WWII Unexploded Ordnance A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countries

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AuthorsResearch team and authorsPublication produced jointly by Steven Francis and Ioane Alama

Substantial contributions from Lorraine Kershaw

Organisational SupportPacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Political Governance and Security Programme

Cleared Ground Demining - Palau

The analysis and recommendations reflected in this publication are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the policies and view of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS). While every care

has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information provided, PIFS, its officers, employees, and

agents accept no liability for any loss, damage, or expense arising out of, or in connection with, any

reliance on, any omissions or inaccuracies in the material contained in this publication.

All rights for commercial/profit reproduction, in any form, are reserved. PIFS authorise the partial

reproduction or translation of this material for scientific, educational or research purposes, provided that

PIFS and the source document are properly acknowledged. Permission to reproduce the full document in

any form, whether for commercial, profit or non profit purposes, must be requested in writing.

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WWII Unexploded Ordnance A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countries

UXO collected and stored by Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Explosive Ordnance Unit at Hell’s Point, Solomon Islands Photo taken by S. Francis

August 2011

This publication is based on a paper initially provided to the Forum Regional Security Committee to guide

discussion on avenues to assist Forum Island Countries affected by World War II Unexploded Ordnance.

While this paper was not initially intended for publication, it was recognised that the information collected

could contribute to combating UXO issues in the region. It was also recognised that one of the main

challenges faced by the countries studied was the lack of awareness regarding the extent and the severity

of UXO issues. This publication seeks to provide some guidance and act as a resource document for further

and more detailed research.

PIFS Cataloguing-in-Publication

WWII Unexploded Ordnance : A Study of UXO in Four Pacific Island Countriesprepared by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 100 p. : ill. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 978-982-202-017-5

1. Unexploded ordnance disposal – Oceania 2. Explosive ordnance - Oceania 3. Hazardous substance – Risk assessment – Oceania I. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

327.1’743 dc21

ContentsAcknowledgements ..................................................................................... 6

List of Acronyms ........................................................................................ 7

Definitions ............................................................................................... 8

Foreword ................................................................................................. 9

Executive Summary .................................................................................... 10

Introduction and Methodology ....................................................................... 11

UXO in the Pacific Context ............................................................................ 15

Summary of Findings ................................................................................... 25

Kiribati scoping assessment report .................................................................. 35

Palau scoping assessment report .................................................................... 45

Papua New Guinea scoping assessment report .................................................... 53

Solomon Islands scoping assessment report ........................................................ 61

Recommendations and Regional Strategy .......................................................... 69

Appendices .............................................................................................. 78

Bibliography ............................................................................................. 85

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AcknowledgmentsThe Authors would like to acknowledge the kind assistance provided by various Government officials,

international representatives and members of the community from Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and

Solomon Islands who graciously gave their time to provide information and data regarding their experiences

in relation to UXO. Special mention to Stephen Ballinger and Cassandra McKeown from Cleared Ground

Demining who were part of the scoping mission to Kiribati and provided significant contributions to this

publication. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions by Christine Pahlman - AusAID Mine

Action Coordinator, Kerry Brinkert – Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, and

Mary Wareham - Human Rights Watch New Zealand.

The Project team are also thankful to all the individuals that assisted in putting this publication together

so as to provide a resource document in an area where information is sorely needed. Particular thanks to

Cameron Noble, Atantaake Tooma, Filipo Masaurua, Mue Bentley Fisher and Peter Bednall for their kind

assistance.

We would also like to thank Rick Nimmo, Director - Political Governance and Security Programme (PIFS),

and Andie Fong Toy, Deputy Secretary General - Economic Governance and Security (PIFS) for their direction

and leadership in the development of this publication.

Last but not least, special acknowledgement is given to the brave men and women currently tasked with

UXO clearance in the various Forum Island Countries. Operating in dangerous circumstances with limited

resources, it is a credit to both their countries and their organisations that these individuals continue to

put themselves in harm’s way to serve their communities.

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AcronymsADF Australia Defence Force

CGD Cleared Ground Demining

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EOU Explosive Ordnance Unit

EQPB Environmental Quality Protection Board

ERW Explosive Remnants of War

FICs Forum Island Countries

FRSC Forum Regional Security Committee

GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

IMAS International Mine Action Standard

KPS Kiribati Police Service

LEA Law Enforcement Agencies

LEU Law Enforcement Unit

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

PNG Papua New Guinea

PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force

RSIPF Royal Solomon Islands Police Force

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SPREP South Pacific Regional Environment Programme

UN PoA United Nations Programme of Action

USA United States of America

UXO Unexploded Ordnance

WWII World War II

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DefinitionsFor the purposes of this publication:

Munitions is the general term that can be used to describe ordnance. Munitions are devices equipped with

explosives or other material for use in military operations which can represent a hazard to people and to

any future use of the land where they are located.

Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) means explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed

conflict but has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under

control of the party that left it or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been

primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.

Explosive Ordnance (EO) means all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and

biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery,

mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters

and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro explosive devices; clandestine and

improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components which are explosive in

nature.

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) means Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance

(AXO).

Mine Action refers to activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of

landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) including unexploded sub-munitions. Mine action is not

just about clearing and releasing suspected land. It is also about people and societies, and how they

are affected by landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk

from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health

development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which the

victims’ needs can be addressed.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) means the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery

and disposal of EO. EOD may be undertaken:

1. as a routine part of mine clearance operations, upon discovery of ERW;

2. to dispose of ERW discovered outside hazardous areas, (this may be a single item of ERW, or a larger

number inside a specific area); or

3. to dispose of EO which has become hazardous by deterioration, damage or attempted destruction.

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ForewordThere can be little doubt that World War II was a traumatic period for many Pacific Island communities previously isolated from the turbulence of global contests. Foreign military forces wreaking a path of havoc across the region used the islands as stepping stones to establish bases from which to attack enemy forces in neighbouring islands. Introducing unprecedented levels of destruction, the Pacific Islands became one large extended battlefield.

At the conclusion of hostilities in 1945, the foreign military forces of both sides for the most part returned to their homelands leaving the islands littered with sunken ships, burnt out tanks, abandoned pill boxes and large empty gun emplacements. However, left interspersed amongst these were large quantities of war relics of a far more dangerous nature, unexploded ordnance (UXO).

For 68 years many island communities have lived and played amongst explosive material designed to sink battle ships or destroy fortified gun emplacements. Sadly, while efforts have been undertaken to clear this material over the years, UXO continue to be recovered regularly in many Forum island countries. Rapidly deteriorating, UXO have become increasingly unstable and dangerous and their chemicals pollute the surrounding lagoons and soil.

This publication, initially produced as an internal report to guide the activities of the 2011 Forum Regional Security Committee, is one of the first studies on UXO affecting Forum island countries. In recognition of the lack of information currently available on UXO in the region, it was decided to publish the study as a resource document to contribute to policy and programme development.

This publication provides preliminary insight regarding the extent of UXO issues in the countries studied, identifies national agencies and organisations currently responsible for clearing WWII Ordnance and discusses challenges faced by respective Police and Defence forces in fulfilling their duties. Issues pertaining to the countries studied such as the lack of available technical capacity, limited resources and geographical challenges are all discussed.

It is also a publication which explores possible solutions at both the national and regional levels. At the national level, several recommendations are provided on possible activities that can be undertaken by affected Forum island countries to coordinate activities and maximise resources. At the regional level, preliminary thinking on the development of a concerted strategy is outlined to provide for a mechanism that can identify and raise awareness and better access available international resources to support domestic UXO clearance activities.

We hope that this publication will provide an initial impetus to raise awareness of the continuing struggle faced by many of our people and provide some guidance on possible paths forward. For some of our Pacific communities, World War II remains much more than just a memory. UXO remains an unwanted legacy which must be addressed.

Tuiloma Neroni SladeSecretary GeneralPacific Islands Forum Secretariat

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Executive SummaryAt the height of WWII from 1941 to 1945, military forces from the United States of America (USA), Japan, Australia and New Zealand clashed in a series of battles throughout the Pacific Islands region. Large stocks of munitions predominantly from USA and Japan were shipped to various parts of the Pacific to support ongoing military operations. Many of these items when used did not detonate and were left either strewn across islands or atolls, buried in the soil or sand, or submerged in surrounding lagoons. At the conclusion of WWII, a large amount of ordnance remained in the islands posing a significant threat to local communities.

After more than six decades, the presence of WWII ordnance continues to plague a number of Pacific Island countries such as the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

In the four countries studied for this publication (Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands), officials reported recovering significant amounts of WWII ordnance on a regular basis in numerous areas, both urban and rural. The ordnance recovered included high explosive bombs, sea mines, hand grenades, and artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition.

In the countries studied, Police Agencies and Defence Forces have been tasked with managing and clearing WWII ordnance with only Palau having obtained the services of an international NGO to undertake comprehensive clearance activities. All Countries reported similar challenges linked to the lack of: (1) available resources; (2) local technical expertise; (3) modern safety equipment; (4) available data and information; (5) public awareness, both locally and internationally; and (6) comprehensive policies /national action plans to coordinate available resources, Government Agencies and clearance activities.

In response, the main recommendations contained in this publication explore resolving these issues by improving: (1) local coordination and ownership through the development of national action plans and multi-agency oversight structures; (2) local UXO clearance capacity by seeking sustainable UXO clearance methods; and (3) access to resources by integrating UXO activities into domestic planning and budgeting processes, and developing national and regional mechanisms to raise UXO awareness, mobilise support, and link national needs to available international assistance.

While limited resources will always remain a challenge, effective coordination and planning will often ensure that available resources are maximised. The lack of comprehensive UXO clearance policies or national action plans are a major impediment and restrict the abilities of affected Forum Island Countries to systematically clear affected areas. As a first step, the development of a detailed National UXO Assessment would provide important baseline information allowing for the development of effective, data based, national coordinating policies. Resources developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and outlined in the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) could provide useful policy guidance to affected Forum Island Countries (FICs).

The creation of a regional strategy by the Pacific Islands Forum is a possible initiative that could assist Members by providing a mechanism for the coordination of international and regional resources to support domestic UXO clearance activities among Members. Importantly, it would also provide an opportunity to develop regional resources and raise awareness amongst the international community to mobilise resources and technical expertise which are problems currently faced by affected Forum Island Countries.

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Deteriorating UXO at Hell’s Point, Solomon IslandsPhoto taken by S. Francis

Introduction and Methodology

Chapter One

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At the 2010 Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) meeting held in Suva Fiji, during a discussion on

small arms and light weapons, several Member countries expressed their concern regarding the threat

caused by World War II (WWII) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) to local communities. As an outcome of this

discussion, the FRSC requested that the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) explore the issue of UXO

in the region to assist Forum members.

In response, PIFS undertook to assess the scope of UXO in affected Forum countries. As part of this

assessment the Secretariat undertook a scoping study of four FICs affected by UXO (Kiribati, Palau, Papua

New Guinea, and Solomon Islands). The findings of this scoping study was presented to the FRSC for it’s

consideration in 2011.

Definition of Unexploded OrdnanceTechnically WWII ordnance found in the Pacific Islands can be defined as either unexploded (UXO) or

abandoned (AXO). Unexploded ordnance is defined as explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused,

armed or otherwise prepared for use in armed conflict but has failed to explode. Abandoned explosive

ordnance is defined as explosive ordnance unused during an armed conflict and subsequently abandoned

or left behind. UXO and AXO are defined collectively as Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

However, for the purposes of this publication, due to the prevalent use of the term in the Region, UXO is

used to refer generally to all explosive ordnance whether abandoned or unexploded. As such, the terms

WWII UXO and ERW are used interchangeably and are to be taken as referring to all explosive ordnance

remaining from WWII including artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms ammunition; as well as bombs,

landmines, sea mines, torpedoes, depth charges and propellant actuated devices.

Objectives of the Study This publication explores the difficulties faced by four Forum Island Countries seeking to address WWII

UXO. It provides an overview of the common challenges faced by Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea,

and Solomon Islands; reviews activities undertaken to manage UXO; and explores possible activities and

initiatives that could be undertaken at the national and regional level to enhance domestic clearance

activities.

This publication does not attempt to provide a technical survey of contaminated or affected areas. Nor does

it purport to be a comprehensive and fully detailed assessment for each of the countries studied. Rather

this publication provides a scoping analysis of activities in the study countries and is intended to highlight

the serious ongoing threat of WWII UXO. It also provides a preliminary insight into the difficulties faced

by local communities, and shares information to support the development of policies and programmes to

assist Forum Island Countries in managing UXO.

Structure of the ReportChapter One introduces the UXO issue, provides background information regarding the research and

outlines the methodology undertaken by the Research team. Chapter Two provides a brief overview of the

WWII conflict in the Pacific, identifies Countries and islands affected by UXO in the region, and provides a

summary of international and regional frameworks that support UXO activities. Chapter Three presents a

summary of the Findings provided to the FRSC arising from the Secretariat’s consultations. Chapters Four

to Seven provide individual country reports for each of the countries studied. Chapter Eight introduces

recommendations based on the scoping reports provided to the FRSC and explores a Draft Regional Strategy

being proposed as a mechanism to coordinate regional and national UXO clearance activities.

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MethodologyIn 2010 and 2011, the PIFS Law Enforcement Unit (LEU) conducted a scoping study on unexploded ordnance

in the Region to assist Forum Island Countries. The scoping study involved: (1) consultations in four study

countries; (2) the distribution of UXO questionnaires to all Forum Members; and (3) a review of secondary

sources available to the Research Team.

Country ConsultationsIn-country consultations were held in Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands, and involved

interviews with: government representatives from Police, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Infrastructure,

Environment and Conservation, Health, Marine and Fisheries; foreign diplomatic representatives;

development partners; civil society organisations; and local communities affected by UXO (refer to

Appendix One for list of officials interviewed).

For Papua New Guinea, Palau and the Solomon Islands only one member of the research team, Steven

Francis, undertook the country visits. In Kiribati the consultations were undertaken in partnership with

Cleared Ground Demining (CGD), a UK-based non-profit organisation currently operating in Palau.

The research team spent approximately 4 to 7 days in each of the study countries conducting interviews

and undertaking site visits. Information that could not be obtained during these periods was subsequently

sought through follow up telephone calls and email correspondence.

While UXO issues were not restricted to the countries visited, further consultations could not be undertaken

due to time and budgetary constraints.

UXO Questionnaire SurveyThe research questionnaire was disseminated in September 2010 to 13 Forum Island Countries (Australia,

New Zealand and Fiji1 were not included in the questionnaire survey). The questions were organised into

three parts to:

1. Assess the extent of Unexploded Ordnance in Forum Member Countries;

2. Assess the extent of current activities undertaken by Forum Member countries to deal with UXO; and

3. Consider options to improve approaches when dealing with UXO.

Part One was designed to confirm the presence of UXO, determine if possible an estimated quantity, and

identify sites UXO were commonly found (land, sea, inhabited areas).

Part Two sought to identify and assess domestic agencies responsible for dealing with UXO, programmes

and initiatives implemented to manage UXO, awareness raising activities previously undertaken, assistance

provided and challenges/constraints faced by affected Forum Island Countries.

Part Three was designed to seek Member input on UXO activities and possible impediments anticipated

when implementing initiatives.

Responses were received from Palau and Samoa. Samoa indicated that UXO was not an issue while Palau

provided a full report on their UXO issues.

1 Under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to the implementation of two targeted measures against the current military regime in the Republic of Fiji Islands. These measures consisted of: (1) the suspension of participation by the leader, ministers and officials of Fiji from all Forum meetings and events arranged by PIFS, including the annual Leaders’ meeting; and (2) the ineligibility of the Fiji military regime from PIFS’ regional cooperation initiatives or any new financial or technical assistance, other than assistance towards the restoration of democracy. These measures took effect on 2 May 2009.

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Review of Secondary SourcesThe Research Team undertook to collect information from secondary sources available online and at the

PIFS library. Secondary sources included research reports, policy documents, online documents, historical

books and news articles.

Following the consultation phase, initial reports were prepared and made available to the study countries.

A summary Report on the principal findings was prepared and submitted with the individual country

reports to the FRSC for its discussion in June 2011. As part of that Report, a preliminary Regional UXO

Strategy Framework was developed for Members to consider.

Limitations of the StudyThe lack of UXO information and data in the study countries posed a significant impediment. While all

attempts were undertaken to obtain information regarding UXO in a number of areas, in most cases data

was unavailable or had not been recorded.

Limited resources available placed a significant constraint on the activities of the Research Team. While

the Research Team had initially intended to visit the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and Vanuatu,

this was not possible. Limitations in resources also resulted in country consultations being limited to

periods less than a week.

Many of the WWII battlefields affected by UXO were located in remote or isolated areas such as Kirimati

Island in Kiribati and Oro and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. With information difficult to obtain from

these remote areas, on site visits were considered but costs of internal travel and the lack of available

flights were prohibitive.

The Research Team was unable to obtain information on UXO activities for the study countries in the

period prior to independence which would have provided valuable information on UXO clearance activities

undertaken immediately after WWII. Due to the short time frame of each country visit, the Research

Team was unable to review in any great depth Government records of the agencies responsible for UXO

clearance. It is proposed that these are possible areas for future research.

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UXO in the Pacific Context

Chapter Two

Torpedo from WWII near beach vegetation – PalauPhoto taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining

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BackgroundWorld War II – The Pacific Conflict

Lasting from 1939 to 1945, WWII was one of the most destructive and violent events in the history of

mankind. In December 1941, WWII came to the Pacific when Japan bombed Pearl Harbour and began

a number of military campaigns seizing several territories and islands across South-East Asia and the

Pacific. With the Allied forces focused on combating Germany and her Axis Allies in North Africa, the

Mediterranean, and Europe, Japan captured large amounts of territory in South-East Asia and the Pacific

region. To support military operations and strengthen her supply lines, Japan built a number of military

bases and air fields throughout the region.

From 1942 to 1945, the Allied forces from USA, Australia and New Zealand fought a series of bloody

campaigns across the Pacific to recapture the territories occupied by Japan. The Allied forces invaded a

number of Japanese held islands in what is now Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall

Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Guam

and Palau.

The islands in the region were seen as important strategic prizes for both Japan and the Allied forces,

capable of being used as forward operating bases to support naval activities or for the construction of

airfields from which to launch attacks. With territories in Micronesia entrusted to Japan by the League

of Nations after World War I, the expansion of the Japanese territory into Papua New Guinea, Guam and

the Solomon Islands represented an opportunity to obtain resources and further isolate Australia and New

Zealand. On the other hand, USA and the Allied forces sought to use the islands as stepping stones across

the Pacific Ocean to halt the Japanese advance and eventually prepare for a final assault on Japan.

The battles that raged across the Pacific during this period saw the introduction of vast amounts of

ordnance into the region. In addition to the ordnance used in numerous sea engagements between naval

warships, high explosive bombs and artillery rounds were fired or dropped in large quantities onto small

areas of land occupied by enemy forces. Standard US tactics for amphibious assaults at the time called for

substantial naval and air support to bombard or ‘soften up’ land based enemy forces2 prior to, and during

assault landings. While information regarding ordnance has been difficult to obtain, levels of ordnance

used to attack island defenders were substantive as evidenced by reports claiming that over 6,800 tonnes

of bombs were dropped on Chuuk Lagoon3 alone while 4,818 tonnes of high explosives, both bombs and

artillery, were directed at Kwajalein Atoll4 by the US Armed Forces. In addition to bombs and artillery

used to defend the beaches, Japanese forces in anticipation of assault landings often prepared defensive

positions using land mines and aerial bombs converted to act as land mines.5

In addition, islands and atolls across the region such as Chuuk, Funafuti, Nanumea, Betio, Guadalcanal,

Tulagi, Gavutu and New Britain to name a few, were used as military bases and ammunition depots for the

storage of ordnance to supply naval vessels, aircraft and infantry. Land mines, grenades, flame throwers,

ammunition and in some cases chemical weapons6 were shipped into the areas of conflict for storage and

eventual use.

2 Hough (et al), pp15-17.3 Chirgwin p8.4 Spennemann. 5 Garand (et al), p72.6 Interview with RSIPF EOU.

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Much of this ordnance was never used. Many that were used failed to detonate. After WWII, many areas

which had seen fierce fighting were littered with abandoned machinery of war including tanks, abandoned

weapons, unexploded ordnance, pill boxes, fortified gun emplacements, abandoned fuel, hazardous

materials, and wrecks and cargoes of sunken vessels. At the 2011 FRSC meeting, officials noted that 68

years after the conclusion of WWII, these abandoned weapons and UXO continued to pose a danger to

Pacific Islanders. While figures regarding levels of WWII UXO are almost impossible to determine, it is

assumed that they are substantial given that items continue to be recovered on a regular basis throughout

the region and that for unexploded ordnance alone, the failure rates have been estimated as high as

30%.7

Countries affectedForum Island Countries affected by UXO include Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea,

Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated State of Micronesia, Nauru and Vanuatu.8 Most of the areas

affected were either battlefields or military bases during WWII.

While Australia and New Zealand are Forum Members, they are not included in this Report as their UXO

issues are largely isolated to military storage sites and training areas, and both countries have relatively

advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) resources and facilities.

Photograph 1 - UXO items currently awaiting disposal by RSIPF Explosives Ordnance Unit - Solomon

Islands. Photo by S. Francis.

7 CGD UXO Country Assessment. 8 Note Appendix 2

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Source: Shaw (et. al), Hough (et. al) and Tyson.

UXO – The international contextUnder international law, no treaty or agreement specifically regulates the clearance of WWII UXO.9

However, in recent years, the international community has concluded certain mine action disarmament

treaties which provide a framework through which States Parties can access assistance in relation to their

broader UXO problems. These treaties are:

- the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-

personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,10 also known as the ‘Ottawa Convention’. The Ottawa

Convention bans the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines and require

their clearance as well as the provision of assistance to victims. This Convention entered into force on

1 March 1999; and

9 Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons addresses the issue of responsibility for clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), but only came into force on 12 November 2006 and is of prospective, rather than retrospective operation. Under Protocol V, States Parties and parties to armed conflict are required to take action to clear, remove or destroy ERW (Art. 3), and record, retain and transmit information related to the use or abandonment of explosive ordnances (Art. 4). They are also obligated to take all feasible precautions for the protection of civilians (Art. 5) and humanitarian missions and organizations (Art. 6). States Parties in a position to do so should provide cooperation and assistance for marking, clearance, removal, destruction, and victim assistance, among other things (Art. 7 & 8).

10 For the full text of the Ottawa Convention, see: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.

Box One – Selected WWII Pacific Battles1941 December 7 Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Thailand, Shanghai and Midway beginning Pacific Theatre of WWII.1942January Japanese Troops capture Rabaul, New Britain and land on Bougainville.May - July, Japanese Troops occupy Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.July Japanese land troops near Buna Mission on New Guinea.Aug – Feb 1943 1st US Marine Division seize Tulagi and land on Guadalcanal with naval and air support After six months of hard fighting, US Troops capture Guadalcanal.April US Army B-24’s from Funafuti bomb Tarawa.November Japanese air raid on Darwin, Australia.

1943January Allies take Buna in New Guinea. June – Aug Allies capture New Georgia, Solomon Islands.Oct – Feb 1944 U.S. bombers strike Japanese naval base at Rabaul, New Britain for several months.Nov – Aug 1945 Allies invade Bougainville finally securing Japanese surrender in August 1945.November U.S. Troops capture Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.December Full Allied assault on New Britain as 1st Division Marines invade Cape Gloucester.

1944February U.S. Troops capture Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls in the Marshall Islands.February U.S. bombers strike Japanese naval base at Chuuk (FSM).April –May Allies land at Aitape and Hollandia in New Guinea. Campaign lasts until end of war.July U.S. Troops capture Guam Sept – Nov U.S. Troops capture Peleliu & Anguar in Palau.

1945Feb – Mar U.S. Marines capture Iwo Jima.April – June U.S. Tenth Army captures Okinawa.May 8 Victory in Europe Day.August 14 WWII in Pacific officially ends with surrender of Japan.

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- the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (the ‘CCM’).11 The CCM prohibits all use, stockpiling,

production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance

to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. The CCM entered into force

on 1 August 2010.

In relation to the Ottawa Convention, twelve of the sixteen Members of the Pacific Islands Forum are State

Parties to this Convention.12 In relation to the CCM, Fiji, New Zealand and Samoa are State Parties, while

Australia, the Cook Islands, Palau and Nauru have signed, but not yet ratified it.

Forum Island countries have negligible experience of the type of weapons which are the subject of

prohibition under the Ottawa Convention and the CCM. That said, in addition to advancing the cause

of universality of these Conventions’ operation, FICs’ participation in these international treaties can

further national and regional efforts in addressing the problems caused by WWII UXO. For example, State

Parties to the Ottawa Convention have adopted a formal understanding that “the lessons derived from

fulfilling Article 5 obligations [whereby a State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of

all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control] are applicable in addressing related challenges

associated with other explosive remnants of war.”13 Furthermore, States Parties recognise that “in many

instances, the organisational structures, the capacities that have been built and the standards that have

been established largely as a result of the need to implement Article 5 are also being applied to address

weapons contamination more broadly.”14 Indeed, support provided to Palau – which will be described in

further detail in Chapter Five – was activated through Palau’s participation in the Ottawa Convention.15

11 For the full text of the CCM, see http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf.12 The Members which are State Parties to the Ottawa Convention are: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New

Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a signatory to the Convention, but has not yet ratified it.

13 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, p25.14 Ibid.15 Support is also available to FICs in relation to ratifying and implementing the Ottawa Convention and the CCM. The Anti-

Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit provides information and advisory services to all states in relation to the Convention: www.apminebanconvention.org. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also provides technical assistance to states in relation to ratifying and implementing the conventions: www.icrc.org.

International Mine Action StandardsThe International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were developed by the United Nations in collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to provide an international mechanism to coordinate activities combating the impacts of UXO and mines on communities around the world. The IMAS provide principles, standards, and internationally recognised operational procedures to guide the planning, implementation and management of mine action programmes. Discussed in more detail below, ‘mine action’ refers to a group of activities which seek to comprehensively address all threats caused by mines and UXO.

Updated on a regular basis, the IMAS:(1) provides a frame of reference that enhances effective communication between all UXO and Mine

stakeholders such as national agencies, international organisations, NGOs, and donors;(2) provides guidance on a wide number of issues and activities such as information management, training,

safety and occupational health, stockpile destruction, and victim support to name a few; (3) promotes a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations; and(4) can be used or adapted by national authorities to develop domestic standards and national mine action

plans to coordinate and guide national activities.

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Mine ActionMine action activities describe a comprehensive approach that has evolved internationally to remove the

threat of land mines and UXO. The term ‘mine action’ is defined by IMAS as a group of activities aimed at

reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO. Mine action expands activities

beyond just the physical removal of mines and UXO, seeking to develop a broad approach addressing the

effects of contamination on people and their communities. The underlying objective of mine action is to

reduce domestic risk to a safe level enabling free, social and economic development while addressing the

needs of existing and future victims.16 Mine action is made up of five complementary groups of activities:

1) Mine Risk Education;

2) humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking and clearance;

3) victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;

4) stockpile destruction; and

5) advocacy against the use of Anti Personnel Mines.

In addition to these five core components, a

number of additional activities are required

to support action programmes. These include

activities promoting “assessment and planning,

the mobilisation and prioritisation of resources,

information management, human skills

development and management training, quality

management and the application of effective,

appropriate and safe equipment.”17

Mine action activities are implemented globally by

a number of different entities and mechanisms.

International mine action operations, such as

demining and mine-risk education, are mostly

performed by NGOs although commercial

contractors and militaries also provide mine action

services. Funding for these activities is usually

obtained from a number of sources that include Governments; intergovernmental, international and regional

organisations; as well as international financial institutions.18 Assistance is usually provided directly to

affected States by development partners and NGOs, or through frameworks developed by international

bodies such as the United Nations (UN).19

Various UN bodies implement mine action related activities with partners and currently implement

clearance programmes in a large range of countries. These activities are implemented mainly through funds

appropriated by the UN General Assembly for peacekeeping, and contributions received by the Voluntary

Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In 2010, the VTF received in excess of USD 63 million

dollars in contributions with the top 5 donors being Japan, Canada, Netherlands, the European Union and

Denmark.

16 UNMAS, p23.17 UNMAS , p24. 18 GICHD pp25-3619 Activities of the 14 UN Departments, Agencies, Funds and Programmes involved in Mine Action activities are coordinated by

the United Nation Mine Action Services (UNMAS).

Photograph 2 - UXO Clearance Activity in Peleliu , Palau. Photo by Cleared Ground Demining.

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Regional Framework To date, regional activities related to UXO have been undertaken primarily through the Pacific Islands

Forum regional security policy framework with law enforcement partner organisations such as the Pacific

Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) and the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO). Regional initiatives have

focused mainly on developing strategies and regional resources to assist Forum Members in controlling

weapons which also include ammunition and explosives.

In 1998, a PICP (known then as the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference) and OCO subcommittee

at the request of the FRSC developed the ‘Honiara Initiative’ which was a strategy to address illicit

manufacturing and trafficking in firearms and other related materials.

In 2000, this subcommittee at the request of Pacific Islands Forum Leaders developed the “Nadi Framework”

which established a structure for a common approach to weapons control measures based on the principles

that:

(1) the possession and use of firearms, ammunition, explosives, prohibited weapons, and other related

materials is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety; and

(2) public safety could be improved by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms,

ammunition, prohibited weapons, and other related materials.

The Nadi Framework incorporated and extended the Honiara Initiative beyond firearms to cover other

weapons such as knives, traditional weapons (clubs, bows and arrows and spears), stun guns, and military

style ordnance and explosives.

In 2003, PIFS developed the Model Weapons Control Bill. Based on the Nadi Framework, the Model Bill

provided a regional resource to update domestic legislation according to identified gaps between the

model law and existing provisions. The Model Law provided draft provisions to control arms, ammunition,

explosives, and other types of weapons in areas such as import and export; civilian possession, trade

and manufacturing; and registration and licensing systems for possession and trade. The Model Law also

provides standards on marking, record keeping and safe secure storage. In 2010, the Model Bill was

updated by PIFS to incorporate model text to control arms brokering, an area which had been identified

as not being strongly regulated in the region.

Other UXO related regional activities undertaken in the Pacific include the development of a Regional

Strategy to Address Marine Pollution from World War II Wrecks. Endorsed by the South Pacific Regional

Environment Programme (SPREP) in 2002, the strategy was developed in response to concerns caused by an

oil spill in the Federated States of Micronesia due to the disturbance of a WWII wreck, the USS Mississinewa.

The principal aim of the strategy is to prevent/minimise damage to marine and coastal environments and

resources as a result of marine spills from WWIII wrecks. While the strategy does not consider UXO on land

and is mainly focused on marine spills, it does provide a framework for the collection of data regarding

the environmental impacts of WWII chemicals and UXO and also has developed a comprehensive database

on sunken WWII naval and cargo vessels.

Within the region, Australia and New Zealand contribute significantly to the VTF and other mine action

activities. Australia has developed a Mine Action Strategy for the Australian Aid Programme 2010 to 2014

which includes a commitment of $100 million AUD to reduce the threat and socioeconomic impact of

landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war.20

20 Australian Agency for International Development, pp7-8.

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Box Two - Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Architecture

Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC)Created in 1987, the annual meeting of the FRSC is the principal forum for setting a regional security agenda and identifying priorities for enhancing the capacity of members to respond to internal and external security threats. The FRSC provides an opportunity for Regional Law Enforcement Organisations 21 and law enforcement

related CROP agencies22 to meet annually with Forum officials to discuss strategic issues on law enforcement

and security related matters. Forum Leaders in 2010 commended the work of the FRSC in advancing regional cooperation in addressing the numerous law enforcement and security challenges and highlighted the valuable work being carried out by national and regional law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies active in the region.

Security DeclarationsIn addition to the Pacific Plan, various regional instruments adopted by Forum Leaders provide guiding principles and mechanisms to facilitate collective law enforcement and security action. - 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation: Recognised that an adverse

law enforcement environment could threaten the sovereignty, security and economic integrity of Forum members and jeopardise economic and social development.

- 1997 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation: Forum Leaders agreed to a number of principles governing security cooperation in the region.

- 2000 Biketawa Declaration: The declaration sets the framework for regional crisis management and conflict resolution initiatives.

- 2000 Nadi Framework Initiative: Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control in the Pacific region.

- 2002 Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security: Leaders recognised the need for immediate and sustained regional action in response to the threats of terrorist related activities..

The Pacific Plan The Pacific Plan endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2005 is based on the four pillars of security, economic growth, good governance, and sustainable development. - Good Governance Improved transparency, accountability, equity and efficiency in the management and use of resources

in the Pacific - Security Improved political and social conditions for stability and safety

21 Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, Pacific Immigration Director’s Conference, Oceania Customs Organisation, Pacific Islands Law Officers Network.

22 Secretariat of the Pacific Community and Forum Fisheries Agency.

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UXO Clearance Initiatives Undertaken to DateHistorically there have been a number of UXO clearance activities undertaken in the region by Forum

members and international military personnel. Although details are limited, various sources refer to

a number of clearance activities undertaken by military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, the

United States of America, and the United Kingdom. These activities include missions to Kiribati (1943,23

2008),24 Tuvalu (1980),25 the Republic of the Marshall Islands (several missions from 1945 to 1969),26

Solomon Islands,27 and Papua New Guinea (2009).28

In recent years however, UXO clearance activities in the region have largely been the responsibility of the

affected country. With no regional mechanisms or frameworks through which to source assistance, Forum

Island Countries have had to either develop UXO clearing capabilities or seek bilateral assistance from

countries with sufficient technical expertise and resources.

Officials interviewed in the study countries confirmed that in the past, assistance had been received in

areas such as capacity building and destruction of WWII UXO. Clearance activities had been undertaken

routinely by military forces from Australia and the USA and continue to be undertaken on an intermittent

basis upon request and availability of resources. In Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, the

personnel responsible for UXO clearance continue to receive intermittent support from Australian Defence

Force Personnel.

In some Forum Island Countries, NGOs have undertaken large scale UXO clearance projects funded by

various donors. In Palau, British NGO Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) has been clearing UXO on Peleliu

since 2009 with the assistance of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, USA, the United

Kingdom and Italy. This type of assistance provides the opportunity for donors to contribute varying levels

of funding which can allow funding to be more readily obtained. The activities currently undertaken in

Palau provide a model for affected Forum Island Countries and for international initiatives that can be

provided in the region.

In terms of research, there have been limited publications on UXO in the Pacific. Most of the information

obtained for this Report have been from military reports and historical text based on either WWII Battles

or the Pacific Islands.

In 2003 Landmine Action published A Global Survey on the Explosive Remnants of War which attempted

to take a snapshot of global, regional and national levels of ERW and their socio-economic impacts during

2001/ 2002. The publication provided a brief regional overview of the Pacific, highlighting Kiribati, the

Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG). It was identified

that while ERW were present in the five Forum countries, more research was required as insufficient

contemporary data was available to indicate that the effects of contamination were more than residual.

In reviewing activities in the region, the publication noted that there did not appear to be any systematic

demining or awareness programmes being undertaken in the region.

23 Chirgwin, p20.24 Price, p1.25 Chirgwin, p17.26 Spennemann 27 Chirgwin, p21.28 Price, p1.

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Also published the same year, Under the Gun; The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific by David Capie

included a Chapter on World War II Surplus and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). The Chapter discussed

UXO, SALW, and ammunition in Solomon Islands, PNG, Bougainville, and Micronesia focusing on the use of

refurbished WWII weapons and ammunition in current conflicts. Capie noted that while there was some

evidence of a number of WWII weapons being used in PNG and Bougainville, the true danger was in the

surviving stock of ammunition such as the .50 calibre rounds used in US machine guns that were readily

available.

In response to this threat, Capie recommended that UXO clearance assistance could be provided as part of

the Australian Defence Cooperation and mutual assistance programmes between Australia, New Zealand

and the Pacific States with possible financial support from Japan and USA.

In 2009, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), with funding from the

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), commissioned Carl Chirgwin to prepare an

interim report titled A Pre-Survey Study into ERW Contamination in the Pacific. Undertaken as a ‘desk

study’ exercise, the publication sought to provide an analysis for GICHD on: (1) the scope and scale of UXO

contamination in Pacific Islands Forum Countries; (2) the capacity of Forum Island Countries to deal with

UXO contamination; and (3) the ‘gap’ between the current capacity and those required to deal with the

identified UXO issues.

The survey provided an overview of ERW in the Pacific and provided very useful information on WWII

battles that had occurred in the subject nations. The Study focused on nine Forum Countries that had

been affected by WWII conflict and sought to collect information regarding the scale of UXO and the

number of clearance and capacity building activities that had been undertaken in the region. The study

concluded that there was a degree of ERW contamination in the Pacific Islands Countries studied.

Photograph 3 – Ammunition located in RSIPF UXO Storage Area. Photo taken by S. Francis.

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Underwater wreckage with UXO - Palau.Photo taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining

Summary of Findings

Chapter Three: -

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Summary of FindingsThe scoping studies undertaken in Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands identified a

number of common themes and issues. For the most part, all study countries faced similar issues albeit

to varying degrees. This Chapter is based on the findings of the country reports provided by the Research

team to the FRSC in 2011.

The issues considered in the country reports focused on three main areas:

1. the extent of the problem of UXO in Member countries, and the impact on communities, the

environment and development;

2. current activities being undertaken to address UXO; and

3. the challenges and constraints faced by national authorities dealing with UXO.

SummaryIn the study countries, UXO items continue to be present in varying levels in affected areas. These items

are located on the ground, sub-surface or underwater in both rural and urban areas. UXO has the potential

to cause significant impacts on local communities through (1) safety issues resulting in possible loss of

life or injuries as evidenced in PNG and Solomon Islands; (2) environmental impacts resulting from the

leaching of harmful chemicals contained in the UXO, or from the links of UXO to dynamite fishing which

damages reefs and lagoon ecological systems; (3) impeding development activities especially those linked

to excavation; and (4) impeding the ability of local communities to utilise land for economic activities

such as those related to tourism and subsistence agriculture.

Activities currently undertaken to combat UXO in study countries involve tasking organisations such

as local Police or Defence Forces, or international NGOs in the case of Palau, to undertake clearance

activities. These activities for the most part are limited to responding to public reports, making initial

safety assessments, and transportation of UXO items for storage in secure areas. While some of the

countries have undertaken activities to dispose of UXO, resources have been reported as a constraint.

With the exception of Palau, comprehensive Mine Action activities are not undertaken and information

management is limited with only Solomon Islands and Palau collecting centralised national data. Assistance

in terms of UXO clearance missions and technical capacity building have been provided in the past by

foreign external military personnel, development partners, and NGOs.

The main difficulties reported by the national UXO authorities in the study countries involve (1) limited

resources; (2) limited technical capacity; (3) lack of reliable information and clarity on extent of UXO

issues and resulting impacts on community; (4) lack of awareness at national and international levels;

and (5) limited national coordination to implement comprehensive UXO clearance activities according to

IMAS.

Detailed discussion of Findings

(i) The extent of the UXO Problems in the Forum Island Countries studied and the impacts on communities, environment and development:

1. UXO items continue to be present in a number of areas in the study countries. The

study countries reported that UXO can be readily found in varying amounts in numerous locations.

While many of the affected sites are remote rural areas, UXO continue to be discovered regularly in

highly populated areas. A survey by CGD of the Peleliu battle site found that 26% of local households

reported UXO contamination.

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2. The true extent of current UXO contamination for most of the Forum Island Countries studied is unknown and difficult to ascertain due to the limited information available. The quantity of UXO used in the region is almost impossible to ascertain due to the incompleteness

of records available. Many of these records may no longer be available or may have been destroyed

when military bases were being overrun. This was reflected in information available to the study

countries. As such, baseline data has not been collected in several key areas.

3. UXO items currently being recovered for disposal vary greatly. Many different types of

UXO are currently being collected and disposed of in the study countries. Examples include aircraft

bombs, rockets, artillery shells, mortar round, hand grenades, sea mines, depth charges, and small

arms and light weapons ammunition.

4. Most WWII UXO items that continue to be recovered have deteriorated and are purported to be in an increasingly unstable condition.

5. UXO items continue to be present in areas that can be accessed by the public. In countries

studied, the Research Team observed UXO in lagoons, forests and residential areas. Officials report

that in remote outlying areas UXO continue to be washed up on beaches or discovered in bushland.

6. UXO have caused fatalities and injuries and continue to endanger local communities. Data provided by the Solomon Islands indicates that there have been at least 12 reported incidents

of UXO related fatalities between 2005 and 2010 although the numbers could be higher due to cases

of non-reporting. Papua New Guinea media reports also indicate a number of fatalities.

7. It is commonly believed that chemical leakage from UXO contaminates land and marine environments leading to possible health and safety problems. In the countries visited the

Research Team were able to observe first hand a number of UXO items visibly leaking chemical

substances due to corrosion. While officials interviewed strongly believed that leaking UXO are

contaminating the environment, no scientific research or data is available to support these claims.

Chemicals in UXO and ammunition include (1) heavy metals such as lead, zinc, copper; (2) explosives

such as TNT and nitro-glycerine; and (3) components from propellants such as dinitritoluene and

dibutylphtalate.29

Photograph 4 – UXO Projectile located close to residence in Palau. Photo provided by Cleared Ground Demining.

Photograph 5 – UXO lying openly in bush area in Palau. Photo provided by Cleared Ground Demining.

29 OSCE 2008, p148.

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8. UXO remains an available source for obtaining explosive material. Reports

from Solomon Islands and information obtained

from officials and secondary resources indicate

explosive material being extracted by locals

from UXO. Solomon Islands report a number

of related prosecutions for possession of UXO

items.

9. UXO and remnants of war such as firearms have been used (1) to produce weapons, (2) as ammunition for weapons, and (3) to manufacture explosives. A number of

reports indicate that WWII materials such as

firearms have been refurbished or used to

produce home made weapons. Ammunition

from WWII remains readily available30 and gun

powder from UXO has been used to manufacture explosives.

10. UXO and other WWII material have been used as weapons during internal conflicts and also to commit crimes. Reports from law enforcement officers indicate that WWII materials were

used by militants during the civil conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. WWII materials were

also used in tribal conflicts in Papua New Guinea.31 The severity of the impacts from these activities

have resulted in certain countries visited criminalising the use and possession of WWII remnants.

11. UXO continue to be used as a source for obtaining explosive material to undertake dynamite fishing which causes environmental damage. Dynamite fishing which involves

the detonation of explosive devices often results in environmental damage to lagoons and reefs. In

addition, while details are limited, officials interviewed reported injuries and fatalities caused by

this type of fishing.

12. UXO and other war remnants continue to be sought after by members of the public. There is a demand for gun powder, scrap metal and other remnants of war increasing the risk of

interaction between the public and dangerous UXO materials. In Solomon Islands, it was found that

a one litre bottle containing gunpowder had been available for purchase at a local market price of

about 1,500 – 3,000 Solomon Dollars. It is foreseen that the risk of interaction between the public

and UXO in affected areas will continue to exist due to an ongoing demand for gunpowder and scrap

metal.

13. UXO currently place an additional burden on available public resources. Governments are

currently required to dedicate resources to handle, store and destroy UXO. In many instances this

will require Governments to recruit an Officer responsible for explosive ordnance disposal, provide

appropriate training and safety equipment and establish a suitable storage facility. More resources will

also be needed for additional activities such as the creation and management of databases, recovery

operations, the protection of fisheries from UXO related dynamite fishing, and the investigation and

prosecution of UXO related offences.

14. The presence of UXO acts as an impediment to development. UXO in many instances

restricts land use for farming, food gathering and other socio-economic activities. This problem can

be significant in areas where land is scarce. In many islands where residential settlements have been

Photograph 6 – Artillery rounds in RSIPF UXO Storage Site leaking a white substance in the Solomon Islands. Photo taken by S. Francis.

30 Capie p112.31 Capie p112.

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constructed on affected areas with sub-surface UXO, activities such as gardening or construction that

require excavation can lead to potentially life threatening incidents. The Research team obtained

firsthand knowledge of this in Palau and Kiribati.

a. Officials interviewed in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands noted that most of the UXO

recovered were in response to ordnance discovered by the public during construction;

b. Officials reported UXO discovered at building sites hindered development projects. In Kiribati, UXO

in the South Tarawa lagoon were a possible hindrance to two proposed infrastructure development

projects; and

c. Officials noted UXO affected economic opportunities such as (1) agricultural activities and (2) tourism

ventures.

(ii) Current activities undertaken in the study countries to combat UXO:

1. Most of the countries studied have adopted a two tier approach to manage UXO. This has involved:

1. developing national EOD teams to respond to UXO reported by the public. These teams

remove UXO where possible according to the resources available;

2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the

United States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas.

2. Apart from Palau, pro active systematic UXO Clearance activities in the study countries were limited.

3. Limited Mine Action activities were being undertaken in study countries with UXO Awareness raising activities being undertaken in only Palau and Solomon Islands;

4. Solomon Islands currently have a dedicated clearance unit made up of 6 members. While this unit has personnel trained in the clearance of UXO, they report often having issues with

limited resources and equipment.

5. PNG currently utilises the expertise of its Defence Force Personnel to undertake UXO clearance activities. While these personnel have received training for the clearance of UXO, they

frequently lack adequate resources and equipment.

6. Kiribati currently uses the expertise of the Police armourer in Tarawa for the recovery and storage of UXO. The current police armourer has not received any formal training but has

previously assisted trained officers that have since left the Service.

7. Palau has no dedicated national UXO clearance mechanism and coordinates its activities through Cleared Ground Demining (CGD), an NGO that began local clearance activities in 2009. CGD are currently training a local team and implement limited awareness raising

programmes.

8. International assistance in terms of military deployments for UXO clearance in the study countries has previously been provided by Australia, United States of America, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. External military assistance continues to be provided on

an ad hoc basis with of recent activities undertaken in PNG and Kiribati. ADF has provided training to

Solomon Islands RISPF as part of RAMSI and EOD support to Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands and the

Marshall Islands as part of Operation Render Safe.32

32 Solomon Times Online, October 27 2009.

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9. Notwithstanding the availability of external assistance, officials interviewed generally were of the view that long-term local sustainable solutions for comprehensive UXO clearance were required. It is noted however that the ADF, New Zealand and CGD have provided

in country training to the study countries.33

(iii) Challenges and constraints faced by national authorities in Forum Island Countries studied:

1. Lack of Baseline Data and information. Baseline data is required to determine the planning and

prioritisation of resources for UXO clearance. A detailed assessment/survey of UXO affected areas

and related impacts allows each country to determine the extent and severity of the challenges

created by UXO, prioritise resources accordingly, and monitor future activities.

2. Limited Resources. Officials from all countries agreed that there were limited resources available

to allocate to dedicated UXO activities. As a result, the UXO activities in the countries studied

were mostly limited to clearance, transport and storage of UXO items in response to reports from

the public. Even in countries like Solomon Islands and PNG with trained personnel, limited modern

safety equipment posed a potential health and safety risk. Officials noted that the lack of resources

had restricted their ability to undertake UXO clearance in remote areas, or undertake additional

activities such as UXO risk reduction, victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration),

stockpile destruction, and advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.

3. Lack of a Comprehensive Policy Framework. Most of the Countries reviewed had yet to develop

a comprehensive national UXO clearance policy framework to systematically coordinate activities,

information, resources and personnel. As a result there was often no central mechanism to prioritise

and coordinate national and international activities and resources on UXO clearance leading to many

activities being undertaken in isolation.

4. Lack of Technical Capacity. Linked to limited resources, there were a number of capacity issues

raised in the countries studied. UXO staff in many cases had not received any form of formal training

on UXO and did not have any standard operating procedures.

5. Lack of Awareness. In the Countries studied (apart from Palau), there was a general lack of

awareness at all levels (from the public to national government to international donors) regarding the

dangers of UXO, the extent of the problem, and its potential impact to communities, the environment

and development.

This can be attributed in part to:

• Lack of information and data being collected nationally ;

• Lack of awareness raising campaigns being undertaken nationally. Apart from Palau and Solomon

Islands, there were no UXO risk awareness programmes in the countries studied due mainly to the

lack of resources to undertake such activities.

6. Competing National Priorities. UXO issues are often overlooked when the national focus is on

development. Forum Island Countries predominantly seek to focus available resources in advancing

the development agenda which often leads to a significant lack of emphasis on UXO. The absence of

UXO from national, sector, and agency development and planning policies often suggests that UXO

issues are not a domestic priority.

33 Chirgwin p21.

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7. Data and Information Management. Apart from Palau (since 2009) and the Solomon Islands, record

keeping and information management activities for UXO has been generally limited. The standard

procedures set out by international best practices such as International Mine Action Standards on

data management are not adapted. Records about where UXO are located, the types of items found,

clearance activities and previous assistance provided have not in some cases been maintained by the

lead agencies.

Information on injuries and fatalities caused by UXO, with the exception of Solomon Islands, was

mainly limited to media reports and accounts from national EOD teams with a limited number of

databases available. Where information was recorded locally, this information was not made available

to the international community.

While basic records have been kept by some countries (Palau and Solomon Islands) there is significant

room for improvement.

Recording and compiling accurate data on UXO is essential as it assists national agencies in:

• ascertaining the full extent and impact of UXO domestically;

• providing an effective baseline to monitor future activities;

• developing a comprehensive, coordinated and systematic UXO clearance strategy;

• raising the awareness of UXO issues at the national, regional and international level to mobilise

resources; and

• accessing information to justify proposals when making requests to fund UXO activities.

8. Geography. UXO in PNG, Solomon Islands and Kiribati are scattered over a wide geographical area in

various islands and provinces. Limited resources for travel make it difficult to investigate and manage

reports of UXO in isolated areas. Conversely, in Kiribati and Palau where the ordnance is concentrated

on small land masses such as Peleliu and Betio Island, land scarcity increases the risk of exposure to

UXO.

9. Limited links to international Mine Action support Frameworks. To date only Palau of the

study countries has been able to obtain significant NGO assistance with activities being undertaken

with donor funding.

Box Three: Model approach for those affected countries in the region.In its presentation to the FRSC, the Research team highlighted the efforts currently undertaken by British NGO Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) in Palau. The Research team noted that the types of activities undertaken by CGD in Palau set a bench mark in the region for affected Forum Island Countries and for international initiatives to be implemented in the region. The model used in Palau focused on enhancing information management, building local capacity, involving all sectors of the community (community based) in a pro-active approach, and promoting socio-economic development issues. In 20 months CGD reported that it had cleared 9,106 UXO items and have trained seven local staff.

Activities currently undertaken in Palau provide a model national approach between Government, UXO clearance service providers, and donor agencies.

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CGD Staff inspecting fuse of 1000lb bomb underwater. Photo taken by T. Essick for Cleared Ground Demining

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Country scoping assessment reports

This section of the publication provides country reports on Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon

Islands. The background research and in country consultations were undertaken in the study countries

from late 2010 to early 2011.

The country reports provide an overview of the extent of UXO related issues in the study countries,

identifying affected locations, Agencies involved in UXO clearance, past clearance activities, institutional

capacity, policy frameworks and UXO clearance constraints. The reports reflect responses received from

various officials interviewed regarding activities currently being undertaken.

As discussed in the previous Chapter, the scoping missions highlighted that the study countries have

identified UXO as a threat to public safety and have each developed mechanisms based on available

resources to manage clearance and disposal activities. However, local stakeholders during the missions

have highlighted serious resource and technical capacity constraints requiring further support at national

and regional levels.

The analysis here is best described as a scoping study, undertaken to explore possible UXO issues in the

study countries. The scoping studies sought to (1) explore the levels and impacts of UXO; (2) identify the

current capacity available to the study countries to manage UXO issues; and (3) assess if there is added

value in undertaking further initiatives to support UXO clearance activities.

The findings were presented to the 2011 FRSC meeting where it was met with a positive response from

attending officials.

It should be noted that the country reports only provide a snapshot of the local context at the time of

the interviews with the findings being neither comprehensive nor detailed and only tentative in nature.

It explores developing assistance programmes and initiatives to coordinate national actions. The scoping

study has provided an opportunity to identify (1) programming options; (2) possible national activities;

and (3) where more detailed assessment is required.

Subsequent programme development would require national assessments to determine (1) the full extent of

UXO issues for each affected member; (2) the capacity and resources currently available to UXO clearance

agencies; and (3) possible avenues of support from bilateral, regional and international partners.

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Population (Census 2005) 92,533

Land Area (Km²). 811

Population density :( people/ Km²). 127 ( approx for 2011)

GDP Growth rate - 2010 1.8%

GDP Per Capita (PPP US$). 1479.18 Rank 127

Police Personnel Approximately 400

No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit. 1

Kiribati

Line Islands

Christmas Islands

Phoenix Islands

Gilbert Islands

Tarawa

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Projectile next to residential area - PalauPhoto taken by S. Ballinger for Cleared Ground Demining

Kiribati

Chapter Four:

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BackgroundKiribati consists of 33 islands dispersed over more than 3,500,000 km2 of ocean. With a combined land

area of approximately 800 sq km and a population of approximately 95,000 individuals,34 Kiribati was

initially a colony of the United Kingdom as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands until its independence in

1979.

The Islands of Kiribati saw some of the bloodiest encounters in WWII with battles fought on Abemama,

Makin, Betio, Butaritari and Tarawa. The Battle of Tarawa, which concentrated on the Southern Tarawa

Atoll islands of Betio and Bairiki, took place from 20 - 24 November 1943. Over 1,000 US Marines lost their

lives while approximately 4,600 Japanese and Korean soldiers and labourers were killed as a result of the

battle.35

From 1942 to 1943, a substantial amount of ordnance was dropped or fired onto Betio Island and the

surrounding lagoon areas. In addition to ordnance fired from US naval warships, bombers flown from

Funafuti and other bases situated in the Ellice Islands (now Tuvalu) bombed Tarawa and the surrounding

lagoon areas36 repeatedly. These attacks intensified in the days leading up to the actual amphbious

assaults by the US Marines.

MissionThe Secretariat with assistance from CGD undertook an on-site visit to Tarawa and met with local officials

involved with UXO clearance from 22 March to 1 April 2011. During the mission the Team was able to

discuss a number of issues with key officials involved in UXO clearance and also witnessed firsthand

examples of UXO.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Scope of UXO IssueUXO remains a serious issue for Kiribati with a number of areas currently affected. Unfortunately insufficient

information regarding the numbers of UXO introduced during WWII and removed or destroyed since 1943

make ascertaining the true extent of the current problem difficult. Discussions with local police, Government

officials and the diplomatic community in Kiribati indicated that UXO continue to be uncovered regularly in

affected areas such as Betio, Makin, Butaritari, Abemama, and Christmas Islands as well as the South Tarawa

lagoon. Kiribati Police Service (KPS) officials reported that about 800 items of UXO were buried at a WWII

Memorial Park on Betio Island approximately 10 years ago.

Sources suggest that in excess of 2,400 tons of ordnance was fired or dropped onto Betio by the US Military

during the amphibious landings.37 With failure rates for ordnance estimated between 25% and 30%38 it is

probable that a large quantity did not explode. Matters have been complicated by land scarcity resulting

in subsequent construction and development in this area. As such, KPS report that UXO continues to be

unearthed regularly during construction projects. The Team witnessed firsthand an example of sub-surface

UXO contamination on Betio Island when on the last day of the scoping mission, the team was called to a

34 Estimates based on Kiribati Government Census 2005, pix.35 Cawthorne, pp220-22836 McQuarrie, p55 -63. 37 Smith, p121.38 CGD Interview.

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Photograph 7: USA HE Projectile excavated behind a house in Betio at a depth of 0.3 metres. Photo taken by Cleared Ground Demining

residence where the homeowner while planting a banana tree in his vegetable garden dug up a USA Naval

High Explosive Projectile that was armed and in an unstable condition. (refer Photograph 7)

The mission team visited Betio Police station where around 2,500 recovered UXO items were stored

and witnessed examples of WWII UXO in three different locations on the Island and in the South Tarawa

Lagoon.

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Description Quantity Country of Origin

MK4 GP 100lb Aircraft Bomb 2 USA

M49A2 60mm HE Mortar 1 USA

Type 97 81mm HE Mortar 1 Japan

Type 94 HE Projectile 2 Japan

Type 2 Hollow Charge Projectile 2 Japan

127mm HE Projectile 1 Japan

5inch MK35 Naval HE Projectile 3 USA

75mm HE Projectile c/w M18 Cartridge 9 USA

25mm Projectile 1 Japan

Type 89 ‘Knee’ 50mm HE Mortar 1 Japan

MK2 Fragmentation Hand Grenade 4 USA

Type 99 HE Blast Hand Grenade 2 Japan

Fuse – Unknown – Heavily Corroded 3 Unknown

SAA – 6.5mm 2,465 USA

Total 2,495

Table 1: Ordnance currently located at Betio Police Station Storage

Photo 8: UXO of Japanese and USA origin including 60mm High Explosive Mortars, 75 & 127mm Projectiles stored at Betio Police Station. Photo taken by Cleared Ground Demining

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Personnel interviewed reported that the South

Tarawa Lagoon contained possibly several dozen

if not 100 or more aircraft bombs scattered

throughout the area. The team carried out a brief

underwater search in the lagoon and immediately

located two USA 100lb Aircraft bombs that had

failed to detonate. (refer Photograph 9). WWII

tourist guides interviewed by the mission team

also indicated the presence of UXO on the Southern

Reef line off Betio Island although these could not

be confirmed visually.

UXO AwarenessKiribati does not have any UXO awareness

programmes. Most officials interviewed knew that

they had to notify KPS if they discovered UXO

items.

Condition of UXO The types of UXO located in Kiribati are similar to

those encountered in most Pacific Island Nations

affected by WWII battles between the USA and

Japan. The UXO is primarily of Japanese and USA

origin, containing an array of chemical components,

fusing mechanisms, ammunition and high explosives.

All UXO encountered were at least 68 years old and

in various stages of deterioration, with the outer

casings heavily corroded, fuse mechanism working

parts exposed and explosive chemicals visible to

the naked eye. This deterioration and the possible

chemical leakage underground or into the lagoon

raises possible health and environmental concerns

especially in waters where the population is very dependent on fishing and locally constructed wells

for washing and cooking purposes. In addition, the leaching of chemicals contained in UXO over time

is a potential hazard to both human health and the environment. Chemicals in UXO and ammunition

include heavy metals such as Lead, Antimony, Zinc, Copper, explosives such as TNT and nitro-glycerine,

and components from propellants such as dinitritoluene and dibutylphtalate.39

UXO Policy FrameworkUXO activities in Kiribati are currently limited to ad hoc clearance responses undertaken by the Police

Service. While proactive clearance and UXO destruction activities have been undertaken periodically

with the assistance of foreign military personnel, these activities were conducted intermittently. Limited

information management and the lack of an effective central database to record or access data of past

activities has resulted in the lack of a coordinated approach. According to officials interviewed, while

foreign assistance received has been greatly appreciated, in most cases it has not led to the development

of a sustainable domestic mechanism to properly and safely handle UXO disposal.

Photograph 9: USA MK4 GP 100lb Aircraft Bomb – One of two located by Research team in the Southern lagoon of Tarawa Atoll. Photo provided by Cleared Ground Demining.

Photo10: Rusted USA Mk 2 Fragmentation Hand Grenade stored at Betio Police Station. Photo provided by Cleared Ground Demining.

39 OSCE, p148.

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Agencies Dealing with UXO The Kiribati Police Service are the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance in Kiribati. The clearance

activities are currently undertaken by the KPS armourer who is based in the Police Head Quarters on Betio

Island in Tarawa.

UXO Assistance ObtainedClearance projects have been undertaken previously with assistance provided by foreign military personnel

from the USA, Australia and New Zealand.

Previous UXO Clearance ActivitiesAlthough there have been a number of UXO clearance initiatives undertaken by external military personnel

in affected areas since the conclusion of World War II, there is limited information available regarding the

details of these activities. In 1943, US Marines were reported to have destroyed large stocks of ammunition

discovered after the defeat of Japanese Forces while military specialists from New Zealand and Australia

also undertook clearance activities intermittently40 since the end of World War II.

In 2008 the Australian Defence Force deployed a small Joint Task Force of 22 personnel made up of

Air Force and Army specialists as well as a diving team to undertake land and underwater clearing

activities.41 As part of the assistance provided by the ADF, the Joint Task Force also undertook to scope

future UXO disposal requirements and EOD training opportunities for the Kiribati Police Force.

Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXO Current clearance procedures in Kiribati do not involve pro-active clearing activities. The KPS respond

to public reports when UXO are uncovered. Current procedures involve an initial assessment of the UXO

item undertaken by the ‘brave’ Armourer, as described by the KPS Commissioner, to identify any potential

risks and determine the safest method for extraction and transport. UXO items that can be moved are

transported to the Police Station for storage until a sufficient quantity has been collected to justify

seeking external assistance for disposal. The disposal of UXO utilising external military assistance (most

recently from Australia and New Zealand) have generally been undertaken by using explosive material.

While in country, the Team assisted the KPS Armourer with UXO that had been collected by an external

military team and deposited in a public area outside the Police Station. The Team assisted the Armourer

to move the ordnance to an adjacent derelict WWII bunker and erect protective works such as sandbags

around the ordnance. The Mission noted that some of the ordnance had been moved without any render

safe (disarming) procedures performed.

Domestic Capacity of Lead UXO AgencyThe domestic capacity of Kiribati to manage UXO issues are currently hampered by the lack of: (1) available

resources; (2) a comprehensive national policy to coordinate clearance activities; (3) clear and accessible

data regarding current UXO levels and past clearance activities; and (4) training and technical expertise

available to staff responsible for UXO disposal.

40 Chirgwin, Section 3.1.41 http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opkiribatiassist/gallery/20080814/index.htm

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42 Secretariat of the Pacific Community, p5.

Institutional CapacityThe current capacity of the KPS to safely manage UXO is limited due mainly to the lack of resources.

Discussions with the KPS Officers indicate that:

• The KPS lack technical standard operating procedures for the management of UXO events;

• The KPS Officers have limited access to formal explosive ordnance disposal training;

• The KPS lack specialized safety equipment for handling, transporting and disposing of UXO;

• The current KPS Armourer by his own admission does not have any formal training to handle

UXO although he had obtained experience through assisting previous Kiribati Police Officers

trained in Explosive Ordnance Disposal;

• Previous explosive ordnance training made available to KPS had not been sustainable leading to

a gap of about ten years since formally trained Officers had left the Service; and

• Geography is a considerable constraint to KPS due to the difficulty involved in travelling around

Kiribati to investigate and deal with ordnance reports. Kiribati covers some 3.55 million square

kilometres and travel between islands can be challenging with limited transportation and

domestic flights available.

The KPS Commissioner expressed concern that his personnel, who were required to respond to UXO

threats, lacked essential tools and the necessary skills to identify, assess, plan and respond appropriately

to dispose of UXO while mitigating potential risks.

Information ManagementInformation regarding UXO related injuries and fatalities, areas affected, items collected and destroyed,

and past clearance activities were not available and are not currently recorded or consolidated. While the

Government has historic information such as bombing maps or base and bunker fortifications, actual data

on the extent of the contamination on Betio Island does not exist, and reports on various external military

clearance activities undertaken over the years could not be located.

This has resulted in the lack of data on: (1) locations from where UXO have been removed from; (2) details

of the ordnance type and quantities discovered; and (3) methods used to dispose the UXO. Direct enquiries

have been made to the foreign Governments involved in either the initial conflicts or clearing activities for

copies of the reports to assist in compiling a working database to assist UXO disposal activities.

While there are a number of documented examples of UXO items uncovered or disposed of by both

external military forces and local Kiribati police, the information recorded is limited.

Developmental impacts of UXOThe presence of UXO in a number of affected areas both sub-surface and underwater are an impediment

to the development of these areas. The South Tarawa lagoon and Betio Island in particular continue to

show signs of UXO contamination and are a possible safety concern for individuals undertaking activities

in these areas. The problem in Betio Island is exacerbated by the fact that it is a densely populated area

estimated at over 2,500 people per square kilometre.42 As land scarcity is a problem in Kiribati, it is highly

likely that the land in the affected areas will be increasingly utilised to support the growing population.

Activities such as construction and gardening will increase excavation activities further increasing the

probability of human interaction with UXO.

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During the Team visit there were a number of major development projects in the process of being

implemented in Kiribati. Discussions with a number of consultants working for the World Bank and the

Asian Development Bank confirmed that most projects had not developed counter-measures to deal with

the possible presence of UXO in their proposed project sites. This was mainly due to a lack of awareness

regarding the risk levels of UXO contamination, which in turn was due to the lack of awareness in the

relevant Government Ministries.

The presence of UXO in the South Tarawa lagoon created potential issues for proposed projects to: (1)

extend Betio Island Port; and (2) mine gravel to support infrastructure development.

Current constraints facing Kiribati include:1. Limited technical capacity and specialist equipment:

a. KPS Armourer responsible for UXO clearance by his own admission lacks any formal training on

UXO clearance;

b. Officers interviewed claim that the KPS record keeping ability is limited primarily because they

do not possess the skills to identify the types of UXO received for storage; and

c. The Government currently lacks a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal

Officials are adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and

destruction facilities available.

2. Limited resources available to KPS Armourer resulting in Mine Action programmes and UXO activities

being limited to clearance in response to reports from the public.

3. No mine risk education activities to raise awareness of (1) national stakeholders/ public/ partner

Government Agencies; (2) international community; and (3) UXO Donor organisations.

4. Inadequate access to information and limited UXO information management.

a. No baseline data or survey information available to determine extent of threat and impacts on

community.

b. Limited UXO data currently being collected by KPS, the Ministry for Health and

other Government agencies;

c. Absence of a centralised database to assist officials responsible for UXO management;

i. The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO

clearance actions hinders the safety and possible success of future activities and leads

to possible duplication of activities in areas that have already been cleared;

ii. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the

number of items discovered are invaluable for determining high risk areas;

5. Lack of scientific data and research capability to determine possible health and environmental impacts

caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.

6. Lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources and

activities to systematically clear and manage UXO.

7. No domestic standards or guidelines to direct UXO clearance activities.

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Rusting Ordnance in Solomon Islands. Photo by S. Francis

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Population (Census 2005) 19,907

Land Area (Km²). 444

Population density :( people/ Km²). 46

GDP Growth rate. 1.0%

GDP Per Capita - 2008 (PPP UD$). 8,100

Police Personnel Over 300

No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit. 6

Palau

Koror

Ngemelis

Angaur

Peleliu

Ngergoi

Eil Malik

Urukthapel

Babelthuap

Galap

Konrei

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Local clearance team carrying 100lb bomb found in food garden area - PalauPhoto taken by S. Ballinger for Cleared Ground Demining

PalauChapter Five:

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BackgroundPalau is located in the North Pacific Ocean some 2,000 kilometres (1, 2424.8 miles) north of Australia.

It is estimated that there are more than 200 islands in the chain running from northwest to southwest,

although only 8 are inhabited. The population of Palau is approximately 20,000 of whom 70% are native

Palauans who are of mixed Melanesian, Micronesian, and Austronesian descent.

Peleliu Island was the scene of one of the Pacific’s bloodiest battles when U.S. Marines made an amphibious

assault in 1944. Peleliu was heavily fortified with concrete bunkers and over 600 man-made and reinforced

natural caves which were used to shelter the Japanese forces during massive naval bombardments prior

to the assault.

Palau in recognising the threat of UXO and the limited technical capacity approached the international

community to seek assistance. In 2009 a British NGO, Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) sourced funding to

undertake a clearance project in Peleliu which to date has been highly successful.

MissionThe Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Palau and met with local officials involved with UXO clearance

from 8 to 12 November 2010. British NGO CGD assisted with the mission providing information about their

activities. During the mission the Team was able to discuss a number of issues with key officials involved

in UXO clearance and also visited some affected areas.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Scope of UXO IssueUXO continue to be regularly recovered from several areas in Palau with the clearance of affected areas

in Peleliu estimated to take between 3 to 5 years.

Japanese bases and bunker positions were located extensively across the islands of Palau, and clearance

activities have to date removed UXO from ten of Palau’s sixteen States. However Peleliu and Angaur

islands where historic land battles took place are the sites where the majority of UXO have been found to

date. A door-to-door survey on the island of Peleliu discovered that 26% of households had some form of

UXO contamination.43 Major air battles also took place over Palau’s biggest island of Babeldaob, and its

most populated island of Koror.

Although clearance activities to date have concentrated on land, some ordnance have also been removed

from some of Palau’s most famous dive sites due to safety concerns faced by this important tourism sector.

In addition, CGD reports that 1109 items of ordnance were removed from the popular diver lunch spots of

South Dock on Peleliu, and 178 from Two Dogs lunch spot.

Information obtained from the US Military records for Palau shows that 2,200 tonnes of ordnance was

dropped by air and another 600 tonnes were fired from US Navy vessels.44 As Palau was one of Japan’s

major supply bases for the Pacific, and also the base for its naval fleet following defeat in Chuuk, it is

assumed that Japanese Forces had the capacity to return fire of equal magnitude. Hence given that

military failure rates range from 20-30%, at 25% there could be up to 1,400 tonnes remaining.45 It has been

estimated that with current resources the island of Peleliu could take from 3-5 years to clear with more

time needed should it be necessary to also undertake extensive sub-surface clearance.

43 CGD interviews.44 CGD Interviews.45 CGD UXO Survey Response.

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The above figures are consistent with CGD’s current experience in assisting the Government of Palau

with mine action activities. After five months of clearance activities by a small local team, 5,864 items

of ordnance weighing some 6.5 tonnes have been located, removed and destroyed.46 Ordnance ranges

from hand grenades to 1000lb aircraft bombs, and includes land mines, cluster munitions, armed trip wire

devices, improvised explosive devices etc.

US records also show that munitions stores were dumped at sea by US forces as the battle moved from

Palau, and today much of these UXO ordnances still wash up on Peleliu’s beaches after storms.

In May 2009, the Republic of Palau through the Ministry of State instigated an assessment of its UXO problem

by CGD, and on receiving the findings invited CGD to mobilise international donor resources so that they

could implement clearance activities. Operations commenced in September 2009, prioritising high impact

clearance, in this case where communities and visitors are most at risk. Hence, clearance to date has

been focusing on UXO contamination in households and fields, around public infrastructure, and in the

vicinity of tourist monuments and sites. All activities are conducted in accordance with International Mine

Action Standards (IMAS) and CGD’s SOPs based on international best practice. This includes a full time

paramedic on site and accident insurance for all workers. CGD’s activities have also been awarded the

relevant permits from the Environmental Quality Protection Board (EQPB) and the Historic Preservation

Office (HPO) which recognise CGD to conduct clearance.

UXO AwarenessRisk awareness sessions have been conducted by CGD on Peleliu through community meetings, and

regular sessions at the schools. Signs depicting UXO have been erected at the points of entry to Peleliu

Island, warning of the dangers which UXO pose, and advising tourists not to touch them. Leaflets are also

distributed when tourists purchase their land permits with a Japanese version now translated and awaiting

printing. Awareness has also been conducted with local and Japanese tourist guides to ensure their visitors

do not touch items discovered.

CGD is seeking additional resources to expand their awareness campaign nationally, using media such as

television, radio and newspapers. At present national newspapers are highly supportive of the clearance

work being undertaken, and provide regular updates on activities.

Condition of UXOAfter exposure for over 60 years, much of the ordnance in Palau is deteriorating and leaking into the

ground and sea, with isolated incidents of self-ignition from phosphorous grenades.

46 CGD Interviews.

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Photograph 11. Unexploded bomb, Peleliu, Palau. Photo taken by AJM

UXO Policy FrameworkAt a strategic level, the President’s Office, with the assistance of the Ministry of State, deals with the

issue of UXO. The Ministry of State has been a driver in adopting the Ottawa and Oslo Treaties, as well as

encouraging other Pacific states to do likewise. The Ministry of State has also been responsible for inviting

NGO assessments of the problem and implementing clearance activities. The Office of the President and

the Ministry of State have also been active in raising awareness of Palau’s problem with the international

community and encouraging funding support for activities.

Agencies dealing with UXOThe clearance activities are focused mainly on Peleliu and are being undertaken by CGD with the assistance

of a locally trained team.

The Bureau of Public Works has been assisting the Ministry of State in coordinating public reports of UXO.

The Governors of all sixteen States have also been made aware of the clearance programme and their

State Rangers are responsible for reporting all public reports of UXO directly to CGD, or to the Bureau of

Public Works.

UXO Assistance obtainedTo date the USA, UK and New Zealand have assisted in funding UXO clearance. CGD have at their own cost

provided the use of capital equipment such as vehicles, detection gear, tools, personnel and protective

equipment (PPE). However, to ensure that clearance activities continue, it will be necessary for Palau to

seek additional financial assistance to secure a sustainable clearance programme.

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Previous UXO Clearance Activities No information regarding UXO clearance activities undertaken prior to the commencement of CGD

activities in 2009 could be obtained.

Note: Statistics compiled and provided by Cleared Ground Demining

Location Type Quantity Weight Kgs

Agricultural 900 869.65

Beach 1,199 2,618.20

Construction Site 86 13.69

Historical Tourist Sites 6,393 11,796.54

Infrastructure 1,028 2,606.10

Residential 366 2,375.25

Underwater 118 21,425.70

TOTALS 10,090 41,705.14

Note: Statistics compiled and provided by Cleared Ground Demining

Table 3: Locations where ERW were Found

Ordnance Type Quantity Weight Kgs

Aircraft Bomb 44 3,242.00

Landmine 43 101.16

Cluster Munition 3 27.67

Demolition Charge 275 189.15

Depth Charge 92 20,532.56

Fuse 193 43.77

Hand Grenade 563 317.46

IED’s 8 160.00

Sea Mine 7 696.59

Mortar 775 1,322.04

Projectile 1,394 10,809.16

Rifle Grenade 38 38.91

Rocket 121 1,514.48

SAA 6,246 984.86

Torpedo 2 1,672.74

Miscellaneous Items e.g. Low explosive, primary cartridges, detonators.

286 61.40

TOTALS 10,090 41,705.13Kgs

Table 2: Type, Quantities and weight of ERW located in Republic of Palau from Oct 2009 – July 2011

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Current Methodology for removalCGD and their local Team undertake systematic clearance activities in Peleliu.

For responses to UXO reported by the public to CGD or the Bureau of Public Works, the CGD Team

conduct site visits to undertake an assessment. Render safe procedures (RSPs) are then conducted by the

international explosive ordnance disposal expert to make the UXO safe for transport, after which it is

taken to secured storage areas on Peleliu Island.

Demolition of all collected ordnance are undertaken at regular intervals of approximately 2 to 3 months

at a remote demolitions facility on Peleliu Island. Since 2009, no on site demolitions have been necessary

and no ordnance has been dumped at sea.

Other related activities have included: household UXO surveys on Peleliu and Angaur; risk awareness

sessions to communities and schools; survey and underwater clearance of dive and State boat dock; and

current clearance of a tourist trail through Peleliu’s main battle field site Bloody Nose Ridge. CGD has

also established an Emergency Callout Facility to deal with immediate high risk threats to the population

and visitors nationwide. Callouts have included the removal of a 1000lb bomb from the centre of densely

populated Koror, and removal of ordnance from popular dive sites.

Institutional CapacityA very positive aspect of Palau’s UXO clearance programme is that a sustainable local capacity mechanism

is being developed. CGD have trained a local team that currently assists with clearance activities.

This is currently possible because of the presence of an international EOD expert to provide technical

assistance.

Palau hopes that its clearance team will be able

to assist other Pacific countries with their UXO

problems, with removal and demolition activities, as

well as longer term train-the-trainer programmes.

Palau also ensures that clearance activities are

provided with paramedics for the clearance team

and boats to analyse underwater UXO situations.

Photograph 12: local staff in Peleliu involved with

UXO clearance. Photo provided by CGD- Palau.

Table 4: Land use categories and quantity of UXO found in each area.

LAND USE %

Agricultural 15.7

Public Beaches 15.2

Historic / Tourist Site 34.3

Infra-structure 18.1

Residential 16.7

Note: 48% US origin, 52% Japanese origin

Note: Statistics compiled and provided

by Cleared Ground Demining

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Information ManagementSince 2009, detailed records, including GPS locations, are prepared for every piece of ordnance located,

utilising the International Management System for Mine Action formats created by the international

mine action bodies including the UN. To guide activities, CGD and its local team undertake research to

determine possible UXO locations through reports, historical research and surveys etc. Governors of all

States have also been advised by the Ministry of State to report known locations of UXO.

Development Impacts of UXOThe presence of UXO in a number of affected areas, both sub-surface and underwater, are an impediment

to the development and use of these areas.

UXO continue to be located in areas frequented by the public.47 Subsistence food gathering activities

on Peleliu takes the community into all areas of the island and increases the likelihood of direct regular

contact with UXO.

Illegal explosive fishing is also a problem in Palau. A highly dangerous practice, this type of fishing is highly

destructive for Palau’s reefs and marine life on which the majority of Palau’s industries rely on.

UXO affects tourism sites which forms 60% of Palau’s GDP. A few dive sites and the majority of Peleliu’s key

battle areas are affected by UXO and can pose potential risks for tourist traffic. Any UXO incident could

have a significant negative impact on this important industry.

In addition, there has been speculation regarding possible links between UXO leakage and several health

issues reported locally. While scientific tests could be undertaken to explore these links, the EQPB of

Palau does not have the facilities to test for chemical contaminants.

Current Constraints1. The main challenge currently faced by Palau is raising resources to allow CGD to continue its UXO

clearance efforts. With the presence of CGD, technical capacity is readily available for UXO clearance.

However, ensuring that the whole range of activities required for effective UXO clearance is undertaken

will require additional financial support.

2. Funding challenges currently prevents survey and clearance activities from expanding to all states

of Palau. Pro active clearance is currently only undertaken on Peleliu focusing on high impact areas

of contamination with serious risk to communities and visitors. However, contamination is known to

be widespread nationally and further resources will be needed to support a comprehensive national

programme.

3. Another challenge is that many individuals assume that UXO is safe due to the passage of time. The

opposite is true, with ordnance becoming more unstable with age.

4. CGD have identified that obtaining additional donors may be difficult as current conflicts occurring

in areas such as Afghanistan and Sudan are taking the greater share of donor funds for clearance

activities, therefore it is necessary to seek other sources of funding. CGD have identified that some

international donors may not be supportive due to: (1) concerns that clearance activities may reopen

large scale war compensation claims across the Pacific; and (2) the low number of UXO incidents

(fatalities and injuries) do not merit intervention.

5. With the high costs of explosives and the strictly regulated environment in which to internationally

transport and store explosives, CGD arranged with the US Navy to provide the explosives required for

demolitions. Hence every 2-3 months the US Navy transports sufficient explosives to allow demolitions

by CGD to take place.

47 CGD reported locating a 1000 lb US bomb in the centre of Koror in close proximity to the town’s water storage and fuel station while 84 items were also unearthed in a church in Peleliu. The 1000lb bomb was in mint condition, with highly sensitive impact fuses on both ends.

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Population (2010). 6.5 Million

Land Area (sq km). 462,000

Population density (people/km2 /population. 14.2

GDP Growth rate - (2010). 7.0%

GDP Per Capita ( PPP US$) 2010 2,300 – Rank 140th

PNGDF (2010). 2000 plus.

No of Personnel currently in EOD Unit. approximately 20

PNG

Port Moresby

New Britain

New Ireland

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UXO hidden amongst local vegetation – Palau Photo taken by J. Curry for Cleared Ground Demining

Papua New GuineaChapter Six:

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BackgroundPapua New Guinea (PNG) is located in the South Western Pacific Ocean and is one of the most culturally

diverse countries on Earth with over 850 indigenous languages out of a population of just under seven

million.48 It is also one of the most rural with only 15% of its people living in urban centres.49 Papua

New Guinea regained its independence from the Australian administration in 1975 and its capital is Port

Moresby.

During WWII, Japan used the PNG islands as a staging centre establishing a major base in Rabaul on

New Britain.50 In 1942, Japanese Forces moved into North Eastern New Guinea establishing bases on

Bougainville and New Ireland. In response, the Allied Forces landed on Bougainville in November 1943 and

Japanese resistance finally finished almost two years later in August 1945. This period saw a prolonged

campaign in which the Japanese forces were isolated and suffered tens of thousands of casualties from

combat, disease or hunger.

MissionThe Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Port Moresby and met with local officials involved with UXO

clearance from 14 to 18 February 2011. During the mission the Team was able to discuss a number of issues

with key officials involved in UXO clearance. Site visits to the rural affected areas were not possible due

to resource constraints.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Scope of UXO IssueOfficials indicated that UXO remains a threat in PNG with a number of areas currently affected.

Unfortunately records on UXO introduced into the region during WWII and subsequent clearance activities

could not be obtained by the Research Team making it difficult to ascertain the true extent of UXO

contamination.

Officials reported that UXO and other WWII remnants are found over a wide area in PNG. The areas

affected include: (1) the provinces of East Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Popondette and Milne Bay which

are situated on the mainland island of PNG; and (2) the islands of New Britain, Manus, New Ireland and

Bougainville.

During WWII, most battles in PNG occurred mainly in the provinces mentioned above. It is believed that a

lot of the arms and UXO abandoned from the 20 month WWII campaign later became an important source

of weapons for the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Resistance Fighters during the civil conflict on

the island.

UXO AwarenessDuring the course of the interviews, it was noted that there was a lack of awareness amongst many national

government agency officials interviewed in dealing with UXO. Officials from several Agencies, some of

which are expected to deal with UXO, were of the view that UXO was not a major development concern

being an issue for only the provinces affected. Some government agencies and community members

interviewed assumed that UXO was no longer an issue.

48 Based on estimates from National PNG Census 2000.49 Based on estimates from National PNG Census 2000.50 An important Japanese base on the Pacific island of New Britain, Rabaul was the main base in the Japanese Southeast Area

and was well situated to support Japanese advances southward to New Guinea and Australia.

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UXO Policy FrameworkPapua New Guinea has developed a two tier approach to dealing with UXO. This has involved:

1. tasking PNGDF national EOD teams to respond to UXO reported by the public. These teams remove and

dispose of UXO where possible according to the resources available; and

2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United

States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas that are known to be highly

contaminated or have reported casualties in the past.

PNGDF personnel interviewed stated that they did not have a comprehensive policy framework to guide

UXO clearance activities. Clearance activities were purely responsive depending on reports from the

public and Provincial governments, as well as the availability of resources. There was no centralised policy

allocating roles and responsibilities for all Government Agencies that are involved in various areas of UXO

clearance.

Agencies dealing with UXOThe PNGDF is the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance and other WWII remnants. The PNGDF has

EOD units attached to its Infantry, Engineering and Navy Divisions that respond to reports of UXO and

undertake clearance activities. With assistance from ADF and the US Army, the PNGDF have undertaken

area clearance UXO activities in the past

UXO Assistance Obtained and previous UXO clearance activitiesApart from the PNGDF responses to UXO reports, area clearance activities and capacity building have been

undertaken sporadically in the past although records could not be obtained to provide further information.

During the 1980s and 1990s, officials interviewed remembered UXO clearance activities undertaken in

some affected provinces by Australian and PNG Defence Forces but actual records of these activities

could not be provided by both the PNG Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence.Other assistance has

been received as part of infrastructure development projects. In 2003 and 2004, an Australian company

(Milsearch) conducted a survey of UXO contamination as part of the Rabaul to Kokopo road repairs

development.

Clearance assistance undertaken recently include a US mission to Bougainville in response to a request

from the Government of PNG made to the US Embassy in Port Moresby. Based on that request, a team

consisting of 7 disposal technical advisers from the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal

and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in Washington were deployed in 2009 to Torokina

District on Bougainville Island. The team was tasked with undertaking an impact assessment of Torokina

in Bougainville and conducting UXO clearance operations to (1) lessen the danger to local residents; and

(2) reduce the possibilities for scavenging of explosives for illicit use. The team reported disposing of over

three tons of UXO and clearing four school areas

including areas for gardening. Before departure,

the Team was reported to have trained several

locals in recognising and marking UXO items with

GPS for future clearance activities.

Photograph 13: Shows crater caused by UXO

demolition. Photo by Charlie Hollway, 2010.

Retrieved 22/05/11

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Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXOMost UXO findings are reported mainly to the police and provincial authorities. The Provincial Affairs

Administrations in each province are then advised to contact the national agencies for assistance. The

government agencies consulted throughout the mission (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Provincial

Affairs) were aware of this arrangement. Funding for UXO clearance activities are the joint responsibility

of provincial and national government agencies even though the capacity of the provinces to respond to

reported cases were noted by officials as limited.

Box Four: Man killed by WWII bomb caused by bush fireA man was killed and three others injured when a World War II bomb exploded on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville during a bush burn-off by villagers.

Three men who suffered burns in the blast were flown north by helicopter to Buka General Hospital where they were in a critical condition, PNG’s Post-Courier newspaper reported.

The man killed in the blast was reportedly blown apart.

District officials said the bomb was once dropped by the Allies during fighting against Japanese forces on the island. It went off after villagers set a fire to clear bush land for food gardens. Torokina witnessed fierce fighting during the war and large quantities of unexploded ordnance remain in the jungle

Source: PNG Post Courier 2009, pg 8.

Institutional CapacityThe current capacity of PNGDF to respond to UXO threats is limited by resource constraints. As the

PNGDF are only established in three major urban areas, (Port Moresby, Lae, and Wewak), their ability

to respond is severely limited by the available resources, the geographic expanse and the remoteness of

many affected areas. Due to resource constraints some officials noted that some cases reported to PNGDF

could take several months to be investigated.

Information ManagementThe research team could not obtain any centralised records from PNGDF on the quantities of UXO items

left behind in the provinces. While work is undertaken by various EOD units there did not appear to be any

central database to assist with the development of risk assessments for the prioritisation of UXO clearance

activities. The team was also unable to locate any centralised data on past UXO clearance activities

undertaken with support from foreign military personnel.

Development Impacts of UXOUXO and abandoned arms from WWII have impacted on development in PNG by causing a number of

fatalities and injuries and impeding infrastructure development. UXO items have been used to commit

illegal activities such as dynamite fishing or violent crimes and responding to these activities require the

use of public resources.

Several interviews and media reports indicated that UXO had been responsible for a number of fatalities

and injuries with many caused by homemade fishing explosives. PNG has enacted legislation to prohibit

dynamite fishing due to the inherent risks to life and the environment. The National Fisheries Authority

and police statistics confirmed that there had been a recent decrease in arrests made on illegal dynamite

fishing compared to past years although no data was provided. A number of fatalities were reportedly

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caused by UXO explosions in areas such as Bougainville, New Ireland, Popondetta and recently in 2010 at

Wau, Morobe Province.51 In 1999, an 8 year old girl was reportedly killed on Emirau Island, New Ireland

province, which had been a USA military base during the war. A subsequent investigation revealed the

explosion occurred when bullets buried near a traditional earth oven exploded.

Reports about tribal conflicts in the Highlands of PNG frequently mention the use of WWII weapons.

According to police reports, WWII weapons such as L40, Mark 303, Mark 304 and Mark 47 rifles had been

used in recent tribal clashes between the Wogia and Unjamap people in the Southern Highlands province,

WWII firearms and ammunition also featured heavily in the Bougainville crisis with a number of homemade

weapons produced to accommodate WWII small arms ammunition such as 0.50 calibre rounds.

A feasibility study undertaken by the Works and Engineering Department on road development in affected

provinces identified UXO as a hazard although it is unclear whether any affected provinces have undertaken

technical studies to determine the level of adverse effects caused by UXO on the environment.

Current Constraints1. Limited information and baseline data available on UXO levels and past UXO clearance activities

resulting in difficulties with determining extent of UXO issue.

2. Limited awareness of the public, Government officials and international community regarding domestic

risks and threats of UXO.

3. Limited resources available to PNG Government and PNGDF EOD Teams resulting in:

a. UXO activities being limited to clearance in response to reports from the public;

b. Lack of ability to implement UXO initiatives to raise awareness of (1) national

stakeholders / public/ partner Government Agencies; (2) international community; and

(3) UXO Donor organisations;

c. Lack of ability to implement where appropriate comprehensive ‘mine action’ activities in

areas such as: (1) UXO risk education; (2) UXO clearance (UXO survey, mapping, marking

and clearance); (3) victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration); (4) stockpile

destruction; and (5) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.

4. The lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources,

identify Agency roles and responsibilities to systematically clear and manage UXO. To date, project

based clearance activities continue to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis in conjunction with the

availability of support from external assistance.

5. Limited information being collected for analysis by National Government Agencies such as Health,

PNGDF, and Works regarding UXO clearance activities and incidents such as injuries and fatalities

caused by UXO.

6. The lack of a centralized database to assist officials responsible for UXO management:

a. The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO clearance actions

compromises the safety and possible success of future activities and leads to possible duplication

of activities in areas that have all ready been cleared;

b. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the number

of items discovered are invaluable for determining the areas at highest risk to the population.

7. The lack of a strategy to develop a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal officials are

adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and destruction facilities

available.

8. Limited safety equipment available to current PNGDF EOD personnel to safely handle, transport, store

and dispose of UXO.

51 PNGDF interview.

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9. No awareness activities in place to inform communities about the risks and potential threat of UXO.

10. Lack of data and scientific research undertaken to determine possible health and environmental

impacts caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.

11. A perception of officials interviewed that there was a relatively low priority given to UXO issues by

government and communities alike.

12. A number of areas affected by UXO, most of which do not have a PNGDF EOD personnel presence.

Photograph 14. Destruction of WWII munitions in

Torokina, Bougainville, PNG.

Photograph by Charlie Hollway, 2010. Retrieved

22/05/11 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/

nwslter/148656.htm#story

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Ordnance cut open with explosive materials removed.Photo by S. Francis.

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Population (2009). 535,699

Land Area (sq Km) 28,000

Population density:(people/ Km²) 19

GDP Growth rate - 2010. 5.50 %

GDP Per Capita (PPP US$) 2010. 3062.88 Rank 129

Police Personnel Approximately 1,135

No of personnel in EOD Unit. 6

Solomon Islands

New GeorgiaIslands

Cholseul

Santa Isabel

Honiara

Guadalcanal

Malaita

San Christobal

Rennell

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UXO stored at Hell’s Point – Solomon Islands. Photo taken by S. Francis

Solomon IslandsChapter Seven

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BackgroundSolomon Islands consists of nearly one thousand islands with a combined land area of approximately 27,

986 sq km and a population estimated at about 540,000 people. Its capital Honiara, is situated on the

island of Guadalcanal and while previously a colony of the United Kingdom, the Solomon Islands regained

its independence in 1978.

During WWII, Solomon Islands was the site of several battles as the Allies began to slowly recapture

Japanese held territory and apply pressure to the main Japanese Base in Rabaul. Throughout 1942 and

1943, U.S. forces captured the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Vella Lavella, Florida, and New Georgia in

months of fierce jungle fighting.

The Guadalcanal Campaign, which lasted 6 months, resulted in a large loss of materiel and life. The large

number of war ships and cargo vessels sunk between Guadalcanal Island and Savo Island, led to this body

of water being referred to as the “Iron Bottom Sound.”52 During this period it is estimated that hundreds

of thousands of firearms and UXO items were left behind.

MissionThe Secretariat undertook an on-site visit to Honiara and met with local officials involved with UXO

clearance from 1 to 6 October 2010. During the mission the Team was able to visit the Royal Solomon Island

Police Force (RSIPF) Explosives Ordnance Unit (EOU) Magazine to witness firsthand the large number of

UXO items currently being stored for destruction.

Box Five – UXO Incident Reported in the Solomon Star“Discovery of 12 unexploded bombs in the past weeks has renewed police warnings in Solomon Islands for people to report any sightings of unexploded explosive ordinances. Construction workers at a new complex beside the QQQ Wholesale shop in Honiara’s China town said they discovered 12 unexploded bombs since they started last month. The discoveries came under spotlight yesterday when a further three were found but one was thrown into the Mataniko River. The workers alerted police who dispatched members of the Explosive Ordinance Division to collect the two. The officers were surprised when the constructors said one of the bombs was thrown into the Mataniko River. One of the constructors said they did not only discovered bombs but also live ammunition. Members of the EOD said it is always safe for any constructors to seek EOD assistance to clear areas before constructions are commenced”.

Source: SOLOMON STAR HONIARA, 23/11/10, Solomon Islands

52 McGee, p39.

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SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Scope of UXO IssueUXO remains a serious issue for Solomon Islands with a number of areas currently affected at varying

levels. Officials interviewed report UXO affected areas in Guadalcanal, Savo, Makira, Temotu, Florida,

New Georgia and Renell. Unfortunately, the lack of available data made ascertaining the true extent of

UXO contamination difficult.

Discussions with RSIPF personnel suggest that a large number of UXO remain to be removed from

Guadalcanal. While it has been difficult to obtain accurate figures of UXO to confirm these views, reports

and data made available by RSIPF, and the amount of ordnance currently stored by the RSIPF team seem

to verify these claims. Officials interviewed reported that a site in the Western Province called “bomb

beach” contained UXO items. In New Georgia Island, RSIPF reported large quantities of materiel still

contaminating lagoons and beaches often washing up during high seas.53 While RSIPF confirmed receiving

a number of reports from this island, efforts to effectively clear this area have been hampered by resource

constraints.

While in Honiara, the Research Team visited the EOU Storage site and noted a large number of UXO items

such as artillery shells, mortar rounds, grenades, aircraft bombs and small arms ammunition.

UXO AwarenessThe RSIPF through their ordnance unit and community policing units have conducted awareness raising

programmes in communities and schools about the dangers posed by WWII ordnance. However these

programmes were not undertaken on a regular basis and due to resource constraints tended to be limited

to the main centres. It was identified that there was a need for programmes to be provided to areas known

to be contaminated and in rural areas. The RSIPF Officers interviewed stated that their activities were

limited due to insufficient resources and that they required support and assistance from other government

agencies. Officials from other Government agencies interviewed appeared aware of the UXO issues.

Condition of UXO The types of UXO located in the Solomon Islands are similar to those encountered in most Pacific Island

Nations affected by WWII battles between the USA and Japan. The UXO is primarily of Japanese and USA

origin, containing an array of chemical components, fusing mechanisms, ammunition and high explosives.

All UXO encountered were at least 68 years old and in various stages of deterioration, with the outer

casings heavily corroded, fuse mechanism working

parts exposed and explosive chemicals visible to

the naked eye.

Photograph 15 – US Mk2 Fragmentation Hand

Grenades located in RSIPF EOU Storage site in the

Solomon Islands. Photo taken by S. Francis.

53 Records of interview with Solomon Islands EOU team.

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UXO Policy FrameworkSolomon Islands has developed a two tier approach to dealing with UXO. This has involved:

1. tasking RSIPF EOU personnel with support from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

(RAMSI) experts to clear UXO reported by the public. These teams remove and dispose of UXO where

possible according to the resources available; and

2. seeking periodic assistance from development partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the United

States of America to undertake clearance activities in specific areas that are known to be contaminated

or have reported casualties in the past.

There is currently no comprehensive coordinated policy for the management and systematic clearance

of UXO. UXO clearance activities in Solomon Islands are currently limited to reactive clearance responses

undertaken by RSIPF.

While UXO clearance projects and destruction activities have been undertaken periodically with the

assistance of foreign military personnel, these activities have often not been coordinated as part of a

national comprehensive and systematic approach. Limited information management and the lack of an

effective central database to record or access data of past activities has impacted on local capability to

coordinate and prioritise various UXO clearance activities.

Agencies Dealing with UXO The RSIPF is the lead agency responsible for UXO Clearance. The RSIPF have a dedicated 6 man Explosive

Ordnance Unit that undertakes clearance activities in response to reports from the public. The Solomon

Islands government provides funding to the RSIPF on an annual basis based on priority areas and daily

operational requirements.

Other agencies assisting the police are the law enforcement unit of the National Fisheries Authority,

Provincial Affairs, and Environment & Conservation. Most agencies acknowledged the risk and dangers

posed by WWII remnants but admitted that the lack of capacity and resources to assess and provide pro-

active initiatives were areas that needed to be addressed.

UXO Assistance ObtainedUXO clearance assistance and support has been provided in the past by foreign military personnel from the

USA, Australia and New Zealand. Officials reported that current assistance has mainly been in the form of

UXO training and clearance support provided by the ADF or through RAMSI.

Assistance provided was mainly in the form of short term training for police officers involved in ordnance

clearing activities with some officers receiving training in Australia. The request for assistance was made

to the appropriate authorities such as the Foreign Affairs who would in turn seek assistance from the

international community. For example, in 2006, a request for assistance was made to the US Government

to assist with the removal of gas masks that had been discovered as it was suspected that these items had

been used with chemical weapons.

Previous UXO Clearance ActivitiesThere is limited information available regarding UXO activities in Solomon Islands although there have

been a number of clearance activities undertaken by external military personnel in affected areas since

the conclusion of World War II. The RSIPF EOU reported that assistance was mainly received from ADF

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although assistance was also provided by US and New Zealand military personnel. In 2009 ADF provided

some clearance assistance under Operation Render Safe clearing underwater UXO off the coast of Malaita

and Shortland Harbour.

Current Methodology for Removal and Destruction of UXOThe RSIPF EOU respond to public reports of UXO and undertake UXO clearance activities. UXO items

undergo render safe procedures and are then transported to the RSIPF EOU Storage site. Large amounts of

UXO are currently stored by the RSIPF EOU awaiting disposal. Where there are no nearby police stations

in the outer islands, reports are directed to relevant government district agencies which then notify

police at the provincial headquarters. The RSIPF EOU is based in Honiara and is often requested to attend

incidents in other provinces.

Institutional CapacityMembers of the current RSIPF EOU had received formal technical training previously. In addition, the

services of an EOD expert attached with RAMSI provided additional support and welcome expertise.

However, RSIPF EOU personnel when interviewed confirmed that basic safety tools and detection equipment

required for effective clearance operations were limited. The RSIPF EOU noted that much of the current

equipment being used was donated in the 1980’s and required replacing.

RSIPF noted that limited resources affected their ability to respond to UXO threats reported or undertake

further activities. Investigations into UXO reports received from outer provinces were often delayed due

to resource constraints.

Information Management Attempts to obtain comprehensive statistics on the number of locations cleared and the amount of items

destroyed in the past were unsuccessful. While some records were kept these could not specify the full

details of previous activities undertaken in past missions.

RSIPF EOU collected information regarding fatalities and injuries caused by UXO but these figures only

reflected cases that were reported directly to the Police. EOU personnel interviewed admitted that the

figures did not reflect: (1) cases that were only reported to Health, as Health did not collect UXO data;

and (2) UXO incidents in the remote outlying areas which were often unreported.

Development Impacts of UXOUXO and abandoned arms from WWII have impacted on development in Solomon Islands by causing a

number of fatalities and injuries and impeding infrastructure development. UXO continue to be used to

commit illegal activities such as dynamite fishing or violent crimes, and are a drain on public resources.

RSIPF reports indicated that UXO had been responsible for a number of fatalities and injuries. Several

fatalities and injuries were caused by homemade fishing explosives. According to records held by RSIPF,

there were at least 12 fatalities linked to UXO between 2005 and 2010 although these figures are

conservative as officials interviewed noted limited reporting from the remote outlying areas. According to

RSIPF, most of the injuries and deaths that occurred involved youth seeking to extract explosive material

from UXO items for the production of homemade dynamite for fishing.

Reports about the period of civil unrest frequently mention the use of WWII weapons. According to

police reports, WWII weapons and ammunition were used to produce a number of homemade weapons to

accommodate WWII small arms and light weapons ammunition such as 0.50 calibre rounds.

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Graph 1: Number of deaths & injuries caused by UXO Reported to RSIPF over the last five years.

Graph 2: Indicates number of arrests relating to UXO incidents.

Data provided by RSIPF Explosive Ordnance Unit

In many cases the presence of UXO at work sites have resulted in development projects being delayed. In

many cases these projects were for large commercial ventures where delays cost significant amounts of

money. As a result, it is now a requirement to clear large commercial land of UXO before any development

activities can take place. The Secretary of Public Works and Infrastructure Development stated that the

issue of UXO is a growing concern and that it was important to ensure that the land is thoroughly cleared

of all UXO.

An additional issue in the Solomon Islands was the increasing trend for members of the public to collect UXO

for sale or to manufacture: (1) homemade explosives for fishing; and (2) firearms. EOU Officers interviewed

reported charging a number of people for possession of UXO. In some instances these individuals had

sought to extract the gun powder by cutting open shells with hacksaws. Officers interviewed revealed that

there had been instances where one litre containers of gunpowder had been sold locally for 1000 Solomon

dollars each.

2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

Deaths & Injuries by UXO

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Deaths Injuries

4

2

5

4

5

3

4

2

01

8 8

2010

Criminal Charges

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

2009 2008

Possession of explosivesImprovised explosive device for dynamite fishingDynamite fishing

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In terms of the environment, there are common perceptions that UXO causes significant harm to ground

water and marine habitats. According to reports provided by members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police

Demolition Team (RSIPDT), UXO demolitions in the sea have caused extensive damage to the coral reef and

the marine habitat. RSIPF and representatives of nearby communities noted incidences of coral bleaching

where UXO were known to have been dumped although other causes could not be effectively ruled out.

In Russell Island, evidence was provided regarding the presence of picric acid from UXO leakage. While

officials from the Environmental Health Division and Ministry of Environment and Conservation confirmed

receiving the report, further investigations could not be undertaken due to limitations in capacity to

undertake further tests.

Current Constraints1. Limited information and baseline data available on UXO levels and past UXO clearance activities

resulting in difficulties with determining extent of UXO issue.

2. Limited information being collected for analysis by National Government Agencies such as Health,

RSIPF, and Works regarding UXO clearance activities. While figures regarding UXO fatalities are

collected by RSIPF, these figures are incomplete.

3. The lack of a centralised database to assist officials responsible for UXO management.

a. The failure to record and consolidate data and information from previous UXO clearance actions

compromises the safety and possible success of future activities and leads to possible duplication

of activities in areas that have already been cleared.

b. Information such as where the ordnance was located, types of ordnance located, and the number

of items discovered are invaluable for determining the areas at highest risk to the population.

4. Limited awareness of the international community regarding risks and threats of UXO in Solomon

Islands.

5. Limited resources available to the Solomon Islands Government and RSIPF EOU Teams resulting in:

a. UXO activities being limited to intermittent risk awareness activities and clearance in response

to reports from the public;

b. Lack of ability to implement UXO initiatives to raise awareness of: (1) national

stakeholders / public/ partner Government Agencies; (2) international community; and

(3) UXO Donor organisations;

c. Lack of ability to implement where appropriate comprehensive ‘mine action’ activities

in areas such as: (1) UXO risk education; (2) UXO clearance (UXO survey, mapping, marking

and clearance); (3) victim assistance, (including rehabilitation and reintegration); (4) stockpile

destruction; and (5) advocacy against the use of anti- personnel mines and cluster munitions.

6. The lack of a national overarching policy framework/ National Action Plan to coordinate resources,

identify Agency roles and responsibilities to systematically clear and manage UXO.

a. To date UXO area clearance projects continue to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis in

conjunction with the availability of support from external assistance.

b. UXO issues are not reflected in national, sectoral, and agency development plans and budgets.

7. The lack of a strategy to develop a sustainable approach to ensure local UXO disposal officials are

adequately trained, safety equipment provided and maintained, and storage and destruction facilities

available.

8. Limited safety equipment available to current RSIPF EOU personnel to safely handle, transport, store

and dispose of UXO.

9. Limited awareness activities in place to inform communities about the risks and potential threat of

UXOs.

10. Lack of data and scientific research undertaken to determine possible health and environmental

impacts caused by leaching of chemicals contained in UXO.

11. Wide area affected by UXO in areas with no RSIPF presence.

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Rusting small arms ammunition at Hell’s Point – Solomon IslandsPhoto taken by S. Francis.

Recommendations and a Draft Regional StrategyChapter Eight

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Background

The scoping studies highlighted a number of common issues facing the study countries. Lack of capacity,

limited resources, geographical challenges, and poor data available restricted the ability of domestic

Agencies to undertake effective and comprehensive UXO Clearance activities.

In response, several recommendations were developed for affected Members to consider to enhance

domestic clearance activities.

In addition, the Secretariat also developed a draft Regional UXO Strategy as a possible framework to

coordinate regional activities to support affected Forum Island Countries. This Chapter discusses the

recommendations and the draft regional strategy.

RecommendationsThe UXO scoping missions in the study countries of Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands

highlighted a number of concerns. Without seeking to overstate the issue, it was evident from the research

that UXO impacts development, endangers lives, and restricts social and economic activities. Responses

to date in most of the study countries have lacked coordination or prioritisation and projects based

UXO clearance activities have been based around the availability of intermittent support from external

partners.

A number of commonalities were identified in the study countries which are likely to be reflected in

other Forum Island Countries also affected by UXO. In response, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

presented to the FRSC in 2011 a number of recommendations that could be used to assist with the possible

development of national UXO clearance activities. These recommendations are grouped into four key

areas which seek to:

1. Reduce the negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the environment;

2. Enhance the capacity of affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO threats;

3. Improve the mobilisation and coordination of resources among regional and domestic stakeholders;

and

4. Increase UXO awareness and promote support for international obligations on UXO and mine

activities.

1. Reducing the negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the environment.

Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to reduce the negative impacts of WWII UXO on local

communities by:

(1) Reducing interaction between public and UXO;

(2) Undertaking UXO clearance initiatives in high risk areas;

(3) Protecting local communities from physical and environmental harm caused by UXO; and

(4) Supporting initiatives to assess and address the impacts of UXO on communities and the

environment.

Possible National Activities1. Undertaking systematic and prioritised clearance of all affected areas;

2. Enhancing risk education and community awareness on recognition of UXO particularly in high risk

areas;

3. Enhancing awareness of UXO risk among Government Agencies responsible for regulating

construction, development projects, agriculture and health;

71

WW

II Unexploded O

rdinance

4. Supporting activities and research on health and environmental impacts linked to possible

contamination by UXO;

5. Criminalising possession of UXO, purchase of UXO scrap metal, and use of UXO as explosives for

fishing;

6. Implementing risk reduction activities such as identification of UXO contaminated areas through

mapping, marking and surveying; and

7. Supporting national initiatives to assist persons affected by UXO;

Possible Regional Activities1. Coordinating initiatives to support domestic activities of affected Forum Island Countries; and

2. Providing assistance to international, regional and Civil Society Organisations as well as national

agencies undertaking UXO clearance and demining activities in Forum Island Countries;

2. Enhancing the capacity of affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO threats.

Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to enhance their capacity to respond in a coordinated

and systematic manner to UXO threats by:

(1) Improving the technical expertise of local officials responsible for UXO clearance;

(2) Encouraging the participation of all levels of government and development partners to mobilise

available resources and;

(3) Promoting domestic adherence to international best practices such as those contained in the

International Mine Action Standards.

Possible National Activities1. Undertaking a training needs analysis for personnel and agencies responsible for UXO clearance to

determine current levels of capacity to manage all areas of UXO threat;

2. Developing national UXO action plans to establish a comprehensive policy framework for the

systematic clearance of UXO;

3. Undertaking technical surveys of affected areas to assess risk and determine appropriate

responses;

4. Utilising readily available mine action resources and guidelines developed by UN Bodies or the

Geneva Institute of Humanitarian Demining;

5. Ensuring that personnel and agencies responsible for UXO clearance are appropriately resourced

and receive adequate training and equipment;

6. Ensuring that national agencies integrate UXO activities where relevant into national development

policies, programmes, annual plans, operational guidelines and budgets; and

7. Ensuring that information and data on UXO obtained through assessments and technical surveys are

made readily available to stakeholders.

Possible Regional Activities1. Engaging with relevant UN Bodies, NGOs and donors to coordinate possible capacity building and

UXO clearance activities;

2. Supporting the development of regional training resources and technical guidelines as well as

coordinating possible sharing of technical expertise amongst Forum Members; and

3. Acting as a focal point to enhance the flow of information between all stakeholders.

72

WW

II Unexploded O

rdinance

3. Improving the mobilisation and coordination of resources among domestic and regional stakeholders.

Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to improve the mobilisation and coordination of

resources among regional and domestic stakeholders by:

(1) Enhancing domestic information and reporting systems on UXO; and

(2) Strengthening the communication between stakeholders to ensure effective collaboration

Possible National Activities1. Undertaking National UXO Assessments/Surveys to determine: (1) extent and impacts of UXO

contamination; and (2) domestic capacity to respond to UXO threats;

2. Ensuring that current and future activities on UXO assistance be coordinated among all stakeholders

involved through the formation of national multi-agency UXO Task Force type structures (made up

of Police, Environment & Conservation, Public Works, Infrastructure Development, Health, Land

& Physical Planning, Fisheries & Marine and Foreign Affairs)to coordinate and oversee activities of

national UXO Clearance Authorities;

3. Utilising national actions plans to coordinate activities and allocate resources and responsibilities for

UXO clearance activities;

4. Supporting UXO database development to provide comprehensive, accurate, and easily accessible

information for national authorities and all stakeholders;

5. Engaging with certified international clearance organisations to assist with UXO clearance

programmes;

6. National ownership of UXO problems at all levels of government by seeking to: (1) integrate UXO

activities into national, provincial and local development plans, programmes and budgets (such as

incorporating UXO clearance components into infrastructure development projects); and (2) developing

sustainable national capacities to undertake UXO activities; and

7. Exploring resourcing options with development partners and international UXO Agencies.

Possible Regional Activities1. Ensuring that UXO continues to be raised at regional fora;

2. Mapping out and coordinating available international assistance and support to be matched to needs

of affected Forum Island Countries;

3. Establishing a UXO network including donor organisations and national contact points to facilitate

communication;

4. Engaging potential donors and UXO Clearance organisations to provide possible assistance; and

5. Acting as a focal point to enhance coordination between affected Forum Island Countries and donor

providers to assist with policy and programming.

4. Increasing UXO awareness and promote support for international obligations on UXO and mine activities.

Affected Forum Island Countries are recommended to increase UXO awareness and promote support for

international obligations on UXO and mine activities by:

(1) Enhancing community and government UXO awareness and risk education initiatives; and

(2) Promoting signature and ratification of relevant international conventions such as the Mine Ban Treaty

among Forum Island Countries.

73

WW

II Unexploded O

rdinance

Possible National Activities1. Promoting use of media and CSOs to raise profile of UXO threats as well as personnel and agencies

responsible for UXO clearance;

2. Allocating appropriate resources to raise national awareness;

3. Utilising national assessments and data to determine extent of impacts;

4. Raising awareness on the adverse social, economic and environment impacts of UXO;

5. Advocating on UXO related activities.

Possible Regional Activities1. Advocating ratification of the Ottawa and Oslo Treaties;

2. Supporting UXO initiatives undertaken in region;

3. Providing annual updates on UXO activities at appropriate regional fora such as FRSC and PICP; and

4. Providing support to Forum Island Countries for the development of public awareness raising

campaigns.

Our Measures

UXO

Stra

tegi

cPl

an

NAT

ION

AL

ACTI

ON

PL

ANS

Regi

onal

Man

date

s

Inte

rnat

iona

lM

ine

Acti

onSt

anda

rds

Inte

rnat

iona

lO

blig

atio

ns(O

ttaw

a Co

nven

tion

)

OU

R G

OAL

KEY

RESU

LTAR

EAS

To s

afel

y m

anag

e an

d m

inim

ise

the

pote

ntia

l thr

eat

and

soci

o ec

onom

ic im

pact

of

WW

II U

XO in

For

um Is

land

Cou

ntri

es

Redu

ced

adve

rse

impa

cts

caus

ed b

y W

WII

UXO

on

Paci

fic c

omm

unit

ies

and

the

envi

ronm

ent:

Enha

nced

cap

acit

y of

aff

ecte

d Fo

rum

Isla

nd C

ount

ries

to

man

age

UXO

thr

eats

Impr

oved

Mob

ilisa

tion

and

Co

ordi

nati

on o

f Re

sour

ces

Incr

ease

d pu

blic

aw

aren

ess

and

supp

ort

for

inte

rnat

iona

l UXO

and

M

ine

Conv

enti

ons:

• Co

mpl

etio

n of

Nat

iona

l UXO

As

sess

men

ts w

ith

base

line

data

;•

UXO

/ERW

adv

erse

impa

cts

iden

tifie

d;•

Iden

tifie

d U

XO/E

RW a

dver

se im

pact

s re

duce

d in

num

ber

or le

vel;

• In

crea

sed

num

ber

of U

XO it

ems

loca

ted,

rem

oved

and

des

troy

ed;

• In

crea

sed

num

ber

of a

ffec

ted

area

s sy

stem

atic

ally

cle

ared

.

• D

evel

opm

ent

of a

Nat

iona

l Act

ion

Plan

;•

Incr

ease

d ca

paci

ty o

f U

XO C

lear

ance

Ag

enci

es;

• In

crea

sed

num

ber

of U

XO/E

RW

init

iati

ves.

• Fu

ndin

g so

urce

s id

enti

fied

and

assi

stan

ce p

rovi

ded;

• Im

prov

ed in

ter-

agen

cy c

oord

inat

ion;

• In

crea

sed

leve

l of

supp

ort

from

Se

cret

aria

t.

• In

crea

sed

num

ber

of a

war

enes

s in

itia

tive

s co

nduc

ted;

• Re

sour

ces

for

awar

enes

s ra

isin

g in

itia

tive

s id

enti

fied

• In

crea

sed

leve

l of

supp

ort;

Mon

itor

ing

&

Eval

uato

n

Nat

iona

l•

Dev

elop

men

t of

det

aile

d N

atio

nal

UXO

Ass

essm

ents

to

dete

rmin

e im

pact

s an

d af

fect

ed a

reas

and

es

tabl

ish

base

line

data

;•

Enha

ncin

g W

hole

of

Gov

ernm

ent

coor

dina

tion

to

redu

ce a

dver

se

impa

cts;

• U

nder

taki

ng t

echn

ical

sur

veys

of

affe

cted

are

as t

o as

sess

ris

k an

d id

enti

ficat

ion

of b

est

mit

igat

ion

appr

oach

es t

o be

und

erta

ken;

• In

tegr

atin

g U

XO c

lear

ance

ac

tivi

ties

into

nat

iona

l gov

ernm

ent

deve

lopm

ent

plan

s;•

Und

erta

king

aw

aren

ess

rais

ing

init

iati

ves

for

com

mun

itie

s in

hig

h ri

sk a

reas

;•

Supp

orti

ng r

isk

redu

ctio

n ac

tivi

ties

su

ch a

s id

enti

ficat

ion

thro

ugh

map

ping

, m

arki

ng a

nd s

urve

ying

of

UXO

con

tam

inat

ed a

reas

.

Regi

onal

•

Prov

idin

g su

ppor

t to

aff

ecte

d Fo

rum

Is

land

Cou

ntri

es t

o de

velo

p an

d im

plem

ent

UXO

ris

k ed

ucat

ion

and

awar

enes

s ra

isin

g in

itia

tive

s;•

Prov

idin

g su

ppor

t to

inte

rnat

iona

l,

regi

onal

and

civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zati

ons,

as

wel

l as

nati

onal

ag

enci

es,

unde

rtak

ing

UXO

cle

aran

ce

and

dem

inin

g ac

tivi

ties

in F

orum

Is

land

Cou

ntri

es;

• Su

ppor

ting

nat

iona

l ini

tiat

ives

to

assi

st p

erso

ns a

ffec

ted

by U

XO;

• Su

ppor

ting

act

ivit

ies

to a

sses

s po

ssib

le c

onta

min

atio

n an

d po

lluti

on

of e

colo

gica

l sys

tem

s.

Nat

iona

l•

Dev

elop

men

t of

nat

iona

l act

ion

plan

s to

est

ablis

h a

com

preh

ensi

ve

polic

y fr

amew

ork

for

the

syst

emat

ic

clea

ranc

e of

UXO

;•

Und

erta

king

a N

atio

nal U

XO

Ass

essm

ent

to d

eter

min

e cu

rren

t le

vels

of

capa

city

to

man

age

all a

reas

of

UXO

thr

eat;

• U

nder

taki

ng a

tra

inin

g ne

eds

anal

ysis

for

per

sonn

el a

nd a

genc

ies

resp

onsi

ble

for

UXO

cle

aran

ce;

• En

suri

ng t

hat

pers

onne

l and

age

ncie

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r U

XO c

lear

ance

are

ap

prop

riat

ely

reso

urce

d an

d re

ceiv

e ad

equa

te t

rain

ing

and

equi

pmen

t;

• Pr

omot

ing

the

inte

grat

ion

of U

XO

acti

viti

es w

here

rel

evan

t in

to n

atio

nal

deve

lopm

ent

polic

ies,

pro

gram

s an

d bu

dget

s;•

Dev

elop

men

t of

app

ropr

iate

in

form

atio

n m

anag

emen

t sy

stem

s to

en

sure

nec

essa

ry d

ata

is c

olle

cted

.

Regi

onal

• D

evel

opm

ent

of r

egio

nal U

XO t

rain

ing

reso

urce

s to

ass

ist

shar

ing

of t

echn

ical

ex

pert

ise

amon

gst

Foru

m M

embe

rs;

• Su

ppor

ting

bila

tera

l UXO

cle

aran

ce

prog

ram

mes

und

erta

ken

by

deve

lopm

ent

part

ners

or

NG

Os

to

assi

st F

orum

Mem

bers

;•

Supp

orti

ng F

orum

Isla

nd C

ount

ries

to

bui

ld lo

cal c

apac

ity

to m

anag

e do

mes

tic

UXO

pro

gram

mes

;•

Supp

orti

ng F

orum

Isla

nd C

ount

ries

to

dev

elop

and

impl

emen

t pu

blic

aw

aren

ess

cam

paig

ns t

o se

ek s

uppo

rt

for

UXO

init

iati

ves;

• Pr

ovid

ing

supp

ort

to c

ivil

soci

ety

orga

nisa

tion

s an

d lo

cal b

odie

s un

dert

akin

g U

XO c

lear

ance

act

ivit

ies

in F

orum

Isla

nd C

ount

ries

; •

Enha

ncin

g th

e ca

paci

ty o

f na

tion

al

agen

cies

to

inte

grat

e U

XO c

lear

ance

ac

tivi

ties

into

the

ir a

nnua

l pla

ns;

• Su

ppor

ting

aff

ecte

d Fo

rum

Isla

nd

Coun

trie

s to

obt

ain

assi

stan

ce f

or U

XO

clea

ranc

e ac

tivi

ties

.

Nat

iona

l•

Uti

lisin

g na

tion

al a

ctio

ns p

lans

to

coor

dina

te a

ctiv

itie

s an

d al

loca

te

reso

urce

s fo

r U

XO c

lear

ance

ac

tivi

ties

;•

Prom

otin

g a

who

le o

f G

over

nmen

t ap

proa

ch t

o in

clud

e na

tion

al a

genc

ies

(Pol

ice,

Env

iron

men

t &

Con

serv

atio

n,

Publ

ic W

orks

, In

fras

truc

ture

D

evel

opm

ent,

Hea

lth,

Lan

d &

Phy

sica

l Pl

anni

ng,

Fish

erie

s &

Mar

ine

and

Fore

ign

Aff

airs

) an

d CS

Os

whe

n de

alin

g w

ith

UXO

act

ivit

ies

and;

• M

appi

ng o

ut o

f na

tion

al a

ctiv

itie

s fo

r U

XO c

lear

ance

; •

Supp

orti

ng U

XO d

atab

ase

deve

lopm

ent

to p

rovi

de c

ompr

ehen

sive

, ac

cura

te,

and

easi

ly a

cces

sibl

e in

form

atio

n fo

r na

tion

al a

utho

riti

es a

nd a

ll st

akeh

olde

rs;

• Se

ekin

g av

aila

ble

inte

rnat

iona

l do

nor

assi

stan

ce t

hrou

gh r

egio

nal

stru

ctur

es;

Regi

onal

• Es

tabl

ishi

ng a

UXO

net

wor

k in

clud

ing

dono

r or

gani

sati

ons

and

nati

onal

con

tact

poi

nts

to f

acili

tate

co

mm

unic

atio

n;

• En

suri

ng t

hat

UXO

con

tinu

es t

o be

ra

ised

at

regi

onal

for

a.•

Map

ping

out

of

avai

labl

e as

sist

ance

an

d su

ppor

t to

be

mat

ched

to

need

s of

For

um Is

land

Cou

ntri

es;

• Co

ordi

nati

ng r

egio

nal a

ssis

tanc

e in

itia

tive

s on

beh

alf

of a

ffec

ted

Foru

m

Isla

nd C

ount

ries

.

Nat

iona

l•

Rati

ficat

ion

and

impl

emen

tati

on o

f th

e O

ttaw

a an

d O

slo

trea

ties

;•

Supp

orti

ng U

XO in

itia

tive

s un

dert

aken

in t

he r

egio

n;•

Ensu

ring

adv

erse

impa

cts

iden

tifie

d ar

e ef

fect

ivel

y co

mm

unic

ated

to

stak

ehol

ders

;•

Prov

idin

g an

nual

upd

ates

on

UXO

ac

tivi

ties

at

appr

opri

ate

regi

onal

for

a su

ch a

s FR

SC,

PICP

;•

Prom

otin

g us

e of

med

ia a

nd C

SOs

to

rais

e pr

ofile

of

UXO

thr

eats

, as

wel

l as

per

sonn

el a

nd a

genc

ies

resp

onsi

ble

for

UXO

cle

aran

ce;

• Ra

isin

g aw

aren

ess

on t

he a

dver

se

soci

o-ec

onom

ic a

nd e

nvir

onm

ent

impa

cts

of U

XO.

Regi

onal

• Pr

ovid

ing

supp

ort

to F

orum

Isla

nd

Coun

trie

s fo

r th

e de

velo

pmen

t of

pu

blic

aw

aren

ess

rais

ing

cam

paig

ns ;

an

d •

Adv

ocat

ing

on U

XO r

elat

ed a

ctiv

itie

s.•

Incr

ease

d nu

mbe

r of

aw

aren

ess

init

iati

ves

cond

ucte

d;•

Reso

urce

s fo

r aw

aren

ess

rais

ing

init

iati

ves

iden

tifie

d;

• Pr

ovid

ing

a re

gion

al o

nlin

e U

XO

disc

ussi

on p

age

to e

nhan

ce

com

mun

icat

ion.

Our Strategies

Mem

bers

Conc

erns

Aff

ecte

d co

untr

ies

to

form

m

ulti

-age

ncy

wor

king

gro

ups

on E

RW/U

XO

and

deve

lop

nati

onal

act

ion

plan

s.

Thes

e st

rate

gies

will

be

bui

lt in

to

nati

onal

act

ion

plan

s an

d pr

ogra

mm

es.

Age

ncie

s re

spon

sibl

e w

ill

refl

ect

thes

e ac

tivi

ties

in

thei

r ag

enci

es

corp

orat

e pl

ans.

75

WW

II Unexploded O

rdinance

Draft Regional StrategyBased on the findings and recommendations of the scoping studies, the Draft Strategy seeks to provide

a mechanism to coordinate activities to support affected Forum Island Countries. The draft strategy

was presented to the FRSC in 2011 which welcomed its development as a contribution to addressing the

challenges of UXO in the region.

Purpose of a Regional StrategyThe aim of a UXO strategy is to establish a framework to coordinate international and regional activities

and resources to support: (1) the development of national UXO Policies and Action Plans; and (2) the

implementation of national mine action initiatives. It seeks to provide a framework linking activities,

(based on the recommendations made by the Secretariat to the FRSC), to a regional mechanism to

coordinate and support domestic UXO clearance activities in affected countries. It allows the Secretariat

to:

(1) Support the implementation of domestic UXO clearance initiatives;

(2) Promote the development of mine action type activities; and

(3) provide strategic direction to affected Forum Members so that technical assistance and resources can

be identified and channelled efficiently for the benefit of affected communities.

This regional approach to address UXO provides a collaborative and collective effort for stakeholders as

it provides broad directions to address key areas that are critical when developing national UXO plans

of action. Individual countries will then devise detailed national plans to reflect their specific needs and

priorities.

The Strategy recognises that:

• Affected Forum Island Countries have limited resources and technical capacity to manage an issue that

was created by external military forces;

• There is a need for affected Forum Island Countries to develop comprehensive policies to undertake

systematic proactive UXO clearance activities, raise awareness, and coordinate national activities and

international assistance;

• A whole of government approach is necessary to ensure adequate support from all Agencies involved;

• International best practices as advocated for by Mine Action and the IMAS are an effective method for

developing national strategies and policies to manage UXO;

• A coordinated regional approach allows for better utilisation of limited resources;

• PIFS can play an important role as both an advocate for Forum Island Countries in engaging external

partners and as a focal point to coordinate regional activities and resources to assist national efforts

by affected Forum Island Countries; and

• A coordinated regional approach will promote regional and international awareness of the UXO issue.

Structure of the Regional UXO Strategy

GoalThe goal of the Regional Strategy is to safely manage and minimise the threat and socio-economic impacts

of WWII UXO in the region.

Key Result AreasTo achieve this goal, the strategy proposes four Key Result Areas that reflect the groupings used to sort the

various recommendations described earlier in this Chapter. The Key Result Areas are for:

1. A reduction in negative impacts of WWII UXO on Pacific communities and the environment;

2. The development of adequate capacity in affected Forum Island Countries to manage domestic UXO

threats;

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Diagram 1: Four Key Result Areas for this strategy

Reduced adverse impacts

of WWII UXO

Enhanced capacity & Ownership

Promotion & Educational Awareness

Improved Mobilisation and Coordiantion of

Resources

3. The mobilisation and coordination of resources among regional and domestic stakeholders; and

4. The development of UXO awareness in affected Forum Island Countries and provision of support for

international obligations on UXO and mine activities.

ActivitiesThe Strategy proposes a number of activities or initiatives based on the recommendations provided earlier

in this Chapter that Forum Members and the Secretariat can consider implementing to achieve the Key

Result Areas. The activities listed are not exhaustive and can be implemented based on relevance to

national conditions and priorities.

ImplementationTo drive regional and national activities, the Strategy proposes that:

(1) The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat act as a focal point to mobilise and coordinate regional and

international resources and activities; and

(2) Members develop National UXO Action Plans to coordinate domestic activities in affected Forum Island

Countries;

Regional Approach• Promote awareness of Pacific UXO issues regionally and internationally;

• Support affected Members in implementing domestic UXO initiatives and developing national action

plans;

• Mobilise and coordinate available international and regional resources;

• Link affected Forum Island Countries to potential assistance and resources;

• Engage external parties on behalf of Members to explore possible areas of collaboration and

assistance;

• Explore the development of regional resources and technical guidelines;

• Act as a repository of information and regional resources regarding UXO clearance activities undertaken

in the region;

• Develop networks to facilitate the sharing of UXO related information; and

• Ensure that UXO activities continue to be raised at the appropriate regional fora such as the FRSC.

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National ApproachAt the national level, affected Forum Island Countries will need to consider developing National Action

Plans and policies to manage UXO. Such plans will need to focus on building domestic capacity in 5 key

areas:

• technical knowledge and skills to undertake surveys, mapping, markings and physical clearance;

• risk education;

• victim assistance;

• stockpile destruction; and

• support for international conventions related to Mines and UXO.

The main objectives will involve: (1) developing adequate coordination mechanisms; (2) developing

sufficient information to guide activities; and (3) identifying sufficient capacity and resources given

competing development and infrastructure priorities. While identifying resources will always be a

challenge faced by most small island states, the development of the UXO Regional Strategy will allow

for a better understanding of international and regional resource support currently available to enhance

domestic capacity and undertake UXO clearance activities. In addition, the policy resources developed

by GICHD and the IMAS will provide guidance to affected Forum Island Countries.

Monitoring & Evaluation Monitoring and evaluation will be a critical element to measure the effectiveness of UXO activities

conducted. Effective monitoring requires the development of initial baseline data that can be obtained

through the development of a National Assessment. Once the initial data has been established initiatives

can be measured based on timeliness, resources utilised, UXO items cleared, and mechanisms and

processes established.

IMAS provide comprehensive uniform standards for all key areas of Mine Action activities including

programme development, UXO clearance, worksite safety, development of National Assessments,

destruction activities and Mine Risk Education. IMAS also provide standards on monitoring activities that

can be adapted to suit domestic circumstances and programmes.

Future ActivitiesAs of August 2011, the Draft Regional UXO Strategy is still being finalised. It is envisaged that the Pacific

Islands Forum Secretariat will continue to develop the Strategy in collaboration with UXO Stakeholders

with a view to adoption by the Forum Regional Security Committee in 2012.

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Appendix 1 - Consultation Meetings.

The consultation meetings were held with representatives from both Government and other

stakeholders.

Solomon Islands – Consultations were conducted from 01st -06th October 2010 with the following stakeholders• Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (, Police Commissioner, ACP Operations, Explosive Ordnance Unit)

• Secretary for Public Works & Infrastructure Development

• Lands Officers from Department of Lands & Physical Planning

• Under Secretary for Ministry of Police

• USA Consulate in Honiara

• Embassy of Japan Staff

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Staff

• Manager of Iron Bottom Sound Hotel

• Village representatives from Lunga and Henderson areas.

• Director for Environment & Conservations

• Director for Environmental Health – Ministry of Health

• Officer in Charge - Records & Statistics Section - National Referral Hospital

• Honiara Town Council Authority

• Representatives from National Fisheries Authority

Palau – Consultations were conducted with the following stakeholders from the 08th -12th November 2010• Governor of Peleliu

• Director, Public Works & Utilities

• Assistant Director, Environment & Conservations

• Police representatives from Ministry of Public Safety

• Representatives from Maritime & Fisheries Authority

• Representatives from Cleared Ground Demining

• Representative from the Ministry of Culture & Heritage

• Representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

• Representative from the Ministry of State

• Peleliu community representatives and community rangers

Papua New Guinea - Consultations were conducted from 14th -18th February 2011 with the following stakeholders• PNGDF Ordnance Dive Unit – Langrond Naval Base Port Moresby

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade – Port Moresby – Pacific Section

• ACP Public Safety Police – Police Headquarters

• Ministry of Provincial Affairs – Waigani Government Office

• Representative from the Ministry for Bougainville Affairs – Port Moresby

• Representatives from Environment & Conservation

• Representatives from National Fisheries Authority

• Community representative from Manus & Morobe

Appendices

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Kiribati – Consultation were conducted from the 22nd March – 1st April 2011.• Kiribati Police Service (Police Commissioner, Armorer, Maritime Unit, other police personnel)

• Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Immigration

• Director Town Authority & Utilities

• CEO public Works & Infrastructure

• NZ High Commissioner to Kiribati

• Director of Lands & Physical Planning

• Director of Environment & Conservation

• Director for Marine & Fisheries

• Representatives from Kiribati Hospital

• Representative from Betio communities

• Molly Tours

• Australian High Commissioner

• AusAid representatives

• Officer in Charge - Kiribati Museum

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Country Snap shot of WWII ordnance in Forum Island Countries

Assistance provided.

Cook Islands WWII UXO not an issue. Not affected

Fiji WWII UXO not an issue. Not affected

Republic of the Marshall Islands

WWII ordnance found on land and underwater in several areas of the Marshall Islands. Most of the smaller surrounding atolls of Eniwetok, Parry, Engebi, Roi , Namur and Majuro islands were heavily bombarded by airstrikes and navy warships prior to landings by assault craft.

UXO clearance activity was conducted in 1950. A report on this activity highlighted the degree of removing the ERW and recommended follow up activities to clear the areas.

Kiribati WWII ordnance found on land and underwater mainly around Tarawa Atoll; the outer islands of Makin, Abemama, Butaritari; and the Christmas islands. Heavy bombardments occurred in Betio and surrounding atolls prior to landings by assault craft.

UXO Clearance and technical capacity training undertaken previously by USA and ADF. Most recent clearance project conducted in 2008 by Joint ADF Task Force. Information and records of these activities were not provided by Kiribati Police and ADF.

Palau WWII ordnance found on land and underwater in surrounding islands of Palau. The islands of Peliliu and Angaur are areas where most of the ordnance is located. Heavy bombardments and ground battles occurred in these islands.

No records of assistance until 2009 when Non- Profit Organization, Cleared Ground Demining started clearance activities on the islands of Peliliu, Angaur and main island of Koror. CGD report disposing of 10,090 items between 2009 and mid 2011.

Solomon Islands WWII ordnance found throughout several affected areas in Solomon Islands. The main islands with UXO presence are Guadalcanal, Rennel, Makira, and Savo,

Assistance provided mostly by ADF and NZDF with some activities undertaken by USA and UK in the past. RSIPF currently receive some support from RAMSI EOD expert.

Nauru Armed forces from Germany and Japan occupied Nauru during WWII. While no significant ground battles occurred on Nauru, the Island was bombed several times and used as a military base.

Reports indicate that Solomon Islands EOU assisted Nauru in 2009 to dispose UXO items. No information was obtained to establish whether other assistance was provided to Nauru in the past by outside agencies.

Appendix 2 - Snapshot of WWII UXO in FIC’s

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Tuvalu Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Namumea were used as military airfields during WWII and were subjected to several Japanese bombing raids from airbases in Tarawa. Namumea was reported to have had a UXO issue.

Reports indicate New Zealand assistance provided to Tuvalu in 1980s for the destruction of UXO in the early 1980s .

Vanuatu Espiritu Santo and Efate Islands were reported as the site of large military bomber airfields. Interview with Vanuatu Police in November 2010. Suggests presence of UXO in these areas although a proper assessment needs to be undertaken.

Information on previous UXO clearance activity could not be obtained.

Niue WWII ordnance not an issue. Not affected

Papua New Guinea

WWII ordnance mainly found on the coastal areas of East Sepik, West Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Oro, Milne Bay and the New Guinea Island provinces of Manus, Bougainville, East/West New Britain and New Ireland. These areas were the sites for numerous battles and military bases.

UXO Clearance has been provided by ADF and US Military in the past. Recent activities include UXO clearance in Torokina Bougainville in 2009 by US EOD experts. The PNGDF is responsible for ordnance clearance.

Tonga WWII ordnance not an issue. Not affected

Federate States of Micronesia

WWII ordnance found in several areas throughout FSM. Chuuk was the site of a major Japanese naval base and was heavily bombarded during WWII. Military activities also occurred on Pohnpei, Yap and Kosrae.

Reports suggest US military undertook some UXO clearance activities in some of the islands. However, no information was available to confirm if activities were conducted.

Samoa WWII ordnance not an issue. Not affected

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Appendix 3 - A Framework for a Strategic Mine Action Plan (A Guide to Mine Action, GICHD 2010)

ContextPolitical context

Security

Economic context

Social context

Geography

Demography

Development priorities and actors

HazardsNature of contamination

Extent of contamination

Unknowns

Needs assessmentVulnerability assessment (current impact)

• affected communities

• risk-taking behaviour

• victim profiles and numbers

• projected changes (e.g. refugee return, reconstruction projects underway)

• unknowns Development constraints (future impact)

• development priorities — key sectors and areas for mine action linkages

• unknowns

Description of the mine action programmeHistory

Current status

Problems with programme and organisations

Vision, strategic goals and objectives for mine action programmeVision statement — A country free from the most severe impact of

landmines and unexploded ordnance and otherwise in full compliance

with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Goal 1. Strengthen national mine action programme and key organisations

• Objective 1.1 — Pass mine action legislation

• Objective 1.2 — Mobilise national and donor resources

• Objective 1.3 — Strengthen senior and middle management in the mine action centre

Goal 2. Goal for demining

• Objective 2.1 etc

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Goal 3. Goal for mine risk education

• Objective 3.1 etc

Goal 4. Goal for stockpile destruction

• Objective 4.1 etc….

Goal X. Research and development

• Objective X.1 — Integrated demining techniques

• Objective X.2 — Pilot project in community-based risk reduction

• Objective X.3 — Pilot project in using politicians to clear minefields

Actions to achieve goals and objectivesMine action activities

Coordination mechanisms

Planning and sharing information with other humanitarian and

development actors

Timeframe

ResourcesAvailable resources

Implementing organisations

Additional resources required

Plan for resource mobilisation

Key assumptions and implicationsSigned peace agreement with rebels

Implementation of peace agreement with rebels

Successful negotiation of unified mine action wage structure

Successful use of mine detection rats

Risk management

Contingency plans if peace not signed

Contingency plans if peace agreement does not hold

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Appendix 4 - PIFS Circular 179/2010

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The Pacific Islands ForumThe Pacific Islands Forum is a political grouping of 16 independent and self-governing states.

Members include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New

Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshal Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,

Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

New Caledonia and French Polynesia, previously Forum Observers, were granted Associate Membership in

2006. Forum Observers include Tokelau (2005), Wallis and Futuna (2006), the Commonwealth (2006), the

United Nations (2006) the Asia Development Bank (2006) and the World Bank (2010), with Timor Leste as

Special Observer (2002).

The annual Forum meetings are chaired by the Head of Government of the Host Country (currently

Vanuatu), who remains as Forum Chair until the next meeting.

Since 1989, the Forum has held Post Forum Dialogues with key Dialogue Partners at Ministerial level.

There are currently 14 partners – Canada, People’s Republic of China, European Union, France, India,

Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the

United States.

The Pacific Islands Forum was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. In 2000, the name was changed

to the Pacific Islands Forum to better reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and

south Pacific.

Founding members of the Pacific Islands Forum were Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand,

Tonga and Western Samoa – now Samoa.

The Secretariat to the Forum was initially established as a trade bureau in 1972 and later became the

South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC). In 2000, when the name of the Forum changed,

the Secretariat became the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

The Pacific Islands Forum SecretariatThe Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji. The Secretariat’s mandate is delivered through

the annual Leaders’ Communiqués and high level ministerial meeting decisions.

The Forum Secretariat is led by the Secretary General (currently Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Samoa) who

is directly responsible to the Forum Leaders and to the Forum Officials’ Committee (FOC). FOC is the

Secretariat’s governing body comprising representatives from all Forum members.

The Forum Secretariat is also mandated to coordinate the implementation of the Pacific Plan for

strengthening regional cooperation and integration.

The Forum Secretariat has trade offices in Auckland, Beijing, Sydney, and Tokyo that work independently

but come together as Pacific Islands Trade and Invest.

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The Leaders’ Vision “Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a

region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity,

so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile lives.

“We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future

in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are

valued, honoured and developed.

“We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of

its governance, the sustainable management of its resources,

the full observance of democratic values and for its defence

and promotion of human rights.

“We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to

develop our knowledge, to improve our communications and

to ensure a sustainable economic existence for all.”

Mission, Goals & Roles Our mission is to ensure the effective implementation of

the Leaders’ decisions for the benefit of the people of the

Pacific.

Our goals are to stimulate economic growth and

enhance political governance and security for the region,

through the provision of policy advice; and to strengthen

regional cooperation and integration through coordinating,

monitoring and evaluating implementation of Leaders’

decisions.

In achieving these Goals, the Primary Roles of the Forum

Secretariat, as set out in the 2005 Agreement Establishing

the Pacific Islands Forum, are to provide:

• Policy advice and guidance in implementing the

decisions of the Leaders

• Coordination and assistance in implementing the

decisions of the Leaders

• Support to the Leaders’ meetings, ministerial

meetings, and associated committees and

working groups

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Ratu Sukuna Road, Muanikau, Suva, Fijiwww.forumsec.org <http://www.forumsec.org>