2 july2016

Unislamic Ideology of the Islamic State

Photo:REUTERS/Ahmed Saad A general view of the site after a suicide car bomb attack at the shopping area of Karrada, a largely Shi'ite district, in Baghdad, IraqJuly 4, 2016

On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the head of what was then known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, proclaimed the establishment of the Caliphate. Two years on, in summer 2016, the Islamic State celebrated its “birthday” with a spate of terror strikes.

The Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed Al Adnani released a statement in May that called upon Muslims worldwide to make Ramadan “a month of calamity everywhere for non-believers”.

A string of attacks carried out by Islamic State fighters throughout the Middle East rocked Turkey, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the final days of the holy month of Ramadan. The devastating suicide bomb attack in a predominantly Shia area of Baghdad that took 292 lives was shocking in its barbarity but was not surprising in its nature. The Islamic State that claims to propagate pure Islam sees any diversion from its Salafi Jihadi ideology as a deviation that needs to be eradicated. In that regard the Baghdad attack against Shia Muslims largely fell in line with their ideology.

The blasts in Turkey on June 28 and Saudi Arabia on July 4 were different in that the Islamic State was targeting Sunnis, the very sect the group appeals to in its videos and statements.

ReutersMap of Iraq and Syria showing the areas controlled by Islamic State

Muslims around the world condemned these attacks and even some Sunni extremist groups rushed to speak against the atrocities perpetrated by the Islamic State which speaks volumes about the lengths it is ready to go for the sake of advancing its agenda. Jabhat Al Nusra, another extremist group operating in Syria, released a statement in which it called the Medina blast “a criminal act that Muslims must condemn.”

Recent suicide attacks reveal just how unislamic the Islamic State really is. This point was reinforced by IS bombing in Medina, one of Islam’s most sacred sites. The endgame of this entire operation is still not clear. However, the fact that the Islamic State has not claimed this attack yet reveals how little coordination there is between the organization’s core and its cells throughout the region. IS and the Saudi monarchy both claim to be each other’s enemies, so the three attacks in Saudi Arabia were likely designed to deliver a political blow to the King, yet the group ended up shooting itself in the foot.

Political Extremist Groups and Islamic   Movements in the Middle East and North Africa

Recent suicide attacks reveal just how unislamic the Islamic State really is. This point was reinforced by IS bombing in Medina, one of Islam’s most sacred sites.

In the past two years IS has funded its terror campaign in the Middle East from illicit oil trade, by robbing banks, selling historic artifacts on the black market and imposing taxes on civilians. Now that the oil prices have collapsed, banks have been robbed and civilians living under IS control have been impoverished, the organization’s finances are running thin. Experts believe that such deadly attacks of the Islamic State are part of its new strategy of attracting new fighters and new sponsors. There is a clear need for both: according to the Pentagon, the number of IS recruits arriving in Iraq and Syria dropped more than seven-fold in the last twelve months, from 1,500 a month in April 2015 to just 200 in 2016.

Consequently, the territory controlled by the Islamic State is shrinking. According to US officials, the group has lost 47% of its territory in Iraq and 20% in Syria. Bombings in Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia help the organization attract marginalized elements whose goal is not even building the illusive Caliphate but spreading jihad, which they interpret as their path towards liberation.

Islamic State Volunteers

IS and the Saudi monarchy both claim to be each other’s enemies, so the three attacks in Saudi Arabia were likely designed to deliver a political blow to the King, yet the group ended up shooting itself in the foot.

The bad thing is that the Islamic State that is clearly becoming weaker and is shrinking which encourages its offshoots abroad to carry out attacks locally. In other words the idea of localizing IS and eradicating it inside Iraq and Syria has failed. We are now witnessing IS-inspired violence that does not necessarily have to be coordinated with the leadership and that poses a threat of a major spillover into the wider region.

Do recent events mean that the Islamic State is declining? Yes and no, it is rather imploding from within, but this process may last for years and can be extremely bloody. Being an entity that depends greatly on its public image the Islamic State will resort to suicide attacks more and more as it grows weaker. This threatens to create more regional instability and the Islamic State’s calculation is that regional powers will opt for dealing with it inside Syria and Iraq, on IS-dominated soil. This would be a mistake, instead world powers need to concentrate on tightening security around Syria and Iraq to prevent IS attacks from happening there as well as globally and allow the Caliphate to destroy itself from within.

06 july2016

“Ankara–Tel Aviv” Orient Express: Course Set for Rapprochement?

Photo:REUTERS/Amir CohenA Turkish ship carrying humanitarian aid 

to Gaza, at the Ashdod port, in southern IsraelJuly 3, 2016

Turkey’s foreign policy has been on the rise this past month. Riding the wave of de-escalation in the Russia–Turkey dialogue, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv are also being resumed after an almost six-year break. One should not forget that deterioration began in 2009, when Israel strengthened its positions in the Gaza Strip and soon started an open intervention. Later, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Recep Erdogan delivered his famous speech, later dubbed “one minute talk,” where he sharply criticized the actions of the Israeli leadership at the time. Further escalation happened in May 2010 following the incident with the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship: as it attempted to break the Israeli blockade and deliver a humanitarian cargo to the Gaza Strip, Israel killed 10 Turkish citizens. Afterwards, political and diplomatic relations between the two countries were ceased.

Ankara has put forward three conditions which, should the Israeli side agree, could result in the de-escalation of the bilateral relations crisis: an official apology; compensation to the families of the deceased; and, most importantly, lifting the naval, land and air blockade of the Gaza Strip that has been in effect since 2006. In 2013, under U.S. President Barack Obama’s mediation, Israelagreed to offer a formal apology to Turkey and pay compensation. This may be viewed as the first step towards normalizing relations between the two countries, but questions concerning the sums to be paid to the victims and the lifting of the blockade were never even on the agenda.

The lack of statehood and growing destabilization in many Middle Eastern countries forces Ankara and Tel Aviv to look for common ground.

On the other hand, Israel set a series of demands of its own, with which Ankara could not comply at that time. One was to abolish the prosecution of Israeli soldiers whose actions had resulted in the deaths of Turkish citizens. Essentially, it would ensure their immunity on an international level. At the same time, Tel Aviv could not lift the blockade of the Gaza Strip completely. Moreover, Israel insisted that the Turkish leadership significantly cut the number of the Hamas representatives (Israel views Hamas as a military threat) in Turkey and stop all contacts with the group as soon as possible. Obviously, the domestic political climate in both states, as well as the foreign political situation, did not allow Ankara and Tel Aviv to make mutual concessions. Until 2010, political and military contacts between the two countries had been developing successfully, but dropped off sharply that year. Israel–Turkey economic relations, however, were on the rise, and the trade volume grew many times over. What is more, it is common knowledge that, since 2014, the oil that fills the new pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan is transported via Turkey and its ports (Ceyhan) and on into Israel. Such developments prove once again that neither country is interested in severing ties completely. And the results of the parliamentary elections held in Turkey on November 1, 2015, where the ruling party received nearly 50 per cent of the votes, allowed Ankara to adhere to a bolder foreign policy, including a rapprochement with Tel Aviv.

Normalization of Relations or Forced Cooperation?

It is apparent that the events in Syria and the Middle East played a key role in defining a new foreign policy, not only for countries directly connected with the region, but also for the non-regional players, primarily the West, Russia, and the United States. In this context, Turkey and Israel are countries that are involved in the conflict to some extent, and their domestic political situation depends directly on foreign policy decisions. Thus, both sides have gradually come to realize that looking for common ground is a necessity.

First, Turkey and Israel are two non-Arab countries in the Middle East whose positions and actions largely determine the development of the Middle East as a whole. In many ways, this served as a starting point for the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Tel Aviv. At the same time, both Turkey and Israel have long been targets for large-scale terrorist attacks. That is why a joint fight against armed and radical groups such as ISIS could significantly enhance possible bilateral cooperation. The lack of statehood and growing destabilization in many Middle Eastern countries forces Ankara and Tel Aviv to look for common ground.

EPA/MAXIM SHIPENKOV/Vostock PhotoNikolay Surkov:Russia and Israel — Do Not Mess With Me inMiddle East

At the same time, it should be remembered that the involvement of the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces in Syria ran contrary to Ankara’s regional interests and thus afforded an opportunity for a renewed dialogue between Turkey and Israel. Tehran’s nuclear agreement (Р5+1), which opened a new page in Iran developing its regional influence and strengthening its international stance, also contributed to a further rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Neither Turkey, nor Israel favour Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East, and therefore, making it necessary for Ankara and Tel Aviv to cooperate. Although the question remains open as to which party will derive greater profits from this rapprochement, the renewed dialogue is nothing but a reflection of Realpolitik. Certainly, this rapprochement cannot fully resolve the crises and disagreements, of which Turkey and Israel had had their fair share even before the Syrian crisis, but it could minimize the increasing risks of destabilization processes.

Second, Ankara’s foreign policy largely contributed to isolating Turkey from regional processes, while non-regional actors such as Russia, the United States and western countries have now joined in. A significant cooling of Russia–Turkey relations was a trigger to overcoming the Israel–Turkey crisis. In a typical move, in May 2016, Turkey revised its position concerning the right to veto the opening of the Israeli office at NATO’s Brussels headquarters. For a long time, Ankara was against such cooperation.

It should also be noted that, although officially, cooperation between Israel and NATO was not particularly productive, bilateral cooperation with Washington has compensated for this. Moreover, as is well known, Turkey has been going through a period of strained relations with its western partners of late, including the United States. For Ankara, Tel Aviv has become a bridge for improving dialogue with Washington due to Israel’s powerful lobby in Washington.

A significant cooling of Russia–Turkey relations was a trigger to overcoming the Israel–Turkey crisis.

Third, despite the political premises for improving relations, energy is also a very significant factor. The energy situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has changed drastically over the past five or six years. Geological explorations for new deposits are under way. Ten years ago, discussions focused on the possibilities of exporting Russian gas to Israel, and now Tel Aviv is concerned with selling its own gas to Europe, thus essentially becoming a competitor for Moscow. Among the largest new gas fields are Tamar (discovered in 2009) and Leviathan (discovered in 2010).

Later, taking into account the impossibility of finding a consensus in the Turkey–Israel dialogue, Tel Aviv was prepared to sell its gas to Egypt, which also had political disagreements with Ankara. The rapprochement between Cairo and Tel Aviv was as disadvantageous for Ankara as Iran’s growing influence in the region. Thus, Turkey was forced to soften its stance in order to prevent further rapprochement between states Ankara had conflicts with. However, in 2015, Egypt conducted its own geological exploration which resulted in the discovery of its own shelf deposits. Israel was forced to look north and west to export its gas. Some suppose that had geological exploration revealed large gas fields

in Israel during the Turkey–Israel crisis, the Mavi Marmara incident would not have had such grave aftermath. However, history knows no “ifs.”

Israel’s rapprochement with Cyprus and Greece also irritated Ankara due to the territorial proximity of the states and Ankara’s clear interests in that area. The possibility of exporting natural gas into those countries seemed attractive to Tel Aviv, yet constructing a new pipeline branch into Greece and Cyprus was not financially sound, since neither country consumed sufficient amounts of energy commodities to meet Israel’s export plans.

REUTERS/Nir EliasAlexander Krylov:The Strategic Partnership between Turkey andIsrael

It is also obvious that the Eastern Mediterranean is an unstable region. Territorial conflicts and questions of the water border jurisdiction involve a large number of risks, and to minimize them, Tel Aviv would still have to negotiate with Ankara. At the same time, transporting Israeli gas to the European market via Turkey is more advantageous from a financial point of view. On the other hand, a crisis in Russia–Turkey relations had a negative impact on the possibilities of diversifying Turkey’s energy sources, which enhanced the role of such gas exporting countries as Azerbaijan, Qatar, Iraq and Israel.

Fourth, both Turkey and Israel have recently experienced international pressure as a result of their actions in Palestine. The Iranian factor also irritates Tel Aviv, because Iran has gained the status of a significant regional player and enjoys the support of western countries, Russia and China. The nuclear agreement also contributed to the fact that countries that had previously been unable to find common ground started to talk about the possibilities of cooperation. This is what happened between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, both Israel and Turkey believe that, with time, Tehran will enhance its positions in Syria, Yemen and other Middle Eastern countries, which is not in the best interests of Ankara and Tel Aviv.

Who Sets the Terms of the Agreements?

As we have already noted, normalization of the Turkey–Israel dialogue required that Tel Aviv comply with three demands, and the main demand – a complete lifting of the Gaza Strip blockade – has never been implemented. Still, in late June 2016, the parties were able to reach a consensus and sign an agreement giving Ankara the right to ship humanitarian cargo for the Gaza strip to the Israeli port of Ashdod on the condition that such cargo is cleared by the Israeli authorities and the contents are inspected upon arrival. At the same time, an agreement was achieved on constructing a power plant in Gaza jointly with Germany. Turkish contractors are also ready to build a hospital and water treatment facilities.

For Ankara, Tel Aviv has become a bridge for improving dialogue with Washington.

Essentially, the agreement returns both parties to the time period before the Mavi Marmara incident. Israel puts forward the same demands as before, and Turkey believes that it can extenuate the blockade. Ankara agreed to Tel Aviv’s demands that the prosecution of Israeli soldiers who had caused the death of Turkish citizens be stopped and the number of Hamas offices in Turkey be reduced. The remaining offices will have to play a diplomatic role. It was a kind of symbolic gesture on the part of the Turkish leadership towards Israel.

Despite the progress in the Turkey–Israel dialogue, there is a risk that relations could deteriorate due to the unpredictability of developments in the Gaza Strip and in Israel–Palestine relations. Moreover, as is well known, Egypt has recently initiated its own blockade of the Gaza Strip as a result of the close ties between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is therefore apparent that in the nearest future, in order to develop a more effective foreign policy and resolve domestic political issues Turkey will have to improve its relations with both Tel Aviv and Cairo.

Finland and Russia: a Bit More Than NATO

Photo:Lehtikuva/Jussi Nukari The meeting ofVladimir Putin and Sauli Niinistö

On July 1, 2016, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin met with his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö. Despite the Ukrainian crisis, the events in Syria and attempts by Western countries to isolate Russia, the Russia–Finland partner dialogue, as well as political contacts and trading and economic cooperation between the two countries never ceased. Vladimir Putin and Sauli Niinistö exchanged opinions on key issues of the international agenda, including the prospects of Finland joining NATO. Vladimir Putin said that Russia would respect Finland’s choice, noting that should Finland join NATO, Russia will be forced to ensure its security using all means at its disposal. Lev Voronkov comments on the issues discussed by the two leaders and analyses the results of their meeting.

When Niinistö took presidential office in 2012, he spoke about his intention to take a pragmatic approach to cooperation with Russia. Since Putin’s latest visit to Finland in 2013, Niinistö has visited Russia three times. During this time, the Russia–Finland partner dialogue, as well as political contacts and trading and economic cooperation never ceased, despite the Ukrainian crisis, attempts by Western countries to isolate Russia, Crimea joining Russia, the developments in Syria, the aggravation of the situation in the Baltic Sea, and the criticism of Finland’s stance by the Baltic states and influential politicians in the neighbouring Sweden.

The dialogue with Russia remains particularly valuable for Finland.

It is clear that the dialogue with Russia remains particularly valuable for Finland. Bilateral trade, economic, political and cultural relations with its eastern neighbour are important for the country and contain certain strategic elements. Similarly, the dialogue with its northern neighbour is equally important for Russia.

Currently, Finnish investments into Russian economy amount to about $7 billion, and about 7,000 Finnish firms do business in Russia. Russia–Finland interaction is mutually beneficial: the Finnish company Fortum participated in the modernization of combined heat and power plants in Russia via $4 billion investment programme; it is also planning to launch a pilot project in the Ulyanovsk Region to build a wind farm with a capacity of 35 MW for the wholesale market. Moreover, the construction of the Hanhikivi-1 Nuclear Power Plant continues in Northwest Finland with Rosatom taking part in it; Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation is completing construction of the world’s first ice-breaker powered by liquefied gas and diesel fuel in a Helsinki shipyard; and Yandex’s data centrerecently became operational in the Finnish municipality of Mäntsälä.

As an EU member, Finland is capable of influencing the overall state of relations between the European Union and Russia.

Finland remains a favourite destination among Russian tourists. In terms of inbound tourism , Finland provided the second largest number of holidaymakers among EU countries in 2015, and was fifth overall (link in Russian). Russia is the third-largest consumer of Finnish goods, behind only Germany and Sweden. Still, due to the unfavourable situation on the global market and the EU sanctions policy developed and adopted with Finland’s participation, Finnish exports to Russia droppedby 40 per cent, and its agricultural exports into Russia dropped by 72 per cent.

Length of the Russian-Finnishborder is 1 271,8 km

Putin’s working visit took place immediately after Brexit (the United Kingdom is an important market for Finland) and after the European Union, with Finland’s consent, extended anti-Russian sanctions and Russia took the appropriate counter-measures. In this context, Finland’s foreign trade prospects have not improved in the slightest. Sidestepping the issue of lifting the sanctions, the presidents focused on discussing the possibilities for developing bilateral trade and economic relations outside the restrictive measures. Among the possible solutions mentioned were localizing the production of Finnish goods that are under Russian sanctions (which has been done with Valio, , for instance) and increasing the activity of Finnish investors in Russia (link in Russian). Regarding more radical measures to solve the issue, Vladimir Putin recommended turning to London for advice. Clearly, as an EU member, Finland is capable of influencing the overall state of relations between the European Union and Russia.

In addition to bilateral relations, the presidents of Russia and Finland paid great attention to the discussion of a number of international issues that will be on the upcoming NATO summit agenda to take place in Warsaw on July 8–9, 2016. Finland and Sweden have been invited to participate Thus, the

discussion of the international agenda and the situation in the Baltic region was extremely timely and necessary.

Efforts have been stepped up by the supporters of NATO membership in Finland, which is not a member of any military alliance, as well as in neighbouring Sweden. NATO supporters use the propaganda campaign started with the assistance of other states (NATO and the European Union members) to frighten the population with Russia’s aggressive actions and thus turn public sentiment in favour of abandoning the policy of neutrality and force these countries to join NATO. The Finnish President had stated previously that he intended to hold a referendum on Finland’s membership in NATO.

Сlaims of Russian aggression against Finland do not hold water and look far-fetched and exploitative.

Through the media, the Finnish and Swedish military authorities have also contributed to fuelling fears with regard to Russian aggression, with lively discussions on alleged secret incursions of Russian submarines into Finnish and Swedish territorial waters having taken place recently. No submarines were found, neither could any plausible explanation for the incursions be offered. Still, they did manage to sway public opinion.

At the concluding press conference, Vladimir Putin statedhat, given Finland’s neutral status, Russia had long since stationed its military 1,500 kilometres away from the Russia–Finland border and adheres to decisions made previously in this respect. Russia takes Finland’s status into account, despite NATO’s revitalized activities in the Baltic countries and in the Baltic Sea close to its borders. Against this background, claims of Russian aggression against Finland do not hold water and look far-fetched and exploitative. There are no other convincing arguments that could indeed prove Russia’s “aggressive” actions against Finland and confirm the concerns of the Finnish population.

Through the media, the Finnish and Swedish military authorities have also contributed to fuelling fears with regard to Russian aggression.

Throughout the long history of Russia–Finland relations, the probability of Russia being attacked via Finnish territory and Russia’s attempts to preclude this possibility have caused a large number of problems and conflicts. It has never been in Finland’s best interests to ignore Russia’s understandable and legitimate concerns about its security. Should Finland join NATO, its military will become a part of the NATO military infrastructure located along the 1,300 kilometres of the Russia–Finland border with immediate proximity to St. Petersburg and Helsinki. The threat of NATO forces attacking Russia from Finland will increase drastically. In that case, Russia will be unable to continue its previous policies toward Finland and will be forced to ensure its security by any means at its disposal.

REUTERS/Michaela RehleIgor Ivanov: How Can We EnsureNational Security in the 21st Century?

It is doubtful that such a move will increase Finland’s national security, since the country will have to be guided not so much by its own national interests, but by the bloc’s collective strategy. And this coordinated strategy is perceived in Russia as a threat to its fundamental interests, not to mention the fact that it has a negative impact on trade, economic and military-technical ties with non-NATO countries. Just

look at the situation with the French Mistral helicopter carriers, and the unilateral termination of military-technical cooperation with Russia that NATO had announced in connection with the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia is also concerned with the intentions of Finland, the United States and the United Kingdom to draft agreements or treaties on defence cooperation. What is important, though, is not the agreement itself, but its contents. In 2010, NATO members and the non-allied countries of Northern Europe concluded a defence agreement which does not imply the creation of a military alliance with strict mutual commitments. The President of Finland assured Vladimir Putin that the agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom are technical and spell out the current situation.

Public opinion surveys in Finland show that there are still more people opposed to joining NATO.

Public opinion surveys in Finland show that there are still more people opposed to joining NATO. If a referendum on the issue is held and if it produces a negative result for those who support NATO membership, it may remove the issue from the national agenda for a long time. Before the referendum, both sides will step up their efforts to win the population’s support. Against this background, we can expect new initiatives, if not provocations, on the part of NATO supporters aiming to prove Russia’s aggressive nature. Under such circumstances, if the currently drafted agreements between Finland, the United States and the United Kingdom on interaction in defence and military technologies are, indeed, purely technical in nature, then they may be used as an additional argument against Finland’s full NATO membership, since many issues important for Finland may be solved through other channels.

During the meeting, the President of Finland said that mutual confidence-building measures could de-escalate the situation in the Baltic Sea; such measures could include the combat planes of all countries flying over the Baltic regions with their transponders on. In this connection, Vladimir Putin charged the appropriate Russian authorities with entering this issue on the agenda of the upcoming meeting f the NATO–Russia Council scheduled to take place in Brussels after the NATO summit in Warsaw (link in Russian). If the NATO member countries are sincerely interested in de-escalating the situation in the Baltic Sea, then they should take this initiative positively. NATO’s refusal to approve the proposal put forward by the President of Finland will be hard to interpret as an argument proving Russia’s growing aggressiveness.

The exchange of opinions that took place during Vladimir Putin’s working visit to Finland allowed the countries to clarify their respective stances on pressing international issues and the problems in bilateral relations. It was also an important element in maintaining a regular dialogue between two neighbouring and friendly countries on a large range of international issues.

12 july2016

Stefanie Babst: We Need to Settle the Ukrainian Crisis First

Photo:EPA/RADEK PIETRUSZKA/Vostock PhotoBritish Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko andNATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland, 09 July 2016

On July 11–12, 2016, Moscow became the venue for the 162nd Bergedorf Roundtable titled “Russia and Europe: What Unites Us, What Divides Us?” held by the Russian International Affairs Council and the Korber Foundation. RIAC website editor Maria Smekalova asked Stefanie Babst, Head of Strategic Analysis Capability to the NATO and Chairman of the Military Committee, about the latest NATO summit results, prospects of Russia-NATO copperation and the bloc’s reaction to Brexit.

Could you comment on NATO Summit outcome?

Well, overall I think the allies are very happy with the conduct of the Warsaw summit. In particular, because everything that was prepared for the Heads of State and Government to sign was signed, everything that was prepared to be discussed was discussed. I think it was important that the allies spoke with one voice, not only on their future actions vis-à-vis the Middle East and the South, but also when it comes to the alliance’s future relations with Russia. The allies agreed that our future strategy towards Russia should be based on a dual track philosophy. One is that of enhanced deterrence, and the other one is that of dialogue. In that respect the allies were very much in line with each other. There was absolutely no diverting voice, and we will now in the next couple of months translate all of these decisions into action.

Stefanie Babst

The NATO-Russia Council has resumed its activity. Can we expect any kind of rapprochement in the near future?

I think that depends very much, in fact, on the Russian side because the NATO allies have made their position very clear. They have said, and they have reiterated this in Warsaw, that practical cooperation remains suspended until we have seen the full implementation of the Minsk agreement. We need to see that Russia continues to adhere to internationally agreed norms. Now, obviously our hope is that progress will be made in the Minsk process, but I think it’s already very important that the allies get together with Russian partners to talk about a number of issues. One of the issues which is really important to us is to find agreement with Russia on reducing military incidents, reducing the risk of misunderstanding each other in military terms, and how we can ultimately modernize the Vienna document that guides military inspections and transparency.

Nowadays there are several conflicts in the world that require international efforts. How can Russia and NATO cooperate to solve some of the existing crises?

EPA/RADEK PIETRUSZKA/Vostock PhotoDmitry Danilov:NATO has swung back to strategic competition,according to which Russia is seen as a major andlong-term challenge

You are right, assuming that there would be ample ground for Russia and NATO to work together, and we did so before the illegal annexation of Crimea. Unfortunately, the time is not right yet because we think it is critical to first settle a conflict which is still very hot in Europe and which involves one of our partners, Ukraine. So before we have settled that conflict, it will be very difficult to work jointly on other issues. We have to deal with this one first.

Do you think Brexit will lead to serious consequences for the NATO?

First of all, the United Kingdom is still a member of the European Union, and will remain so until the vote on Article 50 of the European Treaty. Only then the process of divorce will start. I think it is only then and at the end of that process that we can actually make a judgement about how that could affect NATO. So for me this is far too early to say that NATO will be affected. What counts for us now is that we have a truly committed ally amongst our members, that we have an ally, fully dedicated to NATO’s overall agenda, to our operations, and is also an active contributor to our military outpost. That will remain the case for some time to come. However, I do think it all depends on how the process between the European Union and the United Kingdom will develop and what that relationship at the end of the day will be. And we don’t know that yet because first, the UK would have to invoke Article 50 of the Washington Treaty and then we will see the process unfolding. We have to be a bit more patient.

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30 june2016

Vladimir Putin’s Visit to China: No High Expectations, Concrete Results

Photo:EPA/MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV/Vostock PhotoRussian President Vladimir Putin and Presidentof the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping attend the official welcome ceremony in Beijing,China, 25 June 2016

The President of the Russian Federation’s recent visit to China was one of the most successful Russia–China top-level meetings in terms of practical content. The visit was also notable for the unusually high level of thinly disguised anti-American rhetoric on both sides and the adoption of an important joint political statement that may make a difference to Moscow and Beijing’s dialogue with the United States on strategic matters.

In addition, the text of the joint Russia–China statement made as a result of Putin’s visit sets down the intention of the two sides to pursue a completely new integration initiative – the Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership – which would, in addition to the EAEU and China, include ASEAN countries. The initiative is still sketchy, but if it gets off the ground, the consequences could be immense.

The joint Russia–China statement on strengthening global strategic stability opens with a reference to the “dangerous trend” arising from the desire of “certain states and military-political alliances to achieve complete military and military-political superiority” in order to use force and the threat of force to further their interests. The declaration then goes on to accuse “certain countries and alliances” of evading a dialogue on making cuts to the types of weapons that “they consider to be instrumental in ensuring military superiority”.

Russia and China refuse to see strategic stability as a strictly military category confined to nuclear weapons.

Russia and China expressly state that they are concerned about the deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defence system in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia “under false pretences”. The two countries then set forth their new vision of strategic stability which will likely provide the basis for future talks with the United States on strategic issues. Russia and China refuse to see strategic stability as a strictly military category confined to nuclear weapons.

Russia and China refuse to see strategic stabilityas a strictly military category confined to nuclearweapons.

Now strategic stability also includes non-interference in internal affairs and renunciation of coercive measures outside the UN Charter in the political sphere; ensuring a balance of the entire range of weapons at the minimum level necessary and a refusal to expand military alliances that could potentially threaten other countries.

The declaration is key to future world politics. It means that Russia and China have worked out a coordinated position in response to any announced or future U.S. with regard to nuclear weapons. Both countries apparently see nuclear weapons as one of the foundations of their security and intend to parry any U.S. anti-nuclear initiatives by demanding that nuclear issues be discussed comprehensively, taking conventional weapons and the non-military aspects of security into account.

Similarly, a common position has been confirmed at the top level for another key topic on the world agenda, namely, information security. The parties did not just confirm and specify their views on the issue, but agreed to set up a permanent mechanism of consultations in this area. On the Russian side, it will be headed by the presidential adviser on information technologies, while the Chinese side will be represented by the head of the Office of the Steering Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Information and Network Security.

Larisa Smirnova:Cooperation in Science and Education toPromote an Innovative Approach to Russia–China Relations

Russia and China have worked out a coordinated position in response to any announced or future U.S. with regard to nuclear weapons.

As for economics, a number of important agreements that had been in preparation for a long time have been finalized. Most important is the agreement whereby the Chinese side will provide $12 billion to finance the Yamal-LNG project. The agreement to create a Russia–China joint venture for building a wide-bodied aircraft is also important. It gives Russia a measure of confidence in remaining part of this extremely important and massive Chinese project, which in turn may be critical for Russian civil aviation. After many years of negotiations, the Russia–China project to create a heavy transport helicopter has moved into the practical implementation stage. The project has a long history (the first talks began after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, when Russian Mi-26 helicopters played an important role in the rescue operation). For a long time there was a sense that the project would never reach the practical stage because of differences between the sides, but now there are signs that it will get off the ground. The

agreement on cooperation in the production of liquid-fuel rocket engines for carrier rockets and the supply of Chinese avionics is important for the space industry.

Considerable progress has been made in the preparation of major joint projects for the future. One example is the memorandum of understanding between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) on the participation of the Russian company in gas storage and power generation in China, which will probably make it possible to move forward on signing an agreement on gas supplies via the western route. Preparation of an agreement between Rosneft and Sinopec on building a petrochemical complex in the Far East has entered the final stages. Rosneft has signed an agreement with Beijing Gas Group on the main principles of the Chinese purchase of a 20 per cent stake in Verkhnechonskneftegaz. Finally, progress has been made on important aspects of localizing production and financing the large high-speed Moscow–Kazan railway project in the future.

Li Wencong, President of Bank ICBC:We Consider Russia Our Strategic Partner

One problem that remains in relations between the two countries is the low quality of “managing the expectations” of the two governments, as well as those of the general public, with regard to bilateral relations.

Thus, the results of President Putin’s visit give grounds for noting substantial progress in cooperation. Better results could hardly have been expected in many areas considering the state of bureaucracy in both countries and the practice of doing business at the start of the Ukraine crisis.

One problem that remains in relations between the two countries is the low quality of “managing the expectations” of the two governments, as well as those of the general public, with regard to bilateral relations.

The problem is particularly catastrophic in Russia considering the well-known propensity of the Russian state propaganda to create a ballyhoo around political plans as soon as they begin to assume barely discernible shape. Fostering exaggerated and patently unrealistic expectations in a bid to derive temporary political mileage inevitably ends up in disappointment and discredits the project. In recent years, this approach has ruined the reputation of countless important reforms and economic and technological programmes which, strictly speaking, could be seen as a total or partial success.

In Russia, the propaganda campaign surrounding the “pivot to the East” in 2014 generated unwarranted hopes for progress in bilateral relations. Predictably, they were followed by equally unwarranted “disenchantment” in 2015, when absurd rumours began to circulate that “China has practically joined sanctions against Russia” and that no progress in Russia–China cooperation was being made.

Russia and China – No Negative CompetitionShould be in Sight

There is a need to develop a legal framework and create financial institutions to service bilateral trade with due account of the experience of economic links between China and Iran.

The reality, however, is more prosaic. For objective reasons, such as geography and the structure of the economy, Russia–China cooperation hinges on a limited number of very large projects in energy, infrastructure and industry. Each project involves years of negotiations and approvals. Speeding up this process inevitably undermines the quality of the agreement for the country seeking to accelerate it (i.e. Russia). That would be unreasonable considering the long-term character of the deals under discussion and the relatively mild nature of the crisis of the Russian economy.

China of course, far from “joining the sanctions,” is known to have offered help to Russia at the peak of the crisis. The assistance was declined, apparently due to Moscow’s reluctance to weaken its negotiating position.

As for business relations, both Russian and Chinese companies depend almost totally on the U.S.-controlled financial and information infrastructure in their international activities. To be sure, the introduction of sanctions against Russia was not a stimulating factor. Problems attracting Chinese investments were predictable. There is a need to develop a legal framework and create financial institutions to service bilateral trade with due account of the experience of economic links between China and Iran (whose mutual trade exceeded $50 million before oil prices plummeted). The trade mechanisms between China and Iran are designed to function in the context of the economic war with the West.

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Vasily Kashin, “Vladimir Putin’s Visit to China: No High Expectations, Concrete Results ,” Russian International Affairs Council, 30 June 2016, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=7852

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30 june2016

North Korea’s Two Allies

Photo:KCNATest of intermediate-range Musudan ballisticmissile, June 22, 2016

On July 3, 2016, North Korea will mark its first ever Strategic Forces Day. Following the fourth nuclear test that took place earlier this year, North Korea recently carried out successful tests of a medium-range missile. So, what kind of strategic forces is North Korea building?

Background

The history of the Korean nuclear crisis is filled with all kinds of claims made by both sides. This article will mention only some of the most important events [1]. Kim Il-Sung was probably interested in nuclear weapons ever since they first appeared, and the 1950–1953 war during which the United States unambiguously threatened to use them against North Korea only emboldened his interest further. In 1965, the Soviet Union gave the North Koreans its IRT-2000 light-water reactor. At the time, the North Korean regime regarded the nuclear weapon as a means to boost its prestige and independence.

In December 1985, North Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decision was made under heavy pressure from the USSR, which made it the condition of continued aid. However, the situation changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which resulted in cooperation between North Korea and the new Russia collapse almost entirely, and led to the emergence of the United States-dominated unipolar world. China committed itself to strengthening its economic links with the West, which made providing military aid to the country problematical.

North Korea’s security situation became precarious. Although the United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from the south of the peninsula in 1991, the superiority of the military alliance of South Korea and the United States was overwhelming. Apparently, it was then that North Korea made the final decision to develop its nuclear weapons. In 1993, the country refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out an unscheduled inspection and declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Judging from publicly available information, the United States at the time was seriously considering launching military actions, but was deterred by the forecast of high casualties. Some top U.S. generals assessed losses at 490,000 South Korean and 52,000 American troops in the first 90 days, or even one million dead, including 80,000–100,000 U.S. soldiers, though these figures are too high to be taken seriously [2]. The fact that the Pentagon made these figures public, on the contrary, suggests that the military establishment was strongly opposed to a conflict breaking out.

REUTERS

However, North Korea could not dismiss the possibility of an air offensive being launched against it. Such an operation could be conducted with minimum losses because the Korean People’s Army Air Force, though quite strong in terms of numbers, has obsolete aircraft and cannot hold its own even against South Korea, not to mention the United States [3]. An air campaign would not have decimated the North Korean army, but would have been fully capable of destroying its infrastructure, shattering its power industry, disrupting communications and exerting psychological pressure. Needless to say, a humanitarian disaster would ensue. Such a scenario is relatively painless for North Korea’s adversaries, but it would sooner or later cause the country to capitulate on certain terms, or prompt a ground offensive against a weakened North Korean army.

Thus, from the viewpoint of the North Korean military-political leadership, in order to survive, the country must have the means to prevent such an aerial war from being launched against it. The only credible deterrent is nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons have an intimidating reputation, which is not the same thing as effectiveness.

From the viewpoint of the North Korean military-political leadership, in order to survive, the country must have the means to prevent such an aerial war from being launched against it. The only credible deterrent is nuclear weapons.

In the 1990s, the nuclear crisis was defused by diplomatic means: an agreement was signed whereby North Korea put its withdrawal from NPT on hold in exchange for economic (mainly energy) assistance and the construction of light-water reactors that cannot be used for military purposes. However, cooperation with the West never got off the ground, which was probably inevitable because the two sides pursued different goals: it was not in the interests of the United States and South Korea to shore up the North Korean economy (the reactor was never built and fuel supplies were erratic), while North Korean, along with the declared missile programme, apparently continued nuclear research behind closed doors.

In 2002, the agreement was broken off. And on January 10, 2003, North Korea officially withdrew from NPT, thus setting a serious precedent that jeopardized the entire global non-proliferation system [4]. Since then, North Korea has carried out four tests: in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016. Notwithstanding the diplomatic efforts in the six-party talks, North Korea continues to build up its Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) [5]. World events, especially the wars in Iraq and Libya (which abandoned its nuclear programme in 2003), are causing it to intensify its efforts in the field. So what kind of SNF is North Korea building?

Not Much to Choose From

CIAAl-Samud II, Iraq

Building Strategic Nuclear Forces can help save resources and have a leaner army. A conventional arms race would have cost a great deal more because the country would have had to compete single-handedly against the collective military might of the West and the defence budgets of a coalition of countries. Engaging in a symmetric arms race with South Korea has not made sense ever since the prices of modern weapons started to soar and North Korea found itself in isolation (even China does not sell it modern weapons).

Opinions vary as to how many warheads North Korea has. The most reasonable and balanced assessment at present seems to be about ten finished warheads. More important is the quality of the warheads, above all the ratio between size and power. North Korea probably has, or will soon have, the capability to produce transportable low-yield warheads. It is now the question of the second component of the nuclear weapon, the means of delivery.

The classical SNF triad is based on air, ground and sea components, represented by missile-carrying bombers with cruise missiles or unguided bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBMs) in launch silos or on mobile ground complexes, and ballistic missile submarines, respectively.

Engaging in a symmetric arms race with South Korea has not made sense ever since the prices of modern weapons started to soar and North Korea found itself in isolation

The early notion of huge and unwieldy Korean nuclear devices prompted sarcastic forecasts of their possible use, the only viable option being to plant a “mine” in the way of an advancing enemy. Interestingly, the sceptics, perhaps unwittingly, were describing the tactics employed by the United States during the Cold War period[6]. Then the spots where nuclear mines might be planted on the presumed route of the Soviet offensive were determined. Until 1991, the U.S. group had such places on the Korean Peninsula. The terrain, which offers a limited choice of paths for an offensive, seems to be tailor-made for this kind of weapon, whose use may have a serious demoralising effect. The disadvantage is that it can only be used in the event of a ground-based campaign, which, as mentioned above, is unlikely.

The first nuclear weapons carriers were planes, but this is not an option for North Korea, because it does not have modern bombers and is vulnerable to a first nuclear strike. For North Korea, which attaches great importance to cannon and rocket artillery, it would be tempting to turn them into tactical nuclear weapons patterned on Cold War-era “nuclear artillery”, but that does not solve the problem of strategic deterrence and requires the serious miniaturization of warheads. This is hardly an option for North Korea considering its limited resources, including enriched fissile materials.

Thus we come to the conclusion that the only carrier that suits North Korea’s needs is the ballistic missile.

The Last Ally of Rogue States

U.S. ArmyTHAAD launch

The “first world” countries faced the threat of enemy ballistic missiles during the localized war in the Persian Gulf in 1991. The threat of Iraqi missiles was supposed to be countered by the latest MIM-104 Patriot missiles, which can theoretically intercept operational-tactical missiles [7]. However, while the Iraq War was on the whole a deserved triumph of the multinational force, the “rocket war” looked more like a defeat. Of the 88 registered launches [8], 53 rockets hit the targets covered by Patriots, and 27 were shot down [9]. The defeat of the launchers was an even more disappointing experience. Despite the massive resources committed, the efforts of the entire U.S. intelligence machine and numerous special forces operations, as many as 40 per cent of the warplane sorties (which delayed the start of the ground campaign by a week [10]), not a single ground missile was destroyed (link in Russian). This was partly compensated for by the poor results of rocket bombardment: military targets were hit only twice, in one case an F-15C fighter plane and a Patriot launcher were hit, and in another case a rocket hit a barracks killing 28 soldiers and wounding more than a hundred. It was a rare piece of luck that the dozens of rockets that fell on cities did not claim many civilian casualties: 14 people [11] died in Israel and one person died in Saudi Arabia (more than 300 people were wounded and many buildings were destroyed) [12].

In the 1991 war, Iraq used updated longer-range Soviet R-17 (Scud) missiles known as Al Hussein [13]. After its defeat, Iraq was prohibited from possessing and developing missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres [14].

Not surprisingly, the North Korean military-political leadership, which kept a close eye on the localized wars of the 1990s and 2000s, has concluded that mobile ground missile complexes could form the basis of the strategic deterrence potential.

The United States had more success in terms of the contest between air defence and ballistic missiles in 2003 owing to the fact that it was using a new modification of the Patriot complex (PAC-3) that took the experience of 1991 into account, and also because the enemy was much weaker. At the time of the invasion, Iraq had a small number of Al-Samoud 2 and Ababil-100 missiles with a range of less than 200 kilometres. In 2003, Iraq launched at least 23 ballistic and cruise missiles [15], of which nine were shot down. Although most of the other missiles hit the sand, one success was reported: on April 7, a ballistic missile hit the field HQ of an army brigade killing three servicemen and two journalists, wounding 14 people and immobilizing a score of vehicles.

The 2003 campaign has shown that the United States is beefing up its capacity in theatre missile defence, but still has a long way to go to guarantee interception. Although several launchers were destroyed during the second Iraq War, the fact that it took 20 launches shows that the process of seeking missile complexes is still not up to scratch.

At this point in time, there is no coherent solution to the Korean nuclear problem.

Not surprisingly, the North Korean military-political leadership, which kept a close eye on the localized wars of the 1990s and 2000s, has concluded that mobile ground missile complexes could form the basis

of the strategic deterrence potential. They are perfectly suited to the geography of the northern part of the Korean Peninsula: many hideouts and tunnels can be made in the mountains, making attempts to destroy mobile missile launchers that have a very good chance of surviving a nuclear strike futile. Obviously, even such specialized anti-missile complexes as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Aegis BMD cannot ensure 100 per cent interception [16], and nothing less will suffice when it comes to countering a nuclear attack.

North Korea does not need to equip a significant part of its missiles with nuclear warheads. Indeed, it would even be harmful to do so. A large number of conventional missiles would come in handy as a means of a “last warning”, and in the event of a main strike, they would serve as decoys for ballistic missile defence.

Krim SahaiRodong-1 Missile complex, 2012

North Korea has been actively pursuing its own missile programme since the 1980s. North Korean engineers quickly learned how to produce their own Scud missiles (called Hwasong-5) and even supplied them in mass to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War. In the first half of the 1990s, Hwasong-5 formed the basis for serial production of the longer-range Hwasong-6 (500 km) and Hwasong-7 (700–800km). That comfortably covers the entire territory of the South Korea. Exactly how many such missiles have been built is unknown, but it would be safe to say that they number in the hundreds (the number of launchers of course is significantly less).

However, these missiles do not have the necessary range to strike at key U.S. military infrastructure facilities in Okinawa and Guam. In the mid-1990s, Rodong-1 missiles with a range of 1300–1500 kilometres were put into service [17]. These missiles, which can hit any target in Japan, have often been named as carriers of nuclear weapons in North Korea. A considerable number of these missiles is thought to have been built and they are combat-ready. The Musudan missile is a potential threat to Guam [18], home of Andersen Air Force Base, the main U.S. strategic aviation base in the region. It is widely believed in the West that Musudan is based on the Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), possibly with the assistance of Russian specialists, though these reports can be neither confirmed nor denied. The range of that missile is variously estimated at between 2500 and 4000 kilometres. The missile is currently undergoing tests, with the first successful test having been carried out on 22 June (link in Russian).

North Korea also has its own “super missile” – the KN-08 (14?) [19]. There is some confusion surrounding it: during parades in 2012, 2013 and 2015, the same launchers demonstrated models of the missile that differed in size and the number of stages [20]. A smaller missile with two stages (sometimes called KN-14) was displayed in 2015, whereas earlier three-stage missiles were shown. Signs are that the missile is still a work-in-progress with a lot of tests still lying ahead. However, eventually it may become the first North Korean IBM that would be capable of reaching Alaska, Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States.

In a certain sense, the current situation suits the United States, since it justifies a build-up of the military infrastructure in the Pacific.

All the above-mentioned missiles use mobile ground launchers.According to unconfirmed reports, North Korea has a small number of missile silos, but even if they do exist, their function is auxiliary because they are highly vulnerable. For the same reason Taepodong missiles should not be regarded as true combat missiles because they are launched from a bulky launch facility and need a long time to be prepared for launching. The programme to develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles should also be mentioned. The North Korean media widely covered its tests, probably to impress its opponents (link in Russian). It would be unwise, however, for North Korea to count on them because its submarines are highly vulnerable for U.S., South Korean and Japanese anti-submarine defences. This is compounded by the weakness of North Korea’s aviation and surface fleet, which are unable to create safe deployment areas. Whether the possibility of launching missiles from their naval bases is worth the extra cost is a moot question. However, they may be useful as back-up assets, as the existence of even a couple of missile-carrying submarines would force the enemy to commit disproportionately large assets to counter them.

EPAKN-14 Missile complex, 2015

The conclusion that suggests itself is pessimistic. At this point in time, there is no coherent solution to the Korean nuclear problem. North Korea will not give up its missile and nuclear programme just like that, while making significant concessions is not an option for the United States. Both sides are right in their own way, because one is fighting for survival while the other – in addition to national prestige – is upholding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is extremely important for recognized nuclear powers, including Russia. Besides, in a certain sense, the current situation suits the United States, since it justifies a build-up of the military infrastructure in the Pacific. Nor is there a military solution to the problem because even if one assumes that North Korea does not have usable nuclear weapons today, the price of war with North Korea does not justify the dubious benefits of Korean unification. So, the world will watch the slow maturing of yet another nuclear power.

The issue of the size of the nuclear arsenal North Korea seeks to have and the rate at which it may increase takes us into the realm of guesswork. Considering its goals, it would be reasonable for North Korea to be content with 40–50 warheads, even in the longer term. By the middle of the next decade, North Korea’s SNF will probably comprise a significant number of mobile ground missiles coupled primarily with armoured vehicles, only a small portion of which will be fitted out with nuclear

Launching domestic production of heavy chassis for KN-08/14 missile sizes is critical.

1. For a more detailed historical overview in Russian see the works of Russian experts on Korea, notably a review article by A. Lankov titled “Nuclear Socialism” and the cycle of lectures by K. Asmolov.

2. To put the numbers into perspective, there were only 36,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in 1994. Losses of 80,000–100,000 would be double those that the United States sustained during the Vietnam War, which lasted many years.

3. Only a small number of MiG-29 (9–13) and Su-25 strike fighters delivered during the final years of the USSR are of any real combat value.

4. Israel, India and Pakisan have not signed the NPT.

5. The six parties to the talks are North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

6. The USSR had similar systems, probably intended for the same purpose, but far less is known about its plans in this field.

7. There is some confusion with regard to the classification of weapons in the Russian and American traditions. In the United States, missiles are divided into tactical (with a range of less than 300 km), short-range (up to1000 km), medium-range (up to 3000–3500 km) – with short- and medium-range missiles sometimes referred together as “theatre ballistic missiles” – and intermediate (up to 5500 km). The USSR/Russia classified missiles as tactical (up to 300 km), operational-tactical (up to 500 km), short or shorter-range (up to 1000 km) and medium-range (up to 5500 km).

8. Including 46 on targets in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and 42 in Israel. It was one of Saddam Hussein’s aims to provoke a response from Israel and use it to undermine the international coalition. U.S. diplomats exerted great efforts to prevent Israel from entering the war.

9. Steven Zaloga. Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems. 1955–2005, Osprey, 2006.

10. Robert Scales. Certain V

ictory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Office of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1993.

 

11. Two people died in the explosion, while the majority died of "indirect causes", primarily heart attacks.

12. For comparison, during the Iran–Iraq war in the spring of 1988, massive bombardments (about 200 missiles) of Iranian cities claimed 2,000 lives and forced an exodus of the civilian population from cities.

13. The range of fire was increased from 300 to 550–650 km (according to various estimates). The launchers were modernized MAZ-543 chassis from R-17 and domestically designed launchers, including semi-trailers attached to conventional civilian tow trucks.

14. Under UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707.

15. In addition to several Al-Samoud 2 and Ababil-100 missiles, that number included Soviet Luna-M missiles. “Cruise missiles” here means Chinese anti-ship HY-2 missiles refitted to hit ground targets. Not a single cruise missile was shot down.

16. In the narrow sense, Aegis is the information and control system of the U.S. Navy, primarily intended to defend aircraft carrier groups. The high potential of Aegis prompted the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Agency to launch the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Aegis BMD) in order to develop marine and ground means of intercepting mobile ground missiles (link in Russian).

17. This is the South Korean name. Better known as the names Nodong-1/2 (1 and 2 differ in warhead mass and range) or Nodong A. “Nodong,” with a corresponding letter index, is sometimes used in the West to denote all North Korean medium-range ballistic missiles. Inside North Korea, the name Hwasong (Mars) is apparently used for similar purposes. Here and elsewhere the more common name has been used.

18. Also known in the West as BM-2, Rodong (Nodong)-B. In North Korea, it is possibly known as Hwasong-10.

19. Rodong (Nodong)-С, or Hwasong-13.

19. Rodong (Nodong)-С, or Hwasong-13.

20. On the basis of a Chinese commercial chassis purchased in 2011 (link in Russian).

21. Launching domestic production of heavy chassis for KN-08/14 missile sizes is critical.

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Alexander Yermakov, “North Korea’s Two Allies,” Russian International Affairs Council, 30 June 2016, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=7847