99574 -

COPY NO: 2'FIEND VALUABLE CONFERENCE

RECORD OF AGREED ACTION

The following is a record of the action required tobe taken as a. result of decisions mutually agreed at theFLND/VALUABLE Conference, Minutes of which are attached.

1. Propaganda Activities

(a) "Useful Articles" (Para.14)

Irt4,4 II I al

C.I.A. to look at their stocks of "usefularticles" to determine whether they would likeany of S.I.S. stocks, if S.I.S. should for anyreason not be able to drop them themselves.

(b) Leaflets (Paras. 15,17, and 18)

Leaflets and C.I.A. News Digests to bemutually discussed in advance in Rome or Athensas appropriate, as also timings of drops.

2. N.C.P.A.

(a) lleo]mpnisation (Pares. 19 - 24)....o...

• O.. Cl2O ',2-.

CO 'CO AV ''") M (3 ss4 , 1,., 3and(....,, to. . Ecsa '''gr mo at in Rome on 9th November, 1953 final y to

1122 6no ‘,..1,a

4/2 TM om DC agree names of proposed new Consultative Committee..c

-- . and to decide when and how best the N.C.F,A.taLl w

D... CM

..-2 C.) M. __, should be informed of our future plans.. = = tarw irLa MO

cm cs• X —. DOSTI to be info:Tmed of the changes 24 hours_ 412 21=2..x ....I Oa COD in advance of our formal notification of the I.,1. c. IP , .2=, ..., ..

S.I.S. not Lafuture to inform the N.C.F.A.of the composition of their operational parties.

,- 3. PRIZREN Committee ( p ara. 29)

Mutual exchange of information obtained on th1sC ommittee.

4. IntelliP-ence (Para.. 30 - 31)

Mutual exchanges of summaries of all source informationon . Albania an 1st May and 1st November each year, C.I.A.. toprepare n summary shortly.

La/2O2 2,2 CD = The Italian and Greek authorities also to bew s— mc _. informed of our intentions in advance, method to_ W Vs..... ._ m r=, be decided. Every effort . to be made by the Rome- —2 - CC 0. -cr w -2 c--, representatives to retain the B.X. within the..x CC cjo re-organised C ommittee.- ,,..,m m . Z

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. ..z

... (b) Security (Para. 25).. cm =

request.S.I.S. to pass C.I.A. personality info rma tion. on

•

5.. SBILAKU Org-anisation (Pa:az. 34-35) •

- — —

Both Services to keep each othw informed wt.'developments and C. LA, to inform S. I. S. L ot teps' sbeing token to contact the group.being

S.I.S. to inform C.I.A. of Albanian refugees rrivingin the British Zone of Austria and to facilitate C.I.A.into rroc,-0 t i on of- 6,--giroptinil characters.

CLASJEICAIION E Ew-

r)!VI 3NDi 0 Alt 1980.,4,.?

Ozi--- t

C.I.A.

(London)(London)(London) 1

(London) i

on.don)--1London)

•■•••••••••■,

Prosont:

Chairman

s -3.13ET 2COPY NO:

FIEND/VALUABLE CONFERENCE

21st-22nd Octobor 1953

MINUTES

7 !Ja:shingta)1i-

fE

:1r'Oashilligton). .

—]

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a. =mod the Conference by welcoming tho C.I.A.rop sentativo,; and apologisod for tho many changes of datowhich had preventod an uarlier mooting.

I. CURRENT DIRECTIVES

2. outlinod tho 1953 airoctIvo in accordanco withwhi S.I.S. h, oporated this year, its major r'.)quiromontsbeing as follows:

(a) Intolligonco gathering in conformity with bri')fssupplied.

(b) Support for N.C.F.A. In collaboration with C.I.A.(c) Loaflot raids on tho scalo of approximatoly one

ovary throo months.

3. then said that the S.I.S. directive for 1954wou probabl„ u vary similar to the one given thom for 1953and that it was highly unlikely at the momont that the ForeignOffico would require S.I.S. to stop up thoir Cold Lar activitiosin Albania. The Foreign Offico had rocontly boon asked forguidance in view of the Fiond/Valwblo mooting and had includedthe following paragraph in thoir r_ply:

"Thu danger is that an intornal upheaval of whatsoevernature in Albania mightbo c.aco anLodby the interventionoithor of members of the Prizron Committoo or, loss probably,of the National Committoe for a Froe Albania, oithor with orwithout invitation fro- wihin Albania itself. Interventionby oithor alone might be intorprotod by Italy or Yugoslaviaas the case may be, and porhaps by Greece, as a throat to

vital national interests. Especially in view of Italy's

and Yugoslavia's quarrel about Triosto we can do withoutanother laro bane of contention. The conclusion is thatit would probably be hotter that thoro should be no change ofrogimo in Albania for the pros ant, - at least until theTriosto question has boon solved. We are reasonably cant antwith the declarations by Albania's neighbours and by Turkeyand wish to avoid stirring up fr,sh controversies bys peculation or by inviting intorostod parties to "discussthe Albanian problem". In other words, we favour a "goslow" policy for the tino being."

L

butsaid C.I.A. had no new directive in writingartho U.S. ovornmcnt's view was that Albani, s. was an important

psychological target and that efforts to dotach it from theCommunist orbit must not be roduced, although at the moment noloara-'.1ilitary solution was contemplated. aimed at

9 9 5 7 4 - oc-

Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness henceforth in theirAlbanian operations.

5. It was agreed that the main divergence between the C.I.A.and S.I.S. policies as a result of these directives was thatC.I.A.. are preparod to adopt a more forward policy than thatallowed . S.I.S. by tho Foreign Offico; but it was also agreedthat this divergonco would not in fact be groat in practiceand would not affect the Sorvicos working together.

II REVIEW OF FIEND/VALUABLE 1953 INFILTRATION OPERATIONS

(a) Targets and Methods of Infiltration

6.4-nt7o said that S.I.2. had had no direct S.O. brieffo his yoafl`s VALUABLE operations, but that throe S.I.operations had boon planned. The first party for VALONA wasnovor formed owing to agent difficultios and the second partyfor TIRANA was Lnfiltratod overland from Greece in July (LUCID I).It was not a groat success and returned to Greece. Under nowloadorship however it was re-infiltrated in August (LUCID II)and is still in the country with W/T. Tho third team which wasfor Northern Albania was the best team yot recruited but theoporation had to be abandoned owing to S.I.S. eventual inabilityto carry out either soa or air infiltra an. The team is beingkept on ice for noxt year. C— said S.I.S. had no teamsloft over in Albania from 1n*e.

7. iR.st said that C.I.A. infiltration operations had boon

aga the saA targets as previously, but had boon morewidespread. They aimed at establishing pormanont resistancenuclei inside the country, maintaining operations towards thoeventual detachment of Albania from tho Communist orbit, ostablichingcontact with high level Albanians to encourage thorn to defect, andgathering intolligonco on the main targots. Operations had boonreduced in ordor to sond in agents of a higher quality, but itwas agreed by S.I.S. and C.I.L. that on the whole the calibre ofagents loft much to be desired. A five man team which had boonin last year was ro-infiltratod in July this year and stayed infor throo weeks (WILLOW to the KORCE area, mainly on a P/W bricf);they ro-ostablishod contacts made last year. A two man teamwas infilt/atod in early August to SARANDE (THROTTLER) and stayedin tho country throe wooka. A third team, usod in Previousyears, was infiltrated successfully and is still in the countryand in W/T contact with C.I.A. (FIG to POGRADETZ re&). Two teamsparachuted into central Albania during the summor have not beenhoard of since infiltration; and a further setback occurrod inthe loss of an oxfiltrating party which included both the loaderof a team which had boon operating in the MATI area for aver ayear and tho toam which had boon droppod into Albania to oxfiltratothis key agent.

(b) Quality of Agents

8. Both C.I.A. and S.I.S. wore agreed about the low colibro ofagents available for recruitment in Greece. Very fow refugeesfrom Albania arc arriving in Greece and any higher calibroescapees normally do not wish to go back to live in the mountains.C.I.A. said they wore encouraging tea-Is to establish rosidontsourcos in Albania rather than suggesting any contacts they mightmake should come out, as tho number of operations to bo mountodis so limitod. Leaflets might ho used in order to oncouragohighor calibre Albanians to cone out.

-4--

to say.

jmentionad that a defector inducement leaflet hadceoltro pped so far with no success, but he hoped in the longrun to gat one or two Albanians in the Communist hierarchy todefect 4 °• agretd that this was well worth trying butexperian'e stiould.rn us against over-optimism- - In additionto these defector leaflets C.I.A. had put out defector broadcastsover the V.O.F.A. (jamming of the programmes had started at thistime, which might perha ps indicate that the appeal hit sensitives)ot).

17. C.I.A. programme for 1954 aims at a maximum of 24 Digest drops,combined with food and article drops, and. LIP to six leaflet drops.

for, their part aim at six leaflet drops. They plannedto i:iprove the context of their leaflets, those so far used 17),:vnginsufficient popular appeal; pure propaganda does not sen tobe going down very well and they intend to introduce more hardnews. It was agreed that with proper co-ordination this wouldnot cut across C.I.A l s idea of a News Digest. If and when S.T.S.article dro ps took place they would be coMbinsd with leaflet drops.C.I.A. said that they had used leaflet drops as cover for agentdropping.

18. It was agreed that leaflots -Lnd timings oft drops would bemutually discussed in advance in _Is a i) or opriate

IV N .0 .111

19. It was agreed to discuss the Executive Commit t ee positionand the C.I.A. reorganisation proposal together. (......_that from the evidence available S.I.S. ard C.I.A. aaeearoa Inidclose agreement. C.I.A. wanted to broaden and re-organise the7.C.F.A. and intended to effect certain economies. It was hoped ---1

[f

earnestablish a ca in Italy to house the Albanians there andonly the members of the ]Ixecutive Committee should receive salaries'in future, but a Consultative Committoe of 30 members should ho

ormed. Discussion then took placc as to whether the Executive .,Committee should consist of 5 or 9 members and whether theConsultative Committee should elect the Ti;xecutive Committee orwhether N.C.F.A. should be presented with our joint choice ofnames as a fait accompli. S.I.S expressed the view that ifan ultimatum on broadening and re-organising were given theAlbanians some might walk out and then there might he difficultyin maintaining a Committee at all. S.T.S also said they wouldlike to see the members appointed as individuals and not as partymembers. A sub-committee of S.I.S. and C.I.A. representativest:as than set up to discus:i the position further and report back.with Concrete, proposals including agreed names. Meanwhile itwas generally agreed by S.I.S. and C.I.A. that the Committeemust be broadened to include representatives of the E.IC..I. andKLISSURA groups. S.I.S. said that they would not like to seeany ilotorious (uislings on the new Committee.

20. The sub-committe,:, later reported its findings to the_Qonferonce. They -d i.tcreed, and the Conference approved, that

jndL7- on should meet again in

-tome November when they woul.0 consider in more detailthe tactics of the t.pProach to the Albanians and finally agreethe names of the Consultative Committee members to be proposedto the Albanians. Dosti in Now York would be given 24 hoursadvance notice of the changes to be effected. Officialnotification would also be given to the Greeks and Italians -since it was felt that both would then ado pt a more benevolentattitude to the broadened Committee. Timing for thi-s to bo

99574 - a__

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proposed by the Rome representatives!.

21. The Conference also agreed that there should be aConsultative Committee of about 40 members composed as follows:-

10 members of the

10 il if if

5 if if if

5 if ii if

5 if if ff

5 Indeeendents

Bain HombotarLogalitetSaid Hryeziu l s partyYlissura Group

These men to be picked as individuals and not party members,and none of them to be paid salaries.

22. An Executive Committee of 7 members to be made we asfollows:-

Hasan Dosti (Chairman) (BH)Abas Kupi (Log)Z•f Pall' or ereferably , Abas Ermenje (BH)All Klissura (BKO)Ndue Maragjoni . MI)

, Muharrem Bajraktar (Ind)Said Hryeziu (Agrarian)

Dosti would be a non-voting member except in case ofdeadlock.

23. The Executive Committee will sit in Rome, with its ChairmanDosti in Now York and two secretaries one In New YorL. (Toptani)and one in Rome (Hotta), all members of this Committee and thesecretaries to be paid salaries. All other committees would beabolished as )art of the C.I.A. economy campaign.

24. A discussion then took place as to-which party should begiven preference if members would not join the . committees aslaid down by C.I.A. and S.I.S. It was generally agreed thatthe whole of the Tealli Kombetar Agrarians should bo kept withinthe Committee if possible.

SecuritI. and Extent N.C.F.A. informed of Operations

25. There was a divergence of opinion between S.I.S. and C.I.A.on whether or not clearance was required from the N.C.F.A. beforexlrties were infiltrated into Albania. S.I.S. had hithertoboon obtaining N.C.F.A. clearance. They felt that agents liketo have N.C.F.A. backing, and the details the N.C.F.A. producedon the agents backgrouhd wore useful in assessing theirqualities. C.I.A. maintained that the security risk of lettingij.C.F.A. know beforehand was too groat and they had boonsuccessfully operating without N.C.F.A. clearance and wouldcontinue to do so. After discussion it was agreed that S.I.S.would in future also follow this line. A suggestion was madethat the Committee should be told after the agents had gone La,but was turned down on the grounds that the agents oper_tingarea could easily be deduced by the N.C.F.A. from their knowledgeof their background, and loekage could spell disaster. Thequestion was then raised of whether not tolling the Committeeof our operations would worsen our relations with them, but thiswas thought to be solved by the fact that in the now re-organisationthere will be no Military Junta.

-0-

Rovierq of N .0 . Activities

26. c- reviewed N .0 .F.A . activities in Rome and saidtho coulct es divided into two categories:

Psychological ', ,lo.rfare, which covered leaflets,the Mews DigeFF-(77hT7ch though not 'actuallyprinted was edited in Rome), news bulletins andthe monitoring station in P)ari; . he mentionedtrouble with jamming of V.0 .F .A. which C .1 .Atechnicians believed might be coming fromBulgaria.

The N .0 .F .A, itself, which sends representativesYo U.N. me jiTags on Slave Labour Camps and to thel'Free Jurists" gatherings.

said there was ex11ent co-operation b..twoenhimself in R Orae ebTPod and said

(—there was nothing to add fron his side.

V PRIZREN. CM.12.7.TTEE

28. L,„„: that when the Committee was first set upC .I.A . had been extremely interested, but from lator informationfrom both S .S. and C .T . sources it turned out that theCommittee is coat-Diet el;,T under Yugoslav domination and is mainlyused as a cover fur agent operations into Albania.There are very few Prominent Albanian names on the PrizronCommittee and C.I.A. felt that if a change of government inAlbania were effected ; Yugoslavia, through the...Committee, wouldtry to set up a government on 'Titoist lines. tho was in agreement with the C.I.A. view. Ho said tha 1 ,,t bhouh-there had been a tentativc a1Yroachh from the Prizrcn Committ eeto the N .0 .F .A. he considered it would be a long time beforeanything concrete materialised and certainly not till there 1J1:.san improveraent in Yugoslav/Italian relations.

42 9 . 3.1.3. and C.I.A. wore in general agreement over theirattitude to the Co-mittoo and on the fact that the Trieste

*XL situation at eresont prevented the establishment of liaison05% between it and the N.C.F.A. 8.1 .S. was 'aking a study of the

Committee and would pass it to C.I.A. as soon as it wascomplet9. C.I.A. in return agreed to pass any furtherinformation they got on the Committee to

VI INTELLIGENCE

-130.( v_0 s,'.1d that from time to timo in the past 3.I.8.had`"ra-Anariz1P1' 11 their source information on Albania andoassed it to C.I.A. and that he would ho grateful if C.I.A.could roc] erocato. j,:groee. to this. It was agreedthat this should be aono on a six monthly basis, on 1st Novemberand let '2T';:y each year. As S.I.S. had passed a re port of thiskind to C .,A. last W3Oli they would not produce anything furthertill next 12Tcy, but C .A would start working on their Novembersummary at once.

.i.sked if it wer-thomCersonali y information. is.

31 noRRiMngrS.IeedS.I.S.

t to

O dogive

tha

98574-6,

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VII IIILE SELLAKU aiGANISATION

32.r gave C.I.As views on this organisation.Ho ici. they won. still in doubt as to whether thisorganisation existed and certainly as to whether it reallywas 35,000 strong. They had tried to make contact, hadflown over an island rendez-vous in August when no recognitionsignals were received 'and again in September when they sawfires. They arc exploring further, as they fool if thisorganisatioi does exist it would be potentially of groat value.

xplained that now S.I.S. wore in possession ofall the 1T.nown facts concerning the SELLAKU organisation theyhad modified their initial views and felt that the group mightwell exist and might well wish to put itself at the disposalof the Free West. Since, however, the very size (alleged) ofthe organisation made it a potential throat to the TIRANAGovernment and aincc Yugoslavian interests wero also involved,S.I.S. asked that f e C.I.A. moves should be discussed inadvance with S.I.S.

33.1 said that there were only three Alb:anianreftrgees who apcare. to ?now anything about the organisation.E:ORCA, who was a close friend Of Hilo SHLLAKU; disclosed that

_34e had been son)- out by SELLARU to make contact with the Westthought that there was every chmce that such

an organisation id exist in fairly large numbers, anyway15,000 or 20,000. SE1LAKU had boa a Gondarmorie officer beforer.-nd during the war end travelled a lot round the mountains whorehe would have made many contacts. He was later arrested andesca ped again to the mountains so he was in a position to bein touch with man7 Chie in tho northwest and as far south asTirana. aid from what he had heard theorganisa ion would still De intact as it was worked in water-tight groups. According to KORCA they have no arms at themoment, though they thought they would got them from thoYugosla ys, and an actual Yugoslav Cad -0 had been prepared for thisyear but had been called off.

asked if S.I.S. would keep C.I.A. informed ofany -banian rorltug ees who come out from Yugoslavia into thePritish Zone of Austr as they _ight have information on theSliLLAEU .1 said that he would brief the

of:ce in Vien to do t s as far as possible.then asked if C.I.A. could send an interrogator ifoking refugee came out. This was also agreed.

Stiorl. of potential political importance and significance andIummed up by saying that this appeared' to' anbo a

S.I.S. and C.I.A. should koop each other fully informed of any. developments, confirming or refuting the existence of such aresistance group.'

VIII FUTURE OPERATIONS (1954)

36, L. said that as far as S.I.S. were concerned theyhad only one fi ,I. operation planned for 1954; the team forNorthern Albania which 'J. d boon cancelled this year. . The party

3

34. 1 said that both sidos had only reached theDxpl rtory sto at the moment and we must find out all thefacts Possible. He asked C,I.A. to kee p S.I.S. informed ofanything they heard on the subject. S.I.S. were of coursero n uired to the F.O. informed, as this organisation might

a maio Political factor in the Albanian situation in future

L__ -.greed that would 1:cop S.I.S. informed.

35,

4'

had useful looking contacts in the North and it was proposedto put them in by Ur in Juno. He was not aiming atPutting in more than a couple of other teams and had not yetlooked into the intelligence priorities so did not knowwhlch areas particularly wanted covering. Difficulty wasbeing experienced with operators of the right calibre. Someleft over from past operations wore willing to go again, butin most cases they were blown and 11) recruiting position inGreece was poor, as alre_Ldy mentioned.

37. aid that in view of the interest theirGove a at oxp ssed in Albania they wore going to continuooperations at the same tempo as before, their main interestsbeing information on the Rile SELLA= organisation and thehopo of a high levol dafeetionz_ Ho d4 , not detail tho numberof operations planned. LatorL., j said expectedto have a boat available for oeerations Albania and askedif S.I.S, had found it necessary for sc, infiltrAion to useagents with a knowledge of the coast. , .�171 said S.I.S.had previously managed successfully witn agents ha ing nospecial knowledge of the coast. S.I.S. did not think that theywould be mounting sea infiltration operations in 1954.

30, said that ho had hoard from returningagenus that they wee not well received in the countryside andput forward the opinion that it was not worth sending them. inunless they had some dofinito intelligence target.

IX DISPOSAL PROBLEMS

9. C -,said that most of our agents for disposal

were Still in tr:4, U.K. but one or two hat'. gone to the U.S.A.Now the Home Office would not allow any mere into thiscountry. L., ; as:!;:ed C.I.,.. if they could help over thoU.S.A. visa problem. ,1,said he would look into the .matter but he was afraid there would be little he could do asthe authorities always insisted that immigrants should waittheir turn. ‘outlined the various disposal channelsused by C.I.b :5 World Council of Churches; P.E.P;-,-.-

a farming scho!n: in France; South America; Canada. They hadnot really found any roil difficulty in disposing of them-He mentioned that tho U.S. Army wore taking in 12,500 refugeesfrom satellite countries between tho ages of 18-35 as long asthey were single PhYSically fit and answered the securityrequirements.said. the in trouble for S.I.S. wasthat their disiConal = cases were not fit. said wecould not reach a policy decision on•thi now out s --asted thatthose concerned might consult together during the next two daysand pool their ideas.

X CUTCLUSION---

40. At tho close of the meeting both sides oxpressed theirsatisfaction at the warli

III REVI Teri OF 1953 LEAFLET RAIDS AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

(a) Frequency of Future Raids.

9. told the Meeting that S.I.S. had been carryingout tile-c rai s on the scale of one every three months; MarchAugust and early October, approximately half a million leafletseach time.

10. S.I.S. had used one aircraft in March, two in August andone age..in in October. F.O. directive forbade S.I.S. to flyover A.A. defended areas but by taking stock of the winddirection S.I.S. had managed to get the leaflets over TIRANAand other towns in March, towns throughout the country inAugust and in October villages and roads in the North. Leafletshad been prepared in Rome. The question then arose of whetherto concentrate on towns, where the leaflets might be picked upby the Security Forces before the population had time to readthem, or on villages. It was felt that no hard and fastdecision could be made.

11. -laske(Lif S.I.S. were considering stepping up theirrai s. . replied that he thought next year G.I.S.would o obably aim a six. They did not think it advisable todo more as they were afraid of working up the spirit of resistancetoo much when there was no hope at the present of liberation forthe country.

12. .said that C.I.A. had carried out four leafletraids this year, March, July, August and September, averaginghalf a million leaflets each time. They had covered more, orless all Albania, but had not concentrated on larger towns somuch as on town outskirts and highways. C.I.A. planned nextyear to continue publication of the News Digest, which wouldbe dropped at least monthly and if possible twice a month. Itwas generally agreed that such news publications probably didmore good than purely propaganda or incitement.

(b) Article and Food Drops

13. The S.I.S. view was that food drops laid us open to chargesof bacteriological warfare and were therefore not worth carryingout. C.I.A. held that proper instructions sent with the .containers and careful packing should heap to avoid this andthey proposed to resume food drops until small existing stocksin Athens were exhausted, after which time the position wouldbe reviewed.

14. Article drops were agre d by S.I.S. and as useful,though S.I.S. were unable yet to say whether policy clearancewould be forthcoming. S.I.S. offered C.I.A. some of theirstocks for next year, if available and if for policy reasonsthey were unable to drop them themselves. C.I.A. thankedthem and said they would look into their own stool, eosition.

(c) Future Content of Propaganda Material

15. C.I.A. are sfor both the Newsfuture be discussC.I.A. would welcIn addition theyalternating withleaflets to coverthese to be printsaid they did notscheduled to do s

etting up their own ',Printing press in AthensDigest and leaflet5.e This mat2,rial would in

ome 5.1 .S. suggostns for the News Digest.ed with the S.I.S.

propose to make propaganda leaflet dropsS.I.S. and also hoped to put out specialany sudden incident or special emergency,ed'and dropped as quickly as possible. C.I.A.Intend to drop leaflets just because they wereo, but only if they had something of interest

995

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1-lad useful looking contacts in the North and it was proposedto put them in by Ad.r in Junc. H.:, was not aiming at*cutting in more than a couple of other teams and had not yetlooked into the intelligence prioritios so did not knowwhich !areas particularly wanted covering. Difficulty wasbeing experienced with operators of the right calibre. Sameleft over from past operations wore willing to go again, but.in most cases they were blown and h recruiting position inGreece was poor, as already m:Dntioned.

37. fsaid that in view of the interest theirGova n .c; expr4ssed in Albania they were going to continuooperations at the same tempo as beforo, their main interests.being information on, the Hilo SELLAKU organisation and thehope of a high level defeetion. Ho did not detil tho numberof operations planned. Latort f aid C.I.A. expectedto hav3 a boat available for o' ...irtions 17-7'to Albania and askedif 3.1 .S had found it necessary for se_infiltrn to useagents with a knowledge of the coast. said S.I.S.had oreviously managed succossfully w5e47 -agents haying nos p ecial knowledge of the coast. S.I.S. did not think that theywould be mounting sea infiltration operations in 1954.

30,1 said that he had heard from returningages that they we not well received in the countryside andput forward the opinion that it was not worth sending thorn inunless they had some definite intMigence target.

IX DISPOSAL YhOBLEMS

39.L said that most of our agents for disposalwere -Still in tn U.K. but one or two had gone to the U.S.A.Now the Hoe Office ipuld not allow any more into thiscountry. i asked C.I.A. if they could help over the

U.S.A. visA problem. said he would look into thematter but ho was afraid there kould be little he could 6_6 asthe authoritie- always _insisted that immigrants should waittheir turn, I outlined the various disposal channelsused by C.I.t1—^in Athen .- World Council of Churches; P.E.P;a farming scheme in France; South America; Canada. They hadnot really found any real difficulty in disposing of thorn.Homentioned that the U.S. Army were taking in 12,500 refugeesfrom satellite countries between the as of 18-35 as long asthey wore single ,,. physically fit and answered the securityrequiremnts. / Asaid. the main .trouble for. S.I.S. was

• that their distSai casesere not fit. L __Paid wecould not reach a oolicy decision on this -now but Suggested thatthose concerned night consult together during the next two daysand pool their ideas.

COCLUSION

40. At the closo of the meeting both sides expressed theirsatisfaction at the general agreement which had boon reachedend looked forward to continuing close co-oPeration iA 1954.C.I.A. expressed their appreciation of the very cordial rocoptionthey had received and of the friendly atmos phere whichcharacterised the talks.

39574-L_.