© 2005 donald e. vandergriff 1 agenda part 2 part 2-understand “why?” purpose historical...

© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff1

AgendaPart 2

Part 2-Understand “Why?”PurposeHistorical Traditions

2nd GW forceROTC FollowsMythsThe Results

In Sum: Where history leads us—today’s ROTC program

Conclusion

“The military school system remains an anachronism of 19th-century pedagogy that fails to make best use of the dismally limited time available to soldiers for learning”

MG Robert Scales USA (ret.), “Studying the Art of War,”

Washington Times (17 Feb 05)


Purpose

In order to evolve an organization it must: Be willing to admit that there is a problem Be willing to say, what worked, worked but what now?

Then, First understand the “why” to where we are today Examine with an unbiased eye

Assists in providing for a viable solution

“Who is to blame for allowing the learning deficit within the military to grow so wide? The list of the guilty is long. Congress shares much of the blame. In the past it has had a "show me the money" attitude toward funding military education that required an immediate and demonstrable payback for any fully funded learning program.”

MG Robert Scales USA (ret.)“Studying the Art of War”

Washington Times (17 Feb 05)


Historical Traditions Results of a 2nd Generation Army in today’s world

Maneuver Army Brilliant execution in Race to Baghdad Unhinged the Taliban in Afghanistan

Stability and Support Operations Country/area specific 3 Block War Company Commander’s War Evolving 4th Generation War (4GW)

Why is it this way? Starting to change, but hard.

History will help explain!

“The Best Trained Army for the Wrong War”xxxx

Information Operations and 4GWGreg Wilcox SRI International 23 February 2005


Historical Traditions Evolution toward 2nd Generation force?

Prior to the Cold War, accessions were due to: Lack of esteem for military service Fear of a large standing Army in peacetime Crisis management

The Cold War Army focused on: Winning the first battle dramatically (North German plain)

Drove the obsession with technologyA force dependent on logistics, with “short shelf-life”

Plan for battles of attritionIndustrial-Age personnel system (Neo-Taylor)“Cadre system” top-heavy officer corps

“The aim of leadership is not merely to find and record failures in men, but to remove the causes of failure.”

W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (1986)


Historical TraditionsEvolution of today’s culture

Evolves to a personnel system for a 2GW Army: Temporary officers appointed when needed Professional entrance requirements unpopular Management science defined military professionalism Theories of Follet, McGregor, Maslow and Adams, shaped

laws, regulations, policies and beliefs (Culture):“Sunk Cost” and “Career Investment” theories defined

career template used to motivate constructive behavior“Tangible Incentives” (rapid promotions, monetary rewards,

prestige and power) to retain talented peopleConcepts used by McNamara in lieu of “classical military

thinking.” Too often it’s using numbers to “prove” what the commander has already decided—exactly the opposite of the scientific method

These in turn guided the way ROTC evolved and is in fact guiding it today


Historical Traditions 2nd Generation Army Training & Education Model

Neo-Taylorism Army ROTC training and education doctrine: Everything had a Task, Condition and Standard Competence was assessed as a mastering appropriate task,

condition and standard (avoiding mistakes) Judgment and evaluation were not really required or expected at

the tactical level (junior officer level)Lower level leaders focused on HOW not WHY or WHATReceived the mission, determined the appropriate tasks,

maybe adapted to terrain, and THEN EXECUTERegulations and manuals covered everything

“Frederick Taylor’s system work processes were broken into small, repetitive components; and jobs were designed around these repetitive tasks. Workers became replaceable parts in a huge industrial machine”

Richard Black “A Strangely Soft Voice: Caring for the Soul of Big Business” Zion’s Herald (May/June 2001)


Historical TraditionsROTC follows

Guided how ROTC responded to the evolution in war1819 Foundation of Norwich Military College 1862 Morrill Act—to create pool for mobilization. 1916 Institutionalized to create pool for mobilization

(why the “R”eserve in OTC)

“It was not until the decade of the 1980s that the ROTC began to move in a different direction. A program whose effectiveness had long been limited by its organizational diffusion and lack of standardization was transformed in a relatively short period of time into an efficient producer of commissioned officers.”

U.S. Army Cadet Command: A Ten Year History(U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996)



1919-1970 Providing officers for mobilization/crisis Post Vietnam cries “We want change!”1978 RETO study 1984 “Reserve Officers’ Training Corps study group

report”1984-86 MG Robert Wagner’s changes in ROTC1996 “Army Science Board Ad Hoc Study”2000 “Future Lieutenants Study”

There were improvements:“Cadets also felt the pressure. The taking away of their discretionary time certainly added to their strain. It was the shift in the focus of Advanced Camp from the teaching of military skills to leadership evaluation, however, that really ratcheted up cadet stress levels.”

U.S. Army Cadet Command: A Ten Year History(U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996)



The Army adopted many of the individual recommendations “RETO” Leadership Assessment/Standards Major General Wagner and “The ROTC Study Group

Report”:Established Cadet Command Imposed a standardized program of instruction (POI)Made “Advanced Camp” harderBrought in better officers and NCOs to serve as cadre

“Future Lieutenants Study” Impact was limited

No one assumed ownership of ideas Implemented piecemeal Meant to solve short-term problems, not providing a long-

term vision



“The Way Ahead” (2001) first significant attempt to shift culture, but focused internally, Good Points, recognizes:

College life has changed Important to maintain contacts between the Army and social elitesAssignment to ROTC as a high priority—a sought after

assignment outside command—if the officer corps is to evolve with war

ROTC has to change its industrial-age based, rote curriculum

“Future battlefields require a more liberally educated, mentally adaptable leadership to coexist in a culture with high standards of cohesion and discipline. An adaptive Army will require very high standards of entry training for commissioned members, to acculturate tactical knowledge in the force at a very early stage.”

Col. Robert B. Killebrew, USA (Ret). “Toward an Adaptive Army” Army Sept 2002


“The Way Ahead” (2001), cont.Downsides

Emphasizes the “Production” of officers

Subordinates ROTC to other academics

Lack of rigor is not the cause of the problem

Over-emphasizes material incentives


“In its major wars, the United States has been willing (and rich enough) to compensate its material wealth for what it lacked in preparedness for war. Once mobilized, America war industry in the 20th Century overwhelmed its enemies with weaponry.”

Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (ret)Firepower in a Limited War (1999)



“The Way Ahead” (2001), cont.Downsides (cont.)

Persists in the obsolete distinction between officer and enlisted recruiting

Focuses on a small part of the problem—successful commissioning—rather than the larger problem of representing the Army. Fails at

Exciting young people about the prospect of serviceWhile recruiting SALs, raise academic rigor as well

Fails to evolve ROTC education or training with warfare

“Education aims at acquiring the right intellectual constructs and learning the appropriate principles of selection so that the needed tools are available and the right ones can be selected and used to achieve a desired effect. It is about trying to learn whatever it is we do not know but that we envision what we need to know to survive and succeed.”

“Brilliant Warrior,” LTG Jay W. Kelley, USAF, (AUG 1996))



Any reforms will be undermined by:The Army’s short-term focus on “Making Mission”To meet Congressional and Army “requirements”

Myths about the Army in our nationWhich in turn blocks necessary “Cultural Shift”

What are Lieutenants saying about their preparation:

One engineer noted, “I don’t think that I am much of an engineer at all. I think I am an infantry guy with a lot more equipment.”

A field artillery officer stated, “I definitely didn’t think that I would be clearing buildings as an artillery officer, or working with the CIA or Special Forces or anything like that. Never, never ever.”

Dr. Leonard Wong, “Developing Adaptive Leaders” (July 04)


Historical TraditionsMyths based on history?

Myth 1—Today’s youth don’t want to serve: Do not sell on Army’s merits Low standards accepted to attract and retain Scholarships have to be used to entice people to join Only people that can do nothing else join the Army

Myth 2—The frontiersman/minuteman Hard work can overcome any obstacle Soldiering is natural to Americans Anybody can be a leader if they want to

Elihu Root


Historical TraditionsMyths based on history?

Myth 3—Disdain for European-based military professionalism: The profession of arms does not require extensive study Military science does not rank alongside other ROTC means an “easy ‘A” Lessons of military history are insignificant today Learn from the Germans, they lost two wars?

Myth 4—Tangibles dominate Intangibles or Machines over People: Quantitative analysis can solve any military problem People only do what they have to do to get by People cannot be trusted “Technology-Ideas-People” in that order

Frederick Taylor

Commanders COA worksheet of the MDMP


Historical TraditionsMyths allow for excuses

Some highlights, “Academics first!” “Cadets can only do so much, and that is at the

basic level.” “ROTC cannot rank with other on-campus or

traditional academic programs/departments” “My cadets can’t do that. Are you crazy?” “Oh, they will learn later at OBC or their unit” “If the POI is hard, then we will drive people away” “Recruiting is the priority because everyone knows

how to train” “Only programs that make ‘mission’ are successful” “The quality of cadets that a program produces is

not a factor in their decisions.”


“The Army “machine” equates 2LTs with ZERO years of experience to Captains with 10 years of years.”

Historical TraditionsThe Results: The production-line”

The Army’s response to: current shortages future field grade short falls force structure changes, i.e., increase of Unit of Actions

But in reality: Experience goes downQuality decreases Competence suffers Retention pays

To meet the cycle of declineIncrease “mission”

Strategic, operational and tactical impacts


Historical TraditionsThe Results: “Can we do both?”

Assumption: a numbers-based and a standards based accessions program can co-exist without conflict Creates two conflicting demands

“Commission only those you would want to lead your sons and daughters”

“Making Mission” But, Reality is Different!

At Cadet Command, we only check numbersShort-term accomplishments are the only metric that matters

“My boss comes to visit once a semester, and all he cares about is numbers, ‘are you going to make mission?’ He never asks about training or what we are teaching.”

Unnamed PMS (Sept 2004)


In SumWhere history leads us

With a study of history we see: We have built an officer system based on assumptions that

We always have time to get them [lieutenants] ready laterAcademic rigor of ROTC must be subordinate to the others on

campusROTC must be treated as a club or extracurricular activity, not

an entrance route to a profession

We use inhumane terms based on the theories of Frederick Taylor when talking about our future leaders as if,

They are like parts of a machineWe are producing large numbers of officers for wars of attrition

In turn, these allow us to justify one aspect of readiness, on achieving numbers or statistical readiness



“The Way Ahead” did provide many routes for PMSs to make mission, Progression, 4 year Compression, “catch up” “Prior service” or “JROTC” credit for “basic course” Complete Leaders Training Course (Basic Camp)

Impact, MS III cadets do not start on common ground, have to

“dumb down” in order to catch up “Prior service” is a broad based term Teaching MS I & MS II skills correctly is time consuming Some “prior service” still need Soldier skills not learned in

their version of “prior service”



Blame de-Carte on POI and training approach The “Crawl-Walk-Run” “Lecture-Demonstration-Practical Application” system Use of “True or False,” or multiple-choice based tests

Curriculum easy for the cadre to implement (which they in

turn “dumb down”) Evolving curriculum different package, same substance

Decision making tools “on the market;” but are not used (Tactical Decision Games standard in USMC)

Some are incorporating the latest lessons learned

“Moreover, focusing inward [on process] takes valuable energy away from accurately assessing the enemy situation. After all, how productive could perfectly executing the solution to the wrong problem really be?”

John Poole The Last Hundred Yards (1998)



Leadership Development and Assessment Course “If so critical then MS3 POI should reflect LDAC”Of the 4569 cadets who attended LDAC

Only 259 (5.7%) were attrited116 failed the APFT (after numerous times)52 were allowed to test a third time on Day Land

NavigationOnly 17 failed the course (for unknown reasons)

In regards to Leadership Evaluation“Cadets are to focused on leadership dimensions” “Does that cadet have the potential to lead?”“Everything is done to allow a cadet to “Graduate,” “Even if a cadet received an “N”, they graduated!”



LDAC Assessment (cont) : TACs felt that poor cadets were difficult to drop from the

course Poor cadets sent for “PMS to deal with”

But, efforts are being made to increase “Physical, Stress and Endurance” Foot road marches are increasing “STX Lanes” incorporating “variables” “Patrolling” 3 days of moderate stress

“The United States, once a most ardent and effective practitioner of capital-intensive war, must learn how to rely as much on strategy as on resources and as much on cleverness as on overwhelming force.”

Dr. Richard Kohn, “The Officer Corps for the 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998)



The Leadership Development Program (LDP) “Control oriented” uses “competency-mapping” Does not explain variations in social judgment skills and problem-

solving affect performance Skills can be mastered, anathema to the concept of lifelong

learning Creates a “competency trap” uses “single loop learning”

Adjusts subsequent actions to avoid similar mistakes Ignores why the overall solution was sought in the first place

Leadership skills appropriate for bureaucratic hierarchies Fails to capture emerging leadership concepts

“…it is reminiscent of industrial-age concepts derived from Taylorism, ‘scientific management,’ The education of strategic leaders is not an endeavor suited to an assembly-line approach.”

George Reed, Craig Bullis, Ruth Collins and Christopher Pararone“Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead” Parameters (Autumn 2004)



Accessions process Uses system analysis approach for leadership Values quantifiable assessment of specific aspects of

complex managerial tasks Centralization of decisions are reminiscent of the Age of

Corporations Ranks cadets in the entire command based on “stacks of files” Establishes one order of merit list for approximately 4800

cadets GPA is 50% of assessment without taking source of GPA or

major

“Mission First, People Always’ is on target. In practice, however, Army leaders often put mission first but neglect people, especially in leader-development programs.”

COL Peter J. Varljen, “Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment” Military Review (March-April 2003)



Recruiting (Marketing) based on objective management: No study to investigate the root cause of our shortfalls Do not redistribute the assets of reoccurring failed programs Scholarship process complicated

270 un-calibrated PMSs = 48% retention of 4-year scholarshipsManagement focus forces less than desirable behavior

Too much focus on easily achieved target “We do not market a ‘product’ in ROTC, IT’S A SERVICE!” Marketing with tee shirts and key chains doesn’t Work Devotion of officer to recruiting bureaucracy is a waste of critical

manpower. “I know we can make it easier than it is!”“We have failed miserably in providing college students a reason to believe that our program will provide them a competitive advantage in life. Remember, for the most part, selfless service is contrary to how we have raised America’s young.”

Major Marty KleinROO Georgetown ROTC



Assignment in ROTC?: Contractors—big indicator that it’s not worth sending good

people too Army view of quality (competence) conflicts with academics Advanced degrees—good enough for West Point, but not

ROTC Do those at the top understand what we do in the trenches? The Army culture is also at fault:

Where does the Army place those on the fast track?Does not try to identify what leaders also make good instructorsPace of deployments, current assignment practices and the

pressures for command track assignments have sidelined teaching assignments

“The ‘heroic warrior’ concept - the legacy of the ancient Greeks - associated the military more with muscle, individual prowess and patriotism than things cerebral like education.”

Robert O’Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression



Is it training or education? On-line and residence version of School of Cadet Command

necessary, but too much on administration On-line version pushes more burdens on PMSs already

strapped by recruiting, retaining, training, educating Most officers, especially NCOs, are good trainers, but are

they good educators?

Use of contractors-sends mixed signal Many good people, but took a while to find them Are paying them for the impact they could have on the

future? “One gray beard around here [in a program] is enough” As the Army transforms can contractors stay abreast?



What role does the structure of Cadet Command have on creation of effective lieutenants? Reduced C2 from four to two headquarters Each region controls seven brigades Each brigade controls around 15-20 battalions Realignment of personnel results in improper staff to provide

an added value Expanded span violates all traditional Army thinking Roles and functions of each level remain unclear Resources migrated to CC while C2 remained

Result Layers of bureaucracy No value added, increased confusion, reduced efficiency



Cadre input: “We still have cadre that are not comfortable teaching

anything but D&C (drill and ceremony). They are not picking up on the lessons learned from Iraq”

“Combat training has evolved with more emphasis on patrolling, but still centers on ‘STX Lanes,’ which are canned scenarios on most campuses” with the emphasis on “process more than how to think”

“Calibration of TACs is focused on writing the correct ‘blue card’ [Evaluation Form] vice teaching and mentoring,”

“Some cadre don’t know how to stand back and observe”

Academic rigor varies from program to program Depends on the Professor of Military Science Inspections from “higher” look more at administration

“paper work” and how the program is going to make “mission” than assisting or advising or observing education or training.


What cadets say is different. They want: To be physically and mentally challenged

“More responsibility in leadership positions” “Longer periods of time in leadership positions”

Flexible leadership evaluation approach“Cater to cadets w/various levels of competency”“Give more to those who can handle it”“Allow to experiment”“Don’t lower the bar in order to pass through more cadets”“Discourages and drives out good cadets”“Don’t like wasting a lot of time at LDAC”

“Want to get credit for the work put into ROTC” “Chain of command talks out of both sides of their mouths.”




From “Learning To Adapt To Asymmetric Threats”The Institute of Defense Analyses (Nov 2004)

Tem

per

ed

by

ob

ses

sio

n w

ith

“m

issi

on

” [n

um

be

rs]

Cold War Threat

ColdWar

TrainingModel

ImprovedCold WarTrainingModel

OngoingAdaptation

Thru LL

1990 to TodayWhere we need to go 2005 and beyond

Disruptive

Catastrophic

IrregularTraditional



The answer unfortunately is defined by:

That sounds like management theories from a century ago.

“We must focus on really getting that much sought after scholar-athlete-leader. Doing so will require us to purchase and distribute significantly improved incentive items. We need high quality milestone recognition items for distribution at various stages of the recruiting and retention process.”

U.S. Army Cadet Command “State of the Command” (2002)



“Taylorism in Action Today (Neo-Taylorism):Perfectionism—a belief that “best efforts” will achieve optimal results; Management by objective (MBO) as a vehicle for enforcing perfectionism; Rejection of continuous improvement; Belief in certification as a guarantee of quality; Demands for repeatability of processes; Denial or minimization of failures, and dismissal of the opportunity to learn from them; Reliance on reengineering and automation as a substitute for reducing inherent process complexity; Spreadsheet mentality in planning (assumption that fixed or linear relationships exist among variables); Quotas and work standards; Hiring only high-GPA college graduates; Employee ranking and rating schemes; Imitation of others without understanding why, how, or even if they get their results: Concentration of measurement of outcome rather than understanding of the underlying system of courses”

Kenneth T. Delavigne Deming’s Profound Changes, p.26 (1994)



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4790Number of Factors Our History “American Way of War” Personnel

System focused on Individual Replacement System (IRS)

The Myths Focus on easily

defined mission Out of date HR &

Management theories

Results The End drives

the means Force officers

into ethical dilemmas

Recruits the wrong type of person for service

Impacts the rest of the Army

“But, this is our measure of success”


In SumWe Won't have the money!


Conclusion

Assessment: Army ROTC is behind! We are Out of Sync with Transformation

Operate with many attributes that are Neo-Taylorism In setting goal of organization numbers trump qualityCulture should see assignment as second only to line

duty

The Solution: Make an intellectual investment

“If you’re going to change a large organization, you have to do in a year or it will not get done.”

Jack Welch The G.E. Way: Management Insights and Leadership Secrets of the Legendary CEO (July 1998)

© 2005 donald e. vandergriff 1 agenda part 2 part 2-understand “why?” purpose historical...

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