War and Peace

Shaping Politics in Reformation Germany after the Battle of Lepanto*

Stefan Hanß (Cambridge)

[…] l’Imp[er].re non farà alcuna risolutione ch[e] prima non si facci una dieta

Imperiale, per no[n] priuarsi dell’auisi che li dan[n]o i stato dell’Imperio ne’i

bisogni di guerra, talmente che s’entrasse in lega, et massime col Pappa, farebbe

mouere i uermi à questa natione, che dubitarebbe di peggio, di maniera ch[e] per

tutti i detti rispetti, la cosa si ne pascerà in discorsi et bone parolle […]

Comment of the Genoese diplomatic agente Georgi, Vienna, 7 November 1571,

Archivio di Stato di Genova, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, fol. 2r.

“As if any Christian leader could be neutral when the cause of Christ was at

stake. Yet neutral they were, many of them, most of them. […] in Germany as in

the Netherlands and in England they thought to serve Jesus Christ by hating his

sweet Mother…. The Emperor in Vienna—a weak, vacillating man, content to

buy peace from the Sultan.”

L. de Wohl, The Last Crusader: A Novel about Don John of Austria (San Francisco:

Ignatius, 2010 [1956]), 402 f.

Religion, Politics and History

This article challenges and reconsiders one of the most popular narratives of the

historiography of the Battle of Lepanto; that ever since the ‘Holy League’ of Spain,

Venice, Rome and several smaller Catholic principalities defeated the Ottomans in the

Ionian Sea in October 1571, historians assumed that the reason the Holy Roman Empire

did not support the league was a direct consequence of the Reformation. Strong

Protestant interests at court and in the territorial estates within the Empire, it has been

argued, prevented the Catholic monarch from joining the military campaign against the

Ottomans.1 However, I argue that this approach perpetuates an early modern Catholic

interpretation that established the narrative of a Christian victory over ‘infidels’ by

drawing parallels between Ottoman Muslims and German Lutherans.

Already in 1571, Italian diplomats residing at the Imperial Court ascribed the

emperor’s indecisiveness to the influence of Protestants. In this tradition, it has been

argued that the strong position of Protestant factions prevented the multiconfessional

Holy Roman Empire from joining the league. Yet, German, Latin, Italian and Spanish

archival sources document the negotiations leading up to an Imperial Diet that was to

decide whether the Empire would join the league against the Ottomans. Before the

decision-making process came to its end, however, Venice signed a peace treaty with the

Ottoman Empire that made the league collapse; and the question of imperial support

lost its political urgency. The reports of Imperial diplomats who travelled to Catholic,

Lutheran and Calvinist princes in the direct aftermath of the battle suggest that

reservations and enthusiasm for the treaty alike were shared across the confessional

divide. The lengthy process of political decision-making leading up to the Imperial Diet

demonstrates that Reformation Germany was engaged in pragmatic politics towards the

Ottomans that move beyond the paradigms of Türkenfurcht and Türkenhoffnung, based

on confessionalism. In that sense, this article is not another political history of the Battle

of Lepanto; rather, it aims to reveal the degree to which religious opinions in general,

and early modern confessional polemics in particular, shaped the political memory of

1

this battle. Thus, this article reflects on how religion in the past moulded the production

of history.2

External Perspectives: Attempts to Convince the Emperor

Soon after the formation of the ‘Holy League’ in May 1571, high-ranking Catholic clerics

and diplomats approached Emperor Maximilian II to join. Cardinal Marcantonio Amulio,

for instance, informed the Emperor about his hope that the maritime fleet’s success will

soon be duplicated by the actions of the Imperial forces. The Papal nuncio informed the

Habsburg ambassador in Venice, Veit von Dornberg, about the alliance. The Augsburg

Cardinal Otto von Waldburg asked Maximilian to grant the Papal legate Giovanni

Commendone special audiences for discussing the Empire’s possible contribution.3 Soon

after the Commendone’s arrival in Vienna, the legate as well as the Papal nuncio at the

Imperial court, Giovanni Delfino, intensified their efforts to entice the Emperor to join

the league by making use of ever more and ever longer audiences with him.4 Soon

thereafter rumours spread in Vienna, Prague, Brandenburg and Rome that Maximilian

was keen to support the league.5 In response to the many pro-league statements of

Habsburg residents abroad, the Emperor had indeed stated just a few weeks earlier that

2 HHStA, Ungarische Akten, Fasz. 97, Konv. A, 7r, Maximilian II to Adam von Dietrichstein, Prague, 30 January 1571; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, I, 109r, Veit von Dornberg, Habsburg ambassador in Venice, to the Imperial Court, Venice, 1 April 1570; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, III, Veit von Dornberg to the Imperial Court, Venice, 6 May 1571, 1r.

3 ASFi, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, 3110, 659r, Fabrizio Ferraro to Cosimo I de’ Medici, Milan, 30 January 1572; J. Rainer, Nuntius G. Delfino und Kardinallegat G. F. Commendone, 173-174 (Giovanni Delfino to Girolamo Rusticucci, Vienna, 21 November 1571, the audience took place on 20 November 1571); HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 92r-93v, Francisco de Mendoza to Maximilian II, Rome, 12 July 1572.

4 G. Khevenhüller-Metsch (ed.), Hans Khevenhüller an Kaiser Maximilian II. 1571-1574: Die geheime Korrespondenz des Kaiserlichen Botschafters am Königlich Spanischen Hof, vol. 1/1 (s.l.: s.n., s.a.) (HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 8, 20), 16v, Hans Khevenhüller to Maximilian II, Madrid, 26 November 1571 (HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 8, 2, 24r-27v).

the alliance was an “indispensable deed of universal Christendom” (gemaine

Christenhait hochnotwendigs werck).6

Still, in October 1571 Commendone himself informed Maximilian about the

victory of Lepanto by stating that only the Emperor’s support would enable the conquest

of Istanbul the following year. Commendone furthermore assumed that the Emperor’s

consent might also convince the Polish king to join the league, whose reservations were

ascribed to Protestant sympathies.7 The receipt of a Papal breve on Lepanto provided

another opportunity for Commendone to renew his pressure in early November which

was then reiterated by the local Venetian diplomat.8 Philipp II and Don John of Austria

likewise sent special envoys, Pietro Fassardo and Fernando de Mendoza, to Vienna to

advance the negotiations.9 In addition to all of this, the German Cardinal Waldburg

dispatched a letter from Rome, informing Maximilian that God had granted this

“Christian victory” against “Christendom’s entire common hereditary enemy”. As the

Emperor was a Christian monarch, the cardinal solicited that Maximilian may join this

5 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572; W. Schulze, Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16.  Jahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung (Munich: Beck, 1978), 67-301; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 42-1; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 53-1; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München [hereafter BHStAM], Pfalz-Neuburg, Akten, 1967; P. Fuchs, “Philipp Ludwig,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, eds. Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 383.

6 Ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572.

7 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 47r-50v, Wilhelm von Rosenberg to Maximilian II, s.l., 25 March 1572 (quote ibid, 48v); ibid., 1r-7v, John George of Brandenburg to Maximilian II, Cölln/ Berlin, 29 February 1572 (quote ibid., 2v-3v); ibid., 8r-11v, August of Saxony to Maximilian II, Dresden, 23 February 1572.

8 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.

9 R. Jordan, “Der Kurfürstentag zu Mühlhausen 1572,” Mühlhäuser Geschichtsblätter: Zeitschrift des Altertumsvereins für Mühlhausen i. Thür. und Umgegend 5 (1904/1905), 2; A. P. Luttenberger, Kurfürsten, Kaiser und Reich, 219-241; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 53r-56v, Johann Hegenmüller and Philipp von Winnenberg to Maximilian II, Heidelberg, 3 April 1572; HHStA, Reichsarchive, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 63, protocol. The Stadtarchiv Mühlhausen [hereafter StadtAMühlhausen], 10/G 26 Nr. 1 contains logistic documents regarding the administration of the college of electors (e.g. expenses for fish and beer).

“Christian ribbon/bond (Bandt)” amongst “all, or at least most, Christian potentates”.

The victory was celebrated in cities like Vienna, among others, as a result of God’s

benevolence. The cardinal continued that the Battle of Lepanto implied that it would

certainly be followed by further future victories against the Ottomans, which would

elevate the honour of the Emperor. “The occasion is convenient, the opportunity not

small.”10 Pope Pius V encouraged Cardinal Amulio to dispatch another letter to Vienna, in

which future imagined consequences were outlined in greater detail: After Lepanto, the

Emperor could conquer Hungary and further territories whilst the League would invade

the Levant, the Near East and Northern Africa.11

The Habsburg ambassador in Madrid, Hans Khevenhüller, informed Maximilian

that everyone at the Spanish court assumed the Emperor’s imminent accession to the

League, yet he warned against any hasty actions by the Emperor.12 Given the significant

10 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 3, 50r-61v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 15 March 1573; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 36r-43v, Lazarus Schwendi to Maximilian II, Kientzheim, 22 March 1572; ibid., 27r-30v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 4 March 1573; HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 3, 64r-67v, Johann Hegenmüller to Maximilian II, Augsburg, 22 March 1573; ibid., 31r-38v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 4. March 1573; ibid., 39r-40v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 5 March 1573; ibid., 41r-42v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 5 March 1573; ibid., 68r-69v, Albert V of Bavaria to Maximilian II, Munich, 23 March 1573; ibid., 21r-26v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 4 March 1573.

11 My translation of the poem reads: “Venice, my true fatherland are thou!/ Moreover, Miss Betrayal is my mother!/ Of ungodly manner and bad honour,/ Of such a spite kin is my origin/ That neither anything noble nor anything honorable is mine/ As it becomes completely evident now./ First, I put the laudable Emperor/ In danger, when he has not been a daredevil for me,/ So that I carried the Turk in the sea/ On my back through my knavery./ At the beginning, I pretended to be the Turk’s enemy./ However, when it took me too much efforts and money/ I soon forgot what I had shown myself to be!/ After eschewing the Pope and Spain,/ With the Turk I signed a nefarious peace treaty/ Even though it annoyed entire Christianity./ Indeed, just like Venetian moneybags/ I offered disgrace and remained an archbetrayer!” The poem’s rime reproduces the word “betrayer”. GStA PK, I. HA, Geheimer Rat, Rep. 11 Auswärtige Beziehungen, Akten, Nr. 11253, 42r-45v: 45r, Roman and Venetian avvisi, 2 May and 5 May 1573; ibid., 46r-50v, Venetian avviso (via Vienna), 13 March 1574; ibid., 51r-52v, Venetian avviso, 22 October 1574.

12 HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Rom, Hofkorrespondenz, 5, Fasz. II, Cardinal Marcantonio Amulio to Maximilian II, Rome, 27 October 1571, 55v: Tutti i Principi Christiani sono quasi come membri d’un capo principale, e questo è l’Jmperatore; et non conuiene alla Jmperiale dignità, che li membri faccino la guerra senza il capo.

pressure that Cardinals Morone and Farnese, as well as Venetian observers, put on

Habsburg residents abroad, Maximilian received further letters from Rome and Venice

in which Habsburg diplomats called on the Emperor to act. Yet his response did not

communicate any positive decision; this caused utter astonishment amongst many

contemporaries, such as the Swiss nobleman Nicolaus Polweiler.13 The Emperor’s official

letter of congratulations to the Pope, however, shortly after Lepanto aroused further

hopes in Genoa, Madrid, Rome and Venice whose diplomats reassured each other in

mutual correspondence about the imminent intent of the Emperor to join the Holy

League.14

Internal Perspectives: Political Debates in the German lands

In their optimism, Italian and Spanish observers failed to understand that the Emperor’s

indecision was embedded in a complex political system of decision-making. When

receiving an ever-growing number of requests to join the League, Maximilian asked the

highest political authorities, as well as his closest counsellors, for advice. Responses

followed promptly. Archduke of Austria Charles II warned his brother against

expressing any commitment towards the members of the Holy League. The Empire’s

frontier fortifications and border troops were in a miserable state and the stability of the

alliance, he continued, was anything but clear. Archduke Ferdinand II shared this point

of view and pointed to the advanced age of the Pope as well as the Venetians’ general

interest in peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Ferdinand

emphasised the attitude of reluctant local authorities towards the Türkensteuern, the

13 B. Stollberg-Rilinger/ A. Krischer (eds.), Herstellung und Darstellung von Entscheidungen: Verfahren, Verwalten und Verhandeln in der Vormoderne (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010).

14 ASGe, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, first letter of the agente Georgi sent to Genoa, Vienna, 7 November 1571, 2r.

taxes which the German estates were obliged to pay in order to support the Emperor in

his – potential – combat with the Ottomans. Indeed, the Archduke of Further Austria had

very good reasons to draw the Emperor’s attention to this point. Although the Imperial

Diet in Regensburg in 1567 had doubled the tax, payments were still due when the

discussions about the Empire’s possible support of the league reached its peak in

1571/72. Entire villages still refused to pay the Türkensteuer, which had been due since

1557. Attempts at double taxation furthermore decreased the subjects’ willingness to

pay these dues. Circulating the payment demands within their territories took months,

even for political supporters of the taxes such as the Lutheran Count Palatine of

Neuburg.15

The most crucial objection to the Empire’s accession to the Holy League, however,

was the existing peace treaty between the Emperor and the Sultan. The latter’s interest

in maintaining this agreement became obvious when Selim II commanded the beylerbey

of Buda to prohibit any possible violations of this treaty in the Habsburg-Ottoman

frontier zone. The command, which was issued on 31 Shabʿān 979/ 18 January 1572,

was also dispatched to Vienna.16 Given the treaty’s validity, Archduke Charles

highlighted emphatically that military actions against the Ottomans would signify an

“offensive war” (offensiffkrieg).17 Ferdinand, however, explained that the many previous

15 HHStA, Ungarische Akten, Fasz. 97, Konv. A, 7r, Maximilian II to Adam von Dietrichstein, Prague, 30 January 1571; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, I, 109r, Veit von Dornberg, Habsburg ambassador in Venice, to the Imperial Court, Venice, 1 April 1570; HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Berichte, 11, III, Veit von Dornberg to the Imperial Court, Venice, 6 May 1571, 1r.

16 HHStA, Kriegsakten, 22, Konv. 2, 12r-23v, Charles II Francis of Austria to Maximilian II, Graz, 7 March 1572; ibid., 28r-35v, Ferdinand II, Archduke of Further Austria, to Maximilian II, Innsbruck, 19 March 1572; W. Schulze, Reich und Türkengefahr im späten 16.  Jahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer äußeren Bedrohung (Munich: Beck, 1978), 67-301; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 42-1; HHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, 53-1; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München [hereafter BHStAM], Pfalz-Neuburg, Akten, 1967; P. Fuchs, “Philipp Ludwig,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, eds. Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 383.

17 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.

border disputes might provide sufficient reasons for attacks, especially as the Holy

League’s victory indicated that God would support the war against the Ottomans. Yet

despite faith in God, a proper military plan was needed to put such ideas into practice.18

As the response of the Emperor’s military councillor strongly urged restraint, however,

such plans were soon abandoned. Lazarus Schwendi, the Austrian commander, had

outlined the very same objections as both archdukes did, and Schwendi furthermore

stated that the Ottomans might be defeated at sea but their position at land is surely

much stronger. He not only mentioned the considerable costs of such a military

campaign, but also indicated that there was bad morale among the soldiers and it was

not certain France and the Imperial estates would support such a campaign. The sheer

effort of preparation for a war against the Ottomans could not be kept secret and would

banish any hope for a victory. “According to all reason and experience”, he strongly

discouraged the Emperor from joining the League to fight the Ottomans.19

After Lepanto, Emperor Maximilian II also dispatched special envoys to the

electoral princes to discuss the possibility of joining the League. As one of the envoys,

the Bohemian magnate Wilhelm von Rosenberg presented the issue during several

audiences in Dresden in February 1572. August, Elector of Saxony, expressed the very

same concerns and hopes as many of his contemporaries did, to which he impored

18 My translation of the poem reads: “Venice, my true fatherland are thou!/ Moreover, Miss Betrayal is my mother!/ Of ungodly manner and bad honour,/ Of such a spite kin is my origin/ That neither anything noble nor anything honorable is mine/ As it becomes completely evident now./ First, I put the laudable Emperor/ In danger, when he has not been a daredevil for me,/ So that I carried the Turk in the sea/ On my back through my knavery./ At the beginning, I pretended to be the Turk’s enemy./ However, when it took me too much efforts and money/ I soon forgot what I had shown myself to be!/ After eschewing the Pope and Spain,/ With the Turk I signed a nefarious peace treaty/ Even though it annoyed entire Christianity./ Indeed, just like Venetian moneybags/ I offered disgrace and remained an archbetrayer!” The poem’s rime reproduces the word “betrayer”. GStA PK, I. HA, Geheimer Rat, Rep. 11 Auswärtige Beziehungen, Akten, Nr. 11253, 42r-45v: 45r, Roman and Venetian avvisi, 2 May and 5 May 1573; ibid., 46r-50v, Venetian avviso (via Vienna), 13 March 1574; ibid., 51r-52v, Venetian avviso, 22 October 1574.

19 ASGe, Archivio Segreto, 2525, m. 8, first letter of the agente Georgi sent to Genoa, Vienna, 7 November 1571, 2r.

Maximilliam to call for an Imperial Diet that might decide on the issue. On the one hand,

August hoped that other monarchs, such as those of France, England, Denmark, Poland,

Sweden and Scotland would join the Holy League. On the other, he hoped that such an

important question could be discussed in Consens by all members of the Empire, even

though Rosenberg informed him about Maximilian’s hope to decide on this matter

rather soon.20 Still, in the very same month, Rosenberg presented the issue during

various audiences in front of John George of Brandenburg who obviously felt

uncomfortable with the pressure that the envoy put on him. First, the Prince-elector,

who had only held this rank for a few months, wished to have one or two councillors

present during the audience, as his “bad memory” would impede him from making a

good political decision. Second, John George asked for a written enquiry, so Rosenberg

presented the Emperor’s instructions which, though issued for private purposes, had

been already revealed during the audience in Dresden. In Berlin, the Prince-elector

likewise responded and asked for an Imperial Diet to decide on a possible accession to

the League given the “current dangerous and evil times and events, in which much more

harmful mistrust, schism and discord prevails between Christian kings and potentates

than just and true trust and Christian unity”. Rosenberg hinted at the importance of time

as a factor: if the decision was not to be made soon after Lepanto, the Emperor might be

blamed for any possible bad consequences that followed. Yet his appeal was in vain,

even though the Prince-elector understood war against the Ottomans as a “Christian

deed”. The issue was so important that John George, just like August, wished it to be

discussed at an Imperial Diet.21 The Imperial councillor Johann Hegenmüller and the

President of the Aulic Council, Philipp von Winnenberg, both special envoys for

20 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.

21 Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung DE, Dessau [hereafter LHASA], Z 6, Nr. 1311, Friedrich Trauboth to Joachim Ernst of Anhalt.

negotiating a possible accession to the Holy League, faced similar responses in audiences

with the Prince-electors of Cologne, Mainz, the Palatinate and Trier. The Archbishop-

Elector of Mainz understood the League’s victory at Lepanto as offering a chance of a

military success over the Ottomans, yet he also pointed to the difficulties that would

occur when fighting the Ottomans. Just like the Archbishop of Cologne, he pleaded that

the matter should be decided in the college of all electors. The Count Palatine even

refused to provide any direct response to the matter, stating that he would inform the

Emperor in due course.22

Thus, Maximilian received reserved responses across the confessional divide.

Even the Catholic Duke of Bavaria referred to these same strategic reservations and

asked the Emperor not to join the League.23 All electors wished the matter to be

discussed either amongst each other or at an Imperial Diet that would include the

imperial estates in the decision-making process. Such responses were not surprising, as

the possibility of supporting Venice in a war with the Ottoman Empire was already

discussed during the Imperial Diet at Speyer in 1570.24 Just a few weeks after the arrival

of the news of Lepanto in Vienna, Commendone informed Rome that the Emperor

expected to convene an Imperial Diet to decide the possibility of supporting the

League.25 This was exactly the position of the Lutheran prince-electors. Shortly after the

audiences in spring 1572, however, the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony agreed to

discuss the issue in the college of electors. When the Calvinist Count Palatine

Frederick III failed in his attempt to convince the Catholic Archchancellor of Mainz to

proceed in finding a resolution without the Lutheran electors of Saxony and

22

23

24

25

Brandenburg, Frederick III also gave his consent for a general college of all prince-

electors. Hegenmüller presented this result as a success in front of the Emperor, stating

that the estates usually follow the resolution of the electors.26 The councillors of the

electors then met in Mühlhausen, Thuringia, in July 1572. Here, it was again impossible

to come to a shared resolution in favour of or against the matter. Whilst Lutheran

Saxony and Catholic Trier openly argued in favour of joining the League, the Calvinist

Count Palatine was afraid that the money would be used to fight the Protestants instead

of the Ottomans. As a possible accession to the League that necessitated the estates’

decision about issues of financing, the prince-electors agreed to ask the Emperor to

convene an Imperial Diet.27

The Long-Drawn-Out Nature and Irrelevance of Political Decision-Making

When the maritime season, and thus the season of warfare, commenced again in early

1573, however, the Emperor had still not convened an Imperial Diet. On the contrary, in

light of the cross-confessional diffidence he even instructed Habsburg ambassadors

abroad, such as Adam von Dietrichstein in Spain, to respond firmly in front of foreign

monarchs who called on the Emperor to act.28 Since the League’s members continued to

approach him, Maximilian again asked the highest political figures in the German lands

to comment on the issue and the entire procedure of the previous year started again.

The fact that Maximilian sent at least three letters to Archduke Ferdinand, asking him to

comment on the question, demonstrates both the reluctance of the correspondent and

26

27

28

the significance that this correspondence obviously had on the Emperor.29 In their

responses, Charles, Ferdinand and the Duke of Bavaria emphasized that an Imperial Diet

should take place very soon, as the Emperor’s honour would be seriously damaged

otherwise. Whilst Charles and Albert V of Bavaria openly favoured supporting the

League and fighting the Ottomans, primarily because of rumours that Portugal was

willing to join the League, Ferdinand reminded the Emperor of circulating rumours that

Venice was negotiating with the Ottomans. He also pointed out the immense financial

burdens that such a war would cause the Holy Roman Empire.30

When the special envoys Rosenberg, Hegenmüller and Winnenberg confronted

the prince-electors with the question of a possible accession to the Holy League in 1573,

the Mühlhausen resolution of the previous year did not leave much scope for

interpretations and actions different to 1572. The Elector of Saxony and the archbishop

of Mainz, for instance, both reminded the Emperor’s envoys of the necessity to call an

Imperial Diet. In informal conversations, however, Hegenmüller was informed by the

archbishop about his wish to support the League. Yet, he had serious concerns whether

all the prince-electors and subjects would actually be willing to do so.31 Hegenmüller and

Winnenberg arrived in Heidelberg on 18 April 1573, staying overnight in a lodging

house with excellent wine. The following morning, they entered the castle to discuss the

question with the Count Palatine over lunch. As soon as they arrived, Frederick III

informed them of the fact that Venice had signed a separate peace treaty with the

Ottomans. In the meantime, the Calvinist Count Palatine informed the Emperor’s envoys,

that the son of the Venetian diplomatic resident in Istanbul had arrived in Venice to

report on the results of the negotiations with the Ottomans, and the papal and Spanish

29

30

31

residents had also been informed by the Doge. This new information obviously

undermined the envoys’ diplomatic mission. “For our part”, Hegenmüller states in the

letter which he dispatched to Vienna, “we didn’t say any further word about this.” When

returning to their rooms the very same day, the envoys found letters in which the Duke

of Bavaria confirmed the news.32

Such news rapidly spread all over the German lands. During the very same days,

for instance, the prince-elector of Brandenburg also received a Venetian newsletter

(Zeytung) that reported on the peace treaty. The local correspondent and news agent

was obviously so aghast that he added a satirical song which blamed the “betrayer”

Venice in a catchy rime:

Venedig mein Rechts Vater Landt bist du, V

Fraw verretereÿ ist mein muter d[ar]zu

Einer Gotlosen art vnnd schlechten ehr. E

Von solchem Argen schlecht khom Jch her.

Nix adelichs, noch Erbarlichs ist bei mir zwar R

Wie es dann gentzlichen Jetzt wirdt offenbar

Erstlichen den loblichen kheiser in gefahr, R

Jch gem gebracht, wo er mir zu witzig nit gwest wer

Damit Jch durch mein furgenohmen puben stuck E

Den Turcken in d[a]z Meer Luedt vf den ruck

Jm Anfangk Jch mich, als des Türck[en] feindt stelt T

Aber wie es mir wolt nehmen zuuil muhe vnd gelt,

Garbalt Jch vergaß, weß ich mich erzeigt hett T

Dem Bapst vnd Hispanien ich enthalt[en] thet

Ein schendlich[en] friedt ich mit dem Turcken beschloß E

32

Obs gleich die gantz Christenheit verdroß

Recht Alls ein pfeffer sack vnnd Venedig[er] R

Gab Jch Schandt vnnd bleib ein ertzverreter.33

Given such widely circulating news, Hegenmüller and Winnenberg hurried on with their

diplomatic mission. Neither the archbishop of Trier nor that of Cologne was informed

about the new political agreement when the Imperial envoys arrived. The clerics

therefore agreed to debate with the other Rhenish prince-electors about the possibility

of joining the League during the Probationstag in Mainz on 1 May 1573. When the

envoys briefly informed the archbishop of Trier about the rumours of a Venetian-

Ottoman peace treaty after that decision had been made, the Trier Landhofmeister von

Reiffenberg, who was present at the audience, replied furiously: “if this has happened, it

would be the most dishonourable thing that has ever happened in the history of

humankind.”34 When the rumours proved to be true, the issue of support, which has

been discussed by then for years, lost its political momentum.

Reassessing Historiographical Narratives: Catholic Views on Reformation

Germany

In the end, it was not solely the Emperor who decided about the Empire’s neutrality.

Catholic diplomats misunderstood the important role of political decision-making in

sixteenth-century Germany when repeatedly approaching Maximilian II in letters and

audiences. When praising the result of the battle as a Christian victory, they were

seeking the Emperor’s support by referring to his role as a Christian monarch. Knowing

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about the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire as a “body with head and

limbs”,35 the Cardinals approached Maximilian as the “principal head” of all “Christian

princes” who should decide whether to join the Holy League or not.36 At the same time,

other Catholic diplomats were aware of this fact and tried to influence such processes of

decision-making by using Christian rhetoric to underline the importance of the Battle of

Lepanto.

Such post-Lepanto rhetoric, however, did not convince the Emperor, given the

“counter movement” (kegenbewegnus) that he faced when asking the most significant

political figures of the Empire for advice on whether or not joining the League would be

wise. Such reservations, in fact, did not rely on the confessional divide but rather

bridged the confessional diversity of Reformation Germany.37 Indeed, joy at the victory

was similarly shared across confessions. All across the Holy Roman Empire, Lutherans

and Catholics celebrated the result of the Battle of Lepanto in services, masses and

festival processions for weeks after the arrival of the news.38 Nevertheless, the Holy

Roman Empire did not support the Holy League. As outlined above, the main reason for

this was constitutional, for political decision-making in the Empire was processual in

character.39 Whilst protagonists initially interpreted the calling of a college of electors as

a consensus-building and time-saving solution, which would pre-define or even obviate

an Imperial Diet, it finally turned out to be a procedure which inhibited the Emperor’s

timely decision-making with respect to the Holy League. However, this procedure was

never consciously intended to cause delay. The Mühlhausen resolution codified the

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electors’ position and thus prevented them from reacting in a more flexible and prompt

manner in the following months. Such processes of decision-making took a great deal of

time, yet they ensured the inclusion of various opinions and guaranteed that decisions

were based on a wide consensus. As a consequence, agents changed their points of view

throughout this process. Archduke Charles, for instance, first argued against and later in

favour of supporting the League. Above all, however, such points of view were not

primarily related to confessional identities. In Mühlhausen in 1572, for instance,

Lutheran Saxony and Catholic Trier argued for and the Calvinist Palatinate against

joining the League. In the Holy Roman Empire of the 1570s, thus, political decision-

making was a processual act that included Catholics, Lutherans and Reformed

Lutherans. The diverse confessional landscape, however, did not predefine political

positions when the accession to the Holy League was open to debate. On the contrary,

concrete military, strategic, diplomatic and internal concerns were shared across the

confessional divide; a fact, which prevented the Emperor, who indeed still had

reservations against the de Medici, to declare a clear position.40 The highly ritualised

processual character of the Holy Roman Empire’s culture of political decision-making,

however, made the necessity of coming to a decision itself obsolete after the Venetian-

Ottoman peace treaty had been signed in 1573. The issue of support was no longer

pressing as the league did not exist any longer.

Why then are explanations which refer to a Lutheran opposition to the Holy

League so prominent when discussing the Empire’s neutrality in this scenario?41

Historians of the Battle of Lepanto have often argued for this as they have usually only

consulted Italian or Spanish sources. When describing the responses to the battle in the

German lands, however, they simply adopted the most prominent topos of sixteenth-

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century Catholic diplomats. Italian envoys faced the negotiations between Commendone

and Maximilian with considerable scepticism. A Genuese diplomat reported in

November 1571 that the Emperor, indeed, received the Papal legate quite often. Yet,

such audiences did not lead to more than “nice words”. Maximilian would probably only

decide on this issue after an Imperial Diet had taken place. The Genoese agent

considered this to be a precaution of the Emperor as the decision to support the Pope

“would set the worms [i. e. the Lutherans] of this nation in motion”.42 This observation,

however, was itself a confessional polemic as it drew an implicite parallel between

Lutherans and Ottomans for the sake of presenting Catholics as the true proponents of

the Christian faith. When the discursive dichotomies of ‘believers’ and ‘infidels’, which

labelled Lepanto as a ‘Christian victory’, did not match the realities they tried to

describe, contemporaries could refer to such topoi for explaining the neutrality of the

Holy Roman Empire as a result of ‘Protestant guilt’. Contemporaries described the

victory as la rotta which had broken the idea of the invincibility of the Ottomans.43 The

Genoese diplomat reflected this rhetoric when stating in a disillusioned manner: “But

who knows, what this victory did not shatter (rotto).”44 It is time to break the

unquestioned longevity of such interpretations in historiography and popular

imagination that ultimately rely on early modern confessional polemics. Indeed, such

explanations do not mirror the complexity of the past. Dissent was widespread amongst

Catholics and Protestants alike. As a consequence, confessional identities mattered less

than pragmatic politics towards the Ottomans.

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