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Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 32, pp. 121

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Divided Sovereignty in the Genghisid States as

Exemplifed by the Crimean Khanate:Oriental Despotism rebours?

Dariusz Koodziejczyk

In 1957, when Karl Wittfogel published his seminal book on OrientalDespotism,1it was evident from the outset that the authors arguments wereheavily biased against Russia and deeply rooted in the Cold War atmosphere.

Wittfogels chief argument about the liaison between irrigation and state des-potism had to wait for its critics until more recent times,2but his treatment ofRussia as an example of a hydraulic society was immediately perceived asan intellectual aberration. Nonetheless, the notion of Russia as an OrientalTyranny or Asiatic Tyranny proved handy in journalistic efforts to explainthe Soviet system to a Western reader, and it has retained some popular cur-rency up to the present day. In a paragraph of his book, headed The Introduc-tion of Oriental Despotism into Russia, Wittfogel blamed the Tatars for beingdecisive both in destroying the non-Oriental Kievan society and in laying thefoundations for the despotic state of Muscovite and post-Muscovite Russia. In

doing so, he invoked such different authorities as historians Vasilij Kljuevskij3and George Vernadsky, and... the poet Alexander Pushkin.4Among the tremen-dously rich literary tradition that blames the Mongols and Tatars for infectingthe Russian soul with the spirit of despotism, two other inuential writers canbe named here: a nineteenth-century French author Marquis de Custine5andan early twentieth-century Polish historian Jan Kucharzewski.6

1 Karl Wittfogel,Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power(New Haven, 1957). 2 For a recent discussion, invoking earlier literature, see Alan Mikhail,For a recent discussion, invoking earlier literature, see Alan Mikhail, Nature and Empire in

Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 3137.

3 The system of Latin transcription, adopted in the present article with the kind permis-sion of the ASI Editorial Commission and differentiating between Russian, Ruthenian,and modern Ukrainian texts recorded in the Cyrillic script, is based on the one proposedby George Shevelov, although with a number of modications; for additional details, seeDariusz Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and PolandLithuania: International Diplomacyon the European Periphery (15th18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated

Documents(Leiden, 2011), pp. 524525. 4 Wittfogel,Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, pp. 219225, esp. p. 225. 5 See especially his letter from July 8, 1839, in Astolphe markiz de Custine,See especially his letter from July 8, 1839, in Astolphe markiz de Custine, Listy z Rosji. Rosja

w 1839 roku(Warszawa 1991), pp. 1819 [I quote the Polish edition.]. 6 See Jan Kucharzewski,See Jan Kucharzewski, Od Biaego Caratu do Czerwonego, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1926); for typi-

cal terms such as the savage school of Mongol slavery or Mongol tyranny see theabridged English translation: The Origins of Modern Russia(New York, 1948), pp. 1920.

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To state that the Muscovian rulers borrowed despotic forms of govern-ment from the Tatars, one must tacitly assume that such forms were indig-enous and natural for the Tatar society. Yet, such an assumption is far fromthe truth. At times of great military conquests, most notably during the reign

of Genghis Khan, high-level centralization and violent suppression of domes-tic opposition might have been achieved temporarily in the Mongol empire,but to make this vast empire function and survive in the long term, the coop-eration of local elites must have been secured. To strengthen and legitimizetheir rule, the khans were compelled to share the spoils of war and the rightsto exploit subjugated populations with their immediate family members, theleading Mongol and Tatar clan leaders and their followers, rank and le war-riors, and nally, landed and urban elites as well as clergymen7belonging tovarious ethno-religious groups peopling the Genghisid empire. Given the lackof precise inheritance rules in steppe society, following the death of GenghisKhan any of his agnate descendants would have been able to claim the throne.Consequently, with the ongoing fragmentation of the Eurasian empire oncefounded by Genghis Khan, the members of various branches of the Genghisiddynasty, who struggled to secure control over the whole empire or at leastits substantial parts, were in desperate need of cooperation from the side ofthe local elites. In the Mongol tradition, the election of the khan as well as hismost important decisions was subject to acceptance by the noble general as-sembly known as qurultay. This institution survived in the late Genghisid statesin Eastern Europe, with which Muscovy maintained intensive contacts, most

notably the Kazan Khanate and the Crimean Khanate.8In the sixteenth-centuryMuscovian chronicles one nds numerous mentions of qurultay, referred to asvsja zemlja, i.e. the whole land, thus the Russians must have been familiarwith this democratic institution of their MongolTatar neighbors.9

7 To invoke just one example, regarding the privileges granted to Russian clergymen by thekhans of the Golden Horde, see Arkadij Grigorev, Sbornik xanskix jarlykov russkim mitro-politam. Istonikovedeskij analiz zolotoordynskix dokumentov(St. Petersburg, 2004).

8 t is worth emphasizing that a number of Mongol traditional institutions, reecting the patt is worth emphasizing that a number of Mongol traditional institutions, reecting the pat-tern of steppe democracy, survived better in Genghisid states in Eastern Europe, Siberia,and Central Asia, than in Persia and China, where the rulers from the Ilkhanid and Yuandynasties largely adopted local models of kingship typical for the urbanized and bureau-cratized empires that had existed in Persia and China since ancient times.

9 See Mixail Xudjakov,See Mixail Xudjakov, Oerki po istorii Kazanskogo xanstva(Moscow, 1991 [rst published in1923]), pp. 191196, and Donald Ostrowski, Ruling Class Structures of the Kazan Khan-ate, in H. Gzel, C. Ouz, and O. Karatay, eds., The Turks, vol. 2: Middle Ages(Ankara,

2002), pp. 841847, esp. p. 844 (both aforementioned studies refer to the Kazan Khanate,but their conclusions apply just as well to the Crimean Khanate).


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STEPPEDEMOCRACY ASREFLECTEDINTHECRIMEANKHANATESFOREIGNRELATIONS

This article addresses the problem of divided sovereignty in the Crime-

an Khanate, the last Genghisid state in Eastern Europe, which was to persistuntil 1783. It is based on the records related to the diplomatic exchanges be-tween the Crimean Khanate and its northern neighbors: PolandLithuania10and Muscovy.11The question of who was in charge of the Khanates foreignpolicy and with whom one should negotiate political agreements reappearedwith regular frequency in both mutual negotiations and in internal discourseat the courts in Moscow, Vilnius, Cracow (later Warsaw), as well as Qrq Yer(later Baghchasaray).

Any foreign envoy sent to the Crimean Khanate in the sixteenth or seven-

teenth century knew that it was insufcient to negotiate with the khan. Peacetreaties concluded by the Tatars with their northern Christian neighbors weretypically negotiated, sworn and conrmed by numerous members of the Gi-ray dynasty, the four clan leaders named qarai beys,12lesser Tatar and Nogaynobles, Muslim clergymen, and courtiers.

The most prominent Crimean dignitary after the khan was the qala13

typically a younger brother or the eldest son of the ruling khan. In the earli-est yarlqs (khan decrees) and artnames (oath-letters) addressed to the PolishLithuanian rulers, the name of the qalais listed among the personalities whoswore the peace, directly after the name of the khan. In the subsequent period,

the qalas began to edit their own instruments of peace.While the consent of the qalawas instrumental for securing peace evenwhen his relations with the khan were impeccable, it was even more crucialduring internal conicts within the Giray family. n 1527, during uneasy co-

10 Until the early sixteenth century Vilnius and Cracow maintained contacts with the CrimeaUntil the early sixteenth century Vilnius and Cracow maintained contacts with the Crimeaseparately even though Poland and Lithuania were joined by a dynastic union. Nonethe-less, already in this period one observes a gradual amalgamation in the foreign policy ofthe two states. For instance, Casimir and Sigismund were titled as kings when they re-

ceived Crimean embassies in Vilnius, although in Lithuania they formally acted as granddukes and not as the kings of Poland. 11 Foreign policy is of course but one window through which one might view the CrimeanForeign policy is of course but one window through which one might view the Crimean

structure of power. No less valuable insight can be gained through the examination ofsuch aspects of the Khanates domestic policy as the distribution of lands and pasturages,the structure of tax collection, or the unequal levels of the khans jurisdiction over varioussegments of Crimean society; for a recent groundbreaking study of the latter aspect, un-dertaken by Natalia Krlikowska, see n. 60 below.

12 On their role in the Mongol world, see Uli Schamiloglu, TheOn their role in the Mongol world, see Uli Schamiloglu, The Qara Beys of the LaterGolden Horde: Notes of the Organization of the Mongol World Empire, Archivum Eur-asiae Medii Aevi4 (Wiesbaden, 1984), pp. 283297.

13 On the term and its usage, see oseph Matuz, QalaOn the term and its usage, see oseph Matuz, Qala Turcica. Revue dtudes turques 2(1970), pp. 101129.


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habitation between the khan Saadet Giray and his nephew, the qalaIslam Gi-ray, the PolishLithuanian diplomacy secured two instruments of peace issuedseparately by both Girays.14The fact that Islam Giray received foreign embas-sies and that he could issue a peace instrument separately from the ruling khan

contributed to a somewhat blurred picture of the khanates domestic hierarchyof that period, both in his contemporaries opinions and in modern historiog-raphy. n 1532, during the renewed open conict between Saadet Giray andIslam Giray, the lords of the Lithuanian Council wrote to King Sigismund thatin the present time there have remained two khans in this Horde (teperenehoasu na toj Orde dva cary zostaly).15This vision found a modern corroboration inthe opinion of Wadysaw Pociecha, an eminent Polish historian, who observedthat, in 1534, King Sigismund of Poland had dispatched an embassy to bothkhans (do obu chanw) who reigned in the Crimea.16

In the seventeenth century, the qalas had their own chancery based inAq Mesdjid Saray, their residence located near modern Simferopol. They is-sued documents provided with their own monograms (turas), not inferior inartistic quality to the monograms of the ruling khans.17Two instruments ofpeace (ahdnames), issued by Qala slam Giray along with the instruments ofhis elder brother, Khan Bahadr Giray, in 1637 and 1640, have been preservedin the Polish archives.18

The qalas also corroborated peace instruments along with or on behalfof the ruling khans. n 1595, after the OttomanPolish negotiations at uora/Cecora, in which the Ottomans were assisted by the Tatars, the resulting peace

14 See the instruments from 1527 issued by Khan Saadet Giray and Qala slam Giray, pubSee the instruments from 1527 issued by Khan Saadet Giray and Qala slam Giray, pub-lished in Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 665680.

15 See A. Dubonis, ed.,See A. Dubonis, ed., Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 15 (15281538). Uraym knyga 15(Vilnius,2002), p. 174.

16 Pociechas observation is related to the period when Islam Giray once again rioted againstPociechas observation is related to the period when Islam Giray once again rioted againstthe ruling khan, Sahib Giray (r. 15321551), another uncle of his; Acta Tomiciana, vol. 16,pt. 1 (Wrocaw etc., 1960), p. 597, n. 11. Albeit reecting the de facto Crimean realities ofthat time, the opinion of the Polish scholar is nonetheless misleading. The Polish courtoften tacitly supported Islam Giray in the hope of weakening the ruling khan, but it couldnot risk open confrontation with the Ottoman sultan, whom Sahib Giray owed his throne;hence, in the PolishOttoman peace treaty, concluded shortly before, in 1533, King Sigis-mund formally acknowledged Sahib Giray as the Crimean khan and engaged not to assistthe Crimean malcontents; see Dariusz Koodziejczyk, OttomanPolish Diplomatic Relations(15th18th Century): An Annotated Edition ofAhdnames and Other Documents (Leiden, 2000),p. 233.

17 or some ne eamples, published in color facsimiles, see Sagit aizov,or some ne eamples, published in color facsimiles, see Sagit aizov, Tugra i Vselen-naja.Moxabbat-name i ert-name krymskix xanov i princev v ornamentalnom, sakralnom idiplomatieskom kontekstax(Moscow-Baghchasaray, 2002).

18 Published in Koodziejczyk,Published in Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 919922 and 942947; the instrumentfrom 1640 is preserved in the Turkish original, provided with Islam Girays tura(see ibid.,

facs. IXa-c), whereas the instrument from 1637 is extant only in a Polish translation. IslamGiray later became Khan Islam III Giray (r. 16441654).


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instrument of the Muslim side was corroborated by Khan Ghazi II Giray, hisbrother, Qala eth Giray, and the Ottoman governor of Bender, Ahmed Bey.19n 1667, in result of the PolishCrimean pacication at Pidhajci/Podhajce, inthe absence of Khan Adil Giray, the Crimean instrument was sealed by Qala

Qrm Giray, two other Giray princes who were the khans and the qalasnephews, and seven other Crimean dignitaries.20

The Giray princes who did not hold the post of the qalaalso felt entitled toparticipate in negotiations with foreign courts, exchange presents with foreignrulers, and even issue their own instruments of peace along with the instru-ments issued by the khan. When Mehmed Giray ascended the throne in 1515,he was compelled to grant the post of qalato his younger brother, Ahmed,unwillingly, even though he would have preferred to grant it to his oldestand favorite son, Bahadr. Nonetheless, this move did not discourage BahadrGiray from playing an independent role in the Crimean foreign policy. Weknow about his unsuccessful overture to negotiate a separate peace instrumentwith Moscow: in 1515 the Muscovian envoy, Ivan Mamonov, was instructed tonegotiate with the khan only and notto accept any separate instrument fromBahadr (a neto carevi stanet davati Ivanu svoju oprinjuju ertnuju gramotu, iIvanu u carevia gramoty ego ne imati).21Bahadrs initiative to play a semiinde-pendent role in the Crimean foreign diplomacy was better received in Vilniusand Cracow. In 1517, the Giray prince issued an instrument of peace in his ownname, corroborated with his oath and signet seal, in which he reiterated thecontents of his fathers instrument previously sent to King Sigismund.22

The qala, typically identied with the heir apparent, was appointed bythe khan from among his male family members. Nevertheless, the khans free-dom of choice was limited by custom and domestic pressure, sometimes aidedby foreign (i.e. Ottoman) intervention. Whereas the khans usually preferred toappoint their oldest sons, thereby tacitly promoting the rule of primogeniture,the Genghisid tradition favored the rule of seniority which gave the khansyounger brothers precedence over the khans sons in the order of successionto the throne. This tension is eemplied by the previously described conictof Bahadr Giray, the ambitious son of Mehmed Giray (r. 15151523), andthe khans brother, Ahmed Giray, who held the post of qala from the timeof Mehmeds accession in 1515. In 1519, Ahmed openly rebelled against thekhan and was killed by Bahadr, who only then ascended to the post of qala.After the violent deaths of both Mehmed and Bahadr Giray at the hands of theNogays in 1523, the net decade was strongly affected by the conict betweenthe late khans brothers, Saadet Giray (r. 15231532) and Sahib Giray (r. 1532

19 Published in Koodziejczyk,Published in Koodziejczyk, OttomanPolish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 298299. 20 Published in Koodziejczyk,Published in Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 984990. 21 G. Karpov and G. tendman, eds.,G. Karpov and G. tendman, eds.,Pamjatniki diplomatieskix snoenij Moskovskago gosudarst-

va s Krymskoju i Nogajskoju ordami i s Turciej, vol. 2: 15081521 gg. in Sbornik Imperatorskago

Russkago Istorieskago Obestva95 (St. Petersburg, 1895), p. 215. 22 Published in Koodziejczyk,Published in Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 633641.


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1551), and the late khans sons, Ghazi Giray (r. 1523) and Islam Giray (r. 1532),whose short reigns were frustrated by concerted efforts of the Ottoman Porteand the domestic opposition in the Crimea. When a similar conict broke outonce again in the Crimea, and in 1581, Khan Mehmed II Giray (r. 15771584)

was prevented from appointing his son, Saadet Giray, to the post of qala,which was given instead to the khans rebellious brother, Alp Giray, MehmedII Giray resolved to create for his son a new post of nureddin. Because nureddinhad become third in rank in the Crimean hierarchy, it is no wonder that for-eign courts hastened to establish direct friendly relations with this new Tatardignitary. At least once, a nureddinis known to have issued his own instrumentof peace: in 1640, Nureddin Qrm Giray sent to Poland his ahdname, providedwith his own tura. His document was brought to Warsaw along with the in-struments of his two older brothers, the khan and the qala.23

Among the other Crimean ofcials who took part in diplomatic nego-

tiations, a special role was played by the chief qara the leader of the mostprominent noble clan in the Crimea.24This special role was already evident inthe fteenth century. n 1480, during his audience in Vilnius, a Crimean envoyHadji Baba swore on behalf of his lord and all the Tatar nobles a solemn oath tokeep peace with King Casimir. Signicantly, the Tatar envoy invoked by nameonly three Crimean personages: Khan Mengli Giray, the khans brother, QalaYaghmurcha Sultan, and the qarafrom the Shirin clan, Eminek. Three decadeslater, Emineks nephew and successor, Agsh, in his correspondence with Mos-cow, frankly disclosed the political aspirations of the Shirins: Are there not

two shafts to a cart? The right shaft is my lord the khan, and the left shaft amI, with my brothers and children.25As might be expected, Agishs name is, inturn, duly invoked in the peace instruments sent by Mengli Giray to Vilniusand Moscow in the years 1507 and 1508, respectively, although contrary tohis lofty ambitions the name of the Shirin leader is preceded by the names ofTevkel and Mamsh, the leaders of the clans of Manghts and Sedjevts, whocompeted with the Shirins for the preeminence in the hierarchy of the Crimeannoble clans and who strongly challenged the Shirins position in the early six-teenth century.26

23 Published in ibid., pp. 935941; the instrument is preserved in the Turkish original, proPublished in ibid., pp. 935941; the instrument is preserved in the Turkish original, pro -vided with Qrm Girays tura(see ibid., facs. VIIIa-c). Although the post of nureddinwascreated initially for the khans oldest son whereas the post of qalawas occupied by thekhans brother, it had never become a formalized rule. A khans son could still becomethe qalaand, vice-versa, a khans brother (or any other male relative) could become thenureddin.

24 On theOn the qaras, whose number should have been four (although this rule was not alwaysobserved in the Crimean Khanate), cf. n. 11 above.

25 Quoted after Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Clans of the Crimean Khanate 14661532,Quoted after Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Clans of the Crimean Khanate 14661532, Har-vard Ukrainian Studies2 (1978), pp. 282309, esp. p. 282.

26 Cf. Koodziejczyk,Cf. Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 3334; the instrument sent in 1507 to King Si -gismund is published in ibid., pp. 566579.


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Although the Sedjevts proved unable to establish themselves perma-nently at the top of the Crimean noble hierarchy, the challenge of the Manghtswas more serious. n the early seventeenth century, the Manght leader, Kan-temir, outdid other Crimean clans by far in drawing his military strength from

the Nogay tribes dwelling on the Black Sea steppes; he openly challengedthe khans authority by establishing a semi-independent rule in Budjak andby invoking Ottoman mediation in his conicts with successive khans. ThePorte was all too happy to strengthen its hold in the region by interfering inthe Khanates internal disputes.27The Polish authorities were so desperate toprevent Kantemirs raids from neighboring Budjak that the royal instrumentfrom 1624, in which Sigismund conrmed the conditions of PolishOttomanpeace, negotiated in 1621 at Hotin, contained a special clause providing that thekhan, the qala, the Manght leader and other Tatars nobles (mirzas) as wellas commoners (nec ipse chan, nec galga sultan, nec Cantimir murza, nec alii murziet Tartarii) abstain from raiding and causing harm to the royal domains.28It istelling that Kantemir was listed by name in this instrument after the khan andthe qala, just as Eminek had been once listed in the oath of the Tatar envoy,pronounced in Vilnius in 1480.

After the Ottomans executed unruly Kantemir in 1637 and after KhanBahadr Giray massacred numerous Nogay leaders in 1639, the Manghts lostmuch of their power. The Shirins were able to reassume their position as theleaders of the Crimean nobility, with the Manghts still counting as the sec-ond most important clan in the Khanate. The Tatar instrument of 1667, result-

ing from the peace negotiations at Pidhajci/Podhajce and already mentionedabove, was corroborated with the seals of the qala, two other Giray princes,and seven Crimean dignitaries, among whom one nds the Shirin qaraanda representative of the Manght clan named Muradshah Mirza.29It is particu-larly interesting that the Shirin qara, Mengli Giray Bey, whose name opens thelist of non-Giray dignitaries, was immodestly named after the Crimean khanMengli Giray who had reigned in the years 14661515 (with two interruptions).He also used the almond-like seal, which was otherwise restricted to the use ofthe Giray dynasty members, and his seals legend openly invoked his descentfrom Khan Hadji Giray, the founder of the Crimean Khanate.30These were not

27 On Kantemir, see Mihnea Berindei, La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues,16001637, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 1 (1977), pp. 273307, esp. pp. 291306.

28 or the document, issued on 1 April 1624 in Warsaw, see Koodziejczyk,or the document, issued on 1 April 1624 in Warsaw, see Koodziejczyk, OttomanPolishDiplomatic Relations, pp. 419426, esp. p. 421.

29 Koodziejczyk,Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 986987 and 989990. Murad-shah Mirza is re-ferred to as Mansur-oghlu (Mansur uu) in the Polish tet while in that period the Manghtswere alternatively known as the Mansurs or Mansur-oghlus. Murad-shah was not the clanleader, as the qarawould have been titled beyand not mirza.

30 Cf. Ibid., p. 989, n. 14, and facs. XIIIc. The Shirin clan members customarily married GirayCf. Ibid., p. 989, n. 14, and facs. XIIIc. The Shirin clan members customarily married Giray

princesses. Therefore, the qaras claim to descent though only matrilineal from theGiray, and consequently the Genghisid family, was justied. To give just one eample,


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innocent pretensions: they reected the ambitions of the powerful clan, whosemembers had frequently inuenced Crimean policy and with whose opinionevery khan had to reckon.

The Giray family members and the leaders of the most powerful noble

clans were not the only ones who participated in the Khanates foreign cor-respondence and the procedure of peacemaking. Mengli Girays instrument ofpeace, sent to King Sigismund in 1507 and already described above, containsa long list of the Crimean dignitaries who corroborated the newly establishedpeace with their oaths taken in the presence of the royal envoy. The dignitariescan be grouped into three categories: the dynasty members, the Muslim clergy-men, and the leaders of the Crimean nobility.31

Dynasty members: - Yaghmurcha (the khans younger brother and qala) - Mehmed Giray (the khans oldest son, future qalaand khan) - Ahmed Giray (the khans second son) - Yapancha (Yaghmurchas son) - Mahmud Giray (the khans third son) - Feth Giray (the khans fourth son) Burnash (the khans fth son)

Muslim clergymen: - Babaka Seyyid32

- Sultan Ali33 - Burghan Mullah34

Mahdum-shah, a daughter of Khan Mengli Giray and hence granddaughter of Khan HadjiGiray, was married to Devletek, the head of the Shirin clan and the son of Eminek; see lyaZaytsev [Zajcev], The Structure of the Giray Dynasty (15th16th Centuries): Matrimonialand Kinship Relations of the Crimean Khans, in E. Boikova and R. Rybakov, eds., Kinshipin the Altaic World: Proceedings of the 48th Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Moscow

1015 July, 2005(Wiesbaden, 2006), pp. 341353, esp. p. 341.31 Cf. Koodziejczyk,Cf. Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 483484; for more details about the listed per-

sonages, see ibid., pp. 574576, notes 217, and p. 579, n. 40. 32 Babaka or Babike Seyyid, the brother-in-law of Mengli Giray.Babaka or Babike Seyyid, the brother-in-law of Mengli Giray. 33 Probably identical with the great mullah Ali, mentioned by Mehmed Giray in his letterProbably identical with the great mullah Ali, mentioned by Mehmed Giray in his letter

to Vasilij III from 1516 and referred to as my great mullah, superior to all our mullahs, andalso my great kadi; see Karpov and tendman, Pamjatniki diplomatieskix snoenij, vol. 2, p.299.

34 In my book, I regarded the above two persons, Sultan Ali and Burghan Mullah, as oneIn my book, I regarded the above two persons, Sultan Ali and Burghan Mullah, as oneperson named Sultan Ali Abdulghani (recorded as soltan ali abulgan mallaor alternativelysoltan ali aburgan mallawhere the letter adisplayed in bold could be read as the rst letterin a proper name but also as a conjunction in Ruthenian); see Koodziejczyk, The CrimeanKhanate, pp. 566 and 574. Yet, a discussion with Laimontas Karalius persuaded me that

these were two different persons. Apart from Mengli Girays instrument of peace dated1507, Burghan Mullah is recorded two more times in the Lithuanian Register, in the docu-


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- Baba Sheikh (on him see below)

Highest noble functionaries and leaders: Mamsh Ulan, lieutenant (qaymaqam) of Qrq Yer35

Saqal Bey, leader of the Crimean branch of the Qyats36 Tevkel Bey, leader of the Crimean Manghts and the khans brotherinlaw37

Mamsh Bey, leader of the Sedjevts (Sedjeuts) and the khans brotherinlaw Agsh Bey, qaraof the Shirins Devlet Bakht Bey, qaraof the Barns and lieutenant of Qarasu Bazar38

- Merdan Bey, qaraof the Arghns - Mahmud Bey, qaraof the Qpchaqs.39

Apart from those listed by name, many more Tatar nobles and courtiersparticipated in the oath ceremony. A year later, in 1508, a Muscovian envoyKostjantin Zabolockij resolved to remunerate each who had sworn to keeppeace with Moscow, with one sable. It soon turned out that he had no sablesleft: twenty dissatised Tatars remained with empty hands.40

Well aware of the decentralized structure of Crimean politics, the Khan-ates northern neighbors insisted that the oath to keep peace should be taken

ments from 1507 and 1509; see the recently published volume: . larien, L. Karalius, andD. Antanaviius, eds.,Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 7 (15061539).Uraym knyga 7(Vilnius,2011), pp. 104 and 142. Moreover, Burghan Mullah is recalled as deceased (pokojniku Bur-

gan molle) in the aforementioned letter by Mehmed Giray, addressed in 1516 to Vasilij III,whereas in the same letter Mullah Ali gures as a living person; cf. n. 32 above. would liketo thank Laimontas Karalius for his help in solving this puzzle.

35 Mamsh Ulan, son of Sarmak Ulan, gured prominently in the diplomatic negotiationsMamsh Ulan, son of Sarmak Ulan, gured prominently in the diplomatic negotiationswith Muscovy and Lithuania and headed embassies to these countries. Syroekovskijsassumption that he belonged to the Qpchaq clan has been challenged by Beatrice orbesManz; see Manz, The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, pp. 292293. n the period con -cerned, the post of the Qpchaq qarawas occupied by Mahmud Bey (see below), whosepolitical inuence was nevertheless much weaker than that of Mamsh Ulan.

36 Saqals father (or perhaps a more distant ancestor), Qyat Mansur, was the founder of theSaqals father (or perhaps a more distant ancestor), Qyat Mansur, was the founder of thebranch of the Qyat clan, which had left the Volga region after 1380 and settled in Lithuania

and the Crimea. 37 Tevkel, son of Temir, was the Manght (i.e., Nogay) leader who had entered the CrimeanTevkel, son of Temir, was the Manght (i.e., Nogay) leader who had entered the Crimeanservice in 1503, after the collapse of the Great Horde; his sister, Nur Sultan, was MengliGirays wife.

38 Devlet Bakht also gured prominently in Crimean international policy and led embassiesDevlet Bakht also gured prominently in Crimean international policy and led embassiesto King Sigismund I (15121513) and to the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1515).

39 The last two beys are not listed by name in the instrument proper but their names can beThe last two beys are not listed by name in the instrument proper but their names can befound in the appended list that has been recorded in the Lithuanian Register along with theartname; the list also contains the names of Mehmed Giray, Mamsh Ulan, Agsh Bey, andDevlet Bakht Bey, who are already mentioned in the instrument proper; in 1508, Merdanand Mahmud Beys also swore an oath to preserve the peace with Muscovy.

40 Anna orokevi,Anna orokevi, Rus i Krym. Ot sojuza k protivostojaniju. Konec XV naalo XVI ss . (Mos-cow, 2001), p. 252.


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not merely by the khan, but by his family members, dignitaries, and promi-nent Crimean clans as well. A very long list of those who had taken an oath tokeep peace with Muscovy in 1524 has been preserved in a copy in the Russianarchives. It includes over two hundred names, grouped into the following cat-

egories: Muslim clergymen (seyyids and mullahs), the Giray princes, the beysand mirzas from the Shirin and Barn clans, the members of the khans council(divan), the khans mother and other prominent harem ladies, the Manghts,the sheikhs and kadis, the palace clerks and the khans courtiers, Qala zbekGirays retinue members, Prince Islam Girays retinue members, the ulans, theSedjevts, Arghns, Kipchaks, Qongrats, Qyats, and others.41

It is worth noting that in both 1507 and 1524, Muslim clergymen werelisted beforethe clan leaders. This was also the case in 1508, as shown by a listof the Crimean dignitaries who swore to keep peace with Muscovy.42The onlyclergyman invoked by name in 1508 was Baba Sheikh, the mullah at the khanscourt, referred to in the Russian sources as molna and bogomolec. One of hissons, Hadji Mehmed Sheikh-zade, was then the mullah at the court of PrinceMehmed Giray. Another, Qurtqa, gures among the clergymen on the list from1524. In the list from 1507, Baba Sheikh was preceded formally by three otherMuslim hierarchs, but his political position was probably greater because threeyears later Sigismund asked him to mediate the peace, invoking his great inu-ence on the khan. In Polish domestic correspondence, Baba Sheikh was thendesignated as the khans archbishop (archiepiscopus imperatorisin Latin).43Wemight assume that his prestige, already high in Crimean society, was further

elevated because of his correspondence with Sigismund, in which the mul-lah was compared explicitly with the archbishop of Gniezno, who in Polandcrowned the king and acted as interrexduring the interregna. Unfortunately,the role of the Muslim clergy in Crimean society and politics is still very muchunder-researched.44

The attitude of the khans in relation to the idea that not just the ruler,but the whole Tatar society should participate in the process of peacemakingwas ambiguous. On the one hand, admitting the limits of his power dimin-

41 Moscow, Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arxiv drevnix aktov [RGADA], f. 123, op. 1, no. 6, fol.Moscow, Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arxiv drevnix aktov [RGADA], f. 123, op. 1, no. 6, fol.86b88b; published in storieskoe i diplomatieskoe sobranie del proisodivi medurossijskimi velikimi knjazjami i byvimi v Kryme tatarskimi carjami s 1462 po 1533 god.Collected by A. Malinovskij, in Zapiski Odesskago Obestva istorii i drevnostej, vol. 5 (Odessa,1863), pp. 178419, esp. pp. 412415; in Central Asia, the Qyats originally formed a subsec-tion of the Qongrats.

42 See Karpov and tendman,See Karpov and tendman, Pamjatniki diplomatieskix snoenij, vol. 2, p. 20. 43 Cf. Koodziejczyk,Cf. Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 37, 485, and 575, n. 11. 44 Pace the studies by Damir Isxakov, which are nonetheless based almost solely on RussianPace the studies by Damir Isxakov, which are nonetheless based almost solely on Russian

sources and focused on the early siteenth century; cf. Damir sakov, slam v pozdnezo-lotoordynskix tatarskix xanstvax, in R. Muxametin, ed., Islam v Srednem Povole: istorija

i sovremennost. Oerki (Kazan, 2001), pp. 5989, esp. pp. 7482; Damir sakov, Seidy vKrymskom xanstve, Qasevet 33 (2008), pp. 1419.


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ished the prestige of the khan as a sovereign monarch. On various occasions,the khans emphasized their exclusive right to negotiate with foreign courts intheir correspondence and in disputes with foreign envoys as to who shouldparticipate in the ceremony of oath-taking that usually cemented the exchange

of peace instruments (see below). On the other hand, claiming the limits of hispower served as a convenient excuse for a khan who was unable or unwill-ing to restrain his subjects from raiding the domains of a neighboring ruler,even though the two states formally remained at peace. In 1566, when Tatartroops had been invited by the Ottoman sultan, Suleyman the Magnicent, toparticipate in his campaign in Hungary and the campaign was prolonged bythe siege of the fortress of Szigetvr, Khan Devlet Giray (r. 15511577) openlyforewarned the envoy of Ivan IV that although he wished a peace with the tsar,he could not swear an oath in the name of the whole land 45because manybeys and mirza

s, along with Qala Mehmed Giray, were still overseas.

46

WHOISINCHARGE? THEKHANATEINTHEEYESOFITSNORTHERNNEIGHBORS

The decentralized structure of Crimean politics provoked different atti-tudes among members of the foreign courts. On the one hand, both the Musco-vian and the PolishLithuanian diplomacies strove to appease with kind wordsand gifts as many Crimean notables as possible. On the other hand, Crimeanpartners at times displayed growing irritation with the need to negotiate eachagreement repeatedly with numerous Crimean dignitaries who all claimed

that they were entitled to do so and epected tting gifts in return. Curiously,their Portuguese contemporaries experienced quite similar cross-cultural en-counters in West Africa.47

45 In the Russian version:In the Russian version: ertovat vsej zemlej; as described earlier, the epression vsja zemlja,encountered in Muscovian sources, typically referred to the Tatar noble assembly knownas the qurultay.

46 Aleksandr Vinogradov,Aleksandr Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnoenija: 50-e vtoraja polovina 70-x godov XVIveka, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2007), p. 66.

47 Micha Tymowski,a Polish medievalist historian and anthropologist, offers an illuminatingMicha Tymowski, a Polish medievalist historian and anthropologist, offers an illuminating

case study by tracing the whereabouts surrounding the death of a Danish knight, Valarte,who commanded one of the Portuguese trading expeditions to the shores of todays Sen-egal. In 1447, Valarte successfully negotiated a trade agreement with a local leader namedGuitenya, who assured his European partners that he was furnished with supreme author-ity by the head ruler of the Serer tribe, who was absent in pursuit of a military campaign.Yet, when Guitenya left to hunt elephants, several Europeans, including Valarte, werekilled in an ambush. In his article, Tymowski strove to reconstruct the internal structureof the fteenthcentury Serer society. According to the Polish scholar, by his negotiationswith European merchants Guitenya sought to elevate his political position and simulta-neously gain wealth. Yet, his real power was severely limited by other local leaders andcommunity members who also took part in the negotiations and deliberately frustrated

Guitenyas plans during his temporary absence; see Micha Tymowski, Dlaczego zginValarte? mier duskiego rycerza w czasie wyprawy do Afryki Zachodniej w poowie


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n 1515, when the Muscovian chancery declined the offer of Bahadr Girayto issue a separate instrument of peace along with the instrument of his father,Khan Mehmed I Giray (see above), the move was apparently dictated by theunwillingness to send additional gifts to the ambitious Giray prince, who acted

as if he were a sovereign ruler.48Negotiating each additional peace agreementinvolved more money spent on gifts, sending and hosting envoys, etc.

The wish to limit the number of embassies and envoys is expressed open-ly in Article 10 of the PolishLithuanian instrument, negotiated with a Crimeanenvoy in Cracow and sent to Khan Sahib Giray for ultimate acceptance in 1541:The khan should not send numerous couriers to His Royal Majesty becauseit causes great detriment [...] in His Majestys treasury.49The royal side alsosought to prevent the khans subjects from sending separate embassies to theroyal court.

In the khans instrument from 1542, the offer was plainly rejected. Sa-hib Giray emphasized the right of all the Giray princes (titled as sultans in theCrimea) as well as the Crimean qaras to send separate embassies to foreigncourts, invoking the ancient tradition, the qaras military power and theirsocial standing parallel to that of the Lithuanian and Polish lords. His onlyconcession was his advice to the king not to receive the envoys sent by otherCrimean subjects:

Envoys and couriers should be sent [to you] by us and our sons: Emin GiraySultan and other sultans. As they used to be sent formerly, also now theyshould be sent likewise by the aforementioned sultans. And as regards the

qaras, they have each 20,000 or 30,000 servants and they used to send envoysand couriers; should we now reduce their number [i.e., the number of theirenvoys]? They used to send envoys in the times of our ancestors and fathers,we cannot reduce their number. As you have the Lithuanian and Polish lordsat your side, so they are their peers at our side. But other people should notsend envoys. And even if [envoys] are sent by other people, you should notreceive them and we will gladly accept it. If you receive those who come with-out any reason, they will not stop coming. So if they come without any reason,

V wieku, in S. Kuczyski, A. Rachuba, and M. Tymowski, eds., Afryka, Orient, Pol-

ska. Prace oarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Dziubiskiemu w siedemdziesit rocznic urodzin(Warsaw, 2007), pp. 133143. 48 The expression volnyj elovek (free man), referring to the khan, gured prominently in

the Crimean correspondence with Muscovy, preserved today in Russian copies; the termreected the ancient MongolTatar notion of sovereignty and probably derived from theMongolTurkic term darhan/tarhan. It expressed the sovereigns independence from otherrulers and especially his right to endow his subjects, including those foreign rulers whomhe regarded as vassals, with titles, lands, or privileges at his will; see orokevi, Rus iKrym, pp. 117118; Vadim Trepavlov, Belyj car: Obraz monarxa i predstavlenija o poddan-stve u narodov Rossii XVXVIII vv.(Moscow, 2007), pp. 3840.

49 A ne maet car mnohyx honcov svoyx do Korolja Eho Mylosty slaty, bo Hospodar[u] Eho Mylost[y]

koda velykaja u skarbe Eho Mylosty sja deet; published in Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khan-ate, pp. 724 and 727.


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you should send them back with empty hands so that they should not comeagain; thus you should know.50

Signicantly, the khan did not forbid his remaining subjects to send em-bassies abroad, but only relieved the king from the obligation of feeding andhosting them. At the same time, this obligation remained in power with regardto the embassies sent by the khan, the Giray princes, and the Crimean qaras.

Although not mentioned in the correspondence presented above, femalemembers of the Giray dynasty also participated in diplomatic exchanges.51In 1539, Sahib Giray emphasized the right of us, our wives, daughters, anddaughters-in-law, [...] the qala sultan and all [other] sultans, whatever theirnumber, and [...] the four qaras, and [...] the two mirzas from the retinue ofeach qara to send embassies to PolandLithuania.52

The royal efforts to limit the number and size of Crimean embassies con-

tinued during the reign of Sahib Girays successor, Devlet Giray, but their ef-fects were rather unimpressive. In a letter sent to King Sigismund Augustus in1552, the new khan adopted an almost conciliatory tone and remarked that hisfamily consisted of merely four wives, two sons, and two daughters, in com-parison to the two wives, six sons, and six daughters of Sahib Giray, hence theroyal treasury would save on extra presents.53In his instrument of peace, sentalong with the aforementioned letter, the Crimean ruler engaged:

And we should not send more envoys and couriers but only the number thatused to be heretofore. According to the custom, envoys and couriers shouldbe sent primarily by us and our wives, the qala sultanand other sultans, threeqaras and two mirzas, their sons, and by nobody else. If more envoys andcouriers were to go, you may send them back without giving them anything,and I will not reproach you, our brother, for this, because as you lavish giftson the envoys and couriers who come to you, on seeing this, they do not want

50 Published in ibid., p. 738.Published in ibid., p. 738. 51 On the correspondence of the ladies from the Giray family with the Swedish court, seeOn the correspondence of the ladies from the Giray family with the Swedish court, see

Elbieta wicicka, The Diplomatic Letters by Crimean Kery Ladies to the Swedish Roy-al House, Rocznik Orientalistyczny 55:1 (2002), pp. 5790. In the Habsburg Imperial Court,where the protocol barred females from receiving foreign embassies, the letters of Crimean

ladies (e.g. the mother of the khan) were typically delivered to and responded by the em-peror himself; see Vienna, Haus, Hof und Staatsarchiv, Trkei , 130, Conv. B (Aprilune1658), fol. 67ab; Trkei , 134, f. 66 (uneAugust 1662), fol. 88ab; Trkei , 144, f. 69 (anu-aryMarch 1673), fol. 63a64a, 69a; Trkei , 150, 2 (anuaryune 1680), fol. 75a78b; cf.Mria vanics [vani], Posolstva krymski tatar pri Venskom dvore v 15981682 gg. (izistorii krymsko-tatarskoj diplomatii XVIXVII vv.), in I. Zajcev and S. Orekova, eds.,Turcica et Ottomanica. Sbornik statej v est 70-letija M. S. Mejera(Moscow, 2006), pp. 226237,esp. p. 234.

52 See Koodziejczyk,See Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 719720. 53 The letter, dated May 15, 1552, is published in M. Obolenskij and . Danilovi, eds.,The letter, dated May 15, 1552, is published in M. Obolenskij and . Danilovi, eds., Kniga

posolskaja Metriki Velikago Knjaestva Litovskago, soderaaja v sebe diplomatieskija snoenija

Litvy v gosudarstvovanie korolja Sigizmunda-Avgusta (s 1545 po 1572 god)(Moscow, 1843), pp.6063.


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to stop going, but if you send them back with empty hands, you would seeyourself whether they would come again.54

In analogy to PolishLithuanian rulers, Muscovian rulers also sought tolimit the number and size of Tatar embassies that visited Moscow annually,consuming large amounts of food and fodder at the expense of their hosts, andextorting gifts on behalf of those who had sent them. The correspondence ofvan with Mengli Giray, originating from the end of the fteenth century,is full of the grand dukes requests that the khan not send embassies of redun-dant size (ne vo mnogix ljudej; linix ljudej ne posylat). Two Crimean envoys,who visited Moscow in 1521, were accompanied by almost 100 men of rank(dobryx ljudej) while the entire embassy might have numbered 400 horsemen.Not incidentally, this exceptionally large embassy was sent after the devastat-ing raid of 1521, when the humiliated Muscovian court sought peace at almost

any price, fearing a restoration of the Golden Horde by the ambitious khanMehmed I Giray.55Although the embassy was exceptionally large in the his-tory of MuscovianCrimean relations, it still did not match the size once at-tained by the embassies from the Golden Horde, which might have greatlyexceeded 500 horsemen.56Although this size certainly reected the hegemonicpretensions of Tatar rulers, expressed by ceremonial pomp, it also expressedthe composite and decentralized structure of Tatar society, whose numerousmembers wanted to benet from the awe in which the Tatar cavalry was per -ceived by the Slavs.

It was not until the seventeenth century that the Russian and Polish courts

managed to include respective clauses in their treaties negotiated with thekhans, limiting the number and size of the Crimean embassies sent to Moscowand Warsaw.57A changed military balance between the Crimean Khanate andits northern neighbors enabled the latter to ignore or openly reject Tatar claimsfor augmented gifts or even to punish the Tatars for their raids executedduring a formal peace by not sending gifts at all. Simultaneously, the khansadopted a centralizing policy and preferred to send smaller embassies com-

54 Y my te ne maem bolej poslov y honcov, odno tak, jako y pered tym byvalo, podluh obyaju poslyy honcy majut yty najpervej ot nas y ot on nayx, y ot koalkgy carevya, y ot ynyx carevyov, yot trex koraeev, a ot yx synov dvux murz, a bolej toho ne maet nyxto slaty. Estli by bolyi toho

posly abo y honcy mely xodyt, vy te nyoho ym ne dajte, otpustyte; ja za to vam, bratu svoemu,

nyoho ne maem movyty, bo posly y honcy, kotoryi xodjat do vas, vy tyx daruete, ony te vydey

to, toho xoenja svoeho perestat ne xout; jako li by este takovyx ny ym otpustyly, samy by este

toho dosmotrely, estli by ony u druhyj raz xodyly; published in Koodziejczyk, The CrimeanKhanate, pp. 745 and 751.

55 Apart from securing his rule in Kazan and Astrakhan, Mehmed Giray contemplated a res-Apart from securing his rule in Kazan and Astrakhan, Mehmed Giray contemplated a res-toration of the independent Duchy of Rjazan whose territories had been recently annexedby Muscovy; see Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, p. 60.

56 orokevi,orokevi, Rus i Krym, p. 270. 57 Koodziejczyk,Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 467470.


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posed of trusted men instead of sharing the splendor and gifts with numerousmembers of Tatar nobility.

OATH-TAKINGCRISES ANDTHECENTRALIZINGEFFORTSOFTHECRIMEANKHANS

During the same period, the khans tried to bar the members of Tatar no-bility and even the members of the khans court from participating in the tra-ditional procedure of oath-taking that usually took place during audiences offoreign envoys. In 1623, Mehmed III Giray (r. 16231628) announced to a Rus-sian envoy that unlike in the times of his predecessor, Djanibek Giray hiscourtiers were merely his slaves (Rus. xolopy) and not his companions, so therewas no need for them to take an oath.58A similar scene was observed in 1654,when a Polish envoy sent to Baghchasaray insisted that the newly negotiated

treaty be conrmed not merely by the khan, but also by Tatar dignitaries. nresponse, the envoy heard that it was unnecessary because, unlike the Polishking, the khan was an absolute ruler. If we are to believe the envoys report,Khan Mehmed IV Giray himself retorted: like God is one on the earth, so am Ithe single lord (jako Bg jeden jest na ziemi, tak i ja pan jeden).59When the envoystill insisted that at least the Shirin qarashould take an oath, he was told thatthe latter was absent from the Crimea but he might meet him on his way homein the steppe and there try to bring him to the oath.

After another 30 years had lapsed, in 1681, a Russian request that the oathshould be taken not just by the khan but also by the ve noble Crimean clans

was similarly rejected one more time. The Russian envoys heard that just likebringing their tsars subjects to the oath would diminish his monarchic hon-or (gosudarskaja est), it would be equally untting to demand that the khansengagement be conrmed by his subjects.60

58 Aleksej Novoselskij,Aleksej Novoselskij, Borba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka (Moscow Leningrad, 1948), p. 111. On Mehmed III Girays centralizing domestic policythat was inspired by the Ottoman model even though in his foreign policy the khan wasoften conicted with the Porte, cf. Oleksa Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 2:Krymskie xany pervoj poloviny XVII stoletija v borbe za samostojatelnost i edinovlastie(Kiev Baghchasaray, 2009), pp. 8688.

59 or the diary of Mariusz asklski, see Warsaw, Archiwum Gwne Akt Dawnych [hereafor the diary of Mariusz asklski, see Warsaw, Archiwum Gwne Akt Dawnych [hereaf-ter AGAD], Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 41b45a, esp. fol. 44b; on his two embassies to theCrimea effected in 1654, see Sawomir Augusiewicz, Dwa poselstwa Mariusza Stanisawa

asklskiego na Krym w 1654 roku, in . Wolaski and R. Koodziej, eds., Staropolski ogldwiata. Rzeczpospolita midzy okcydentalizacj a orientalizacj, vol. 1: Przestrze kontaktw(Toru, 2009), pp. 4660; and Koodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 164168.

60 N.Murzakevi,ed.,SpisoksstatejnagospiskaVelikagoGosudarjaEgoCarskagoVeliestvaN. Murzakevi, ed., Spisok s statejnago spiska Velikago Gosudarja Ego Carskago Veliestvaposlannikov: stolnika i polkovnika i namestnika perejaslavskogo Vasilja Mixajlova synaTjapkina, djaka Nikity Zotova, in: Zapiski Odesskago obestva istorii i drevnostej,vol. 2,otdelenie vtoroe i tretie (1850), pp. 568658, esp. pp. 630632. On the three oath-taking

crises in the Crimea which took place in the years 1623, 1654, and 1681, cf. Koodziejczyk,The Crimean Khanate, pp. 486487.


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It would be tempting to see the last procedural dispute, recorded duringthe reign of Murad Giray (r. 16781683), as an illustration of this khans allegedefforts to return to the Mongol roots as the means of strengthening his rule.Such a plan of abandoning the Muslim shariaand replacing it with the Geng-

hisid law (tre-i cingiziyye) was imputed to Murad Giray by an eighteenth-cen-tury Crimean chronicler, Seyyid Mehmed Riza. Yet, in a recent doctoral thesis,Natalia Krlikowska demonstrates persuasively that this legend should be dis-missed as spurious. Murad Giray certainly wanted to consolidate his rule, butif this was his wish, adopting the Ottoman model was much more handy thanrestoring the Mongol tradition, which in fact expected the khan to honor theright of aristocratic clans to share the government with the ruler and to respecttheir wide immunities in controlling their hereditary lands.61

Not by accident, the most notorious centralizers among the Crimean

khans, to mention such eemplary gures as Sahib Giray, Ghazi Giray, orMehmed Giray, were also the rst to abandon Mongol traditions and adoptOttoman institutions such as the formation of the janissary-like segbans, a courtpeopled by servants, designated as aghas and reminiscent of Ottoman viziers,or a chancery that introduced the TurkishOttoman language and the Ottomanpompous forms. To be sure, the same rulers, although inspired by Ottoman in-stitutions, were at the same time ready to challenge Ottoman hegemony in theregion and to invoke the Genghisid tradition as a legitimizing tool uniting theCrimean subjects around the khan. The ceremonial dispute between Russianand Tatar diplomats, recorded in 1681 and invoked above, suggests that, in

building their prestige as autocratic rulers, the khans might have employed notjust the Ottoman model, but also the Russian one. The attractiveness of the Rus-sian model for an ambitious Crimean khan can be illustrated best by the tragicfate of Shahin Giray (r. 17771783), the last Crimean khan who in the followingcentury, infatuated with Catherine the Great and her court, strove to emulateher absolutist reforms to reconstruct his own state, later to be rejected rst byhis own subjects and then deposed by his Russian patrons.

WITTFOGELREBOURS?

Political osmosis and cultural borrowing rarely work in only one direc-tion.62If the khans are known to have adopted Ottoman or Russian models,

61 Natalia Krlikowska, Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate: A Study onNatalia Krlikowska, Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate: A Study onthe Reign of Murad Giray (16781683) (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Instituteof History, PAS, Warsaw, 2010), pp. 6465, 7174.

62 For some preliminary remarks related to mutual inspirations and political osmosis be-For some preliminary remarks related to mutual inspirations and political osmosis be-tween, on the one hand, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, and on the other hand, thetwo decentralized monarchies whose rulers were kept in check by powerful nobilities: thePolishLithuanian Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate, see Dariusz Koodziejczyk,

Turcja i Krym, in M. Kopczyski and W. Tygielski, eds.,Rzeczpospolita-Europa: XVIXVIIIwiek. Prba konfrontacji (Studies in Honor of Antoni Mczak)(Warsaw, 1999), pp. 6776.


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we should epect that the Crimean model might have also inuenced theKhanates neighbors. In a recent monograph of MuscovianCrimean relationsin the mid-sixteenth century, Aleksandr Vinogradov notes with some surprisethe lasting importance of the noble council (bojarskaja duma) in the Muscovian

diplomatic contacts with the Crimea, even during the centralizing reforms ofIvan the Terrible, who was notorious for his mistrust of the boyars. The Rus-sian scholar suggests that because the khans noble councilors, designated asmen of rank (dobrye ljudi) in the Russian records, actively participated in theCrimean foreign correspondence and in the audiences of Muscovian envoysin Baghchasaray, the tsar accepted a parallel participation of boyars in foreignexchanges with the Crimea for ceremonial reasons, even if the actual politicalposition of Russian nobles vis--vis the tsar was more limited than the positionof their Crimean counterparts vis--vis the khan.63

What we observe here is certainly not the radiation of Wittfogelian Ori-ental despotism from the Tatars to Russia. Rather we observe the opposite:ruled collectively by the khan and the nobles, the decentralized political sys-tem of the Crimean Khanate checked autocratic tendencies in Moscow and per-suaded the Russian tsar to tolerate the nobilitys greater participation in theconduct of state affairs than he would have wished for.

CONTEMPORARYANDLATERRECEPTIONSOFTHECRIMEANSYSTEMOFPOWER(A POLISHCASE)

A country in which the Crimean Khanate was nonetheless often presentedas a despotic and absolutist monarchy is Poland. Mariusz Jasklski, the Polishenvoy to the Crimea, whose report from 1654 has already been invoked above,put in the mouth of the Crimean vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha, a statement thatwe have [in the Crimea] the absolutum dominium: whatever the khan orders,so it must be.64Yet, are we really to believe that a Crimean vizier, no matterhow well educated, used the Latin term absolutum dominiumin his conversa-tion with a Polish envoy? Or rather the envoy entered this term in his report,scheduled to be read in the Diet on his return to Poland, to gain popularityamong the Polish noblility? The term absolutum dominiumwas part of the Pol-ish domestic discourse of the period and was widely used by noble republicansin their struggle with real as well as imagined absolutist tendencies of thekings from the Vasa dynasty.65

63 Vinogradov,Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnoenija, vol. 1, p. 81. 64 [...] bo to u nas absolutum dominium: co chan kae, to by musi; see Warsaw, AGAD, Libri

Legationum, no. 33, fol. 42a. 65 Cf. my paper Should We Throw Away Western Sources? Western Didactic Prose on theCf. my paper Should We Throw Away Western Sources? Western Didactic Prose on the

Oriental Societies from Herodotus to Kapuciski, presented at the Nineteenth Sympo -

sium of the Comit International dtudes pr-ottomanes et ottomanes [CIEPO-19] in Van(2630 July 2010).


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More than two centuries after Jasklski, Henryk Sienkiewicz, a Polishnineteenth-century writer, composed his most popular historical novel, TheDeluge, which is set in the seventeenth century. In an invented dialogue be-tween two semictitious characters, the novels protagonist Andrzej Kmicic, a

valiant Polish nobleman and soldier, and Akbah Ulan, a commander of Tatartroops sent by the Crimean khan to help the Poles ght against the Swedishinvasion of 16551660, Akbah Ulan initially refuses to obey Kmicic, stating thathis obedience is directly to the khan and not the Polish king or his ofcers. nresponse, Kmicic gives him a sound beating and argues: the khan gave youto the king like a dog or a falcon, so do not insult him unless you want to betaken on a leash like a dog! The argument, along with the beating, persuadesthe Tatar commander to subdue himself and to remain fully devoted to his newmaster. As the next scene illustrates, when somewhat later, Kmicic orders someof his Tatar subordinates to hang each other as a punishment for their maraud-ing, Akbah Ulan fully consents and hastens the culprits to do it promptly sothat they do not upset the Bagadyr(Tat. hero), as Kmicic was soon namedby his Asiatic subordinates.66Sienkiewicz was probably unaware that the titleUlan, with which he labeled his ctitious Tatar character, revealed his Geng-hisid descent, but by doing so he inadvertently strengthened the message ofthis scene even further: here we have a noble descendant of Genghis khan andsimultaneously a purely Oriental character who, accustomed to slavery in hishomeland and persuaded by the physical and moral strength of his Polish, i.e.,European, opponent, acknowledges his superiority and turns his humiliation

into devotion and love. A purely Orientalist discourse indeed.Even today, at least one Polish historian believes that the Crimean Khan-ate was an absolutist monarchy, although he hastens to add that the khansabsolutism was tempered by the domestic power of noble clans and the exter-nal inuence of Ottoman sultans.67

Only a few years before Jasklskis visit to the Crimea, in 1648, the Ta-tars supported a Cossack revolt against PolandLithuania and invaded Pol-ish Ukraine, taking prisoner the head commanders of the Polish army: CrownGrand Hetman Mikoaj Potocki and Crown ield Hetman Marcin Kalinowski.Because the Tatar action was not authorized by the Ottoman Porte, the sultandemanded that the prisoners be dispatched to Istanbul to be released and sentback to Poland. Yet, Khan Islam III Giray (r. 16441654) openly refused by in-forming the Ottoman kapc ba, sent from Istanbul to collect the Polish prison-ers, that both hetmans were private prisoners of the Tatar nobles (mirzas) whoparticipated in the campaign. The khan explained that when he had asked themirzas to deliver their prisoners, they had refused because they expected a fair

66 Henryk Sienkiewicz,Henryk Sienkiewicz, Potop(Warsaw, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 504 and 510. 67 Marek Wagner, Tatarskie elity wadzy w latach 16841699, in Marek Wagner,Marek Wagner, Tatarskie elity wadzy w latach 16841699, in Marek Wagner, W cieniu

szukamy jasnoci chway: Studia z dziejw panowania Jana III Sobieskiego (16841696)(Siedlce,2002), pp. 97109, esp. p. 97.


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scholarly approaches used to characterize different societies. When describingthe decentralized, pre-modern Tatar society, a Polish scholar would typicallyuse such labels as tribal or primitive. Yet, when describing his/her ownsociety in the same period, the same Polish scholar would proudly invoke the

emancipation of the nobility from the dynastic rule, the birth of the modernnotion of the Polish Crown (Corona Regni Poloniae), whose lands could not bealienated by the monarch without the consent of the nobility, and the rise of thestate chancery independent from the royal court. Why should we treat the de-centralization of Tatar society as proof of its backwardness, and simultaneouslypraise the decentralization of Polish society as a sign of progress?70

When blaming some71 early modern societies for their decentralizationand anarchic chaos, we should be aware of the ambiguous role played byits often idealized antitype, namely centralization. For a human being, living

in the twentyrst century, there is something deeply disturbing in traditionalpraises of such centralized state structures as France of Louis XIV or Prussia ofFrederic the Great. Few people today would be happy to serve in the Prussianarmy, pay Prussian taxes, or to put it la foucaultienne experience Prussiandiscipline. Admittedly, in the twentieth century many oil companies preferredto set up their businesses in developing countries ruled by dictators rather thanby parliaments because it was easier to negotiate with the former than with thelatter, but they were rarely praised for this efciency in the Western media.72

While not defending the extremes of anarchy, which early modern Tatars(as well as early modern Poles) have often been accused of, I would still like to

pose the question: was it so wrong and non-modern that the Tatars negoti-ated their peace treaties collectively and had their international engagements

70 Similar questions with respect to Ottoman society are posed in a recent, highly inspir-Similar questions with respect to Ottoman society are posed in a recent, highly inspir-ing and provoking book by Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and SocialTransformation in the Early Modern World(Cambridge, 2010). For instance, the author asksHow have we been led to believe that the English Civil War, which led to the execution ofCharles I in 1649, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which dethroned Charles Is son

James II, were advances in the history of limited government, whereas the regicide of theOttoman Sultan Ibrahim in 1648 and the deposition of Ibrahims son Mehmed IV in 1687,for instance, were simply signs of decline? (p. 5).

71 With a notable exception of the English early modern society, which typically has beenWith a notable exception of the English early modern society, which typically has beenpraised for its individualism.

72 Anybody who works in the academia today is aware of the omnipresent conict betweenAnybody who works in the academia today is aware of the omnipresent conict betweencentralization and decentralization in present university life. What I found especially tell-ing was my experience as a visiting professor at one American university. While I wassurprised that their president was appointed, and not electedas was the rector of my homeinstitution, my American host was equally shocked by the collegial autonomy of univer-sity faculties which he learned about during his scholarly trip to Europe. Is it a relict of

feudalism he asked me one day that your faculty councils in Europe are so powerfulvis--vis the dean? Well, we call it democracy was my answer.


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sworn and conrmed not merely by their monarchs, but by numerous othermembers of their society as well?