wilfrido cardenas hoffmann, defense memo

8/9/2019 Wilfrido Cardenas Hoffmann, defense memo

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

vs. : CRIMINAL NO. 3:14CR00239(MPS)WILFRIDO ANIBAL CARDENASHOFFMAN 1

: JANUARY 30, 2015

MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING

Wilfrido Hoffmann suffers from schizophrenia, often called the most devastating of mental

illnesses, because it disrupts all aspects of a person’s mental, emotional and social functioning. The

disease is characterized by delusions, hallucinations, and extremely disorganized thinking. At the

time he made the phone calls at issue in this case, there is no question that Mr. Hoffmann was suffering

from the symptoms of schizophrenia and unmedicated.

Although Mr. Hoffmann suffers from a chronic mental illness, the offense conduct was not

recurrent. It occurred on one discrete day, December 16, 2012. Eighteen months elapsed between the

calls and the day he was arrested. During that 18-month period, there was no further criminal conduct

– no additional calls and no steps to act against anyone who received a threatening phone call. If Mr.

Hoffmann had not been arrested, he never would have entered the state of Connecticut.

The statements Mr. Hoffman made were crimes, and he has suffered the consequences. He

has never been arrested nor incarcerated before. He has now been incarcerated for over seven months

in a prison in a foreign country, isolated from his family.

1 Although the docket sheet uses the spelling “Hoffman,” the correct spelling is “Hoffmann.”1

Case 3:14-cr-00239-MPS Document 43 Filed 02/09/15 Page 1 of 18


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Crucially for Mr. Hoffmann’s future prognosis, he is now committed to remaining compliant

with his medication. That commitment is shared by his family. His parents can never again

underestimate the need to remain vigilant regarding his treatment. They have already set up a detailed

treatment plan in Venezuela, and Dr. Carlos Salgado, from the Yale School of Medicine, has spoken

with the doctor who will be treating Mr. Hoffmann in Venezuela to confirm the appropriateness of

the plan.Mr. Hoffmann’s parents will be present at his sentencing on February 12, 2015. Should the

Court agree to the defendant’s request for a sentence of time served, his parents will act as custodians,

and fly with him home to Venezuela. The FBI has already been provided with the flight details and

will confirm his departure from the country. Mr. Hoffmann understands and agrees that he is

permanently barred from re-entering the United States.

For these reasons and those detailed below, Wilfrido Hoffmann, through counsel, submits this

memorandum in support of a downward departure and/or variance to a sentence of time served with

the maximum period of supervised release, three years. The government takes no position on the

request and is not requesting a Guidelines sentence.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Childhood and the development of mental illness

Mr. Hoffmann was born and raised in Venezuela, except for one year he spent attending third

grade in Houston, Texas. He grew up with both his parents and two sisters. His parents are both

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full-blown symptoms.

Unfortunately, Wilfrido’s mental health continued to deteriorate.

2. The time period of the offense

In December of 2012, at the time Mr. Hoffmann made these threatening calls, he was

struggling to come to terms with his illness. As Wilfrido and his parents explain, he, like many young

people with mental illness, found it difficult to accept that he suffered from a chronic condition.

Evidence collected by law enforcement in investigating this case confirms that Wilfrido had stopped

taking his medication prior to making the calls. PSR ¶ 12.

He made the calls all in one night, December 16, 2012. After that night, and during the 18

months before he was arrested, there were no further calls to Newtown. He stopped the calls on his

own, with no outside intervention. He took no steps to act on any of the threatening comments he

made in the calls. There is no evidence that he ever tried to obtain a weapon or ever tried to travel to

Newtown. When he was arrested for the calls, he was not travelling to Newtown. He was travelling

from Venezuela to Mexico to see his sister, and the family had a stop-over in Miami. If he had not

been arrested, he would never have entered the State of Connecticut.

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3. Incarceration at Wyatt Detention Center

Since being arrested on June 21, 2014, Wilfrido has been incarcerated at Wyatt Detention

Center. While there, his mental health declined precipitously.

During that time, he was evaluated by Dr. Carlos Salgado from the Department of Psychiatry

at Yale School of Medicine. Dr. Salgado did an extensive evaluation. He interviewed Wilfrido for

approximately seven hours and interviewed Wilfrido’s parents for an additional one hour and thirty

minutes. He reviewed psychiatric records and evaluations from Venezuela and from Wyatt Detention

Center, as well as documents related to this case. On the basis of his evaluation, he diagnosed

Wilfrido with schizophrenia and alcohol use disorder. He further determined that Wilfrido was

already suffering from schizophrenia at the time that he made the calls.

Dr. Salgado met with Wilfrido on two occasions: September 6, 2014, and November 1, 2014.

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Wilfrido’s treatment plan in Venezuela will address all aspects of his illness,

4.

Treatment plan Wilfrido’s family has already arranged a rigorous treatment plan that will begin as soon as he

completes his period of incarceration. As Dr. Salgado explains in his evaluation, Dr. Salgado has

spoken with the psychiatrist who will treat Wilfrido, .

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II. ARGUMENT

Mr. Hoffmann respectfully requests a sentence of time served, followed by the maximum

period supervised release, three years. There are four grounds supporting this below-Guidelines

sentence: (1) Mr. Hoffmann’s mental and emotional condition pursuant to Section 5H1.3 of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or “Sentencing Guidelines”); (2) Mr. Hoffmann’s

reduced mental capacity pursuant to USSG § 5K2.13; (3) downward departures based upon “other

sentencing considerations” pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0, including the limited resources for treatment

at the Bureau of Prisons, Mr. Hoffmann’s vulnerability to abuse in prison, incremental sentencing

considerations pursuant to United States v. Mishoe, and the harsher effects of the criminal justice process on a citizen than on a non-citizen; and (4) a non-Guidelines sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a).

1. Mental and emotional condition pursuant to §5H1.3

The Sentencing Guidelines recognize that mental and emotional conditions “may be relevant

in determining whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination

with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the

typical cases covered by the guidelines.” USSG § 5H1.3. 3

This provision reflects case law and sentencing data showing that courts have long found

3 This provision represents an evolution in the thinking of the Sentencing Commission andwas implemented by a 2010 amendment. See USSG App. C, Vol III at 348 (Amendment 379). Priorto the amendment, the provision stated that mental and emotional conditions were “not ordinarilyrelevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.” See United States v. Ferguson, 942 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (emphasis added).

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mental impairments to be “inherently mitigating,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285-88 (2004).

The Supreme Court has most fully explored this question in the capital context. In Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court explained that mental impairment is mitigating when it

involves “diminished capacit[y] to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract

from mistakes, and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to

understand the reactions of others.” 536 U.S. at 318. Such limitations, the Court explained, equal

“lesser culpability.” Id. at 319.

The Supreme Court made analogous observations in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),

in which the Court held that juveniles, because of their diminished mental functioning, are alsocategorically not as culpable as adults. Juveniles are different from adults, the Court held, because

they demonstrate “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” which “often

result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” 543 U.S. 55, 569-70 (2005). The Court

further explained:

Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt toright the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with aminor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty isimposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree,

by reason of youth and immaturity.

Id. at 571.

Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct 2455 (2012), the Court continued its

consideration of the role of diminished functioning in assessing appropriate punishment. In that case,

the Court struck down mandatory sentencing laws that do not allow sentencing authorities to consider

that “adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems relating to higher-order

executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance.” Id. at 2465.

Courts have recently recognized the application of these principles in the non-capital context

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and expanded their application from the areas of mental retardation and youth to mental illness. A

District Court considering this question wrote:

Together, the amendments and policy statements [of the Guidelines] reflect the principle that

“punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.”Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed. 2d 256 (1989), abrogatedon other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed. 2d 335(2002). A few “exceptionally” mentally ill defendants may be found incompetent to stand trialor judged not guilty by reason of insanity; however, there also exists a spectrum of mentaldeficits and diseases that lessen, but do not erase, a person’s responsibility for her crimes. SeeJennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration ofIndividuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, Ethical andConstitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to theInsanity Defense, 5 Hous. J. Health & Pol’y 1, 4-5 (2005).

United States v. Ferguson, 942 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1192-1193 (M.D. Ala. 2013).Like the defendants in Atkins, Roper, and Miller, Mr. Hoffmann’s mental illness reduced and

continues to reduce his ability to “understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract

from mistakes, and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to

understand the impulses of others.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).

The guiding principle of these cases is that these deficits matter.

Given the severity of Mr. Hoffmann’s deficits, a downward departure is appropriate in this case.

2. Reduced mental capacity pursuant to § 5K2.13

In this case, at the time he made these phone calls, Mr. Hoffmann was demonstrating the

symptoms of schizophrenia and was not medicated. Psychiatric Evaluation, pg. 3 (provided to the

court under separate cover).

Under Sentencing Guidelines § 5K2.13:

A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the defendant committed

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the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. However the courtmay not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mentalcapacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts andcircumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect the public because theoffense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence; or (3) the defendant’s criminal

history indicates a need to protect the public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of thedeparture should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to thecommission of the offense.

USSG § 5K2.13. In an accompanying Application Note, the Sentencing Commission clarifies that:

For the purpose of this policy statement – “Significantly reduced mental capacity” means thedefendant, although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand thewrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or(B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.

Id. (Commentary, Appl. Note 1).Section 5K2.13 is one of the so-called “encouraged factors” recognized by the Commission.

The “goal of the guidelines is lenity toward defendants whose ability to make reasoned decisions is

impaired.” United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). See also United States v.

Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000)(upholding departure for computer fraud based on defendant’s

compulsive gambling disorder even though there was no direct link between the diminished capacity

and the crime charged); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding departure

where defendant pled guilty to use of firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime and suffered from

post-traumatic stress disorder relating to service in Vietnam war); United States v. Bennett, 9 F.

Supp.2d 513 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (upholding departure where defendant pled guilty to charitable fraud

case).

While Mr. Hoffmann does not describe himself as suffering from active psychosis at the time

of the calls, we know that schizophrenia involves global impairments in functioning. In Mr.

Hoffmann’s case, it severely impairs his ability to process information. He struggles, and was

struggling at the time of these calls, to accurately understand the world around him.

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Given the far reaching nature of his impairments, it is appropriate to understand the calls made in

2012 in the context of his long-standing reduced mental capacity.

3. Other sentencing considerations supporting a departure pursuant to § 5K2.0

(a) The Bureau of Prison’s limited resources for treatment

The facilities run by the Bureau of Prisons are not treatment facilities, and Congress never

intended them to be. As Congress explained in 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), “the Commission shall insure

that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for

the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed . . . medical care.”

On the contrary, the BOP’s resources for treatment are limited. A recent audit by the Office

of the Inspector General reported that at a number of institutions, the BOP “did not provide required

medical services to inmates,” which included failing to monitor inmates with chronic conditions and,

importantly for Mr. Hoffmann, failing to properly monitor inmates for psychotropic medical side

effects. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, The Federal Bureau

of Prison’s Efforts to Manage Inmate Health Care, at 32-34 (2008), available at

www.justice.gov/oig/reports/BOP/a0808/final.pdf.

Unfortunately, the vast

majority of mentally ill inmates at the Bureau of Prisons do not receive therapy. The most recent

report on mental health treatment in the Bureau of Prisons, “Mental Health Problems of Prison and

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Jail Inmates” explains that of those inmates with mental health issues, therapy is received by only

15.1%. Doris James and Lauren Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates, at 9,

Table 14, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.

(b) Vulnerability to abuse in prison

Back when the Guidelines were still mandatory, the Supreme Court upheld a departure based

on a defendant’s susceptibility to abuse in prison. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111-12 (1996),

See also United States v. Mena, 968 F. Supp. 115, 117 (E.D. NY 1997) (departing downward because

a defendant’s intellectual disability “makes him vulnerable to attack while incarcerated”); UnitedStates v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 343 (D.C.C. 1990) (noting that intellectually disabled inmates

“are frequently the victims of [beating] and other types of abuse.”)

Vulnerability to abuse is a significant issue for inmates who suffer from mental illness.

[There is a] growing recognition that treating mentally ill criminal defendants rather thanimprisoning them better serves both the defendants and society. See e.g. United States v.Bannister, 786 F. Supp.2d 617, 656-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)(Weinstein, J.); Policy Topics: TheCriminalization of People with Mental Illness, National Alliance on Mental Illness,http://www.nami.org (last visited February 18, 2013); W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisonersin the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Strategies for ImprovingTreatment and Reducing Recidivism, 24 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 1, 34-37 (2007).Prison is not an appropriate setting for mentally ill defendants to receive treatment, as suchindividuals may be more vulnerable to difficult living conditions and abuse from other

prisoners. Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with mental Illness56, 59 (2003). This is because, “[f]or mentally disordered prisoners, danger lurkseverywhere”:

They tend to have great difficulty coping with the prison code – either they areintimidated by staff into snitching or they are manipulated by other prisoners intodoing things that get them into deep trouble . . . [M]ale and female mentally disordered

prisoners are disproportionately represented among the victims of rape. Manyvoluntarily isolate themselves in their cells in order to avoid trouble. Prisoners whoare clearly psychotic and chronically disturbed are called ‘dings’ and ‘bugs’ by other

prisoners, and victimized. Their anti-psychotic medications slow their reaction times,which makes them more vulnerable to ‘blind siding,’ an attack from the side or from

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behind by another prisoner.

Id. at 56-57 (citation omitted).

United States v. Ferguson, 942 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1193-1194 (M.D. Ala. 2013).

(c) United States v. Mishoe

The Court should depart or vary downward pursuant to United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214,

220 (2d Cir. 2001). As indicated in the PSR, this is Mr. Hoffmann’s first ever arrest and first ever

period of incarceration. Accordingly, a sentence anywhere near the Guidelines range would be

unnecessarily excessive in the context of this specific case. In Mishoe, the Second Circuit stated:

Obviously, a major reason for imposing an especially long sentence upon those who havecommitted prior offenses is to achieve a deterrent effect that the prior punishments failed toachieve. That reason requires an appropriate relationship between the sentence for the currentoffense and the sentences . . . for the prior offenses.

Id. While the Mishoe decision principally addresses the Career Offender Guidelines, the teaching of

that decision applies here. Specifically, the concept of incremental punishment is relevant to the

sentencing goal of deterrence. When an individual has never before been incarcerated, a Guidelines

range recommending 33-41 months is excessive. That is because there is no reason to believe that a

higher sentence would be more effective than a lesser sentence.

(d) The harsher effects of the criminal justice process on a non-citizen than on acitizen

Mr. Hoffmann is a Venezuelan citizen and he will return to Venezuela at the end of his

sentence. He will never be permitted to return to the United States. Because he is not a United States

citizen, the process has necessarily been harsher for him than it would have been on a United States

citizen.

First, if he were a United States citizen, he could have sought treatment in the community

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while he case was pending, especially given that he has no prior criminal record. As described above,

Mr. Hoffmann became very ill while incarcerated at Wyatt Detention Center. He developed full

blown psychosis. If his immigration status had been otherwise, other treatment options may have

been possible.

Second, although he is statutorily eligible for a sentence of probation, home confinement or

community confinement, none of those options is available for Mr. Hoffmann in light of his alienage

status.

Third, should Mr. Hoffmann enter ICE custody, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) will not treat

ICE administrative detention as “official detention as a result of the offense for which the sentencewas imposed” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) in order to receive credit toward a sentence. The

Second Circuit has recognized the appropriateness of a downward departure to account for time spent

in custody for which a defendant will receive no credit. United States v. Ogbondah, 16 F.3d 498,

500-01 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Montez-Gaviria , 163 F.3d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).

Importantly, the Court cannot simply direct BOP to accord credit starting on the date of ICE

administrative detention; the only way to accord such credit is to reduce the time imposed itself.

Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d at 700-01. Here, Should Mr. Hoffmann be transferred to ICE custody

following his sentence, he will receive no credit for time spent in administrative custody following

completion of his sentence. 4 The Federal Defender Office has followed recent illegal reentry cases

4 In Ogbondah and Montez-Gaviria, the court permitted a departure for time spent inadministrative custody prior to imposition of a defendant’s sentence, not for the time anticipated to

be spent in administrative custody following release from one’s federal sentence. Whether framedas a departure or a non-Guidelines sentence, the Court should extend the same principle to the timeanticipated to be spent in administrative detention following release from BOP custody. This Courthas previously considered anticipated time to be spent in pre-deportation custody as relevant

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for the purpose of tracking how many days elapse from the date of release to the conclusion of a

federal sentence to the date of deportation. In six recent cases, the length of time that elapsed was 76

days, 58 days, 36 days, 38 days, 30 days, and 22 days. 5 This is true in spite of the fact that the

government often estimates the process takes 15 days or less. Thus, as a result of Mr. Hoffmann’s

immigration status, he could end up spending one to two extra months in administrative detention for

which he will receive no credit toward his sentence.

Fourth, Mr. Hoffmann’s alienage will affect his security level, so that he will serve any further

period of incarceration in a Federal Correctional Institution rather than a minimum security Federal

Prison Camp. In addition, he will not be eligible for a halfway house placement during the last 10%of his incarceration because aliens do not qualify for such placements. See United States v. Navarro-

Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588-89 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding case for re-sentencing post-Booker where

district court noted at sentencing that cases “involving defendants who will be deported result, in

effect, in harsher time because they are not eligible for halfway house placement . . . So this defendant

will be serving six months longer in an institution than someone who is an American citizen”).

sentencing considerations. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel Antonio Contreras Martinez,3:12cr126 (SDU), Judgment doc #34 (imposing non-Guidelines sentence in part based upon “thetime that Contreras will spend in pre-deportation detention will likely make up the difference

between the sentence imposed and a Guidelines sentence”).

5 See, e.g., United States v. David Humberto Sanhueza Arancibia, 3:12cr29(SRU)(deportation to Chile); United States v. Marino Avalo, 3:10cr180(RNC) (deportation to DominicanRepublic); United States v. José Uriel Acevedo Alfaro , 3:11cr130(JBA) (deportation to ElSalvador); United States v. Jignesh Patel, 3:12cr114(SRU) (deportation to India); United States v.Oscar Cuapio-Rodriguez, 3:12cr254(JCH) (deportation to Mexico); United States v. ErnestoSulugui-Ajcalon, 3:13cr122(JBA) (deportation to Guatemala).

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The combination of these circumstances suggests that any sentence imposed upon

Mr. Hoffmann will be harsher than would be felt on a citizen. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d

649, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that “a downward departure may be appropriate where the

defendant’s status as a deportable alien is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity of his

sentence”).

4. Grounds for a Non-Guidelines Sentence

Here, there is a confluence of factors that mandates a below-Guidelines sentence, including

Mr. Hoffmann’s lack of any criminal history, the 18 months of compliance with the law between the

time of the offense and the time of Mr. Hoffmann’s arrest, as well as his mental illness, current

compliance with treatment, and his treatment plan in Venezuela.

As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137 (2d Cir.

2006), if a Court believes a lower sentence will be as effective as a higher sentence in serving the

purposes of sentencing, it must choose the lower sentence. Id. at 142 (holding that where a Guidelines

sentence is “in equipoise with [a] below-the-range sentence,” the parsimony clause requires

imposition of the lower sentence.)

Turning to the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence of time served, with the maximum

period of supervised release is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to punish Mr. Hoffmann.

The sentence as a whole would be the longest sentence ever served by Mr. Hoffmann. The custodial

portion of the sentence already served has been extremely punitive for Mr. Hoffmann, given his lack

of prior incarceration, his remoteness from his home and family, and the impact of incarceration on

his mental illness.

As for specific deterrence, Mr. Hoffmann has been specifically deterred. He was arrested in

a foreign country, held in a foreign jail, and suffered a severe deterioration of his mental health

It is clear that for Mr. Hoffmann incarceration was a punishment

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different in kind and in degree that suffered by other inmates. Furthermore, even before his arrest, he

had ceased the conduct at issue in this case. The conduct occurred on one day only, and did not

continue during the 18 months between the day of his offense and the day of his arrest.

Most importantly, although Mr. Hoffmann cannot be monitored in this country because he isnot permitted to reside here, there is every indication that he will be closely monitored in Venezuela.

He is committed to taking his medication. His family is committed to him continuing to take his

medication. A treatment plan has already been established for him in Venezuela. After he serves his

period of incarceration, he will return to Venezuela and never be permitted to re-enter the United

States. The fact that he cannot be subject to monitoring by probation in this country, because he is

not allowed to remain here, should not be a reason to prolong his incarceration.

As for the seriousness of the offense, general deterrence, and just punishment, anyone

observing what has happened to Mr. Hoffmann will understand that threatening phone calls will be

met with the most severe consequences. Although Mr. Hoffmann made the calls from a foreign

country, he was identified. Although Mr. Hoffmann never intentionally traveled to Connecticut, he

was arrested and brought to court in Connecticut. He has been held in jail in the United States for

over seven months; by the date of his sentencing, it will be close to eight months. The punishment

has been severe. Moreover, Mr. Hoffmann’s impairments are relevant to the notion of “just punishment.” His higher-order executive functioning, the concern of the Supreme Court in Roper, is

simply not that of a person without severe mental illness.

The last statutory factor, the goal of rehabilitation, will be also met by a sentence of time

served and three years of supervised release. Mr. Hoffman has already cooperated with treatment at

Wyatt. He is currently compliant with his medication. The proposed sentence will enable him to

return to Venezuela to a treatment plan that has been assessed by Dr. Salgado and found to be

clinically appropriate and which will allow Mr. Hoffmann to continue to progress in treatment. A

further jail sentence will actually prevent him from receiving the therapy that is indicated at this stage

in his rehabilitation. Furthermore, a sentence of time served would allow him to return to Venezuela

in the custody of his parents, who will act as custodians, and prevent his transfer into immigration17



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custody. For someone with his treatment needs, transfer between detention facilities raises the specter

of inadequate attention to his medication regimen

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hoffmann respectfully requests that the Court sentence him to

time served, followed by the maximum period of supervised release.

THE DEFENDANT,Wilfrido Anibal Cardenas Hoffmann

FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE

Dated: January 30, 2015 /s/ Jennifer MellonJennifer MellonAssistant Federal Defender 265 Church Street, Suite 702

New Haven, CT 06510Phone: (203) 498-4200

Bar no.: ct27235Email: [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 30, 2015, a copy of the foregoing Defendant’sMemorandum in Aid of Sentencing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all

parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept

electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing throughthe Court’s CM/ECF System.

/s/ Jennifer MellonJennifer Mellon

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