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The Soviet Union's Control ofthe Warsaw Pact ForceO---------------~---------------HR70-14

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J>ir«lol"llltorIntelllllet1Ce

The Soviet Union's Control ofthe Warsaw Pact ForcesO

An Inl,Ulaenc:e AUelsmnl

This paperwu prepared by1r- --JlthcOfficeofSoviet Anal)'1isO

Comments and ueries arewelcome andmaybedirected10SOV·,----L-----,--------------'

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TheSodet lInlon'. Cont~the Warsaw Pad Force~

Key Judlmtnts1n/,mnQI/(In QVQI/Gbl,QS qf I AullU' I PIJWOlf ""i I" 'hi' "pOlt.

TheWarsaw Pact, despiteorlani2:ation and procedures suallestive of amilitary alliance of equal members. is in fact the instrument of Sovietc:ontrol over the armed forccs of Eastern Europe. It iscurrently oraanizedunderauthorityof the Peacetime Statute ratifiedin 1969. Itsorlanizationforwar is detailed in the 1980Wartime Statllte. sillned by all the WarsawPact nations exceptRomania. Tbe Soviet-Imposed.provisions of thatstatute. when implemented. leaal1y subordinate the Combined ArmedForces of the Warsaw Pact to a unilateral Soviet Supreme HiahCom­mand.essentially abrolatlna thesoverelsn rlahtsof the EastEuropeanstates.I IThe Soviet SupremeHiah Command assumes absolute control of theCombined Armed Forces well in advance of bostilitles, accordina to theWartime Statute's provisions. This earlysubordination of theirarmedforces to direct and complete Soviet controlcould deny the EastEuropeansa full voice in the later staaes of a crisis·1 I

The command structure established by the Wartime Statute reflects theSoviet GeneralStafrs concept that all command andcontrol must becentralized in a sinale,Soviet Supreme Hiah Command without EastEuropean representation. The statute cstablishes two subordinate HillhCommands with absolute authority foroperations in the Western andSouthwestern Theaters of Military Operations. East European forces,includina fleetsand air defense units,will operate under the directcontrolof thesecommands] I

Thecommand and controlstructureof the Wartime Statute isdesigned foractualwar fi~hting and is not intended to expand theSoviets' control ofthePact durina peacetime. The crganlzation established bythestatuteappearsto be the resultof theSoviets'generalrationalization ofall theater-level as­setsand commands, includina their own. The statutewas prepared at thesametime that the SovietGeneral Staff, despiteinternal service resistance, .shifted its own theater-oriented navaland air forces to the theaterHighCommands.! I

Romania is the exception to the Pact members' acceptance ofthe WartimeStatute: it has not acceptedSoviet command of its forces and insists onde-vclopina its own defense c.:lnceptsj I

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Key J,'dllmentsPeacetime Sttll-c-lll-re-o""'f:-t':""he-W:-:':""a-rs-a-w-·P=-a-ct---------------;---·

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The Political Conllultative CommitteeThe Committce of Dcfensc""'M,..,.,..ln-:"is-te-rs-----------,..----

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Thc MilitaryCouncilStaffof theCombined ArmedForces

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The: 1980 Wartime Statute and Its Provisions---- --..,--------------:----The Worklnpof the Pact Durin, PeacetimeCAP Staff RapoDsiblllty 8

FarceAllocations 11War Plans 12

TheSecretariat 12

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The Wartime Combined Armed ForceaThc History ofthe Wartimesti.-tu-t-e:-----------------:------- Proposals

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The RomanianPosition1617

A Timetable 17

-Reactions to the DraftSlatutc 18Kulikov's Rolc 18Approval

Implications19

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Peacetime Controls

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SCI wlOle Marshal of lheSoviel Union Vlklor O. Kullkov. Com­maud., In Chier ortheCombined Armed forces or lhe Wal1lWPlOl.Inhi. I9U bookIe' Th. Coil,,,,.. DI/.III' aISex'nll,m. A

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1_-TheSoviet Union's Controlofthe Warsaw Paet ForeeO

Peacetime Stf\lctllre of tbeWana" Pact

TheWarsaw Pact's public posture Isthat ofa militaryllllianee of soverelln nations, joined tOlether forcommon defense, It Is a formal structureand,as such.hasformally constituted bodies to ensurethat itspurpoa.;;s arc accomplished (filule 2).Onebody-thePolitical Consultatlye Committee (PCC}-WIS formedthesame year, 1955. that thePactwascreated, A1969 document, known as thePeacetime Statute,created the Committee of Defense Ministers (COM)andan orlaniZlltion offorces called the CombinedArmed Forces ICAF) of the Warsaw Pact. While theCDM lind the Combined Command of the CAF existonly in peacetime. thePCCIs to exist durini bothpeace and warl I

ThePoUtlealConsultatl" CommitteeThePCCis themost important body of t:le WarsalYPact. In The COlletl/1It Defellse afSactaltsm,Marshal Viktor O. Kulikov describes the PCCas the"hillhest political alleney of theWarsaw Pact Organi­zation" (liaure3). With theparticipatlonof the FirstSecretaries, the I'l'<':makes deCISIons of the broadestnature concerning thecommon interest and collectivedefense of the Pact'smember countries, Throughout,the"principle orsoyerei.n equality is the basic princl­pleaovernina theactivities of the PCC. Representa·tives ofall allied nations enjoy equal rilhts in placinlquestions on theagenda, in discussing them.and inreaehinR decisions onthem." Marshal Kulikov alsoIlsserts: "Participation in thework of the PCC meet­inas by the leaders of the rulinll partieslindheads ofgovernment giyes theadopted decisions considerableweight and greatly raises the international prestile ofthisbody."[::::::::J

TheCommittee of Defense MinistersNextin the formal hierarchy is the Committee ofDefense Ministers (figure 4). It i3 made up of theMinisters of Defense of the member states and theCommander InChief andChief ofStaff of the CAFofthe Warsaw Pact. This body, rather than the PCC,de:!!! more !pcd!lcsl!y withmilitary questions than

the PeC and,accordina to Marshal Kullkov, isconcerned with "l1renathenlnll thedefense capabilityof theallied nations. oraanizational deyelopmcnt andimprovemenl of theCombined Armed Forces, andincreas!n. their combat readincss," Eachdefenseminister presides at the annual meetinll when it isheld in turnin hiscountry. Marshal Kulikov stressesthat the"opcratilllprocedure for the Ministers ofDefense Committee proceeds from the principles ofequality andsoverei.nty onwhich mutual relationsamong the Wa,rsaw Pactmember nations arc based."

oTheCOM's sj)\.ocllic responsibilities alsoinclude over­seeina the control bodies orthe CAFlind theirreadiness for wartime usc. Because the 1969 statutethat established theCOM reportedly specifics that itisempowered during peacetime and is not, therefore,a wartime body, Itsstatutory executive illent is theCAFStaff.The COM's recommendations arc sub­mitted to either thePCCor the governments of themember states forapproval, I

TheCombintd Armed Forces of the Warsaw PactCillna the Warsaw Treatyprovision ecncernina therequirement to provide mutual :1Ssistance. the 1969Peacetime Statute created the Combined Commandof theCombined Armed Forces. Asindicated byMarshal Kulikov, the CAFconsists of forces allocat­til to it bythe member states in accordance withtheirown economic capabilities. PCCdirectives, lind rec­ommendations from the Commander inChiefof theCombined Armed Forces (CinC/CAF). The sizeofthis allocation is laid out inbilateral protocols be­tween indiyidu.i1 states andthe Combined Command.Thestatutespecifics thai allocated forces rcmaindirectly subordinate to their ownMinistries of Dc·fens~ I

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The leadership oftheCombined Command, accordinato Marshal Kulikov, includes himself as CinC/CAFithe Chiefof Staffof the CAF,Oeneral Gribkov(figure ~); and deputY ClnCs for air defense. airforces, naval fcreel, and weapons andequipment, aswcll asdeputyCinC.from each Pactcountry, Kull­kov poinuout that both the Commander in Chiefandthe Chiefof Staff are.elected bythe Pact's memberaovernmcnts "from themilitary commanders ofanyWarsaw Pact member nation •..." From the bellin­nina, however, these positions have been heldonly bySovlct officers. Thenational deputy CinCs arc to"conduct exton~lve activilies penaininll to traininanatlonal troopcontlnaents , . , and maintainina themin a continuous hlah state of combat readiness."These deputl,.,s, who arcnormally national deputyministers of (Jefen.e orChiefs ofGeneral Staff,donotreside In Moscow butremain Intheirnational head­quarters. As a consequence, they have little involve­ment in the actlvllies ofthe Combined Armed Forcesand its staff·1 I

The primary responsibility of theCinC/CAf, as laidout Inthe statute, is the preparatlun ofthe CAF forthe outbreak of hostilities, Hedirects training andcxercises, propo$Cs improvements in weapons systemsand equipment, and directs loaistic preparations andstockpiles in the theater. More s(anlficRnt is hisabilityto iuue "ordersor recommendations" forchanaina

3

the combat readiness status of theCAF to hlllPlemenl"decisions of the aovernments" or the PCC.

c::=JThe"orders or recommendations" phrase is sianifi­cant because i( was formulated] II ~s the rcsultofsensitivity amone theEastEuropean General Staffsabout any peacetimeauthorit)' that could order chanaes in the resdinen.tatus of their forces. This romalns a particularlyimportant Issue for the Romanians who rccogniae nocommand authority other thantheirownfor theirforces, nomatter the circumstances~ I

Marshal Kullkov writcs that thestrength, composi­tion, organizatlon, equipment, andrelated details ofthe Combined Armed Forces have beendeterminedbyeachmember after consider!na the recommenda­tions of the PCCandCinC/CAF,"as well as theeconomic and military capabilities ofeach country,"HeIOCS on to saythat theseforces are stationed ontheir own territory and "remain under the nationalministries of defense." These ministries "have fullresponsibility for thestate, equipment, combat readi­ness, andmilitary and political indoctrination of the:personnel of thesc troops and naval rorecs.'D

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ThePeacetime Statutoalsoprovided fora Unified AirDefenso System for the CAF. (In fact, a separatestatutoon tbissystem wasalsosianed in 1969, IIttbesame time as Individual statutes for the CommitteeofDefense Ministers and tbe Military Council.) Thissystem places the national air defense forcesof theEan European members, ilona with those inspecifiedareasof the Soviet Union, under centralizedcontrolforcombat.A combined plan for their employment isspecified, aswell as the establishment of a unifiedsystem of radardetection, warn!na, au1dance, andcommllnicatlons. Command of this peacetime entity isvested in a Deputy CinC/CAF for Air l, :Cense, whoissimultaneously desl,nlted Commanderof the AirDefense Forces of the Warsaw Pact MemberStates.Thisstatute alsostipulates that the control body ofthe All'Defense Commander is the staff of the airdefense forces of thestate fromwhichthe commanderIsappointed. The two officeholders thus far havebeenboth Sovietmarshals and commanders of the SovietNational AirDefense Forces. The current command­er is Marshalof Aviation Aleksandr \. Koldunav(fiaure 6)1 ITIr, Mill,." COll/lcll. Kulikov describes the MilitaryCouncil (MC), comprislni the DeputyCinCsof theCombined Command, as dealina withquestions "per­tainina to thecombat lind moblllzatien readiness oftheCAF ..." and (amonll ethers)"measures toim rove troop "fltrol and naval forces control.'

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Accordin, to itsstatute, the Military Council iscollcaial, and its recommendations arc the result ofmutualaareemeDt by members. A specialopinion bya slnlle member, thouih duly recorded, docs notprevent the otherwise a,reed ondecision beina imple­mented in the other countries. The Chief ofStarr/CAF Is responsible for the preparationandcoordination of the MC's biannual session•.I ISll4l101'h~ Combin,d ,4,mld ForcI6_ The 1969Peacetime Statute created the multinational CAFStaff as the ClnC'sexecutive aient of control. It isresponsible for preparinlassessments, proposals, andImplementing decisions in thoseareas under the pur-view of the Combined Command.! JMarshal Kulikov describes the CAF Starf lIS "alVorkina body of the Committee of Defense Minis­ters" that worksclosely withtheGeneralStaffs of thenational armies to plan "currentand lona-ranaejointmeasures, including those pertainina to operationaland combat trainina." Oneof Itsmostimportant toolsIsthe preparation for and holdiniof joint exercisesandotherconferences &lid meetinas. In particular, it"playsa major role in preparina for and holdinameetinas of the Ministers of Defense Committeeandthe Military Council, in prlletlcal execution of theirdecisions in the combat activities of troops and Itaffs, .and In broadenina the fiahtina friendship of the alliedarmies.'O

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No pruvlslon is made for the parti~ipation of thestarfin operational planninll because, reportedly, the war­time plannlnll process Is carriedout bythe individualMinlslries of Oofonso and Oenoral SlaffsI Ir. aeeord­anee withthe recommendations of theCinC/CAI'lind the proposals of lheSovict Oeneral Staff. Plans,created for all Inc allocated forces, arcsilned bylhercsPllclive Ministers of Defense and theCinC/CAFlindare approved by the respcc:tlve lovernments.

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Marshal Kulikov describes the Pact as a militaryalliancc or equalandsovereilln stales,which operalesthroullh slaffs and deliberative bodies tnal represenlcacn or their interests inpursuitof common 1I0als. Byimplicalion, Kulikov's description covcrs lheopera­tionsor lhe CAl' inboth peaceand warD

Tbe 1980 Wartime Stalule and It. Protl.lolII

In March 1980, a dccument entitled "Staluteon theCombined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Mem­berSlales and Their Command Orlans for Wartime"wasslanedand ratified by all the members of theWarsawPacl except Romania. One month laler, inaccordance wilhlhalstatute,a preteeol was sillned bythe samecountries appointinll Marshal or the SovietUnion Lconid 1I'ich Brezhnev as the Supreme Com­manderinChiefofthe Combined Armed Forces ofthe Warsaw Pact.Theslatlllc'sprovisions lind lheprocess of ils ralifiealion provide a casestudyofSoviet control over Warsaw Pact decisionmakina,command relationships, and preparations forwar.

I IIn detail, as well aswith somereportedly intentionalambilluity, the Wartime Statute describes how theWarslIw Pact sees itselforganizinll for theconduct ofwar in Europe. Farfrom the coalitional tone of thePact's peacetime provisions and Marshal Kulikov'spublic assertions, thestatute illustrates Soviet deter­mination to control all aspects of a warin Europe.

I I, Tbet!all Germanormed rorces do nolmaintain a Oenaral SiaffbUI do have a MainSialf.FoplmpllellYIhil paper will rcfc'lOallIuchIinffsII GcnerllSllfflU

The Wartime Stalulc alaninc:lntly differs from Mar­shal Kulikov's portrayal of the CAl'. The statuteindicates that the Pact nations rceo.nize that notonlymilitary, bUl economic, polillcal. and other aspecls ofsociety would have tobe mobilized "In the defense ofSoclall.~m." Instcod or the existinl Combined Com­mllnd with Its multinational stafr, the Wartime Stat­ute Irants full contfol of Pacl operations to a single,Soviet Supreme Hiah Command (SHC)withtheSoviet Oeneral Suff aa its executive lIIenl.Thesubsequent appointment of Bre%hnev as the SupremeHllb Commander cstabliJhes the Supreme HllhCommandof the Warsaw Pact asbeingoneand lhesameas thr.Soviet Suprenlc Hillh Commend.'

I IAbsolute authorityforthe control of operations in thetwoEuropeanTheaters is vested in two HighCom­mands directly subordinate to the Supreme HighCommand.The statute authorizes each commanderto make direct contact with the nationalleadcrships ofthe member nations in hb theaterI IA wartime stllfffor each Theaterof Mililllry Opera­tions (TMO) is also provided for by the statute and,unlike the pea.:ctimc CAFStaff, lIiven the responsi­bilityto prepare and carryout operational planningforeach TMO'I aSlilned Iorces, Its full responsibil­itiesare those traditionally assigned to an operational,wartime command"1 I

Underthe Wartime Statute,controlor the composj­tionof the CAF forces differs from the peacetimecontrol that Marshal Kulikov describes. Virtually alltheater rorces-armies, divisions, taeticelair forces.and naval units-arc preallocated to the control of the

I General Seer.lory IndChairman of Ihe USSROcranlC ConneilAndroPDY was named PlIbllcly II Supreme Commander inChiefoflheSoyiel Armed foreCl on9 May1983, Ind webelieye he halseeee.. ded Brczhncy ISSHC(CAF, by virtueof hisauumption ofIhisPDlilion!L~~~-----,J'The Theater Hlah Commands nlsohayedOPUlY 'llnllnandm fromIIOch ~r Ih. Pact membeli wllhforcea In the thealcr.TheirrClPDnaibllh)' il 10plrlkipate Inpl~nnin, and ensureeffeeliveliaison wilh lhe nnlionlllcadenhip'l J

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Supreme Hl,h Command. Asa concession to EastEuropoan sensibililies. thestatutespecificathal nonal­located forces (for example,lhe Polish Inlernal Front),remain subordinate to thoirnational commands, butmay be employed, Ifnceessary. by"a,reement ofn.tlonalloadorshi.... and theSupreme Hi,b Com­mand. TheltaluleaOCI on,however, to furlher specifyth.t the sizeof tho forces allocaled to the CAF, inpeacetime a responsibility of the nationalleadcrshlps,In wartime f.1I1 undor the authority of tboSupremoHiahCommand with onlycoordination of thenation­alleadershiPi required. Nonallocatcd forces. there­fore, while remainlna a national rcsponlibllity, maybecome allocated forces oydecision of the SupremeHiSh Commandj I

Pact naval forccs Inthe Bailie and Black SeasandCAF Air Defenlc F"rces arc directly subordinated toSoviet commander5, who arc, in turn, subordinated tothe HighCommands. The Wartime Statute establish­es twoCombined Fleets-one in the Baltic Sca andonein the Black Sea. Each fleet comprises the non­Sovlel andSoviet neels In Itsal'ca and places themunder itl Combined I"leel Commander. TheCom­manderof theSoviel Bailie Sea Flect is the Com­mander of theCombined BahlcFleet; the SovietBlack FleetCommander IsCommander of the Com­bined Black Sea Fleot. TheStaff and control oraansof the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets arc also theexecutivo aaentsofbothCombined Fleets. The na­tional fleetcommanders arc deslgnated Deputy Com­bined FleetCommanders. Both Combined Fleets arcdirectly subordinate to the HiahCommands of theirtheaters.I IThe WartimeStatute stipulates that the peacetimeUnified Air Defenle System, continuing under Sovietcontrol. is to be retained in war.Breaklna with thePeacetime Statute; it specifics that, in addition toprotectin, theirown territories, the national air de­fense forces may also be required toassistnelahborlnastates.To thisend, theymay be relocated outsidetheirown countries andeven rcsubordinatcd by theTheater CinC, incoordination with the national lead­erships and the Commander of Warsaw PactAirDefense Forces. The theater commander coiucols l1irdefense forccs in thetheaterthrough his deputy for

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Air Defense, Coordination between thoalers is aresponsibility of the Supreme Hillb Command,throuah the Commander ofWarsaw Pact Air De-fenses·1 I

Even in peacelime, thestatute requires that thecontrol postsof the twoHiah Commands, theirCombined F1ccts, and each of tbo national commandsbeincluded ina unified communications system toensure control by the Supreme Hilh Command duroinaconversion from peacetime to wartime IlIlus.TheWartime Statuto allo provides for additional eemmu­nications .ylttms to bedeployed uponorder of theSupreme Hilh Command, Inaccordance withcoordi·natedpeacetime plansi IThe WartimeStatute also dofines rear services andarmaments support structures, which arc based on thedirectives of the Supreme Hiah Command. Thestal·ute provides for the transfer uf jurisdiction overmateriel stockpiles from national depots to the HiahCommands, access to thenational defense industrialbase,and authorityfor the Hillh Commands tocoordinate loaistic anc1 industrial supportfor theCAi"withthe nationalleaderahips! IUnder the WartimeStatute, pany political work inthe CAF would be carried outonorders from theSupreme Hi,h Command rather than thenationalauthority. Eachof thePact armies maintains a hierar·chyofpolitical officers, whose peacetime responsibil­itiesinclude political indoctrinatior. of tbetroops andmaintenance of national party control. Political direc­toralcs. established simultancously with theformationof the High Commands, would take overfull controlof political work durina wartime. Reprcsentatlvesfrom the member stateswould beresponsible foralscssina and reportina on theirown troops andparticipatina in the plannina and implementation ofpolitical work. for their theaters. Implementation ofpolitical work. in eachof the forces would remain theresponsibility of national political officers.

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In a ICpar"IC $eelic,n of Ihe stalute, the Hlah Com­mands are directed 10function on the basisof"deel­sions of Ihe member states" tlnd orden of theSuoprome HlahCommand. The Hiah Commanel.arc alsovested wllh blnd/n, authorityIn thelr respec\!ve lbe­aters. National authorhlesarc to ensureexecution ofthe decisions of the Supreme Hlab Command. Inwanlme, the national authoritiesretain responsibilityfor maintenance of combatreadiness andothersup'pori functions, in eITect, rc.1ucln~ their roleto thaiofa mobilization Andsupport basel I

The Wartime Statute lives operational control oftheCAF to the Supreme Hilh Command and theThe­ater Hllh Commands. It stipulatesthat CAF taskinaIs tocome from thOse commands and from theCombined FleetCommands. The Hlah Commands, inturn, areeharled withthe responsibility of informinathe respective natlunalleaderships about the plans,slalus,and proaress oftheir forces. Indeed, theslatutcalsoslipulalesthat for both the prtparatlon andconduct of war,the nalionalleaderships arc to be,uided by"decisions of the member Slates" andoftheSupreme Hlah Command.] iUnderthe WarlimeStatute, the CAF would beshifted to a wartimefoadnl on order of the SupremeBiah Command. by"decision of the member sllles."If such a ehanle were required beforethe activalionof theSupreme Hiah Command, the ordercould beaivell bythe CinC/CAF. The statute. however, re­portedly presumes that the activationof tht SupremrHig!l Coml/lolld wouldoccurwtllin advallCt ofactual!los/iIIllrs. Forexample. the staITs of the HiahCommands, whose activation follows that of theSu­premo Hiah Command, are specifiCallr charKed withoverseeinathe conversion of the CAF._ IDespite the obvious centralization of authority InaSoviet-manned and Soviet·ledcommand structure,literally interpreted, the WartimeStatute stillpee­vides an appearance of shared deeisionmakina. albeitunspecified. The ambiluouS "by decision of thememober states"appears to be the onlyreference in thestatute to anyauthorityevenclose to that of theSupreme Hillh Command. To adequalely understandthis phrase, 85 well as the fullpotentialof thestatute'sprovisions, wemustexamine how the ostensibly multi­IIlleral peacelime provisions of the Pact were used inthe coordination and ratification of the WartimeStatutel I

The Workln.. of tbePact DIIr1111 Peacetime

CAF StairRllponalbilityTho: work of the CAFStaff is closely controlled bySoviets-from the topwhereMarshal Kulikov is bothCommander inChiefof the CAF and Soviet FirstDeputy Dofenso Minister to the bottomwhereallmajorstarracctlons arc headed bySoviets. (For theoraanization of the Combined Command of the CAF,sec fillurc 7.)EastEuropean officersareassilned onlyto warkina-lovd positions in the individual divisionsdeallnl Wilh their thaatar.(A typical breakdown IsshownInfiaure 8.) Fornon-Soviets, asslanment to theCAF StaIT isa low-pressure job usually liven officersnearina retirement. Postlna to the starr (located inMoscow) IlITords themopportunitielto place theirchildrenin Sovletsehoals and to cam bonuacs. TheGeneralStarrofoneWarsawPact countryis reportedto hav~ startedplacina younaor officers on the CAfStaff, however, because IOveral older officers diedwhileon assilnment there.I ISovietdomination of the CAF Staff is reinforced bystrict limitations onresponsibilities of non-Sovlet offi­cers. A Czechoslovak officer assilned to West Divi­sionof theCommunications Directorate,forexample,actually functions aa I representatlve ofhis ownC,eneral Staffand has acc:ess to and authurily fur .workdcalina only withCzechoslovakia. He Is notallowed access to relatedinformation onPolish,EastGerman, orSoviet forces. That information is reoleasedonly to the otherappropriatenational desks.The various ieces come toaether onlyon a Sovietdesk

These procedures raise the question of how a staffoperating under such constraints couldinitiate multi­nationaland multiforcc plannina-anel the answer,accordina to knowledacable sources, is that it docsnot. TheSoviet General Staff iencrolly initiatesandpreparesdocuments and plans that are forwarded tothe CAF Stafr.There,the plans are broken downandissuedto nadonal staff orneers to passinformation,requirements, and reactions to their own leneralstaffs.! I

8

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Fllure 7Simplined Orllanlzallon of the Combined Command

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Bl~NK PAGE

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·'IIUft' 8Nominal CAF Staff Structure

~I

ForceAlloc.tlonaTheprocess bywhich forces are allocated to the CAFis one in which the East Europeans reactto SovietInitiatives. Aceordina to the Peacetime Statute, forceallocations to the Combined ArmedFore.. arc madethrouah bilateralaareemenU between the nationalarmies and the Combined Command for a five·yearperiod. Allocations are based on the recommendationsand requests of the CinCICAF, who tlikes intoac­count expected wartime needs, and theprocess isstaffed by the CAF. Details of the bilateral aaree'ments reflectthe roleeachPact nation would playinthe execution of war plans. The Soviet General Stafforiainates all such material,but, because it has noauthority under the Pact's peacetime provisions todetermine Coree allocations other than itsown, therequirement is passed to the CAF Staff for action.Nelotiations subsequently take place between thenational staffa and Soviets represented on the CAFStaff·1 IThe most recent Soviet-Polish negotiations for the1981-85 period provide additional insiaht into therelations nndauthorities, real and implied, of the

11

national staffs,the CAFStaff. and theSoviet GeneralStaff.Accordina to reliable reportina. theSovietsopened nellotlatlons by presentillil Kulikov's (CinCICAf) request fora total 200-percent Increase inPolish expenditures for the 1981-85 period to meetfive-year aoalsset for the CAF and national forcesthat would beallocated to the CAP inwar. The PolishGeneral Staff referred Kulikov's request to the Chair­man of the Plannina Commi"ionat thePolish Coun­cilof Ministcrs, who delcllated the responsibility forpreparina an alternative nelotiatinaposition to theChiefof the Polish General Staff. The Poles thenmanaged to whittle thc request dowa to about 34percent.'I ICinC/CAF Marshal Kulikov involved himself in ne­lotlations. Faced withparticularly thorny problems,the Soviet CAFstaffers declared that the issue had

• In the pa.I. the Ea.1Eu,opea•• havonol metth••pondina<'Ilmmillne.l••s,ocd 10wilh Ihe Sovie!s. \Vedoubl. eI,e,e(olo,lh.1the Poles will meet Ihe 34-rlO,oe. I Inc="j I

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beencleared bythe Soviet GeneralStaff and thllt anyappeal would have to be made to it. WhentheallOCAtion was nnlllly aareed on and approved byPoland's Prime Minister. the document automaticallybecame pllrt of the Polish Five-Year Planand wasconsidered an internalional aareelllent. Thus. theSoviet-Polish ncaotiations gavethe appearance ofequal nillions allocating forces to a joint command.but in rC3lity theyshowed that each Pact nation hasto negotiate its besldeal throuah a combined staITthat uetul\lIy represents the interestsof the SovietGeneral Slaff·1 1

War PlansUnlike force allocations. which are processed throuahthe CAFStarf. operalional war plan~ arc prepared bythe Soviet GeneralStaff and the individual nationalstafrs. Accordina to reliable reporling. the numberofIndividuals Wilh access 10war plans is small-In thePolish military,for example, only about 16ofncers.Even these national slaffs.however. haveno knewl­edgeofwar plans not pertainlnadirectly to their ownforces. Once drafted.WMf plansarc approved by theparty FirstSecretaryand sianedby the Prime Minis­ter. Rcaardless of that requirement, Polish PrimeMinisters Edward Babiuch and Jozef Pinkowski werenot shown the "lainS byorderof the Defense Minisler,General of ArmsWojciech Jaruzelski,because oftheir uncertain lellurej IThe: CAF Staff essentially represents a means bywhieh the Soviets coordinate the activities of theirmilitary alliance; lheyensurethai their Interests areprotected by maintainina direct control over its work.Althoueh Marshal Kullkov is repOrted to havejusti­lied chanaes in the CAl-' structure as necessary 10ensurerapid transition to a wartimestetus. the EaSlEuropeans' lackof access tooverall Soviet operationalplannlna makesit unlikely that thecurrent CAF stafrcouldbe transformed into the staffs or the HighCommands.] I

The WanimeSialute makes no mention of a Com­binedStaff lit all.except to say that there would bemultinalional representation on the staffs of the HiihCommands. East European officersgoing to the HiihCommands in wartime are likely (lnly to supplementSoviet GeneralStaff officers detailed to thosecom­mands. Their reles would probably beconfined to

5tarr aelions involvina their own forces; they wouldthereby act as HallIOn officers rather than as functlcn­ina members of the Combined Staff. Each EastEurllpean General Staff loses nearlyall of Its Opera­lions Directorate and a slanincantpo~tion of the otherdirectorates to the HiahCommand Slarrc=J___I

The SecretarlatAdministrative preparaticru for all three of the majorprocedural bodiesof the Warsaw Pael-PCC. COM,and MC-are eonlrolled bya SovietSecretariat'directly subordinateto Marshal KuUkov. The Chief ofStarr/CAFis responsible for the preparationandcoordination of the meetlncs of all three bodies. and asinaic secretariat hasbeenestablished within theCombined Command, underMarshal Kullkov andGeneral Gribkov. Headina thisSecretariat Is theChiefof the Operations Directorate of the CAF Staff,Soviet LieutenantGeneral Mikhail G. Tuov. He issupported bya smalloraanizalion consisting of Sovietstcnoaraphers, secretaries, and a Secret Reaistry. Inpreparation for each meelina. Titovselects n numberofSQI(iet officersand cenerals from the CAF Starr.six ormore. and asslans themto supportthe meeting.General Titov'sSecretariatperforms this function notonly for the CDM and the Militllr)' Councll, but.when military decisions arc involved, for the PCC as

wen·1 1Preparation by the Secretarial allows the SovietGcn­eral Staff to act at eatekecpers for the controllingbodies of the WarsawPac!.The Secretariat providesindividual countriesa detailed aaenda. summariesofthemajor presentations, draft resolutions on issues.and a draft communique. Proposed presentations bynational ministers must be submitted at least sixmonths in advance10 the Secretariat in Moscow. At

•InfIIncl10n ands\ructure. the CAFSeeretariatappellrs 10be aduplicAte of theSecrelariatofIheSoviet Defense Council. whleh i.drawn from th. Main pPerations Direclorate of theSoviet General511ff·1 I

12

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, 1 __~ .. '. tl'l." • . ••

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The History of tbe Wartime Statute

The process bywhich theSoviets orlanized theproposal, preparation,and ratllicatlon of the WanimeStatuteIsa majorfactor Inour assessment of thesubordinate roleplayed bythe EastEuropeans in theWarsaw Paetl I

links between the national defense ministries andstaffs and the Supreme Hillh Command. The HighCommands, however, would huve dlreet aceess andcommand lIuthority over national unitsat the opera·tionallevel (Ice fiaure 9).1 1

best, therefore, a Soviet Staff appears to e~ercise

subtle pressure lhrouah conlrol of aaendasand otherprocedural ma\lers~ IInreality, the: Sovieu use: theSeallarlalto ensure theproper treatment of Issues thai concern them,to theextenl of disallowinll eontestlna aaenda Items nndorehestratlna lhemembers' respOnses. Draftsofallprl>posed presentations are c:ollected to determinewhich, if any, threaten Soviet positions. Someitem~arcsimply slruekfrom the allenda. Romanian propos­als for the aienda, forexample, haveoften been cutoutonvarious pretexts. The Soviets, often MarshalKulikov personally, allO attempt to modify positions.Failinll that, as is most oftenthe case withtheii.omanillns, theSoviets orchestrate the other mem­bers'arauments insupport of their pOsition. All thistakes placewell in advanee of the meetinas, which areusually pro forma. Final committr resolutions arcalways writtenb)' theSecretariat I

TbeWartime Combined Armed Ferces

ProposaltDespite provision in the 1969 Peseeume Statute for asubsequent "special"statutetocover wartime rele­tionship&, preparations of lueh a document did notbellin until the Novembcr 1976 meetina of the PCC.At that meetina, a CinC/CAFreport cited a requlre­ment to improve c:ontrollystems oraanizationally, aswell as qualitatively, throuah the introduction ofautomated Iystems. Inaeneral, it stated there wasa

At its highest level, theSoviet SupremeHiah Com- need to 'orin, the entirestructure closer to meetilli itsmand,operatlnl throuah the Soviet General Staff, wartime requirements-specifically to aivethe CAFcontrols military dc.;isionmakina for the Warsaw .reater direcl contro! of troops. ThereportexpressedPact. Absolute authority to conduct operations In two theCinC/CAF'sconcern to keep paee withNATOEuropean theaters is vested In two Hlah Commands throuah lenetal improvements in the CAF:strcnlth·that re lace thesinlle peacetime Combined Com- enina theAir Defense System,lmprovina rear servicesmand the andinercasina material reserves, andIIreatly inereas·planned disestablishment 0 ue om IRe mmand Ina the depthand breadth of the CAFstructure. TheandStaffduring the transition to war caused the East PCC-made upof all the FirstandGeneral Secretar-European General Starrs to eonelude that Marshal ies of the Warsaw Pact pllrlies-approved the meas-Kulikov would assume the Hlah Command for the ures presented in the report andcharged the CDMWestern TMO and General Gribkov, the Southwelt- with theirelaboration. I 1

ernTMO. They, in turn, would c:ontrolthe combined )forces in the theater throuah the SovietDeputy The nextstep in the process was at the DecemberCinCs, whowould accompany them fromthe peace- 1977 meetina of the COM where Marshal Kulikovlime Combined Command. Nationul theater Deputy made a presentation coneernina the improvementsCinCs would probably have perfunctory roles in the aurlbuted to the PCC. Ile reportedly declared thatplanninlllnd conduct ofcombatoperations and serve NATO was stressinllsurprise attackand that themainly as liaison officers between the Hiah Com- CAFshould be prepared. Because therewould be nomands and their respective national ministries and time then to leolaanize the CAF, its peacetimewhat remained of thenlitionailleneral staffs,C=I Inoprovision hasbeenmade inany plannina associated withthis structuretoprovide for representatives or even communications

13

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Figure 9Warllme OrlanllAtlon of the Wars.w Pacl

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structureshould be modified to meetwartime require­ments. Citina years ofstlldy (presumably by theSoviet GeneralStafO, Kulikllv informed the ministersof a aeneral consensus amona military thinkers thatcoalitional operalions onstraleaicax~ should becontrolled durinll wartime by Hiah Commands set upfor tbat purpose. He then proposed a change in the

CAF'speacetime structure,recommending theestab­lishment of Deputy CinCs/CAF for the Air Forceand the Navy, each supported by a separate director­ate. In peacetime, theseofncers and staffs wouldparticipate in development And planninl for theirrespective forces, while ill ar theywould control

..14

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, .'

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.-

litem, He also proposed a number ofother detailedchanacs IntheCombined Command. Ina final resolu­lion, wrlllcn by lite Soviet Secretariat, the COMdccided to concur with ManllalKullkov'a proposals,citinals its authority the prierapproval of the PCCIn1976. The CDMthen went one step further. however,andcharied the CAf Staffandthenational GeneralStaffswithproduclna a draft Wartime Statute in1978 and with prelll1rin. It for approval at a meetinaof the PCC·1 IConceptiIn March 1978J laSoviet memorandum dealina with naval oraanizatiDnaraued that the most effective utilization of neetsforwarwould be throuah their rcoraani7.ation al Com­bined fleets.The memo lIcknowlcdeed that durinepeacetime the Pact'snational neets should remainsubordinate to national commands. In wartime, how­ever. command and control ofboth proposed Com­bined fleets, for the Baltic and Black Seas. wouldbecome the respolISibility of theSoyiet fleet com­manders and theirstaffs in those areas, redueina thenational commanders to subordinate sIalus. Thememo also reporledly specified that neet pianninawould respond to taskina from theHiahCommandsin the theater. Also sianificanl WaI the memo's stipu­lation Ihat actual resubordination of the neets wouldtakeplace upon theSupreme Hiah Command's deci-sion well in advance 01hOJtl/ltfes·1 IAnothermemorandum, oriainated in March 1978 asrecommendations of the Soviet General Staff and theCAFStaff, proposed changes inthe CAF'scombatreadiness structure. Specifically, It suggested that anew level ofcombat readiness beadded to the exlstinathree. A condition dcsillnated "Military Threat" wasto beinserted belween the middle level, "Increased"(thelowest level was "Constant"), and the hiahestlevel, "Full." It also recommended that the militaryobtain additiDnal communications channels by takinaoverthestate nelwDrks·1 I

In June 1978, a special Naval StatutepromulgatedthisSoviet cutline for Combined fleet structure,butapparently bowina to national sensitivities, reportedlystipulated that theCombined fleet commander in atheater was "appointed by thegovernments of the

15

member states" on the basisof recommendaucns bythe CinC/CAF. His staff was to be the staffof theIleet from which he was"chosen." 'fhe warllmeorganization for thc nccts would be coycred in a"special slluute," Thisnodto theEast Europeans wu,ncvcrtheless, followed by the namill& of Soviet FleetCommanden to thesepositions.I I

I Ineither this northesubsequent Wartime Statute sat well with theCommander of the Polish Navy,Adm. Ludwik Jane­zyszyn, who on beinasubordinated to the SovietBaltic FleetCommander. Adm. Ivan M. Kapitanets,threatened rosianation but finally accepted the situa­tion (tiaure 10).from the moment the SDviet staff.located In Baltysk. was.ivcn wartime control over thePolish Navy, It reportedly beaansendine a Acries ofrequiremcnts and directives to Polish Navalhead­quarters, enlirelybypaAslna any connection with thePolish General Staff. The affrontto the Poles wassottened onlyafter the Defense Minister, General ufArms Jarllzelski. personally intervened with MarshalKulikov whodirectedthat the Baltic FleetCommand-er backoff somewhat.I IThe East Europeans had someadvance knDwledae ofhow the Soviets envisaaed the fDrtheomina statute; infall 1978 they received a Sovietmemorandum thatindicated the need forall the statesto mobilize thl:irentiremilitary. economic, and social forces and thaIdeclared that a war utilizine suchforces could becontrolled onlyby a sinaleheadquarters with com­plete party, slate, and militaryauthority. The memo­randum araued that command inthe theaters shouldbecentralized and directlysubordinate to that head­quarters. The Hiah Commands themselves were de­scribed as havina complete control and authoritywithin their theaters,1\ al»o added that the HighCommands should b«IItablish,d In advane" toensure that they would be able toassume controldurlnathe conversion from peacetime to wartimestatus.The mainresponsibility of the national com­mands in the theater would be cnsurina thesuccessfuloutcome of operaricnal-strateglc laskslevied on the

J 4 "7 4

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CAF.The theater commander. therefore, would haveto be sure to inform the nalionaI commands abouthisplans, as well as about the currentsituation andrequirements for support and replacements. Thememorandum concluded that rcprcsentatives and op­erations groups from the national commands shouldbe present at the theaterheadquarters. Subordinationof the national commands would be.therefore, to theTheater High Commands. onelevel below that of theSupreme High Command in Moscowj I

At the October 1978 session of the Military Council,Marshal Kulikov reported that bothpartyand Bovern·ment leaderships were concerned with the Council'sactions. Hestressed the importance of the orgunlza­tional ehangcs hehad instilUled andcitedthe require­ment to set up High Commands to control ground andCombined Fleet preparations in theWestern andSouthwestern TMOs. At the samcmeeting, GeneralGribkov reported on improvements in the CAF',

rClIdincss posture, Includin. those in its alertinamcch­anism, which would improve both combat lIltd mobili­zation readincss. The introduction ofautomated sys­tems reportedl)' allowc;d transmission or reAdinesssignals to subllnits Inone to three mln\ltcs. In addi­tion. thesilnals could bescntcollectively to all unitsor selectively. Concurrently, changes lbat focused tbeactivities of alltbe members into a single systemreportedly were bcinllntroduced. Tospeed the con­version of troops from peace towar,General Gribkovinformed the Council that theCAFSlalT would soonproduce a new directive on combat re&dlnessc=JI IPreparationsTbenon-Soviet members of the Pactreportedly con­curred with theconcept of centrlIizcd control Inthetheaters. Reliable Information indicates that the EastEuropeans presumed that the highest strateiie au­tbority for the warwould continue tobea coalitionalbody-probablythepce. Their initial concern, thesame as the Romanians' lona-held position, WIIS thattheSoviets .bouldremember toapply the principle ofproportional representation toaulanments In thestructure. In acneral, they saw the entire process asonethat would require some time tocomplete. WorkontheWartime Statute wastakinll placc primarily attheworklna levels of theStafCJ~ I

At tbe November 1978 pcemeetina Marshal Kuli·kav reported that the military leaderships of themember nations shared the view thatcontrol of theCAFinwartime should be centralized and exercisedbya single Supreme Hillh Command witb broadauthority. Sucba command was needed becausequestions werearisina aboutthe strateaie leadershipof theCAF in wartime. He tben proposed that Ihlsview bereflected in a wartime statute. He is reportedto have suucsted thatbefore such a statutc's ratifica­tion, the CAF leadersbip should beaSupreme HiahCommand (established bydecision ofthe memberslates) and theSoviet General Staff.ThePCC issueda resolution tbat approved this proposal, directing the

16

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· .. ) ~- -.- _.. ---------,

prcparalion ofa alatllte and specifically ac!:nowleda'ina theprinciple ofa sinlle warlime Supreme HllhCommand, with Thealer Hllh Commands andCom­bined flcelJ. Approval was Ilvcndc~pllc ~Inllion

'n thevariollS natlonalslaffs thaI KUllkov's proposalwould havclhecftea notonlyofsubordinatin,theirforces to HlahCommands in the theatersbut alsoofremovln, a dearee ofpolitical dircction from thclrleaderships·1 I

ThePCCresolialion, probably prepared by the Secre­tariat,directed that the final statute besubmitted tothemember Slates for approval, bypassinl the PCCmechanism for ratification and thereby avoldina aveto bythe Romanians. Secretary GeneralNicolaeCeausescu hadIllnaledRomania's displeasure byrefu.ina t<lliin the relolutlon. All actions undertakenbyt PCCrePOrtedly requite unanimity to be bind·ine. ITheRomanian POIltionTIle Romanian objeaions actually werepublicized Inthelovernment prC$$. InSoviet Influence tn BastemEurope, Christopher D.Jvnl:S, rcferrlna to the 1978PCC meetin" indicates that "for the first limeIn thehistory of the Pact,the othersix,actinl as six Itatesrather than asa majorily in the Warsaw Pact PCC,issued a separate statement at a PCC seuion." FromCeauseseu's statements reported in the Romanianpress, Dr. Jonu correctly Infers that:

The six a/her members • . . adapted a resolution.b/ndfn, ,on thesix only. /0 increase dtfenseexpenditures andtofurther t/,htenintegrar/on aftileWar.law T"aty Orlan/:al/on commandstructure. InJustVylng Romania's rtlusal toaccept these declsiolll as binding on theRoma­niall arlntdforces. Ceausescu rt/lealtdly rt­lerredto /he supremacy 01Romanian constttu­tiona/ procedures over Romanian militaryforces.

It was. Indeed, rare forobjections to suchsensitivematters to beexpres.ed publicly--cspeciatly because,even within thePacI mililary cstablishments, fewwere pcrmillcd knowledle of Iheslatute.c=J

c=J

17

Romania is unique amon, the East European Pactmembers because of its aUlonomous national defensepolicy. The Romanians are proud that their nationaldefenae concepti are doal,ncd and Implem.nt~d byROmanians and arc Intended to defend tbe nationfrom "any"armedinvader. Normal PacI formulationsinvllriably include a specific idendfication of thepotential a'lrc5sor-usually NATO,lmpcrialists,counterrevolutionaries, and soon.The Ramanianshave been especially concerned about insulatin,thcircommand Itructure from outside Interferen<:e. In aJanllary 1983articlepublished InRomania. Col. Gen.Vasile Mitea, Romanian FirstDeputy Minister ofNadonal Defenle, stressed Itthe inalienable ri,ht ofthe Rumanian Communist PDn~" to "leadership ofthe national defense," Hequoted Ceausescu: "Thelaic leader ofcur armedforces is the Party, thelovernmen', tbe ~upreme national command. Onlythese ean ,ive orders toour army,and theseorderscan only be carriedout wilhin theSocialist Republicof Romania.nO

AnmetableMarshal Kulikov's noxt move occurred in December1978 when hesenta letter to the national defenseministers citlnathe authority of the PCCdecision andformally dlrcctlnl themto prepare a wartime statllte.His letter referred to the June 1978 meetln, of thenational Chiefs of General Staff and their ,eneralalreementaboutthe ltatute's outline andcontents. Inreality the Icslion had been no more than a eenerlllbriefina by General Gribkov, who had acquainted theChiefs with the CAF Stafrs solutions. I<ulikov out­lined thestatuto'sleneral provisions, the roleof theHi,h Commands, Combined Fleets, rear services, andsoon.In conclusion, he proposed an accelerated workschedule to allow apptoval of the draft by the 12thmeelins of the CDMscheduled for December 1979inWarsaw.! I

Concurrent with the work on the statute.staff workproceeded ona new directive on readiness. which atleast one Pact member found difficult 10accept. In amemorandum prepared fora meetin, between the

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Polish Chiefof Staff, General of ArmsFlorianSiwlcki (nllure Ill, andGribkov, the Poles pointed outthat they hadsenttheCombined Comma.nd theirsUlllcstlons. but they had notbeen informed whetherany had been taken intoconsideration. They furthernoted that, because the readiness directive dealt es·sentially withmobilization of the armed forces, theywere facinK a difficult problem. Under the PolishConstitution andvarious laws and resolutions. mobili·zation is explicit Iy thejurisdiction of Polish nationalbodies. The draft directive violated thoselawsand, Ifenacted. would require theirchan,e. The memoran­dum askedGeneral Siwlcki to Inquire about thenatureof related Soviet laws. The issue WIU neverresolved to the Poles' satisfaclion, and the followinamonth the readiness directive wasslaned and distrib·uted by Marshal Klilikov~ IReactions to tbe Draft StatuleTheaeneral reaction to thedraft WartimeStatuteamona the non-Soviet General Staffswasneaalivebut rcsiancd because members aenerally believedthat,specifics excluded, thedocument's mainpremiseeculd not be avoided. Neverlheless, the Romaniansproduced a full, Iineoby·line revision that reflectedmost of the ehanletdesired bythe otherstaffs·D

c=:JThese chanaes provide a useful outline of East Euro­pean concerns. Wherever thewordlnl of the orillnaldraft was"Supreme HlghCommand," the Roma­nians sUiaested substitution of"Combined SupremeHiahCommand," They then defined that body as thePolitical Consultative Committee, actina through a

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Combined Staff. The Romanians noted that thewar­timestructure should I15slan the hlahest political·strate.lc direction of war toanexplicitly denned,coalitional body, representinltheinterests ofallmember states.The subordinate Theater Hillh Com­mandswould still exist,butalreater rolewould beplayed by Deputy Commanders InChieffor nil tionaImailers.The "Allied F1eeu" would not beoperation·ally removed from national control. but would eoordl­nale their aClivilles throuah an Allied FleetCom­manderwhowould beappointed on a rotational basis.Political work under thestatute would remain anational responsibility. Althouah acceptina central·izedcontrolof Pactwide opc:ratioll5, the Romaniansenvlsaaed suchcontrol, nevertheless, as coalitionaland as a directextension of lhepeacetime meeha-nisms·1 INo other staIT. although some privately held similarviews, was apparently willlng to ao as far as theRomanians had in opposition, Forexample, inamemorandum prepared for Minister of DefenseJaruzelski, the Polish General Staff outlined Polishobjections to the WartimeStatute. Incoordinationwiththe Ministry of Fore1an Affairs and other 10V­

ernmem aaencies, the staIT pointed Ollt tbat valuenessabout the activation of the Supreme Hlah Commandwould lead to contention unless furtherdefined. Slat­ute provisions empowerln. theSupreme HiahCom­mand to convert the forces towartime stalus3ndauthorizlna the theater Itaffsto lupervlse the processwereidentified as contraveninl provillons of thePolish Constitution. Thememorandum reportedlyalsohilhUahted the apparent subordination of thenational military leadership tothe TheaterHillhCommands. Jaruzelskl sympathized withthestafrsconcerns andsouaht to intervene on those issues.

I IKullkoy'. RoleDuring fall 1979, numerous meetings concerninathestatute took lacewith Marshal Kulikov.] I

Kullkov's involvement wasLItI-o-s-C-t-e"f~·ec-Ct·lv-e·l-n"'t·es-e,..,.j1 atOTal nellotilltlons. TheSoviets conceded somepoints, but in acneral their

18

[ Idefense minis­tersusually prepare tllKlnapapers 10 take to COMsessions. ThePoli.h General Staff,therefore, pre­pared note cards for Jaruzelski's use durlna thesession. Several days beforethemeetlna, however,General Titov and several other Soviet officers fromthe CAFSecretariatflew to Warsaw. On their arriv­al, theyreviewed those cards,discarded them, andspent two days proparlna new ones, Thesewereextremely specific, included openlnl and clasina re­marks, andsunosted alternative responses basedonwhat milht besaid bythe other ministers durina thecourse of the meetinl. On theIr arrival, the otherdefense ministers had prepared cardsthat also hadbeen screened by the Soviet Sacretariat. The seasionWIS, therefore, effectively on:hcstrated by the Soviets.Even the EastEuropeans were surprised at the Sovi­ets' directinterference. Indlcatina their stronll con-cern.! I

Kulikov wanted to prepareJaruzelskl by aCQuaintinlhim with thevarious views thatmlaht bc expressed.

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Themeedna wentas planned, Jaruzelski even madeaspeech that outlined the nec~slty andvirtuesof theslatute.Althouah none of tho standina Polish objec­tinns hadbeen met, Jaruzelski told the aroup that thestatute wu the reau1l of a full andopen exehanleofopinions, andhe criticizcd theRomanians for theirattemptto undermine its principles. Jaruzelski is alsoreported to have declared thatthestatute did not

Approval violate sovereilnty and that a nation cannot be trulyThrouahout sprlnll and fall 1979, Marshal Kulikov sovereian without securlty,luaranteed borders. andmadea seriesof visits to all theMinisters of Defense allied support. The other members "cateaoricaJly"to obtain theircomments. None of the ministers rejected theRomanian objeclions andapproved theconsulted witheach otherdirectly but only throuah statute,It was to be forwarded, notto the PCC. but 10Kulikov, Durlnl a visit to Poland. forexample, the the member stateafor approval. Once again, theissue of lhe representatives to the Supreme Hiah Soviets avoided the possibility of a veto b) theCommand was raised. Kulikov informed Jaruzelski Romanians.I Ithat the othersaarr;ed that theIssue should bedropped, whereupon Jaruzelski alsoaareed, In reality, By AprU 1980, the statute WIlS ratified byall memberas the Pollsh General Staff later learned throuah its statesbut Romania. Marshal of theSovietUnion,own connections. the other staffs were at least as Supreme Commander in Chief of theSovietArmedconcerned about the issue as they were.I I

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Marshal Kulikov paidmuchattention to GeneralJaruzelski because Warsaw was to be thesiteoftheCOM meetina and Jaruzelski was tochairthesession.

peshlon remained firm. KuHkov arauedthat thestructure provided by the stalutewas the only effi·cient wayto control 'lperation. in Europe andtoensure the rapid transition of forces to a wartimestatus. Little by lin Ie,the EastEuropeans, except theRomanians, dropped their objectioN in the face ofSoviet determination, which inc:luded Bnary fistpoundina by Marlhal Kullkov. Inonecase,Jaruzelski.ent a deleaatlon of Polish officers to Moscow. Afterdeterminina that they werethere to urae acceptanceof the Polish position and notto concede, KulikovcalledWarsaw in the orrlcen' presence and beratedJaruzelski for intransiaenee, whereupon Jaruzelsltirevised the Polish position over the phonee=]

c::::::::JAnotherstrikinl example ofSoviet neaotiatina tacticsconcerns the issue of national representatives at theSupremeHlah Command. Thoearliestversions of thedraft statute included a reference to suchrepresenta·tives. The Ea.t Europeans souaht to define theposi·tionand to empower each incumbent to participate indecisionmakina and hold a rankequivalent to aminister. The Sovieta rcaponded that the position hada liaison function only. When the otherstaffs per­sisted, the Soviets simply deleted the reference insubsequent drafts. Attempts to reintroduce therepre­sentative In the draft, even as II Hllison nfficer, werecast asidewith the araumentthat ber;ause it had onlyconfused the members the position wasnotnecessary.

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Serge)' G. Gorshkov (lillurc 12). Admiral Gorshkovhad aT&ued that naval forces operating alona coastalareasshouldbecontrolled byautonomous navalcom­mands operatinll incoordination with adjacentIlroundforces. He apparently reslsted the resubordinatlon butwasoverruled by Ihe General Starr,( I

At thesame time, chanlles were being implemented inthe subordination of theSoviet Air Forces to unifycommand andcontrol of Air Force elements witharole in the theater. They were made more responsiveto theTheater Hillh Commands and their subordinatellround units. Frcntal air defense wassimilarly inte­grated by thecreation of jointair and air defensecommand~u to replace separatecommand posts forthose forces, I I

1/", ....,""'.' III I/w$",1"U.IOII5''117 G,,,,,lfff/••r;"611AfI'I, Commtlnd" InChit!. So,';" Naval FOrt"6.D

Adm. A. M. K.II.'n, Com­rmmd.r. Suvltl SI"k 5NFI,tI, and Comma.d,,~6iMd 1110•• S'II F1,t1.~

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Implications

Underthecommand structure imposed byIhe staune,the Black Scaand Baltic Sea Fleets, bothnowCombined Fleets, were removed from the operationalccntrol ofSovlel naval headquarters and directlysubordinated 10 the Soviet officer commanding theTheater Hiah Command. Soviet officers fromtheCAF Staff were reported to have told Ihe EastEuropeans that thiswas the resultof a majordefeatfor the Soviet Nav)' Commander inChief, Fleet Adm.

TheCentralization of CommandSoviet mtereslln thespecific aUlhorities provided bytbe Wartlme Statutewas probably motivaled b)'evolvlna Soviet concepts for the conduct of war inEurope. Since hisassumplion of theCAFcommand in1977. Marshal Kullkov hasseemed intenton makinails peacetime oraanizllt10n more elosel)' resemble itswartime oraanization. He hasfocused hisattentiononthecommand of hil forces and has emphasized re­peatedly that centralized command is the onl)'effec­tive answer tothe problem of coalitional war inEurope, Althouah theSoviets had expressed thisaeneral view for some time, it is Kulikov who hasoverseen its implemenlalionj I

The Wartime Statuteshould be considered in thecontext ofchanaes that were occurrina in the organl­zalion ofSoviet forces in theEuropean theater. Thesechanaes involved the nalure and extenlof commandin the theater and were consistent withthe authoritiesbeini drafted intothe statute·1 I

From thestart, Marshal Kulikov beganimplementlnspeacetime changee thntanticipated the commandrelationships of the Wartime Statute. AI the 1977COM mceting. Kulikov not only received approval togoahead with the statutebUI alsohad approved hisplanto add two new Deputy Commanders in Chief(Air Force lind Navy), who would have wartimecontrol responsibilities, to theCombined Command.I I

Forces Leonid ll'ich Brezhnev wasnamed asSupreme Commander in Chief of the CombinedArmed Forces 01 theWarsaw PMt member slalCI.

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Addinathe twoDeputy Commanders in Chief to theCombined Command allowed MarshalKulikov tomore effectively control air and navaloperations inthe theater.Airdefense Will already provided for Inthe Itrueture,but,liven the nature of anticipatedHiah Command control,ltsformal oraanization badto be chanledsomewhat to conform. Since 1969 therebad beena Commander of Air Defense Forcesof theWarsaw Pact,wht' was simultanlOusly a DeputyCommander In Chiefof the CAF and Commander ofSovietNational AirDefense Forces (PVO). Underthestatute, however, activation of the Hiah Commandwould, in theory. subordinate a Soviet commander ofa national-level orlanization to the theater command­er. This inconsistency wasresolved in 1977 whenMllU,hal Kulikov recommended that the Air DefenseDepartment be made an Independent departmentonthe CAr Staff servin,as a link between Lhe staff andthe Air Defense Commander. The WartimeStatutestipulated that theAir Defens.e Commander wouldassumeresponsibility forcoordlnall", the air defenseeffortsofthe two Hillh Commands, which would eachbecontrolled byII Deputy Commllnder In Chief forAir Defense. That,in erfect, removed SovietMarshalKoldunov, Commander of Soviet Air Defense Forces,from theoretical subordination to the theater corn-manders·1 IThese ehan,es were consi$tent with requirementsllenerated by thecreation ofTheater Hilh Commandswherenone existed previously. Wherethe CAF'Com·blned Command already contained a certain func­tion-for example, air defen~o-a sJiaht change indefinedresponsibilities was probably considered suffi·eient, Where a function was essentially absent-suchas separatedeputies to control air force and navyoperations-that function wasaddedand Sovietoffi·cers named to the posts. Allthis occurred at the sametime that work was to belin on the WartimeStatute.whichwould brina the East European forces. asrepresented by theCAF. Intoconformity with theSovietGeneral Stafrs reorganization ofSovietforces.

I IBoth theCAf andSoviet national forces underwentchangeand resubordination in the late 1970s, beain­nin, with Marshal KuJikov's move from the SovietGeneralStaff to CAFCommander. It is unlikely that

21

these Chlillaes wen: coincidental, they mort probablyreflect a fundamental decisiu" by the Soviet GeneralStarrabout how toconduct a war in Europe. Webelievc that the Soviets' drive tocentralize comrnundand control in the European TMOs was the me-incause of the Wartime Statuteof the Warsaw Pact.East European sensitivities were a seconda ry eonsid-eratlon·1 I

TransItion to WarPactcommand andcontrol procedures influence howtheSoviets and theirEalt European allies might actdurin, a period ofcrisis. In May 1979, a stafr exerciseinvolvinl the Commander in Chlef/CAF and all PactGeneral Staffsand Fleets, except Romania's, testedtheSupreme Hlllh Command and the High Com­manda as (ormulated bythe November 1978 PCCdecision. We believe thisto bea sllnlficant event thllthelps 10lI1ustrate Soviet Intentions for the statutoandthe natureof EastEuropean concerns, Althouah thcCommander in Chief/CAf and hisstaff played boththe Supreme Hi,h Command lind the two HighCommands, theexercise was run by the S(lviet Gener­al Staff. Its avowed purpose was twofold: to cathcrinformation that could be of usein the subsequentdevelopment of the Wartime Statute and to testaspects of the re<;cntl romul ated readiness direc­tive

Remarkably, the Bast Europeans w~re never loldwhen the Supreme HlahCommand was activated,The East Europeans had believed that the exercisewould explicitly show them bow they would partici­pate in the decision to movc from peace to war. It didnot.The Poles allonized forweeks about how to worda memorandum to theirown leaders descrlbina theexercise. They didnotfeel that theycould simplyadmit that theirown political leadership had beenexcluded, so they drafted a memorandum presentingan assumed role for thePCC.The Poles presumedthat, because of a deterillratina situation, the PCCauthorized theactivalion of the Supreme Hiah Com­mand. Accordinll to the reported exercise scenario,

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however. suchlloihorizatloll would havehad to occurabout 30daysbefore the outbreak of hostilities. Nolongerspcculatinl. the Poles reportedly went on toreport that thescenario sp..~lned that 26days beforethe outbreak olf bostllities the headQuarters of theTheater Hilh Commands wereexpanded towartimestrenlth byorder of the Supreme Hilh Command.Finally. 13days before the outbroak. the SupremeHlah Command introduced the "MilitaryThreat"readiness state,whereupon it assumed direct com­mandof the national forces assllned to theCAP. Inprcvious excrcises. command had shiftedtotheCAPwhen"Full" readiness was declared. In at lcalloneexerclse after May 1979, the Suprem'l Hilh Com­mandassumed full control at "Incrcascd"readiness\Inly onelevel above normal, peacetime status. ThePolish General Starrreportedly soulht clarification ofthe actlvlltion process. but the Soviets were steadfastin their refusal toanswer~ I

We believe theactivation of the Supreme HiahCommand so lon£ before the initiation of hostilitieshas important implications forSoviet control andEastEuropean responsiveness durinall crisis. The EastEuropeans seem to have IittlcInfluence onSovietmilitary concepts-forcontrollinl and conductinl aconnict-which arc Imposed on them. In draft!nl theWartimeStatute, the Soviets succcssfully resIstedEast European allempts bothto specify a role for thePee and to identify a formally establiShed. coali­tional.political body for wartime. We must concludethat sole authority in wardoes indeed restwith theSovietSupreme mah Command.I IWc believe theWartime Statute would affect the roleof East European leader~ in a crisis leadina to war.Each nation's put reaction to the statute'sprovisilmsmakes it clear thateach has concepts of SQvereiantyand natlonatl interest that III beyond "proletarianinternationalism." On mauersconcerning defense.however, those concepts arc liable to beoverridden bySoviet pressures. Weassume that the Soviets tosomedegreeaccenr the counsel of their allies. Inanycrisisthat advice would bechanneled throulh either thePCC or. morelikely, made bilaterally. At some pointdurinl a worseninl crisis, however,·the Soviels wouldprobabl)' request the activation of the Supreme HighCommand. which would provide both the UnitedStates and theSoviets' allies a clear Indication oftheirserious intentiQns·1 I

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The statute docsnot specifically address how tbepolillcal decision to &0 toWllr woulloS be made. How orwhether theSoviets would allow the East Europeanstoparticipate in II ~elslon to Inltlate hostilitiessubsequent to the est,blisbmcnt of the Supreme HiahCommand is unclear'l ISome analystsholdthat bydecidina to activate theSupreme Hiah Command the Soviet leadership hasdetermined that the crisis maylead to war. In suchcircumstances, theseanalysts believe it hllhly unlike­lythat the Soviets would tolerate any East Europeandeviance. Further, these analyst.judlc that, once theHiah Commands of theTheaters of MilitaryOpera­tions are activatedand their authoritiesestablished,therc would be no practicat way for East Europeanleaderships, liven loslofcontrol over nlltionalcommunications Iystems and military forces. to coun­termand Soviet directives. Therefore, theseanalystsbelieve that with the "tivation of the: Supreme HiahCommand the Soviets. if they10 chose, would be: in aproaressively better positiQn to initiate a NATO­Warsaw Pact war without further consultation withEast European Jl\lliticalleaderships.! I

Other analysts believe that, in viewof the roleplayedbyEast European forces inwartime, theSoviet Unionwould somehow hove toinvolve the East Europeanleaderships in what would be R final political decisionto10 to war-if for noother reason than its ownreassurance. Theseanalysts also hold that. even if theWarsaw Pact wartime command structure Were al­ready activated.many EastEuropeanpolitieal au­thorities-particularly those who may not be in fullaccord withSovietintentions-would try to maintainsome Idndof communicstlon with their own nationalforces. Furthermore, these analystsbelieve that. in theevent of Sovietattempts tocircumvent completelyEast European political leaders in takina the WarsawPact to war. somecommanders, if convinced theywere beinacommitted to battle,miaht balku~communicated with their national authorities.~

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armed forccs of the recalcitrant member state cuuldreceive ordcrsfrom the CAFheadquarters that miahtweaken or neutralizepotenlial reAlstlllce. Inasmuchas the stlltuteneither strips national commanders oftheir control ovcrtbeir own combatforces norre­places them withSovieu, it appearsdcslaned to workthrouah thesecommanders as smoothly as possible.

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The stalute's provisions seem to be basedon theSoviets' beliefthat East European forces wouldindeed move whellind IS dlreeted by the SupremeHlah Command. Its authorities could be used by theSovicts in the evenlor an internal East Europeancrisis. Usin, the CAF'salerlina system. the SovietGeneralStaff would be ina better position 10manaaeR multinational armedforce engaged in an interven­tion.such as In Czechoslovakia. Even clements of the

The statute secmsto be mainly a device forcontrol·lina wartimeoperations andnot for furthering the

Independllnt of any particular scenario.therefore, I1nd Soviets'innuenceIn peacetime. TheirInfluence inrc,lIrdlessof any residual political influence thcy peacetime is already10 areat that theycould establishmiaht hl1vo as individuals. the East European leaders. the WartimeStatute despite the EastEuropeans'underthe provisioos of theWartimeStatute. would be serious objections. Whetherthrouahactual aareemcntlosina not onlyoperational control of their forces in or mereacquiescence. the East Europeans acceptedadvanceof actual connicl, theycould alsobe losina a the needfor II Sillilic iuprcme command and, exceplslsnifieantvolee in makine a final judament over for the Romanians. for a sinalesupreme commander.takina their nationsto war.I I Theyalsocerlainly recoanized that the supreme

commander would be a Soviet. TileEast Europeans'Peacetime Canlrals majorconcerns focused onhow theywould particlpa teThe WarlimeStalute hasallowed the Soviets to in directina their own forces in the cvent of warandIncrease their alrcadyhigh degree of control over the on their rolein makina a decision to activate thearmed forces of the Warsaw Pact durlna peacetime. statute's authorities. The evidence lndicates that theAlmost Immediately after the staune's ratification, East europeanswere more concerned with thespedf·the Soviet. asserteda need to be involved in or icwartimeauthoritiesof thestatute than with ilsinformed of what had been strictly nationaldefense implications for the Soviets' cr,;I.'Inc:cd leaali7.edmatters. We expecta trendof increasin, control to peacetime involvement.I Icontinue, whiletho East Europeans resill Sovietinroadswilhvaryina degrees of success! IThe peacetime Warsaw Pactcontinues to function

1'-- accordlna to the 1969Peacetime Statute. with all itsSovietccnircl or the process used to create thestalute command, staff. linddeliberative bodies in place. Hadunderlined to the EastEuropeans their subordinate the Soviets intendedprimarily to increase theirpeace-status. This reminder, however, is limited to a small timc control, webelieve lhat they would havecircle. Detailsor even theexistence of the Wartime strengthened the 1969statute. In Iact,they modifiedStatute arc not aeneralknowledae in Eastern Europe. lhat statute and brought it intoconformity with theThe Implications of Its wartime authorities arc IOSI, anticipated wartimestructurebycreating Naval andtherefore,on all but the handful of militar)'nnd Air Force Deputy Commanders in Chief. Further-civilian officials char,ed wilh implementinathem. more, the Iull authority of the Wartime StatutecanI I be wielded onlyby the Supreme High Command and

the twoTheater High Commands. when theyarcactivated. Finally, the Soviets have notshown aninclination to activate the Hiah Commands in pence'

lime'l I

Given the Soviets' refusal to deflnea role (Clr thenatlonallcadershlps, tbelrpcrpctulltion ofambiauouswordIn. indlseu5sions ontbestatute, and theseenarl­as of the exerci5cs, many officers on the East Europe­linstaffs reportedly concluded tbatthe final decisionin which their leadersmiaht beallowedto participatecollecdvely was the decision to activate the SupremeHiah Command.Thatllction, accordina to thestat­ute, wasclearly to occur well in advanceof hostilllles.

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