PUB-6082

The World Bank

Financing Adjustment with Growthin Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90

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Financing Adjustment with Growthin

Sub-Saharan Africa,1986-90

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MARCH 1986

Financing Adjustment with Growthin

Sub-Saharan Africa,1986-90

THE WORLD BANKWashington, D.C.

Copyright 1986 by the International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.All rights reservedManufactured in the United States of America

First printing April 1986

This report was prepared by the Special Office for AfricanAffairs, with the assistance of many World Bank staff mem-bers. It draws heavily on the ideas and views expressed byscholars and officials in Africa and in donor countries. Thejudgments expressed do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe Bank's Board of Executive Directors or of the govern-ments that they represent.

The map in this document is solely for the convenienceof the reader. The presentation of material and the desigrna-tions employed do not imply expression of any opinionwhatsoever on the part of the World Bank or its affiliatesconcerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, orarea or of its authorities; concerning the delimitation of itsboundries; or concerning its national affiliation.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.Financing adjustment with growth in sub-Saharan

Africa, 1986-90.

Bibliography: p.1. Africa, Sub-Saharan -Economic policy.2. Agriculture and state-Africa, Sub-Saharan.3. Economic assistance-Africa, Sub-Saharan.1. Title.HC800.1565 1986 338.967 86-7754ISBN 0-8213-0767-3

Foreword

This is the World Bank's fourth report focusing on developmentissues and requirements in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1981, thedevelopment strategies of many African countries have changeddramatically. Major structural reforms are being undertaken, and somepromising results are already evident. The tragedy of drought andfamine heightened the urgency of these reforms while often weakening thecapacity to implement them. Nevertheless, many African policymakershave demonstrated farsighted determination in pursuing necessaryreforms. While much remains to be done, especially in addressing long-term issues of human and natural resource development, there has beenmarked progress by many African countries in redressing major macro-economic and sectoral distortions.

The response of the donor community to Africa's famine wasgenerous and effective and represented a heartening example of how awide array of donors can pursue a shared objective to the great benefitof the people of Africa.

However, the major structural reforms undertaken by manyAfrican countries to address their long-term development problems havenot received adequate donor support. As noted in the Report, growth andequity enhancing reform programs already under way are founderingbecause of inadequate donor funding, which is often inappropriate inform and timing. Countries considering major reform programs can findlittle encouragement from the donor support demonstrated for thosecountries with reforms under way. In the absence of adequate financialsupport, structural reforms cannot be achieved with growth. Adjustmentthrough further economic contraction is not a feasible alternative in acontinent where per capita income levels today are no higher than theywere twenty years ago.

In the past, the Bank has argued that resource availability isonly one element in addressing Africa's development; the political willof African leaders, essential to effectively utilize both domestic andforeign resources, is also critical. But there is now growing evidencethat many African countries are exercising this political will. Theircommitment and efforts must be matched now by the political will of thedonor community to increase the resources available to implement growth-oriented adjustment programs.

The resources needed to restore growth prospects in Africa arenot large, but they exceed by far those currently available orenvisaged. These resource requirements reflect the deepening debtproblem in Africa, with a rapidly increasing share of resource flowsrequired to service debt, as well as a decline in nonconcessional flowsdue to the deteriorating creditworthiness of the region. While someincreases in bilateral and multilateral flows are foreseen, because ofan enlarged Lome III and the Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa, afurther US$2.5 billion per year in concessional flows and debt relief isrequired in 1986-90 to restore African import capacity per capita to its1980-82 level, even assuming a significant increase in exports. The

increased flows from multilateral agencies, including an enlarged IDA-8,IMF Trust Fund reflows, and an enhanced replenishment of the AfricanDevelopment Fund, when due, might provide up to $1 billion per year ofthese additional funds. For the remainder, a major effort is requiredin bilateral assistance--whether through new money or more liberal debtrelief.

Donor action is also required in several areas to enhance theeffectiveness of assistance to Africa. Many of these actions are notnew; they have been discussed and agreed upon in principle in variousfora. However, their implementation has lagged far behind theimplementation of structural reforms by many African countries, andurgent action is now required on matters relating to the quality, form,timeliness, and coordination of aid. Action in the following areaswould do much to strengthen the system:

- Donors must be willing to work within coherent and realisticadjustment and investment programs designed by African governments.Projects outside these programs are of lower priority and should not befinanced unless the agreed priority program is also fully financed.

- Donor decisions on aid and debt relief must be made in lightof an overall financial package and a program of adjustment with growth.

- To enhance the effectiveness of aid group meetings, themajor participants should discuss the key elements of the financialpackage and adjustment program required for the country, in advance ofthe meeting, and arrangements should be made to monitor implementationof aid commitments in support of each adjustment program.

- Donors should provide meaningful medium-term indications ofaid and debt relief levels, to enable countries to program theirinvestment strategies in light of an indicative resource envelope.

For its part, the World Bank stands ready to further strengthenits role in assisting countries to design programs of growth-orientedadjustment and in their funding. In addition, as requested by theDevelopment Committee, the Bank will continue to exercise a leading rolein establishing mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of aid flowsthrough improved coordination and monitoring.

There are opportunities ahead to restore many African countriesto a sustainable growth path. But substantially increased donor supportis essential to capitalize on these opportunities.

A. W. ClausenPresident

March 1986 The World Bank

Contents

Country coverage ix

Acronyms and definitions x

Sunmmary and conclusions I

Progress in domestic policy reform IResource scarcity 2Measuring the resource gap 2Bridging the resource gap 4Improving aid coordination 5A year of opportunity 5

1 Introduction 7

The end of the drought 7Continuing long-term decline 9The deepening debt problem 11A strategy of adjustment with growth 11

2 Adjustment programs 15

Correcting overvalued exchange rates 16Correcting urban-rural bias 18Rationalizing the public sector 21

3 Long-term constraints on growth 25

Population 25Human resources 27Health 28Education 29

Deforestation 30Agricultural research 31

4 External capital and aid coordination 35

External resource flows, 1986-90 36Foreign exchange requirements 36Sources of external finance 38Bridging the resource gap 41

Institutional reforms in aid coordination 43Recent progress 43Further reforms 45

Appendix A: The debt problem and its implications for importcapacity 49

Profile of the African debt problem 49Projected debt-service burden and import capacity 50

Appendix B: Macroeconomic indicators 57

Statistical Annex 61

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Text tables

1.1. Developments in the trade environmentof IDA-eligible countries, 1970-86 8

1.2. Output, population, income, andconsumption in IDA-eligible countries, 1960-86 9

1.3. Availability of resourcesin IDA-eligible countries, 1960-84 10

2.1. Earnings as a multiple of per capitaGDP: Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 21

3.1. Desired family size and actual fertility rates 27

3.2. Agricultural research efforts:Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1980 33

4.1. Foreign exchange paymentsby IDA-eligible countries, 1980-90 36

4.2. Supply of external finance for IDA-eligiblecountries, 1980-90 39

4.3. Concessional resource gap forIDA-eligible countries, 1986-90 41

Text figures

2.1. Real effective exchange rate indexesin developing countries, 1971-84 17

- lx

Country coverage

The series of the Bank's Africa reports, of which the presentone is a part, covers all countries south of the Sahara, except SouthAfrica. Like its predecessors, this report presents statisticalmaterial for thirty-nine sub-Saharan African countries. However, in thelight of attention given to resource needs of middle-income countries inthe discussions relating to the Baker Plan, this report focuses on theneeds of twenty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa that depend heavilyon official development assistance. Resource requirements of others arenoted only in brief (see page 42-43). These twenty-nine countries areeligible to receive credits from the International DevelopmentAssociation (IDA).

Benin Guinea Mali SomaliaBurkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mauritania SudanBurundi Kenya Mozambique TanzaniaCentral African Republic Lesotho Niger TogoChad Liberia Rwanda UgandaEthiopia Madagascar Senegal Zaire

Gambia Malawi Sierra Leone ZambiaGhana

As a group, these countries are referred to in this report as "low-income countries" or "IDA-eligible countries." Thus, the definition oflow-income used here differs slightly from the definition of low-incomeeconomies in the Statistical Annex and in other World Bank publications(per capita GNP of $400 or less in 1984). In this report, the low-incomecountries include not only those with per capita GNP of $400 or less in1984, but also Liberia, Lesotho, Mauritania, and Zambia, which had percapita GNP below $550 in 1984.

The share of these twenty-nine countries in some major economicaggregates in sub-Saharan Africa is shown in the charts below.

IDA-eligible countries in sub-Saharan Aftica, 1984

Population GDP

Other sub,Saharcn Other subSalra

e3eIDA-eligible

IDA-eligible

Other sub-Saharon Ot er sutoShahrran65% / 42%

0DA-e ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IDA-eligible

e xportI DAbeligible

Exports Debt

x

Acronyms and definitions

DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECDFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationIDA International Development AssociationILO International Labour OrganisationIMF International Monetary FundODA Official development assistanceOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting CountriesUNICEF United Nations Children's FundUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnesco United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

OrganizationUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationWHO World Health Organization

Unless otherwise indicated, tables and figures in the text andappendices are based on World Bank data. Growth rates are least-squaresestimates in constant prices unless otherwise stated.

Billion is 1,000 million.

Dollars are US dollars.

Not available.

(.) Less than half the unit shown.

Summary and conclusions

Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging from one of the worst famines inrecent history. Good rains have come to much of the region. Per capitaincomes should rise this year for the first time since 1980. Even so,there is little cause to celebrate. Low-income Africa is poorer in 1986than it was a generation ago in 1960. And though the recent good newsinterrupts the trend of chronic economic decline, it will not be enoughto reverse it. Population growth is largely unchecked, productivity allbut stagnant. If present trends continue, the human disaster of 1983-84in sub-Saharan Africa will return to haunt the world community.

This year gives a breathing space. Africa should use it tomake structural adjustments aimed at reviving growth, especially inagriculture, and to halt the deterioration in basic health and educationservices. Donor countries, for their part, must not see 1986 as a timeto relax. The principal theme of this report is that Africa's attemptsto help itself will fail without additional resources in the form of newaid and debt relief.

Progress in domestic policy reform

Many African governments are now making significant progressin structural adjustment. But they still have much to do tocorrect the accumulated policy distortions of the past.

In many African countries, government policy has longdiscriminated against agriculture--the sector which is not only crucialfor any attempt to raise output and exports, but which also gives mostof the poor their livelihood. DismantLing such policies will help theregion to increase output and exports, and help the poor at the sametime. This process has begun. Governments have started to reduce theovervaluation of their currencies--one way in which agriculture had beenpenalized. They have increased agricultural prices and lowered realurban wages. They have reduced public spending, with its bias towardexpanding employment in urban areas.

These are welcome reforms, but no more than the first steps.Exchange rates remain severely overvalued in many African countries.Producers' shares of export prices are still too low. Urban wages arehigher than in other low-income developing countries.

Africa's governments have done even less to overcome theregion's longer-term obstacles to development. Family planning,education and health, resource conservation and agricultural researchare vital in this respect. In some cases, however, services havedeclined, canceling out progress made in earlier years. And governmentsstill have much to do to improve the allocation of resources--by giving

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a greater role to prices, markets and the private sector, by increasingthe supply of domestic savings, and by running public enterprises moreefficiently.

Resource scarcity

Declining imports and investment threaten to underminestructural adjustment in low income Africa.

Adjustment with growth requires extra resources, but the recenttrend in resource flows has been just the opposite. The investment ratein low-income Africa has been falling since 1980 and is now the lowestamong developing regions. It is not sufficient to maintain andrehabilitate existing productive capacity, nor to provide for newcapacity. This decline in investment mirrors declines in Africa'ssupply of both domestic and foreign savings; the shortfall in foreignsavings in turn reflects a worsening debt crisis and a diminishing flowof commercial capital. A dozen countries now face acute debtdifficulties, with little prospect of improvement.

Africa needs more imports, not just of investment goods, butalso of essential consumer goods and raw materials. Imports per capitahave been declining since 1970, and the rate of decline has acceleratedin the 1980s. In spite of higher coffee prices and lower oil prices,the outlook for the terms of trade is poor. Without new aid and debtrelief, imports per capita will continue to fall for the rest of thisdecade and beyond.

Measuring the resource gap

To continue its progress toward economic adjustment, low-income Africa will need at least $11 billion a year inconcessional flows during 1986-90. Allowing for known andexpected aid conmitments, a gap of $2.5 billion remains.

In calculating external resource requirements, the objective isto halt the trend of decline in per capita consumption by 1990 andachieve some growth thereafter. This minimum objective would require aGDP growth rate of at least 3-4 percent a year by 1990. On the basis ofthe Bank's country experience, it is unlikely that such growth rates canbe achieved, unless the decline in import capacity is reversed. At aminimum, imports per capita should return to their level of 1980-82.This implies imports of $28.5 billion a year in current prices during1986-90. Provision must also be made for debt-service payments that areprojected to rise to an average of $6.8 billion a year over theperiod. Altogether, then, the region needs $35.3 billion a year for thenext five years.

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The possible sources of that finance are as follows. Exportsmight provide at best $20 billion a year--and this assumes thatgovernments continue to adopt export-oriented policies. New bankborrowing on commercial terms might provide $1 billion a year; in viewof the region's poor debt-servicing capacity, it would be imprudent toseek more. In all, another $1 billion a year in nonconcessional financemight come from the IMF, from direct private foreign investment, and inshort-term capital flows. Debt reschedulings, under existingprocedures, should provide around $2.3 billion a year. Known andexpected aid commitments imply concessional flows of $8.5 billion ayear--an increase of about 30 percent from the level of 1980-82.Altogether, the region might tap $32.8 billion, leaving a resource gapof $2.5 billion a year.

1980-82 1986-90

actual projected

annual average

(billions of dollars)

Foreign exchange requirements for IDA-eligible countries

Imports of good and services (excluding interest) 22.9 28.5

Debt service payments (including payments to IMF) 4.0 6.8

Total 26.9 35.3

Sources of finance

Exports of goods and services 16.0 20.0

Nonconcessional flows 3.3 a 2.0

Debt rescheduling 1.1 2.3 b

Concessional flows 6.5 8.5 c

Total 26.9 32.8

Resource gap

To be filled by additional concessional flows

and debt rescheduling - 2.5

a. Including miscellaneous flows not specified elsewhere.

b. Based on existing practices.

c. Based on existing and expected commitments.

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Bridging the resource gap

Multilateral agencies might provide $1 billion of theresource gap of $2.5 billion a year. This leaves $1.5billion a year to be met from new bilateral aid andadditional debt relief.

Multilateral agencies could, at best, meet about $1 billion ofthe gap if the IDA-8 replenishment is at least $12 billion and low-income Africa receives a large part of the SDR 2.7 billion expected inthe IMF Trust Fund reflows. Bilateral aid and additional debt reliefmust bridge the remaining gap of $1.5 billion a year. That would meanan increase of 30 percent over the aid and debt relief given in 1984 anda 20 percent increase over the levels currently projected.

The additional resources will be needed to pay for importsduring 1986-90 and to cover debt service payments, so they must be inquick-disbursing form. The correct pattern of assistance--inparticular, the split between quick-disbursing aid and debt relief--willvary from case to case. But one general rule should be observed: nodonor country should be a net recipient of resource flows from anyAfrican country undertaking credible economic reforms.

Additional bilateral assistance could be provided in differentways and the appropriate combination would depend on the particularcircumstances of the donor and the recipient country. Several donorshave already converted bilateral official loans into grants for low-income countries--as proposed in the UNCTAD declaration of 1977; otherdonors may wish to adopt this practice. For export credit agencies, theterms of refinancing scheduled debt service payments should at a minimumcontinue whatever concessionality the original loans might have had and,to the extent feasible, increase the concessionality consistent with thefinancing needs of the adjustment programs. Third, the group ofcreditors that participate in rescheduling of principal and interestshould be widened to include non-OECD countries and, wherever possible,private creditors. However, these sources can at best meet only a smallfraction of the resource gap for low-income Africa. Consequently, thereis no alternative to a substantial increase in bilateral aid,particularly in the form of balance of payments support for adjustmentprograms.

The above assessment does not consider the resource needs ofmiddle-income African countries for initiating adjustment with growth.It is estimated that for a CDP growth rate of 3-4 percent a year during1986-90, gross resource flows to these countries should be in the rangeof $7-10 billion a year, and there is a gap of $1-3 billion a year to befilled by concerted action by commercial banks and bilateral and multi-lateral agencies.

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Improving aid coordination

Donors must act more in concert--with each other and withrecipients. This report suggests six ways to improvecoordination.

First, donors must be willing to work within adjustmentprograms designed by African governments. Second, they should betterharmonize decisions on aid and debt relief together. Third, the majorparticipants should discuss the elements of the required financialpackage in advance of full-scale aid coordination meetings. Fourth, toprovide effective support for medium-term adjustment, donors should bemore willing to give medium-term indications of aid. Fifth, instrumentsshould be established to monitor progress toward economic reform andtoward implementing governments' and donors' agreements. Sixth, themultilateral agencies must assume a larger role in orchestrating donorassistance--both in designing adjustment programs and in financingthem. The World Bank and the IMF, in particular, must work togetherwith African governments, first to develop adjustment and investmentprograms aimed at restoring growth, and second to assess therequirements for, and sources of, external finance.

A year of opportunity

Recovery from the drought has brought lower food prices, andimported petroleum will be cheaper because of the decline in oilprices. This makes 1986 a good year for Africa to accelerate itsprocess of correcting overvalued exchange rates: lower food andpetroleum prices will soften the inflationary impact of devaluation onurban dwellers; at the same time, devaluation would help raise the farmprices of agricultural exports and partly offset the effects of lowerfood prices on farmers. Lower food prices have also created anopportunity for Africa to dismantle, without undue hardship, more of itscontrols on food pricing and marketing.

It is a year of opportunity for donors too. Decisions on theIDA-8 replenishment and on the IMF Trust Fund reflows will affect theresources available for Africa over the next five years. TheDevelopment Committee's meeting in April and the special session of theUN General Assembly in May can establish the principles on which theconcerted effort of the African countries and the internationalcommunity can be based.

1. Introduction

The famine of 1983-84 in sub-Saharan Africa is widelyrecognized as being part of a longer-term production crisis. The WorldBank's previous report on the region argued that this deeper problem hasits roots in high and accelerating population growth and in low anddeclining efficiency in the use of resources. The report predictedthat, without additional donor support, inadequate resources would soonbecome another major constraint, and Africa's decline would continue.

This year has brought some welcome signs of relief. Most ofAfrica has had good rainfall. An increasing number of countries arestarting to recognize the policy mistakes of the past and are takingsteps to correct them. For low-income Africa, terms of trade haveimproved because of higher coffee prices and lower oil prices.

However, the long-term trend of decline persists. As yet, notall countries have embarked upon the structural adjustment process;those that have begun still have far to go. Only a handful of countriesare seriously trying to control extremely high rates of populationgrowth. The availability of resources in Africa is shrinking, andwithout additional donor support, will continue to do so.

The challenge for Africa and the donor countries is to reversethe long-term trend of decline. Adjustment with growth must become arealistic theme for the low-income countries of the region--as for thehigh-debt middle-income developing countries. Over the next five years,this calls both for national programs of policy reform and forsubstantially higher donor assistance: each will fail without theother. To achieve adjustment with growth during this period, decisionsmust be made in 1986 on the level and the form of assistance that thedevelopment community will provide. The focus of this report is on theneeds of low-income African countries eligible to borrow from IDA, butmany of its conclusions hold for the other sub-Saharan countries aswell. 2

The end of the drought

Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging from one of the worst famines inrecent history. The drought that began in southern Africa in 1983 went

1. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A JointProgram of Action (Washington, D.C., 1984).

2. For a list of the IDA-eligible countries, see the note oncountry coverage at the beginning of this report. In this report, theterms "IDA-eligible" and "low-income" countries are synonymous.

on to affect more than twenty countries and 35 million people by 1985.The international community responded on an unprecedented scale, withcontributions of food, medicine, and other critical supplies. Reliefworkers from donor and recipient governments and from private agenciesmoved massive amounts of material under extremely difficult conditions,helping to save thousands, if not millions, of lives. Yet the faminetook its toll. Many farmers and nomads have joined the ranks of theurban poor. Families have broken up, systems of community support haveweakened, and the strain on over-stretched government services hasincreased still further. In these difficult circumstances, people arestruggling, with remarkable spirit, to resume their normal lives.

Fortunately, most of Africa received good rainfall in 1985. Inspite of the famine's devastation, agriculture is recovering. Accordingto the FAO, agricultural output in 1986 will equal or exceed pre-droughtlevels in most IDA-eligible countries. The main exceptions areEthiopia, where famine persists in some areas, and Mozambique; both willneed special assistance this year, according to the UN Office forEmergency Operations in Africa. Most of the region, however, shares ina sense of relief.

Another favorable development is that low-income Africa's termsof trade are expected to improve this year by more than 10 percent--enough to restore them to their average for 1975-80 (TabLe 1.1). Coffee

Table 1.1. Developments in the trade environment of IDA-eligiblecountries, 1970-86

1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1986(preliminary) (projected)

Terms of trade (1975-80=100) 124 100 95 101

Merchandise export volume(annual percentage change) -2.2 1.4 -1.0 6.4

prices have increased sharply, mainly because of drought in Brazil.They should be around 50 percent higher in 1986 than in 1985; this willadd roughly $750 million to the export earnings of the low-incomecountries. More recently, the price of oil has fallen dramatically; ifit stabilizes between $15 and $20 a barrel, they will save at least $750

3. FAO, "Food Crops and Food Shortages," Special Report (Rome,December 16, 1985).

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million a year in import costs. These two factors more than make up forfalls in the prices of some other exports--such as cotton, tea, andedible oil--and the rise in the dollar price of manufactured imports.

Table 1.2. Output, population, income, and consumption in IDA-eligible countries, 1960-86

(annual change; percent)

1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986

(prelim- (esti- (pro- index

inary) mated) jected) (1960=100)

GDP 3.6 2.4 2.3 1.7 -0.8 -0.1 0.8 0.0 3.6 192

Population 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 201

Per capita GDP 1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.2 -2.2 -3.0 -2.2 -2.9 0.4 95Per capita GDY a -2.2 -0.5 -3.6 -2.4 -2.1 -1.7 -3.4 2.5 78 b

Per capita

consumption 1.0 0.1 -0.5 -2.4 -5.0 -2.9 -2.0 .. .. 96 c

a. GDY is GDP adjusted for changes in terms of trade.

b. 1986 as a percentage of 1970.

c. 1984 as a percentage of 1960.

Together with the first steps toward policy reform, thesedevelopments should bring a pause in Africa's decline. In 1986, percapita GDP should rise for the first time since 1980--though onlyjust. Thanks to the improvement in the terms of trade, per capitaincome will rise by a larger margin--perhaps by 2.5 percent (Table 1.2).

Continuing long-term decline

Welcome as these developments are, they will not make up theground that low-income Africa has lost in recent years. Even after thisyear's projected increase, per capita income will have fallen by about12 percent since the start of the decade. In countries such as Chad,Niger, Tanzania, and Togo, the drop since 1980 will be roughly 30percent--similar to that in the United States during the GreatDepression of the 1930s. The decline in Africa's per capita outputduring the 1980s, together with the decline in the 1970s, will wipe outall its rise in per capita output since 1960. As a result, low-incomeAfrica is poorer today than in 1960. Improvements over those years inhealth, education, and infrastructure are increasingly at risk. For thefirst time since World War II, a whole region has suffered retrogressionover a generation.

The underlying trend of economic decline in low-income Africahas not changed. Movements in the terms of trade are hard to predict,but the long-term projection is for renewed deterioration; by 1990 the

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index is likely to be a third lower than in 1970, and 3 percent lowerthan in 1986. Rapid growth in population continues largely unchecked.Africa's policy reforms should eventually lead to greater efficiency andhigher output, but this process has barely started.

Now a new problem must be reckoned with. In the 1970s, as theWorld Bank's 1984 report on Africa pointed out, the region was not shortof investment as compared with the 1960s. The increase in foreigncapital inflows more than balanced lower terms of trade and the fall inthe domestic savings rate. Africa maintained its investment at around18 percent of GDP. But in the 1980s the investment rate has slipped.It fell to an estimated 14 percent in 1984 (Table 1.3). It seems thatAfrica is acquiring another negative superlative; its investment rate isnow the lowest of any developing region. Investment is less than theregion needs for sustained development--too little to provide for newproductive capacity or even to maintain and rehabilitate existingcapacity.

Table 1.3. Availability of resources in IDA-eligible countries, 1960-84

(percent of GDP in current prices)

1960-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

(prelimi-

nary)

Gross domestic investment 14.8 17.9 18.3 19.0 18.1 16.6 14.8 14.3

Gross domestic savings 14.0 15.0 10.1 8.4 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.4

Resource balance -0.7 -3.0 -8.2 -10.8 -11.5 -10.4 -8.3 -7.8

The fall in the investment rate during the 1980s reflects adecline in both domestic and foreign savings. Domestic savings averagedabout 15 percent of GDP until the mid-1970s. Since then, the savingsrate has dropped steadily. In 1984, it may have fallen to 6 percent--anextraordinarily low figure. Two factors go far to explain this trend.One is that per capita incomes have been falling. More important,perhaps, public sector deficits (that is, negative public savings) havegone up because of unchecked government budget deficits and lossesincurred by state-owned enterprises.

The net inflow of foreign savings has fallen from 11 percent ofGDP in 1980-82 to 8 percent of GDP in 1983-84. This has happenedprimarily because of the increase in debt service payments and lowerinflows of commercial capital due to reduced debt servicing ability.(See Chapter 4 for more details.)

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The deepening debt problem

Most of the countries in low-income Africa face mountingdifficulties in servicing their debts. Between 1980 and 1984, theregion's debt service payments (including payments to the IMF) increasedfrom 18 percent of export earnings to 26 percent. In countries such asMalawi, Niger, and Zambia, the ratio rose to more than 30 percent. But,these actual debt service payments understate the problem. If it hadnot been for reschedulings and, in some cases, a build-up of arrears,debt service payments in 1984 would have been much higher--38 percent ofexport earnings for low-income Africa as a whole. Fourteen countriesrescheduled their debts in 1984-85; in some cases, the new arrangementwas just the latest in a series. And several countries went furtherinto arrears on their payments, including to the IMF.

Repeated reschedulings and arrears hinder development.Frequent reschedulings use up the scarce management time of Africa'spolicymakers. They can also create a climate of uncertainty that makessustained development more difficult. Arrears, for their part, can haltnew loan commitments and disbursements from existing loans. Inparticular, arrears to the multilaterals can make more difficult theprocess of formulation of an adjustment program, which in turn can blockdebt relief from private and bilateral creditors. In either case,foreign suppliers begin to take account of the uncertainty that theywill be paid--and the debtors' import prices rise as a result.

Without action by the development community, these problemswill mount during the next few years (see Chapter 4 and Appendix A). A .

dozen low-income countries face particularly severe debt problems andfor them present rescheduling arrangements will be inadequate. 4 Evenwith rescheduling on conventional terms during the next few years, theirdebt burden will still be high at the end of the century.

A strategy of adjustment with growth

If Africa's decline is to be reversed, action is needed onthree fronts. First, the region needs more resources for investment--both foreign and domestic. Second, it must use new and existingresources more efficiently. Third, it must curb its growth inpopulation.

The basic objective of further adjustment is to stimulategrowth. That requires more resources. Some of the additional resourcescan come from higher domestic savings. Prudent fiscal and monetary

4. Benin, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia.

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policies are essential for that purpose. But domestic savings cannotcarry the whole burden.

A consensus is emerging in the international community thatconcessional capital inflows to the low-income countries of Africashould rise, at least for the rest of this decade. To make medium-termprograms of adjustment with growth feasible, donors must give medium-term indications of their plans for aid and debt relief. Programs canthen be designed on a longer-term basis to give adequate attention tothe tasks of developing human resources, conserving natural resources,and maintaining or extending infrastructure. A clearer picture of theresources to be available would also promote stability in trade andcredit regimes. Domestic and foreign private sectors would then feelmore confident about the outlook for imports and credit and could play amore active role in stimulating growth.

In judging the prospects for adjustment with growth in low-income Africa, it is important to realize that the region's performancehas not been uniformly poor. The region has its success stories, someof which are better than average for the developing world. This is trueboth for sustained development and for medium-term adjustment. At leastseven countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Cameroon, C6ted'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, and Rwanda) achieved significantgrowth in per capita income over the last twenty-five years; four ofthem (Botswana, Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, and Mauritius) have graduatedfrom low-income status. Some (C6te dlIvoire, Kenya, Malawi, andMauritius) launched unsustainable public expenditure programs during theperiod of commodity price boom in the mid-1970s, but then adoptedstructural adjustment programs in the early 1980s and by 1985 had madesubstantial progress. For each area of policy Africa can report somesuccess. For example, exchange rate policy in Malawi; food marketing inCameroon; export crop pricing in Kenya; export promotion in Mauritius;family planning in Mauritius and Zimbabwe; and management of windfallincome and technical assistance in Botswana.

A detailed strategy for 1986-90, which translates general aimsinto specific programs, can be formulated only at a country level--butsome elements that all such programs should include are discussed in thechapters that follow. Two sets of issues are important. The first,discussed in Chapter 2, concerns the efficiency of resource use. Itinvolves three main areas of policy that were highlighted in earlierreports:

o Exchange rateso Urban-rural biaso Public sector management.

The second set of issues, discussed in Chapter 3, covers longer-termconstraints on development; these were also identified in earlierreports:

o Population growtho Healtho Educationo Deforestationo Agricultural research.

Chapter 4 then goes on to assess the external capital and donorinstitutional reforms required to support these programs of adjustmentwith growth.

A crucial objective of the proposed programs is to stimulateoutput and exports by correcting discrimination against the ruralsector. This is to be done through reduction in price distortions andin urban bias in the allocation of government and aid expenditures.Most of the poor in low-income Africa live in rural areas; so theseimprovements should promote equity as well as growth. Rarely will thepoor be the principal losers from such programs.

2. Adjustment programs

For some time Africa's own regional institutions have beenleading a change in attitudes toward development policy. The mostrecent joint report by the Economic Commission for Africa and theAfrican Development Bank is one example. I It argued that mistakenpolicies have depressed agricultural output and industrial productivity,promoted inefficiency in state-owned enterprises, and damaged incentivesfor the domestic private sector. The Organisation of African Unity'ssummit meeting in July 1985 echoed the theme by adopting "Africa'sPriority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-90." This too stressedthe importance of agriculture, and the need for new industrial policiesthat give the private sector a larger economic role, and for more activepopulation programs. This shift in African thinking toward a morepragmatic approach to development is important and encouraging.

But new thinking is only a first step. Successful adjustmentmeans adopting new policies, not merely agreeing that they aredesirable. How much has the region actually achieved? This is hard toanswer precisely, because improvements consist of many different changesin many different countries. Nonetheless, progress is clearly underway.

Especially in the past two years, more countries have startedto act, and the changes they are making go deeper than before. Severalcountries illustrate the trend. Togo, Ghana, and Zaire have reinforcedthe comprehensive economic and financial reforms which they introducedin 1983. In 1984-85, Senegal, Mauritania, Zambia, and Guinea adoptedsimilar policies--aiming to improve broad macroeconomic performance, aswell as to assist individual economic sectors. Other countries, such asNiger, Mali and Madagascar, continue to adopt important policy reforms,though more slowly. The reform movement seems likely to endure, andperhaps to gather pace, as more countries see the results in those thathave led the way.

These reforms cover a wide range of measures aimed at givingprices, markets, and the private sector a greater role in promotingdevelopment in Africa. In particular, they reflect a desire to reduceadministrative intervention in setting prices; to end monopolies ontrade and marketing; and to reduce the government's role in allocatingcredit and to increase the scope for private sector activity. Changesare needed on a broad front, but this chapter focuses on three areaswhich were highlighted in the World Bank's previous Africa report:exchange rates, urban-rural bias, and public sector management.

1. Economic Report on Africa, 1985.

- 16 -

Correcting overvalued exchange rates

Correcting overvaluation of currencies helps to reduce balanceof payments deficits. Equally important, it also shifts the internalterms of trade in favor of those who produce for export (often mainlyrural households) and away from those who consume imports (oftenpredominantly urban households). In the past two years, severalcountries have made progress in this area. After more than a decade ofcreeping appreciation, the average real effective exchange rate for theIDA-eligible countries in Africa began to depreciate in 1984, and thistrend seems to have continued into 1985. A growing number ofgovernments have adopted more flexible exchange rate regimes, which relyon supply and demand in the foreign exchange market to determine theexchange rate.

Following a huge devaluation, Zaire introduced a floating ratesystem in 1983, and by 1984 the exchange rate was freely determined inan interbank market. By the end of 1984, the real effective exchangerate had fallen by three-quarters and the premium on the parallel marketwas no more than 10 percent, roughly in line with the cost of bankcommissions. In late 1985, Zambia introduced an auction system for mosttrade-related exchange transactions. Although the government andselected public enterprises continue to receive an administrativeallocation of foreign exchange, the value of foreign exchange isdetermined by the auction. After the introduction of the new system,the nominal exchange rate fell by two-thirds in three weeks.

Guinea and Gambia are establishing similar systems intended tolead to a unified, market-determined exchange rate; as an interim measure in Guinea, the new rate has been devalued to less than 10 percent ofthe old official rate. Madagascar took a step toward more flexibleexchange rates in March 1984; it began to adjust the Malagasy francevery quarter in line with the change in the consumer price index duringthe previous quarter. Between then and the third quarter of 1985, thereal effective exchange rate depreciated by about 15 percent and wasbrought in line with its 1978 level. Other countries (Ghana andMauritania) have made substantial devaluations within their existingexchange rate systems, by combining vigorous nominal devaluations witheffective measures to contain inflation.

These are promising developments. However, for the low-incomecountries as a group, the average real effective exchange rateappreciated significantly in the 1970s and early 1980s--a markedcontrast to the performance of Asian and Latin American councries(Figure 2.1). As of late 1985, in spite of the recent adjustments, thereal effective exchange rate was about 15 percent above its 1970-72levels. Moreover, even the 1970-72 level is too high for somecountries, especially where terms of trade shifts have been large and

- 17 -

Figure 2.1

Real effective exchange rate indexes in developing countries, 1971-84

(1971 = 100)180

170 -

/160 ---- All sub-Saharan Africa

IDA countries in Africa- - - - -W Western Hemisphere.......... Asia

150 /All sub-Saharan Africa /

140 - 0

130 -

120 - -

IDA countries in Africa110 _

/--

100 t

90

80 - \ / '\ '*-.,, Asia

70 - * #

Western Hemisphere

60

50 l l l l l l l l l l1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Note: Regional averages are weighted by GDP in 1983.Source: IMF Research Department.

negative. For example, in Zaire and Zambia, market-determined realeffective exchange rates had fallen at the end of 1985 by over 40percent from their level in 1970-72. The progress observed in 1984-85is important, but only part of a long process that still has far to go.

- 18 -

One of the reasons for delaying or minimizing exchange rateadjustments is the fear of the social and political consequences.Resistance to adjustment, of course, comes from groups--often in theurban sector--who benefit from the implicit subsidies of currencyovervaluation. The distributional effects of devaluation differaccording to the underlying structure of the economy, but they arelikely to benefit lower-income groups in many African countries.Moreover, devaluation allows the removal of controls and traderestrictions which create artificial scarcities and bring "rents" tothose with access to the scarce rights. Rarely will the poor be theprincipal losers from devaluation.

However, because of the impact on the urban population, it isimportant to time devaluations with care. The economic developments of1985-86 make 1986 a good year to act decisively on exchange rateadjustment. Lower food prices, folLowing recovery from the drought,together with lower petroleum import prices, can cushion the impact ofdevaluation on the towns; at the same time, devaluation would help raisethe farm prices of agricultural exports and partly offset the effects oflower food prices on farmers.

Correcting urban-rural bias

There is a growing consensus in Africa that policies whichdiscriminate against agriculture and favor the urban sector must bechanged. There are at least three links between farming and developmentin low-income Africa. First, the largest part of the population and themajority of the poor depend on agriculture for a living. It willtherefore be difficult to attack poverty on a broad front so long as thesector is discriminated against. Second, the region's output is stillheavily agricultural. Higher output will require incentives forimproved productivity in farming. Third, exports, too, will be mostlyagricultural for the medium term. But they wilL be slow to rise as longas governments channel the profits mostly to benefit their urbanpopulations.

Devaluation, as noted earLier, can be a powerful instrument toredress the urban-rural bias. It can simultaneously mean higher farmprices for agricultural exports and higher prices for the imported goodsthat are consumed mostly in the towns. But correcting the urban biasrequires complementary changes in domestic policy. These include higherfarm prices, lower agricultural taxation, more flexible marketingarrangements, and wage restraint in the urban sector, as well as morepublic expenditure in the rural areas. Over the past two to threeyears, many governments in low-income Africa have introduced reforms inthese areas.

Many governments have improved agricultural incentives byincreasing official prices in conjunction with a currency devaluation.

- 19 -

Some have done it by deregulating markets, to give farmers access tohigher prices on parallel markets. Others are introducing more flexiblesystems of official pricing as a step toward lifting controls onagricultural trade.

There is a clear trend toward higher food-crop prices. In1984, following substantial devaluations, the government of Zambiaraised the official producer price of maize by over 35 percent (a 12percent increase in real terms). In Tanzania, the government more thandoubled the controlled producer price of maize between 1983 and 1985 (aone-third increase in real terms). In 1985, Mauritania set ration shopcereal prices in line with the price of imported grain. In Zairefollowing devaluation and deregulation of food marketing, producerprices are estimated to have doubled for maize and tripled for cassavabetween 1983 and 1984 (which amounted to at least a doubling of theseprices in real terms since 1980). As part of a reform package includingmassive devaluation, in early 1986 Guinea decontrolled producer pricesfor food crops and quadrupled the official wholesale price of importedrice.

A number of countries are making similar efforts to improveincentives for export crops. Ghana, after large devaluations in 1984-85,tripled the price of cocoa between 1983 and 1985 (a 50 percent increasein real terms). Zambia raised the price of cotton, and Zaire raised theprices of both coffee and cotton; in both countries, these priceincreases followed substantial currency devaluations.

Another clear illustration of this trend is that the countriesimplementing reforms during the 1980s have seen crop prices rise muchfaster than urban incomes. The disparity was sometimes dramatic--as inthe case of maize in Zaire and rice in Madagascar. In most cases, farmprices for export crops also improved relative to urban incomes, thoughless so than food-crop prices.

Examples of some dramatic shifts in urban-rural income ratiosinclude Tanzania during 1980-84, when real farm incomes are estimated tohave risen by 5 percent, while urban wage earners faced a decline of50 percent. In Ghana, during the same period, farm incomes stagnatedbut urban incomes fell by 40 percent in real terms. Per capita incomeshave fallen in low-income Africa during the 1980s, while real producerprices have risen or at least remained constant in most of the countriesthat have adopted reform programs. This leaves little doubt that thereforming governments have helped to raise the terms of trade betweenthe countryside and the city.

In agriculture, it is hard to separate the effects of betterweather from the effects of better prices and better policy. But theresponse of agriculture in the countries that have adopted improvedincentives has been too dramatic to dismiss. In Ghana, cocoa output in1985-86 is expected to be 25 percent above the level of two years

- 20 -

earlier--though it will still be lower than the pre-drought level of1981-82. After a price increase of over 300 percent in 1983, maizeproduction tripled in 1984, rising above the pre-drought level by almosttwo-thirds. in Zambia, cotton and maize production rose by over 20percent during 1983-85. The amount of maize marketed is estimated tohave risen by over 55 percent during 1984-85; it came close to meetingZambia's domestic consumption requirements for the first time since1976. In Togo, cotton production is estimated to have doubled between1984 and 1985.

Incentives for farmers have improved, but there is room forfurther progress. The producer share of the international price ofexports remains relatively low. For coffee, cocoa, and cotton--low-income Africa's principal agricultural exports--farmers in the mainexporting countries generally received only about half of the exportunit value in 1984. Coffee farmers in Kenya were an importantexception, usually receiving as much as 90 percent of the exportprice. By contrast, in Tanzania, the producer share for coffee was 40-50 percent, and in Madagascar it was only about 20 percent in 1984-85.During these years, for cocoa, the share in Togo was about 40 percent,and for cotton, the share in Mali and Togo was as low as 30 percent.

Two recent reforms in this area may be a guide for othercountries. In 1984-85, Cameroon's national marketing board startedimplementing a system of rebates to coffee and cocoa farmers; it isestimated that it will increase their share of the export price by 7-8percent. In late 1985, Guinea said the state marketing agency would paycoffee and palm producers 80 percent of export prices, and raisedofficial buying prices substantially.

Conditions in 1986 seem right not just for initiatives onexchange rate policy, but also for other policies to correct the urban-rural bias. High food output has helped ease consumer prices in manycountries. This creates an opportunity for governments to dismantleprice and marketing controls and to eliminate food marketing subsidieswith fewer fears of the effects on inflation. Lower prices for food andpetroleum should also dampen inflation. Hence, 1986 will be a good yearto try to restrain urban and public sector wage increases. Furthermore,in those areas where excess production threatens to depress the market,deregulation, including freer intraregional trade, could help tomaintain producer prices and at the same time help consumers in areaswith shortages.

Price adjustments and market deregulation can go only part ofthe way to correct the urban bias. Personnel policies in the publicsector must also change: they influence urban earnings because thegovernment and public enterprises are the largest employers in mostcountries. Public sector hiring and wage policies have inflated wagesand in many cases left them out of line with productivity and laborcosts in other developing countries. Although earnings data are poor

- 21 -

and difficult to compare between countries, indicators for selectedAfrican and Asian countries reveal that government and urban wages inlow-income Africa are relatively high (Table 2.1). This salarystructure was adopted at the time of independence and then maintained inmany African countries through most of the 1970s; it must now beadjusted to reflect current budgetary realities. Salaries for somepositions in the public sector--especially senior officials and highlyskilled technicians--may need to be raised in some countries, but theaverage public sector wage will have to come down in most of Africa.

Table 2.1. Earnings as a multiple of per capita GDP: Sub-Saharan

Africa and Asia

Sub-Saharan AfricaRange Asia

Earnings Average Low High (average)

Central government 6.9 3.9 15.1 3.3Manufacturing 4.3 '.7 6.5 2.8

Construction 3.1 2.0 4.1 2.0

Note: Data cover thirteen IDA-eligible countries in sub-Saharan

Africa and three low-income countries in Asia for various years from

1978 to 1983.

Source: Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait, "Government Employmentand Pay: Some International Comparisons," IMF Occasional Paper 24,October 1983; ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1984;

and World Bank estimates.

Rationalizing the public sector

The role of the state in the economies of sub-Saharan Africais larger than in other regions. Public sector employment is half ofall modern sector employment, compared with only one-third in Asia.Allowing for country size, public enterprises are more numerous than inmost other developing countries, and they engage in a wider array ofactivities. Public investment accounts for the bulk of investment inthe formal sector.

As the Bank's previous reports on Africa have argued, therapid growth of the public sector, along with its inefficient managementand overambitious public investment programs, are important reasons forthe economic difficulties facing sub-Saharan Africa today. In addition,the scope of public sector activities and the operating subsidies towhich public enterprises had access stifled private entrepreneurialactivity in agriculture, industry and commerce. Many governments insub-Saharan Africa now face financial difficulties and are thereforetrying to reduce the size of the public sector and to improve itsmanagement. However, these reforms are still at an early stage.

- 22 -

Financial stabilization programs are beginning to reducegovernment expenditures. Public consumption as a percentage of GDP inlow-income Africa declined from 17.1 percent in 1980-81 to 16.2 percentin 1983-84. This decline happened alongside the fall in GDP. As aresult, public consumption declined by 1.5 percent a year in real termsduring 1980-84, compared with an increase of almost 5 percent a year in1975-80. These cuts have been achieved, in part, by restraints onpublic employment. In the past few years, Rwanda, Mali, Somalia, andTogo have abandoned their policy of automatic employment of secondaryschool and university graduates. In 1984, the share of personnel intotal central government expenditures declined for the first time inseveral years in Mali because of slower growth in government employmentas a result of the introduction of competitive examinations for entry tothe civil service. The Somali government froze government employment in1985. Togo reduced total government employment by 1.6 percent in1984.

Budget restraint, reflected in lower public employment, isdesirable in much of Africa, but in some cases it has led to excessivecuts in financing for equipment, maintenance, operating costs, andmaterials. The result has been a steady deterioration in the quality ofpublic services and further declines in the productivity of publicemployees. The impact is plain when road maintenance crews lack fueland bitumen to accomplish their work, when teachers lack books, chalk,and even classrooms for their students, and when health workers have nomedicines to distribute. This deterioration in public services isespecially disruptive for programs designed to deal with the basicconstraints on development. Unless a better balance is establishedbetween personnel and other expenditures, these programs are injeopardy. To maintain nonwage expenditures, most countries must reducegovernment employment and, in some instances, civil service wages.

Efforts to rationalize the public enterprise sector havefocused on improving management as well as reducing its size. Studiesand audits are generally followed by closure of nonviable enterprises,by divestiture of nonstrategic enterprises, or by carefully tailoredrehabilitation of enterprises (such as utility companies) selected toremain in the public sector. Most of these efforts involveinstitutional reforms to strengthen government supervision.

Low-income Africa's governments have closed down or divestedabout 5 percent of their public enterprises during the 1980s. For manyof those that remain, better management has cut operating losses--through higher prices, better cost accounting, and (usually) reducedemployment. In Ghana, the aggregate net losses (before taxes) ofapproximately a hundred public enterprises fell in 1983 to 20 percent oftheir 1982 level. In The Gambia, net losses after taxes of seventeenpublic enterprises fell in 1984 to about 30 percent of the 1982-83level. Between 1981 and 1984, the operating deficits of thirteen keypublic enterprises in Mali fell by over 50 percent. In 1985, Ghana's

- 23 -

Cocoa Marketing Board--the country's largest public sector employer--dismissed 19,000 employees, a third of its payroll. In Mali, about 10percent of public enterprise empLoyees were fired in early 1984.However, reductions made in one area can sometimes be offset byincreased employment elsewhere.

Of the countries that are trying to reform their publicenterprises, Senegal and Zaire are especially interesting. In Senegal,the government and six public enterprises have signed formal agreements(contract programs) which establish objectives and performanceindicators and set out the reciprocal obligations of the government andthe enterprises. Compared with other public enterprises, these firmshave had higher sales growth and lower personnel costs.

In 1984, Zaire introduced a series of reforms, and for somelarge public enterprises, these measures have started to bear fruit.Substantial restructuring of the mining sector, together withdevaluation and tax reforms, have vastly improved the financialsituation of GECAMINES. After two years of substantial losses, anddespite the continuing low price of copper, profits after taxes amountedto $45 million in 1984 and are expected to have been much higher in1985. In Zaire's transport sector, ONATRA--the company responsible forriver and rail transport between Kinshasa and the port of Matadi--tooksteps to reduce wage costs and raise tariffs. Now it is payingdividends to the treasury for the first time in several years. AndZaire's national railway company reduced its losses by over two-thirdssince 1983.

The region's governments have made efforts to reduce the sizeof their public investment programs and to improve the allocation ofpublic funds to sound, high-priority projects. Some of the disciplineresults from unavoidable financial austerity. Much of it, though,reflects a greater appreciation of the importance of includingrehabilitation in public investment programs, of keeping investments inline with the capacity to finance recurrent costs, and of using existingproductive capacity before building more. There is also a growingawareness that small-scale investments, especially in agricuLture, maybe more productive than large-scale investments and that large projectsof great political appeal but doubtful economic viability are bestpostponed or dropped altogether.

However, doubtful projects continue to be financed--ostentatious universities, overdesigned highways, luxury sportsstadiums, and uncompetitive agroindustriaL ventures. Often these arefinanced by donors responding to political requests. Sometimes donorsfail to appreciate the scarcity of investable funds and the need todevote aid resources to projects that are economically sound. And it isodd that finance is sometimes easier to find for a politicallyattractive project of doubtful viability than for support of exchangeand trade adjustment programs or for maintenance and rehabilitation

- 24 -

projects. Most African countries still need to strengthen the authorityof the government agencies that are in charge of planning and projectevaluation.

This year, strengthening the planning process is all the moreurgent. The coffee price boom will augment resources available to manyAfrican governments. It is essential that mistakes of the mid-1970sfollowing commodity price booms are not repeated, and that extraresources be used to stimulate growth in the near term and to attack thebasic constraints to development in the long term. In most of low-income Africa in 1986-90, rehabilitation and maintenance should remainthe focus for expenditures on infrastructure, agriculture, and industry--together with some carefully chosen new investments to removebottlenecks. However, as the next chapter explains, in areas concernedwith overcoming long-term constraints on growth, it is necessary to gobeyond rehabilitation and maintenance and finance new projects coveringboth capital and recurrent expenditure. Projects of doubtful viability--"white elephants," as the 1984 report called them--must not be allowedto reappear.

Adjustment programs along the lines indicated above, combinedwith higher investment and imports can provide considerable stimulus toeconomic activity in the near term. The area with the greatestpotential in much of Africa is agriculture. With improvement inagricultural prices and increased availability of imported raw materialsand basic consumer goods, the agricultural output can be expected togrow by about 4 percent a year during 1986-90. Similarly, industriesand services, particularly those linked to agriculture, will benefitfrom increased investment and imports. In some areas of industry (forexample, steel mills and refineries) and some services (for example,government services), a phase of contraction may be a necessary part ofadjustment for sustained development. However, some growth in percapita income should be a realistic objective in African countries whereadjustment programs are put in place and adequate resources are madeavailable to support them.

3. Long-term constraints on growth

The thrust of structural adjustment in Africa has been toward agreater role for prices, markets, and the private sector in promotingdevelopment. This emphasis needs to continue. However, in areas suchas family planning, human resource development, natural resourceconservation, and agricultural research, governments must play a largerand more effective role. Sub-Saharan Africa has made little progress inthese areas in recent years. In some cases, services have declined,undoing earlier progress.

On issues such as family planning, resource conservation, andagricultural research, governments must commit themselves to change andpromote a social consensus in its favor. Consensus must spring from aclearer understanding of the link between these long-term factors andprospects for a better quality of life.

Policy can then build on this by giving programs in these areasgreater priority in the allocation of scarce budgetary and humanresources, by strengthening public institutions where necessary, and bygiving private agencies (including nongovernmental organizations) a muchlarger role. Increased health and education coverage for a growingpopulation requires, when resources are short, restructured programswhich emphasize low-cost preventive health care, primary education, andgreater efficiency. Without new policies, the quality and relevance ofthese services will decline, and the objectives of universal literacyand greater technical and managerial independence will be out ofreach.

Population

Until recently, very few African governments recognized theimportance of family planning. Africa's vast empty spaces suggest thatmany more people can be accommodated and, in the long run, that may wellbe true. However, substantial investment and other inputs will beneeded to make that land sufficiently productive to support a largerpopulation. Additional resources will also be needed to provide water,health, and education facilities. It takes time to mobilize theseresources and use them effectively. On the basis of the currentexperience, the existing rate of population growth in Africa isobviously higher than the rate at which the capacity to meet essentialneeds can be increased.

In 1984, at both the Second African Population Conference inTanzania and at the UN International Population Conference in Mexico,African governments appeared ready to adopt a new approach to theirpolicy on population. A recent World Bank study found that about three-quarters of African countries now endorse family planning, at least forhealth reasons, and some have set expLicit targets for population

- 26 -

growth. Increasingly, national leaders are ready to discuss thepopulation problem and the need for action to deal with it--as, forexample, the presidents of Nigeria and Kenya have done in recentspeeches.

In some cases, such as Malawi, the turnaround in officialattitudes has happened remarkably quickly. In Zimbabwe, provision ofcontraceptive services has expanded rapidly in the past five years, andcontraceptive use has more than doubled. Kenya and Botswana haveprograms well under way, and several other countries--for exampLe,Tanzania, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi and Malawi--have recentlystarted programs too. As a result, fertility seems to be falling in somecountries. Birth rates are starting to drop in Zimbabwe, which providesgood access to family planning services in rural areas. Kenya, one ofthe first countries with a major population program, receivedconsiderable aid for family planning in the 1970s; its most recentpopulation surveys show that fertility rates have declined, though onlymarginally, from 8.0 in 1977 to 7.7 in 1984.

However, the progress achieved so far in sub-Saharan Africa asa whole is small in relation to the task of achieving viable populationgrowth. First, several African countries still take a pronatalistposition or show virtually no support for population control. Second,experience around the world shows that in the difficult area of familyplanning, government support is only a beginning. It is not enough towiden contraceptive choice and expand channels of access to familyplanning assistance, however important that may be. Poor people inAfrica, as elsewhere, find it in their interest to have largefamilies. Desired family size in Africa is the highest in the world(Table 3.1); in contrast with Asia and Latin America, it is higher thanthe fertility rate.

Because the demand for contraception is so small, familyplanning programs that do nothing more than supply contraceptives willhave limited impact on population growth. Clearly, action is needed toraise demand for family planning and to buiLd a national consensus inits favor. Over the medium term, demand for family planning wilLincrease with progress in education (especially of women), with betterstandards of health (especially reduced infant mortality), and withimprovements in the status of women. Equally important are policiesthat reduce the gap between private and social rates of return fromfamily planning by increasing the private financial costs of largefamilies.

1. World Bank, "Population Growth and Policies in Sub-SaharanAfrica" (forthcoming).

- 27 -

One measure of the progress of family planning efforts is thecontraceptive prevalence rate (CPR); that is, a percentage of marriedwomen of childbearing age using contraception. The average CPR in sub-Saharan Africa is 3 to 4 percent, compared with 50 percent or more inmuch of Asia (Thailand 59 percent, China 71 percent, Sri Lanka 55

Table 3.1. Desired family size and actual fertility rates:

Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America

Desired Total

Region family size fertility rate

Sub-Saharan Africa

(10 countries) 7.5 6.7

Asia(10 countries) 4.0 4.7

Latin America

(13 countries) 4.3 4.7

Note: Data are from surveys conducted in the late 1970sor early 1980s.

Source: World Bank, "Population Growth and Policies in Sub-

Saharan Africa" (forthcoming).

percent, Indonesia 58 percent, and Philippines 48 percent). However, inMauritius, the CPR is 51 percent and in Zimbabwe 22 percent. Otherexamples of better than average CPRs in Africa are Benin 18 percent,Ghana 10 percent, and Cameroon 11 percent. Experience elsewheresuggests that to bring population growth down to about 2 percent a year,the CPR has to rise to at least 25 percent. To reach that target beforethe end of the century, African governments and the donor communityalike will have to increase their efforts.

National governments at present finance a very small share ofexpenditure on family planning, and it is essential for them to givehigher priority to population control in budgetary allocations. Donorsalso need to increase their support for family planning activities,which in Africa currently receive only 0.5 percent of ODA, compared with1.5 percent for all developing countries.

Human resources

Despite the recognized need to develop human resources inAfrica, there have recently been signs of shrinking access to, and a

- 28 -

deterioration in the quality of, services for health and education--especially in rural areas. Basic policy reforms, as well as additionalresources, will be needed to reverse this trend.

Health

Health conditions in sub-Saharan Africa have improved over thepast few decades, but they remain among the worst in the world. In mostAfrican countries, access to health care is extremely limited.According to 1985 estimates by UNICEF and WHO, childhood immunizationlevels, for example, are the lowest in the world: polio 32 percent,measles 35 percent, tuberculosis 41 percent, and diphtheria, pertussis,and tetanus 33 percent. An immunization level of about 80 percent isgenerally considered necessary to control the transmission of thesediseases, so there is still a long way to go.

The 1980s have seen decline, not improvement, in healthservices. Despite the lack of reliable and timely statistics, mostobservers report that public health delivery systems have deterioratedin the past few years, particularly in rural areas. In many countries,this has meant a lower overall standard of health. Immunization levelshave actually dropped in recent years in countries such as Zambia,Tanzania, and Ghana. One reason for this dismal picture is a worseningshortage of financial resources. Health expenditures are oftenvulnerable to cuts during periods of fiscal austerity; in some WestAfrican countries the share of public health in the national budget fellin the early 1980s.

Inefficient use of the resources that are available hasaggravated the problem. Government policy has contributed to this inthree ways. First, at times of budget austerity, growth of employmentin che health sector has been maintained, so a rising salary bill hascrowded out funding for essential supplies, transport, and maintenanceof facilities. Second, most governments continue the practice ofconcentrating health care facilities in urban areas (and especially inhigh-cost hospitals), neglecting peripheral facilities that are muchmore cost-effective for treating the vast majority of diseases. This,together with the policy of providing such facilities free or at anominal charge, puts pressure on high-cost urban facilities and leavessecondary facilities underused. Third, some governments have reducedthe supply of private health services by making medical facilities apublic monopoly.

Raising the standard of health in Africa will require severalpolicy reforms to increase the efficiency of resource use. The firststep is to aim to deliver a minimum package of health care--especiallyimmunization against major communicable diseases, oral rehydrationtherapy, early diagnosis and treatment of acute respiratory infections

- 29 -

and malaria in children under five, and other elements of mother andchild health care. To do this, governments need to reorient theirpublic health systems by expanding access to community-based, primaryhealth care, particularly in rural areas. These community programs mustthen be backed up by institutions to monitor public health.

Governments must also change their hiring and cost recoverypolicies to ensure that they have adequate funding to cover theirnonlabor costs. Several governments are already emphasizing primaryhealth care programs that will help to correct the urban bias of pastpolicies. Many have introduced cost recovery measures. Senegal, forinstance, has a program in which user fees are collected and managed bycommunity health committees. Other countries--Ghana, Malawi, andZambia, for example--are seriously considering various schemes for usercharges and community financing. Some have taken steps to reduce unitcosts--for example, Mali now imports generic drugs.

Reforms to improve the level and use of resources areimportant; they must be supported by donor financial assistance. Donorsshould coordinate their efforts not only-in financing projects, but alsoin promoting policy reforms that emphasize primary health care, costrecovery, and funding for recurrent costs. Donors should also considerfunneling a larger share of their resources through nongovernmentalorganizations. These are already the principal providers of health carein many rural areas, where they can serve as a well-developed vehiclefor targeted primary health care.

Education

In many African countries, the education sector expanded afterindependence. Now it is suffering a reversal in both the quality andthe quantity of the services it provides. According to the most recentUnesco data, primary enrollment ratios declined during 1980-83 in twelveIDA countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases (Somalia, Togo, andMozambique), the decline in these three years was 10 percentage pointsor more. Evidence of declining quality is more scattered and anecdotal,but the fact that spending--on items other than teachers' pay--hasfallen in the past three years is an indication. A lower quality ofeducation in turn discourages families from sending their children toschool--especially when the decline happens alongside higher school feesand other charges.

To restore the momentum of primary education, Africangovernments will have to allocate additional resources to the sector.This is necessary not only to meet the enrollment requirements of arapidly growing population, but also to ensure that students have basicbooks and supplies. Some savings may be possible on primary teachersalaries--without jeopardizing either the quality or quantity of primary

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education--through increased quality differentials in the salarystructure, increases in teachers' working hours (to bring them more inline with civil service norms), and, in some cases, higher student-teacher ratios.

In postsecondary education, the immediate priority is to reducethe public costs per student. In sub-Saharan Africa, the annual publiccost of higher education amounts to almost $3,000 per student. That iseight times higher than the cost of higher education in Asia and almostdouble its cost in Latin America. The costs are high for severalreasons. Student-teacher ratios are only seven to one, compared withtwelve or fifteen to one in Europe and the United States. Nonteachingcosts and student subsidies are also high: a recent survey of twenty-four African countries showed that twenty-two provide free tuition,twenty-one cover board and lodging for most students, and sixteenprovide additional cash allowances. Governments can reduce these publiccosts in several ways. For example, they should close or consolidatesmall or low-priority programs (for example, the degrees in Spanish andPolish granted by Ghana's universities). They should spend less on artsand humanities and more on scientific and engineering training. Theyshould institute tuition charges and provide fewer subsidized servicesand student stipends. Some countries, such as Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi,and Nigeria, are working on programs to cut costs in their universities.

Donors should coordinate their efforts to ensure thatscholarships, technical assistance, and construction programs areconsistent with the national objectives discussed above. Externalassistance to education is at present heavily skewed to postsecondaryeducation. Bilateral assistance is concentrated in technical assistanceand scholarships, multilateral aid in civil works and construction.Only 14 percent of ODA for education is spent on operating costs andsupplies, and only 11 percent of total foreign assistance for educationis channeled to primary education. Foreign donors undoubtedly have acomparative advantage in supplying higher education and capitalassistance, but they need to restructure their assistance to avoid adeterioration in the primary schools: they should increase the share ofassistance for school supplies at the primary level.

Deforestation

Deforestation and, more broadly, degradation of the land--soilerosion, declining soil fertility, and desertification--are serious andmounting problems over large parts of Africa. The area of forest andsavannah woodland has halved since the turn of the century, and therehave been major losses in farm tree stocks. The decline in tree stocksis accelerating under several influences: consumption of fuelwood isrising with population growth; land clearance has removed trees fromfarm boundaries and groves that were needed to maintain soil moistureand nutrient contents or to protect soils from erosion; seedlings and

- 31 -

mature trees have been lost to ill-managed livestock; commerciallogging in the higher rainfall zones goes on without adequatereinvestment in, or maintenance of, forest reserves; and the mean annualyield of tree stocks has fallen in proportion to the decline in thestocks themselves.

A recent World Bank paper reviewed the major issues in thisarea and proposed an action program.2 It concluded that virtually everygovernment has recognized the threat of deforestation and taken somesteps to protect forests and encourage tree planting. Yet forestryprograms are often treated as a low priority and, in some cases, evencountries with well-designed policies fail to implement themeffectively. There is a clear need for public education and governmentcommitment.

In the more favorable ecological conditions of the humid zone,farmers and local communities are planting trees, especially onprivately owned farmlands. The issue there is how to design policies onincentives, pricing, harvesting, forestry extension, and expansion offorestry research. In the Sahelian/Sudanian zone, where trees growslowly, the natural rangelands are overstocked, and land is ownedcommunally, the hostile environment presents more formidable problems.These cannot be solved by reforestation alone. Forestry programs mustbe integrated with policy on agriculture, livestock, land settlement,forestry, energy, and irrigation. When an integrated approach has beentried, it has often been successful as, for example, in Ethiopia, Kenya,and Uganda. Nongovernmental organizations can play a vital part bysupporting the community actions that are essential to the success ofthis approach. Judged against the scale of the problem, however, theprograms adopted so far to check deforestation have been grosslyinadequate.

Deforestation in Africa presents a formidable challenge.Answering it will require sustained political commitment and appropriateconservation policies on the part of the African governments, withsubstantial technical and financial support from donors extending overmany years.

Agricultural research

Over the past few decades, large sums have been allocated toagricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa. The number of researchscientists more than doubled in the decade 1970-80; scientific staffyears in relation to the value of agricultural output in Africa now

2. "Deforestation, Fuelwood Consumption and Forest Conservation inAfrica: An Action Program for FY86-88," January 1986.

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compare favorably with other developing regions. Funding, especiallyfrom outside donors, has been substantial by international standards.It amounted to about . percent of agricultural GDP in 1980, whichcompares with 0.5 percent in Asia and about 0.75 percent in LatinAmerica (Table 3.2). All of the research centers in the ConsultativeGroup for International Agricultural Research support some aspect ofAfrican food and agricultural production.

There have been some encouraging results. Hybrid maizevarieties for subtropical climates, adopted in the 1960s or earlier,have enabled some East African countries to become self-sufficient inmaize or even to become exporters (Kenya, Malawi in good years, andZimbabwe). Cote d'Ivoire has developed a hybrid coffee (arabusta) toraise the quality of production where arabicas cannot be grown. "Jabplanters" have been developed in Nigeria to minimize soil tillage andsoil erosion. Controlled droplet sprayers have revolutionized insectcontrol in, for example, Sahelian cotton production. Progress has beenmade toward controlling leaf mosaic in cassava and livestock diseasessuch as east coast fever.

In spite of this, most observers agree that the technologyshelf in sub-Saharan Africa is nearly bare. Most farming remains atrudimentary suabsistence levels: farmers make little use of fertilizer,and hand-hoe cultivation is still the most common. Major advances suchas those that revolutionized wheat and rice cultivation in Asia have nothappened since the 1960s, when some countries with favorable climatesadopted hybrid maize. There has been no breakthrough for millet andsorghum, which account for 80 percent of cultivated land in the Saheland other dry areas, or for root crops, which are major staples in morehumid zones. For some crops, the backlog of basic research is enormous,despite the apparently high levels of resources devoted to it. Evenwhere improved technology exists, it often lacks proper testing or ispoorly dispersed to farmers.

Existing research capacity is not only costly to maintain butoften underused. Costs per researcher are high by internationalstandards (on average, over $50,000 per scientist a year, compared withabout half that amount in Asia). Researchers are isolated andfrequently lack the incentives, equipment, funding, and supportingpersonnel to conduct research effectively. Highly trained nationalresearchers become demoralized or are siphoned off into administrativeroles. The local institutions responsible for research are generallyweak; they lack strong political backing and recurrent budget support.

A long-term program to strengthen agricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa must aim to build up scientific knowledge, to strengthenthe country-level institutions, and to make better use of existing localresearch capacity. A short-term priority, however, is to adapt existingtechnology to local farm conditions. The results can then be spread byinput suppliers in the private sector (as in many developing countries

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in other regions) or through the extension system. In the longer run,attention must turn to land conservation--and not just to agronomicpractices (cultivation, seeds, fertilizer, weed control), but also toland tenure and farming systems. Especially in dry areas, it will notalways be enough, even in the short run, to adapt existing technology.Africa needs major research on new crop varieties to diversifyagricultural production, on new techniques to conserve soil moisture, onimproved irrigation practices, on control of livestock diseases, and onagroforestry.

Donors pay for much of the agricultural research in sub-SaharanAfrica. In the early 1980s they spent about $300 million a year--perhaps half of the total. As a result, they shape research policies,

Table 3.2. Agricultural research efforts: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and

Latin America, 1980

Expenditure on

agricultural research AgriculturalAs percentage Per scientist scientist

As percentage staff year staff years per $10

of agricultural (thousands of million agricultural

GDP dollars) GDP

Sub-Saharan AfricaWest Africa 1.19 83 1.42

East Africa 0.81 46 1.76Southern Africa a 1.23 50 2.47

AsiaSouth Asia 0.43 34 1.29

Southeasi- Asia 0.52 25 2.07

Latin AmericaTemperate South America 0.70 53 1.32

Tropical South America 0.98 56 1.77Caribbean and Central America 0.63 52 1.20

a. Includes South Africa.Source: R. A. Evenson, "The lARCs: Evidence of Impact on National Researcn and

Extension on Productivity," for the Consultative Group for International AgriculturalResearch (draft), 1985.

institutions, and priorities, often without adequate nationalinvolvement. The large number of donors and the small size of many ofthe countries in sub-Saharan Africa have led to confusion and toduplication of effort. Donors have compounded the problem by frequentlychanging their priorities and by demanding quantified results within

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periods that are unrealistic for agricultural research. Donor missionshave produced an increasing amount of often contradictory documentation,proposals, and solutions to Africa's research problems. Large numbersof separate donor-financed projects make competing demands on staffresources which are limited, particularly in the smaller countries.Moreover, these "enclave" projects typically last only a short time:they do little to improve the institutional framework.

In order to assist the African countries in this area, theWorld Bank is helping to develop a special program for Africanagricultural research. The initial objectives of the program are toimprove the exchange of information among donors on research activities,to collect and assess research results on promising technologies, tohelp develop national research strategies supported by regional programsand networks, and to provide research funds to selected nationalscientists. This is a modest but important initiative to improve theeffectiveness of aid for agricultural research.

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that sub-Saharan Africahas made littLe progress in overcoming the long-term obstacles todevelopment. In several countries, facilities for basic services havedeteriorated. Poor government policies have sometimes contributed tothe problem--for example, by failing to provide adequate funds forrecurrent costs and by allowing wages to crowd out spending onequipment, maintenance, materials, and other supplies. Unit costs haveoften been unsustainably high. Some governments have ruled out moreefficient nongovernmental organizations or private alternatives. Policyreforms are essential: they can help to mobilize more local resourcesand to reallocate existing resources to their most efficient use. Butby themselves policy reforms will not be enough to reverse thedeterioration. Additional resources--from donors as well as Africangovernments--will be needed if the initiatives outlined in this chapterare to succeed. The amounts are small in relation to total resourcerequirements, and in a strategy of adjustment with growth, allocationsto these sectors should be protected, even when there is an overallresource constraint.

4. External capital and aid coordination

Medium-term programs of growth-oriented adjustment areessential if Africa's decline is to be reversed. But the effectivenessof programs that are already in place and the further spread of suchreforms are threatened by inadequate external resource flows.Adjustment programs need additional financing to meet urgent needs forraw materials and spare parts to increase the use of existingcapacity. External financing is also needed, along with increases indomestic savings, to raise investment rates, which are now lower inAfrica than in any other region of the developing world.

The scarcity of foreign exchange imperils the success ofadjustment programs in country after country. Because of it,administrative controls are retained, spending on maintenance andrehabilitation is squeezed, and existing capacity is not fully used.More important, without extra resources, the price changes caused bygreater reliance on market mechanisms can have a serious social andpolitical impact; this, in turn, strengthens those who argue forcontinued public intervention in allocating resources.

The external capital required to support these programs in low-income Africa is not large in relation to the needs of highly indebtedmiddle-income countries. However, most of it must be granted on aconcessional basis, since several of Africa's IDA-eligible countrieshave prolonged debt problems, and all have limited creditworthiness.Official flows require budgetary appropriations. These can be made onlythrough a political process in the donor countries. As a result,obtaining new funds from official sources raises issues which aredifferent from those that face countries with access to commercialsources. For instance, commercial lenders provide freely usable foreignexchange, while official lenders often concentrate on project financingto ensure political identification with the funds provided. And whenofficial lenders provide import financing, it may be tied, thusrequiring the recipient country to maintain import controls, in order toenforce donor procurement regulations. Moreover, unlike commerciallenders, donors often have their own view of the priorities for whichrecipients can use the funds. Another complication is that in low-income Africa a large part of debt service is owed to preferredcreditors; this limits the scope of debt rescheduling in reducing theregion's debt servicing problem.

To provide the necessary external capital in the appropriateform, political decisions are required to increase resource flows toAfrica through a combination of additional aid and debt relief, and torelax the rigidities concerning the use of aid. This chapter discussesthese issues with particular attention to the resource requirements ofthe next five years, 1986-90.

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External resource flows, 1986-90

As earlier Bank reports on Africa have emphasized, externalresource flows cannot guarantee development. Without appropriatepolicies, no amount of external assistance can reverse Africa'sdecline. At the same time, policy reforms designed to promote growthwill be unsustainable without additional resources. Quantifying theresource requirements of particular countries several years ahead isdifficult at the best of times. The problem now is greater than usual,because massive shifts in relative prices and in patterns of resourceuse in the past few years have overturned the historical relationshipsthat might be a basis for calculation--and these shifts continue. Theprospects for commodity prices, the future trends in exchange rates, andthe outlook for the world economy are all uncertain. It is impossibleto say precisely how many countries will develop credible adjustmentprograms and thus be eligible for additional resources.

Despite these uncertainties, this report estimates the minimumrequirements for IDA-eligible countries as a group. The basic objectiveunderlying these estimates is to halt the trend of decline in per capitaconsumption by 1990 and achieve some growth thereafter. Because of theneed for higher savings to support essential investment, and because allAfrican countries have rapidly growing populations, this objective canbe achieved only if the GDP growth rate reaches at least 3-4 percent ayear by 1990. The report estimates external resource requirementsduring 1986-90 by assessing the minimum imports needed to achieveinvestment levels consistent with such growth rates in light of themaximum exports and domestic savings feasible during the period. Theseare minimum estimates for IDA-eligible countries as a group. Thoughsome of the countries may fail to develop credible programs to besupported with additional assistance, others might need more than theminimum to support faster growth.

This report goes on to estimate the minimum flow ofconcessional assistance needed to pay for imports and debt servicing--after allowing for the maximum feasible effort to increase exportearnings, continued favorable debt relief, and the highest level ofnonconcessionaL fLows that wouLd be prudent. Low-income Africa willneed concessional flows of $11 billion a year during 1986-90 to continuethe process of growth-oriented adjustment. Of the total, about $8.5billion a year can be expected on the basis of known and projectedcommitments. This leaves a gap of $2.5 billion a year to be filled byadditional multilateral and bilateraL assistance, including debt relief.

Foreign_exchanagerequirements

The Bank's experience suggests that in much of low-incomeAfrica inadequate import capacity is thwarting adjustment programs.Real imports per capita have been declining for low-income countries asa group since the 1970s (Table 4.1), and the rate of decline accelerated

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in the 1980s. To finance growth-oriented adjustment programs, and tolay the foundation for sustained and more rapid growth in total outputand per capita consumption, this trend must be reversed. At a minimum,real imports per capita should return to the level of 1980-82. Thisimplies imports of about $28.5 billion a year at current prices during1986-90, or about 24 percent more than in 1980-82 (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Foreign exchange payments by iDA-eligible countries, 1980-90

(billions of dollars)

1986-90

1980-82 projected

annual annual

average 1983 1984 average

Imports of goods and services (excluding interest) 22.9 19.0 19.5 28.5 a

Scheduled debt service payments c 4.0 4.9 4.8 6.8 b

Total 26.9 23.9 24.3 35.3

Memorandum items:

Import volume per capita (1970=100) 74 62 62 74 a

Import price index 100 92 90 101

Amortization before rescheduling c 2.3 3.0 2.8 3.8 b

(of which: multilateral) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (1.3)

Interest before rescheduling c 1.7 1.9 2.0 3.0 b

(of which: multilateral) (0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7)

Total debt service before rescheduling C 4.0 4.9 4.8 6.8 b

(of which: multilateral) (0.7) (1.0) (1.3) (2.0)

a. Proposed objective.

b. Scheduled debt service payments on existing and expected new commitments including

rescheduled loans.c. Including IMF repurchases and charges.

Scheduled debt service payments, including payments to the IMF,are projected to rise to about $6.8 billion a year during 1986-90, asagainst scheduled payments of $4.0 billion a year (and actual paymentsof $3 billion a year) in 1980-82. The situation will be particularlyserious for about a dozen low-income African countries (Benin, Gambia,Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania,Togo, and Zambia). For these countries as a group, scheduled debtservice payments in 1986-90 will be over $2 billion a year more thanthey were in 1980-82.

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Sources of external finance

The principal source of financing for external payments isexport earnings. Adjustment policies along the lines discussed aboveshould help to raise exports. However, because of the region's economicstructure, exports will be relatively slow to respond. They are mostlyprimary commodities, which have limited prospects. For several kinds ofexports--especially minerals such as copper, bauxite, and iron ore--prospects are poor both for prices and for volumes. And nontraditionalexports start from a very low base. Therefore, it will be very hard toachieve a rapid expansion of exports in the near term. A country-by-country analysis indicates that exports in current prices during 1986-90could, at best, be about 25 percent higher than in 1980-82. And thisassumes substantial exporc-oriented policy reforms in Africa and noincrease in protectionism in the industrial countries.

In order to meet Africa's growing foreign exchange require-ments, resource flows from external sources will need to increase during1986-90, but the recent trend has been just the opposite. In 1984,gross capital inflows to low-income Africa from all sources were about15 percent lower in current prices than in 1980-82. This was due to adecline in nonconcessional flows, in particular private capital flows(Table 4.2).

Nonconcessional capital flows were more than 25 percent oftotal gross capital flows in 1980-82; however, with increasing debtservice difficulties, they have been declining steadily. The declinewas particularly marked for private commercial flows, which dropped fromabout $1.6 billion a year during 1980-82 to about $0.4 billion in1984. Nonconcessional flows from official sources (bilateral andmultilateral) have also declined, though not so sharply. Given the weakdebt-servicing capacity of most low-income African countries, it wouldnot be desirable for them to obtain more than about $1 billion a year innonconcessional funds during 1986-90.

Concessional flows to low-income Africa were largely stagnantduring 1980-84; worldwide concessional flows declined during thisperiod. As a result, the share of low-income Africa in global net ODAdisbursements went up from about 19 percent in 1980-82 to 21 percent in1984--a small but commendable shift of resources to Africa. During1985, food aid deliveries increased substantially (about double involume compared with 1984), but nonfood aid may have declined because offamine-related disruptions. On the basis of known and expected levelsof commitments--including the World Bank's Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa, the increases under the Lome III Convention, and thefourth replenishment of the African Development Fund (1985-87)--concessional flows during 1986-90 would be about $8.5 billion a year,some 25 percent higher than 1980-82 levels.

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Table 4.2. Supply of external finance for DA-eligible countries, 1980-90

(billions of dollars)

1986-90

1980-82 projected

annual annual

average 1983 1984 average

Exports of goods and services 16.0 13.8 13.8 20.0

Gross capital flows 9.1 8.0 7.8 9.5

Concessional 6.5 6.2 6.6 8.5a

Grants

Bilateral 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.4

Multilateral 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.8

Loans

Bilateral 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.5Multilateral 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.8

Nonconcessional loans 2.6 1.8 1.2 1.0

Bilateral 0.6 0.6 0.4Multilateral 0.5 0.4 0.4

Private 1.6 0.7 0.4

Debt rescheduling 1.1 2.2 1.4 2.3

Amortization 0.8 1.6 1.0 1.9

Interest 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4

Other flows b 0.7 -0.1 1.3 1.0

Total 26.9 23.9 24.3 32.8

a. Based on disbursements out of existing or currently expected commitments.

Assumes $10.5 billion for IDA-8 and 1 percent a year increase in real terms for

bilateral grants and loans between 1980-82 and 1986-90.

b. Includes direct foreign private investment, net short term capital, IMFpurchases, and, for the historical data, changes in reserves and errors and

omissions.

In recent years, debt reschedulings under Lhe Paris and LondonClubs have shown considerable flexibility. For countries with seriousdebt-servicing difficulties and credible adjustment programs, reschedulingof 85-95 percent of principal has been common, and it has sometimes covered100 percent of the principal and sometimes amounts due from previousreschedulings. Rescheduling by bilaterals of 50 percent or more ofinterest payments due has also become common.

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A Large number of African countries will have to undertakefurther rescheduling of debt service to private and bilateral officialcreditors in 1986-90. If reschedulings cover 100 percent of principaland, in the case of official creditors, 50 percent of interest due(excluding payments on previously rescheduled debt), they can providerelief of about $2.3 billion a year for IDA countries as a group, ofwhich about $1.5 billion a year would be for the countries facingprolonged debt problems. Reschedulings along these lines are consistentwith recent practice, though they will need to be applied to morecountries than heretofore. Creditors must also continue to tailorrescheduling actions to individual country circumstances. Even aftersuch relief, debt service will remain at over 25 percent of exportearnings during 1986-90 for the IDA-eligible countries. For the dozencountries with the most serious debt problems, the ratio will remainabove 35 percent during 1986-90 and beyond (see Appendix A for greaterdetail).

Other nonconcessional flows--such as IMF purchases, directforeign private investment, and short-term capital flows--also declinedduring 1980-84. Purchases from the IMF dropped from about $1.2 billiona year in 1980-82 to about $0.6 billion in 1985. The long-term natureof the balance of payments problems of many of these countries, and therevolving character of IMF resources, make it reasonable to assume thatnet new purchases from the IMF (excluding Trust Fund reflows) willremain Low during 1986-90. As adjustment programs are introduced, theyshould attract direct foreign private investment; such inflows can beexpected to increase over time, but their volume is likely to remainmodest in 1986-90. Similarly, inflows of short-term, trade-linkedcapital are likely to remain low. At best, these three sources canprovide a further $1 billion a year during 1986-90.

To sum up: after taking into account the maximum feasibleeffort on export earnings, the maximum prudent level of allnonconcessionaL flows, and currently committed or expected flows ofconcessional assistance and debt relief, only $32.8 billion a year ofexternal finance can be expected during 1986-90. External payments of$35.3 billion a year and inflows--without further action--of $32.8billion a year leave a gap of $2.5 billion a year during 1986-90(Table 4.3). To bridge this gap, concessional flows should rise from$8.5 billion a year to $11 billion a year over the period.

With concessional flows of $11 billion a year, nonconcessionalflows of $2 billion a year, and actual debt service payments of $4.5billion a year, external flows net of debt service payments will be $8.5billion a year. This is the amount of external assistance that will beavailable to supplement domestic savings. Such external assistancewould amount to 10-12 percent of GDP for these countries as a group.Assuming that with improved policies the domestic savings rate canrecover to 8-10 percent of GDP by 1990, this would permit investment atabout 20 percent of GDP, a rate which is essential for a GDP growth rateof at Least 3-4 percent a year by 1990.

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Table 4.3 Concessional resource gap for IDA-eligible countries, 1986-90

(billions of dollars)

1986-90

projected

annual average

Foreign exchange payments required 35.3

External finance in the absence of further sDecial actions 32.8

Gap to be filled by additional concessiona;

assistance and debt relief 2.5

Possible additional finance from multilateral agencies 1.0

Gap to be filled by additional bilateral concessional

assistance and debt relief 1.5

Bridging the resource_gap

Because of the time lag between commitments and disbursements,a substantially larger increase in commitment authority will be requiredto bridge the resource gap of $2.5 billion a year. Since the additionalfinance is needed to meet import and debt service requirements in 1986-90, most of it will have to be in a quick-disbursing form. However,donors should also direct additional assistance to projects that areaddressed to the long-term constraints on development discussed inChapter 3.

These needs should be taken into account in decisions on theIDA-8 and the next African Development Fund replenishments, and indecisions on the use of the SDR 2.7 billion expected from IMF Trust Fundreflows during 1986-91. It has already been agreed that the Trust Fundreflows should be used to provide additional balance of paymentsassistance on concessional terms to the low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere that are eligible for IDA resources, are inneed of such assistance, and face protracted balance of paymentsproblems. These funds can go far to meet the needs of the Africancountries with prolonged debt and balance of payments difficulties. Ifthere is, in addition, a positive outcome on funding for themultilateral lending institutions (including an IDA-8 replenishment ofat least $12 billion), these sources could probably meet about $1billion of the disbursement gap.

The remaining gap of about $1.5 billion a year would have to befilled by additional bilateral aid and debt relief. This would amount

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to about a 30 percent increase in bilateral assistance and debt reliefover 1984, or 20 percent above the levels currently projected (Table4.2). Such assistance can be provided by a combination of additionalfast-disbursing aid and debt relief. Each package will, of course,depend on the individual circumstances of donor and recipient. However,as a general rule, no donor country should be a net recipient ofresource flows from an African countrv which is undertaking crediblereform programs. This is particularly important for countries whose aidagencies want to maintain a preferred creditor status.

Additional bilateral assistance could be provided in differentways and the appropriate combination would depend on the particularcircumstances of the donor and the recipient country. Several donorshave already converted bilateral official loans into grants for low-income countries--as proposed in the UNCTAD declaration of 1977; otherdonors may wish to adopt this practice. For export credit agencies, theterms of refinancing scheduled debt service payments should at a minimumcontinue whatever concessionality the original loans might have had and,to the extent feasible, increase the concessionality consistent with thefinancing needs of the adjustment programs. Third, the group ofcreditors that participate in rescheduling of principal and interestshould be widened to include non-OECD countries and, wherever possible,private creditors. However, these sources can at best meet only a smallfraction of the resource gap for low-income Africa. Consequently, thereis no alternative to a substantial increase in bilateral aid,particularly in the form of balance of payments support for adjustmentprograms.

The above assessment does not consider the resource needs ofmiddle-income African countries for initiating adjustment with growth.Output and exports of most of these countries are dominated by the oilsector; with the decline in oil prices, they have suffered dramaticdeclines in imports and GDP. Between 1980 and 1986, their per capitaincome declined by 25 percent. Given the uncertainties of the oilmarket, it is difficult to make assessment of their growth prospects andresource needs during 1986-90. A rough order of magnitude is, however,indicated below.

To restore real per capita import levels to the 1980-82 levelfor middle-income countries (excluding Nigeria), the import levels for1986-90 would have to be about $19 billion a year. For Nigeria, thepresent government policy with restraint on foreign borrowings wouldimply imports for 1986-90 in the range of $11-14 billion a year--substantially below 1980-82 level but close to the levels in the lateseventies. Taking into account the projected debt service paymentsafter rescheduling (about $6.5 billion a year) and export earnings withexport-oriented policy reforms (about $29 billion a year) the grossresource flow requirements for middle-income countries during 1986-90are estimated to be in the range of $7 to 10 billion a year. Theconcessional flows to these countries have been less than a billion

- 43 -

dollars a year and even assuming a substantial increase in their levels,the bulk of the external resource needs have to be met by nonconces-sional flows.

Admittedly, it is difficult to make medium-term projections onthe availability of nonconcessional flows, especially private commercialflows. They depend on prevailing supply conditions in the capitalmarkets and the market's assessment of the borrowers' creditworthiness--both of which can change rapidly. Taking into account the presentsupply conditions in capital markets, it is estimated that the grossflows of nonconcessional capital to middle-income African countries arelikely to be about $5-6 billion a year during 1986-90. This would leavea significant gap ($1-3 billion a year) to be filled by concerted actionby commercial banks and bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Institutional reforms in aid coordination

The proposed increases in aid and debt relief to low-incomeAfrica will only be enough to support minimum import levels. But muchstill needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of aid in supportof comprehensive adjustment. This section discusses the key areas forattention and reform.

Recent progress

The creation of the Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa in1985 was an endorsement of the principle that donors should focus theiraid, especially nonproject assistance, on countries that are willing toadopt overall or sectoral adjustment programs. It has also shown howbilateral and multilateral agencies can work together to support policyreforms.

At recent consultative group and other aid coordinationmeetings, increasing numbers of donors have recognized the need foradditional nonproject aid. Ghana and SenegaL are cases in point.Bilateral aid agencies had long been reluctant to join the multilateralinstitutions in providing an adequate volume of nonproject assistance toGhana. However, at the consultative group meeting in November 1985,several bilateral donors indicated that they were willing to increasetheir nonproject assistance and to cofinance with the multilateralagencies. In Senegal the two main suppliers of nonproject assistance,France and the United States, have been working closely with the Bankand the IMF to provide support for major policy reforms.

Another recent development is that many bilateral andmultilateral donors are concentrating on projects that maintain orrehabilitate existing capacity. This is particularly true of

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expenditure on infrastructure, large-scale irrigation, and publicenterprises; lately few such projects have been wholly new invest-ments. Increasingly, donors are cofinancing rehabilitation schemes.Examples include a major agricultural project in Zambia and a powerproject in Senegal.

Donors are trying to improve their project portfolios bycanceling nonperforming projects and reallocating funds to areas ofhigher priority. For example, in 1983-85 the World Bank increaseddisbursement rates and redirected funds to areas of high priority inseventy-five projects in twenty-five countries of sub-Saharan Africa.At a recent consultative group meeting for Zambia, the aid agencies ofseveral countries, in particular of the Federal Republic of Germany,announced their intention to redirect part of their committed assistancetoward higher priority projects and quick-disbursing operations. InNiger, the government and several donors have agreed to scale backconstruction of a major trunk road and to focus instead on higherpriority activities such as road maintenance.

In the past two years, donors have expanded their formalarrangements for coordinating aid, and their use of consultative groupsand roundtables has continued to increase. In 1983-84, the pace ofconsultative group activity increased substantially, and meetings wereheld in eight countries. In 1985 consultative groups were establishedfor the first time in Mauritania and Senegal. Roundtables began in fivecountries in 1984 and in another three in 1985. As a result, by the endof 1985, some kind of formal aid coordinating mechanism was establishedor agreed in principle for all but one of the low-income Africancountries (the exception is Ethiopia). The Bank and the United NationsDevelopment Programme aim to provide similar documentation for bothconsultative groups and roundtables.

Aid coordination has also been strengthened at the locallevel. For example, special meetings on aid for selected sectors havebeen held--usually under the sponsorship of a lead donor--in ninecountries (Benin, Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal,Tanzania, and Zaire). Similar meetings are scheduled in elevenothers. In eight countries (Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, SenegaL,Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, and Zambia), local representatives of majordonors also hold regular meetings--often under the chairmanship of alead donor and in conjunction with a government aid steering group--todiscuss broad issues of aid and economic policy.

These are promising signs. But the progress toward moreeffective use of aid needs to continue. There are at least six areas inwhich further steps shouLd be taken now to strengthen the system.

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Further reforms

First, governments in Africa must be seen to have the primeresponsibility for designing their adjustment and investment programsand for coordinating aid and other financial flows. Donors can assistin the task--but they should not undermine this responsibility by tryingto negotiate their own favorite package of policy reforms or bypromoting their own pet projects. To this end, the African countriesmust strengthen their core ministries of finance and pLanning, and theunits that coordinate their foreign assistance. Better coordinationwithin the government--between the central bank, the ministries offinance and planning, and the sectoral ministries--is also necessary.Such improvements may call for technical assistance from outside andsuch assistance is readily available from the World Bank, ULNDP, orbilateral aid agencies. Some countries have made progress in this area(for example, Zambia) but most still have a long way to go. Changes indonor attitudes and programs are essential to ensure their assistancefits into the national development priorities.

Second, decisions on aid and debt relief are not yet adequatelyharmonized. The current pattern of discussions means that aid levelsare indicated before agreement is reached on debt relief. As a result,larger aid commitments have often allowed creditors to harden theirterms for debt restructuring. In such cases, the increase in resourcesnecessary for the economy to grow out of its problems never materialized.In Latin America's debt negotiations, fresh money and the restructuringof existing debt are normally considered together. In Africa, donorsand creditors are not necessarily one and the same, but the principle ofsimultaneous determination is just as important. Debt rescheduling forlow-income African countries will be needed regularly for many years tocome, so debt relief and aid must be viewed as elements of a singlefinancing plan in support of growth-oriented adjustment. The responsibledonor country institutions can then work out the specific details of aidcommitments and debt relief, as at present. Over the next five years,increases in aid--and the expected rise in export earnings--should beused to support growth, not to reduce debt relief.

In some cases, it has proven useful to harmonize the twofinancial decisions by bringing together the different representativeshandling aid and debt within creditor and donor governments. This wasdone in India in 1968 and 1972 and in Pakistan in 1973 and 1974; debtrelief was committed as part of the annual aid-pledging exercise. In1981, Pakistan's aid consortium meeting focused on balance of paymentsproblems, and a part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of debtrelief--under the chairmanship of the French representative, who waschairman of the Paris Club. More recently, in Africa, the Mauritaniameeting of March 1985 considered financing needs for 1984-85 and adoptedan integrated package of aid and debt relief. In this meeting, Arabdonors evaluated debt rescheduling and fresh money requirements

- 46 -

together; and some OECD donors committed new aid and at the same timeindicated their willingness to reschedule debt at the subsequent ParisClub.

Third, consultative group meetings have sometimes been so largethat effective policy focused discussion became almost impossible. Suchgroups have worked best when the major donors have had discussions withthe government, the IMF, and the World Bank in advance of the formalmeetings. This enables the major parties--not least, the government--torecognize what is required of them in devising a consistent internal andexternal finance package. Such prior consultation might be essential ifthe aid and debt discussions are brought together. Private banks haveformed small steering committees to address the debt problems of themiddle-income countries. For most of the major African debtors, theyhave also established small steering committees led by one or twobanks. In the case of countries with prolonged debt and balance ofpayments difficulties, detailed discussions on debt and aid will berequired; prior consultation between the principal agencies willtherefore be particularly important.

Fourth, Africa's attempted policy reforms are likely to failunless donors can give indications of the resources that will beavailable in the medium term--national programs of medium-termadjustment cannot be formulated without this information. At present,creditors will reschedule only the debt service that is due over thefollowing twelve to eighteen months. As a rule, donors do not committhemselves to financial support for more than a year ahead. Often theylack legislative authority to make multiyear commitments. But even anonbinding indication of aid to come could provide help in medium-termplanning. Donors have already given multiyear pledges as part of theIDA replenishments. In a recent consultative group for Ghana, at leastone bilateral donor (Canada) was willing to make multiyear indicativepledges. To tackle the special problems of Africa, other donors must dothe same.

Fifth, follow-up to the agreements reached at debt and aidmeetings leaves much to be desired. Too often, it takes a year after aParis Club agreement to finalize the arrangements for bilateral debtrelief. Donors often fail to abide by consultative group agreements onthe volume and composition of assistance. Moreover, there is noprocedure to identify such shortfalls quickly.

Consultative groups should establish a more effective capacityto monitor their performance. The World Bank is prepared lo strengthenits capacity, and will explore the modalities and staffing requirementsto achieve this goal with individual borrowing countries and aidgroups. Such a function might suitably be financed, and staffed,jointly by donors.

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Sixth, increases in aid should be largely in the form ofnonproject assistance--for reasons already explained; and multilateralagencies must play a central role in coordinating such assistance. TheBretton Woods institutions are already using more of their resources tosupport adjustment programs. The European Community, acting under theLome III agreement, has started to consider sectoral policies alongsideits assistance programs. The African Development Bank is beginning todirect more resources to quick-disbursing assistance in support ofpolicy reforms--as in its recent support for Ghana's economic recoveryprogram. These are welcome signs of an increasing emphasis on quick-disbursing, policy-oriented lending. But there is a risk offragmentation and inconsistency in policy reform programs negotiated bydifferent agencies. To avoid this, the country's own medium-termadjustment programs and its action program for the next twelve toeighteen months should be the focus of adjustment lending by the WorldBank and other agencies.

Cooperation between the World Bank and the IMF should continueto be deepened. The Bank and the Fund should work together withgovernments, first, to develop an adjustment and investment programaimed at restoring growth, and second, to assess financial needs andsources. Programs of this kind would then become a basis for financialsupport--which would be agreed in consultative group meetings anddelivered in the form of concerted, policy-based lending.

In conclusion, 1986 offers several oppportunities to meet theAfrican challenge. Decisions on IMF Trust Fund reflows and the IDA-8replenishment will help to determine the resources available for low-income Africa during 1986-90. The Development Committee's meeting inApril and the special session of the UN General Assembly on Africa inMay can establish the principles on which the concerted effort of theAfrican countries and the international community can be based.

Appendix A

The debt problem and its implications for import capacity

During the 1970s, IDA countries in Africa borrowed heavilydespite a rise in their export earnings and increasing ODA. Between1970 and 1980, their external debt rose by over 21 percent a year (TableA.l)--more rapidly than in Latin America. Several countriesincreased their debt ten times or more in these ten years. In somecases, the debt roughly tripled in two to three years. The growth rateof debt slowed down considerably during the 1980s (to 7 percent a yearduring 1980-84). But purchases from the IMF increased rapidly andarrears on short- and long-term debt accumulated(Table A.2).

Profile of the African debt problem

At the end of 1984, the low-income African countries' debt(including long-term and short-term arrears and IMF purchases) stood atabout $45 billion. For this group of countries, total debt represented74 percent of their GNP and 349 percent of their exports. Both ratioswere considerably higher than those for major borrowers among developingcountries (which were 51 percent and 239 percent, respectively). Forseveral countries, the external debt was more than 100 percent of GNPand 300 percent of exports. (Table A.2).

A large part of the outstanding debt of the IDA-eligiblecountries at the end of 1984 was owed to official creditors, often onconcessional terms. As a result, despite the heavy burden of debt, thescheduled debt service on long-term debt (plus payments to the IMF) was35 percent of exports in 1984. However, the actual debt service ratiowas only 22 percent, because of reschedulings and the accumulation ofarrears. This distinction can be very important: some countries hadscheduled debt service ratios that ranged from 80 to 145 percent, whiletheir actual debt service payments ranged from 20 to 40 percent.

The composition of the debt service reveals two interestingpoints (Table A.3).

o The predominance of official creditors, especially multilateralagencies. Official lenders plus the IMF account for more than 75percent of debt service due in 1986-87 for the IDA-eligible countries.

1. The tables in this appendix present data on debt for thirty-seven of the principal borrowers of sub-Saharan Africa, although thediscussion concentrates on twenty-five IDA-eligible countries.

- 50 -

Of the 75 percent, 20 percent is due to the IMF, and 17 percent to othermultilateral agencies. For some countries, multilateral lendingagencies (plus the IMF) account for 50 percent or more of the debtservice. Since neither payments to the IMF nor debt service due toother multilaterals can be rescheduled, this reduces the scope for debtrelief.

o The great diversity of bilateral creditors. For some countriesthe principal bilateral creditors are countries represented at the ParisClub, but for others (such as Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan,and Guinea-Bissau) the principal bilateral creditors are OPEC members orcentrally planned economies. Since these creditors have differentprocedures for debt relief, the case-by-case approach is particularlyimportant for African debtors.

Projected debt service burden and import capacity

For many African countries, the reschedulings and arrears arebuilding up obligations for the future. The implications of Africa'sdebt burden become clear when the projected debt service payments areseen in relation to the export prospects. Country-by-countryprojections were undertaken to assess the scheduled debt service burdenin the rest of the 1980s and beyond. The scheduled amounts are definedas the payments due on existing debt and new credits, includingrescheduled debts (Table A.4).

The projections of exports of goods and nonfactor services werebased on export projections done for the World Development Report 1986,which start from a common set of external assumptions, includingdeveloped-courntry growth rates, primary commodity prices and worlddemand, prices of manufactured imports, and changes in the rates ofexchange of the major currencies. The projections also assume that thesub-Saharan African countries will adopt better domestic policies thanthose of the past ten years. Exports were projected under theassumption that there would be no increase in protectionism in developedcountries.

Gross disbursements of external capital were assumed to bemaintained at 1980-82 levels in real terms through 1990. Thedistribution of new disbursements among concessional and nonconcessionalcreditors was assumed to be the same as the distribution ofdisbursements in 1984. As a result, the terms of the projected newcommitments are, in general, somewhat softer than the terms of the 1980-82 commitments. New IMF purchases were assumed to be half the level ofrepurchases in each year. The projections assume that arrears arerescheduled on the same terms as other debt and, for countries withoutdebt rescheduling, paid off in equal annual installments over 1986-90.

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Reschedulings were assumed to take place in most of the caseswhere projected debt service ratios significantly exceed those of therecent past--the earlier ratios were taken as a rough indicator of acountry's ability to service debt over the next five years. Noreschedulings were assumed for countries where projected capital inflowswould in any case result in a substantial increase in import capacity.On this reasoning, seventeen of the twenty-five IDA-eligible countrieswere projected to reschedule debt between 1986 and 1990; most of themhave already rescheduled their debt at least once during 1980-85.

The terms assumed for the reschedulings were:

o A ten-year repayment period, including five years of grace

o Interest rates at or near market rates for rescheduled privatedebt and for the claims of export credit agencies

o Interest rates at their original level for rescheduled ODAloans

O A contract cutoff date of December 31, 1984.

Up to 100 percent of principal and 50 percent of interest payments--including arrears and debt rescheduled before 1985--were assumed to berescheduled. In the case of private financial credits without externalguarantees, however, only principal payments were assumed to berescheduled. Debt service payments on debt contracted or rescheduledduring the 1985-90 period were not assumed to be rescheduled.

While these terms are relatively generous, they are roughly inline with those agreed at recent Paris and London Club reschedulings forsub-Saharan African countries. A single set of terms was used forconvenience. Creditors have sometimes granted more generous terms, andthis may be necessary in the future to provide sufficient debt relieffor certain countries. In other cases, less generous debt relief may beadequate.

For twelve countries in sub-Saharan Africa the scheduled debtservice ratios in 1986-90 are projected to be significantly higher thanthe actual levels in recent years (Table A.4). In these cases, debtrescheduling is likely to continue for some time--as indicated by thehigh debt service ratios projected for 1991. Moreover, their importcapacity in 1986-90 is likely to be lower than in 1980-82, even afterreschedulings and even if gross disbursements of external capital during1986-90 are maintained at 1980-82 levels. Without additional capitalflows or additional debt relief, their import capacity will declinesharply.

For the other IDA countries, the debt problem is moremanageable. Their average scheduled debt service ratio in 1986-90 is

- 52 -

higher (28 percent) than in 1980-82 (19 percent). However, reschedulingoperations are likely to reduce the actual average to 21 percent in1986-90; and the scheduled debt service in 1991 is projected to remainat this level, relative to exports. With gross capital inflows at their1980-82 level, their imports of goods and noninterest services wouldrise by about 13 percent in real terms between 1980-82 and 1986-90.When population growth is taken into account, this implies an 11 percentdecline in per capita import capacity. As noted in Chapter 4, resourceflows to low-income Africa will have to increase substantially during1986-90, if the minimum objective of restoring per capita imports totheir 1980-82 level is to be achieved.

Table A.1. Long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt, disbursed and outstanding(millions of dollars)

Annual nominal growth rate (percent)1970 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1970-75 1975-80 1980-84 1970-84

IDA-eligible countrieswith prolonged debt problems

Benin 41 55 79 167 309 369 567 618 582 14.3 34.0 19.5 24.8

Gambia 5 9 13 28 106 140 155 162 161 23.6 49.7 10.4 33.4

Liberia 159 157 177 348 564 630 633 701 757 1.6 27.6 7.2 14.8

Madagascar 93 119 174 303 1,021 1,462 1,669 1,706 1,636 13.0 43.9 11.6 28.5

Mali 238 282 332 509 667 729 805 906 960 7.3 14.8 9.9 11.4

Mauritania 27 106 188 593 731 848 1,029 1,176 1,171 51.8 27.3 13.5 31.5

Niger 32 64 112 197 399 605 603 633 678 28.8 29.3 11.7 26.3

Somalia 77 127 230 525 714 1,027 1,151 1,236 1,233 25.3 26.3 13.6 25.1

Sudan 307 453 1,235 2,295 3,802 4,541 5,117 5,682 5,659 33.9 25.2 10.7 26.9

Tanzania 250 467 803 1,317 2,011 2,189 2,391 2,584 2,594 26.5 19.0 7.0 19.4

Togo 40 58 120 644 924 855 819 803 659 24.4 56.7 -7.1 30.2

Zambia 623 704 1,147 1,464 2,185 2,230 2,378 2,618 2,779 11.6 13.0 6.6 12.9

Subtotal 1,889 2,601 4,609 8,390 13,433 15,623 17,317 18,825 18,868 19.6 23.8 9.0 20.8

Other IDA-eligiblecnunLtries

Burkina 21 31 63 186 301 313 344 393 407 26.0 38.5 8.7 28.5

Burundi 7 8 18 70 141 157 201 292 334 16.0 57.2 26.4 38.1

Central African Rep. 24 55 71 111 160 190 209 216 224 26.8 16.7 8.3 17.8

Chad 32 39 67 194 202 156 123 115 109 16.0 26.9 -14.2 13.6Ethiopia 169 256 344 511 701 964 1,038 1,222 1,384 14.2 15.3 17.3 16.4 Lo

Ghana 495 716 689 870 1,100 1,114 1,121 1,141 1,122 8.1 10.7 0.6 6.5

Guinea 312 602 759 929 1,029 1,258 1,242 1,241 1,168 19.7 6.8 2.4 9.4

Guinea-Bissau 0 0 7 44 104 111 132 141 149 d 65.1 10.2 , a

Kenya 319 489 604 1,382 2,216 2,316 2,428 2,393 2,633 15.4 30.5 3.9 19.1

Lesotho 8 8 14 33 63 77 118 134 134 9.3 38.1 23.0 26.8

Malawi 122 202 257 504 647 682 706 719 731 16.6 20.6 3.0 15.1Rwanda 2 8 24 99 156 171 189 220 244 72.2 42.9 12.2 46.2

Senegal 100 178 304 640 926 989 1,236 1,498 1,555 25.4 27.4 15.6 23.3

Sierra Leone 59 90 149 243 336 338 372 361 342 21.7 18.7 1.0 15.4

Uganda 138 177 212 363 603 540 602 623 675 9.5 24.7 3.8 13.6

Zaire 311 904 1,718 3,579 4,165 4,126 4,049 4,374 4,084 44.7 19.9 0.2 21.4

Subtotal 2,119 3,762 5,300 9,755 12,850 13,503 14,110 15,084 15,297 21.3 20.2 4.7 16.5

Total: IDA-eligible cotntries 4,009 6,362 9,909 18,145 26,283 29,125 31,427 33,909 34,165 20.6 21.9 7.0 18.6

Other countries

Cameroon 131 237 372 1,185 2,049 2,036 1,945 1,826 1,738 22.1 42.6 -4.3 25.1

C6te d'Ivoire 256 582 943 2,830 4,347 4,393 4,947 4,826 4,835 29.0 38.7 3.1 26.6Nigeria 480 1,157 1,101 2,360 4,369 6,141 9,011 12,338 11,815 21.9 40.4 30.8 27.2

Zimbabwe 233 221 190 418 697 880 1,218 1,522 1,446 -3.4 38.4 22.2 17.3

Subtotal 1,100 2,197 2,606 6,793 11,462 13,451 17,122 20,512 19,834 20.4 39.5 16.4 25.8

Botswana 15 115 147 121 152 165 211 230 276 58.6 -2.5 16.6 14.8

Congo 144 238 423 876 1,132 1,274 1,518 1,511 1,396 23.9 23.6 6.1 20.4

Gabon 91 346 797 1,335 1,356 1,042 870 729 725 55.7 11.2 -14.9 15.9

Mauritius 32 35 46 156 296 329 363 328 354 7.5 51.9 3.6 24.8

Swaziland 37 37 34 105 166 162 170 183 178 -0.6 43.0 2.7 16.9

Subtotal 318 771 1,447 2,593 3,101 2,972 3,131 2,981 2,928 30.8 22.3 9.2 21.5

Total: Other countries 1,418 2,968 4,053 9,386 14,563 16,422 20,253 23,494 22,762 24.6 32.3 13.3 24.2

TOTAL 5,427 9,330 13,962 27,531 40,846 45,547 51,680 57,402 56,927 21.7 25.2 9.4 20.4

Note: Data are for the end of the year. Angola and Mozambique are excluded from all the tables in Appendix A because comprehensive data are not available.

a. Period growth rates cannot be calculated because there was no debt in 1970.

Table A.2. Extersa1 debt b ys re t the -ad i,f 1984

Pobllc airI pobl1ri±~~~~~~~oarantped loog-trren debt ____________ fattinat ed arrears an Debt an~~~~~~~lbtt-t~ D~bTotal Toral pobltc pried pal aed Intereat percentage~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~bl, ~i ip. .d -- t -..

I fabtItabes and pobiloly Private - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ayaeots b- ofliLy P exports, - f-p1tI-lotdio,g Offila.l sore....______ piaea,re oaane nuantred Long Sh-rt- lebt a of goods

IFli Bilft-la MaIl Ci lateral S,,pp1

iet' Flna-rtl long ter Iolg- tra h, iot -ter ter ter P--to tge a-dpereamn) Dbt OPEC Otbhr Ta,t .L IBRD IDb Otbh- Tots I -rditts lotrIstost a deb deft debt IMF debt debt Total of GNP aerire

af tbprolooged de~bt p-ob,e-

Besfn 681 61 1 ) 311 1001 II 1011 110 201 201 2631 sf2 1 0 . 72.5 292.5GabIa 280 6 31 II 48 11 31 III 82 11 23fI I1 . . 217 169.8 325.9LIberIa 1,121 7 d83 24 lb 343 1211 60 91 213 3 117 757 2n88 92.6 209.2

Madagoacas 1,912 492 140 131 814 28 241 153 426 63 3 3 4 ,636 0 .. 148 .. 80.2 51712.Malt 1,1191 47 ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~ ~ ~~14 38 51 191 1611 3I 19 II 960 3 6. 4 I . .f19. 5023

Moarltanla 1,321 b~ ~~~~ ~~~~~8 b9 82 721 5 b 211 121 426 ,1 .31 . . 1 893 .6 383.6

Nfgee 1947 194 72 lb 282 11 119 121 2411 12 144 6738 162 .. 44 .. 81.0 219.4

loinalla 1,~~~ ~ ~~~~~429 185 292 265 242 11 144 288 41 59 ,211 11 0,f1 . . 14.8 5,38.6lodan 1,201 1,1 31 2,814 5811 3,261 48 4,71 428 9,8 411 9113 5,659 11 .. 98 ... .79.1 913.2

Tan-iol 0,329 348 215 167 1,135, 281 526 131 991 I71 2901 2,594 61 .. 24 . .86.9 733.'Toga 776 292 7 43 342 1 123 94 219 9 4 6 59 1 .49 ... .f11.1 3116.0Zambia 4 ,771 914 I1/ 521 1,3952 318 36 223 137 2 21 4115 2,779 23 . 698 . ... 181.8 476.9

Sobhtotaf 24,822 4,041 3,666 2,715 111,421 846 2,121 2,125 5,0172 6311 2,744 18,867 2116 1,8901 1,99 2,639 959 1,598 99.0 127.1

Oth-r IDA-Iiglble

B-ki-a 437 811 17 14 ~ 110 1 1211 136 260 7 311 4072 II. I ... 48,13 255.3""eadi 346 29 25 47 182 8 117 92 289 II24 334 8 0 0 . .. .34.1 270.6

Central Afelean Rep. 242 7 2 9 19 99 11 49 49 98 24 2 224 11. 4 . .. 44.11 166.1

Chad 11t5 3 7 4 13 0 37 34 12 14 Il 1119 11. 4 .,. .38.3 78.1Kthtopia 1,2 178 244 411 681 39 379 1114 122 57 124 1,304 (3. 75 . .. 2.5 249.1Ch... 2,1, ' 41 4II 2 407 523 125 184 162 473 121 3 1,123 11. 468 ... .41.6 329.3

Onfs- 1,287 168 94 5011 763 41 90 95 227 136 43 1,168 2 .. I . ,. 65.3 33119

Dalsea-Dfaaao 180 ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~6 24 28 18 11 28 40 68 9 14 149 1..4 , ,f1.8 1,284.7Kenya 3,811 688 511 172 909 471 363 287 1,248 63 422 2, 683 428 .. 388 6 .44.5 734.6

L-ath. 138 2 6 2 181 11 I3I9ff 2 11 134 0 . 0 ... .41.3 32.6Mafasl 881 123 2 22 146 71 275 I 457 19 189 731 11. 113 ..... 6. 231,2R-tada 281 21 IS 18 54 11 1f7 23 1911 11 1 244 11 0 17.6 151.7

Scogal 2,0126 459 2811 121 8611 91 199 2118 498 12 187 1,155 10(. 201 . ., 84.9 218.8DIceec Least ~~~~ ~~~~463 I113 8 25 128 II' 42 67 124 65 24 342 11,. 74 1 46.2I 298 .1

Dga-da 1,31 87 39 135 261 35 171 132 344 27 42 675 11. 311I5. . 1. 229.7ZlaIr 5,0111 2,531 172 68 2,764 56 3031 2Sf 608 139 173 4,0184 8 .. 579 . . .19.:9 264.9

Sabtata1 19,803 4,963 1,045 1,471 7,480 1,139 2,543 1,821 5,503 696 1,618 15,297 446 1,417 2,248 592 208 881 5 6. 245.0

Tataf, lf)A-ellgfble_ootrin 44,625 9,11114 4,211 4,186, 17,981 1,986 4,644 3,944 10,576 1,326 4,162 34,169 692 3,307 4,239 1,231 1,141 4,398 74.1 148,9

Other raate fo

Ca-m..... 2,729 599 13 15 727 253 222 163 638 82 2911 1,738 419 . 32,3 189.3C6te d'Isee7,131 794 11 41 835 9112 7 242 1,12 212 2,176 4,835 1, 352 , 591 I'll . 12. 246.7

Ntgeefa 19,1114 134 4011 ~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~138 182 ,44 36 31 1,1Il 3150 9,280 11,815 890.8 . .. 26.1 119.5Dtbba ,14 24 1 I 79-4 23 16 18 9 944 1,446 78 .. 256 . .418153.9

Sabt.tal 32,1128 2, 169 514 245 2,929 2,348 288 450 3,088 723 11,094 19,8 34 2,902 8,387 847 612 7,132 1,1192 13.8 166,2

Bot-.a- 281 58 24 2 81 102 11 411 158 7 311 276 8 . . .. 28,5 32.6Logs 1,4803 ff6 61 381 562 48 62 152 263 64 1117 1,396 1 . 0 . ,81.2 123,7Daba 9 73 146 25 20 191 12 0 53 66 46 422 724 0 .. 2 . 28,8 4I.5Mao-itf- 560 73 6 111 89 86 211 53 158 1 106 354 13 . 154 , . 54,4 ff0.3Sicoafad 195 60 4 2 60 .,5 8 57 f110 1 0 178 0 i ,. ... 40.2 12.L

S.bt.t.l 3,614 453 119 412 984 294 1115 353 254 118 1,872 2,928 13 419 164 124 3 124 45.9 68.4

Total, Oltberc-otefe 35,642 2,622 634 656 3,912 2,642 393 808 3,843 842 14,166 22,762 2.945 8,866 1,1111 183 7,032 7,215 3 4.7 145,2

TOTAL 811,268 ll,626 5,345 4,842 21,814 4,628 5,1317 4,754 14,418 2,168 18,527 56,927 1,634 12,173 5,2111 13,414 8,2002 11,614 49.3 214.9

Mote, Rows may slt add to to,tals becaus of -- disg.

8. Arasa -og-ter- tlopt '- papa ents- ar In-ided In Ds-tes- debt, aidaa bah anarer a b rcade naot t-- debt; -- rslt, there may b toed-oble---oitlg

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N CC CN N C'

-C . -CN N C

C C -CNN NON C ONO NNN .-.. ' C' 0.10 NOON N C� NNNO C'.,NC'NC'N C-IN CC

o CNN C'C-N CNN NONN C'NN NNO N-CC NC-, COON N C C,CO C' NONNC N 0 N CC.C H -NN - -C-tN CNN,-,NNNNC.-,NN N,- ON 'C.-. ON - - - CC

-t NC

C C,C C CC

C CC N C'NNNC'OOOCOCO NON NC-N C'C-, 0-CO -CNN.- C N C ON--C .,-CNN N N N C' CCC L�C .CCC CN -CNNNNC-CNNO OC N NON CCC C'-C N-N NC' C' NNN N NN-CN N C' N N CC NO - -CNN C''N 'C -- - N -

Ca C C

C C I CCC N NCC' C CC

-C C' CCC C C-C-N CON NCCNN-C.1N C'NNNNN C'NN .�-CO N-CN C C.C--NN�,N C-NON 0 N - N NCCN N...........C'C -…�. 'C-N - N-CN N-C- NN ONC.-.NN N - - ---- N N ONNON N N N C

N N NC - C

C N I CaNC ,- C' NON ONN N NNNNN NON ON-C NON 0.-0.-N-CNN C N-C.-CNN-.C ,CN N 0 - CC C C'..C -"N NNC'NN-C NNN -CON C NOON-CO-CON NC' N NNNNNC'NCN N -CN-CN C' N N CC

C N N -- -C NN CC

N N

O C0

C' C -a C- N Ca NN NO-C .-. CC' -CNN C CNCNC'--CNNNNN ONC'C' - N CNOO ONCN-CNNNN CC

N OC'N NNN CNN C' C' C-fl K-CNN CN -NC' C'NNO N N N-NC' N NONNO N C' N CC

C NCN N-SN -. CN C' C NNN N-N C'NN ONO 0'--'- C' -. CNC' N N CNN-SN N C' CC... CC

N -CC'N �C NNN N N-CNNN.CNCOO..C CCN C' C' N-.-,O -NN - - -

N C' ON NCN NO-C C' NC'N NCN NON -NC' NONN C N 000 ONC-C. 0 N

- NC C C'N NON -C N-CN 0.-N NN. C NC-NO-SN-C N ONNI ON--NON- N - N N N - - - N - N

N .CNN C-C NON OCN N N

- - NNN.C-..,…NCN - N - N -N NON N-tN ONC NNN -- C NO.' 0.-C OCOC N N NC'NN C C-N-CC'N C'

ON CCCCC C' N-��NC�C' .- C N ��CN NO-C N C' C'CN,N �C.4.-N

CC-C.C N-CNC'NNO C .1N�.-NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN�.-CC'C CC

C I-C NC'C ON N C'-CN N NNCNC'NN CO aNN -CNN C C' - NOON C N-CC'NN C'N NON NC N�N N NNN -C N.-N N

0 �C'NC'C N C C-C-NO N CNNNN N- - NNNNNNNNCNNCN N.'-CN N CC

Ca CCC CC

C C NCCC -C CN NC.-. ON 0 NC'C N C-N-, NOC N C'N N-CO C'NNN N - C'C'N-C N 04.4CC 0 N NC CCCC-C-,-C..COC- C,NCCCC CNC NNC NNN NC'CN NC-N ONO NC-C NC'O C ON-CNN NNSCN.CNC'.--CNONN CCC CtC CCC

-IN N�N N

C- C C-CNO C CN IC I C

C CCN C, I CCC C NN C CC I CC' CC NC' NON N N-C COC' N ONN NC-C--C-C CO-C NNNCN -C C'N�CN CC N CC C. � -CNN-CNN-CON CNN.....NCC' <C ... ... ... CCC' NOC' NC- NC'N o

C'NN-SNNNN-CNNNNN.-,N

C'

C CC CNN - *N N NN - CCC CO CC CO

C N CC CC CCCC ONN NON N N-C NON C C'NN ONO 0000,-N O--- N N ONNO 0-CONNONNO CC

CC CC'-.-C....<CCC> NON CNN N SIC NNN N NON NO C' NC NC'O C'NC.C N N NON CN-C-CNNN C S N C'

C C C C ONN NON N-CC', -CNN N 0NC- C NC - F NNONNNNNNNN N-SNN N NNN - N N CC

C CONC - C

C C CC C.-' NC NC C C

CC o - --CC' C C C' C CC

C C ..-, C C C C CC CC' N -- Ca C - C CN C I ,-, C C C , C ,-� N

CCC C C 0 C, C C 'I C C C CC-C C N C C 0 C I-C C CC'CC C C C 0 I Ca N - N C Co C - C CC

O -'-'N C 'C Ca C N C NC I C N C NC C C. CC C C NC C , CC00CC CC' Ca - - C Ca N NC CC' Ca, C- CC C-CC CCC C C CCC''.CNC NONCa-,-.-:

C' .. CCC CCC C' N C,-,C C N C C .�,CCI CCa CCC CCC' OCC'C C -C CCC C C CCCC'N CNC-C NCC CO C CCC CCC N C .C-' C'NC CCC, CCC CCCC - C CCCC -C 0 CCC C',-,C NEC' CNC .0 CC CCC C-CC -'-,OC CCC CCC.,, C 0CC C CCC'C C CCCCC C I

N�C�*CINC C'CC..0 NZN ZOO C-C-N N CC NON NC'N NOCt .-ON C' COON N N C C NOON N ONONO NI ICC CCN CCC -,,CC CCC C CC CCC CCC CCC CCaC C.,OC C CC C C,C-.-�., C CCCCC ClHI INNC NC I CC C0CC NC I OC N

Table A.4. Total debt service (including IMF repurchases and charges) and projected import capacity of IDA-eligible sub-Saharan African countries(annual average in millions of dollars)

Actual debt service, 1980-82 Scheduled debt service_ 1986-90 Projected debt service, 1986-90 Scheduled debt service, 1991As per- As per- As per- As per- Annual

centage of vantage of cvntage of c-ntage of imports af goods andexports of exports of exports of exports of noninterest services

goods and goods and goods and goods and in 1980 dollarsItarest Principal Total services Interest Principal Total -ercicee Interest Priecipal Total services Interest Principal Total services 1980-82 1986-90

IDA-eligible countrieswith prolonged dcbtproblems

Benin 10 9 19 5.2 52 62 115 43.5 47 11 58 21.9 59 73 132 44.4 488 455Gambia 5 4 9 13.4 18 17 35 37.7 17 9 26 28.2 19 27 47 41.3 170 162Liberia 32 16 48 8.7 75 115 190 35.8 69 59 128 24.2 80 78 158 26.8 700 614

Madagascar 52 44 97 22.4 151 231 383 68.4 130 55 185 33.0 184 211 395 52.5 1,159 773Mali 10 7 17 7.8 46 87 133 50.3 40 27 67 25.5 55 111 166 43.6 495 481Mauritania 30 26 56 17.7 67 133 200 47.0 57 42 99 23.3 83 123 206 40.2 600 661

Nigec 83 100 183 33.3 79 108 187 45.3 70 52 121 29.5 96 92 188 36.0 1,103 989Somalia 10 22 32 13.5 64 124 188 77.7 58 66 123 50.8 79 154 233 67.2 569 606Sudan 171 104 276 25.7 574 562 1,135 128.0 475 157 632 71.3 579 697 1,276 88.5 1,639 1,562

Tan-ania 83 77 160 22.0 181 208 389 60.0 165 69 234 36.1 201 274 475 54.8 1,293 1,107Togo 33 14 47 10.3 60 80 140 35.3 50 18 67 17.0 68 54 122 24.0 569 532Zambia 225 252 477 37.1 421 439 860 71.2 395 232 627 51.9 456 646 1,102 71.4 1,813 1,229

Subtotal 745 677 1,422 22.6 1,790 2,165 3,955 66.7 1,572 796 2,368 39.9 1,961 2,538 4,499 57.1 10,599 9,171

Other IDA-eligiblecountries

Burkina 10 10 20 9.7 17 29 46 20.7 17 29 46 20.7 22 32 54 19.8 532 553Bg,rundi 4 4 8 6.3 17 25 41 20.3 14 10 24 11.7 25 30 54 23.1 283 274 lCentral African Rep. 4 5 10 5.4 14 22 36 15.1 11 9 20 8.4 15 24 38 12.0 303 366

Ethiopia 28 26 54 9.7 44 110 154 18.5 44 110 154 18.5 51 160 211 20.6 883 1,074Ghana 59 54 112 12.2 87 178 265 25.2 87 178 265 25.2 81 108 189 12.2 1,142 995Kenya 241 247 480 27.2 266 365 631 29.9 266 365 631 29.9 293 363 656 24.2 2,413 2,242

Lesotho 5 4 8 2.1 4 7 11 1.8 4 7 11 1.8 5 7 13 1.6 516 714Malawi 54 40 94 30.2 47 67 115 20.4 47 67 115 20.4 53 43 96 11.1 448 633Rwanda 4 2 6 3.2 8 11 19 8.9 8 11 19 8.9 10 12 22 9.0 366 391

Senegal 81 73 154 19.1 167 218 385 34.4 139 80 219 19.6 193 221 415 26.9 1,279 1,578Sierra Leone 18 40 58 27.6 29 43 72 30.5 26 26 52 21.9 31 50 82 25.0 420 347Uganda 18 53 71 21.9 44 126 170 26.0 44 126 170 26.0 37 63 100 13.1 432 772Zaire 217 179 396 22.2 434 542 977 39.6 334 169 503 20.4 452 565 1,316 31.4 2,072 2,498

Subtotal 741 737 1,478 19.0 1,177 1,744 2,921 27.8 1,042 1,187 2,229 21.2 1,267 1,678 2,945 21.2 11,089 12,437

Total: IDA-eligiblecountries 1,486 1,413 2,900 20.6 2,967 3,910 6,877 41.8 2,614 1,983 4,597 28.0 3,228 4,216 7,444 34.2 21,688 21,609

Other countries

Cameroon 168 155 323 15.0 195 239 434 14.1 195 239 434 14.1 262 160 423 10.9 2,340 3,592Cite d'1voire 635 556 1,191 37.8 1,074 1,145 2,220 55.3 1,025 588 1,613 40.2 1,351 1,048 2,398 48.0 4,270 5,244Nigeria 1,155 586 1,741 8.7 2,373 3,088 5,461 48.6 2,373 875 3,248 28.9 2,981 2,596 5,537 38.9 22,211 12,256Zimbabwe 88 47 135 8.1 184 279 463 22.7 184 279 463 22.7 205 242 448 15.3 2,102 2,180

Subtotal 2,045 1,344 3,389 12.5 3,827 4,751 8,578 42.1 3,778 1,981 5,759 28.3 4,760 4,047 8,806 33.8 30,923 23,773

Botswana 10 4 14 2.0 32 32 64 4.9 32 32 64 4.9 46 47 94 5.5 1,093 1,431Congo 84 80 164 14.4 221 257 477 40.1 204 73 277 23.3 293 315 607 41.2 1,441 1,487Gabon 131 235 366 15.0 98 138 236 11.1 98 138 236 11.1 121 141 263 10.6 2,020 2,192Mauritius 45 28 73 13.7 51 90 141 14.6 51 90 141 14.6 52 105 157 9.7 638 957

Subtetal 269 348 617 12.9 402 517 918 16.4 385 333 718 12.9 512 609 1,121 15.4 5,192 6,067

Total, Other countries 2,314 1,692 4,006 12.6 4,229 5,268 9,496 36.6 4,163 2,314 6,477 25.0 5,272 4,655 9,927 29.8 36,115 29,340

TOTAL 3,801 3,105 6,906 15.0 7,196 9,177 16,373 38.6 6,776 4,298 11,074 26.1 8,499 8,872 17,371 31.5 57,803 50,948

Ncte: Debt service includes interest on shurt-term debc and payments of private nonguaranteed debt and arrears. Rows nay not add to totals because of rounding. Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bitsau, and Swa-ilacd areexcluded because data are not available.

- 57 --

Appendix B

Macroeconomic indicators

Table B.1. Key macroeconomic anrnal growth rates, 1960--84(percent)

1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-84 1981 1982 1983 1984

Gss dastic produtt a

ID-keligible countries 3.6 2.4 2.3 0.7 1.7 0.8 -0.1 0.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 3.9 7.8 3.4 -2.6 -1.7 -1.6 -4.4 -2.4Total sub-Saharan Africa 3.7 5.5 3.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.7 -2.7 -1.2

Popilation

IDA-eligible countries 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1Other sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5Total sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2

a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Per capita COP a

TDA-eligible countries 1.0 --0.3 -0.5 -2.3 -1.2 -2.2 -3.0 -2.2Other sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 4.9 0.7 -5.9 -5.0 -4.9 -7.6 -5.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 1.2 2.7 0.2 -4.4 -3.5 -3.8 -5.7 -4.2

Per capita OX a, b

IDA-eligible countries .. -2.2 -0.5 -2.5 -3.6 -2.4 -2.1 -1.7Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 8.1 2.8 -6.1 -3.9 -4.6 -9.0 -5.2Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 2.8 1.5 -4.6 -3.7 -3.7 -6.4 -3.8

Export volune c

IDA-eligible countries .. -2.2 1.4 -2.6 -2.7 -6.5 -1.9 2.7Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 4.7 3.0 -9.3 -24.0 -8.0 -13.6 14.1Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 2.7 2.6 -7.4 -18.7 -7.6 -10.1 10.4

Import voliec C

IDA-eligible countries .. -4.8 2.8 -5.4 -7.5 -5.6 -7.5 0.5Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 8.7 6.8 -6.2 16.1 -9.6 -18.3 -1.8Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 0.6 5.0 -5.9 6.4 -8.2 -14.3 -0.9

CP deflator

IDA-eligible countries 5.8 10.3 19.8 22.4 22.9 18.8 28.6 21.7Other sub-Saharan Africa 3.7 13.9 12.7 9.5 7.3 9.4 4.4 21.2Total sub-Saharan Africa 4.5 12.6 15.4 14.3 13.0 12.8 13.3 21.4

Tenim of trale c

IDAreligible countries .. -7.7 0.1 -1.0 -12.1 -1.2 5.1 2.4Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 12.6 7.3 -0.6 3.9 1.3 -6.6 1.4Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 0.5 4.9 -0.8 -1.0 0.5 -3.6 1.8

Note: Angola is excluded from all aggregates because of missing data. Growth rates for sunmary measuresare calculated from aggregates in US dollars, except the GDP deflator, which is constructed from localcurrency deflators, weighted by GDP in 1980 US dollars and GDY, which is derived directly frcm sumiarymeasures. For definitions and sources, see the technical notes to the Statistical Annex.

a. Constant prices.b. Gross domestic income (GDY) is derived from per capita GDP adjusted by gains or losses from the terms

of trade.c. These growth rates are derived from UN Trade Data in current US dollars deflated by appropriate price

indexes (exports by weighted unit price indexes constrtcted from the Wrld Bank's primary commodity pricedata and the manufacturing unit value index, and inports by implicit import deflators). Unit value seriesare calculated from the dollar series in current amTd constant prices. Excludes Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Mozambique, and Swaziland.

- 58 -

Table B.2. Key macroeconomic ratios, 1960-84(annual average as percentage of GDP)

1960-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

Gross domestic investnent

IlA-eligible countries 14.8 17.9 18.3 16.5 19.0 18.1 16.6 14.8 14.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 17.2 21.4 28.7 22.8 24.6 29.2 24.3 21.2 14.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 15.6 19.5 24.2 20.3 22.5 24.8 21.2 18.5 14.5

Gross *mestic savirks

IDA-eligible countries 14.0 15.0 10.1 6.9 8.4 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 15.3 25.2 29.2 21.6 29.9 24.0 17.8 17.7 18.6Total sub-Saharan Africa 14.4 19.8 21.0 15.9 21.9 17.2 13.3 13.0 13.9

Private conWptian

IDA-eligible countries 72.3 69.3 73.9 76.5 74.5 76.0 76.9 77.9 77.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 74.9 65.0 58.3 65.7 58.3 63.6 70.2 69.6 67.1Total sub-Saharan Africa 73.2 67.1 65.0 69.9 64.3 68.5 72.9 73.0 71.0

Public mnsumptLin

IDA-eligible countries 13.7 15.8 15.9 16.7 17.1 17.1 16.7 16.0 16.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 9.7 9.8 12.5 12.7 11.8 12.4 12.2 12.7 14.4Total sub-Saharan Africa 12.4 13.1 14.0 14.3 13.8 14.3 14.0 14.1 15.2

1qorts of gDods and nmfactor services

IDA-eligible countries 25.9 24.1 22.2 19.9 23.1 19.7 19.2 18.3 19.2Other sub-Saharan Africa 25.1 25.2 28.3 25.4 32.4 27.3 22.8 21.7 22.6Total sub-Saharan Africa 25.6 24.8 25.7 23.2 28.9 24.3 21.4 20.3 21.3

lTrs of gDods an nonfactor servics

IDA-eligible countries 26.6 27.1 30.4 29.7 33.9 31.1 29.6 26.7 27.0Other sub-Saharan Africa 27.0 21.3 27.8 26.7 27.4 32.8 29.3 25.5 18.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 26.7 24.4 28.9 27.9 29.8 32.2 29.4 26.0 22,0

Xes.orce balance

IIDA-eligible countries -0.7 -3.0 -8.2 -9.8 -10.8 -11.5 -10.4 -8.3 -7.8Other sub-Saharan Africa -1.9 3.8 0.6 -1.4 5.0 -5.5 -6.5 -3.8 3.9Total sub-Saharan Africa -1.1 0.3 -3.2 -4.6 -0.8 -7.9 -8.0 -5.7 -0,6

Oirrent ac=mt almrre a

IDA-eligible countries .. -6.0 -9.5 -11.1 -11.8 -12.9 -11.5 -9.6 -9.9Other sub-Saharan Africa .. -0.7 -2.9 -5.1 1.9 -8.9 -9.4 -7.0 -1.9Total sub-Saharan Africa .. -3.1 -5.6 -7.2 -2.9 -10.4 -10.2 -8.0 -4.8

(rtral govermiet deficit

IDk-eligible countries .. .. -6.1 b -6.9 -7.1 -7.5 -7.9 -6.3 -5.6Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 4.4 b -6.0 -1.8 -7.6 -7.2 -9.0 -4.5Total sub-Saharan Africa .. .. -5.1 b -6.3 -3.7 -7.6 -7.5 -8.0 -5.0

Note: Angola is excluded from the aggregates. The averages are calculated fron aggregates expressed inUS dollars, except for the central government deficit, which is based on country averages weighted by GDP in1980 US dollars.

a. Excludes net official transfers. Excludes Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 'bzanbique, amid Swaziland.

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Table B.3. Selected macroeconcanic aggregates, 1960-84(annual average in millions of dollars)

1960-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

CUP in current prices

IDA-eligible countries 16,283 28,928 51,453 68,580 70,225 71,533 69,102 66,562 65,480Other sub-Saharan Africa 7,607 24,537 68,238 106,125 119,373 108,841 104,899 94,896 102,614Total sub-Saharan Africa 23,890 53,465 119,690 174,705 189,598 180,374 174,001 161,458 168,094

Gross flues of grats and apressiosl loans a

IDA-eligible countries 13 1,372 3,605 6,315 6,499 6,612 6,093 6,043 6,327Other sub-Saharan Africa 38 380 678 992 1,064 996 1,005 987 910Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 1,752 4,283 7,307 7,563 7,608 7,098 7,030 7,237

Gross floes of rxxn esicral loans a, b, c

IDA-eligible countries .. 886 2,073 2,356 3,280 2,660 2,527 2,036 1,275Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 344 2,166 5,732 4,624 5,273 7,143 7,548 4,113Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 1,230 4,239 8,088 7,904 7,833 9,730 9,584 5,388

Net direct foreign iestint d

IDA-eligible countries .. 168 325 384 410 311 528 402 268Other sub-Sabaran Africa .. 445 526 731 -331 907 718 747 1,614Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 613 851 1,115 79 1,218 1,247 1,149 1,881

Use of IMF credit e

IDk-eligible countries .. 165 1,035 3,251 1,830 2,830 3,284 4,072 4,239Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 4 75 683 126 581 697 1,001 1,011Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 169 t,11O 3,934 1,956 3,411 3,981 5,073 5,250

Gross Intetional reserves d, e

IDA-eligible countries .. 1,578 2,257 2,354 2,878 2,496 2,080 2,203 2,112Other sub-Saharan Africa .. 1,874 5,379 5,022 11,976 5,290 3,059 2,391 2,394Total sub-Saharan Africa .. 3,451 7,636 7,376 14,854 7,787 5,138 4,594 4,506

Note: Angola is excluded from the aggregates.a. Figures differ slightly from those in Table 4.2. Concessiornal flows here exclude grants not allocated on a country basis, and

nonconcessional flows here include private nonguaranteed short-term loans that have been converted into mediaum and long-term loans.b. Public and publicly guaranteed nmdiun- and long-term loans and nonguaranteed private medium- and long-term loans.c. Excludes IMF purchases.d. Excludes Chad, Guinea, Guinca-Bissau, Mczambique, and Swaziland.e. Levels at end of the year.

Statistical Annex

Introduction 63

Tables

1 Basic indicators 67

Production2 Growth of production 683 Structure of production 694 Growth of consumption and investment 705 Structure of demand 716 Commercial energy 72

Trade7 Level and growth of merchandise trade 738 Structure of merchandise exports 749 Structure of merchandise imports 7510 Origin and destination of merchandise exports 7611 Terms of trade 7712 Commodity exports: Volume and price 78

Aid, debt, and capital flows13 Balance of payments, debt service, and international reserves 7914 External public debt and debt service 8015 Outstanding and disbursed external debt of sub-Saharan Africa 8116 Gross disbursements of external loans to sub-Saharan Africa 8217 Average terms of borrowing for sub-Saharan Africa 8318 Indicators of aid and total resource flow, 1984 8419 Disbursements of official development assistance 8520 Food aid imports 86

Agriculture21 Growth of agriculture 8722 Production of major crops 8823 Agricultural imports 8924 Major agricultural exports: Growth and shares 90

Social indicators25 Population growth and projections 9226 Demographic and fertility-related indicators 9327 Labor force 9428 Urban:ization 9529 Health-related indicators 9630 Education 97

Fiscal data31 Central government expenditure 9832 Central government current revenue 99

Technical notes 100

Principal sources 118

- 63 -

Introduction

The Statistical Annex provides information on the main variablesaffecting social and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Thetables show data on production, trade, aid, debt, capital flows, andagriculture, as well as basic indicators, social indicators, and fiscaldata.

Considerable effort has been made to standardize the data;nevertheless, statistical methods, coverage, practices, and definitionsdiffer widely. In addition, the weakness of the statistical systems inmost of the African countries affects the availability and reliabilityof the data. Readers are urged to exercise caution and to take theselimitations into account in interpreting the indicators, particularlywhen making comparisons across economies.

This annex covers thirty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africawith a population of more than 0.5 million. They are divided into twogroups: low-income (per capita GNP of $400 or less in 1984) and middle-income; for the latter, a distinction is made between oil importers andoil exporters. In the tables, economies in each group are listed inascending order of GNP per capita; Angola, Chad, and Mozambique, forwhich GNP per capita has not been estimated, are listed at the end oftheir groups. The reference numbers below reflect the numerical orderof each country in the tables. Asterisks indicate the IDA-eligiblecountries referred to in the main text.

Angola 39 *Malawi 7*Benin 14 *Mali 2Botswana 33 *Mauritania 26

*Burkina Faso 4 Mauritius 34*Burundi 9 *Mozambique 25Cameroon 36 *Niger 6

*Central African Republic 15 Nigeria 35*Chad 24 *Rwanda 17Congo, People's Republic of the 37 *Senegal 23

*Ethiopia 1 *Sierra Leone 20Gabon 38 *Somalia 13*Gambia 12 *Sudan 21

*Ghana 22 Swaziland 32*Guinea 18 *Tanzania 8*Cuinea-Bissau 5 *Togo 11

C6te d'Ivoire 30 *Uganda 10*Kenya 19 *Zaire 3*Lesotho 29 *Zambia 28*Liberia 27 Zimbabwe 31*Madagascar 16

- 64 -

Summary measures--totals, median values, or weightedaverages--were calculated for the country groups only if data wereadequate and meaningful statistics could be obtained. The weights usedin computing the summary measures are described in the technical notesthat follow the tables. The letters w, m, t indicate weighted averages,medians, and totals, respectively.

Worldwide averages or median values for low-income, lowermiddle-income, and upper middle-income and industrialized countries areincluded for comparison at the bottom of some tables. Countriesincluded in the four groups are as follows:

1. Low-income countries (per capita GNP of $400 or less in 1984)

Afghanistan Haiti Pakistan

Bangladesh India Rwanda

Benin Kampuchea, Democratic Senegal

Bhutan Kenya Sierra Leone

Burkina Faso Lao People's Democratic Somalia

Burma Republic Sri Lanka

Burundi Madagascar Sudan

Central African Republic Malawi Tanzania

Chad Mali Togo

China Mozambique UgandaEthiopia Nepal Viet Nam

Ghana Niger Zaire

Guinea

2. Lower middle-income countries (per capita GW of between $401 and $1,635 in 1984)

Angola Honduras Nicaragua

Bolivia Indonesia Nigeria

Botswana C6te d'lvoire PaDua New Guinea

Cameroon Jamaica Paraguay

Colombia Korea, Democratic Peru

Congo, People's Republic of PhilippinesRepublic of the Lebanon Thailand

Costa Rica Lesotho Tunisia

Cuba Liberia TurKey

Dominican Republic Mauritania Yemen Arab Reoubiic

Ecuador Mauritius Yemen, Peoo e's

Egypt, Arab Republic of Mongolia Democratic Repuolic of

El Salvador Morocco Zambia

Guatemala Zimbaowe

- 65 -

3. Upper middle-income countries (per capita GNP of 11,636 or more in 1984)

Algeria Iraq Singapore

Argentina Israel South Africa

Brazil Jordan Syrian Arab Republic

Chile Korea, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago

Greece Malaysia Uruguay

Hong Kong Mexico Venezuela

Iran, Islamic Panama Yugoslavia

Republic of Portugal

4. Industrial countries (industrial market economies)

Austral ia Germany, Federal Norway

Austria Republic of Spain

Belgium Ireland Sweden

Canada Italy Switzerland

Denmark Japan United Kingdom

Finland Netherlands United States

France New Zealand

All growth rates shown are in constant prices and, unlessotherwise noted, have been computed by using the least-squares method.The least-squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a Least-squares linear trend line to the logarithmic annual values of thevariable in the relevant period. Mcre specifically, the regressionequation takes the logarithmic form: Log Xt = a + bt + et, where thisis equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the compound growthrate equation: X, = XO (1 + r)t. In these equations, Xt is thevariable, t is time, and a = log XO and b = log (1 + r) are the

parameters to be estimated; et is the error term. If b is the least-squares estimate of b, then the annual growth rate, r, is obtained as[antilog (b*)] - 1.

The technical notes that follow the tables outline concepts,definitions, and specific data problems. Readers are urged to refer tothese notes for any use of the data. For comprehensive definitions anddescriptions of concepts used, see the sources listed at the end of thenotes.

6 7-

Table 1. Basic indicators

GNP per capita Life Average index ofArea Annual expectancy food production

Population (thousands growth rate Annual rate of at birth per capita(millions) of square Dollars 1965-84 inflation (percent) 1983 1981-83mid-1984 kilometers) 1984 (percent) 1965-73 1973-83 (years) (1974-76=100)

Low-income economies 260.6t 15,694t 220w (.)w 3.6w 18.5w

49w

93w

1 Ethiopia 42.0 1,222 110 0.5 1.8 4.4 47 1062 Mali 7.3 1,240 140 1.2 7.6 10.3 45 1063 Zaire 30.6 2,345 140 -1.3 18.7 48.2 51 93

4 Burkina 6.6 274 160 1.4 2.6 10.8 44 1005 Guinea-Bissau 0.9 36 180 .. .. 6.9 38 84

6 Niger 6.3 1,267 190 -1.2 4.0 11.8 45 122

7 Malawi 6.8 118 210 2.2 4.5 9.8 44 1018 Tanzania 21.5 945 210 0.9 3.2 11.5 51 1039 Burundi 4.6 28 220 2.1 2.9 12.4 47 97

10 Uganda 14.3 236 230 -4.4 a 5.6 62.7 b 49 9111 Togo 2.9 57 250 1.1 3.1 8.3 49 9912 Gambia 0.7 11 260 1.4 3.0 10.4 36 79

13 Somalia 5.2 638 260 -0.8 a 3.8 20.1 45 7214 Benin 3.9 113 270 1.0 3.6 10.8 48 9515 Central African Rep. 2.5 623 270 0.1 3.0 14.4 48 94

16 Madagascar 9.7 587 270 -1.2 4.1 13.9 49 9017 Rwanda 5.9 26 270 2.3 7.7 11.2 47 11418 Guinea 5.9 246 300 1.1 3.0 4.0 37 85

19 Kenya 19.7 583 300 2.3 2.3 10.8 57 8620 Sierra Leone 3.7 72 300 1.1 1.9 14.7 38 9821 Sudan 21.5 2,506 340 1.3 7.2 18.0 48 94

22 Ghana 13.4 239 350 -2.1 8.1 51.6 59 6523 Senegal 6.4 196 380 -0.5 3.0 8.9 46 7124 Chad 4.9 1,284 .. .. 4.5 8.3 b 43 101

25 Mozambique 13.4 802 .. .. .. .. 46 68

Middle-income oil importers 32.6t 3,257t 620w 1.2w 3.5w 10.8w 53w 89w

26 Mauritania 1.7 1,031 450 0.3 3.9 7.8 46 10227 Liberia 2.1 111 470 0.8 1.5 7.2 49 9228 Zambia 6.5 753 470 -1.3 5.2 10.3 51 74

29 Lesotho 1.5 30 530 6.3 4.4 11.9 53 7630 Cote d'Ivoire 9.9 322 610 1.0 4.1 11.9 52 10831 Zimbabwe 8.2 391 740 1.5 3.0 9.7 56 79

32 Swaziland 0.7 17 800 2.6 4.3 14.1 55 11633 Botswana 1.0 600 910 8.5 4.4 9.8 61 6834 Mauritius 1.0 2 1,100 2.8 5.6 13.1 67 89

Middle-income oil exporters 117.7t 3,256t 80Ow 3.4w 8.3w 13.2w 49w 95w

35 Nigeria 96.8 924 770 3.2 10.3 13.3 49 9836 Cameroon 9.9 475 810 2.7 5.8 12.6 54 8437 Congo, People's Rep. 1.8 342 1,120 3.5 4.6 12.4 63 99

38 Gabon 0.8 268 3,480 3.2 5.8 18.5 50 10239 Angola 8.4 1,247 .. .. .. .. 43 82

Sub-Saharan Africa 410.9t 22,207t 420w 1.8w 4.2w 1

4.8w 49w 94w

All low-income economies 2,335.4t c 31,603t 260w c 2.

7w d 1.

4w 5.

4w 5

9w 1llw

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 665.1t c 18,446t

750w c 2.

9w d 5.6w 1

7.9w 57w 105w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 500.1t c 22,079t 2,5sow C 3.8w d 5.3w 3

4.ow 65w 106w

Industrial market economies 728.9t c 30,395t 11,060w c 2.5w d 5.

2w 8.0w 76w 107w

a. Because data for the entire period are not available, figures are for periods other than that specified.b. Figures are for 1973-82, not 1973-83.c. Figures are for 1983, not 1984.d. Figures are for 1965-83, not 1965-84.

- 68

Table 2. Growth of production

(annuial growth rate; percent)

GDP Agriculture Industy Manufacturing a Services1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83

Low-income economies 3.7w 2.1w 2.6w 1.5w 5.7w 1.6w ... 3.4w 2.4w

1 Ethiopia 4.1 2.3 2.1 1.2 6.1 2.6 8.8 3.5 6.7 3.62 Mali 3.1 4.1 0.9 5.0 5.2 0.6 ... 4.7 4.53 Zaire 3.9 -1.0 .. 1.4 .. -2.0 ... . -1.1

4 Burkina 2.4 3.5 .. 1.3 .. 5.1 .... 4.55 Guinea-Bissau .. 2.1 .. -3.1 i. .3 ... . 12.16 Niger -0.8 5.2 -2.9 1.6 13.2 10.9 ... -1.5 5.9

7 malawi 5.7 4.2 .. 4.1i 4.2 ... . 4.28 Tanzania b 5.0 3.6 3.1 2.6 6.9 0.2 _ . 6.2 5.49 Burundi 4.8 3.6 4.7 2.3 10.4 8.3 . . 3.0 5.3

10 Uganda h 3.6 -2.1 3.6 -1.6 3.0 -10.1 . 3.8 -1.011 Togo 5.3 2.3 2.6 1.1 6.2 2.6 . . 7.3 3.012 Gambia 4.5 3.2 4.5 -2.4 4.4 7.2 . 4.5 5.2

13 Somalia b . 2.8 . 3.5 .. 1.1 . .. 2.614 Benin 2.2 4.8 .. 2.7 .. 6.9 .... 6.015 Central African Rep. 2.7 1.0 2.1 2.4 7.1 1.0 . . 1.6 -0.7

16 Madagascar b3.5 0.3 .. -0.2 .. -1.8 ... . 1.217 Rwanda 6.3 5.6 . .. ..

18 Guinea 3.0 3.1 .. 2.4 . 6.7 .... 1.9

19 Kenya 7.9 4.6 6.2 3.4 12.4 5.3 12.4 6.3 7.8 5.320 Sierra Leone 3.7 1.9 1.5 2.2 1 .9 -2.9 3.3 2.5 7.1 4.121 Sudan 0.2 6.3 0.3 3.5 1.0 6.7 . 0.5 8.6

22 Ghana 3.4 -1.3 4.5 (. 4.3 -7.0 6.5 -6.2 1.1 -0.323 Senegal 1.5 2.6 0.2 0.3 3.5 6.1 . 1.5 2.224 Chad 0.5 -5.8 . .. ..

25 Mlozartbique . . . .. ..

Middle-income oil importers 5.4w 3.0w 3.2w 2

.4w 5.

6w 3.0w .

6.2

w 3.3w

26 MauritanLia 2.6 2.5 -2.1 2.6 3.5 () .. 8.7 3.927 Liberia 5.5 0.2 6.5 2.0 6.2 -1.5 13.2 0.5 3.8 0.828 Zambia 3.0 0.2 i. .4 . -0.3 . .. 0.6

29 Lesotho 3.9 5.5 ...... .

30 C6te d' Ivoire 7.1 4.7 3.7 4.0 8.8 7.4 8.9 4.5 8.5 4.131 Zimbabwe 7.3 1.8 . 1.2 .(.. ... 3.3

32 Swaziland b 7.6 3.8 8.0 4.7 3.1 4.1 . 5.8 12.2 3.033 Botswana 14.8 10.2 6.4 -4.2 30.2 15.3 6.4 10.0 10.6 10.934 Mauritius 2.3 3.8 . -3.4 . 4.8 . 4.4 . 7.0

Middle-income oil exporters 9.1w 1.6w 3.0w -1.5w 18.9w 1.0w .

8.2w 4.5w

35 Nigeria 9.7 1.2 2.8 -1.9 19.7 0.3 15.0 10.7 8.8 4.136 Cameroon 4.2 6.8 4.7 1.8 4.7 13.7 7.5 9.9 3.6 7.337 Congo, People's Rep. 6.8 7.9 4.1 0.4 9.3 12.7. . 6.7 6.8

38 Gabon 7.4 -1.9 . .. ..

39 Angola . . . .. ..

Sub-Saharan Africa 6.6w 2.1w 2.9

w 0.7w 14

.6w 1.4w . 6.3w 3.5w

All low,-income economies 5.5w 5.0w 2

.6iw 2.9w

7.2w 7.1w .

4.2

w 5.0wAll lower middle-income

economies 6.6w 4.1w 3

.4

w 1.9w 10.6w 4.

4w

8.5w 5.

4w 6.8w 5.3w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 7.4w 4.

9w

3.2w

3.2w

8.4w 5.0w .

7.8w 5.2w

Induistrial market economies 4

.7

w 2.4

w 1.8w 1.0w 5.1w 1.9w 3.8w 1.1w 4

.8w 2.1w

a. Manufacturing is a part: of the inidustrial sector, hut its share of GDP is shown separately because it typically is the mostdvnamic part of the industrial sector.

h. Figures are for 1973-82, nor 1973-83.

-69 -

Table 3. Str-ucture of production

Distribution of gross domnestic product (percent)

GDP a(millions of dollars) Agriculture Inidustry Manufacturing b Ser-vices

1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983

Low,-income economi-es 4 3

w 40w l6

w 17w

9w

8w

4 1w

43w

I Ethiopia 1,180 4,270 58 48 14 16 7 11 28 362 Mali 370 980 49 46 13 ii.. . 38 433 Zaire 1,64 5440 d 22 36 27 20 1 1 4

4 Burkina 250 900 52 41 15 19. . 32 405 Guinem-Missan . 145 .. 43 .. 11 .. .. 466 Niger 370 1,340 63 33 9 31. . 28 37

7 Malawi 220 1,330 50 . 13 ... .37

8 Tanzania d 790 4,550 46 52 14 15 8 9 40 339 Burundi 160 1,020 . 58 .. 16 .. .. 26

10 Uganda 1,080 3,360 d 52 .. 13 .. 8 .35

11 Togo 190 720 45 22 21 28 10 6 34 50

12 Gambia 40 220 39 27 10 14... 50 59

13 Somalia d 220 1,540 71 50 6 11 3 6 24 3914 Benin 210 930 53 40 9 14. . 38 4715 Gentral African Rep. 140 600 46 37 16 21 4 8 38 42

16 Madagascar c, d 730 2,850 31 41 16 15 .. 53 4417 Rtwanda 150 1,560 75 .. 7 .2 1818 Guinea 520 1,910 . 38 .. 23 .2 .. 39

19 Kenya 920 4,940 35 33 18 20 1t 12 47 4620 Sierra Leone 320 950 34 32 28 20 6 5 38 4821 Sudan 1,330 6,850 54 34 9 15 4 8 37 51

22 Ghana 1,330 3,720 41 53 19 7 10 4 41 4023 Senegal 810 2,570 25 21 18 26 . 17 56 5424 Chad 240 3 2 0 d 47 12 ... .41

25 Mozambique . .. .. ..

Middle-income oil importers . .24w 20w 35w 32w 11w 18w 4lw

48w

26 Mauritania 160 700 32 34 36 21 4 .. 32 4527 Liberia 270 980 27 36 40 26 3 7 34 3828 Zambia 1,040 3,350 14 14 54 38 7 19 32 48

29 Lesotho d 50 300 65 23 5 22 1 6 30 5530 C6te d'Ivoire 960 7,090 36 27 17 24 10 13 47 5031 Zimbabwe 960 4,730 18 11 34 32 20 21 48 57

32 Swaziland 70 .. 35 .. 33 .... 3233 Botswana 50 890 34 10 19 43 . .47 4834 Mauritius 190 910 16 14 23 25 ... 61 61

Middle-income oil exporters . .. 48w 26w 17w 35w 7w 6w 35w 39w

35 Nigeria 4,190 64,570 53 26 19 34 7 5 29 4036 Gameroon 750 7,220 32 24 17 32 10 11 50 4537 Congo, People's Rep. 200 2,110 19 7 19 55 .. 6 62 38

38 Gabon 220 3,120 26 7 34 63 7 5 40 3039 Angola . .. .. ..

Sub-Saharan Africa . 41w 29w 20w 29w 9w 8w 3

9w

4 2w

All low--income economies . .. 43w 37w 2

9w 34w 14w 14w 28

w 29wAll lower middle-income

economies . . 31w 22w 24w 33w 15w 16w

45w

45w

All upper middle-income

economies . .17w 11w 35w 37w 22w 24w 49w 5

2w

Industrial market economies .. w 3w 39w 35w 29w 24w 5

6w

6 2w

a. Due to different conversion procedures, these GOP dollar- figures are not comparable to GNP dollar figures used for GMPper capita in Table 1. See Technical Note.b. Manufacturing is a part of the industrial sector, but its share of GDP is shown separately because it typically is the

most dynamic part of the industrial sector.c. Figures are for 1966, not 1965.d. Figures are for 1982, not 1983.

- 70 -

Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment(annual growth rate; percent)

Public Private Grossconsumption consumption domestic investment

1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83

Low-income economies 4

.1w 3.4

w 2.6w 0.7w 6.3

w 1.9

w

I Ethiopia 3.7 7.1 4.2 2.6 1.5 2.62 Mali (.) 7.5 3.9 2.8 1.0 4.23 Zaire a 5.8 2.2 2.2 -7.7 10.2 4.9

4 Burkina 10.7 3.6 0.4 4.9 13.7 -3.75 Guinea-Bissau .. 2.2 .. 1.7 .. 3.56 Niger 2.1 2.3 -3.3 6.6 4.6 3.5

7 Malawi 3.0 .. 4.0 .. 16.08 Tanzania .. .. 5.0 3.0 9.6 4.49 Bolrundi 12.3 5.4 4.7 2.8 -1.4 15.7

10 llganda b .. .. 3.8 -6.4 2.1 -5.211 Togo 7.9 8.4 6.0 3.3 3.3 -0.212 Gambia 2.8 .. 4.4 .. -0.1

13 Somalia a .. t.5 .. 7.9 .. -8.214 Benin 3.6 3.7 1.1 3.1 3.9 10.315 Central African Rep. 1.7 -1.5 3.6 3.2 2.3 -6.7

16 Madagascar a 3.3 3.9 4.0 -0.5 3.9 -1.017 Rwanda 2.8 .. 7.7 .. 6.318 Guinea .. 6.4 .. 2.0 .. -0.7

19 Kenya 13.1 6.3 5.8 3.6 15.9 3.420 Sierra Leone a 5.3 -2.1 3.8 3.2 -1.4 1.121 Sudan 1.4 4.5 -1.7 7.6 0.2 5.6

22 Ghana 1.1 4.8 2.3 -1.3 -3.5 -8.123 Senegal -1.2 6.6 0.1 3.3 8.1 -0.724 Chad 6.0 .. 0.7 .. 4.525 Mozambique .. .. ..

Middle-income oil importers 10.2w 7.0w 3.7w 3

.6w 8.1w -1.7w

26 Mauritania 6.1 1.4 2.7 3.0 12.5 7.027 Liberia 4.5 4.1 0.3 -0.1 5.6 1.528 Zambia 10.4 -0.8 -1.2 3.9 6.2 -12.5

29 Lesotho 5.4 .. 5.9 .. 11.030 Cote d'Ivoire 15.2 9.6 5.1 3.7 10.2 6.031 Zimbabwe 6.9 10.8 7.3 2.9 9.2 1.9

32 Swaziland c 10.6 5.5 5.6 11.5 7.4 9.933 Botswana a 5.5 13.7 7.4 7.8 35.8 5.734 Mauritius 2.3 6.4 -0.6 5.5 5.2 -3.7

Middle-income oil exporters 14

.4

w 5.0w 6.9w 4

.5w 13.9w 2.1w

35 Nigeria 16.1 3.3 4.9 2.5 15.2 3.536 Cameroon 4.6 5.9 3.4 5.4 8.6 10.637 Congo, People's Rep. 7.4 5.0 3.9 10.8 9.3 10.2

38 Gabon 10.2 8.8 5.8 5.6 7.3 1.039 Angola .. .. ..

Sub-Saharan Africa 9.2w 4.9w 4.5w 3

.Ow 10.1w 1.3

w

All low-income economies 5.9

w 6.8w 3.5w 4

.5w 6.4w 5.7

wAll lower middle-income

economies 8.5w 6.1w 5.4w 4

.4

w 8.4w 5.1wAll upper middle-income

economies 6.5w 4.4

w 7.6w 5.0w 8.9w 3.8wIndustrial market economies 3.2w 2.

6w 4.8w 2.

6w 5.4w 0.8w

a. Figures are for 1973-82, not 1973-83.b. Public consumption figures are not available separately; they are therefore included in private consumption.c. Figures are for 1973-80, not 1973-83.

- 71 -

Table 5. Structure of demand

Di1stribution of gross domestic produict (percent)Exports of goods

Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resourceconsumption consumqption investOsent savings services balance

1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983

Low-income economies lAw 16w 74w 78w 15w 16w 13w 7w 25w 21w -2w -9w

iREthiopia ii 17 77 Ri 13 ii 12 2 12 12 -1 -9

2 Mali 17 27 72 75 23 17 11 -2 13 23 -11 -193Zaire a 18~ 19 44 55 28 24 38 26 70 33 10 2

4 Burktna 7 14 91 ion in 12 2 -15 9) 17 -8 -275 G~uinea-'Rissau .. 26 .. 75 .. 23 .. -1 .. 6 .. -256 Niger 8 10 84 79 15 25 9 11 12 22 -7 -14

7 Malawi 16 16 A2 70 14 23 2 14 16 19 -12 -98 Tanzania a 10 22 74 70 15 20 16 8 26 11 1 -12

9 Burundi 7 14 89 79 6 21 4 7 10 9 -2 -14

lou Tganda in . 78 95 11 8 12 5 26 5 1 -311lTogo 8 17 76 79 22 23 17 4 20 31 -6 -1912 Gambia 19 27 78 84 8 21 3 -11 43 31 -5 -33

13 Somalia a 8 24 84 78 11 20 8 -2 17 10 -3 -22

14 Benin 14 12 83 91 12 12 3 -3 14 20 -9 -1415 Central African Rep. 22 13 67 89 21 11 11 -1 27 23 -11 -13

16 Madagascar a 23 15 74 81 10 14 4 4 16 13 -6 -1017 Rwanda 14 .. 81 in10 . 5 .. 12 ..

l8 Guinea .. 19 . 65 .. 14 . 16 .. 29_

IQ Kenya 15 20 70 61 14 21 15 19 31 25 1 -220 Sierra Leonie 8 7 83 91 12 9 9 2 30 12 -3 -7

21 Sudani 12 13 79 88 10 15 9 -i 15 1i -i -16

22 Ghana 14 6 77 90 18 8 8 5 17 5 -10 -323 Senegal 17 19 75 78 12 17 8 3 24 28 -4 -1324 Chad 14 .. 4 .. q 2 23 ..- 725 Wbzamhique . . . . . . . ..

Middle-income oil importers 13w 20w 61w 67w 19w 17w 26w 13w 42w 33w 7w -4w

26 Mauritania 19 2.3 54 88 14 18 27 -ii 42 47 13 -2927 Liberia 12 23 61 62 17 20 27 14 50 40 10 -528 7ambia 15 26 44 60 26 15 41 15 50 31 15 -1

29 Ti-otho 18 31 109 146 11 29 -26 -77 16 14 -38 -106

30 C6te d'Ivoire 11 17 69 *67 19 18 20 16 35 34 1 -231 Zimbabw..e 12 20 65 61 15 22 23 19 ... 8 -3

32 SXwaziland 16 .. 46 .. 26 . 38 .. 59 .. 1233 Botswana 24 27 89 54 6 30 -13 19 32 60 -19 -10O34 vauritius 13 14 74 69 17 18 13 17 36 47 -4 (.)

Middle-income oil exoorters 8w 11W 75w 68w 19w 21w 17w 21w 20w 19w -2w (.)w

35 Nigeria 7 11 76 70 19 19 17 19 18 16 -2 036 Cameroon 14 10 73 54 13 27 13 37 25 32 -1 1037 Congo, People's Rep. 14 13 80 51 22 46 5 35 36 55 -17 -11

3A Gabon 11 3 51 28 31 34 37 59 43 .. 6 2539) Angola . . . . . . . ..

Sub-Saharan Africa 12w 14w 72'w 74w 17wq 18w 16w 12w 26w 21w -1w -6w

All1 low-income economies 10w 12w 75w 70w 21w 26w 19w 24w 6w Qw -2w -2w

All1 lower miTddle-incomeeconomies 11w 13w 73w 70w 17w 22w 16w 1

7w 17w 21w -1w -5w

All upper Tmiddle-incomeeconiomies 11w 13w

65w 64w 23w 22w 24w 23w 19w 25w 1w 1w

Industrial market economies 15w 18w 61w 63w, 23w 2(w 23w 20w 12w 18w (.)w (.)w

a. Figures are for 1Q82, not 1983.b. Public consumption figures are not available separately; they are therefore included in private consumption.

- 72-

Table 6. Commercial energy

Energy consumption Energy importsper capita as a percentage

Annual growth rate (percent) (kilograms of merchandiseEaergy_production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) exports

1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83 1965 1983 1965 1983

Low-incomne economies 10.4 w 8.

4w

9.9w 0.8w 48w 59w 8w

I Ethiopia 11.1 6.2 11.4 4.4 10 19 82 Mali 80.5 5.0 4.6 4.8 15 22 163 Zaire 4.8 9.1 6.0 1.5 61 77 6

4 Burkinia ... 8.0 10.7 8 22 11 505 Guiinea-Bissau .. 2.0 0.7 41 346 Niger ... 14.7 11.7 8 43 9 17

7 Malawi 31.1 8.3 8.3 4.3 25 45 78 Tanzaniia 6.8 5.9 10.5 -2.6 37 389 Burundi .. 30.2 5.6 12.5 5 17 11

10 Uganda 3.7 -2.6 8.4 -5.8 36 2311 Togo -6.1 27.4 12.9 13.9 25 88 6 18 12 Gambia .... 10.6 11.2 22 74 3

13 Somalia .. 9.3 16.8 15 84 914 Benin ... 19.7 0.3 21 39 1415 Central African Rep. 10.6 3.9 9.8 4.7 22 35 7

16 Madagascar 8.6 2.3 13.6 1.4 33 59 8 3217 Rwanda 15.7 2.0 11.4 13.0 8 35 1018 Guinea 17.1 2.2 2.3 1.5 56 54.

19 Kenya 9.9 15.0 7.1 1.4 114 109.20 Sierra Leone .. 5.1 6.9 90 102 1121 Sudan 14.7 9.0 12.4 -3.3 67 66 5 ;7a

22 Ghana 43.4 1.0 15.0 -0.4 76 ill 623 Senegal ... 14.3 -2.8 169 151 8 58 24 Chad ........... 23

25 Mozambique 4.6 18.6 93 1.5 93 95 13

Middle-income oil importers 5.6w 3.6w

8.lw 1.9w 280w 33

9w 4

26 Mauritania ... 16.0 3.6 48 130 227 Liberia 37.0 -0.4 16.1 1.9 181 357 628 Zambia 26.3 6.4 1.6 1.9 464 432 5

29 Lesotho . .. ..

30 C6te d'lvoire 0.5 45. 10.9 5. 109 186 5 1631 Zimbabwe 1.8 -2.6 9.9 0.5 441 491()

32 Swaziland 18.9 2.1 15.2 2.6 112 246 33 Botswania 8.4 7.7 7.8 8.9 207 415 34 Mauritius 3.1 5.1 11.9 0.5 163 3166

Middle-income oil exporters 32.5w -2.9w 10.3w 11.6w 43w 1

63w 5w

35 Nigeria 33.4 -4.4 9.6 15.4 33 150 736 Cameroon 1.2 45.6 6.5 8.0 67 128 6 4 '

37 Congo, People's Rep. 33.4 10.5 7.5 11.9 90 216 8

38 Gabon 24.3 -2.6 27.3 0.9 110 1,355 339 Angola 47.1 -1.0 10.6 4.1 ill 226 2

Sub--Saharan Africa 28

.9w -2.1w 9.4w

4.5w 62w hlOw 6w

All low-inicome economies lO.Ow 6.1w 9.7w 5.5w 128w 2

76w 8w

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 15.

9w 2.2w

7.4w 5.5w 183w 3

82w 8w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 6.8w -0.8w

8.lw 5.1w 646w 1,225w 8w 2

9w

Industrial market economies 3.2w 1.6w 5.2w 0.1w 3,764

w 4,73 3

w 11w 2 5

w

a. Figures are for 1981 or 1982, not 1983.

- 73 -

Table 7. Level and growth of merchandise trade

Merchandise trade(millions of dollars) Annual growth rate (percent)Fxports Imports _ xports Imports

1983 1983 1965-73 1973-83 1965-73 1973-83

Low-income economies 8,512t 12,486t 2.2w -3.8w 2.5w -2.1w

1 Ethiopia 422 875 3.0 1.4 -0.2 2.72 Mali 106 344 13.1 5.1 8.5 3.93 Zaire 1,459 a 953a 6.5 -8.7 9.6 -13.7

4 Burkina 99 288 -1.0 1.7 7.2 4.25 Guinea-Bissau .. .. ..

6 Niger 301 a 44a 6.1 19.0 4.4 11.5

7 Malawi 220 312 3.8 2.8 6.4 -0.68 Tanzania 480 a 1,134 a 0.9 -4.6 7.1 -2.79 Burundi 76 194 ..

10 Ulganda 354 340 0.2 -8.0 -2.5 1.911 Togo 242 284 4.4 3.5 6.6 7.412 Gambia .. . -3.2 -6.9 2.2 5.0

13 Somalia 163 422 6.7 7.3 1.4 0.014 Benin 85 523 12.4 -1.4 13.2 4.515 Central African Rep. 106 a 132 a -0.4 3.8 -0.5 2.5

16 Madagascar 329 a 419 a 5.4 -4.3 1.5 -2.517 Rwanda 80 279 6.3 2.6 4.6 12.918 Guinea 390 279 ..

19 Kenya 975 1,274 3.8 -4.8 5.9 -4.620 Sierra Leone 202 1,71 2.2 -5.3 0.9 -5.021 Sudan 624 1,354 3.8 -1.5 4.9 1.3

22 Ghana 895 7L9 3.5 -6.4 -3.3 -8.023 Senegal 585 984 -1.3 -0.9 5.4 -1.224 Chad 58 a 1(9 a -3.5 -3.1 18.7 -8.625 Mozambique 260 635 -7.9 -8.3 -8.9 -4.2

Middle-income oil importers 5,298t 4,578t 4.4w -0.8w 6.4w -1.9w

26 Mauritania 246 227 9.7 0.5 15.4 -0.827 Liberia 841 415 8.9 -2.3 3.6 -4.328 Zambia 870 690 -0.3 -0.8 3.0 -7.3

29 Lesotho .. .. ..

30 Cote d'Ivoire 2,068 1,814 7.1 -1.4 7.8 0.131 Zimbabwe 1,273 a 1,432 d

32 Swaziland .. .. ..

33 Botswana .. .. ..

34 Mauritius .. .. 4.2 4.2 4.5 -0.4

Middle-income oil exporters 23,529t 21,198t 7.4w -6.1w 7.8w 10.9w

36 Nigeria 17,509 a 17,600 a 8.9 -6.2 8.9 13.6

37 Cameroon 1,708 1,226 4.2 3.9 6.3 5.138 Congo, People's Rep. 887 806 -2.2 4.4 -2.3 12.0

39 Gabon 1,566 a 799 a 6.8 -3.1 7.9 3.840 Angola 1,859 768 5.4 -13.3 8.3 3.3

Sub-Saharan Africa 37,338t 38,261t 5.8w -5.0w 3.9w 3.3w

All low-income economies 45,991t 57,333t 1.5w 0.9w -2.0w 1.4wAll lower middle-incomeeconomies 91,138t 110,575t

4.8w O.lw 4.5w 1.4w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 242,394t 340,159t 5.

7w 0.5w 9.7w 4.0w

Industrial market economies 1,128,132t 1,183,257t 9.4w

4.2w 10.0w 3.0w

a. Figures are for 1982, not 1983.

- 74-

Table 9. Structuire of merchandise exports(percentage sbare)

Fuel, Machineryminerals, Other primary Textiles and transport Otherandl metals commodities and clothing equipment manufact-ures

1965 1982 195 192 1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982

Low-income economies 19w 25wi 76w 62w (.)w 2w4 (.)w 2w 4w 9w

1 Ethiopia (18 99 91 () () (3.).)1

2 Mali 1 .. 96 I. I.1. I

3 Zaire 72 .. 20 .. (). ().

4 F1rkina a I .394 85 2 2 1 6 1 7

S Guinea-Bissau . .. . . ..

6 Niger5a. 81 95 17 1 1 1 1 3 1

7 Malawi a . ~ 09 88 (36 (33 1 38 Tanizania 15 86 82 (33.32 13 70 Rurundi (. .94 .. (). . .5

10 Tjganda 13 .. 86 I.(3. (3. I Tooa 33 52 62 33 (2I I 1 4 13

13 Somalia a (2( 6 09 () . 4 (31 .

14 8enin I .. 04 * (...2 .

15 Central African Reo. . .. . . ..

16 Mfadagascar 4 12 90 81 1 4 1 1 4 2

17 Rwanda 40 .. 60 I.(). ().

19 Kenya 13 29 77 57 (3 ().)2 9 12

20 Sierra Leone .. i .. ..

"I I Sdana 98 93 ()111 (.(

22 Ghana 13 .. 85 .. I)..1. 223 Senegal a 9 52 88 29 1 5 1 4 2 1124 Chad S . 92 .. (). . .3

25 Mlozambiquie 14 .. 84 .. I I.().

Middile-income oil importers 50w 41w . 2w . 2.w 5w

26_ Mauritania 94 .. 5 . (3. I . .

27 Liberia. a 72 67 25 31 (I . 1 2 1

28 Zambia 97 I.3(3* . .

20 Lesotho . .. . . *.

30 C6te d'Ivoire 2 13 93 76 1 2 1 3 3 631 Zimbabwe 24 .. 47 .. 6 .. 6 .17

3? Swaziland . *.

33 Botswana34 Mauritius (. (399 62 (33() 2 (36

Middle-income oil exporters 28w .. 66w .. (.3w .(.)w .. 5w

35 Nigeria 32 .. 65 . (3 0 .. 2

36 Cameroon 17 49 77 44 (32 3 1 2 437 Con?o, People's Rep. . .. . . ..

38 Gahon 52 90 37 7 (3 (3.) ( 10 3

39 Angola 6 .. 76 .. (3. .17

Sub-Saharan Africa 32'w .. 62w .. w . w .. 5w

Al1l low-income- economies 11w 20w 65w 30w 16w 18w 1w 5w 7w 28wAil lower middle-incomeeconomiLes 26w 47w 66w 34w 2w 6w 1w 2W Sw 11w

All upDper middle-income

economj.es 41w, 34w IRW 17w 5w 9w 3w 14w 12w 26wIndustrial market economnies 9w 12lw 21W 14w 7w 4w 31w 37w 32w 32w

a. Figuires are for 1981, not l9cO.

7 75-

Table 9. Structure of merchandise imports

(percentage share)

Other Machineryprimary and transport Other

Food -Fue-l cosmmodities equipment manufactures1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982

Low-income economies 19w 16w F.w 2

4w

4w 3w 2

7w 2

7w 45w

30w

1 Ethiopia 7 10 6 25 5 3 37 31 44 31

2 Mali 21 .. 6 .. 3 .23 .. 473 Zaire 19 .. 7 .4 .. 33 .. 37

4 Burkina a 25 25 4 16 12 3 19 24 40 325 Guinea-Bissau . .. . . ..

6 Niger a 13 24, 6 15 44 21 26 55 32

7 Malawi a 16 11 5 17 2 2 21 24 57 468 Tanzania a . 7 .. 31 2 .. 35 .. 25

9 Burundi 18 .. 6 .7 .. 15 .. 55

lO Uganda .. 5 . 23 I.1. 42 .. 2911lTogoa 18, 26 4 8 2 3 32 21 45 42

12 Gambia 24 .. 2 .3 .. 19 .. 52

13 Somalia a 33 20 5 2 5 6 24 50 33 2114 Benin 23 .. 6 .2 .. 17 .. 5315 Central African Rep. 13 .. 7 .2 .. 29 .. 49

16 Madagascar 20 16 5 24 2 3 25 30 48 27

17 Rwanda 12 .. 7 .4 .. 28 .. 5018 Guinea . .. . . ..

19 Kenya .. 8 . 37 .. 3 .27 .. 2520 Sierra Leone 19 24 9 14 1 1 29 18 41 42

21 Sudan a 24 19 5 19 3 3 21 22 47 37

22 Ghana 13 .. 4 .2 .. 33 .. 4823 Senegal a 37 27 6 30 4 1 15 18 38 2324 Chad 13 .. 20 .. 3 .. 21 .. 4225 Mozambique 17 .. 8 .7 .. 24 .. 45

Middle-income oil importers 15w 20w 5w 21w 3w 3w 33w 23w 45w 34w

26 Mauritania 9 .. 4 .1..56 .. 3027 Liberia a 18 22 8 27 1 2 33 25 39 2428 Zambia t0 9 tO 19 2 1 33 34 45 37

29 Lesotho30 C6te d'lvoire 18 19 6 212 2 28 23 46 3431 Zimbabwe 7 . () 4 .. 41 .. 47

32 Swaziland . .. . .

33 Botswana.. ... .... ..

34 Mauritius 35 285 18, 2 5 15, 15 42 34

Middle-income oil exporters 12w 20w 5w 3w 3w 3w 32w 37w

49w 3

6w

35 Nigeria 9 21 6 3 3 3 34 38 48 3536 Cameroon 12 t0 5 4 3 2 28 35 51 49

37 Congo, People's Rep. 15 17 6 15 1 1 34 25 44 42

38 Gabon 16 17 5 1 1 2 37 40 40 4039 Angola 18 .. 2 .. 2 .24 .. 54

Sub-Saharan Africa 16w 19w 6w 11w 3w 3w 30w 33w

46w 3

4w

All low-income economies 21w 17w 5w 18w 8w 11w 32w 20w 34w 34w

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 17w 1

4w 7w 1

9w 5w 5w 29w 31w 41w 32w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 16w 11w 8w 2

2w 11w 6w 29w 30w 36w 31w

industrial market economies 20w 11w liw 26w 19w 8w 19w 24w 31w 31w

a. Figures are for 1981, not 1982.

- 76 -

Table 10. Origin and destination of merchandise exports

Destination (percentage of total)

Industrial East Europeanmarket nonmarket High-income Developing

economies economies oil exporters economiesOrigin 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983

Low-income economies 73w 63w 4w 5w lw 4w 22w 28w

1 Ethiopia 78 66 3 1 6 6 14 282 Mali 7 72 4 2 0 (.) 89 26

3 Zaire 93 89 (.) (.) (.) (.) 7 10

4 Burkina 17 48 0 (.) 0 (.) 83 51

5 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. ..

6 Niger 61 .. (.) .. (.) .. 39

7 Malawi 69 68 0 (.) (.) (.) 30 31

8 Tanzania 66 59 1 4 1 1 32 379 Burundi .. 78 .. 4 .. 0 .. 19

10 IJganda 69 R4 2 (.) 1 (.) 28 1511 Togo 92 52 2 1 n 0 6 46

12 Gambia R9 .. 0 .0 .. 11

13 Somalia 40 16 (.) (.) 3 66 57 18

14 Benin 88 79 (.) (.) 0 0 12 20

15 Central African Rep. 71 32 0 1 0 (.) 29 16

16 Madagascar 85 72 1 3 (.) (.) 14 25

17 Rwanda 96 92 0 (.) 0 0 4 818 Guinea .. 89 .. 9.) .. (.) .. 11

19 Kenya 69 47 2 1 1 1 28 51

20 Sierra Leone 92 66 (.) (.) (.) (.) 8 34

21 Sudan 56 36 13 7 4 28 27 29

22 Ghana 74 47 18 34 (.) (.) 9 20

23 Senegal q2 54 (.) 1 0 (.) 7 45

24 Chad 64 72 0 0 2 (.) 34 2825 Mozambique 24 37 (.) .. (.) 1 76 62

Middle-income oil importers 7Rw 69w 2w 2w (.)w (.)w 20w 29w

26 Mauritania 96 94 (.) (.) 0 .. 4 6

27 Liberia a 98 94 0 (.) 0 1 2 2528 Zambia 87 65 2 1 0 (.) 11 34

29 Lesotho .. .. .. .. ..

30 Cote d'Ivoire 84 70 2 3 1 (.) 13 2731 Zimbabwe 5s 53 1 1 (.) (.) 48 46

32 Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. ..33 Botswana .. .. .. .. .. ..

34 Mauritius 98 .. 0 .. 0 .. 2

Middle-income oil exporters 85w 75w 2w (.)w (.)w (.)w 13w 25w

35 Nigeria 91 74 3 (.) (.) (.) 6 26

36 Cameroon 93 85 (.) (.) C.) C.) 7 15

37 Congo, People's Rep. 86 98 1 (.) 0 0 13 2

38 Gabon 89 76 1 1 (.) 0 10 2439 Angola 55 66 1 2 (.) (.) 45 32

Sub-Saharan Africa 77w 71w 3w 2w lw 1w 19w 26w

All low-income economies 56w 48w low 7w 2w 5w 32w 40wAll lower middle-incomeeconomies 70w 69w 9w 2w lw 2w 20w 27w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 68w 60w 6w 4w lw 3w 25w 33w

Industrial market economies 71w 69w 3w 3w lw 4w 26w 24w

a. Figures are for 1082, not 1983.

- 77 -

Table 11. Terms of trade

Terms of trade Annual growth rate(1980=100) 1970-84

1970 1981 1982 1983 1984 (percent)

Low-income economies

1 Ethiopia 156 68 75 86 100 -4.72 Mali 120 110 105 115 116 -1.03 Zaire 197 87 82 90 88 -5.4

4 Burkina 134 109 100 110 117 -1.85 Guinea-Bissau .. .. ..6 Niger 170 84 88 92 81 -5.2

7 Malawi 138 106 107 125 137 -1.68 Tanzania 108 88 88 91 94 -1.69 Burundi .. .. .. ..

10 Uganda 92 75 75 79 98 0.3-11 Togo 69 91 84 80 88 (.)12 Gambia 143 130 111 113 158 -1.5

13 Somalia 157 109 114 116 116 -2.614 Benin 177 97 77 88 116 -5.315 Central African Rep. 83 97 94 92 99 1.7

16 Madagascar 113 79 80 90 105 -1.817 Rwanda 79 65 64 65 71 -0.418 Guinea .. .. .. ..

19 Kenya 99 87 88 88 94 -0.920 Sierre Leone 145 84 85 89 95 -3.3

, 21 Sudan 98 103 87 87 98 -0.9

22 Ghana 104 69 62 62 70 -1.123 Senegal 101 104 91 87 98 -1.324 Chad 81 105 101 110 108 1.325 Mozambique 112 96 84 90 104 -1.9

Middle-income oil importers

26 Mauritania 178 95 101 101 95 -4.527 Liberia 189 93 93 104 102 -5.328 Zambia 263 81 72 82 74 -8.7 -- _

29 Lesotho .. .. ..

* 30 Cote d'Ivoire 97 92 91 98 101 1.3-31 Zimbabwe .. .. .. ..

32 Swaziland .. .. ..

33 Botswana .. .. .. ..34 Mauritius 108 99 94 98 93 -2.7

Middle-income oil exporters

35 Nigeria 19 112 104 93 94 12.336 Cameroon 96 78 73 74 85 0.137 Congo, People's Rep. 17 118 113 103 104 13.9

38 Gabon 17 114 111 102 103 13.939 Angola 45 110 106 98 102 7.6

- 78

Table 12. Commodity exports: Volume and price(annual growth rate: percent)

Export volumeSub-Saharan Africa World Price a1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84

FuelPetroleum 33.4 -4.9 11.0 -0.7 3.7 16.1

Minerals and metalsCopper 2.9 -0.9 4.7 1.0 -1.4 -8.5Iron ore 7.2 -5.8 7.5 -1.5 -4.3 -3.7Bauxite 11.2 12.5 4.8 -0.6 1.0 2.3Phosphate rock 8.7 -0.6 6.1 -0.3 -5.5 2.8Manganese ore 2.4 -1.6 3.3 -2.6 -5.4 -0.6Zinc -3.9 -3.1 5.3 0.7 7.4 -5.6Tin -3.3 -8.5 2.2 -0.7 -2.7 2.0Lead 2.6 -8.0 3.4 -0.8 -1.7 -6.0

Food and beveragesCoffee 3.4 -2.0 2.9 1.5 -1.5 1.1Cocoa 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 1.0 9.0 0.3Sugar 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 14.8 -11.2Tea 9.7 3.7 2.6 2.4 -7.7 4.4Groundnuts (meal) 0.3 -6.5 0.8 -8.5 6.7 -9.3Groundnut oil -2.6 -6.0 1.3 -1.5 1.1 -0.9Beef 8.3 -10.8 5.9 3.6 5.0 -5.3Palm oil -6.3 -8.3 13.2 9.9 -1.4 -0.5Bananas 0.9 -7.9 4.6 0.3 -4.9 0.9Maize 9.4 -9.3 6.9 4.0 1.8 -3.5

NonfoodTimber 4.7 -3.7 7.1 0.5 10.3 -3.9Cotton 6.3 -0.9 1.9 0.5 4.3 -3.9Tobacco 1.4 2.8 3.1 0.9 -1.3 0.1Rubber 2.9 -2.4 3.9 0.6 -1.4 -3.4Hides and skins 0.5 3.2 1.5 2.5 ..

Sisal -3.9 -9.6 -2.7 -8.1 ..

a. End-point growth rates.

- 7 9-

Table 13. Balance of payments, debt ser-vice, and international reserves

Interest payments Debt service Gross international reservesCurrent account on external As a percentage of In months

balance public debt Aa a percentage of exports of Millions of of import(millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) GNP goods and services dollars coverage

1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984 1984

Low- income economies 1.3w 2.8w 5.6w 15.1w 2.3w

1 Ethiopia -32 -201 6 31 1.2 1.8 11.4 13.8 72 109 1.12 Mali -2 -125 ()7 0.3 1.7 1.4 8.0 1 32 0.93 Zaire -64 -310 9 210 2.1 4.1 4.4 77a 189 281 1.5 a

4 Burkina 9 .. ()7 0.6 1.7 6.2 8.7 a 36 1105 Guinea-Bissau .. -26 a t. . .3 .. 11.8 a

6 Niger (. .1 27 0.6 6.7 3.8 18.3 a 19 92

7 Malawi -35 .. 3 32 2.1 3.6 7.2 20.3 a 29 618 Tanzania -36 .. 6 30 1.2 1.7 4.9 14.1 a 65 279 Burundi ... ()8 0.3 0.8 2.3 7.5 a 15 25

10 lUganda 20 .. 4 32 0.4 1.6 2.7 21.1 a 511 Togo 3 161 37 0.9 10.1 2.9 26.3 35 207 10'.5'12 Gambia 1 .. ()3 0.2 4.2 0.5 7 .7 a .. 2

13 Somalia -6 -146 ()3 0.3 2.0 2.1 28.9 21 7 0.114 Benin -1 *.()17 0.7 2.5 2.3 9.3 a 16 615 Central African Rep. -12 -2 1 6 1.6 3.0 4.8 11.7 a 1 56 2.4 a

16 Madagascar 10 .. 2 31 0.8 3.9 3.5 24.3 a 37 5917 Rwanda 7 -42 ()3 0.1 0.4 1.2 3.3 8 107 3.918 Guinea .. 4 21 2.2 5.8 ..

19 Kenya -49 -135 12 144 1.8 6.1 5.4 22.9 220 414 2.620 Sierra Leone -16 -33 a 2 4 2.9 1.0 9.9 7.2 a 39 8 1.0 a21 Sudan -42 65 13 65 1.7 1.2 a 10.6 11.0 22 17 0.2

22 Ghana -68 -61 12 26 1.2 1.7 5.0 13.2 58 437 6.423 Senegal -16 .. 2 53 0.8 2.5 2.8 7.2 22 1324 Chad 2 10 I. 1.0 .. 3.9 1.7 2 48 2.625 Mozambique ... .47 ... .

Middle-income oil importers 2.4w 7.0w 5.5w 15.0w 1.5w

26 Mauritania -5 -196 a 23 1.7 5.4 3.1 10.0 a 3 81 2.1 a27 Liberia -.75 6 20 5.5 4.3 8.1 8.6 .. 4 0.128 zambia 108 -115 26 63 3.4 4.7 5.9 11.3 515 55 0.6

29 Lesotho .. 21 ()4 0.5 3.8 4.5 5.0 .. 49 1.230 C6te d'Ivoire -38 -190 11 404 2.7 11.1 6.8 21.3 119 19 0.131 Zimbabwe .. -98 5 119 0.6 5.4 2.3 20.0 59 260 2.0

32 Swaziland .. -11 2 9 3.0 3.9 .. 5.4 .. 80 2.233 Botswana .. 59 ()15 0.7 3.8 1.0 3.8 .. 474 6.334 Mauritius 8 -54 2 25 1.3 7.5 3.0 14.8 67 35 0.7

Middle-income oil exporters 0.7w 4.5w 4.4w 21.2w 1.3w

35 Nigeria -368 530 20 1,172 0.6 4.2 4.2 25.5 223 1,674 1.736 Cameroon -30 -292 4 107 0.8 3.0 3.1 8.9 81 63 0.337 Congo, People's Rep. .. -400 a 3 78 3.3 13.0 11.0 20.5 a 9 8 0.1 a

38 Gabon -3 5a 370 3.6 8.5 5.4 11.4 .. 203 1.1a39 Angola ... .58 . .. ..

Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3w 4.2w 5.3w 18.1w 1.6w

All low-income econom-ies . ... 1.1w 0.9w 11.4w 9.2w . 6.4

wAll lower middle-income . ... 1.6w 4.6w 9.4w 19.Ow . 2.2w

economiesAll upper middle-income

economies . .. 1.6w 5.2w 8.8w 16.8w . 3.2w

Industrial market economies . .. .. .. .. 3.9w

a. Figures are for 1983, not 1984.

- 80 -

Table 14. External public debt and debt service(millions of dollars)

External public and publicly guaranteed debt outstanding and disbursed

Official sources Private sources Total Debt service

1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984 1970 1984

Low-income economies 2,294.2t 25,070.8t 897.2t 5,295.6t 3,191.4t 30,366.4t 229.7t 2,044.6t

1 Ethiopia 140.2 1,202.7 28.7 181.5 168.9 1,384.2 21.1 84.12 Mali 231.5 930.0 6.1 30.0 237.6 960.0 0.7 17.43 Zaire 95.3 3,371.6 215.8 712.1 311.1 4,083.7 36.8 352.3

4 Burkina 20.5 369.6 0.3 37.9 20.8 407.5 1.9 21.85 Guinea-Bissau .. 126.5 .. 22.9 .. 149.4 .. 3.36 Niger 31.2 521.9 0.5 156.0 31.7 677.9 2.3 66.6

7 Malawi 89.1 603.1 33.3 127.5 122.4 730.6 5.9 82.38 Tanzania 148.9 2,132.1 100.7 461.5 249.6 2,593.6 15.7 71.39 Burundi 5.8 310.5 1.5 23.9 7.3 334.4 0.6 17.3

10 Uganda 108.6 605.6 29.7 69.5 138.3 675.1 7.9 86.311 Togo 31.9 561.6 7.8 97.6 39.7 659.2 2.3 66.612 Gambia 5.1 128.0 (.) 32.9 5.1 160.9 0.1 7.3

13 Somalia 74.9 1,173.8 2.2 59.2 77.1 1,233.0 0.9 26.814 Benin 29.2 300.6 11.3 280.9 40.5 581.5 1.7 38.315 Central African Rep. 17.9 197.6 6.1 26.8 24.0 224.4 2.9 12.1

16 Madagascar 84.9 1,239.2 7.6 397.2 92.5 1,636.4 6.9 116.617 Rwanda 1.5 243.9 0.4 0.0 1.9 243.9 0.3 6.018 Guinea 275.2 989.7 36.7 178.5 311.9 1168.2 14.5 105.1

19 Kenya 234.2 2,148.9 84.3 484.5 318.5 2,633.4 27.4 348.420 Sierra Leone 32.4 252.6 27.0 89.0 59.4 341.6 12.0 16.221 Sudan 260.2 4713.1 46.2 945.8 306.4 5,658.9 34.6 107.3

22 Ghana 270.6 996.1 223.9 126.4 494.5 1,122.5 23.8 81.023 Senegal 80.5 1,357.9 19.6 197.2 100.1 1,555.1 6.7 92.724 Chad 24.6 85.1 7.5 23.9 32.1 109.0 2.7 2.525 Mozambique .. 509.1 .. 532.9 .. 1,042.0 .. 215.0

Middle-income oil importers 559.2t 7,040.9t 830.0t 4,888.Ot 1,389.2t 11,928.9t 135.0t 1,264.3t

26 Mauritania 19.4 1,047.9 7.9 122.7 27.3 1,170.6 3.3 42.227 Liberia 124.0 595.9 34.9 160.8 158.9 756.7 17.6 42.228 Zambia 119.4 2,149.4 503.1 629.3 622.5 2,778.7 59.0 113.1

29 Lesotho 7.6 121.8 0.5 12.5 8.1 134.3 0.5 21.130 Cote d'Ivoire 144.2 1,986.8 112.0 2,847.8 256.2 4,834.6 38.4 641.031 Zimbabwe 88.1 482.3 144.6 963.4 232.7 1,445.7 9.4 276.4

32 Swaziland 20.9 169.6 16.1 8.4 37.0 178.0 3.3 20.233 Botswana 14.2 239.4 0.6 36.7 14.8 276.1 0.6 33.134 Mauritius 21.4 247.8 10.3 106.4 31.7 354.2 2.9 75.0

Middle-income oil exporters 699.7t 4,858.6t 145.9t 11,674.8t 845.6t 16,533.4t 84.4t 4,116.9t

35 Nigeria 385.1 2,182.7 94.4 9,632.7 479.5 11,815.4 55.7 3,162.836 Cameroon 119.6 1,365.1 11.6 372.8 131.2 1,737.9 8.6 221.537 Congo, People's Rep. 128.0 824.1 16.0 571.5 144.0 1,395.6 8.8 250.9

38 Gabon 67.0 257.0 23.9 467.5 90.9 724.5 11.3 252.839 Angola .. 229.7 .. 630.3 .. 860.0 .. 228.9

Sub-Saharan Africa 3,553.1t 36,970.3t 1,873.1t 21,858.4t 5,426.2t 58,828.7t 449.1t 7,425.8t

Sub-Saharan Africa as apercentage of alldeveloping countries 10.5 15.0 10.5 6.6 10.4 10.2 7.6 9.3

- 81 -

Table 15. Outstanding and disbursed external debt of sub-Saharan Africa(millions of dollars)

1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 19R4

A. Total concessional bilateral 2,361 3,753 4,674 5,308 6,0f4 7,186 8,062 9,188 10,607 11,559 12,386 12,937 12,756

DAC governments 1,656 2,402 2,859 3,194 3,549 4,018 4,346 4,576 5,121 5,231 5,591 9,678 5,539OPEC governments 70 148 249 373 565 824 1,034 1,679 2,091 2,768 3,154 3,498 3,752CPE governments a 577 1,128 1,460 1,615 1,819 2,167 2,417 2,602 3,044 3,244 3,220 3,355 3,015Other bilateral 59 75 106 127 132 177 265 332 351 315 421 407 450

B. Total official export credits 350 520 725 1,0no 1,501 1,749 2,262 4,090 5,430 6,091 7,053 9,442 9,692

DAC governments 286 425 531 616 9(2 1,132 1,550 2,982 3,925 4,386 4,827 6,557 6,525OPEC governments n 14 96 197 410 413 449 467 632 677 1,146 1,647 1,585CPE governments a 44 64 75 100 98 100 131 348 430 543 603 697 668Other bilateral 20 17 23 87 91 104 131 292 442 485 477 540 914

C. Total multilateral 842 1,621 1,999 2,535 3,158 4,040 5,457 6,768 8,443 9,719 11,503 12,936 14,522

TBRD 590 924 1,041 1,261 1,493 1,725 2,017 2,262 2,549 2,855 3,328 3,864 4,628IDA 226 547 679 880 1,157 1,486 1,801 2,156 2,574 3,090 3,751 4,335 5,037Regional banks

Concessional 15 64 89 102 123 190 334 450 604 704 881 1,017 1,051Nonconcessional 11 80 105 122 144 232 367 446 568 657 778 867 921

Other multilateralConcessional 0 2 79 164 231 383 842 1,261 1,813 1,946 2,188 2,307 2,354Nonconcessional 0 3 6 6 8 23 95 193 337 468 578 547 53]

D. Total private publiclyguaranteed 1,873 3,439 4,270 5,350 6,088 8,101 12,033 15,015 17,115 19,128 22,455 23,981 21,858

Suppliers credits 746 1,290 1,618 2,191 2,503 3,285 3,734 3,844 3,763 3,572 3,234 2,920 2,529Financial institutions 305 1,371 1,885 2,607 3,330 4,567 7,R28 10,625 12,686 15,034 18,836 20,759 19,116Bonds 387 321 310 260 204 210 433 530 652 519 374 295 202Other 436 458 457 292 51 39 38 15 14 2 11 7 11

E. Total public and publiclyguaranteed 5,426 9,332 11,667 14,193 16,811 21,075 27,813 35,061 41,595 46,498 53,397 59,297 58,829

F. Total private nonguaranteed 331 636 832 990 1,095 1,214 1,874 2,363 2,855 3,277 3,450 3,444 3,640

(. Total public and private 5,757 9,968 12,499 15,182 17,906 22,290 29,687 37,424 44,450 49,774 56,847 62,741 62,469

Total bilateral 2,712 4,272 5,398 6,308 7,565 8,935 10,323 13,278 16,036 17,650 19,439 22,379 22,448Total official 3,553 5,893 7,397 8,842 10,722 12,975 15,780 20,046 24,480 27,369 30,942 35,315 36,971Total private 2,204 4,075 5,102 6,340 7,183 9,315 13,907 17,378 19,971 22,405 25,905 27,425 25,498Total concessional 2,602 4,366 5,520 6,454 7,576 9,246 11,040 13,055 15,597 17,298 19,206 20,596 21,199Total nonconcessional 3,154 5,602 6,979 8,729 10,330 13,044 18,647 24,369 28,854 32,477 37,641 42,144 41,270

Note: E is the sum of A, b, C, and D. C is the sum of E and F. Components of G do not add to total because of overlapping.a. Centrally planned economies.

- 82 -

Table 16. Cross disbursements of external loans to sub-Sahara. Africa(millions of dollars)

1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1981

A. Total concessional bilateral 380 576 855 1,025 919 1,089 1,112 1,694 1,558 1,853 1,556 1,495 1,20f

DAC governments 255 342 439 587 505 492 639 761 936 821 808 750 556OPEC governonents 3 38 103 132 194 262 233 654 425 723 473 417 301CPE governments a 115 187 278 270 211 288 147 209 180 301 237 306 264Other bilateral 8 9 35 37 10 47 92 70 18 8 38 21 8f

B. Total official export credits 52 143 231 380 467 269 392 972 959 897 1,133 1,327 65f

DAC governments 20 116 131 167 219 232 288 560 572 626 750 574 40FOPEC governments 0 14 82 111 213 6 45 17 136 39 161 533 47CPE governments a 17 8 15 32 21 15 23 231 94 136 71 109 3Other bilateral 15 6 2 70 14 17 35 164 157 95 151 112 199

C. Total multtlateral 151 292 418 621 696 936 1,447 1,414 1,973 1,880 2,241 2,126 2,26'

IBRD 75 131 154 274 284 291 363 346 400 434 621 709 832T1)A 61 108 133 204 281 336 323 363 423 552 692 624 777Regional banks

Concessional 12 22 22 23 25 56 123 107 202 199 226 250 163Nonconcessional 3 21 29 34 35 93 126 93 174 174 199 214 205

Other multilateralConcessional 0 2 77 85 69 147 441 406 596 280 336 221 223Nonconcessional 0 9 4 1 3 14 71 99 178 241 169 107 70

D. Total private publiclyguaranteed 477 1,168 1,166 1,716 1,778 2,280 4,307 4,182 5,230 5,095 6,730 6,178 2,955

Suppliers credits 136 354 500 736 710 866 741 689 1,145 837 611 418 391Financial institutions 32 802 665 980 1,065 1,412 3,306 3,399 4,021 4,258 6,110 5,760 2,555Boods 9 9 0 0 2 2 261 95 64 0 0 0 0Other 301 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 8

E. Total public and publiclyguaranteed 1,060 2,179 2,670 3,742 3,859 4,575 7,258 8,262 9,719 9,725 11,66(1 11,125 7,0893

F. Total private nonguaranteed 116 307 339 304 268 373 748 869 1,175 1,187 1,318 1,205 88.

G. Total public and private 1,176 2,487 3,008 4,046 4,127 4,948 8,006 9,130 10,894 10,912 12,977 12,331 7,9731

Total bilateral 432 720 1,085 1,405 1,386 1,358 1,503 2,666 2,517 2,750 2,689 2,822 1,866Total official 583 1,011 1,504 2,026 2,082 2,294 2,950 4,079 4,489 4,630 4,930 4,948 4,1321Total private 593 1,476 1,505 2,020 2,046 2,653 5,055 5,051 6,405 6,282 8,047 7,383 3,83'3Total concessional 454 707 1,086 1,338 1,294 1,628 1,999 2,570 2,778 2,884 2,810 2,590 2,371Total nonconcessional 722 1,77Q 1,922 2,708 2,834 3,320 6,007 6,560 8,116 8,028 10,168 9,741 5,602.

Note: E is the sum of A, B, C, and D. G is the sum of E and F. Components of C do not add to total because of overlapping.a. Centrally planned economies.

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Table 17. Average terms of borrowing for sub-Saharan Africa

1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19R0 1981 1982 1983 1984

Total public debtInterest rate (Percent) 3.7 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.5 6.6 7.6 7.3 9.3 7.9 8.1 5.8Maturity (years) 26.0 20.4 19.9 19.9 18.8 18.2 16.5 15.4 17.5 15.3 18.5 15.9 23.6Grace period (years) 7.8 5.6 5.9 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.4 5.0 4.1 5.6Grant element (percent) 47.2 31.9 33.3 30.0 30.3 29.0 23.2 16.9 21.2 9.2 18.0 16.7 33.3

Total official debtInterest rate (percent) 1.9 2.8 3.3 4.2 3.5 4.0 3.8 4.1 3.9 5.1 4.8 6.0 4.2Maturity (years) 35.2 29.4 26.0 26.2 27.2 24.4 25.3 23.2 25.0 24.4 27.3 23.5 29.2Grace period (years) 11.4 8.1 7.8 6.8 7.2 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.8 5.9 7.0Grant element (percent) 67.3 55.3 50.0 43.2 48.9 42.7 45.3 40.9 44.0 35.8 40.2 31.1 45.7

Bilateral debtInterest rate (Percent) 1.0 1.9 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.2 6.3 4.6Maturity (years) 36.0 26.0 22.5 22.8 22.5 21.0 23.2 18.3 20.2 20.1 22.4 15.3 19.6Grace period (years) 12.6 8.2 7.7 6.7 7.n 5.7 6.2 5.6 6.0 5.8 6.3 4.7 5.6Grant element (percent) 74.9 60.5 49.2 46.7 45.8 41.0 42.7 33.9 36.9 35.3 34.3 25.4 36.3

Multilateral debtInterest rate (percent) 4.4 4.2 3.7 5.0 3.5 4.2 3.4 3.4 3.1 5.3 4.2 5.8 3.9Maturity (years) 33.1 34.2 32.8 30.1 33.5 29.2 28.1 28.9 30.0 28.1 32.8 30.n 35.9Grace period (years) 7.8 8.0 7.9 6.9 7.5 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.1 6.7 7.4 6.9 8.0Grant element (percent) 46.0 48.1 51.5 39.3 53.0 45.0 48.8 49.2 51.4 36.3 46.7 35.7 52.3

Total private debtInterest rate (percent) 6.7 8.7 8.7 8.3 7.8 7.8 9.4 10.5 11.2 12.3 11.1 10.9 10.4Maturity (years) 10.1 9.9 9.5 8.4 8.3 8.8 8.0 9.0 8.7 8.8 9.1 6.1 8.0Grace period (years) 1.7 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.1 1.7 1.7Grant element (percent) 12.7 4.4 5.0 6.2 7.2 8.2 1.7 -2.8 -5.5 -9.7 -5.5 -1.9 -1.6

Note: Average terms are for new commitments of public and publiclv guaranteed debt.

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Table 18. Indicators of aid and total resource flow, 1984

Total recorded Net official development assistance (ODA): Disbursementsnet flow ofresources As percentage of Bilateral From OPEC

Population per capita Per capita As percentage gross domestic (percent of (percent of total(millions) (dollars) (dollars) of GNP investment total) bilateral ODA)

Low-income economies 260.6t 25.5w 21.6w 10.9w 65.

7w 58.5w 5.5w

1 Ethiopia 42.0 9.9 8.6 7.7 .. 51.5 0.32 Mali 7.3 43.4 43.9 32.0 .. 69.7 4.23 Zaire 30.6 23.4 10.3 10.1 * 67.2 (.)

4 Burkina 6.6 28.3 28.5 19.7 144.5 64.8 9.95 Guinea-Bissau 0.9 68.3 61.2 41.2 134.4 55.2 7.66 Niger 6.3 21.7 25.7 14.8 .. 62.9 8.1

7 Malawi 6.8 23.6 23.3 12.1 80.3 32.6 (.)

8 Tanzania 21.5 28.2 26.0 14.7 .. 72.9 2.79 Burundi 4.6 33.8 30.5 15.0 .. 49.5 19.0

10 Uganda 14.3 11.6 11.5 3.3 .. 28.9 -3.211 Togo 2.9 40.0 37.9 16.7 .. 48.1 3.812 Gambia 0.7 91.0 79.9 35.1 .. 62.1 2.6

13 Somalia 5.2 72.2 69.8 26.6 .. 53.2 10.314 Benin 3.9 43.3 19.8 8.0 125.2 51.0 -0.515 Central African Rep. 2.5 46.1 45.5 18.8 161.0 59.9 0.7

16 Madagascar 9.7 31.0 16.1 7.0 .. 62.3 -5.417 Rwanda 5.9 27.5 27.9 10.2 .. 58.2 6.318 Guinea 5.9 21.9 20.9 6.8 .. 34.2 70.5

19 Kenya 19.7 27.0 21.9 7.5 33.4 68.3 17.420 Sierra Leone 3.7 19.5 16.4 6.2 68.6 37.0 60.721 Sudan 21.5 32.0 28.7 .. 62.6 50.1 36.3

22 Ghana 13.4 17.3 16.1 4.5 45.8 44.1 -4.723 Senegal 6.4 68.9 52.0 14.7 91.6 73.7 9.824 Chad 4.9 23.1 23.5 .. .. 51.1 0.525 Mozambique 13.4 15.1 19.3 4.9 .. 73.4 1.5

Middle-income oil importers 32.tt 48.5w 37.

4w 6.8w 35.0w

72.5w 4.Ow

26 Mauritania 1.3 102.2 99.1 24.6 103.8 40.7 62.827 Liberia 2.1 -69.3 63.4 13.6 .. 80.7 0.128 Zambia 6.5 56.4 36.6 9.8 64.4 75.8 (.)

29 Lesotho 1.5 61.9 64.9 17.6 .. 64.4 4.930 C6te d'Ivoire 9.9 43.5 12.9 2.2 14.8 89.3 0.131 Zimbabwe 8.2 48.0 36.3 5.8 .. 81.8 0.3

32 Swaziland 0.7 36.0 25.6 3.5 .. 98.3 -66.533 Botswana 1.0 181.0 102.6 11.7 50.5 63.2 15.634 Mauritius 1.0 62.3 35.5 3.5 18.9 68.7 12.7

Middle-income oil exporters 117.7t 12.2w 4.1w 0.5w 1.7w 7 4

.2w 4.8w

35 Nigeria 96.8 8.1 0.3 (.) 0.4 44.2 0.736 Cameroon 9.9 28.1 19.0 2.5 9.9 82.2 6.137 Congo, People's Rep. 1.8 64.1 54.4 5.3 14.0 68.7 15.5

38 Gabon 0.8 96.1 94.5 2.5 6.9 89.3 3.639 Angola 8.4 20.9 11.1 1.3 .. 62.0 2.1

Sub-Saharan Africa 410.9t 2 3

.6w 18.3w 5.6w 13.3w 60.

4w 5.4w

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Table 19. Disbursements of official development assistance

Grants as percentageof net ODA

Net disbursements (millions of dollars) (1983-84 average)

Total Technical

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 grants assistance

Low-income economies 3,517.1t 4,715.Ot 5,397.4t 5,567.5t 5,616.3t 5,542.9t 5,618.7t 67.9w 25.8w

1 Ethiopia 139.7 190.6 216.0 249.5 199.7 343.8 363.1 71.2 20.52 Mali 162.8 193.4 267.3 230.3 210.3 214.6 320.2 59.0 21.22 Zaire 316.9 416.4 427.5 393.6 348.2 317.2 313.8 61.0 35.8

4 Burkina 159.4 198.4 212.3 216.8 212.8 183.5 188.4 78.2 36.8

5 Guinea-Bissau 50.1 52.8 59.5 65.2 68.2 64.3 55.1 74.1 23.56 Niger 156.5 174.3 170.1 193.4 259.3 175.3 162.0 75.6 36.3

7 Malawi 98.5 141.7 143.3 137.6 121.2 116.8 158.5 54.1 27.08 Tanzania 424.1 588.3 678.0 701.8 682.5 620.7 558.7 72.5 26.49 Burundi 74.5 95.1 117.2 122.0 126.7 142.0 140.5 63.1 31.8

10 Uganda 22.7 46.3 113.6 135.8 132.8 136.7 163.9 69.5 22.111 Togo 102.5 109.7 91.0 62.9 77.2 112.2 109.8 56.0 25.912 Gambia 35.5 36.6 54.4 68.2 47.6 42.2 55.9 78.3 31.2

13 Somalia 211.5 178.9 433.4 374.0 462.1 327.4 363.0 63.2 32.014 Benin 62.2 84.8 91.1 81.6 80.3 87.1 77.4 63.9 32.815 Central African Rep. 51.3 83.6 111.0 101.6 89.7 93.2 113.8 76.6 32.8

16 Madagascar 90.9 138.0 230.1 234.3 251.0 184.7 156.3 49.8 21.517 Rwanda 125.3 148.3 155.3 153.6 150.6 150.5 164.6 76.7 33.818 Guinea 60.3 55.9 89.5 106.7 90.1 67.6 123.1 57.5 17.0

19 Kenya 247.5 350.5 396.5 449.3 484.9 402.1 430.9 67.3 28.020 Sierra Leone 40.2 53.5 92.9 60.9 82.2 66.1 60.6 66.6 30.521 Sudan 318.1 670.5 588.4 680.6 739.9 956.6 616.2 66.6 15.8

22 Ghana 113.9 169.3 192.5 147.7 141.6 109.9 215.9 63.4 16.723 Senegal 222.6 306.7 262.1 396.8 284.8 322.2 332.7 68.4 33.224 Chad 125.0 85.6 35.3 59.7 64.7 95.3 115.2 96.4 19.225 Mozambique 105.1 145.8 169.1 143.6 207.9 210.9 259.1 80.8 19.4

Middle-income oil importers 818.8t 945.8t 1,246-Ot 1,199.6t 1,230.5t 1,153.3t 1,218.6t 6 9

.2w 29.1w

26 Mauritania 238.1 167.1 175.9 231.4 193.2 171.9 168.4 58.2 18.827 Liberia 48.0 80.8 97.9 108.5 108.9 118.4 133.2 60.2 21.728 Zambia 184.6 277.4 317.9 230.9 308.8 215.7 238.2 67.4 30.8

29 Lesotho 50.1 64.2 90.8 101.0 89.6 104.3 97.3 83.2 32.130 C6te d'Ivoire 131.4 161.5 210.3 123.7 136.8 156.9 128.0 59.0 50.931 Zimbabwe 9.2 12.5 164.1 212.3 215.8 208.3 297.5 73.3 19.3

32 Swaziland 44.6 50.4 49.9 36.6 28.1 33.5 17.9 106.4 65.633 Botswana 69.0 99.7 106.1 96.9 101.5 103.6 102.6 87.1 36.534 Mauritius 43.8 32.2 33.1 58.3 47.8 40.7 35.5 58.8 21.7

Middle-income oil exporters 392.8t 471.9t 501.2t 424.9t 464.6t 426.1t 487.4t 70.9w 42.0w

35 Nigeria 42.7 26.8 35.7 40.7 36.8 47.7 32.8 113.2 104.536 Cameroon 178.1 270.4 265.0 198.7 212.4 129.7 187.9 61.6 40.637 Congo, People's Rep. 81.1 90.9 92.1 81.0 93.1 108.5 97.9 52.2 32.4

38 Gabon 43.9 36.7 55.8 43.5 62.3 64.0 75.6 85.2 39.039 Angola 47.0 47.1 52.6 61.0 60.0 76.2 93.2 79.6 29.0

Sub-Saharan Africa 4,728.7t 6,132.7t 7,144.6t 7,192.Ot 7,311.4t 7,122.3t 7,324.7t 68.3w 27.4w

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Table 20. Food aid imports

Thousands of metric tons, grain equivalent Kilograms per capita1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980 1981 1982 1983 1994

Low-income economies 1,268.7t 1,999.7t 1,916.6t 2,109.1t 2,123.6t 5.7w 8.6w 8.0w 8.6w 8.3w

1 Ethiopia I11.4 227.9 189.7 344.0 171.9 3.6 7.2 5.8 10.2 4.92 Mali 21.8 50.2 66.4 88.1 110.9 3.3 7.3 9.0 11.7 14.43 Zaire 6 9.3 77.0 97.5 109.6 53.4 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.5 1.7

4 Burkina ^16.5 51.2 80.9 45.4 57.3 5.9 8.1 12.7 7.0 8.7

5 Guinea-Bissau 17.6 26.2 30.3 34.9 19.4 22.8 33.2 35.6 40.6 22.^6 Niger 9.1 11.0 71.4 11.8 12.7 1.6 1.9 12.7 2.0 2.1

7 Malawi 4.7 16.7 2.0 2.6 3.4 0.8 2.7 0.3 0.4 0.S8 Tanzania R9.3 236.8 307.5 171.4 135.5 4.9 12.7 15.5 8.4 6.49 Burundi 8.2 11.7 9.0 6.6 11.4 2.0 2.8 2.1 1.5 2.5

I0 Uganda 16.7 56.9 48.5 14.3 10.4 t.3 4.4 3.4 1.0 0.711 Tono 7.4 4.2 4.6 6.7 8.8 2.9 1.6 1.7 2.4 3.112 Gambia 6.8 17.2 21.0 12.8 18.8 11.5 28.5 32.8 20.8 29.3

13 Somalia 136.8 330.2 185.9 188.5 176.6 32.0 75.2 36.5 35.8 32.614 Benin 5.0 11.1 8.3 14.0 5.6 1.4 3.1 2.3 3.8 1.515 Central African Rep. 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.5 7.6 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.8 3.0

16 Madagascar 13.6 25.7 87.1 141.0 74.0 1.6 2.9 9.5 15.0 7.617 Rwanda 14.3 14.8 12.6 11.9 25.3 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.1 4.318 Guinea 24.2 33.8 38.6 25.0 42.6 4.5 6.1 7.6 4.8 8.0

20 Kenya 86.4 172.8 127.2 164.5 121.8 5.2 10.0 7.1 8.8 6.219 Sierra Leone 36.4 11.8 28.9 29.0 15.9 10.5 3.3 8.5 8.4 4.520 Sudan 212.3 194.5 194.1 330.0 450.4 11.4 13.1 9.8 16.2 21.';

21 Ghana 110.0 94.3 43.1 58.4 73.8 9.6 8.0 3.5 4.6 5.'23 Senegal 60.7 152.6 82.7 91.0 150.5 10.6 26.0 13.7 14.4 23.724 Chad 16.2 14.0 28.6 36.0 68.8 3.6 3.1 6.1 7.5 14.025 Mozambique 151.0 154.6 148.5 167.0 296.8 12.5 12.4 11.5 12.5 21.,7

Middle-income oil importers 265.2t 311.3t 313.9t 274.4t 442.2t 12.5w 10.

8w 10.

4w 8.Sw 13.64

26 Mauritania 22.9 106.0 86.4 71.3 128.8 15.0 67.9 49.9 40.1 70.427 Liberia 3.2 26.3 42.4 57.4 47.0 1.7 13.5 21.4 28.1 22.128 Zambia 166.5 84.4 100.0 83.4 76.1 29.5 14.4 16.6 13.4 11.fl

29 Lesorho 28.6 44.0 34.2 27.5 50.2 21.3 32.1 24.3 19.1 34.1

33 C6te d'Ivoire 2.0 (.) 0.9 (.) (.) 0.2 (.) 0.1 (. .31 Zimbabwe (.) 17.7 (.) 6.4 75.9 (.) 2.5 (.) 0.8 9.E

32 Swaziland 3.5 0.9 1.0 3.6 10.4 0.8 1.4 1.7 5.9 16.E33 Botswana 20.0 11.3 6.5 11.9 31.9 22.2 12.2 6.6 11.8 30.434 Mauritius 21.5 20.7 42.5 12.9 21.9 22.5 21.3 44.7 13.4 22.2

Middle-income oil exporters 13.7t 35.7t 86.8t 74.2t 70.8t 0.2w 0.3w 0.8w 0.7w O.6w

35 Nigeria (.) (.) 1.4 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)36 Cameroon 3.6 9.3 10.5 5.6 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.137 Congo, People's Rep. 41.2 1.7 0.4 8.8 0.7 2.6 1.0 0.2 5.3 0.4

38 Gabon (.) (.)39 Angola 10.9 24.7 74.5 59.8 68.9 1.4 3.2 9.2 7.2 8.1

Sub-Saharan Africa 1,552.6t 2,346.7t 2,317.3t 2,457.7t 2,636.6t 4.4w 6.4w 6.

2w 6.

4w 6.6w

- 87 -

able 21. Growth of agricultureannual growth rate; percent)

Volume of production Production per capita

Total TotalFood agriculture Food agriculture

1969-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84 1969-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84

iw-income economies 0.7w 0.2w 2.2w -0.2w -1.9w -2.6w -0.4w -3 .0w

I Ethiopia 0.3 2.1 1.2 2.3 -2.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.42 Mali -6.4 3.1 -0.3 3.4 -8.8 0.5 -2.8 0.83 Zaire 1.4 0.9 1.9 1.9 -0.7 -1.6 -0.2 -0.6

4 Burkina -2.9 2.2 (.) 2.3 -4.8 0.4 -1.9 0.55 Guinea-Bissau -1.2 1.8 -1.5 -0.1 -2.4 -2.2 -2.7 -4.06 Niger -9.3 6.0 -2.8 5.3 -11.6 2.9 -5.3 2.2

7 Malawi 5.6 2.6 5.0 3.0 2.7 -0.5 2.1 -0.18 Tanzania 0.9 2.2 2.0 2.8 -2.1 -1.2 -1.1 -0.69 Burundi 3.3 1.1 2.3 1.2 1.9 -1.2 0.9 -1.1

10 Uganda 1.4 1.6 2.6 1.3 -1.9 -1.2 -0.8 -1.511 Togo 0.2 2.9 1.5 2.3 -2.5 0.2 -1.3 -0.412 Gambia 0.1 1.2 -0.4 -1.4 -2.0 -2.2 -2.4 -4.7

13 Somalia 2.3 -2.3 1.7 1.8 -1.2 -5.0 -1.7 -1.014 Benin 1.0 1.8 3.4 2.1 -1.6 -1.0 0.8 -0.715 Central African Rep. 3.1 1.9 2.8 1.1 1.5 -0.4 1.2 -1.2

16 Madagascar 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 -1.317 Rwanda 2.5 4.5 5.7 4.9 -0.6 1.1 2.5 1.518 Guinea -0.6 0.7 1.9 0.2 -2.4 -1.3 0.1 -1.8

19 Kenya 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 -0.9 -1.3 -1.2 -1.620 Sierra Leone -1.4 0.2 1.3 1.5 -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 -0.621 Sudan 2.1 1.5 4.2 1.3 -0.5 -1.6 1.6 -1.8

22 Ghana 1.2 -1.0 3.1 -2.1 -1.0 -4.1 0.9 -5.123 Senegal -5.2 -0.4 -3.2 -0.3 -7.4 -3.1 -5.5 -3.024 Chad -3.6 3.3 -1.4 1.7 -5.3 1.1 -3.1 -0.525 Mozambique 2.4 -2.2 3.3 -2.2 0.1 -4.7 1.0 -4.7

'ddle-income oil importers 3.0w 3.4w 3 .2w 2.5w -0.3w -O.lw -0.1w -1.Ow

26 Mauritania -8.0 2.7 -2.2 2.8 -10.1 0.5 -4.4 0.627 Liberia 3.4 1.6 3.8 1.2 0.6 -1.6 1.0 -2.028 Zambia 3.3 1.4 2.9 0.6 0.3 -1.7 -0.1 -2.5

29 Lesotho 0.6 0.6 0.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.9 -1.6 -4.130 C6te d'Ivoire 3.2 6.1 4.2 4.3 -1.3 1.5 -0.4 -0.231 Zimbabwe 5.4 0.3 3.3 0.9 1.9 -2.9 -0.1 -2.3

32 Swaziland 6.3 3.7 6.0 5.1 3.1 0.3 2.8 1.633 Botswana 3.1 0.6 2.0 -1.2 0.1 -3.6 -1.0 -5.434 Mauritius 3.7 0.3 0.9 (.) 1.7 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4

iddle-income oil exporters -1.0w 2.5w 1.4w 2.6w -3.6w -0.2w -1.0w -O.1w

35 Nigeria -2.0 2.8 1.1 3.5 -4.4 (.) -1.4 0.736 Cameroon 4.9 2.2 4.2 0.6 2.4 -0.9 1.8 -2.437 Congo, People's Rep. 0.3 0.9 1.9 2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -0.7 -1.0

38 Gabon -3.3 2.2 -0.7 1.4 -3.5 0.7 -0.9 -0.139 Angola 0.4 0.3 1.5 -2.5 -1.8 -2.2 -0.7 -5.0

ib-Saharan Africa 0.3w 1.2w 2.0w 1.0w -2.3w -1.7w -0.7w -1.9w

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Table 22. Production of major crops

Annual changeAverage annual volume in volume

(thousands of metric tons) (percent)Crop 1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84

CerealsMaize

Oil exporters 1,792 2,211 -0.1 2.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 9,894 12,409 4.1 0.5Total sub-Saharan Africa 11,686 14,620 3.5 0.7

MilletOil exporters 2,985 3,355 1.7 0.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 5,205 5,551 -1.0 0.6Total sub-Saharan Africa 8,190 8,906 (.) 0.7

Rice (paddy)Oil exporters 397 865 7.8 11.2Other sub-Saharan Africa 4,086 5,042 3.1 0.6Total sub-Sabaran Africa 4,483 5,906 3.5 2.1

SorghumOil exporters 3,426 3,531 0.1 -1.0Other sub-Saharan Africa 4,831 6,241 2.1 1.9Total sub-Saharan Africa 8,258 9,772 1.2 0.8

WheatOil exporters 37 37 -4.6 4.7Other sub-Saharan Africa 1,121 1,361 3.5 1.5Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,158 1,398 3.2 1.6

Total cerealsOil exporters 8,678 10,053 0.9 1.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 27,253 32,939 2.1 1.0Total sub-Saharan Africa 35,931 42,992 1.8 1.1

oil and oilseedsCoconutsOil exporters 92 93 -0.8 0.2Other sub-Saharan Africa 1,171 1,293 3.1 0.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,263 1,386 2.7 0.7

Groundnuts (in shell)Oil exporters 1,722 670 -9.9 (.)Other sub-Saharan Africa 3,317 3,662 1.0 -2.8Total sub-Saharan Africa 5,039 4,332 -2.2 -2.4

Palm kernelsOil exporters 362 370 -5.2 3.0Other sub-Saharan Africa 344 332 3.0 -1.3Total sub-Saharan Africa 706 702 -1.6 0.9

Palm oilOil exporters 693 805 0.9 1.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 424 513 4.3 0.3Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,118 1,318 2.0 1.2

Other cropsPulsesOil exporters 839 1,003 0.1 1.9Other sub-Saharan Africa 2,919 3,568 3.6 2.1Total sub-Saharan Africa 3,758 4,571 2.9 2.1

Roots and tubersOil exporters 28,046 34,279 2.9 1.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 35,736 44,583 1.4 2.4Total sub-Saharan Africa 63,782 78,862 2.0 2.0

Seed cottonOil exporters 258 223 2.7 -4.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 1,736 1,745 5.6 0.1Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,994 1,968 5.2 -0.4

SugarOil exporters 190 186 2.8 3.6Other sub-Saharan Africa 2,082 2,888 4.8 4.1Total sub-Saharan Africa 2,272 3,074 4.6 4.1

Note: Major crops that are totally or nearly totally exported (such as coffee, tea, cocoa, andrubber) are shown in Table 24, which covers exports of agricultural commodities.

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Table 23. Agricultural imports

AnnualAverage annual volume change in volume Average annual value

(thousands of metric tons) (percent) (millions of dollars)Commodity 1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84

RiceOil exporters 22 422 15.4 39.1 4 204Other sub-Saharan Africa 635 1,344 3.4 12.5 97 424Total sub-Saharan Africa 657 1,766 3.8 15.2 101 628

WheatOil exporters 319 1,082 20.9 11.6 32 220Other sub-Saharan Africa 644 1,422 11.9 7.5 53 256Total sub-Saharan Africa 963 2,504 14.4 9.2 85 476

MaizeOil exporters 3 182 53.3 45.3 (.) 45Other sub-Saharan Africa 282 802 9.2 11.4 22 151Total sub-Saharan Africa 285 984 9.3 14.1 23 196

Total cerealsOil exporters 468 1,948 15.4 16.4 47 526Other sub-Saharan Africa 2,285 4,441 5.6 9.0 233 1,004Total sub-Saharan Africa 2,753 6,389 7.0 10.7 280 1,530

Dairy products aOil exporters .. .. -2.9 b 9.3 b 29 197Other sub-Saharan Africa .. .. 2.8 b 2.0 b 73 242Total sub-Saharan Africa .. .. 1.9 b 3.4 b 102 439

SugarOil exporters 1 1 -3.1 -55.5 (.) (.)

Other sub-Saharan Africa 45 42 -17.1 14.1 6 15Total sub-Saharan Africa 46 43 -17.3 12.2 6 15

MeatOil exporters 5 31 -0.5 30.4 3 54Other sub-Saharan Africa 21 27 1.7 3.8 14 40Total sub-Saharan Africa 26 58 1.3 14.4 17 94

Animal and vegetable oilsOil exporters 41 193 8.4 40.5 5 131Other sub-Saharan Africa 185 253 5.3 11.4 38 165Total sub-Saharan Africa 226 446 5.4 17.7 43 296

Total agricultural imports cOil exporters .. .. .. .. 233 1,862Other sub-Saharan Africa .. .. .. .. 902 2,778Total sub-Saharan Africa .. .. .. .. 1,135 4,640

a. Cheese, butter, and milk.b. See Technical Notes.c. Includes products not listed above.

- 90 -

Table 24. Major agricultural exports: Growth and shares

Average annual Annual change Sub-Saharan exports asvolume, 1973-84 in volume percentage of total commodity exports(thousands of (percent) Of developing countries Of the world

Commodity metric tons) 1965-73 1973-84 1969-71 1979-81 1982-84 1969-71 1979-81 1982-84

BeveragesCocoaOil exporters 252 -0.8 -2.6Other sub-Saharan Africa 535 0.4 0.3Total sub-Saharan Africa 787 (.) -0.6 76.7 72.2 67.3 75.9 68.8 63.1

CoffeeOil exporters 180 2.6 -8.9Other sub-Saharan Africa 835 3.7 -0.4Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,015 3.4 -2.0 30.0 27.1 25.1 29.3 25.6 23.8

TeaOil exporters 1 1.5 16.1Other sub-Saharan Africa 169 9.8 3.6Total sub-Saharan Africa 170 9.7 3.7 17.4 20.6 21.5 14.4 19.1 19.7

CerealsMaizeOil exporters 16 1.4 -62.9Other sub-Saharan Africa 486 14.6 -8.4Total sub-Saharan Africa 502 9.4 -9.3 3.9 1.8 3.5 1.4 0.3 0.7

WheatOil exporters (.) -32.1 -21.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 9 -3.9 -16.0Total sub-Saharan Africa 9 -3.9 -17.8 1.4 0.2 (.) 0.1 (.) (.)

RiceOil exporters 3 8.4 0.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 19 4.9 -17.2Total sub-Saharan Africa 22 5.3 -14.7 1.8 0.2 (.) 0.8 0.1 (.)

Cereals not elsewhere statedOil exporters (.) -23.9 -21.7Other sub-Saharan Africa 214 -3.1 5.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 214 -3.3 5.6 3.6 7.3 4.6 1.4 2.6 2.0

Oils and oilseedsGroundnut oil

oil exporters 11 -5.6 -57.4Other sub-Saharan Africa 171 -2.4 -3.3Total sub-Saharan Africa 182 -2.6 -6.0 70.2 33.7 46.6 57.6 27.0 38.3

Groundnuts (shelled)Oil exporters 25 -18.3 -47.9Other sub-Saharan Africa 225 -9.5 -13.1Total sub-Saharan Africa 250 -12.9 -15.5 77.3 26.1 23.1 69.1 16.3 15.0

Oilseed cake and mealOil exporters 74 0.4 -8.5Other sub-Saharan Africa 597 1.1 -4.5Total sub-Saharan Africa 671 1.0 -5.2 17.1 4.6 3.0 8.3 2.5 1.7

Palm kernel oilOil exporters 35 16.6 1.5Other sub-Saharan Africa 44 2.1 -2.0Total sub-Saharan Africa 79 4.6 -0.5 81.8 27.6 15.2 54.8 25.5 14.0

(continued)

- 91 -

Table 24 (continued)

Average annual Annual change Sub-Saharan exports asvolume, 1973-84 in volume percentage of total commodity exports(thousands of (percent) Of developing countries Of the world

Commodity metric tons) 1965-73 1973-84 1969-71 1979-81 1982-84 1969-71 1979-81 1982-84

Oil and oilseeds (continued)Palm kernelsOil exporters 129 -8.8 -15.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 55 -2.0 -8.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 184 -6.9 -12.7 82.4 74.5 70.4 82.2 73.7 70.0

Palm oilOil exporters 13 -33.0 -6.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 106 6.0 -8.2Total sub-Saharan Africa 119 -6.3 -8.3 17.1 3.0 2.0 16.4 2.9 1.9

Sesame seedOil exporters 1 -21.9 9.0Other sub-Saharan Africa 107 6.6 -9.5Total sub-Saharan Africa 108 4.4 -9.7 78.1 28.2 26.0 75.3 28.1 25.6

OtherBananasOil exporters 97 7.7 -10.7Other sub-Saharan Africa 197 -0.9 -6.6Total sub-Saharan Africa 294 0.9 -7.9 7.1 3.8 3.1 6.5 3.5 2.9

CottonOil exporters 30 -0.5 -1.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 443 7.0 -0.8Total sub-Saharan Africa 473 6.3 -0.9 23.1 22.8 23.4 15.5 10.1 10.8

RubberOil exporters 44 -2.6 -6.3Other sub-Saharan Africa 117 6.7 -0.9Total sub-Saharan Africa 161 2.9 -2.4 7.0 4.4 4.6 6.8 4.3 4.5

SisalOil exporters 17 2.6 -24.5Other sub-Saharan Africa 135 -5.3 -7.7Total sub-Saharan Africa 152 -3.9 -9.6 61.1 56.1 54.6 59.7 55.6 53.9

SugarOil exporters 21 -3.8 0.5Other sub-Saharan Africa 1,254 2.8 2.2Total sub-Saharan Africa 1,275 2.4 2.2 12.8 7.2 7.3 5.6 4.8 4.9

TobaccoOil exporters 5 4.0 -7.8Other sub-Saharan Africa 139 1.3 3.2Total sub-Saharan Africa 144 1.4 2.8 14.6 18.7 17.6 8.2 11.7 11.0

- 92 -

Table 25. Population growth and projections

Hypothetical AssumedAnnual growth size of year ofof population Population stationary reaching net Population

(percent) (millions) population reproduction momentum1965-73 1973-83 1980-2000 1983 1990 2000 (millions) rate of 1 1985

Low-income economies 2.6w 2.8w 3.1w 253t 312t 423t

1 Ethiopia 2.6 2.7 2.6 41 48 64 181 2035 1.92 Mali 2.6 2.5 2.5 7 9 11 37 2035 1.93 Zaire 2.1 2.5 3.1 30 37 50 145 2030 1.9

4 Burkina 2.0 1.9 2.0 6 7 9 32 2040 1.85 Guinea-Bissau 1.2 4.3 2.1 1 1 1 4 .. 1.86 Niger 2.6 3.0 3.2 6 8 11 40 2040 2.0

7 Malawi 2.8 3.0 3.1 7 8 11 38 2040 2.08 Tanzania 3.1 3.3 3.4 21 27 37 125 2035 2.09 Burundi 1.4 2.2 2.9 4 5 7 24 2035 1.9

10 Uganda 3.4 2.8 3.3 14 18 25 83 2035 2.011 Togo 2.8 2.6 3.2 3 4 5 16 2035 2.012 Gambia 3.0 3.6 2.7 1 1 1 3 .. 1.9

13 Somalia 3.5 2.8 3.0 5 6 8 31 2040 1.914 Benin 2.6 2.8 3.1 4 5 6 21 2035 2.0

15 Central African Rep. 1.6 2.3 2.7 2 3 4 12 2035 1.9

16 Madagascar 2.4 2.6 3.1 9 12 16 55 2035 1.917 Rwanda 3.1 3.4 3.4 6 7 10 40 2040 2.018 Guinea 1.8 2.0 2.1 6 7 8 25 2045 1.8

19 Kenya 3.7 4.0 3.9 19 25 36 120 2030 2.120 Sierra Leone 1.7 2.1 2.3 4 4 5 17 2045 1.821 Sudan 2.6 3.2 2.8 21 25 33 102 2035 1.9

22 Ghana 2.2 3.1 3.5 13 17 23 64 2025 2.023 Senegal 2.4 2.8 2.9 6 8 10 30 2035 1.924 Chad 1.8 2.1 2.4 5 6 7 22 2040 1.825 Mozambique 2.3 2.6 2.9 13 16 22 70 2035 2.0

Middle-income oil importers 3.3w 3.5w 3.4w 31t 40t 55t

26 Mauritania 2.3 2.2 2.6 2 2 3 8 2035 1.827 Liberia 2.8 3.3 3.1 2 3 3 11 2035 1.928 Zambia 3.0 3.2 3.3 6 8 11 33 2030 2.0

29 Lesotho 2.1 2.5 2.6 1 2 2 6 2030 1.8

30 Cote d'Ivoire 4.6 4.6 3.6 9 13 17 47 2030 2.031 Zimbabwe 3.4 3.2 3.6 8 10 14 39 2025 2.1

32 Swaziland 3.1 3.4 3.3 1 1 1 5 .. 2.033 Botswana 3.0 4.5 3.5 1 1 2 6 .. 1.934 Mauritius 2.0 1.4 1.6 1 1 1 2 .. 1.8

Middle-income oil exporters 2.5w 2.7w 3.3w 114t 143t 197t

35 Nigeria 2.5 2.7 3.3 94 118 163 532 2035 2.036 Cameroon 2.4 3.1 3.2 10 12 17 52 2030 1.937 Congo, People's Rep. 2.6 3.1 3.7 2 2 3 9 2020 1.9

38 Gabon 0.2 1.4 2.6 1 1 1 3 .. 1.739 Angola 2.2 2.6 2.8 8 10 13 44 2040 1.9

Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6w 2.9w 3.2w 398t 496t 675t

All lower-income economies 2.6w 2.0w 1.8w 2,342t 2,663t 3,154t

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 2.5w 2.5w 2.3w 665t 787t 977t

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 2.

4w 2.3w

2.1w 501t 587t 713t

Industrial market economies 1.0w 0.7w 0.4w 729t 752t 782t

- 93 -

Table 26. Demographic and fertility-related indicators

Crude Crude Percentage Percentage ofbirth death change married women

rate per rate per Crude Crude Total of childbearing

thousand thousand birth death fertility age usingpopulation population rate rate rate contraceptiona

m

1965 1983 1965 1983 1965-83 1965-83 1983 2000 1970 1982

Low-income economies 48w

4 7w 22w 1

8w -2.0w -19.9w 6.6w 5.6w

1 Ethiopia 44 41 19 20 -6.9 6.8 5.5 5.1 .. 22 Mali 50 48 27 21 -4.6 -22.2 6.5 5.9 ..

3 Zaire 48 46 23 16 -4.0 -32.6 6.3 5.3 .. 3

4 Burkina 46 47 24 21 3.3 -12.5 6.5 6.0 .. 15 Guinea-Bissau 46 47 30 27 2.2 -9.6 6.0 6.26 Niger 48 52 25 20 7.3 -22.4 7.0 6.4..

7 Malawi 56 54 29 23 -3.6 -20.1 7.6 6.4..18 Tanzania 49 50 22 16 2.5 -27.3 7.0 5.8 .

9 Burundi 47 47 24 19 -1.1 -22.6 6.5 5.9 .

10 UJganda 49 50 19 17 2.2 -12.4 7.0 5.8 .

11 Togo 50 49 23 18 -1.2 -20.4 6.5 5.412 Gambia 47 49 28 23 3.8 -17.8 6.5 6.2 .. 5

13 Somalia 50 50 28 20 -0.4 -27.0 6.8 6.2 . 114 Benin 49 49 25 18 0.4 -26.8 6.5 5.4 .. 1815 Central African Rep. 43 41 24 17 -4.7 -31.7 5.5 5.5

16 Madagascar 44 47 21 18 6.9 -17.0 6.5 5.917 Rwanda 52 52 17 19 0.8 11.8 8.0 6.7 .. 118 Guinea 46 47 30 27 2.2 -9.8 6.0 5.6 ..

19 K(enya 51 55 17 12 7.3 -29.4 8.0 5.7 6 820 Sierra Leone 48 49 33 27 2.3 -19.2 6.5 6.1 .. 421 Sudan 47 46 24 17 -2.1 -27.2 6.6 5.5 .. 5

22 Ghana 50 49 16 10 -1.8 -35.9 7.0 4.8 .. 1023 Senegal 47 46 23 19 1.7 -19.2 6.6 5.6 .. 424 Chad 40 42 26 21 5.2 -19.2 5.5 5.6 .. 125 Mozambique 49 46 27 19 -6.1 -29.6 6.5 5.9 .. 1

Middle-income oil importers 48w 47w 19w 15w -2.1w -23.2w 6.6w 5.1w

26 Mauaritania 44 43 25 19 -3.0 -26.2 6.0 5.9 . 127 Liberia 46 49 22 18 6.1 -18.2 6.9 5.728 Zambia 49 50 20 16 1.7 -21.4 6.7 5.5 .

29 Lesotho 42 42 18 15() -17.0 5.8 4.8 . 5

30 C6te d'Ivoire 44 46 22 14 5.1 -34.9 6.6 4.9 . 331 Zimbabwe 55 53 14 13 -4.4 -9.3 7.0 4.8 . 22

32 Swaziland 50 51 21 14 2.0 -30.6 7.0 6.533 Botswana 53 44 12 9 -16.8 -20.7 6.5 5.934 Mauritius 37 25 8 7 -33.1 -12.5 2.8 2.3 .5

Middle-income oil exporters SOw 49w 23w 17w -2.9w -27.8w 6.8w 5.

7w

35 Nigeria 51 50 23 17 -3.5 -26.8 6.9 5.7 . 636 Cameroon 40 46 20 15 16.3 -25.0 6.5 5.6 . 1137 Congo, People's Rep. 41 43 14 8 5.6 -43.9 6.0 5.5

38 Gabon 32 35 22 17 10.8 -24.8 4.5 5.739 Angola 49 49 29 22 -1.6 -25.3 6.5 6.0

Sub-Saharan Africa 48w 47w 22w 17w -2.2w -21.5w 6.6w 5.6w

All low-income economies 43w 30w 1

7w 11w -30.3w -3

8.7w

4.Ow 3.1w

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 45w 36w 18w 12w -18.4w -34.5w 4.9w 3.6w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies

38w 31w 12w 8w -16.8w -29.9w

4.1w 3.1w

Industrial market economies 19w 14w low

9w -2

8.6w -

7.3lw 1.7w 1.9w

a. Figures include women whose husbands practice contraception.

- 94 -

Table 27. Labor force

Percentage ofpopulation of Annual growth rateworking age Percentage of labor force of labor force

(15-64 years) In agriculture In industry In services (percent)1965 1983 1965 1981 1965 1981 1965 1981 1965-73 1973-83 1980-2000

Low-income economies 52w 51w 8 4w 7 8w 7w lOw 9w 13w 2.2w 2.2w 2.8w

I Ethiopia 53 52 86 80 6 7 8 13 2.2 1.4 2.22 Mali 53 50 93 73 4 12 3 15 2.2 2.0 2.63 Zaire 53 51 81 75 10 13 9 12 1.8 2.2 3.0

4 Burkina 54 52 90 82 6 13 4 5 1.6 1.5 2.15 Guinea-Bissau .. 53 89 83 5 6 6 11 .. .. 2.86 Niger 51 51 94 91 1 3 5 6 2.4 3.0 3.1

7 Malawi 51 49 91 86 4 5 5 9 2.4 2.8 2.88 Tanzania 53 50 88 83 5 6 8 11 2.5 2.5 3.19 Burundi 54 53 89 84 4 5 7 11 1.2 1.6 2.5

10 Uganda 53 50 88 83 5 6 7 11 3.0 1.7 3.411 Togo 53 50 81 67 10 15 9 18 2.2 1.9 2.912 Gambia 54 55 84 70 a 8 9a 8 12 1.8 3.5 1.8

13 Somalia 49 53 87 82 5 8 8 10 3.8 2.0 1.714 Benin 53 50 52 46 10 16 38 38 2.1 2.0 2.715 Central African Rep. 57 55 93 88 3 4 4 8 1.1 1.6 2.4

16 Madagascar 54 50 92 87 3 4 5 9 1.9 1.7 3.017 Rwanda 52 51 94 91 1 2 5 7 2.7 3.0 3.218 Guinea 55 53 87 82 7 11 6 7 1.2 1.3 2.4

19 Kenya 49 46 84 78 6 10 10 12 3.2 2.9 4.020 Sierra Leone 54 55 75 65 14 19 11 16 0.7 1.2 1.721 Sudan 53 52 84 78 7 10 9 12 2.5 2.5 2.9

22 Ghana 52 49 61 53 16 20 23 27 1.6 2.0 3.823 Senegal 54 53 82 77 6 10 12 13 1.7 2.2 2.624 Chad 56 56 93 85 3 7 4 8 1.6 2.3 2.325 Mozambique 56 52 77 66 10 18 13 16 2.2 3.0 2.9

Middle-income oil importers 53w 51w 7 7 w 6 8 w 8 w 14 w 15w 20w 3.0w 2 .8w 2.2w

26 Mauritania 52 53 90 69 4 8 6 23 1.9 2.4 2.027 Liberia 51 53 78 70 11 14 11 16 2.0 3.9 2.828 Zambia 52 49 76 67 8 11 16 22 2.3 2.1 3.3

29 Lesotho 56 54 92 60 3 15 5 25 1.7 1.9 2.530 C6te d'Ivoire 55 53 87 79 3 4 10 17 4.2 3.8 3.331 Zimbabwe 51 46 67 60 12 15 21 25 2.7 1.4 4.4

32 Swaziland 53 50 86 74 5 9 9 17 2.6 2.1 3.233 Botswana 50 48 90 78 4 8 6 14 2.2 4.2 3.134 Mauritius 52 62 37 29 26 24 37 47 2.8 2.3 2.2

Middle-income oil exporters 53w 50w 68w 57 w 12w 18w 20w 26w 1.7w 1.9w 3 . 2 w

35 Nigeria 52 50 67 54 12 19 21 27 1.8 2.0 3.336 Cameroon 56 51 86 83 6 7 8 10 1.9 1.8 3.237 Congo, People's Rep. 55 51 47 34 19 26 34 40 1.9 1.8 3.8

38 Gabon 62 58 83 77 8 11 9 12 0.5 -2.139 Angola 55 53 67 59 13 16 20 25 1.7 2.8 2.8

Sub-Saharan Africa 53w 51w 7 9 w 7 1w 8w 15w 1 3 w 16w 2.1w 2 .2w 2 . 9 w

All low-income economies 54w 59 w 7 7 w 7 3w 9 w 13 w 14w 15w 2.2w 2.1w 2.Ow

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 53w 55w 66w 54w 13w 17 w 22w 29w 2.1w 2.5w 2.5w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 54w 58w 4 5w 3 0w 21w 28 w 34 w 42w 2.3w 2.7w 2.5w

Industrial market economies 63w 67w 14w 6w 39w 38w 48w 56w 1.2w 1.2w 0.5w

a. Figures are for years other than those specified.

- 95 -

Table 28. Urbanization

urban population Percentage of uirban population Number ofAs percentage Annual in cities of cities of

of total growth rate In largest over 500,000 over 500,000population (percent) city _persons persons1965 1983 1965-73 1973-83 1960 1980 1q60 1980 1960 1980

Low-income economies 11w 20w 6.1w 6.1w 33w 40w 3w 37w it 14t

1 Ethiopia 8 15 7.4 6.0 30 37 0 37 0 12 Mali 13 19 5.4 4.4 32 24 0 0 0 03 Zaire 19 38 5.9 6.9 14 28 14 38 1 2

4 Burkina 6 11 6.5 4.8 .. 41 0 0 0 05 Guinea-Bissau 16 26 4.1 7.2 . . .

6 Niger 7 14 7.0 7.0 . 310 000

7 Malawi 5 11 8.2 7.3 .. 19 0 0 0 08 Tanzania 6 14 8.1 8.6 34 50 0 50 0 19 Burundi 2 2 1.4 3.2 . . 0 0 0 0

10 Uganda 6 7 8.3 0.3 38 52 0 52 0 111 Togo 11 22 6.4 6.6 .. 60 0 0 0 012 Gambia 16 30 6.4 6.5 . 0 0 0 0

13 Somalia 20 33 6.4 5.5 .. 34 0 0 0 014 Benin 11 16 4.5 4.7 .. 63 0 63 0 115 Central African Rep. 27 44 4.4 4.6 40 36 0 0 0 0

16 Madagascar 12 20 5.3 5.5 44 36 0 36 0 117 Rwanda 3 5 6.0 6.6 .. 0 0 0 0 018 Guinea 12 26 5.0 6.3 37 80 0 80 0 1

19 Kenya 9 17 7.3 8.0 40 57 0 57 0 120 Sierra Leone 15 23 5.0 3.3 37 47 0 0 0 021 Sudan 13 20 6.3 5.5 30 31 0 31 0 1

22 Ghana 26 38 4.5 5.3 25 35 0 48 0 223 Senegal 27 34 4.3 3.8 53 65 0 65 0 124 Chad 9 20 6.9 6.6 .. 39 0 0 0 025 Mozambique 5 17 8.2 10.2 75 83 0 83 0 1

Middle-income oil importers 19w 36w 6.8w 6.4w .. 38w Ow 33w Ot 3t

26 Mauritania 7 25 16.0 4.6 .. 39 0 0 0 027 Liberia 23 38 5.3 6.1 . 0 0 0 028 Zambia 24 47 7.6 6.5 . 5' 0 35 0 1

29 Lesotho 2 13 7.8 21.4 . 0 0 0 030 C6te d'lvoire 23 44 8.2 8.5 2 340 34 0 131 Zimbabwe 14 24 6.8 6.0 40 50 0 50 0 1

32 Swaziland 7 18 5.7 12.8 . . . .

33 Botswana 4 22 19.0 11.1 . . .

34 Mauritius 37 55 4.6 3.4 . . .

Middle-income oil exporters 15w 24w 5.0w 5.6w 17w 20w 19w 51w 2t lit

35 Nigeria 15 22 4.7 5.1 13 17 22 58 2 936 Cameroon 16 39 7.3 8.4 26 21 0 21 0 137 Congo, People's Rep. 35 55 4.4 5.5 77 56 0 0 0 0

38 Gabon 21 39 4.0 4.6 . . . .

39 Angola 13 23 5.9 6.0 4 40 6

Sub-Saharan Africa 13w 23w 6.Iw 6.1w 25w 34w 8w 41w 3t 28t

All low-income economies 17w 22w 4.4w 4.5w low 16w 31w 55w 55t 146tAll lower middle-incomeeconomies 26w 36w 5.1w 4.1w 27w 32w 28w 47w 22t 57t

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 49w 64w 4.0w 3.8w 28w 29w 38w 51w 32t 70t

Industrial market economies 71w 77w 1.7w 1.0w 18w 18w 48w 55w 104t 152t

- 96 -

Table 29. Health-related indicators

Daily calorie supplyPopulation per capita, 1982

Per physician Per nursing person As percentage1965 a 1980 a 1965 a 1980 a Total of requiremeni:

Low-income economies 38,007w 28,420w 4,572w

3,12

9w 2,106w 91w

1 Ethiopia 70,190 69,390 5,970 5,910 2,162 932 Mali 49,010 22,130 3,200 2,380 1,731 743 Zaire 39,050 13,940 .. 1,810 2,169 98

4 Burkina 74,110 48,510 4,170 4,950 1,879 795 Guinea-Bissau 21,100 8,840 4,770 980 2,241 686 Niger 71,440 38,790 6,210 4,650 2,456 105

7 Malawi 46,900 41,460 12,670 3,830 2,242 978 Tanzania 21,840 17,740 2,100 3,010 2,331 1019 Burundi 54,930 45,020 7,310 .. 2,206 95

10 Uganda 11,080 26,810 3,130 4,180 1,807 7811 Togo 24,980 18,100 4,990 1,430 2,167 9412 Gambia 27,930 12,310 1,780 1,770 2,207 86

13 Somalia 35,060 15,630 3,630 2,550 2,102 9114 Benin 28,790 16,980 2,540 1,660 2,154 10115 Central African Rep. 44,490 26,750 3,000 1,740 2,194 97

16 Madagascar 9,900 10,220 3,620 3,670 2,577 11417 Rwanda 74,170 31,340 7,450 9,790 2,202 9518 Guinea 54,610 17,110 4,750 2,570 1,987 86

19 Kenya 12,840 7,890 1,780 550 2,056 8820 Sierra Leone 18,400 17,520 4,890 2,040 2,049 8521 Sudan 23,500 8,930 3,360 1,430 2,250 96

22 Ghana 12,040 7,160 3,710 770 1,573 6823 Senegal 21,130 13,780 2,640 1,390 2,392 10124 Chad 73,040 47,640 13,620 3,860 1,620 6825 Mozambique 18,700 39,140 4,720 5,610 1,844 79

Middle-income oil importers 14,330w 8,154w 2,

987w 1,

492w 2,334w 100w

26 Mauritania 36,580 14,500 .. 2,100 2,228 9727 Liberia 12,450 8,550 2,300 2,940 2,267 9828 Zambia 11,390 7,670 5,820 1,730 2,054 89

29 Lesotho 22,930 18,640 4,700 .. 2,285 10030 Cote d'Ivoire 20,690 .. 1,850 .. 2,652 11531 Zimbabwe 5,190 5,900 990 940 2,119 89

32 Swaziland 7,920 7,900 7,760 1,040 2,570 9633 Botswana 22,090 .. 5,960 .. 2,445 9434 Mauritius 3,850 2,010 2,000 610 2,882 128

Middle-income oil exporters 40,376w 12,440w 5,128w 2,861w 2,389w 102w

35 Nigeria 44,990 12,550 5,780 3,010 2,443 10436 Cameroon 29,720 13,990 1,970 1,950 2,102 9137 Congo, People's Rep. 14,210 5,510 950 790 2,504 113

38 Gabon 9,510 3,030 800 .. 2,859 8839 Angola 12,000 .. 3,820 .. 2,041 87

Sub-Saharan Africa 37,067w 22,886w 4,639w 3,014w 2,205w 96w

All low-income economies 12,419w 5,556w 6,

762w 4,564w 2,408w 105w

All lower middle-incomeeconomies 18,399w 7,555w 4,891w 2,292w 2,

495w 10

9w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 2,507w 2,018w 2,0

76w 995w 2,

880w 119w

Industrial market economies 752w 554w 30

2w 180w 3,400w 133w

a. Figures for a large number of countries are for years other than those specified.

- 97 -

Table 30. Education

Number Numberenrolled in enrolled in

secondary higher educationNumber enrolled in primary school school as as percentage

as percentage of age group percentage of of age groupTotal Male - Female age group (20-24)

1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982 1965 1982

Low-income economies 39w 68w 50w 77w 28w 49w 4w 14w (.)w 1w

1 Ethiopia 11 46 a 16 60 a 6 33a 2 12 a 1 a2 Mali 24 27 a 32 35 a 16 20 a 49a a3 Zaire 70 90 a 95 104 a 4 75a 523 a 1a

4 Burkina 12 28 16 28 8 16 1 3a5 Guinea-Bissau 26 88 38 119 13 57 2 15(. )

6 Niger 11 23 a 15 29 a 7 17 a 1 5 a

7 Malawi 44 62 a 5 73a 32 51 a 2 4 a a. .

8 Tanzania 32 98 40 101 25 95 2 3 a9 Burundi 26 33 a 36 41 a 15 25 a 1 3a 1a

10 Uganda 67 60 83 69 50 51 4 8 .)1a

11 Togo 55 106 78 129 32 84 5 27 ()2 a12 Gambia 21 56 29 71 12 41 6 16

13 Somalia 10 30 a 16 3 8 a 4 2 1 a 2 1 1 a ()1 a14 Benin 34 65 48 87 21 42 3 21 2.a15 Central African Rep. 56 70 a 84 92 a 28 50 a 2 14 a 1 a

16 Madagascar 65 1 0 0 a 70 .. 59 .. 8 14 a 1 317 Rwanda 53 70 64 72 43 67 2 2 () (.) a18 Guinea 31 33 a 4 44a 19 22 a 5 16 3.)a

19 Kenya 54 104 69 114 40 94 4 20 a 1 a20 Sierra Leone 29 40 a 3721 5 12 a 1 a21 Sudan 29 52 a 37 6 1 a 21 4 3 a 4 1 8 a 12a

22 Ghana 69 76 82 85 57 66 13 34 1 1 a23 Senegal 40 48 a 52 58 a 29 38 a 7 ~.. 12 a 1 324 Chad 34 .. 56 .. 13 . 1 325 Mozambique 37 104 48 119 26 72 3 6C) (.

Middle-income oil importers 67w 94w 77w 103w 57w 87w 6w 20w (.)w 2w

26 Mauritania 13 3 3 a 19 4 3 a 6 2 3 a 1 1 0 a27 Liberia 41 66 a 59 82 a 23 5 a 520 a 2 a

.. 2 Zambia 53 9 6,a 59 1 0 2 a 46 9 0 a 7 1 6 a .. 2 a~

29 Lesotho 94 112 74 95 114 129 4 20 ) 2 a30 C6te d'Ivoire 60 7 6 a 80 9 2 a 41 6 0 a 6 17 a 3 a

31 Zimbabwe ~~110 130 a18 134 a 92 125 a 6 23 1.)a

32 Swaziland 74 il1 76 ill 71 i11 8 42 33 Botswana 65 102 59 94 71 110 3 2334 Mauritius 101 106 105 107 97 105 26 51.

Middle-income oil exporters 40w 99w 49w .. 30w .. 5w 17w (.)w 3w

35 Nigeria 32 98 a 39 24 .. 5 16~ a 3 a36 Cameroon 94 107 a 114 117 a 75 9 a 19 a 2 a37 Congo, People's Rep. 114 . 134 .. 94 10 69 a 1 6 a

38 Gabon 134 . 146 .. 122 .. 11 39 Angola 39 . 53 .. 26 .. 5 . .

Sub-Saharan Africa 42w 71w 55w 82w 28w 60w Sw 15w (.)w 2w

All low-income economies 62w 8Sw 77w 103w 47w 77w 20w 30w 3w 4All lower middle-incomeeconomies 74w 103w 82w 109w 65w 98w 16w 35w 4w low

All upper middle-incomeeconomies 96w 102w lOOw 108w 92w 0OOw 26w SIw 5w 14w

Industrial market economies 110w 102w 107w 102w 110w 102w 71w 87w 21w 37 w

a. Figures are for years other than those specified.

- 98-

Table 31. Central govenmet expendit-r

______ ~~~Percetage of toto1 epe-ditore

amenities, Overo~~~~~~ft ll

so -l-eoity Econ..oic Total -npoditor -opIos/defi-crrDefense Edu-ti-n Health ad we1fore services Other (e-c-t of GNP) (percet f iNI';

1972 1982 1972 1982 T92 18 92 18 92 18 972 1982 1972 1982 1972 19KI

Los-incom coni-n 12.6w 9.4w 15.5. 15.6w 6.2w 5.2w 3.9. 4.4w 25.2w 2

4.2w 36.6w 41.2. 21.4w 1

8.5w -4.1w -6.1-w

I Ethinpi. 14.3 . 14.4 . 5.7 . 4.4 .. 22.9 .. 38.3 .. 13,8 .. -1.42 Mali 8.4 .. 10.4 2.8 .. 5.0 .. 8.1 61.3 .. 33.7 .. 9.3

3Zaire. .. . . . . 38.6' 35.6 -75 -1O.

4 furkina 17.1 .. 15.7 6.6 .. 5.9 .. 16.4 .. 38.2 .16.2 ..- 15 Gui ... Bi..u... . . . . . . . .

7 Mo1awi 3.1 7.7 15.8 14.3 5.5 5.2 5.8 2.3 33.1 33.5 36.8 37.1 22.1i 27.0 -6.2 -7.18 Taneaia 11.9 11.2 17.3 12.1 7.2 5.5 2.1 2.1 39.0 37.4 22.6 31.5 19.7 32.2 -5.09 B.-cdi . .. . . . . . 23.9 ... ,

10 Uganda 23.1 19.4 15.3 11.9 5.3 5.2 7.3 6.5 12.4 11.7 36.6 42.0 21.8 5.0 -8.1 -1.11 Tugo 7.1 .. 22.9 .. 6.1 .. 11.0 . 22.2 .. 30.8 .3 2.9 .- 1.4

13 So.'alia 23.3 . 5.5 .. 7.2 .. 1.9 .. 21.6 .. 40.5 .. 13.5 0 .6

15 Central Africa Rep. 0 97 . 176 .. 51 . . . 19.6 .. 41.7 21.9 . -3.5

16 Madaguoca 3.6 .. 9.1 .. 4.2 .. 9.9 .. 40.5 .. 32.7 .. 20.8 .. -2.5

19 Kenya 6.0 13.2 21.9 19.9 7.9 7.3 3.9 0.8 30.1 26.9 30.2 31.7 21.0 29.7 -3.9 -.

20 Sierr Leon . ... . . . 22.7 . 1.21 Sodan 24.1 9.5 9.3' 6.1 5.4' 1.3' 1.4 2.3' 15.8' 23.5' 44.1 57.3' 19'.2' 16.'9 -0.8 -4.,1

22 Ghana 8.0 6.2 20.1 18.7 6.2 5.8 4.1 6.8 15.0 19.2 46.6 43.4 19.5 10.8 -5.8 -5.523 S-ngai . 9.1 .. 15.8 . 3.6 .. 7. - 20.4 .. 44.1 17.4 30.9 -0.8 -9.424 Chad 24.6 .. 14.8 . 4.4 I". 2. 32. . 8.1 .. -3.225 Mora.mbiqor. .. . . . . . ..

Middle-intone n il inpnrter- 13.9w . 18

.7w . 6.9w . 5.1w . 23.9w . 31.5w 33.2w 39.1w -13.4e -13.2w

27 Liberia 13.5' . 15.3' . 7.2 . 0.7, 2 9.9 . 33.4 . 39.4 ..- l.28 Zambia 19.3 15.2 7.4 8.4 1.3 1.8 26.7 23.9 45.7 50.7 35.4' 51.9 -14.4 -2 0. )

29 Len..th. 19.5 8.0 6.5 . 24.5 . 41.5 . 16.6 . -0.930 Cte d'I-ir-. .. . . . . ..31 ZCimbabwe 173 21.9 64 . 67 . 23.3' . 24.4 . 39.0' . -11.3

32 Owail-nd . 6.1 20.5 271.2 8.4 5.4 3.8 10.5 23.0 25.3 44.3 31. 21.4 30.7 _-4.2 -9.1

33 B.twna . 6.3 10.0 176 6.0 4.9 21.2 9.1 28.0 32.5 34. 29. 3374. 2. 2.434 Ma-iti-s . 0.9 .. 14.7 .. 7.1 . 5.1 .. 9.8 62.4 .. 29.2 . -12.1

Middle-incom il -mp-rt-r . . . .. .. .. ..

35 Nigeria 40.2 4.5 3.6 0.8 .. 19.6 .. 31.4 .. 10.2 .. -0.9 36 Camros. 5.1 .. 7.5 2.7 .. 5.1 .. 10.0 . 96 . 21.9 ..- 3.437 Cono. epesRp . . . . . . .. . ..

38 Gabo.. . ... . . . .

39 Angola .... . . . . . .

S.b-Sabaca Africa 22.9w 10.1w 12.5w 15.9. 5.5W 5.5w 2.

7w 4.7. 23.6w 23.0w 32.8w 40.8. 17.5w 21.

8. -3.4w -

7.0w

All loeicm cnmia 12.4w iSSo. 15.2w 5.5w

6.lw 3.0w 3.Nw 5.0w 26.3w 25.2w 36.2w 42.8w 20.

8w 16.3w -

4.0w -

6.iw

All lowe middle -inomeconomie_ 16.9. 1

4.

2. 1

7.9w 13.

7s, 4.5. 3.1w

4.

9w 6.8w 28.8w 23.5w 27.0.

3 8.1. 1

6.5w

2 3.

7. -

2.4w 5.7w.

All op-e middle-incomeconoie -1

4.6w ll.5. 11.6w l0.

9w

7.0. 5.1w 2

4.2w 21.0w 22.9w 20.8w 1

9.7w 30.7w

21.0. 2

6.

7. -3.3w -

6.6.a

Indostria1 -aket caoien 23.3w 13.9w 4.3w 4

.8w 9

.9w 11.c 36.8w

40.4w i1.6w 9.7w 14.1w 1

9.5w 21.8w 30.1w -1.0w -4.5w

F. igore ar for 1984, -cr 1982.

-99 -

Table 32. Central government current revenue

Percentage of total current revenueTax revenue

Taxes on income, Social Domestic taxes Taxes on Current Totalprofit, and security on goods international trade nontax current revenuecapital gain contributions and services and transactions Other taxes revenue (percent of GNP)

1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982 1972 1982

Low-incone economies 21.5. 26.1v .. . 23.

7w 32.

7w

38.5w

26'.

4w 4.

7w 3.

9w 11.

6w 10.

9w 1

7.1w 11.5w

I Ethiopia 23.0 .. . . 29.8 .. 30.4 .. 5.6 .. 11.1 .. 10.52 Mali .. 15.4 . 4.3 .. 38.9 .. 18.7 .. 14.5 .. 8.2 .. 15.53 Zaire 22.2' 32.5 2.2 1.4 12.7 22.3 57.9 25.0 1.4 6.5 3.7 12.3 27.9 21.6

4 Burkina .. 15.9 .. 6.5 .. 17.1 .. 42.4 .. 6.8 .. 11.3 .. 14.05 Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . .. . .

7 Malawi 31.4 34.3 . .. 24.2 31.9 20.0 22.7 0.5 0.8 23.8 10.4 16.0 17.48 Tanzania a 29.9 31.1 . .. 29.1 50.6 21.7 10.2 0.5 0.9 18.8 7.2 15.8 19.69 Burundi a .. 22.4 .. 2.9 .. 28.7 .. 24.0 .. 11.2 .. 10.8 .. 13.4

10 Uganda 22.1 9.7 .. . 32.8 31.5 36.3 56.0 0.3 0.1 8.5 2.7 13.7 3.111 Togo . 33.7 .. 6.4 .. 15.3 .. 33.0 .. -1.0 .. 12.7 .. 29.112 Gambia 7.5 .. .. . 1.9 . 70.7 . 0.5 .. 19.4 . 16.'3

13 Somalia 10.7 . . .. 24.7 .. 45.3 .. 5.2 .. 14.0 .. 13.7

15 Central African Rep. a . 16.1 . 6.4' . 20.'8' . 39.8 . 7.8' . 91 .6.4

16 Madagascar 12.7 15.5 7.0 13.7 29.1 41.7 35.3 22.2 5.3 3.3 10.5 3.6 18.8 13.6

19 Kenya 35.6 26.8 . .. 19.9 37.8 24.3 25.4 1.4 0.6 18.8 9.3 18.0 22.820 Sierra Leone .. 24.1 . .. .. 21.5 .. 49.5 .. 1.1 .. 1.8 .. 11.621 Sudan 11.8, 15.8 . . 30.4 14.1 40.5 49.7 1.5 0.7 15.7 19.7 08.0 11.8

22 Ghana 18.2 28.7 . .. 29.1 39.2 40.8 19.0 0.4 (.) 11.4 13.0 15.1 5.423 Senegal 17.6 22.8 .. 3.5 24.5 25.8 30.9 35.0 23.8 5.3 3.2 7.4 16.8 20.124 Chad 16.7 .. . . 12.3 .. 45.2 .. 20.5 .. 5.3 .. 13.125 Mozambique . , . . . . . .. . .

Middle-income oil importers 45.7w 35.Ow . .. 17.5w 28.6w

20.1w

2 3.3w 0.6w 2.Os. 1

6.1w ll.lw

2 3.5w

2 9.3w

26 Mauritania .. .. ..

27 Liberia . 35.3 . . 29.6 . 31.'3 . 1.9 . 1.9 . 25.228 Zambia 49.7 32.9 .. . 20.2 48.3 14.3 8.8 0.1 3.2 15.6 6.6 24.2 24.9

29 Lestho 14.3 . . . 2.0 . 62.9 . 9.5 . 11.3 . 11.730 C6te d'lvoire . . . . . . . .. . .31 Zimbabwe .. 4. . . . 3. .1. . 10 .. 98 .. 33

32 Swazilanda 35.7 32.1 .. . 4.8 2.0 49.7 57.2 1.2 0.9 8.6 7.8 19.5 24.333 Botswana 19.9 28.5 .. . 2.4 1.6 47.2 33.9 0.5 0.4 30.0 35.6 30.7 42.534 Mauritius . 17.1 . . . 18.5 . 48.6 . 3.8 . 12.0 . 19.4

Middle-income oil exporters . . . . . .. . . .

35 Nigeria 43.0 .. . . 26.3 t.7.5 .. 0.2 . 13.0 .. 11.636 Cameroon . 39.0 . 6. .. 14.5 .. 26.0' . 3.9' . 10'.3 . 18.537 Congo, People's Rep. 19.3 . . . 40.3 .. 26.5 .. 6.4 .. 7.4 .. 14

Sub-Saharan Africa 30.

8w 30.1w . . 24a.2w 2

9.8w

29.7w

25.3w 2.8w

3.9w 1

2.5w 10.

9w 15.2w 1

4.4w

All low-income economies 21.5w 19.5w . .. 23.

8w

36.9w

38.

9w

25.

3w 3.6w 1.

3w 1

2.2. 1

7.Ow 16.

4w 1

3.2w

All lower middle-incomeecono..ies

27.8w 3

9.5w .. . 29.8w

212.2w 1

9.3w 14.7w 10.

4w 8.

2w 1

2.7w 15.

4w 1

4.8w 1

9.8w

All upper middle-incomeeconomies

24.7w

2 5.2w 19.8w 14.6w 25.

8w 2l

4.4w li.

4w iO.

2w (.1w 1.Ow 1

8.3w

2 4.6w 1

9.0w

23.3w

Industrial market econoies 41.1w

3 7.5w

2 8.Ow

33.3w 20.

4w 18.3w 1.

9w 1.2w 2.2w 0.

9w

6.4w

8.8w

22.7w

28.lw

a. Figures are for 1981, not 1982.

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Technical notes

Table 1. Basic indicators

The estimates of population for mid-1984 are based primarily ondata from the UN Population Division. In many cases the data take intoaccount the results of recent population censuses. The data on area arefrom the computer tape for the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)Production Yearbook, 1983.

Gross national product (GNP) measures the total domestic andforeign output claimed by residents. It comprises gross domesticproduct (see the note for Tables 2 and 3) and factor incomes (such asinvestment income, labor income, and interest income) accruing toresidents from abroad, less the income earned in the domestic economyaccruing to persons abroad. It is calculated without making deductionsfor depreciation.

The GNP per capita figures are calculated according to thenewly revised World Bank Atlas method. Perfect cross-countrycomparability of per capita GNP estimates cannot be achieved. Twoobstacles stand in the way of adequate comparability. One concerns GNPnumbers themselves. There are differences in the national accountingsystems of countries and in the coverage and reliability of underlyingstatistical information between various countries. The other relates tothe conversion of GNP data expressed in different national currencies,to a common currency--conventionally the US dollar--to compare themacross countries. The Bank's procedure for converting GNP to US dollarsis essentially based on the use of a three-year average of the officialexchange rate. For a few countries, however, an alternative conversionfactor is used because the prevailing official exchange rate is judgedto diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate effectivelyapplied to actual foreign exchange transactions.

Recognizing that these shortcomings affect the comparability ofthe GNP per capita estimates, the World Bank has introduced severalimprovements in the estimation procedures. Through its regular reviewof national accounts of its member countries, the World Banksystematically evaluates the GNP estimates, focusing on the coverage andconcepts employed, and where appropriate makes adjustments to improvecomparability. As noted above, the Bank also assesses theappropriateness of the exchange rates as conversion factors.

The estimates of 1984 GNP and per capita GNP are calculated onthe basis of the 1982-84 base period. With this method, the first stepis to calculate the conversion factor. This is done by taking thesimple arithmetic average of the actual exchange rate for 1984 anddeflated exchange rates for 1982 and 1983. To obtain the Latter, the

- iO -

actual exchange rate for 1982 is multiplied by the relative rate ofinflation for the country and for the United States between 1982 and1984; the actual exchange rate for 1983 is multiplied by the relativerate of inflation for the country and the United States between 1983 and1984. The average of the actual and the deflated exchange rates isintended to smooth the impact of fluctuations in prices and exchangerates.

The second step is to convert the 1984 GNP at current marketprices in national currencies to US dollars by the conversion factor asderived above. The resulting GNP in 1984 US dollars is divided by themidyear population to derive the 1984 per capita GNP in current USdollars.

The following formulas describe the procedure for computing theconversion factor for year t:

p P$ p P$(e" ) e t t +e t t et-2,t = t2 P t-2 )+et-l (P t p$ t

t-2 t-l

and for calculating per capita GNP in US dollars for year t:

(Yt) Yt / Nt L(Yt t e ~~~t-2,t

Where:

Yt = current GNP (local currency)

Pt = GNP deflator for year t

et = annual average exchange rate (local currency/USdollar) for year t

Nt = mid-year population for year t

P = US GNP deflator for year tt

The annual rate of inflation is the least-squares growth rate ofthe implicit gross domestic product (GDP) deflator for each of theperiods shown. The GDP deflator is first calculated by dividing, foreach year of the period, the value of GDP in current market prices bythe value of GDP in constant market prices, both in national currency.The least-squares method is then used to calculate the growth rate ofthe GDP deflator for the period. This measure of inflation haslimitations, in particular for the oil-producing countries during the

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period of sharp increases in oil prices. It is used as an indicator ofinflation because it is the most broadly based deflator, showing annualprice movements for all goods and services produced in an economy.

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborninfant would Live if patterns of mortality prevailing for all people atthe time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Dataare from the UN Population Division, supplemented by World Bankestimates.

The index of food production per capita shows the average annualquantity of food produced per capita in 1981-83 in relation to that in1974-76. The estimates are derived from those of the FAO, which arecalculated by dividing indexes of the quantity of food production byindexes of total population. For this index, food is defined ascomprising cereals, starchy roots, sugarcane, sugar beets, pulses,edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegetables, livestock, and livestockproducts. Quantities of food production are measured net of animalfeed, seeds for use in agriculture, and food lost in processing anddistribution. Given the weaknesses in agricultural productionstatistics, caution should be exercised in interpreting them.

The summary measures for GNP per capita and life expectancy inthis table are weighted by population. The summary measures for theannual rate of inflation are weighted by the share of country GDP valuedin current US dollars for the entire period in the particular incomegroup.

Tables 2 and 3. Growth and structure of production

Most of the definitions used are those of the UN System ofNational Accounts.

Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total final output ofgoods and services produced by an economy--that is, by residents andnonresidents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreignclaims. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation.For many countries, GDP by industrial origin is measured at factor cost;for other countries without complete national accounts at factor cost,it is measured at market prices. GDP at factor cost is equal to GDP atmarket prices, Less indirect taxes net of subsidies. The figures forGDP are dolLar vaLues converted from domestic currency by using thesingle-year official exchange rates, although for a few countries analternative conversion factor is used (see note for Table 1). Thisprocedure does not use the three-year average exchange rate used tocalculate per capita GNP in Table 1.

The agricultural sector comprises agriculture, forestry, hunting,and fishing. In developing countries with high levels of subsistencefarming, much of the agricultural production is either not exchanged or

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not exchanged for money. Because of difficulties in assigningsubsistence farming its proper value, the share of agriculture in CDPmay be underestimated. The industrial sector comprises mining,manufacturing, construction, and electricity, water, and gas. All otherbranches of economic activity are categorized as services.

National accounts series in domestic currencies are used tocompute the indicators in these tables. The growth rates in Table 2 arecalculated from constant price series; the sectoral shares of GDP inTable 3, from current price series.

In calculating the summary measures for each indicator in Table2, constant US dollar values are first calculated for the periodscovered, and the values are aggregated for each of the years covered bythe period. The least-squares procedure is used to compute the summarygrowth rates. The average sectoral percentage shares in Table 3 arecomputed from group aggregates of sectoral GDP in current US dollars.

Tables 4 and 5. Growth of consumption and investment and structure ofdemand

CDP is defined in the note for Table 2.

Public consumption (or general government consumption) includesall current expenditure for purchases of goods and services by alllevels of government. Capital expenditure on national defense andsecurity is regarded as consumption expenditure.

Private consumption is the market value of all goods and servicespurchased or received as income in kind by households and nonprofitinstitutions. It includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.

Gross domestic investment consists of the outlays for additionsto the fixed assets of the economy, plus changes in the net value ofinventories.

Gross domestic saving shows the amount of gross domesticinvestment financed from domestic output. Comprising public and privatesaving, it is gross domestic investment plus the net exports of goodsand nonfactor services.

Exports of goods and nonfactor services represent the value ofall goods and nonfactor services sold to the rest of the world; theyinclude merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactorservices. The value of factor services, such as investment income,interest, and labor income, is excluded.

The resource balance is the difference between exports andimports of goods and nonfactor services.

- 104 -

National accounts series in domestic currency units are used tocompute the indicators in these tables. The growth rates in Table 4 arecalculated from constant price series; the shares of GDP in Table 5,from current price series. The summary measures are calculated in thesame way as explained in the note for Tables 2 and 3.

Table 6. Commercial energy

The data on energy generally are from UN sources. They refer tocommercial forms of primary energy: petroleum and natural gas liquids,natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and so on), and primaryelectricity (nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric power)--allconverted into oil equivalents. Figures on liquid fuel consumptioninclude petroleum derivatives that have been consumed in nonenergyuses. For converting primary electricity into oil equivalents, athermal efficiency of 34 percent has been assumed. The use of firewoodand other traditional fuel, though substantial in some developingcountries, is not taken into account because reliable and comprehensivedata are not available.

The summary measures of energy production and consumption arecomputed by aggregating the respective volumes for each year in theperiods and then applying the least-squares growth rate procedure. Thesummary measure of energy consumption per capita is computed from groupaggregates for energy consumption and population.

Energy imports refer to the dollar value of energy imports--Section 3 in the Revised Standard International Trade Classification(SITC)--and are expressed as a percentage of earnings from merchandiseexports. The summary measures are computed from group aggregates forenergy imports and merchandise exports in current dollars.

Because data on energy imports do not permit a distinctionbetween petroleum imports for fuel and for use in the petrochemicalsindustry, these percentages may overestimate the dependence on importedenergy.

Table 7. Level and growth of merchandise trade

The statistics on merchandise trade are from UN publications andthe UN trade data system, supplemented by statistics from the UNConference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International MonetaryFund (IMF), and in a few cases World Bank country documentation.

Merchandise exports and imports cover, with some exceptions, allinternational changes in ownership of merchandise passing across thecustoms borders. Exports are valued FOB (free on board),,imports CIF(cost, insurance, and freight), unless otherwise specified in theforegoing sources. These values are in current dollars and do notinclude trade in services.

- 105 -

The growth rates of merchandise exports and imports are in realterms and calculated from volume indexes of exports and imports. Avolume index is the ratio of the index for the total value of exports orimports to the corresponding index for the unit values. For mostdeveloping economies these indexes are from the UNCTAD Handbook ofInternational Trade and Development Statistics and supplementary data.For industrial economies the indexes are from the UN Yearbook ofInternational Trade Statistics and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Thesummary measures are calculated by aggregating the 1980 constant USdollar price series for each year and then applying the least-squaresgrowth rate procedure for the periods shown. These values do notinclude trade in services.

Tables 8 and 9. Structure of merchandise trade

The shares in these tables are derived from trade values incurrent dollars reported in UN trade tapes and the UN Yearbook ofInternational Trade Statistics, supplemented by other regularstatistical publications of the United Nations and the IMF.

Merchandise exports and imports are defined in the note forTable 7. The categorization of exports and imports follows the SITC.

In Table 8, fuels, minerals, and metals are the commodities inSITC Section 3, Divisions 27 and 28 (minerals, crude fertilizers, andmetalliferous ores) and Division 68 (nonferrous metals). Other primarycommodities comprise SITC Sections 0, 1, 2, and 4 (food and liveanimals, beverages and tobacco, inedible crude materials, and oils andfats) less Divisions 27 and 28. Textiles and clothing represent SITCDivisions 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns, fabrics, and clothing). Machineryand transport equipment are the commodities in SITC Section 7. Othermanufactures, calculated as the residual from the total value ofmanufactured exports, represent SITC Sections 5 to 9 less Section 7 andDivisions 65, 68, and 84.

In Table 9, food commodities are those in SITC Sections 0, 1, and4 and in Division 22 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, oilsand fats, and oilseeds, nuts, and kernels). Fuels are the commoditiesin SITC Section 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials).Other primary commodities comprise SITC Section 2 (crude materialsexcluding fuels) less Division 22 (oilseeds, nuts, and kernels) plusDivision 68. Machinery and transport equipment are the commodities inSITC Section 7. Other manufactures, calculated as the residual from thetotal value of manufactured imports, represent SITC Sections 5 to 9 lessSection 7 and Division 68.

The summary measures in Table 8 are computed from groupaggregates for individual export commodity categories and totalmerchandise exports in current dollars; those in Table 9, from group

- 106 -

aggregates for individual import commodity categories and totalmerchandise imports in current dollars.

Table 10. Origin and destination of merchandise exports

Merchandise exports are defined in the note for Table 7. Tradeshares in this table are based on UN and IMF statistics on the value oftrade in current dollars. Unallocated exports are distributed among thecountry groups in proportion to their respective shares of allocabletrade. Industrial market economies also include Gibraltar, Iceland, andLuxembourg. The summary measures are computed from group aggregates forindividual economy groups and total merchandise exports in currentdollars.

Table 11. Terms of trade

The terms of trade, or the net barter terms of trade, measure therelative Level of export prices compared with import prices. Calculatedas the ratio of a country's export unit value index to its import unitvalue index, this indicator shows changes over time in the level ofexport prices as a percentage of import prices. The terms of tradeindexes are shown for 1970, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984, with 1980100. The unit value indexes are from UNCTAD.

Table 12. Commodity exports: Volume and price

Volume growth rates are computed from quantum data for individualcommodities. The quantum data for agricultural commodities are from FAOtrade tapes. Metals and minerals quantum data and all commodities pricedata are from the World Bank Commodity Data Bank. The price seriesrepresent international prices in constant US dollars, derived bydeflating the current prices by the unit value index of manufacturedexports (SITC 5-8) from five industrial market economies to developingcountries.

Table 13. Balance of payments, debt service, and international reserves

The current account balance is the difference between (1) exportsof goods and services plus inflows of unrequited official and privatetransfers and (2) imports of goods and services plus unrequitedtransfers to the rest of the world. The current account estimates areprimarily from IMF data files.

Interest payments are those on the disbursed and outstandingpublic and publicly guaranteed debt in foreign currencies, goods, orservices; they include commitment charges on undisbursed debt ifinformation on those charges was available. For the definition of debt,see the note for Table 14.

- 107 -

Debt service is the sum of actual interest payments andrepayments of principal made in foreign currencies, goods, or serviceson external public and publicly guaranteed debt. The ratio of debtservice to exports of goods and services is commonly used to assess theability to service debt. The ratio of debt service to GNP in thesummary measures is computed from group aggregates for debt service andGNP in current dolLars; the ratio of debt service to exports of goodsand services in the summary measures is computed from group aggregatesfor debt service and total exports of goods and services in currentdollars.

Gross international reserves comprise holdings of gold, specialdrawing rights (SDRs), the reserve position of IMF members in the Fund,and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetaryauthorities. The data on holdings of international reserves are fromIMF data files. The gold component of these reserves is valuedthroughout at year-end London prices; that is, $37.37 an ounce in 1970and $308.30 an ounce in 1984. The reserve levels for 1970 and 1984refer to the end of the year and are in current dollars at prevailingexchange rates. Because of differences in the definition ofinternational reserves, in the valuation of gold, and in reservemanagement practices, reserve levels published in national sources arenot strictly comparable. Reserve holdings at the end of 1984 are alsoexpressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods andservices they could pay for, with imports at the average level for 1983or 1984. The summary measures are computed from group aggregates forgross international reserves and total imports of goods and services incurrent dollars.

Table 14. External public debt and debt service

The data on debt in this and successive tables are from the WorldBank's Debtor Reporting System for developing economies.

External debt is defined as debt that has an original or extendedmaturity of more than one year, that is owed to nonresidents, and thatis repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. A distinction ismade among (1) public debt, which is an external obligation of a publicdebtor, including the national government, a political subdivision (oran agency of either), and autonomous public bodies; (2) publiclyguaranteed debt, which is an external obligation of a private debtorthat is guaranteed for repayment by a public entity; and (3) privatenonguaranteed external debt, which is an external obligation of aprivate debtor that is not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity.

The tables showing public and publicly guaranteed debt do notinclude data for (1) transactions with the IMF, with the exception ofTrust Fund loans, (2) debt repayable in local currency, (3) directinvestment, and (4) short-term debt (that is, debt with originalmaturity of one year or less).

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External public debt outstanding and disbursed represents theamount at year-end of all public and publicly guaranteed loans that havebeen drawn by the borrower net of repayments of principal and writeoffs.

Debt from official sources comprises (1) multilateral loans(loans and credits from the World Bank, regional development banks, andother international organizations and intergovernmental agencies) and(2) bilateral loans from governments and their agencies (includingcentral banks) and from autonomous public bodies. Loans from fundsadministered by an international organization on behalf of a singledonor government are classified as bilateral loans.

Debt from private sources comprises loans from (1) suppliers(credits from manufacturers, exporters, or other suppliers of goods),(2) financial markets (loans from private banks and other privatefinancial institutions, and publicly issued but privately placed bonds),and (3) other (external liabilities on account of nationalizedproperties and unclassified debts to private creditors).

Debt service is defined in the note for Table 13.

Tables 15, 16, and 17. External debt and loans

The loans referred to in all three tables are medium- and long-term loans whose maturities exceed one year. Lenders indicated in Table15 and 16 are defined in the note for Table 14.

Interest rates, maturities, and grace periods are averagesweighted by the amounts of loans. Interest is the major charge leviedon a loan and is usually computed on the amount of principal drawn andoutstanding. The maturity of a loan is the interval between theagreement date, when a loan agreement is signed or bonds are issued, andthe date of final repayment of principal. The grace period is theinterval between the agreement date and the date of the first repaymentof principal.

Loans with a grant element of 25 percent and above are defined asconcessional. The grant element of a loan is the grant equivalentexpressed as a percentage of the amount committed. It is used as ameasure of the overall cost of borrowing. The grant equivalent of aloan is its commitment value, Less the discounted present value of itscontractual debt service; conventionally, future debt service paymentsare discounted at 10 percent a year.

Tables 18 and 19. Foreign assistance and other resources

Official development assistance (ODA) consists of loans andgrants made at concessional financial terms by official agencies of themembers of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and

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members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) withthe objective of promoting economic development and welfare. Netdisbursements equal gross disbursements less payments to donors foramortization.

Total recorded net flow of resources includes ODA, grants fromprivate agencies (private aid), and transactions at commercial terms:export credits, bilateral portfolio investment (including bank lending)by residents or institutions in DAC countries, direct investment(including reinvested earnings), and purchases of securities ofinternational organizations active in development. Net bilateral flowsexclude unallocated and unspecified bilateral flows and alldisbursements to multilateral institutions. Grants, including the valueof technical cooperation and assistance, are gifts in money or in kindfor which no repayment is required.

The summary measures of per capita net resource flows and percapita ODA in Table 18 are computed from group aggregates forpopulation, net resource flows, and ODA. ODA as a percentage of GNP iscomputed from group totals for ODA and GNP in current US dollars. ODAas a percentage of gross domestic investment is weighted by countryGNP. Net bilateral ODA as a percentage of total ODA and ODA from OPECas a percentage of net bilateral ODA are computed from the respectivegroup aggregates.

The summary measures in Table 19 for total grants and technicalassistance as percentages of net ODA are average country percentagesweighted by each country's share in the aggregate ODA.

Table 20. Food aid imports

Food aid includes cereals only and is expressed in metric tons ofgrain equivalent. The data are for marketing years, from July 1 of thepreceding calendar year to June 30 of the current calendar year. Thesummary measures for per capita food aid are computed from groupaggregates for food aid and population.

Tables 21 and 22. Growth of agriculture and crop production

Food includes commodities that are considered edible and containnutrients. Nonfood comprises alL inedible and nonnutritive agriculturalcommodities. Accordingly, coffee and tea are classified as nonfoodbecause, although edible, they have virtually no nutritive value. (Thedefinition of food used here is not the same as in Tables 8 and 9, whereall beverages, regardless of nutritive value, are considered as fooditems.)

In Table 21, summary measures for annual growth rate of volume offood and agricultural production are country growth rates weighted byeach country's share in the aggregate value added in agriculture for the

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end year of each period; those of growth rate of total production percapita are differences between growth rates of aggregate production andaggregate population for each country group.

Tables 23 and 24. Agricultural imports and exports

Subcategories of dairy imports are sporadically reported from oneperiod to the next. Thus, the corresponding rates of growth pertainonly to those subcategories of dairy imports for which data arereported, and they must be interpreted with caution. All data are forthe calendar year.

Table 25. Population growth and projections

The growth rates of population are period averages calculatedfrom midyear populations. The summary measures are computed from groupaggregates.

The projections of population for 1990, 2000, and the year inwhich population will eventually become stationary are made for eacheconomy separately. Starting with information on total population byage and sex, fertility rates, mortality rates, and internationalmigration rates in the base year 1980, these parameters are projected atfive-year intervals on the basis of generalized assumptions until thepopulation becomes stationary. The base year estimates are from updatedcomputer printouts of the United Nations and data from the WorLd Bank,the Population Council, the US Bureau of the Census, and recent nationalcensuses.

The net reproduction rate (NRR) indicates the number of daughtersthat a newborn girl will bear during her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific fertility rates and a fixed set of mortality rates. The NRRthus measures the extent to which a cohort of newborn girls willreproduce themselves under given schedules of fertility and mortality.An NRR of 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level: at thisrate childbearing women, on the average, bear only enough daughters toreplace themseLves in the population.

A stationary population is one in which age- and sex-specificmortality rates have not changed over a long period, while age-specificfertility rates have simultaneously remained at replacement level(NRR=1). In such a population, the birth rate is constant and equal tothe death rate, the age structure also is constant, and the growth rateis zero.

Population momentum is the tendency for population growth tocontinue beyond the time that replacement-level fertility has beenachieved; that is, even after NRR has reached unity. The momentum of apopulation in the year t is measured as a ratio of the ultimatestationary population to the population in the year t, given the

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assumption that fertility remains at replacement level from the year tonward.

A population tends to grow even after fertility has declined toreplacement level because past high growth rates will have produced anage distribution with a relatively high proportion of females who are orwill be of reproductive age. Consequently, the birth rate will remainhigher than the death rate and the growth rate will remain positive forseveral decades. A population takes fifty to seventy-five years,depending on the initial conditions, before its age distribution fullyadjusts to the changed fertility rates.

To make the projections, assumptions about future mortality ratesare made in terms of female life expectancy at birth (that is, thenumber of years a newborn girl would live if subject to the mortalityrisks prevailing for the cross section of population at the time of herbirth). Economies are first divided according to whether their primaryschool enrollment ratio for females is above or below 70 percent. Ineach group a set of annual increments in female life expectancy isassumed, depending on the female life expectancy in 1980-85. For agiven life expectancy at birth, the annual increments during theprojection period are larger in economies having a higher primary schoolenrollment ratio and a life expectancy of up to 62.5 years. At higherlife expectancies, the increments are the same.

To project the fertility rates, the year in which fertility willreach replacement level is estimated. These estimates are speculativeand are based on information on trends in crude birth rates (defined inthe note for Table 26), total fertility rates (also defined in the notefor Table 26), female life expectancy at birth, and the performance offamily planning programs. For most countries in sub-Saharan Africatotal fertility rates are assumed to remain constant until 1990-95 andthen to decline until replacement level is reached; for a few they areassumed to increase until 1990-95 and then to decline.

International migration rates are based on past and presenttrends in migration flow. The estimates of future net migration arespeculative. For most economies the net migration rates are assumed tobe zero by 2000, but for a few they are assumed to be zero by 2025.

The estimates of the hypothetical size of the stationarypopulation and the assumed year of reaching replacement level fertilityare speculative. They should not be regarded as predictions. They areincluded to provide a summary indication of the long-run implications ofrecent fertility and mortality trends on the basis of highly stylizedassumptions. A fuller description of the methods and assumptions usedto calculate the estimates is available from the Population, Health, andNutrition Department of the World Bank.

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Table 26. Demographic and fertility-related indicators

The crude birth and death rates indicate the number of livebirths and deaths per thousand population in a year. They are from thesame sources mentioned in the note for Table 25. Percentage changes arecomputed from unrounded data.

The total fertility rate represents the number of children thatwould be born per woman, if she were to live to the end of herchildbearing years and bear children at each age in accord withprevailing age-specific fertility rates. The rates given are from thesame sources mentioned in the note for Table 25.

The percentage of married women of childbearing age usingcontraception refers to any form of contraception used by the women ortheir husbands. The forms generally comprise male and femalesterilization, intrauterine devices (IUD), condoms, injectable and oralcontraceptives, spermicides, diaphragms, rhythm, withdrawal, andabstinence. Women of childbearing age are generally women aged fifteento forty-nine, although for some countries contraceptive usage ismeasured for other age groups. Data are mainly derived from the WorldFertility Survey, the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey, the World Bank,and the UN report, Recent Levels and Trends of Contraceptive Use asAssessed in 1983.

The summary measures in this table are country data weighted byeach country's share in the aggregate population.

Table 27. Labor force

The population of working age refers to the population agedfifteen to sixty-four years. The estimates are based on the populationestimates of the World Bank for 1983 and previous years. The summarymeasures are country data weighted by each country's share in theaggregate population.

The labor force comprises economically active persons aged tenyears and over, including the armed forces and the unemployed, butexcluding housewives, students, and other nonparticipants in the laborforce. Agriculture, industry, and services are defined in the samemanner as in Table 2. The summary measures are country percentagesweighted by each country's share in the aggregate labor force.

The labor force growth rates are derived from the Bank'spopulation projections and from ILO data on age-specific activity ratesin the source cited above. The summary measures for 1965-73 and 1973-83are country growth rates weighted by each country's share in theaggregate labor force in 1973; those for 1980-2000, by estimates of eachcountry's share in the aggregate labor force in 1980.

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The application of ILO activity rates to the Bank's latestpopulation estimates may be inappropriate for some economies in whichthere have been important changes in unemployment and underemployment,in international and internal migration, or in both. The labor forceprojections for 1980-2000 should thus be treated with caution.

Table 28. Urbanization

The growth rates of urban population are calculated from theWorld Bank's population estimates; the estimates of urban populationshares are calculated from UN sources. Data on urban agglomeration arealso from the United Nations. Because the estimates in this table arebased on different national definitions of what is "urban," cross-country comparisons should be interpreted with caution.

The summary measures for urban population as a percentage oftotal population are calculated from country percentages weighted byeach country's share in the aggregate population; the other summarymeasures in this table are weighted in the same fashion using urbanpopulation.

Table 29. Health-related indicators

The estimates of population per physician and nursing person arederived from World Health Organization (WHO) data, some of which havebeen revised to reflect new information. They also take into accountrevised estimates of population. Nursing persons include graduate,practical, assistant, and auxiliary nurses; the inclusion of auxiliarynurses enables a better estimation of the availability of nursingcare. Because definitions of nursing personnel vary--and because thedata shown are for a variety of years, generally not more than two yearsdistant from those specified--the data for these two indicators are notstrictly comparable across countries.

The daily calorie supply per capita is calculated by dividing thecalorie equivalent of the food supplies in an economy by thepopulation. Food supplies comprise domestic production, imports lessexports, and changes in stocks; they exclude animal feed, seeds for usein agriculture, and food lost in processing and distribution. The dailycalorie requirement per capita refers to the calories needed to sustaina person at normal Levels of activity and health, taking into accountage and sex distributions, average body weights, and environmentaltemperatures. Both sets of estimates are from the FAO.

The summary measures in this table are country figures weightedby each country's share in the aggregate population.

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Table 30. Education

The data in this table refer to a variety of years, generally notmore than two years distant from those specified, and are mostly fromUnesco.

The data on number enrolled in primary school refer to estimatesof total, male, and female enrollment of students of all ages in primaryschool; they are expressed as percentages of the total, male, or femalepopulations of primary school age to give gross primary enrollmentratios. Although primary school age is generally considered to be sixto eleven years, the differences in country practices in the ages andduration of schooling are reflected in the ratios given. For countrieswith universal primary education, the gross enrollment ratios may exceed100 percent because some pupils are below or above the official primaryschool age.

The data on number enrolled in secondary school are calculated inthe same manner, with secondary school age generally considered to betwelve to seventeen years.

The data on number enrolled in higher education are from Unesco.

The summary measures in this table are country enrollment ratesweighted by each country's share in the aggregate population.

Table 31. Central government expenditure

The data on central government finance in Tables 31 and 32 arefrom the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF data files, andWorld Bank country documentation. The accounts of each country arereported using the system of common definitions and classificationsfound in the IMF Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics. Owingto differences in coverage of available data, the individual componentsof central government expenditure and current revenue shown in thesetables may not be strictly comparable across all economies. The sharesof total expenditure and revenue by category are calculated fromnational currencies.

The inadequate statistical coverage of state, provincial, andlocal governments has dictated the use of central government dataonly. This may seriously understate or distort the statisticalportrayal of the allocation of resources for various purposes,especially in large countries where lower levels of government haveconsiderable autonomy and are responsible for many social services.

It must be emphasized that the data presented, especially thosefor education and health, are not comparable for a number of reasons.In many economies private health and education services are substantial;in others public services represent the major component of total

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expenditure but may be financed by lower levels of government. Greatcaution should therefore be used in comparisons across countries.

Central government expenditure comprises the expenditure by allgovernment offices, departments, establishments, and other bodies thatare agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country. Itincludes both current and capital (development) expenditure.

Defense comprises all expenditure, whether by defense or otherdepartments, for the maintenance of military forces, including thepurchase of military supplies and equipment, construction, recruiting,and training. Also falling under this category is expenditure forstrengthening the public services to meet wartime emergencies, fortraining civil defense personnel, and for foreign military aid andcontributions to military organizations and alliances.

Education comprises public expenditure for the provision,management, inspection, and support of preprimary, primary, andsecondary schools; of universities and colleges; and of vocational,technical, and other training institutions by central governments. Alsoincluded is expenditure on the general administration and regulation ofthe education system; on research into its objectives, organization,administration, and methods; and on such subsidiary services astransport, school meals, and medical and dental services in schools.

Health covers public expenditure on hospitals, medical and dentalcenters, and clinics with a major medical component; on national healthand medical insurance schemes; and on family planning and preventivecare. Also included is expenditure on the general administration andregulation of relevant government departments, hospitals and clinics,health and sanitation, and national health and medical insuranceschemes.

Housing, amenities, and social security and welfare cover publicexpenditure (1) on housing (such as income-related schemes), on supportof housing and slum clearance activities, on community development, andon sanitary services; and (2) for compensation to the sick andtemporarily disabled for loss of income, for payments to the elderly,the permanently disabled, and the unemployed, and for family, maternity,and child allowances. The second category also includes the cost ofwelfare services such as care of the aged, the disabled, and children,as well as the cost of general administration, regulation, and researchassociated with social security and welfare services.

Economic services comprise public expenditure associated with theregulation, support, and more efficient operation of business and witheconomic development, redress of regional imbalances, and creation ofemployment opportunities. Research, trade promotion, geologicalsurveys, and inspection and regulation of particular industry groups areamong the activities included. The five major categories of economic

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services are fuel and energy, agriculture, industry, transportation andcommunication, and other economic affairs and services.

Other covers expenditure for the general administration ofgovernment not included elsewhere; for a few economies it also includesamounts that could not be allocated to other components.

Overall surplus/deficit is defined (on a cash basis) as currentand capital revenue and grants received less total expenditure lesslending minus repayments.

The summary measures for the components of central governmentexpenditure are computed from group totals for expenditure componentsand central government expenditure in current dollars; those for totalexpenditure as a percentage of GNP and for overall surplus/deficit as apercentage of GNP are computed from group totals for the above totalexpenditures and overall surplus/deficit in current dollars and GNP incurrent dollars respectively.

Table 32. Central government current revenue

Information on data, including sources and comparability, isgiven in the note for Table 31.

Tax revenue is defined as all government revenue from compulsory,unrequited, nonrepayable receipts for public purposes, includinginterest collected on tax arrears and penalties collected on nonpaymentor late payment of taxes. Tax revenue is shown net of refunds and othercorrective transactions. Taxes on income, profit, and capital gain aretaxes levied on the actual or presumptive net income of individuals, onthe profits of enterprises, and on capital gains, whether realized onland sales, securities, or other assets. Social security contributionsinclude employers' and employees' social security contributions as wellas those of self-employed and unemployed persons. Domestic taxes ongoods and services include general sales, turnover, or value addedtaxes, excises on goods, taxes on specific services, taxes on the use ofgoods or property, and profits of fiscal monopolies. Taxes oninternational trade and transactions include import duties, exportduties, profits of export or import marketing boards, transfers togovernment, exchange profits, and exchange taxes. Other taxes includeemployers' payroll or manpower taxes, taxes on property, and other taxesnot allocable to other categories.

Current nontax revenue comprises all current government revenuethat is not a compulsory nonrepayable payment for public purposes.Proceeds of grants and borrowing, funds arising from the repayment ofprevious lending by governments, incurrence of liabilities, and proceedsfrom the sale of capital assets are not included.

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The summary measures for the components of current revenue arecomputed from group totals for revenue components and total currentrevenue in current dollars; those for current revenue as a percentage ofCNP are computed from group totals for total current revenue and GNP incurrent dollars.

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Principal sources

The information in the Statistical Annex has been compiled fromthe World Bank data files and the following sources:

National A System of National Accounts. New York: UNaccounts department of International Economic and Socialand Affairs, 1968.economic Statistical Yearbook. New York: UN Department ofindicators International Economic and Social Affairs, various

issues.

Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics.Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1974.

FAO and IMF data files.

National sources.

Energy World Energy Supplies. UN Statistical Papers,Series J. New York: UN Department of Inter-national Economic and Social Affairs, variousyears.

Trade Direction of Trade. Washington, D.C.: IMF, variousissues.

International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.:IMF, various issues.

Handbook of International Trade and DevelopmentStatistics. New York: UNCTAD, various issues.

Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York: UNDepartment of International Economic and SocialAffairs, various issues.

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York:UN Department of International Economic and SocialAffairs, various issues.

United Nations trade tapes.

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Balance Balance of Payments Manual. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.:of payments, IMF, 1977.capital flows,and debt IMF balance of payments data files.

Development Co-operation. Paris: OECD, various annualissues.

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows toDeveloping Countries. Paris: OECD, various annualissues.

Population Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN Department ofInternational Economic and Social Affairs, variousissues.

Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural, and CityPopulations, 1950-2025. The 1982 Assessment.New York: UN Department of International Economicand Social Affairs, 1985.

Population and Vital Statistics Report (Quarterly).New York: UN Department of International Economicand Social Affairs, 1985.

World Population Trends and Policies: 1983 MonitoringReport. New York: UN Department of InternationalEconomic and Social Affairs, 1983.

World Population: 1983. Washington, D.C.: US Bureauof the Census, International Statistical ProgramsCenter, 1983.

World Population Prospects by Country, 1950-2025. NewYork: UN Department of International Economic andSocial Affairs, 1985.

Labor Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000.force 2nd ed. Geneva: ILO, 1977.

ILO tapes.

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Social Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN Department ofindicators International Economic and Social Affairs,

various issues.

StatisticaL Yearbook. New York: UN Department ofInternational Economic and Social Affairs,various issues.

Statistical Yearbook. Paris: Unesco, various issues.

World Health Statistics Annual. Geneva: WHO,various issues.

World Health Statistics Report. Special Issue on Waterand Sanitation, vol. 29, no. 10. Geneva: WHO,1976.

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