG contains asimilar precaution. These precautions were intended to prevent an inadvertentautomatic initiation in the Emergency Recirculation Mode. In anticipation of

starting the Division 2 DG for a surveillance test, Control Room operatorsplaced both CRHVAC "A" and "B" trains in the Emergency Recirculation Mode with

the "A" train in standby readiness and the "B" train running. Shortly after

starting the DG, Control Room operators heard the CRHVAC "A" train start and,

in about 5 seconds, stop. Control Room operators observed that annunciators[ ANN] for the T0XIC CAS HIGH and the TRAIN A AUTO INITIATION had energized andthen had cleared. The annunciators were reset and af ter the DG surveillancetest was completed, the CRHVAC system was restored to a normal line up.Investigation of the event determined that a puff of DG exhaust tripped one ofthe two Ethylene Oxide Monitors [45] in the CRHVAC system and caused the "A"train to start. When the exhaust cleared, the Ethylene Oxide Monitorautomatically reset and the "A" train returned to standby status. The intentof the CRHVAC SOI and DG SVI precautions was to have both "A" and "B" trains

running in the Emergency Recirculation Mode unless they were in a disabledstatus. This was intended to preclude an automatic Emergency RecirculationMode actuation. However, the precautions were worded such that they allowed atrain to be in standby readiness in the Emergency Recirculation Mode. Thusthe automatic shif t to the Emergency Recirculation Mode was prevented but theautomatic system start was not prevented. The same CRHVAC system lineup hadbeen used during numerous previous DG startups but conditions were such thatthe DG exhaust did not reach the Ethylene Oxide monitors and no autoaaticactuation occurred.

This event was caused by procedure error. The CRHVAC S01 and DG SVIprecautions did not prevent startup of the idle CRHVAC train in the EmergencyRecirculation Mode.

The CRHVAC system maintains Control Room habitability by' automaticallyshif ting to the Emergency Recirculation Mode upon receipt of various signals,including the presence of Ethylene Oxide. During this event the system

started as designed and no adverse effects occurred. Had this event occurredduring power operation the results would have been the same. In addition,

safety analyses have shown that DG operation does not adversely affect ControlRoom Habitability. For these reasons, the event had no safety significance.No previous similar events have occurred.

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N'!.C Pere 364A U S. NUCLE #.R ltEGULATO3Y COMMIS$10N'"''LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION 4 PRovio oMe no. 3 iso-oio4

LAPIRES: 8/31,8B

F ACILITY NAME ill DOCKET NUMBER (23 LER NUMSf R IS) PAGE (3)

5'UM.'' -

0'ut''.70"^"

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I o15|0|0|0|4|4|0 816 - 0| 4| 7 - 0|0 0|3 OF 0|3,

text ta = ==. . .,-w. .,- useo,w une rom, asE4 w sin

The precautions in the CRHVAC system SOI and DG SVI's are being revised toindicate that, prior to starting a DG, both CRHVAC trains should be running inthe Emergency Recirculation Mode unless they are disabled.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as[ XX] .

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