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TRANSCRIPT
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CHAPTER 2 Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions
MULTIPLE CHOICE
1. Which of the following was NOT a possible reason for the 2003 preventive war between the United States and Iraq?a. to forestall an Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitb. to assert American power in the Middle Eastc. to secure supplies of oil from the Persian Gulfd. to transform the Middle East by changing an authoritarian regime in the region into
an effective democracye. to prevent Iraq from using its alleged weapons of mass destruction
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 41–42 KEY: 2003 Iraq WarNOT: Conceptual
2. Why didn’t the United Nations Security Council endorse the preventive war against Iraq in 2003?a. The members of the Security Council did not believe Iraq had any weapons of
mass destruction.b. The Security Council is unable to endorse military action against sovereign
countries.c. The United Nations General Assembly wanted the Security Council to consider a
new peace proposal.d. Since the Security Council oversaw humanitarian programs in Iraq, it decided to
remain neutral rather than risk a conflict of interest.e. Several permanent members of the Security Council opposed going to war against
Iraq and could veto any endorsement of the war.
ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Pages 41–42 KEY: 2003 Iraq WarNOT: Conceptual
3. One result of the 2003 Iraq War was:a. a continuing insurgency by both Sunnis and Shiitesb. the discovery of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons hidden in Iraqc. a minimal level of Iraqi casualtiesd. the restoration of secular government in Iraqe. the creation of a more homogenous society
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 42 KEY: 2003 Iraq WarNOT: Applied
4. Cooperation is:a. a type of institution that makes agreements easier for two actorsb. a type of institution that sets the rules for interactions between actorsc. a type of interaction in which one actor will receive more and the other actor less
of the desired outcomed. a type of interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve
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some outcome they prefere. a type of interaction in which no one is hurt
ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: Pages 43, 50 KEY: CooperationNOT: Factual
5. Successful cooperation depends upon all of the following EXCEPT:a. the number of actors involved in an interactionb. how quickly the actors can interactc. the number of times actors interactd. how much the actors value the futuree. the accuracy of the information they possess
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 43 KEY: CooperationNOT: Factual
6. Bargaining is a type of interaction:a. that involves the distribution of a fixed valueb. in which no one losesc. in which success is determined by individual actorsd. in which zero-sum calculations do not applye. in which new value is created
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 43, 52 KEY: BargainingNOT: Factual
7. Institutions can be all of the following EXCEPT:a. a set of rules for cooperation among statesb. a prime minister declaring war on another countryc. organizations consisting of several sovereign statesd. nongovernmental organizationse. informal norms such as the norm against slavery
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 43, 62–63KEY: Interests NOT: Factual
8. Why do countries comply with international institutions?a. International institutions can always force countries to fulfill their agreements.b. International institutions are always neutral and unbiased mediators.c. International institutions never have their own agendas to pursue.d. International institutions can reduce the cost of coming to an agreement.e. International institutions are easily manipulated by weaker countries.
ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: Pages 43, 69–70KEY: Institutions NOT: Conceptual
9. If France’s top national interest were security, its first preference for a new Iraqi government would be:a. an authoritarian Iraq with a pro-Western dictator as its leader
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b. an authoritarian Iraq with an anti-Western Islamic government holding powerc. a democratic Iraq in which an anti-Western Islamic government might be electedd. a democratic Iraq which might reduce the production and sale of oil to Western
countriese. a democratic Iraq with a continuing civil war
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 44, 46 KEY: National InterestNOT: Applied
10. A state wanting to promote democracy in developing countries would be pursuing which kind of goal?a. powerb. securityc. normatived. economic gaine. material welfare
ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Pages 44–45 KEY: InterestsNOT: Applied
11. In international relations, actors can be any of the following EXCEPT:a. individualsb. international organizationsc. groupsd. rulese. states
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 46 KEY: ActorsNOT: Factual
12. Which of the following is an example of a state?a. Iraqi Shiite militiab. Iraqc. Saddam Husseind. the Middle Easte. the Iraqi parliamentary government
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 46 KEY: StateNOT: Applied
13. What is a failed state?a. an area of the world that never became a consolidated stateb. a state in which the central authority has broken downc. a state that initiates a war that it then losesd. a state that experiences a major debt crisise. a state that is taken over by another state
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 46 KEY: StateNOT: Factual
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14. Why is the concept of sovereignty an important component for the definition of a state?a. Having real sovereignty means other states will not invade the sovereign state’s
territory.b. Being a state presumes legal and political supremacy within a state’s own
boundaries.c. Without sovereignty, more powerful states will often interfere in the politics of
weaker states.d. Being a state presumes that only one group or sovereign entity makes decisions for
that state.e. Sovereignty is presumed and always expected by states.
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: Page 46 KEY: SovereigntyNOT: Conceptual
15. Which of the following would be an example of a state actor?a. President George W. Bush raising tariffs on steel imports to protect an industry
that has contributed to his electoral campaignsb. President Bill Clinton increasing sanctions on Cuba because of lobbying by Cuban
Americans in Floridac. President George W. Bush pursuing an invasion of Iraq because Saddam Hussein
attempted to assassinate his fatherd. President Bill Clinton improving relations between the United States and Europe
because he had studied in Great Britain during collegee. President George W. Bush pursuing an invasion of Iraq to safeguard the flow of oil
to the United States
ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Page 47 KEY: ActorsNOT: Applied
16. The following are all examples of nongovernmental organizations EXCEPT:a. the Red Crossb. Amnesty Internationalc. the United Nationsd. Greenpeacee. Doctors without Borders
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Page 48 (Table 2.1)KEY: Institutions: Nongovernmental Organizations NOT: Factual
17. According to your text, Saddam Hussein’s top interest was:a. to fight a war with the United Statesb. to build weapons of mass destructionc. to avoid a war with Irand. to stay in powere. to go into exile in a friendly neighboring state, if this could be arranged safely
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 49 KEY: 2003 Iraq War
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NOT: Factual
18. Why are some interactions considered to be strategic interactions?a. In strategic interactions, an actor has to prepare a strategy for the future no matter
what other actors will do.b. In strategic interactions, more than one actor is involved in a negotiation.c. In strategic interactions, actors have a set of preferences that determine what their
strategy will be.d. In strategic interactions, actors are unlikely to consider the future consequences of
their choices.e. In strategic interactions, each actor’s plan of action depends on what the other
actors are expected to do.
ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 49–50 KEY: InteractionsNOT: Conceptual
19. Which of the following is an example of cooperation?a. a group of friends contributing a little money each to throw a partyb. a corporation lobbying Congress for trade protection from foreign importsc. a country cutting back on its emission of greenhouse gasesd. media companies dividing up the limited radio spectrum among themselvese. two water districts agreeing that each should get half of a local river’s water
ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 50–51 KEY: CooperationNOT: Applied
20. The Pareto frontier represents:a. the range of possible beneficial outcomes for two actors when they cooperateb. the possible outcomes of a bargaining problem when one actor will losec. the information threshold any actors need for successful cooperationd. the area of a border that is disputed by two neighboring countriese. the amount of power an actor needs to successfully coerce another actor
ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 51–52 KEY: InteractionsNOT: Factual
21. Which of the following is an example of bargaining?a. a group of citizens agreeing to pay taxes to install new sidewalksb. the United States and Great Britain contributing to a joint effort to oust Saddam
Husseinc. two states fighting over a piece of territoryd. the government raising the price per bushel of corn after being lobbied by farmerse. teachers striking to get higher pay
ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Page 52 KEY: BargainingNOT: Applied
22. Two actors facing a coordination problem:a. are unlikely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem
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b. are likely to find a mutually acceptable solution only if one actor has more power than the other
c. are likely to find an acceptable solution that is much more beneficial for only one actor
d. are likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that is difficult to enforcee. are likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that can be self enforced
ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: Page 54 KEY: InteractionsNOT: Applied
23. All of the following are examples of solutions to coordination problems EXCEPT:a. drivers in the United Kingdom drive on the left side of the roadb. international airline pilots all speak Englishc. peacekeepers separate two armies in a civil war to stop the conflictd. all firms producing compact discs use a single compatible formate. countries allocate international flight paths to avoid midair collisions
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Page 54KEY: Interactions: Coordination NOT: Applied
24. What kind of problem does the Prisoner’s Dilemma story illustrate?a. coordinationb. linkagec. coerciond. collaboratione. free ride
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Pages 54–55KEY: Interactions: Prisoner’s Dilemma NOT: Factual
25. The most likely outcome for both participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is:a. both keep quiet so that both prisoners go free and split the lootb. both provide evidence against each other and go to jail, then split the loot after
serving their sentencesc. both provide evidence against each other, but avoid a jail sentence when they
return the lootd. one prisoner keeps quiet, while the other provides evidence and avoids jail and
gets all the loote. one prisoner keeps quiet, while the other provides evidence and avoids jail, but has
to give back the loot
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 54–55KEY: Interactions: Prisoner’s Dilemma NOT: Factual
26. How was the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union analogous to the Prisoner’s Dilemma?a. Both sides ended up with fewer weapons than they wanted but still had enough to
defend themselves from the other.b. Each side kept quiet about the number of nuclear weapons they had, so that they
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could more easily defect.c. Both sides provided evidence of nuclear weapons and cooperated in creating an
arms agreement.d. The United States provided evidence of nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union
remained quiet and thus defected instead of cooperating.e. Collectively each side would have been better off if both had fewer weapons, but
each side had an incentive to defect.
ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Pages 55–56KEY: Interactions: Prisoner’s Dilemma NOT: Applied
27. Which is the best definition of a public good?a. It is a benefit that is always paid for by the government.b. It is a product created by public agencies for the use of all citizens of a country.c. It is a product that cannot be withheld from anyone and whose use does not
prohibit anyone else from enjoying it.d. It is supplies that governments provide for infrastructure projects.e. It is any benefit that governments provide.
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Page 56 KEY: Public GoodsNOT: Factual
28. The following is an example of a public good:a. a free lunch provided by a soup kitchenb. the clean air resulting from laws reducing pollutionc. a tariff protecting an important national industryd. electric cars that reduce smog for everyonee. government tax credits for companies that make safer cars
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: Page 56 KEY: Public GoodsNOT: Applied
29. A state wanting to free ride with regard to ozone depletion would:a. sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, but continue to produce such
ozone-depleting emissions while other states decreased their own emissionsb. sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, but would reduce emissions only if
all other signatories also reduced their emissionsc. refuse to sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases because it would not want
to pay for reducing ozone-depleting emissionsd. sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, and then reduce its emissions only
as much as the other signatories reduce their emissionse. freely reduce emissions without signing any entangling agreements
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: Page 56KEY: Interactions: Collective Action NOT: Applied
30. In which case is an agreement most likely to be successful?a. Over 180 countries sign an agreement to reduce pollution in oceans.b. Twenty Mediterranean countries agree to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean
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Sea.c. Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and Ukraine sign
an agreement to reduce pollution in the Danube River.d. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania sign an agreement to reduce pollution in Lake
Victoria.e. The United States and Mexico sign an agreement to reduce pollution off the
Pacific coast.
ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Page 57KEY: Interactions: Cooperation NOT: Applied
31. Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?a. Countries are better able to threaten reciprocal punishment in the future.b. Countries that are closer together are also more likely to cooperate.c. Countries are more likely to comply with treaties when their commitments are
clearly specified.d. Countries are more likely to cooperate when no country is more powerful than the
other.e. Countries can more easily coerce cooperation when they have full information.
ANS: A DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 57–58KEY: Interactions: Cooperation NOT: Conceptual
32. How does iteration differ from linkage?a. In iteration, agreements are specifically enumerated rather than being combined or
linked to other agreements.b. In iteration, all actors share all relevant information rather than strategically
withholding key information.c. In iteration, an actor makes the first move in negotiations rather than waiting to use
information from other sources to get a better outcome.d. In iteration, an actor waits for others to set the agenda for bargaining rather than
promising cooperation in the future.e. In iteration, an actor can punish another by withholding cooperation in the future
rather than withholding cooperation on other issues.
ANS: E DIF: Medium REF: Pages 57–58 KEY: InteractionsNOT: Applied
33. In 2003, why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?a. Saddam Hussein thought Iran might attack if the Iranians knew he did not have
any weapons of mass destruction.b. Saddam Hussein thought that the United States would be deterred from invading if
it thought Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction.c. Saddam Hussein had been lied to by Iraqi scientists and thought that Iraq really did
have weapons of mass destruction.d. Saddam Hussein thought that Russia would approve of an invasion if it knew Iraq
did not have weapons of mass destruction.e. Saddam Hussein thought that inspectors from the United Nations would be able to
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find out for themselves that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction.
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 59, 72 KEY: 2003 Iraq WarNOT: Conceptual
34. All of the following statements about power are true EXCEPT:a. power is the ability to not have to make concessions when bargainingb. power is the ability to get another to do what that actor would not otherwise doc. power is the ability to get the other side to make concessions when bargainingd. the actor with more power always gets the outcome it prefers when bargaining
with otherse. the more power one has, the better the outcome one can expect from bargaining
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 59KEY: Interactions: Power NOT: Factual
35. If after several months Chile and Bolivia fail to sign a free-trade agreement, the reversion outcome is:a. tariffs will immediately riseb. an appeal will be made to the World Trade Organizationc. Bolivia and Chile will impose more sanctions on each others’ importsd. there will be no trade agreemente. a new trade proposal will be presented
ANS: D DIF: Medium REF: Page 59KEY: Interactions: Reversion NOT: Applied
36. If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide, the reversion outcome would be:a. the Security Council members would return (revert) to more negotiationsb. the genocide would be endedc. the genocide would continued. economic sanctions would automatically be enactede. a thirty-day cooling off period would begin
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Page 59KEY: Interactions: Reversion NOT: Applied
37. When bargaining with others, one actor will have an advantage if:a. there are many other actors to bargain withb. the actor is more satisfied with the reversion outcome than the othersc. the actor begins bargaining after the other actorsd. the actor needs to end the bargaining process quicklye. the actor has no other options but to come to an agreement
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: Page 59KEY: Interactions: Reversion and Bargaining NOT: Factual
38. Imposing some cost on others to reduce the value of the status quo is known as:
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a. coercionb. reversionc. linkaged. enforcemente. collaboration
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: Page 60KEY: Interactions: Coercion NOT: Factual
39. One means with which a country can coerce other countries is:a. walking away from negotiationsb. setting the agenda for negotiationsc. threatening or using military force against the other countriesd. withholding information from the other countriese. having an international organization mediate the dispute
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Pages 60–61KEY: Interactions: Coercion NOT: Factual
40. In the disagreement between the United States and the United Nations Security Council over the 2003 war with Iraq, the United States felt it had less need of Security Council support because:a. the United States usually did not get Security Council approval for its actions and
considered the Security Council an “outside option”b. the Security Council had the reputation of being an irrelevant actor or “outside
option”c. although the United States could not attack Iraq on its own, it could exercise its
“outside option” by pressuring outsider countries to lobby members of the Security Council
d. the Security Council had an “outside option” (little chance) of using military forces to prevent the United States from attacking
e. the United States had the attractive “outside option” of successfully attacking Iraq on its own
ANS: E DIF: Medium REF: Page 61KEY: Interactions: Outside Options NOT: Factual
41. An actor using agenda-setting power during bargaining:a. makes the last and decisive move (like the setting sun)b. uses knowledge of the agenda to create coalitions with other actorsc. links items on the agenda to other issues in order to coerce other actorsd. acts first and therefore changes what choices are available to the other actorse. keeps the official record of the proceedings and uses this to promote its own
description of the agreement or treaty
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 62KEY: Interactions: Agenda Setting NOT: Applied
42. If not resolved, all of the following can hinder cooperation EXCEPT:
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a. incentives to defectb. large numbers of actorsc. nonrepeated interactionsd. coalition buildinge. imperfect information
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 63 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Factual
43. In international relations, when one refers to anarchy one is referring to:a. the chaos of interactions between countriesb. groups of people who conspire to overthrow governmentsc. the fact that a small group of powerful countries controls relations between statesd. the fact that there is no formal global governmente. the amount of power of the strongest states
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Pages 63–64 KEY: AnarchyNOT: Factual
44. Why is enforcement by institutions actually “self-enforcement”?a. Institutions can force their own members to comply with their agreements without
outside help.b. There is no central international authority capable of forcing actors to cooperate.c. To force members to cooperate, actors pay dues to their institutions to
create their own enforcement agency.d. Each institution is defined as a sovereign entity or “self.”e. Conflicts are resolved by a rotating panel of members who punish those who
violate the rules.
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 64 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Conceptual
45. Institutions facilitate cooperation by doing all of the following EXCEPT:a. by forcing actors to collaborateb. by setting standards of behaviorc. by verifying complianced. by reducing costs of joint decision-makinge. by resolving disputes
ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 64–67 KEY: InteractionsNOT: Factual
46. Which of the following is an example of an institution helping to verify compliance?a. the United Nations banning the use of satellites and planes to spy on other
countriesb. United Nations resolutions clearly banning Iraq from possessing weapons of mass
destructionc. the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) having twenty two chapters
of detailed rules on trade and investment between the member countries
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d. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors searching for nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
e. the United Nations Security Council approving the use of military force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Pages 65–66KEY: Institutions: Verifying Compliance NOT: Applied
47. Some organizations, like the World Trade Organization, have created dispute settlement procedures that:a. include a policing agency that can force states to comply with any court rulingsb. help resolve disputes by interpreting ambiguous rulesc. write new rules when the members of the organization disagree with the old rulesd. create a court with the power to subpoena and fine members who violate the rulese. have not helped resolve disputes between members
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: Page 67 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Factual
48. The best example of institutional bias reflecting the history of its creation is:a. the one country-one vote procedure in the United Nations General Assemblyb. the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic
Community before 1986c. the veto power of the five permanent members on the United Nations Security
Councild. the qualified majority voting rule of the European Unione. the consensus procedure in the World Trade Organization
ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Pages 68–69 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Applied
49. Why do some institutions continue to have biased voting procedures that privilege some states?a. Weaker states prefer that more powerful states make and carry out important
decisions.b. The powerful states that benefit from the bias resist changing the procedures.c. Formal institutions are easy to change and states constantly create new procedures
for their own benefit.d. The members of the institutions know that rules and procedures do not really
matter.e. Powerful states want weaker states to think they can contribute to important
decisions.
ANS: B DIF: Medium REF: Page 69 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Conceptual
50. Why don’t powerful countries ignore World Trade Organization rules that hurt their own economic interests?a. The World Trade Organization dispute arbitration panel can effectively enforce
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punishment of rule violators.b. The World Trade Organization can take powerful countries to court in their own
country.c. Powerful countries would rather follow the rules than cause harm to poorer
countries.d. Powerful countries fear that they will have to pay fines if they violate the rules.e. Powerful countries benefit from the whole system of trading rules and do not want
others to also violate the rules.
ANS: E DIF: Medium REF: Page 70 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Conceptual
51. When would Mexico be likely to defect from a trade agreement?a. after other member countries frequently violate the rules of the agreementb. while other member countries export more goods than Mexicoc. after other member countries experience more economic growth than Mexicod. before the trade agreement can be enforced by an arbitration panele. after Mexico’s economy becomes more integrated with other member countries’
economies
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: Pages 70–72 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Applied
52. The outcome of the case of Costa Rican underwear illustrates that:a. countries with economic and military power do not always prevail in trade disputesb. setting the agenda in trade disputes can sometimes succeedc. trade dispute resolution is biased in favor of developing countriesd. unfair import restrictions are often allowed to expire before they are adjudicatede. a system of rules can be rendered inoperative by widespread cheating
ANS: A DIF: Medium REF: Page 71 KEY: InstitutionsNOT: Applied
53. How many cases has the United States brought to the World Trade Organization?a. fewer than 5b. between 5 and 20c. between 20 and 200d. between 200 and 400e. more than 400
ANS: C DIF: Medium REF: Page 71KEY: Institutions: World Trade Organization NOT: Factual
54. Game theory is:a. an approach to understanding human behavior derived from studies of statistics
and gamblingb. an approach to studying international relations that assumes actors do not take
negotiations seriouslyc. the use of role-playing to understand the actions of world leaders
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d. a tool for analyzing strategic interactionse. the use of war games to prepare for negotiations with other countries
ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 75 KEY: Game TheoryNOT: Factual
55. Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?a. a trade agreement in which each side wants more concessions from the other
countryb. a nuclear crisis in which each side wants to take a tough stancec. a peacekeeping mission for which countries are reluctant to send their troopsd. a conference in which countries negotiate over setting international standards for
encoding CDse. an invasion of a small country by a large coalition of countries that did not want to
attack alone
ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 77–78 KEY: Game TheoryNOT: Applied
56. A major difference between the Stag Hunt and the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that:a. in the Prisoner’s Dilemma the best strategy is to stand tough while in the Stag Hunt
the best strategy is to back downb. in the Prisoner’s Dilemma the best strategy is to do the opposite of what your
opponent does while in the Stag Hunt the best strategy is to do the same thing the others do
c. mutual defection is the equilibrium result in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but in the Stag Hunt it is only one of two expected outcomes
d. mutual defection is the equilibrium result in the Stag Hunt, but in the Prisoner’s Dilemma the expected outcome is mutual cooperation
e. in the Stag Hunt there is an individual incentive to defect, while in the Prisoner’s Dilemma the barrier to cooperation is a lack of trust
ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Page 79 KEY: Game TheoryNOT: Applied
ESSAY
1. Describe the different types of actors in international relations and explain why the state is more prominent than the others.
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interests: Actors
2. A state is presumed to have national interests. What is a state, and how can we explain why a states’ national interests are power and security?
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ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interests: National Interest and the State
3. Assume that former U.S. president Jimmy Carter brokered a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1978 to reduce conflict in the Middle East. Explain how in this case President Carter can be presumed to be a state actor pursuing a national interest.
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interests: Actors and National Interest
4. What are public goods and why are public goods often provided by governments rather than private individuals or groups?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Collective Action Problems
5. How does bargaining differ from cooperation?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Cooperation and Bargaining
6. How might states use coercion, outside options, and agenda-setting to exercise power when bargaining with other actors?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Bargaining
7. What are coordination problems, cooperation problems, and collaboration problems and how do they differ?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Game Theory and Cooperation
8. What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and why is mutual defection the expected outcome of the game?
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ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Game Theory
9. Under what conditions are both hunters likely to cooperate in the Stag Hunt game?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Game Theory
10. Explain how the number of actors, iteration, the importance of the future, and information contribute to successful cooperation.
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Cooperation
11. Explain how access to information affects the probability of successful cooperation.
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interactions: Cooperation
12. Why would it be in the interest of sovereign states to comply with institutions?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interests, Institutions: Cooperation
13. How can institutions enforce cooperation between states, given that the world is anarchic?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Institutions: Cooperation
14. Using examples of international organizations, explain how and why the procedures of some institutions are biased in favor of more powerful states.
ANS:Answer will vary.
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KEY: Institutions: Institutional Bias
15. Explain how relatively weak Costa Rica was able to win a case against the United States in the World Trade Organization.
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Institutions: Cooperation
16. Why did the interests and interactions of the United States and Iraq lead to the 2003 Iraq War?
ANS:Answer will vary.
KEY: Interests, Interactions, Institutions: 2003 Iraq War
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