what's in a symbol? emerging parties and anti-corruption symbols

What’s in a Symbol?

Emerging Parties and Anti-Corruption Symbols in

Indonesia’s 2014 National Legislative Election

Campaigns

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Elisabeth Anne Kramer

Department of Indonesian Studies

The University of Sydney

2015

This thesis is my own original work. It contains no material previously published or written by

another person except where due reference is made in the text. Clearance was obtained from the

University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee for the project.

Signed …………………………………………………………………….

TableofContentsAbbreviations..............................................................................................................................................ii

Anoteoncurrency...................................................................................................................................v

AnoteonIndonesianterms................................................................................................................v

Abstract.........................................................................................................................................................vi

Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................viii

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................x

Indonesia’spoliticalsystem...................................................................................................5

Emergingpoliticalparties.......................................................................................................7

Emergingpartiesandthe2014elections......................................................................10

Methodology..............................................................................................................................14

Limitations.................................................................................................................................19

Outlineofthesis.......................................................................................................................20

1.Politicalsymbols,campaignsandcorruption...................................................................25

Symbols.......................................................................................................................................27

Symbolsincampaigns.......................................................................................................29

Developinganarrative......................................................................................................32

Symboldiffusionacrossscales...........................................................................................36

Why(anti)corruptionsymbols?........................................................................................40

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................44

2.Tracingthehistoryofanti‐corruption..................................................................................47

AfterIndependence................................................................................................................48

DefendingGuidedDemocracy.......................................................................................54

TheNewOrder.........................................................................................................................56

CorruptionandthefallofSuharto...............................................................................64

Reformasi....................................................................................................................................70

Presidentialpressures......................................................................................................71

TheriseofYudhoyono......................................................................................................76

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................78

3.Politicsandcorruption,2009–2014.......................................................................................81

The2004and2009elections.............................................................................................81

Anunstablecoalition.........................................................................................................85

Corruptionandanti‐corruptionaspoliticalthemes.................................................86

AttacksontheKPK.............................................................................................................87

Centurygate...........................................................................................................................90

Thedrivingsimulatorprocurementcase..................................................................93

ThecaseofGayus.................................................................................................................95

Thetravellers’chequescandal.......................................................................................96

CorruptionintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcise.........................97

Corruptioninlocalgovernment....................................................................................98

ThefalloftheDemocrats..................................................................................................99

ThefallofPKS.....................................................................................................................102

CorruptionintheConstitutionalCourt....................................................................104

Publicopinion.........................................................................................................................106

Conclusion................................................................................................................................111

4.Emergingpartiesandcampaigningoncorruption......................................................113

Theanti‐corruptionstrategy............................................................................................114

Creatingandmobilizingthesymbol..............................................................................117

Partypublications.............................................................................................................118

Partyleaders.......................................................................................................................121

Partiesinthemedia.........................................................................................................124

Parties’OnlinePresence................................................................................................129

Conclusion................................................................................................................................135

5.Candidatesonthecampaigntrail..........................................................................................137

Hanura,EastJava...................................................................................................................139

Nasdem,SouthSulawesi.....................................................................................................151

Gerindra,NorthSumatra....................................................................................................158

Intra‐partyrelationships....................................................................................................166

Conclusion................................................................................................................................169

6.Asuccessfulstrategy?...................................................................................................................173

Justifyingtheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbol.......................................................173

Salientandprimed...........................................................................................................175

Theartofpersuasion......................................................................................................176

Candidatesmatter............................................................................................................180

Diffusionofsymbols.............................................................................................................183

Mixedmessages.....................................................................................................................188

Conclusion................................................................................................................................193

Conclusion...............................................................................................................................................195

Appendices................................................................................................................................................200

Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................203

ListofFigures

Figure6.1..................................................................................................................................................182

ListofTables

Table3.1......................................................................................................................................................84

Table3.2....................................................................................................................................................108

Table3.3....................................................................................................................................................109

Table6.1....................................................................................................................................................184

ii

Abbreviations

ABRI

Bawaslu

AngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia(ArmedForcesofIndonesia)

BadanPengawasPemilu(ElectoralSupervisoryBoard)

BNN BadanNarkotikaNasional(NationalNarcoticsAgency)

BPK

Bulog

CSIS

Dapil

BadanPemeriksaKeuangan(NationalAuditAgency)

BadanUrusanLogistik(StateLogisticsAgency)

CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Indonesia

DaerahPemilihan(Constituency)

DKIJakarta DaerahKhususIbukotaJakarta(SpecialCapitalRegionofJakarta)

DPD

DPRI

DPRII

DewanPerwakilanDaerah(RegionalRepresentativeCouncil)

DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatpropinsi,(RegionalPeople’s

RepresentativeCouncil,provinciallevel)

DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatkapubaten/kota,(Regional

People’sRepresentativeCouncil,regencyorcitylevel)

DPR‐RI DewanPerwakilanRakyat‐RepublicIndonesia(NationalPeople’s

RepresentativeCouncil)

G30S Gerakan30September(30SeptemberMovement)

Gerindra

Golkar

Golput

Hanura

HKTI

HMI

PartaiGerakanIndonesiaRaya(GreatIndonesiaMovementParty)

GolonganKarya(PartyofFunctionalGroups)

GolonganPutih(‘WhiteGroup’orpeoplewhochosenottovotein

elections)

PartaiHatiNuraniRakyat(People’sConscienceParty)

HimpuanKerukunanTaniIndonesia(IndonesianFarmer’s

Association)

HimpuanMahasiswaIslam(MuslimStudents’Association)

ICMI

ICS

ICW

IkatanCendekiawanMuslimIndonesia(AssociationofIndonesian

MuslimIntellectuals)

IndonesiaSurveyCenter

IndonesianCorruptionWatch

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

INES IndonesianNetworkElectionSurvey

KKN Korupsi,KolusidanNepotisme(Corruption,CollusionandNepotism)

Kopassus KomandoPasukanKhusus(IndonesianSpecialForces)

KPK KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi(CorruptionEradicationCommission)

iii

KPKPN

KPU

KomisiPemeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara(Commissionto

ExaminetheWealthofStateOfficials)

KomisiPemilihanUmum(GeneralElectionCommission)

LIPI

LSI

LSN

LembagaIlmuPengetahuanIndonesia(IndonesianInstituteofSocial

Science)

LembagaSurveyIndonesia(IndonesiaSurveyInstitute)

LembagaSurveiNasional(NationalSurveyInstitute)

Malari MalapetakaLimabelasJanuari(15JanuaryIncident)

MPR MajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat(People’sConsultativeAssembly)

MUI

Nasdem

MajelisUlamaIndonesia(IndonesianCouncilofIslamicScholars)

PartaiNasdem(NationalDemocraticParty)

NGO Non‐GovernmentalOrganization

NU NahdlatulUlama

OPSTIB OperasiTertib(OperationtoImproveOrder)

PAN PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty)

PDI PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty)

PDIP

PEKUNEG

Perludem

Pemilu

Pertamina

PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(IndonesianDemocratic

PartyofStruggle)

TimPenerbitanKeuanganNegara(TeamtoRegularizeState

Finances)

RumahPemiluuntukDemokrasi(ElectionHouseforDemocracy)

PemilihanUmum(GeneralElection)

PerusahaanPertambanganMinyakdanGasBumiNegara(StateOil

andNaturalGasMiningCompany)

PKB PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty)

PKI

PKK

PartaiKomunisIndonesia(IndonesianCommunistParty)

PembinaanKesejahteraanKeluarga(FamilyWelfareDevelopment)

PKS

PNI

PPATK

PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(ProsperousJusticeParty)

PartaiNasionalisIndonesia(IndonesianNationalistParty)

PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan(Centrefor

FinancialTransactionReportsandAnalysis)

PPP

PRD

PartaiPersatuanPembangunan(UnitedDevelopmentParty)

PartaiRakyatDemokratis(DemocraticPeople’sParty)

PSI PartaiSosialisIndonesia(IndonesianSocialistParty)

PUKAT UniversitasGadjahMadaPusatKajianAnti‐Korupsi(Universityof

GadjahMadaCenterforAnti‐CorruptionStudies)

iv

Rp

SMRC

TGPTPK

TII

TimTastipikor

Rupiah(Indonesiancurrency)

SaifulMujaniResearchandConsulting

TimGabunganPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi(JointTeamto

EradicatetheCrimeofCorruption)

TransparencyInternationalIndonesia

TimKoordinasiPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi,(Coordination

TeamfortheEradicationoftheCrimeofCorruption)

Tipikor

TPK

PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi(Anti‐CorruptionCourts)

TimPemberantasanKorupsi(Anti‐CorruptionTeam)

UNDP

USD

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UnitedStatesDollar

v

AnoteoncurrencyMonetaryamountsthroughoutthisthesishavebeengiveninRupiah(Rp.),

Indonesia’snationalcurrency.Therearesomeexceptionswhensourcematerial

providestheamountinUSdollars(USD)only,especiallyforsourceswrittenduring

theOldOrderperiod(1949–1965).Inthehistoricalsectionsofthisthesis,this

amountisgiveninRupiahandUSdollars(wherepossible),inordertoreflectthe

real‐timevalueofthecurrency.

ForsectionsdiscussingIndonesiaintheReformasiperiod(1998–),amountsaregiven

inRupiahonly.However,thisthesisacknowledgesthattherewascurrency

fluctuationduringthistime.Between1998andthetimeofwriting,theRupiah

peakedatRp.6,758.42toUSD1inJuly1999anddippedtoalowofRp.12,023.3to

USD1inJanuary2014.Historicalconversionscanbemadeusingforeignexchange

informationfoundatOANDA(www.oanda.com).Allmonetaryconversionsinthis

thesisareapproximations.

AnoteonIndonesiantermsWhereappropriate,keyIndonesiantermsforspecificphenomenadiscussedinthis

thesisaregivenbothinEnglishandIndonesianlanguage.

Whererelevant,theshortnamesforindividualsusedthroughoutthethesisarebased

onthenamescommonlyusedbyIndonesiansthemselves.Thiscanbetheperson’s

firstname,familynameoraportmanteau(forexampleJokoWidodoiscommonly

knownas‘Jokowi’).

AnystudyofIndonesiapoliticsorhistoryissuretobefullofacronymsand

portmanteau,whicharecommonlyusedinIndonesia,especially(butnotexclusively)

inspokenlanguage.Thisthesishasgiventhefullnameofanyorganizationorterm

followedbyanycommonacronymorportmanteauinbrackets.Afulllistof

Indonesianacronymsusedthroughoutcanbefoundatthebeginningofthethesis.

vi

AbstractThisthesisexplorestheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsduringIndonesia’s2014

legislativeelectionsfromanationalpartyandindividualcandidateperspective.Anti‐

corruptionhaslongbeenapoliticalissueinIndonesia,andtheentrenchednatureof

associatedrhetoricfacilitatestheongoingemphasisonanti‐corruptionsymbols.

However,recenthistoryandtheperceivedmisuseofsuchsymbolsbysomepolitical

partiesmeantthatmobilizingthemcarriedrisksin2014.Thisstudyaddressestwo

keyempiricalquestions:whywereanti‐corruptionsymbolsadoptedbyemerging

partiesandtheircandidates,andhowwerethesesymbolsused?Examiningthese

questionsallowsustoconsiderabroaderparadoxinIndonesia;thatwhileanti‐

corruptionrhetoricisprominent,sotooiscorruption—includingmoneypoliticsand

vote‐buyingduringpoliticalcampaigns.

Theoretically,thethesisspeakstotheliteratureonelectoralcampaignsandthe

diffusionofideasacrossscales,drawingonEdelman’sconceptualizationofpolitical

symbolsassignifiersofmoralityandaspirationthatareultimatelyintendedtosway

audiencesinordertogainpower.Apoliticalsymbolcomesintobeingwhenparties

attempttobindthemselvestoparticulardiscoursesorideasinordertowinfavour

withvoters.Theconceptofthesymbol,whetheritiseffectiveorweak,isbasedon

howsuccessfulpartiesareintheirattemptstobecomesynonymouswithaparticular

cause,withthisanalysisfocusedparticularlyontheanti‐corruptionsymbol.The

applicationofEdelman’stheoryofsymbolicpoliticstotheIndonesiancaseprovides

anopportunitytoextendtheoreticaldiscussionsoftheuseofsymbolsastoolsof

persuasionduringelections.Theincorporationofdiffusiontheorytointerpretthe

parametersandconstraintsofcampaigningrepresentsanoriginalapproachtothe

studyofelectoralcampaigns,notjustinIndonesiabutmorewidely.Thecombination

ofthesetheoreticalframeworkspresentsaninnovativewayofunderstanding

enduringquestionsregardingcoexisting,yetcontradictory,politicalphenomenain

Indonesia.

Focusingoncasestudiesfromthreedifferentemergingparties,thisthesisfindsthat

theuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsvariedconsiderablybetweenthenationallevel

andthecandidates,evenifthesymbolsadoptedwereostensiblythesame.Parties’

executivecommitteesembracedanti‐corruptionsymbolsbecausetheybelieved

voterswouldrespondfavourablytothem,inspiteoftheinherenthazardsinvolved.

However,candidatesexercisegreatautonomyintheconstructionoftheirpersonal

vii

campaigns,andcouldchoosetofolloworignoretheirparty’santi‐corruption

symbol.Inthecasesexaminedhere,theextenttowhichthesymbolwasadopted

dependedheavilyonacandidate’spersonalhistory,throughwhich

personal‘ownership’oftheissuewasestablished.Thenatureofintra‐partyrelations

andtraditionalcampaigntechniquesinIndonesiareinforcedtheseintrinsically

differentcampaignarenas,oftenreferredtocolloquiallyasthe‘aircampaign’

(nationallevel)and‘groundcampaign’(candidatelevel).Giventhedifferent

audiencesandinteractionswithvotersineacharena,therewasscopefordiscrepancy

eventhoughnationalpartycommitteesandindividualcandidatesessentiallyshared

thesamegoalofwantingtomaximizevotes.

Thethesisarguesthatthedisconnectthatexistsbetweentheanti‐corruptionsymbol

constructedinnationalcampaignsandlocalpracticeisinherentlylinkedtothe

simultaneousprominenceofanti‐corruptionrhetoricandmoneypoliticsin

campaigns.Atthesametimethatpartiescompetetobeseenasthe‘cleanest’,

individualcandidatesarepressuredtobuyvotes,knowingthatitmaybetheirbest

chanceforsuccess.Theincongruitybetweenwhathappensindifferentcampaign

arenasnotonlydemonstratesthefragmentednatureofpoliticalparties,butalso

confirmsthatthevaluesanddecisionsofcandidatesplayacrucialroleinthe

perpetuationofmoneypolitics.Thisfindingchallengesthenormativeassumption

thatpoliticalpartiesaresingle,coherententitiesandadvancesanewwayof

understandingtherelationshipsbetweenanti‐corruptionrhetoricandelection

campaignoutcomesforIndonesia’semergingparties.

viii

Acknowledgments

ThankyoutoMicheleFordwhoguidedmewhilegivingmethespaceandsupportto

undertakethisprojectinmyownway.IamalsogratefultoSimonButtforhis

valuablecommentsondraftchapters.

ThankyoutoallmyintervieweesandfellowIndonesianpoliticsenthusiastsfor

helpingmepiecetogetherthispictureandespeciallytomythreecasestudy

candidateswhosharedtheirexperiencessogenerously.

Finally,thankyoutoeveryonewhoprovidedmewithencouragement,assistanceand

amusementoverthepastfewyears.IsuspectmostofyouwillnotreadthisthesissoI

willbesuretothankyouinperson.

1

Introduction

Apositiveimageisidentifiedasparamountforwinningpoliticaloffice,especially

whenpartyloyaltyislowamongstcitizens(CatterbergandMoreno2006;

Mainwaring1998:71;Rose1994),asitoftenisinyoungdemocraciessuchas

Indonesia.Investigatinghowintra‐partyrelationsandlocalcontextaffectdecision‐

makinginpoliticalcampaignsshedslightonthedevelopmentofthisimageandhave

beenidentifiedasimportantrealmsforresearch(Farrell2006:130;Rohrschneider

2002).Tofurtherexplorehowtheserelationshipsplayoutinthecontextofanational

electionand,inturn,influencepartyimage,thisthesisexplorestheuseofanti‐

corruptionsymbolsintheIndonesiannationalparliamentaryelectionsof2014.

Focusingonthepoliticalcampaignsofthreeemergingparties,itinvestigateshow

thesepartiesattemptedtoownanti‐corruptionissuesanddevelopapoliticalsymbol

thatcouldbedisseminatednationallyandbyindividualcandidates.Emergingparties

provideasuitablefocusastheirpre‐existingreputationisnotasentrenchedasthose

ofolderparties,andthereforethe2014campaignspotentiallyhadamoresignificant

impactinshapingpublicopiniontowardsthem.

ThereexistsaparadoxinIndonesia:althoughcorruptionseemsanormalpartof

politicaldealings—bothforgovernmentdecision‐makingprocessesandduring

electoralcampaigns—anti‐corruptionsentimentisalsopervasive.Politicalactorsin

Indonesiahavelongusedcorruptionasapoliticaltoolintheirattemptstocompete

forandpreservepower.Inaddition,itiseasiertocampaignonissueswithwhich

votersidentifyaspartoftheirdailylife,ratherthanonissuesthatmustbesupplied

andexplained(Popkin1991:101).Thereisnoneedtoexplainthatcorruptionisa

probleminIndonesiaasthereisalreadyawidespreadpublicperceptionthat

corruptionisrampantandneedstobequelled.Asaresult,severalpoliticalactors

believethatcreatinganidentitywhichissynonymouswiththefightagainst

corruptionwillboosttheirpopularity.Theuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsin

Indonesianelectioncampaigns,includinginthenationallegislativeelectionsof2014,

isthereforepredictable.

Partiesdonotneedtoconvincevotersthatcombatingcorruptionshouldbeanational

priority;thisisseeminglyself‐evident.However,theuseofanti‐corruption

symbolismcanstillbeperilous.Ifapartypromotesitselfascleanandcorruption‐free,

itrisksbeingbrandedashypocriticalifanyofitsmembersarelaterfoundguiltyof

2

corruption.Duringthe2009‐2014parliamentaryterm,severalpartieswerepilloried

forthisreason,revealingthedangersinherentinthestrategy.But,judgingbythe

attemptsofpartiestoalignthemselveswiththeanti‐corruptionagendathatwas

prominentin2014,manypartiesdidnotdeemtheseriskstobeseriousenoughtoshy

awayfromexploitinganti‐corruptionsentiment.Theaimwasnotonlytoconvince

votersthattheywerecommittedtoeradicatingcorruption,butthattheyweremore

committedthantheirrivals.

Thisstudyexaminestheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsforcampaignpurposes,

drawinguponconceptualizationsfirstpioneeredbyAmericanpoliticalscientist

MurrayEdelman.Edelman(1964;1971)describespoliticalinteractionsassymbolicin

termsofboththeritualsassociatedwithpublicproceduresandintheuseofrhetoric

toinfluencethepublic.1Edelman(1988:12)arguesthatsocialproblemsareexploited

bypoliticians,whousethemassymbolsthatactas:

reinforcementsofideologies,notsimplybecausetheyarethereorbecause

theyareimportantforwellbeing.Theysignifywhoarevirtuousanduseful

andwhoaredangerousorinadequate,whichactionswillberewardedand

whichpenalized.Theyconstitutepeopleassubjectswithparticularkindsof

aspirations,self‐concepts,andfears,andtheycreatebeliefsabouttherelative

importanceofeventsandobjects.Theyarecriticalindeterminingwho

exercisesauthorityandwhoacceptsit.

Well‐chosenpoliticalsymbolscanevokeemotionsandtriggerastrongpersonal

responseinfavourofthepoliticalpartyorcandidateusingthatsymbol(Popkin1991:

102;RabinowitzandMacdonald1989:94).Edelman’sworkonpoliticalsymbols

inspiredarangeofsubsequentstudiestheorizinghowthepublicareaffectedbythe

ritualsandrhetoricofpolitics.Edelman’sframeworkprovidedafoundationfor

investigatingthedevelopmentandsignificanceofsymbolsinelectoralcampaigns.In

particular,thetheoryofpoliticalsymbolismhasinspiredideasof‘issueownership’—

thatis,howcandidatesestablishapositiveassociationwithspecificpoliticalissuesin

themindsofvoters—incampaigns(BélangerandMeguid2008;Druckmanetal.

2004;Petrocik1996;vanderBrug2004)and‘directionalvoting’,relatingtohow

1Forexample,Edelman(1964:3)arguesthatelectionsthemselvescanbeunderstoodasasymbolicritualbecausealthoughtheygivecitizens‘achancetoexpressdiscontentsandenthusiasms,toenjoyasenseofinvolvement…onlyinaminordegreeisitparticipationinpolicyformation’.

3

votersdecidewhotoselect(RabinowitzandMacdonald1989).2Whilesomeofhis

conclusionswerescornedfortheircynicism—particularlyclaimsregardingthe

futilityofindividualactionsandthedifficultiescitizensfaceinavoidingmanipulation

bypoliticalelites—thefundamentalpremiseofhisworkcontinuestoresonatetoday.3

Edelman’sapproachtopoliticalsymbolismalsoallowustounderstandcampaigning

onanti‐corruptionissuesasanattempttoalignwiththesymbol’sbroaderfigurative

implications:tobe‘anti‐corruption’istosubscribetoawholerangeof‘public‐service

related’valuessuchastrust,honesty,humanity,equityandresponsibility;themoral

‘non‐negotiables’(Collins2012:6).Consequently,establishingananti‐corruption

symbolspeakstoa(declared)commitmenttoeradicatingcorruptionwhilealso

portrayingthepartyasarepresentativeofwhatisgoodandmorallyright.Morever,

thistheoryalsopositsthatwhilepoliticalsymbolsaimtoconjurepositive

associationsintheminds’ofcitizens,theyareessentiallyconstructedforthepurpose

ofacquiringand/ormaintainingpower.4Anappreciationofthecontextinwhich

politicalsymbolsareusedisessentialtorealizethisdesireforpoweras‘eventhe

mosttranscendentalimagesoccurinparticularsocialandontologicalspaces,facing

audiences,makinguseofperformersandtheirskills,presupposingcertain

assumptionsabouthowactionsoccurandwhatsortsofbeingsinhabittheworld,and

requiringeconomicandsocialresources’(Keane1997:11).Furthermore,asKeane

(1997:19)argues,themereactofselectingaparticularsymbolreflectsourown

understandingoftheexistingcontextbecausetheabilityofsymbolstoinfluence

2Particularlyrelevanttothisthesisarestudiesthatexaminehowcitizensareinfluencedbypoliticalcampaigns,whichwillbeelaborateduponinChapterOne.Additionally,thereareanumberofotheracademicrealmsinwhichEdelman’sworkhasplayedacrucialrole,forexample,thepersuasiveroleofthemedia(Chadwick2001;Cottle2006;EntmanandRojecki1993),theuseofpoliticalspectacleintheAmericaneducationsystem(Smithetal.2004),thepoliticalusesofsymbolicwomen(Sapiro1993)andtherhetoricofmoralprotestsandpubliccampaigns(Lahusen1996).3EdelmandrewlargelyonMarxistideasandwasconsequentlyoutoffavourwithmanyacademicsworkingintheUnitedStatesinthe1960sand1970s(Bennett2005:354;DeCanio2005:399).Hisworkwasaccusedofbecomingincreasinglypessimistic,culminatinginasharplycynicalargumentinhisbooks,ConstructingthePoliticalSpectacle(1988)andThePoliticsofMisinformation(2001),whichbothpositedthatexistingdemocraticsystemshadfailedbecausecitizenswereinthegripofmanipulativepoliticaleliteswhoseprimaryinterestwastomaintainpower(Bennett2005:354).Hisworkhasalsobeencriticizedforbeingoverlydeterministicregardingthepsychologyofthemassesashemakesanumberofgeneralizationsaboutvoterbehaviourandtheiroverallinteractionswithpoliticalideas(Fenster2005).OthercritiquesofEdelman’sworkinclude:KrausandGiles(1989),Sapiro(1993),andEwickandSarat(2004).4ForthepurposesofthisthesisitisimportanttonotethatEdelman’sworkdidnotcentreonthemanipulationofsymbolsbyelites,butratheronhowtheuseofsymbolsaffectsthepsychologyofthemasses,usuallytotheextentthatitproducesquiescence(Sapiro1993:142).

4

stemsfromthewaythatpeopleassociatethemwithactionsandobjectsintheirown

lives.

Thisthesisalsousesthestudyofanti‐corruptionsymbolstoexploredeeperissuesof

scalarinfluence,diffusionandpartycohesion,representingastartingpointfor

understandinghowpoliticalcampaignsinIndonesiaareimaginedandexecutedat

differentscalesandtheintra‐partyinteractionandsynergy(ifany)thatoccurs.

Examiningthescalardimensionsofpoliticalcampaignschallengesatendencyinthe

literaturetotalkaboutpoliticalpartiesasmonolithicentitieswheninfacttheyare

complexinstitutionscomprisedofsubunits,internalsystemsandconflicts(Sartori

1976:71).5Redressingthenormativeconstructofpartiesasmoreorlesssingular

units,thisthesisexaminestherelationshipbetweennationaldiscourseandindividual

campaignstrategyinemergingpoliticalparties,notingHicken’s(2009:5)assertion

thatpoliticalpartiesoffercandidatesa‘brandname’andeconomiesofscalethrough

intra‐partycoordinationunderthecommongoalofpartypromotion.Thisstudy

investigateshowthesymbolofanti‐corruptionwasconceptualizedatnationaland

locallevels,hownationalleveldiscourseinfluencedwhatwassaidanddoneinthe

localcampaignsofparticularcandidates,andwhatotherinfluencescandidateshadto

consider.

Thisthesisfocusesonfourresearchquestions:

1. Howdidemergingpoliticalpartiesjustifyusingananti‐corruptionsymbolin

theircampaigns?

2. Howdidtheyconstructtheiranti‐corruptionsymbol?

3. Howdidtheydeliverandsellthesymboltovoters?

4. Whatwerethedifferencesbetweentheconceptualizationandthedeliveryof

theanti‐corruptionsymbolatthenationallevelandthelocallevel?

Eachofthesequestionsprovidesabasisforanalysingthedesignandexecutionofthe

2014electoralcampaignandunderstandingtheprominentuseofthisparticular

symbolbyemergingparties.Inaddressingthesequestions,thisstudyfoundthatthe

uniquefeaturesofacountry’shistory,electorallaws,mediasystems,andpolitical

partiesinfluencehowcampaignsareconceptualizedandimplemented(Bowlerand

5Kitschelt(1989:400‐401)contendsthatacademicstudiesoftenconceptualizepoliticalpartiesas‘highlystatic’intermsoftheirbehaviourandthatthereisalackofstudiesinvestigatingtheinternalworkingofparties.MorerecentstudiesthatmakeasimilarpointincludeDeschouwer(2003)andFabre(2011).

5

Farrell1992b:7‐8).Furthermore,individualcandidateshadagreatdealofautonomy

intheselectionanddevelopmentoftheirpersonalcampaignsymbols.Asaresult,

whiletheirpersonalsymbolssometimesalignedwiththoseoftheparty,atother

timespartysymbolswerereimaginedorevenignored,dependingonhow

determinedthecandidatesweretoestablishananti‐corruptionsymbol.Thiswas,in

turn,influencedbytheirbackgrounds,localcircumstancesandvoters’demands.

Althoughpartiesandtheircandidatesostensiblysharedthesamegoals—towinthe

election—thenatureoftheIndonesianpartysystemandcandidaterecruitment

accountedformuchoftheincongruencebetweennationalandindividualcampaigns.

Indonesia’spoliticalsystem

TheIndonesiannationalparliament,knownasthePeople’sConsultativeAssembly

(MajelisPermusyawaratanRakyat,MPR),iscomprisedoftheelectedrepresentatives

fromdifferentelectorates,formingthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil(Dewan

PerwakilanRakyatRepublikIndonesia,DPR‐RI),andprovincialrepresentatives,

whichcomprisetheRegionalRepresentativeCouncil(DewanPerwakilanDaerah,

DPD).TheDPR‐RIhas560seatsandtheDPDhas132seats.DPR‐RIcandidatesmust

benominatedbyanapprovedpoliticalparty,whileDPDcandidatesarenotrequired

tohaveapartyaffiliation(thoughmanydo).Inadditiontothenationallevel

parliament,Indonesiansalsovoteforlegislativerepresentativesfortheprovincial

(DewanPerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatpropinsi,DPRDI)anddistrict(Dewan

PerwakilanRakyatDaerahtingkatkapubaten/kota,DPRDII)legislatures.6Elections

forallthesepositionsoccurredsimultaneouslyon9April2014.Theresultswere

verifiedbytheGeneralElectionCommission(KomisiPemilihanUmum,KPU)and

officialtallieswerereleasedon9May2014.

Electoralsystemsthemselvesoftenpresentbarriersfornewparties(Berrington

1985:446),andthisholdstrueinIndonesia.Politicalpartiesmustmeetanumberof

eligibilityrequirementstocompeteinIndonesia’snationalelections.Theymusthave

aregionalofficeineachprovince,aswellasapermanentofficein75percentof

provinces,districtsormunicipalitiesandachapterinatleasthalfofeachofthesub‐

districts,answeringtoapermanentoffice(thoughthesechaptersdonotneedtobe

permanent).Theymustalsohaveatleast1000officialmembers.7TheKPUmakesthe

6ForacomprehensiveoutlineofthenationalparliamentarystructureseeDPR‐RI(2014a).7TheprovinceofAcehisanexceptiontotheserequirementsaslocalpartiesarepermittedtocompeteunderthespecialautonomyagreementwiththecentralgovernment.SeeHillman(2012)forfurtherdetails.

6

finaldeterminationastowhetherpartieshavemettheserequirements.Partiesmust

alsopassathresholdofatleast3.5percentofvotesinordertoassumetheirplacein

theparliament.8Formingapartythatmeetsalltheserequirementstakestime,money

andresources,nottomentionongoingcostsoncethepartyhasbeenvalidated.

TheDPR‐RIcandidatesnominatedbyeachpartystandforelectioninaspecific

electorate,knownasadaerahpemilihan(dapil).Eachelectorateisallocatedbetween

threeandtenseats,sopartiescommonlyfieldmultiplecandidates.9Thepartiesrank

eachcandidateandthiscorrespondstotheirplaceontheballot.Forexample,a

candidatemaybeassignedthenumber‘3’,signifyingthattheirnamewillappear

thirdontheballotsheet.Until2009,partylistrankingwascrucialbecauseparties

determinedtheorderinwhichcandidateswereallocatedvotes.However,votersare

nowabletodirecttheirvotestospecificindividuals.Despiteitslackofpractical

significance,candidateordercontinuestoincitemuchintra‐partydebatebecausethe

partylistrankingisseenasareflectionofthecandidate’sstatuswithinthepartyand

thelevelofpartysupporttheycanexpecttoreceive.

Oncepartieshavenominatedandrankedtheircandidates,theindividualcandidates

organizetheirowncampaigns.Whiletheofficialcampaignperiodisshort(in2014

from16Marchto5April)thecandidatesspendamuchlongerpreparingtheir

strategyandorganizingtheircampaigns.Thisstudydefinesthecampaignperiod

broadlytoincludeallactivitiesundertakentoadvertisethepartyandcandidatesto

membersofthepublicinthelead‐uptotheelection,aprocesswhichbeganfarearlier

thantheofficially‐mandatedcampaignperiod.Intheleaduptotheofficialcampaign

period,candidatesholdconsultationswithcommunitygroups,businesspeople,and

8LawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofMembersofthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil,theRegionalRepresentativeCouncilandtheRegionalPeople’sRepresentativeCounciloriginallystatedthatthethresholdforparticipationinthenationalparliamentwas2.5percent.ThiswasamendedinApril2012to3.5percent.9ThefulldetailsofvotingprocedureandvoteallocationbypartiesisdetailedinLawNo.8/2012ontheGeneralElectionoftheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,People’sRepresentativeCouncilandRegionalHouseofrepresentatives.

7

otherstakeholderstosourcesupportanddiscussthetermsofthissupport.10Some

candidatesalsonegotiatewithvotersand/orvotebrokers,particularlyiftheyplanto

offerincentivestovotersinreturnforsupport.11Thisthesistakestheview,inline

withBowlerandFarrell(1992b:11),thatan‘electioncampaign’incorporatesthese

periodsofpreparationandplanning.

Theresultsofthenationalparliamentaryelectionsareimportantnotonlybecause

theydeterminetheinfluenceofpartiesinthelegislature,butalsobecausetheyaffect

theirabilitytonominateapresidentialcandidates.UnderLawNo.42/2008onthe

GeneralElectionofthePresidentandVice‐President,partiesmusthaveover20per

centofseatsintheDPR‐RIor25percentofthepopularvotetonominatea

presidentialcandidate.In2014nopartyachievedeitherofthesetargets,and

coalitionswithotherpartieshadtobeformedinordertonominateapresidential

candidate.GiventhatmanypartiesinIndonesiaarevehiclesforpresidentialhopefuls,

thenationallegislativeelectionstakeonanadditionalsignificancebecauseapoor

resultcanthwartaspirations.

Emergingpoliticalparties

Institutionalizedpoliticalpartiesprovideamechanismforchannellingsocial

demandsandensuringeffectivedemocraticgovernance(HickenandKuhonta2011:

2).Politicalpartiesareheredefinedasformalpoliticalorganizationsthataimto

influencethepoliticalnatureofthestatebyparticipatinginelectionsandgaining

powerthroughtheiroutcomes.Duringanelectionpartiesalsoplayarolein

aggregating,organizingandcoordinatingcandidates,politicaldonationsandvoters

(Hicken2009:5).Whilesomedefinitionsofpoliticalpartiesarenarrower,this

definitionprovidesausefultheoreticallabelwithoutinadvertentlylimitingits

10UnderLawNo.01/2013GuidelinesfortheImplementationofElectionCampaignsbyMembersfortheDPR‐RI,DPDandDPRD),Article13,campaignsactivitiesinclude:(a)closedmeetingswithvoters,(b)face‐to‐facemeetings,(c)disseminatingcampaignmaterialtothepublic,(d)installingadvertisingmaterialinpublicplaces,(e)advertisinginprintandelectronicmedia,(f)generalmeetingsand(g)anyothercampaignactivitynotmentionedherethatarenotprohibitedbyotherexistinglaws.Article25ofthelawsstatesthatactivities(a),(b),(c)and(d)arepermissiblefromthreedaysafterthepartyhasofficiallynominatedthecandidateupuntilthe‘quietperiod’(masatenang)(whichismandatedbytheKPU)while(e)and(f)areonlyallowedduringtheofficialcampaignperiod.Thelaw,inArticle26,alsostatesthattheofficialcampaignperiodisdeterminedbytheKPU.11Someexamplesofcommonincentivesusedtogarnersupportincludeparaphernaliasuchast‐shirts,calendarsandclocksthatareoftendistributedinthemonthsleadinguptotheelections,aswellasthedisplayofpromotionalposters.Morecostlyincentivesincludedonationstoreligiousinstitutionsorcommunityorganizations,assistancewithsmallinfrastructureprojects,prizegiveaways,anddistributingcashpayments.

8

applicability.12Abroaddefinitionisparticularlyvaluableasnewpartiesmaybeyetto

contestanelectionorestablishthemselvesinaccordancewithlegislative

requirements.Similarly,measurementsofpublicsupportorpercentagesofvotesin

previouselectionscannotbeappliedtopartiescompetinginelectionsforthefirst

time.Defining‘new’politicalpartiesalsopresentsachallengegiventhatmanyparties

arisefromsplitswitholderpartiesorthemergingofparties,whileothersviewanew

nameasasufficientqualificationtobeconsiderednew(BarneaandRahat2011:

305).Janda(1980:22)assertsthatifa‘new’partyretainsanoldname,thenitcanbe

deemedanoldparty;however,ifapartyadoptsanewnamethenitisattemptingto

dissociateitselffromitspast,markingitselfasanovelalternative.Otherwaysto

identifynewpartiesincludetheiruseofstrikinglydifferentideologiestoexisting

partiesand/ortheirbringingtogetherofanew‘coalitionofvoters’.Sometheorists

argue,forexample,thatthepeoplewhovoteforthepartyarewhatdefineit,andthe

morenewvotersapartyhasattracted,themoreitsnewnesshasresonated(Barnea

andRahat2011:307).

Whenreferringtopartiesas‘new’or‘emerging’thisthesisadoptsthedefinition

presentedbyHarmel(1985:405‐406)thatposits‘new’asbothareferencetotheage

ofthepartyandasacommentaryontheirimpactinthepoliticalsphere.Emerging

partiesmaybe‘contenderparties’,whichgenuinelybelievethattheyhavean

opportunityforelectoralsuccess,or‘promoterparties’,whichrecognizethat

electoralsuccessisunlikelybutexisttochannelattentiontoparticularcauses

(HarmelandRobertson1985:517).Whateverthemotivation,thesepartiespresent

themselvesasabreakfromthepoliticalnorm,evenifinrealitytheysharemany

similaritieswitholderparties.Reflectingthisconceptualization,thisthesisalsotakes

intoaccounttheparty’sownself‐identificationasbeingnew.13Bydefinition,

emergingpartiesarealsooppositional,vyingforpoweragainstmoreentrenched

parties.Astheirpoliticalhistorygrowslonger,theiridentificationasanemerging

partynecessarilywanes.

12Forexample,somedefinitionslimitpoliticalpartiestoorganizationsthatnominatecandidatesinstateelectionsorimposeaminimumlevelofrepresentationtodenotethesignificanceofaparty(Harmel1985:405).13Thisisimportantgiventhattheemergingpartiesinthisstudywereformedbyfigureswhohadpreviouslybeenmembersofotherpoliticalparties.While,inreality,thepartiescontinuetoespousemanyofthevaluesthatthesefiguresheldduringtheirtenureintheirformerparties,theyneverthelessattempttopresentthemselvesasbeingnewanddifferent.

9

Studyingnewpartiesoffersanopportunityto‘observetheformationofanewtypeof

politicalorganization’(Harmel1985:411),aswellasofferingalensforexploring

changeandcontinuitywithinapoliticalsystem.Thepopularityofnewpartiesmay

reflectdeepdiscontentwitholderpartiesorwiththepoliticalsystemingeneral.

Manynewpartiesariseas‘protestparties’,seizingupondissatisfactionwiththe

politicalstatusquo(HarmelandRobertson1985:502),sometimesevenwithnoreal

expectationoftakingpower(HarmelandRobertson1985:517;Powell1982:94).

Theremayalsobecaseswherenewpartiesdonotactuallyrepresentanygenuine

differencesfromotherexistingparties,provokingquestionsastowhyanewparty

wasformedatall(Berrington1985:442).Aspreviouslymentioned,severalpartiesin

Indonesiaareconsideredvehiclesforelitesseekingtogainpower,suggestingthat

newpartiesmaybemediumsforacquiringpower,ratherthanissue‐focused.14The

leadersoftheemergingpartiesexaminedinthisstudyhadall,atonetimeoranother,

attemptedtotakeovertheleadershipofan‘old’partybeforeleavingtoformtheir

own(Sherlock2013:4;Tomsa2009),implyingthistobethecase.

Emergingpartiesfaceanumberofchallengesintheirbidforpower.Theseinclude

establishinglegitimacy,buildingrecognitionamongvoters—referredtoinIndonesia

as‘socialization’(sosialisasi)—andboostingtheircompetitivenessagainstbetter‐

establishedrivals.Theymustbalancepromotingthemselvesasanewhopeforthe

countrywiththefactthattheyhavelittleornotrackrecordingovernment.Howcan

politicalpartiesprovethattheyoffervotersnewhopeandrepresentabreakfromthe

past?Onewaythatemergingpartiesdothisisbyportrayingthemselvesasforcesof

change,whatSikk(2012:478)describesasa‘projectofnewness’.Toarguethat

change,initself,isadesirablepoliticaloutcomeisapopularstrategybecauseitdoes

notrelyonclearpoliciesorpracticalsolutions.Newleaders,asdistinctfromold‐

guardpoliticalelites,becomearallyingpointfortheprojectofnewness,evenifthe

party’sideasarenotnovel(Edelman1988:51).Aslongasapartycanconvincevoters

thattheyrepresentsomething‘better’thanwhatcurrentlyexists,ithasthe

opportunitytoappealtodisillusionedvoters.Newpartiesalsohavetheprospectof

constructinga‘politicalenemy’onthegroundsthattheoldpartieshavefailedtomeet

publicaspirations(Edelman1988:66).Whenconstructingtheirpositioninrelation

14Theterms‘elites’canbeusedtodescribe‘rulingelites’,whohavecontrolovertheday‐to‐dayrunningofthestate;‘oppositionelites’,whocontroloppositionparties,movementsorNGOsthatplacepressureontheregimetomeettheirdemands;and‘economicelites’,whocontrolthevastmajorityofbusinessinterestsinthecountry(Tolstrup2014:127).Whilethisthesisfocusesonrulingandoppositionelites,theyoftenintertwinewitheconomicinterestsmakingitdifficulttodiscretelycategorizeelite.

10

toolderparties,emergingpartiesbenefitfromhavinghadlittlenegativepublicityin

thepastandcanmakeaccusationsagainstrivalswithoutfearofbeingbranded

hypocrites.Forexample,theycanaccuseotherpartiesorpoliticiansofcorruption

withouthavingsufferedfromanymajorscandalsthemselves.Theycanalso,inother

cases,criticizeeconomic,religiousandsocialpolicystanceswithouteverhavingbeen

responsibleforanyunpopulardecisionsinthepast.

Votertendenciesalsopresentanobstacleforemergingparties.Inmostcontexts,

whencompetingagainstolder,moreestablishedparties,newpartiesaregenerally

seentobeatadisadvantage.AstudybyDaltonandWeldon(2005:942)concludes

thateveninsituationswherecitizensaregenerallydistrustfulofpoliticalparties,they

tendtoremainloyaltomoreestablishedparties.15Emergingpartiesmusttherefore

battlenaturaltendenciestovoteforthefamiliar,aswellasthetemptationforcitizens

toforfeittheirvoteasaformofprotest—apracticecommonlyreferredtoin

Indonesianasbelongingtothe‘whitegroup’(golonganputih,golput).16Thismeans

newpartiesfacetheadditionalchallengeofpresentingthemselvesasaviable,

preferablealternativetopre‐existingpartiestowhichthepublichavealreadygrown

accustomed.ThisisallthemoredifficultintheIndonesia,wherevotercynicism

towardspoliticalpartiesishigh.17

Emergingpartiesandthe2014elections

Threeemergingpoliticalpartiescompetedinthe2014Indonesiannationallegislative

elections:thePeople’sConscienceParty(PartaiHatiNuraniRakyat,Hanura);the

GreatIndonesiaMovementParty(PartaiGerakanIndonesiaRaya,Gerindra);andthe

NationalDemocraticParty(PartaiNasdem).Allthreewerebornoutofthepolitical

ambitionsofprominent,wealthyindividualswhohadtriedbutwereunabletotake

15Inrelatedstudies,Mainwaring(1998:71‐72)assertsthatthemoreinstitutionalizedpoliticalpartysystemsare,thelessopportunitiestherearefornewparties.Dalton(2002:32)contendsthatevenincountrieswherepartisantiesaredeclining,voterscontinuetousepartyidentificationstohelpthemdeterminewhichpartybestalignswiththeirownpoliticalbeliefs.Popkin(1991:96‐98)arguesthatvoterssearchfor‘connections’andthelongeraparty’shistory,theeasieritistomakeconnectionsbetweenfutureresultsandpastactions.Thus,commondecisionmakingstrategiesfavourolderpoliticalparties.16Thisphraseoriginatesfromthefactthatvoterschosenottovoteforanyparty,thusleavingtheirballot‘white’.Themeaninghasalsobeenextendedtoincludepeoplewhoalsodonotphysicallyvote,eitherasapoliticalstatementoroutofapathy.Officialestimatesin2014showedthatvoterturnoutwasapproximately75.11percent,anincreaseof4.12percentfrom2009,while7.86percentofthosevotesweredeemedspoiltornull(Pemilu2014).17Furtherdiscussionofvoterattitudestowardspoliticalparties,particularlythosefoundinsurveysbetween2013and2014,canbefoundinChapterThree.

11

overtheleadershipofanexistingparty(Sherlock2003:4).Torealizetheirpolitical

ambitions,theyformednewparties—apracticalnecessitytoachievetheir

presidentialaspirations.Intermsofideology,thesenewpartieshavemany

similarities.Theyallproclaimstrongnationalisticideals,withaferventallegianceto

thenationalethosofPancasilaandIndonesia’s1945Constitution.18Thedifferences

betweenthepartiesaremoredifficulttodiscern,thustheroleofleadershipfiguresas

abasisfordifferentiationwasvital.

HanuraisthepoliticalvehicleofWiranto,aformerhigh‐rankingmilitaryofficerwith

considerableinfluenceduringthelateNewOrder.HeservedasSuharto’saidede

campandascommanderofthearmyduring1998,acriticalperiodinthetransitionto

Reformasi(1998–).After1998,heservedasCoordinatingMinisterofPoliticsand

SecurityunderPresidentAbdurrahmanWahid.Thisappointmentlastedonlythree

monthsasPresidentWahidfacedpressuretodismissWirantofollowinghis

indictmentbytheNationalHumanRightsCommissionforfailingtoeffectively

safeguardhumanrightsfollowingEastTimor’sindependencereferenduminAugust

1999(Crouch2010:138),althoughultimatelynotchargedbytheAttorney‐General’s

office.In2004WirantocontestedthePresidentialelectionasthecandidateforthe

GolkarParty,theelectoralvehicleofformerPresidentSuharto.19Hefinishedthirdin

thepresidentialrace,blaminghisfailureonalackofsupportfromwithinhisown

party(Kawamura2013:16).SeeingnofutureforhimselfinGolkar,heestablished

Hanurainpreparationforthe2009elections(Tomsa2009).Inhispartylaunch

speech,Wirantocriticizedthecurrentleadershipfornothavingthenation’sbest

interestatheart(Hanura2008),butplayeddownhispoliticalambitions,instead

describingtheformationofHanuraasadirectresponsetothegovernment’sfailureto

18PancasilaisIndonesia’snationalphilosophy.Itincludesfivetenets:beliefintheoneandonlyGod,ajustandcivilizedhumanity,theunityofIndonesia,democracyguidedbytheinnerwisdomandunanimityarisingfromconsensusamongstrepresentatives,andsocialjusticeforallofthepeopleofIndonesia.Severalofthetenetswerebornoutofthegoalsofthepre‐independencenationalistmovement.Thesewere:humanity,unity,sovereigntyofthepeopleandsocialjustice.SukarnofirstintroducedhispoliticalphilosophyofPancasilain1945inaspeechon1June1945.ThephilosophycontinuestobetheideologicalbasisfortheIndonesianStateandofseveralpoliticalparties.ForfurtherdetailsonthehistoryandpoliticalandculturalsignificanceofPancasilasee:FeithandCastles(1970);Liddle(1992);Schwarz(2004);Sundhaussen(1981).19GolkarwasestablishedbySuhartoforthe1971elections.Liddle(1985:72)describedthepartyas:‘thegovernment'sparty,anelectoralvehicle…todenyaparliamentarymajoritytotheotherparties.Itsseatsarefilledwithmenandwomenwhohaveorhavehadbureaucraticcareersorareinotherwaysconnectedtothebureaucracy.InParliamentandtheAssembly,theGolkardelegationshavenevertakenanautonomousinitiative,butserveinsteadasthesponsorsofpoliciesarrivedatelsewhereinthegovernment.’

12

fulfiltheaspirationsofthe1945NationalConstitution.20Hanuradescribesitselfasa

’nationalist‐religious’party,whichdrawsitsmoralinfluencebothfromnational

doctrinessuchasPancasilaandreligion(Wiranto2009a).Thepartypurportedto

acceptmoralinputfromallnationally‐recognizedreligions,claimingthatequalityisa

fundamentalgoal,thatpeopleshouldbetreatedequallyregardlessoftribe,religion,

race,politicalbelief,socialstatusandgender.

TheestablishmentofGerindrawascomparabletothatofHanurainseveralways.It

wasalsoestablishedbyaformermilitaryleader,PrabowoSubianto,theformerson‐

in‐lawofPresidentSuharto,whoisbest‐knownforleadingtheIndonesianSpecial

Forces(Kopassus).21WhilePrabowo’spoliticalcareerflounderedafter1998,he

returnedtopoliticsin2004,hopingtogainpresidentialpre‐selectionwithGolkarbut

wasdefeatedbyWiranto.AftersecuringcontroloftheNationalFarmer’sAssociation

(HimpuanKerukunanTaniIndonesia,HKTI)in2004,PrabowoestablishedGerindra

inordertorealizehispresidentialambitions(Tomsa2009).Gerindra’sofficial

declarationalsoarguedthatthegovernmenthadfaileditscitizens(Gerindra2008).

Gerindrapresenteditselfasapeople’spartythatwouldworkto‘buildIndonesia’s

spiritandbody,’andwouldfightforprosperityandjustice.LikeHanura,theparty

alsopledgedacommitmenttoPancasilaandtheConstitutionof1945(Gerindra

2012c).ButPrabowo’scontroversialmilitarypastproveddifficulttoovercome,even

thoughhewasapopularcandidateinsomecircles(Mietzner2010:188).This

controversyincludedallegationsthatheoversawandcondonedhumanrights

violationsinEastTimorandinJakartaduringtheriotsin1998.Hispresidential

prospectsimprovedfrom2009to2014,accompaniedbyanelaborateandexpensive

politicalcampaign(Tempo2014;TimurandPriamarizki2014).Intheend,hefailedto

winthepresidentialelection,receiving46.85percentofoverallvotescomparedto

53.15percentofvotesgarneredbyrivalJokoWidodo(popularlyknownas‘Jokowi’)

(KomisiPemilihanUmum2014b).

20AlsoreferredtoastheRevolutionaryConstitutionof1945,whichincludedthetenetsofthePancasiladoctrineinitspreambleaswellaschaptersaddressingtheunitarynatureoftheIndonesianstate,thepowersofvariouslevelsofgovernment(namelythelegislatureandexecutive),thehumanrightsandreligiousfreedomsguaranteedtoallcitizens,theobligationthatthegovernmentmustspend20percentofitsbudgetoneducation,stateownershipofthemajormeansofproduction,andthestate’ssocialwelfareresponsibilities(RepublicofIndonesia1945).21PrabowoandSuharto’sdaughter,SitiHediatiHariyadi(commonlyknownbyhernickname,‘Titiek’)divorcedin1998afterSuhartoresignedfromthepresidency(Winarno2014).

13

UnlikeHanuraandGerindra,Nasdemdidnothaveaformermilitarypersonatits

helm,thoughtherewereanumberofex‐officersamongstitsleadership.Nasdemwas

regardedasthepoliticalvehicleofmediamagnateSuryaPaloh,whowasdefeatedin

hisbidforGolkarPartyleadershipbybusinesstycoonAburizalBakriein2011.The

supportstructureforapoliticalpartypre‐datedtheofficiallaunchoftheNasdem

partyinJuly2011intheformofamassorganizationcalledtheNationalDemocrats

establishedin2010.2014markedNasdem’sfirstnationalparliamentaryelectionand

itwastheonlypartythathadnevercontestedanationalelectionbefore.In

rationalisingtheneedtoformanewparty,Nasdemleadershipclaimedthat

Reformasihadfailedandthattherewasaneedtoreturntobasics,arestorationof

Indonesiabasedonthegoalsofthe1945Constitution(Nasdem2011a).Initsparty

manifesto,Nasdempledgeditscommitmenttoademocracythatservedall

Indonesiancitizens,notonlyelites,andfundamentallyrejectedthecurrenttrendof

‘routinelyrecirculatingpower[amongstelites]withouttheemergenceofaleaderof

qualityorworth’(Nasdem2011b).

Forminganewpartywasanecessaryconditiontoachievethepresidential

aspirationsoftheseindividuals,giventherequirementthatapartyholdaminimum

of20percentofseatsinordertonominateapresidentialcandidatewithoutbeing

obligedtoformacoalition.BothHanuraandGerindraactivelypromotedtheirleaders

aspresidentialcandidatesintheleaduptothelegislativeelections.Nasdemdeclined

todothis,primarilybecauseitdidnotactuallybelievethattheywouldgainover20

percentofseatsintheelection.22Finally,onlyGerindra’sleader,PrabowoSubianto,

wentontocontestthepresidentialelections,asHanurafellshortofthethresholdand

subsequentlyoptedtoformacoalitionwiththeIndonesianDemocraticPartyof

Struggle(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan,PDIP).Supportingthepresidential

bidoftheeventualwinner,Jokowi,Hanurauseditscampaignmachinestopromote

him.AnumberofpartymembersweresubsequentlyselectedforJokowi’scabinet

andtherehasbeendiscussionabouttheinfluencethatthesepartyleaders,

particularlySuryaPalohfromNasdem,havehadonJokowi’sdecisions.23

22InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2014.23DiscussionofthisinfluencecanbefoundinnumerousmediareportfollowingJokowi’selection.Forexample,respectednewsmagazineTempopublishedanarticleinNovember2014onPaloh’sstronginfluenceoverPresidentJokowi’sdecisionsandhasunparalleledaccesstothepresident(TempoEnglish2014;Widiarsietal.2014).OtherexamplesofmediareportspositingthatSuryaPalohholdssignificantswaywithJokowiinclude:Fakhruddin(2014);Kiswondari(2014);Sutrisno(2014).PoliticiansassociatedwithNasdemwerethreegrantedministerialpositionsinJokowi’sOctober2014cabinetaswellasthepositionofattorney‐general,whileHanura‐affiliatedmemberreceivedtwopositions.

14

EquallyimportantinthepresidentialelectionwastheprominenceofGerindra,who

fieldedtheonlyotherpresidentialcandidateinthe2014race.WhileGerindra’s

nationallegislativeoutcomedidnotqualifythemtonominatePrabowowithouta

coalitionofparties,theircampaignmachinewassoeffectivethatthewhatoriginally

seemedlikeaclear‐cutracebecameacloselycontestedbattle—Prabowolostbyonly

46.85percentofvotestothe53.15percentgarneredbyJokowiandhisrunningmate

JusufKalla.Thesenewpartieshaveproventhattheyarenotmerelyafootnotein

Indonesia’spoliticalhistory,buthaveestablishedthemselvesasprincipalactorsin

thepoliticalgame.Whiletheycannotyetclaimthelonghistoryorpopularityofsome

otherparties,theirrespectiveleadershipsareplayingastrategicgamewhichwill

continuetoinfluenceIndonesia’spoliticalsphereintothefuture.

Methodology

Instudyingthesepartiesandindividualcandidates,Ihaveadoptedamixed‐methods

approach.First,Idrewfrom‘groundedtheory’,whichemphasizesthatresearchers

‘setasidetheoreticalideas’whencollatingdatato‘letthesubstantivetheoryemerge’

(Urquhart2013:5).Dataforthisprojectwascollectedoverthreeseparateperiodsof

fieldwork:December2011‐February2012,July2012‐July2013andMarch2014‐

April2014.24IntheinitialproposalforthisstudyIsetouttoresearch

conceptualizationsofcorruptioninIndonesia.Earlyreadingfocusedgenerallyonthe

historyofcorruptioninIndonesiaanddebatesaboutitsimpact.Mythesistopic

narrowedasaconsequenceofobservationsmadeduringmyfirstperiodoffieldwork

tofocusonemergingpartiesandthe2014election.ItwasatthisstagethatI

identifiedthecasestudymethod,anintensivestudyofspecificinstancesofthe

phenomenon(Swanborn2010),asthemostusefulmeansforgatheringandanalysing

furtherdata.

Isubsequentlyrefinedmyconceptualframeworkthroughacomprehensiveoverview

ofrelevantliterature,providingabasisfortheoreticalpropositionsandanalytic

generalization.25Animportantpartofthisprocesswastodeepenmyunderstanding

oftheterm‘corruption’andtoidentifyawaytostepbackfromtheethicalproblemof

corruptpracticesandanalysehowdiscoursesaroundcorruptionareusedin

24ApprovalforthisfieldworkwasreceivedfromtheUniversityofSydneyHumanResearchEthicsCommittee(HREC)on22August2011.25Yin(2014:41)assertsthatincasestudies,analyticalgeneralizationisbasedoncorroborating,modifying,rejectingoradvancingnewconceptsasaresultofthestudy.Theensuinggeneralizationsmadearethusataconceptuallevelwhichishigherthanthatofthespecificcase.

15

campaigns.Theterm‘corruption’isregularlyusedasacatch‐allforarangeofdistinct

socialpathologiesincludingmismanagementofpublicresources,weakgovernment

institutions,andcomplexrelationshipsbetweenpoliticalactorsandpubliceconomic

assets(ChengandZaum2008:302).Onewidelyuseddefinitionofcorruption

describesitastheabuseofpublicrolesforprivategain(Johnston2005),while

anotherprevalentdefinitionisproposedbyNye(1967:965‐966),identifying

corruptionasbehaviourthatdeviatesfromtheformalpracticeofapublicroledueto

personal(‘private‐regarding’)gains,orthatviolatetherulesofexercisinginfluence.

Thesedefinitions,however,arecriticizedforover‐generalizingtheproblem,failingto

adequatelydefinewhatexactlyconstitutes‘abuse’or‘personalgain’(Philp2008:

311‐312).26Broadlyspeaking,corruptionisnormativelyacceptedasinvolvingsome

formofdeceitwith‘thepretenceofbeingabsolutelyloyaltotheprincipalwhilstin

actualfactbeingintentonbenefitingoneselfand/orthirdparties’(Brasz1963:112).

Whateverformcorruptiontakesitiscommonlyunderstoodashavinganegative

politicalandeconomiceffectonordinarycitizens.Suchunderstandingsconsequently

leadcitizenstoregardcorruptionasaformofinjustice(Anduizaetal.2013:1665).

Despitethegeneralattitudethatcorruptionisbad,conceptualizationsofcorruption

basedonthelaw,moralityandsocialnormsarenotnecessarilycongruent.Legal

definitionsofcorruptionarethosefoundinstatelegislationwhereasmoral

definitionsaredeterminedbysocialcontext.27Moralinterpretationsofcorruptionare

often(butnotexclusively)drawnfromreligionandculture,andidentifycorrupt

actionsasthosewhichareevil(Marquette2012:14)whereassociologicaldefinitions

arederivedfromthesocialnormsofacceptableandunacceptablebehaviourwithina

society(Leys1990:55).Thecontrastbetweenthesedifferentperspectivesis

apparentwhenconsideringLey’s(1990:54)assertionthatforeverycorruptact

deemedbadbyoneperson,thereisatleastoneotherpersonwhoregardsitasgood.

InIndonesia,thisincongruenceisvisibleinthefactthatcorruptioniswidely

26Thereisextensivedebateoverthedefinitionofcorruptioninacademicliterature.ForexamplesseeBullandNewell(1997);ChengandZaum(2008);Friedrich(1990);Heidenheimeretal.(1990);Heywood(1997);Johnston(2005);Mény(1996);Rose‐Ackerman(1999);Warren(2004).27TheIndonesianstatehasimplementedanumberofinitiativesinitseffortstocombatcorruption,suchastheCorruptionEradicationCommission(KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi,KPK)andtheAnti‐CorruptionCourts(PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi,Tipikor),designedtoimplementanumberofanti‐corruptionlawsincluding:LawNo.28/1999onStateOrganizersWhoAreFreefromCorruption,CollusionandNepotism,LawNo.31/1999ontheEradicationoftheCriminalActofCorruption,LawNo.71/2000onProceduresforImplementationofPublicParticipationandProvisionofAppreciationinthePreventionandEradicationoftheCriminalActofCorruption,andLawNo.8/2010ontheCriminalActofMoneyLaundering.

16

condemned,yetprevalent.Whatisregardedascorruptionunderthelawmayclash

withsocialnorms,forexample,whatKing(2000:618)describesasriftsbetween

legalnormsand‘folknorms’suchassocialnetworks,kinshipties,friendships,

patron‐clientrelationsandfamilyloyalty.Thedifficultyinestablishingaworkable

definitionforcorruptionlendsitamalleabilityandpropensityformanipulationthat

makeitanattractiveissueforpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia.

Inseekingtoexplainhowunderstandingsofwhatdoesanddoesnotconstitute

corruptionplayintobroadernarrativesofmoralitywithinpoliticalcampaigns,it

becameevidentthatthewaysinwhichpoliticalpartiesandindividualcandidates

definecorruptionareimportant.Inthediscoursesadoptedbypartiesandcandidates

duringelectoralcampaigns,oneoftheprincipalinterpretationsofcorruption

revolvesaroundtheuseofincentivestoattractvoters.Thisisoftendescribedas

‘moneypolitics’and‘vote‐buying’,termsusedtodescribethedistributionofmoney

(orgoods)inordertogainormaintainoffice(Goodpaster2002:100;Mietzner2007).

InIndonesia,thesepracticesareillegalunderLawNo.10/2008ontheGeneral

ElectionofMembersfortheDPR,DPDandDPRD,whichstatesinarticle87(1)that

candidateswillbesanctionedifitisproventhatacampaignerhaspromisedorgiven

moneyorothergoods,directlyorindirectly,inreturnforparticipantsto(a)notuse

theirrighttovote,(b)usetheirrighttovoteinsuchawaythattheyselectacandidate

inawaythatinvalidatestheirvote,(c)voteforaspecificpoliticalpartyparticipating

intheelection,(d)selectaspecificcandidateforDPR,DPRDI,DPRDIIor(e)selecta

specificcandidatefortheDPD.Moneypoliticsisa‘householdphrase’inIndonesia

duetoitsnormalcyduringelectoralcampaigns(Mietzner2007:239).However,as

AspinallandSukmajati(Forthcoming‐b:7)argue,theterm‘moneypolitics’is

imprecise.28Recognizingthisshortcoming,thisterminologyisneverthelessadopted

because,despiteitsfluidity,itiscommonlyusedinIndonesiabypartiesand

candidatesthemselves.Identifyinghowthesetermsareusedtoconceptualize

corruptionisimportantforunderstandinghowsymbolsareimaginedandanti‐

corruptionimagesareincorporatedintocampaigns.

Instudyingtheuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolsbyemergingparties,Idecidedtoadopt

amulti‐scalarapproachwithineachcasestudy,examiningtwodifferent‘units’of

28Instead,AspinallandSukmajati(Forthcoming‐b)adopttheterms‘patronage’and‘clientelism’asmorespecificdescriptionsofthephenomenaobserved.

17

analysis.29First,thethreecasestudypartiesareexaminedatthenationallevel(the

firstunitofanalysis),lookingatbothmaterialsproducedbythepartyheadoffice—

including,butnotlimitedto,informationoneachparties’‘visionandmission’and

otherdocumentationregardingtheparties’objectivesandraisond’etre,postingson

theofficialwebsiteandsocialmediapostsmadebythoseinthecentralparty

committee(DewanPerwakilanPartai,DPP)andpublicstatementsmadebyparty

leadersandofficialspokespersons—andinterviewswithmembersoftheDPP.

Second,Iconducteddetailedobservationsofthreeparliamentarycandidates(the

secondunitofanalysis),onerepresentingeachparty.Byobservingcampaign

planningandexecution,aswellashavingdirect,personal,accesstothecandidates,

thecasestudiesdevelopedreflecthowtheseindividualsformulatedtheanti‐

corruptionsymbolintheirowncampaigns(i.e.howtheylinkedthemselvestothe

symbol)andwhytheychosetodeliverthesymbolinthewaytheydid.

Intheinitialstagesofthisproject,thequestionofaccesstointerviewsubjectscaused

someconsternationasIdidnothaveanydirectrelationshipswithmembersfromthe

politicalpartiesIwishedtoresearch.However,basingmyselfinJakartaanddrawing

uponcontactsprovidedthroughmypre‐existingnetworksthere,Iwaseventually

abletoorganizeinterviewswithpartymembersfromalmostallpoliticalpartiesthat

competedinthe2014nationalelections.Theseinterviews,inturn,allowedaccessto

otherpartyofficialsforinterviews.Itwasduringthistimethatthefeasibilityofa

studyofemergingpartieswasconfirmed,asIfeltIhadaworkablelevelofaccessto

seniorpartymembersforthepurposesofthisresearch.30ThefactthatIspeak

Indonesianalsoenabledmetodevelopcloserrelationshipswithinterviewees

(althoughsomedidspeakEnglish)thatwouldnothavebeenpossibleusingan

interpreter.Thisexperienceresonateswiththeoriesaboutparticipantobservation,

whichencourageresearcherstousethelocallanguageandengagethroughinformal

interaction(DeWaltandDeWalt2010:4).

Thesecondroundoffieldworkprovidedanopportunitytoconductmoretargeted

interviewswithmembersfromtheselectedcases.Theseinterviewsinitiallyfocused

uponseniorpartymembersbasedinJakarta,withaviewtoestablishhownational

partyleadershipconceptualizeanti‐corruptionissuesandtheimportanceofanti‐

corruptionsymbolsfortheirrespectiveparties.InMarch2013Iapproachedfive

29‘Embeddedcasestudydesign’referstocasestudiesthat‘involveunitsofanalysisatmorethanonelevel’(Yin2014:53).30FurtherdetailsofthefieldworkconductedcanbefoundinKramer(2014b).

18

differentparliamentarycandidates(allofwhomIhadalreadyinterviewed)toaskif

theywouldallowmetoaccompanythemasanembeddedobserverwhileintheir

localelectoratesforpartsoftheircampaign.Threecandidatesagreedandpermitted

metotravelwiththemintheirelectorates,intheprovincesofEastJava,South

SulawesiandNorthSumatraastheyorganizedandexecutedtheirelectoral

campaigns.

Athirdperiodoffieldworkprovidedanopportunitytogathermorespecificdata

duringtheofficialcampaignperiodbetween16March2014and6April2014.Access

affordedduringtimespentintheelectoratesincluded:attendanceatstrategy

meetings,logisticalplanningandprocurementdiscussions,attendanceatcommunity

meetingsandrallies,aswellasthe‘off’timeoftravel,lunchandrestingaftertheday’s

activities.Thelatterprovidedanopportunitytoaskquestionsandreflectonthedays’

events.31Visitstothelocalelectoratewereinterspersedwithinterviewsconductedin

Jakarta,whereeachofthecandidatesusuallyresided.Intotal,thecandidateswere

formallyinterviewedaminimumofsixtimesoverthecourseofcampaignplanning

andexecution,inadditiontotimespenttogetherintheirelectorate.Duringthese

periodsItookdetailedfieldnotesinordertobuildanarrativesurroundinghowthe

candidatebehaved,whattheirprioritieswereandwhethercorruptionremaineda

focusoftheircampaign.Intheinterim,Icommunicatedwiththecandidatesface‐to‐

faceinJakarta,andviaemailandtextmessages.Thenarrativedevelopmentdrew

uponanethnographicmethodologyinwhichI,astheresearcher,establisheda

physicalpresenceatmysitedesignedtohelpmeunderstandthe‘aroundchains,

paths,threads,conjunctions,orjuxtapositionsoflocations’(Marcus1995:105).In

addition,usingnon‐physicalcommunicationtodiscussprogress,targetsand

campaignissuesalsoallowedmetodevelopafullpictureofcandidatesandtheir

strategiesovertheyearprecedingtheelection.Havingamassedfirst‐handdata,Ithen

returnedtotheliterature(primaryandsecondary)toexaminehistoricaleventsmore

closelyinordertotracechangesandcontinuitiesinanti‐corruptionsymbolism,with

aneyetounderstandingitsprominenceincontemporaryIndonesia.

31Thelevelofinteractionduringtheseperiodsdependedonthecandidateandcircumstances.Sometimesthecandidateswouldinvitemefordinnerandwewouldstayinthesamehotel/houseovernight.Othertimesthiswasnotpossible.Ileftittothecandidatetodeterminethelevelofinteractiontheywerecomfortablewithduringthese‘off’times.

19

Analysisofdatagatheredfrominterviewsandobservationswasdonefirstthrougha

bottom‐upcodingprocess,whichwasusedtoidentifythemessuggestedbythedata

ratherthantheliterature.32Thethematiccodingwasbuiltuponcommonphrasesand

ideasembeddedintheinterviewtexts.Forinterviewswithpartyofficials(notthe

casestudysubjects),interviewswerecodedtoseeifthereweresimilaritiesand

disparitiesinhowtheindividualsunderstoodtheirparty’santi‐corruptionsymbol.

Thecodedmaterialwasthencross‐referencedtothethemesandrhetoricfoundin

theparty’sofficialdocuments,mediareportingandonlinepresenceinordertogaina

holisticideaofhowthepartyconstructeditsanti‐corruptionsymbol.Forthethree

casestudycandidatesinterviewswerealsocodedthematically,buttheinitialanalysis

comparedtheprominenceofthemesovertimewithineachcaseandthencompared

thethreecasesagainsteachother.Inthisway,theanalysistrackedchangeswithin

theindividualcandidate’sowncampaignandattitudetowardtheanti‐corruption

symbolovertime,aswellascontextualizingitagainsttheothercases.

Limitations

Thisstudyfocusesonhowthesymbolofcorruptionasidentified,developedandused

byanindividualparliamentarycandidatefromeachofthreeemergingpolitical

parties.Asaconsequence,therearelimitationsinitsscope.WhileIndonesian

politicalpartiessharemanysimilarities,theresultsofthisthesisarenotintendedto

begeneralized.Italsoisimpossibletodrawuniversalconclusionsaboutthe

relationshipbetweennationalrhetoricandindividualcandidatesbasedonthese

threecases.Furthermore,giventhecultural,ethnicandreligiousdiversitywithin

Indonesia,eachofthecasestudiesreflectstheparticularitiesofitsgeographic

location.TheindividualcasestudiesforthisresearchweretakenfromNorth

Sumatra,SouthSulawesiandEastJava—threeverydifferentcontexts.Attimes

duringtheresearchIheardanecdotalevidenceexplainingwhycertaincandidates

hadadvantagesordisadvantagesaccordingtoreligion,genderandfamily

background.Whiletheanalysisofcandidatebehaviouraccountsforthesedifferences,

itdoesnotattemptanin‐depthbackgroundstudyontheculturaldifferencesbetween

theregionsandhowthisaffectedcandidatebehaviourorconstituents’reactionto

them.

32Forfurtherdetailsonbottom‐upcodingseeUrquhart(2013:38).OtherrelevantdiscussionisfoundinYin(2014:136‐137)detailingtheprocessof‘workingyourdatafromthe“groundup”’.

20

Anotherlimitationofthisstudyisthatitdoesnotincludeanyassessmentofhowthe

parties’anti‐corruptionsymbolsareunderstoodandinterpretedbythevoters,

althoughrelevantliteraturehasbeencitedwhereapplicable.Becausethefocusofthis

thesisistounderstandtherationaleandrelationshipswithintheparty,ithasnotset

outtoassesstheimpactofthesesymbolsonthepublic.Theinformationgatheredis

basedmainlyoninterviewswithmembersofparties,ratherthanthosedecidingtheir

fate.However,whilethecitizenperspectiveofanti‐corruptionsymbolsisoutsidethe

boundsofthisparticularproject,itwouldbeapotentialtopicforfutureresearch.

WhendiscussingissuesofcorruptionandelectionsinIndonesia,thetopicof‘money

politics’invariablyemerges.Understandingthecircumstancesthatpromotetheuse

ofcash,goods,orfavoursinexchangeforvotesisanimportantareaofresearchthat

hasbeentakenupbyotheracademicresearchers.Thisworkisreferencedthroughout

thisthesis.33Butwhilethisstudydoesnotshyawayfromobservationsrelatingtothe

useofmoneypolitics,theseobservationsaredescribedinordertounderstandthe

rationalebehindcertaincampaignstrategiesadoptedbyindividualcandidates,rather

thantoassesstheprevalenceofmoneypoliticsitself.Moreover,thisthesisdoesnot

attempttoexplaininanydetailwhyvotersseekmaterialgoodsorfinancialbenefits.

WhilethisquestionispertinenttoelectoralpoliticsinIndonesia,itfallsoutsidethe

parametersofthisstudy.Anydirectobservationsonthistopicincludedinthisstudy

aresignificantinthecontextofthethreecasestudies,butarenotintendedtocapture

theextentofvote‐buyinginIndonesiaasawhole.

Outlineofthesis

Thisthesisbeginswithadiscussionofrelevanttheoreticalliteraturepertainingtothe

developmentofapoliticalsymbolandhowitiscommunicatedacrossscalestothe

intendedaudience(i.e.voters)withinthecontextofelectioncampaigns.This

literatureunderscorestheinstrumentalsignificanceofcampaignsandthatthe

constructionofpoliticalsymbolsisadeliberateprocessshapedthroughlanguageand

drivenbythedesiretomaximizevotes.Electoralcampaignsaredesignedtoinfluence

voterstoactinacertainwayandtheeffectiveuseofsymbolsiscrucialduringthis

process.Ifpartiesorcandidatesmissthemarkintheirframingofsymbolstheyrisk

experiencingvoterbacklash.Thischapteralsoexplorestheappealofusinganti‐

corruptionsymbolsinpoliticalcampaignsmoregenerallyarguingthat,while

33InparticularseeElectoralDynamicsinIndonesia:MoneyPolitics,PatronageandClientelismattheGrassroots,editedbyAspinallandSukmajatianddueforpublicationin2015.

21

appealingtomoralpanicscanbeusefulforparties,therearealsohazardsin

convincingthepublicthattheiranti‐corruptionintentionsaregenuine.

ChapterTwotakesupthispoint,chartingthepoliticalhistoryofcorruptionin

Indonesiasincethelatecolonialperiodupuntilthenationalelectionsin2004,andin

doingsopayscloseattentiontohowithasbeenco‐optedbypoliticalactorsovertime.

Indonesia’sgovernmenthas,thusfar,beencharacterizedbythreeverydifferent

regimes—theOldOrderunderSukarno(1945–65),Suharto’sNewOrder(1966–98),

andtheeraofdemocratizationthathascometobeknownasReformasi(1998–).

Therearecommonthreadsintheuseofanti‐corruptionrhetoricthroughoutthese

regimes.Itwasroutinelyusedbygovernmentstodenouncetheirdetractorsduring

boththeOldandNewOrders,andithasbeenopenlyusedinpoliticaljostling

betweenpartiessincetheendoftheNewOrder.Thus,whilethegovernmentsmay

havechangedmarkedly,themobilizationofanti‐corruptionissueshasbeena

continuoustheme.

ChapterThreeprovidesamoredetailedoverviewoftheIndonesianstatefrom2004

to2014,coveringtwotermsofgovernmentunderformerIndonesianpresidentSusilo

BambangYudhoyono.Inunderstandingthisperiodmoredeeply,thesceneissetfor

ananalysisoftheelectoralcampaignsthattookplacein2014.Inparticular,the

prominenceofcorruptionscandals,affectingseveralpartiesbutmostnotably

Yudhoyono’sownDemocraticParty(PartaiDemokrat),wereofmajorsignificancefor

therulingelite.Theyfosteredthescepticismofcitizenstowardpoliticians,

demonstratedbyverylowlevelsofpublicsatisfactionwiththegovernment,and

providedanopportunityforemergingpartiestoportraythemselvesasaclean

alternativetothecorruptandself‐interestedelitesinpower.Itwasinthiscontext

thatemergingpartiesmovedtoattachthemselvestoanti‐corruptionsymbols.

Buildinguponthiscontextualanalysis,ChapterFourexploreshowemergingparties

constructedtheiranti‐corruptionimageatthenationallevel,particularlyintermsof

rhetoricandthemeanstheyusedtopublicizethisimage.Analysingpartydocuments,

theuseofleadershipfiguresandthemedia,thischaptercomparesandcontraststhe

techniquesemployedtoprojectanti‐corruptionsymbolsfromthenationallevel.

Whilethereweredifferencesinhowthesymbolwasconstructed,thereisnodoubt

thatallthreepartieswantedtoportrayapublicimageofbeingcleanandvehemently

againstcorruption.Eachpartyemployedavarietyofchannelsforbroadcastingthis

22

imageacrosstheIndonesianarchipelago,includingofficialwebsites,traditionaland

socialmediaandralliesbynationallevelfigures.Theseefforts,however,fellshort

andnoneofthepartiesperformedaswellastheyhadhoped.

Sohowdidthesenationalcampaignsinfluencecampaigningbyindividual

candidates?Howwerethesenationalanti‐corruptionsymbolsincorporated,ifatall,

inthecampaignsofparticularparliamentaryhopefuls?Thesequestionsare

addressedinChapterFive,whichdescribeshowonecandidatefromeachofthethree

emergingpartieschosetousetheanti‐corruptionsymbolthattheirpartieshad

promotedsostronglyatthenationallevel.Inanalysingtheirexperiences,decisions,

andrationales,thechapterconcludesthattheadoptionandpreservationofnational

levelsymbolsishighlydependentuponthementalityandpersonalconvictionsofthe

individualcandidate.

TheanalysisiscontinuedinChapterSix,whichdrawsthestudy’sfindingstogetherin

ordertoassessthesuccessandsignificanceofusinganti‐corruptionsymbols.It

concludesthatpoliticalsymbolsarechosenbecausetheyreflecttheimportant

politicalissuesofthetime,asidentifiedbypoliticalparties.Buttheirusealsoreflects

thecandidate’spersonalidealsandtheirlocalcontext.Tensionsarisewhenthe

actionsofcandidates,especiallytheuseofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buying,

underminetheanti‐corruptionsymbolthatpartieshaveworkedsohardtoestablish

onthenationalscale.Ifelectioncandidateswishtopresentacredibleimagethatis

persuasive,theymustconsiderhowvoterswillviewtheuseofthesymbolvis‐à‐vis

theiruseofmoneyandgoods.Thefactthatmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingremains

sorifeinIndonesiacanbeinterpretednotonlyasaperpetuationofingrained

politicalcustoms,butalsoasevidencethatpoliticalcandidateseitherfailto

effectively‘own’theanti‐corruptionsymbolorthattheyareunabletopersuade

votersthateradicatingcorruptionisapriority.Thus,theyareforcedtoresortto

otherformsofpersuasion.

Thethesisconcludesbyunderscoringthatpoliticalsymbol‐creationisinfluencedby

thescaleitisconstructedatandtypeofdiffusionusedtobroadcastit.Thediffusionof

symbolsinnationalelectioncampaigns,conceptualizedbytheDPP,isarelativelyuni‐

directionalandtop‐downprocessinwhichpartiesusepropagandatoinfluence

voters.However,individualcandidatesadoptandreconstitutethesymbolintheway

thattheybelievewillbemostinfluentialforgainingvotes.Itimbuedwiththe

23

candidate’sownpersonalhistoryandideals.Theincongruencebetweennationaland

individualsymbolscanbeexplainedbythedifferentfactorsshapingcampaignsat

thesetwoseparatescales.ThefragmentednatureofIndonesianpoliticalpartiesis

amplifiedbythelackofpartycoordinationandcontrolovertheactionsofindividual

candidateswho,whilerepresentingtheparty,havealotofautonomyinchoosing

howtheycampaignandfaceimmensepressuretoengageinmoneypolitics.

25

ChapterOnePoliticalsymbols,campaignsand

corruptionTheuseofpoliticalsymbols,createdwhenpartiesattempttobindthemselvesto

particularsocial,politicaloreconomicissuesinordertoshapetheirpublicimage

andmobilizesupport,isintendedtocreateabondbetweenvoterandparty.

Throughtheuseofthesesymbols,politicalactorsseektoboosttheir‘validityand

legitimacy’and‘symboliccapital’inordertogarnerpopularity(Lahusen1996:48),

andwiththeever‐increasingreachofthemedia,politicalpartiesandcandidates

facemorescrutinythanever(Balkin1999:395‐402;Rosenbergetal.1991:345;

Street2001).Indeed,anumberofstudieshavearguedthatimageismoreimportant

indeterminingvoterpreferencesthanotherfactorssuchaspolicy(Dalton2000:

923‐924;Edelman1988;KrausandGiles1989;Rosenbergetal.1991;Smith2001;

Trilling1975).Duetotheirage,emergingpartiesfaceadditionalchallengesin

demonstratingtheirlegitimacyandcredentials,aswellasmarketingtheirimage,in

theirbidtoseizepowerfrommoreestablishedpoliticalrivals.1

Peoplederiveimpressionsofpoliticsfromtheireverydayexperiences,andpolitical

campaignsrepresentaconsciousattempttoexploitthesedailyinputsinorderto

influencevoters(Schmitt‐BeckandFarrell2002:183‐184).Downs(1957)asserts

thatbecausemostpeopleareunableorunwillingtoinvestlargeamountsoftimein

gatheringinformationinordertomakeelectoraldecisions,votersuse‘information

shortcuts’inordertomakesenseofpolitics.2Inaddition,the‘mentalpicture’ofa

politicalpartyheldbymostvotersisoftenvagueandcontradictoryandtherefore

pronetomanipulation(Trilling1975:285).Assuch,targetedcampaignscanplaya

roleininfluencingpeople,especiallythosewithnofirmpoliticalallegiance.For

1BowlerandFarrell(1992b:4)arguethat,initsmostrationalform,anelectoralcampaignaimstowin,almostatanycost.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatelectoraltriumphisnotnecessarilytheendgoalforallparties.Forexample,somemaybeconsidered‘promoterparties’,whichexistnamelytohighlightparticularissues.Thesepartiesmaynothavesufficientappealorresourcestoactuallywinanelectionbutusethecampaignprocesstofocusattentiononspecificconcerns(BarneaandRahat2011:310;Berrington1985:457;HarmelandRobertson1985:517).2Downs’1957workTheEconomicTheoryofDemocracyisrecognizedasaseminaltextinstudyinghowvotersandgovernmentmakerationaldecisionsinthedemocraticcontext.Numerousstudiesdrawuponthisearlyworkintheirownresearch,forexample:BowlerandFarrell(1992b);Capelos(2010);ConoverandFeldman(1989);GreenandHobolt(2008);Kitschelt(2000);Rohrschneider(2002)andvanderBrug(2004).

26

newerparties,voteruncertaintiesaboutwhatpartiesactuallystandforoffersan

opportunitytoconnectwithvoters;toputdown‘politicalroots’.3Basingerand

Lavine(2005:181‐182)contendthatwhilenotallvoterswillbeswayedby

campaigns,theyprovideanopportunityto‘informandpersuade’thosewhoare

ambivalent.Bychoosingsymbolsthatresonatewithvoters,partiesendeavourto

garnerenoughpublicsupporttoachieveelectoralvictory(GibsonandRömmele

2001;Graber1976:19‐21;Kaufmann2004;Smith2001).4Moreover,evenindefeat,

campaignsservetobuildtheparty’sprofile,withaviewtofutureelections.

Thecreation,transmissionandmutationofpoliticalsymbolsarecoreaspectsof

campaigning(Howard2003:213).Campaignscanbeunderstoodascomprisingfour

basicelements:themessagesthatthecampaignwishestocommunicate;the

channel(s)ofcommunicationemployedtorelaythesemessages;theimpactofthese

messagesupontargetaudiences;andthefeedbackloopfromtheaudiencebackto

thecampaigningorganization(Norris2002:128).Whileselectingpertinentpolitical

symbolsisimportant,framingthesesymbolseffectivelyisalsoparamount.5Oncea

partyhasdecidedwhichsymbolsitwishestoproject,campaignstrategiesand

propagandamustconstructtheminmeaningfulwaysthatareattractivetovoters

(Herrnson1988:14‐15).Withoutaneffectivecommunicationstrategythattakes

intoaccountthesocio‐politicalcontextofthecampaign,partieswillfailtomaximize

theinfluenceoftheirmessage(Grofman1985).Finally,the‘feedbackloop’allows

fortheongoingadaptationofmessagesandcommunicationmechanismsasthe

campaignprogresses,inresponsetoaudienceinput.

TheprominenceofcorruptionasamoralandpoliticalprobleminIndonesiamakes

theanti‐corruptionsymbolattractivetopartiesandcandidates.Corruption—and

3Forfurtherdiscussionontheconceptof‘politicalroots’seeMainwaring(1998:72).4Farrell(2006:129)arguesthatpartieshaveshiftedfrom‘selling’to‘marketing’themselves,gatheringinformationaboutvoterwantsandattitudes,andframingtheirsymbolwithinthesenarrativesinordertopursuevotes.Asaconsequence,campaignsinvolvemuchmoreplanningthantheyoncedidandpreparationtimesarelonger(Farrell2006;IyengarandSimon2000).5Framingistheprocessbywhichactorsare‘activelyengagedintheproductionandmaintenanceofmeaningforconstituents,antagonists,andbystandersorobservers’(BenfordandSnow2000:613).Inimbuingsymbolswithmeaning,actorsusethemtogenerateframesthatsupporttheirviewpoint,whilepossiblychallengingexistingframes.ForfurtherdiscussionsonframingseeBenfordandSnow(2000);CappellaandJamieson(1996);ChongandDruckman(2007);Fischer(2003).

27

effortstocombatit—datebacktothecolonialera.6Atthesametime,theperceived

lackofprogressineradicatingcorruptionandpublicbeliefthatitisanentrenched

facetofpoliticsrenderstheissueasensitiveone.7Politiciansmustbalancetheir

attemptstomobilizetheissueinawaythatfosterstheircredibilitywhilealso

allayingpubliccynicism.Individualpoliticiansmayshyawayfromtheanti‐

corruptionissuealtogether,evenwhencombatingcorruptionisapartypriority,

fearingthatscepticalvoterswillscornthemforit.Theymayevendirectlycontradict

theirownparty’sattemptstobuildananti‐corruptionsymbolbytryingtoassure

theirvictorybyengagingincorruptpractices.Incongruentrhetoricandactions

withinapoliticalparty’selectioncampaignmayunderminetheunitedfrontofthe

party,subsequentlyfuellingfurtherscepticismandpublicbacklashfromvoters.

Thischapterdiscussestheoriesonsymboluseincampaignsandwhycorruption,in

particular,maybeapopularpoliticalissueforemergingpartiestodiscuss.Itbegins

withanexaminationofwhysymbolsareimportantforpartiesandthe

considerationsrequiredtoeffectivelypromotethem.Italsodiscusseshowaparty

invokessymbolsacrossdifferentscalesandthedifferenttypesofinfluenceexerted

bytheparty’snationalexecutiveandbyindividualcandidates.Itthenreflectsupon

theabstractbenefitsanddisadvantagesofusingcorruptionasapoliticalsymbol,

whichareparticularlypertinentgivenitshistoryintheIndonesiancontext.The

chapterarguesthatevenintheoreticaltermstherearedangersinusingcorruption

asacampaignissue,especiallygiventhat,inthemindsofmany,thegovernmentand

corruptiongohand‐in‐hand.

Symbols

Symbolsconstitute‘carefullyexecutedattemptstoinfluencethepublicagendain

ordertoshapeelectionoutcomes’(GreenandHobolt2008:473).Partiesattemptto

frametheirimageintermsthatcorrespondwithpublic‘patternsofperception,

interpretationandevaluation’,mobilizingandinterpretinggrievancesinorderto

appealtovoters(Lahusen1996:46).Theymay‘mobilize’votersbyappealingto

ideologicalpriorities,or‘chase’thembyfocusingonpollsandcraftingrhetoricin

linewithwhattheybelievethepublicwantstohear(Rohrschneider2002:368‐

6CorruptionwasalreadyconsideredanentrenchedaspectofthegovernmentbureaucracyduringtheDutchcolonialperiod(Wertheim1963).Thehistoryofcorruptionandanti‐corruptioneffortsinmodernIndonesiawillbediscussedatlengthinChapterTwo.7Citizens’attitudestowardspartiesandpoliticiansintheIndonesiancontextarediscussedinChapterThree.

28

369).8Assymbolsareintendedtopersuade,partiestendtowardsmainstream

issuesthatlackfinedetail,affordingvoterstheopportunitytointerpretthemin

accordancewiththeirownworldviews.

BowlerandFarrell(1992b:15)contendthatelectoralsuccesshingesonawell‐

conceivedandwell‐executedcampaignbuiltonthreefoundations:partyimage,

leaderimageandtheparty’smanifestoproposals.9Politicalsymbolsaimtogenerate

positiveassociationsacrosstheseelements.Harrop(1990:278)likensthe

campaignprocessto‘servicessoldontrust’,inwhichvoterschoosethesupplier

(thepartyand/orthecandidate)thattheybelievewillmostlikelyoffer‘future

satisfaction’.Assuch,partiesmustconvincevotersthattheyarecompetent,reliable

andconsistent.Furthermore,votersaregenerallyscepticalofgrandpromises,and

thereforepartiesmustbecarefultobuildsymbolsthatareappealingandcredible

(TomzandVanHouweling2008:303).Settlingonthebestsymbolstoadoptisalso

difficultbecausetheymustappealtoswingvoterswithoutalienatingtheexisting

supportbase(Herrnson1988:12).10

Againstthebackdropofaparty’snation‐widecampaign,thepoliticalimageofits

leadersandofindividualcandidatesiscrucial.Thisimagecanbeinfluencedby

physicalelements,includingcandidates’appearanceandpresentationskills,aswell

asasuccessfuluseofrhetorictoframesymbols.11Thecreationofapositive

personalimagepromotesthe‘validityandlegitimacy’ofanactorandhis/hergoals,

8JowettandO'Donnell(2006:33)identifytwomeansthroughwhichpeopleseektopersuade:eitherbyconfirmingexistingbeliefsorbychallengingthem.Challengingexistingbeliefsoftenfacesresistance.Consequentlymanypoliticalstrategies,particularlyduringelectioncampaigns,focusuponconcernsthatwilleasilygaintractionratherthanattemptingtochangewhatpeoplealreadythink.9Thesethreekeytenantsareofvaryingsignificanceduringanelectioncampaign.10Swingvotersareoftenidentifiedasthecoreaudienceforpoliticalcampaigns,asitistheundecided,‘centre‐ground,floatingvoters’thatarebelievedtoholdthekeytoelectoraltriumph(Evans2004:137).11AccordingtoDruckmanetal.(2004:1184),politicalpsychologistshighlightfourimagesorpersonalitycharacteristicsthatthepublicfindsappealingandmaybestrategicallyattractivetocampaigns:competence,strength,warmth,andtrust.Theyarguethatcompetenceisgenerallyidentifiedbyvotersasthemostimportanttrait,givingcandidatesanincentive‘toboostvoters’perceptionsoftheircompetenceandstrengthtohandletoughproblems’.

29

knownas‘symboliccapital’(Lahusen1996:48).12Harrop(1990:279)contendsthat

sincevotersliketoputahumanfacetotheparty,itisuptoindividualmembersto

establishthenewparty’scredibility,thenengendertrustfromthecommunity.For

somevoters,leaderscometoembodythesymbolsandrhetoricoftheirparty,so

muchsothatpartycredibilitycomestodependonaclosealignmentbetween

personalandpartyimage(Capelos2010;Harrop1990).

Thesuccessthatpartieshaveinaligningthemselveswithcertainpoliticalsymbolsis

alsoimportantinestablishing‘cues’forvoters.RecallingDowns’(1957)assertion

thatvotersuse‘informationshortcuts’tounderstandpolitics,cuesareonesuch

shortcutthatassistvoterstomakeinferencesaboutpartiesandcandidates

(ConoverandFeldman1989:914;Hicken2009:5).Forexample,itmaybedesirable

tobuildananti‐corruptionsymbolbecauseofitslinkstoawholerangeof‘public‐

servicerelated’valuessuchastrust,honesty,humanity,equityandresponsibility

thatfeedintomattersofsocialjusticeandequalitybeforethelaw(Collins2012:6).

Ifapartyisabletocreateapopularsymbol,individualcandidatesmaybenefitfrom

beinglinkedtotheparty’s‘brand’(GeysandVermeir2014:1030;Popkin1991:

100).Inbuildingtheirbrand,partieshopetoachieve‘issueownership’—whena

partyorcandidatehassosuccessfullyboundthemselvestoaparticularsymbolthat

theybecomedirectlyequatedwithit—andthemoresalienttheissue,themore

appealingitistobeassociatedwithit.13

Symbolsincampaigns

Petrocik’stheoryof‘issueownership’(1996)isausefulconceptualtoolfor

examininghowpartiestrytoattachthemselvestosalientissues.Petrocik(1996:

826)contendsthatelectoraloutcomesare,tosomeextent,basedonacandidate’s

abilitytoconvincevotersthattheyarebetterpositionedtohandlecertainissues

12Therearedifferentformsofcapital.Inadditiontosymboliccapital,theseincludeeconomiccapital(cash,saving,property,etc.),whichfundthecampaign;culturalcapital(knowledgeandknow‐howassembledbypoliticalactors);andsocialcapital(becausenetworkscancompelpeopletovoteacertainway)(Lahusen1996:48).Thehighertheselevelsofcapital,themorelikelyacandidateistosucceed.Inhisstudyofthelegitimacyofaidorganizationsusingcelebrityendorsementforpoliticalmobilization,Lahusen(1996:48‐49)contendsthatsymboliccapitalplaysanessentialrolein‘capitaltransformation’becauseitspurstheconversionofotherformsofcapitalintoactivesupport.13‘Salience’isatermfrequentlyusedtodenotetheimportanceassignedtoaparticularissue,designatingtheweightthatindividualsattachtopoliticalinformation.Issuesaliencecanbeincreasedthrough‘elitecommunication’withanagenda‐settingfunction,amplifiedbythemediaandbyinternationalcommentary(McCannandDomınguez1998:485;Zaller1992:268).However,thereissomedebatearoundtheexactmeaningoftheword(Wlezien2005).

30

thantheiropponents—inotherwords,theycometo‘own’thatissue.14Accordingto

thistheory,themoststraightforwardwayforapartytogainownershipofanissue

isviaa'historyofattention,initiative,andinnovationtowardstheseproblems,

whichleadsvoterstobelievethatoneoftheparties(anditscandidates)ismore

sincereandcommittedtodoingsomethingaboutthem’(Petrocik1996:826).15For

example,intheUnitedStatestheDemocratsaretraditionallyassociatedwithissues

ofeducationandwelfare,whereasRepublicansaremorecloselyassociatedwith

socialissuessuchasfightingcrimeandprotectingmoralvalues.Thisownershiphas

becomeentrenchedoveryearsofpoliticaldiscourseandrivalrybetweentheparties

andtheseassociationswouldbedifficulttoreverse(Petrocik1996).Ownershipcan

alsobe‘performancebased’,suchasinthefieldsofeconomicmanagement,national

securityandbureaucraticperformance,whicharenotautomaticallyownedbya

particularpartybut,rather,areattributedbasedonpolicysuccessesandfailures

(Petrociketal.2003:599).Thusthereareboth‘associative’and‘competence’

dimensionstoissueownership,wherebyvotersassociateapartywithanissue,as

wellasjudgeitscapabilitytoaddressit(Druckmanetal.2004:1182;Walgraveetal.

2012:772‐773).16

14Petrocik’stheoryhasbeenfurtherdevelopedbyanumberofstudies,forexample:BélangerandMeguid(2008);GreenandHobolt(2008);Kaufmann(2004);Sellers(1998)andvanderBrug(2004).HeacknowledgesthathisworkdrawsheavilyfromRabinowitzandMacdonald’s(1989)‘directionaltheory’ofissuevoting,whichpositedthatthesalienceofissuesforvoterscouldbemeasuredbywhethertheyconjuredpositiveornegativefeelings(markingdirection)andwhetherthosefeelingwerestrongorweak(markingintensity).RabinowitzandMacdonald,inturn,drewtheiranalysisfromobservationsbyEdelman(1964)thatmostcitizensoperatewithlowlevelsofinformationandthereforemostpoliticaldecisionarebasedonemotionalresponses(RabinowitzandMacdonald1989:94).AnotherrelatedtheorywasputforwardbyCoxandMcCubbins(1986),whoarguethatitisnotsomuchissues,butratherthepromisetoredistributefavoursandbenefitsonceelected,thatdrivessupportforcertaincandidates.Thistheoryisbasedonthepremisethatvotersareprimarilydrivenbyself‐interestandwillsupportthecandidatethatpromisestochannelthemostbenefitstothem.WhilethisargumentholdsadifferenttheoreticalbasistoPetrocik’sconceptof‘issueownership’,itdoesnotnegatetheimportanceofissueownershipasameansforpromotingacandidate’spromises.15Thisisnotthesoletheoryadvancedtoexplainvoterdecisions.TomzandVanHouweling(2008)outlinethreedifferenttheoriesonhowvotersjudgepoliticalcandidates:proximitytheory,whichholdsthatcitizensprefercandidateswhosepositionisclosesttotheirown;discounting,whichpositsthatvotersrealizethatcandidatesrarelydeliverfullyontheircampaignpromisesandthereforevoterselectthecandidatetheybelievewillfallclosesttotheirownviewsoncecompromiseshavebeenmade;anddirectionaltheory,whichhasalreadybeendiscussed.Thesetheoriesarguefordifferentdecision‐makingprocessesbutallagreeontheimportanceofgainingissueownership.16Studieshavefoundthatwhilethecompetencedimensiontendstohaveadirectimpactonvoterpreferences,theassociativedimensionisonlyimportantifthevoteralreadydeemsanissuetobeimportant(GreenandHobolt2008;Walgraveetal.2012).

31

Petrocik(1996:828)arguesthattheownershipofissuesischangeableas

‘reputations…[are]regularlytestedandreinforced’.Thisispertinenttoemerging

partiesthatmaynothavehadtheopportunitytoentrench,orevendemonstrate,

theirperformancecredentials.Issueownershipbyapartymayalsocomebyvirtue

ofbeinguntaintedbytheproblemsfacingotherparties.Corruptionisonepolitical

concernoverwhichpartiescanseizeownershipfromrivals.Forinstance,ifaparty

suffersacorruptionscandalandlosepublicconfidence,rivalshavetheopportunity

toappropriateownershipoftheissue(Pujas2006:36).However,ownershipgained

undersuchcircumstancesislikelytobeshort‐termless(or‘leased’)andless

entrenchedthanthatwhichisbasedonhistory.Inaddition,particularcandidates

cancometo‘own’issuesthatarenottraditionallylinkedtotheirpartiesiftheyhave

anindividualhistorywhichaffordsthemcredibilityoncertainissues(Kaufmann

2004;Sellers1998).IntheIndonesiancase,severalemergingpartypoliticians—

includingtheleadersofallthreepartiesexaminedhere—previouslybelongedto

otherparties,andbringwiththemthereputationsthattheyestablishedtotheir

newroles.Thoseenteringpoliticsfromotherfields,suchasactivistsorbusiness

people,mayalso‘own’anissuebyvirtueoftheirpastprofessionalexperience.

Issueownershipissignificantbecauseitpromotesthebeliefthatcertainparties

and/orcandidatesarebetterabletohandleparticularpoliticalconcerns,allowing

voterstoselectpartiesthattheybelievewillbestaddresstheissuestheyprioritize

(BélangerandMeguid2008).Notonlyarepartiesactivelyadvertisingthemselves

andtheirsymbolstothemasses(GibsonandRömmele2001:32;Smith2001),but

themassesaresearchingforhintsastowhowillbestmeettheirpolitical

expectations.However,advertisingisnotastraightforwardprocessascampaigns

needtoaccountforcitizens’priorknowledgeandlong‐heldbeliefsaboutparties

andcandidates(AnsolabehereandIyengar1994:335;DaltonandWeldon2005).

Campaignsdonotoccurinavacuumandeffectiveissueownershipneedstohave

somebasis,eitherinthehistoryoftheparty(orlackthereofinthecaseofemerging

parties)and/orthecandidate,andsymbolsmustbedevelopedthrougheffective

narratives.Otherwise,campaignsruntheriskofbeingunconvincing,oreven

appearinghypocritical,iftheytrytogainownershipoveranissueonwhichthe

partyorcandidatehasapoortrackrecord.

Inattachingthemselvestoasymbol,politicalpartiesandcandidatesmustensure

notonlythattheirmessageisbeingrelayedeffectively,butalsothattheaudienceis

32

asreceptiveaspossibletothemessage.Onestrategyusedtoimprovethesalienceof

symbolsis‘issuepriming’whereby‘extensivemediacoverageorcandidate

discussionofspecificpolicyareas…primevotestogivemoreweighttothoseareas

assessingcandidates’(Druckmanetal.2004:1180).17Inanattempttonurture

discussionfocusedonissuesrelatedtotheirchosenpoliticalsymbols,partiesand

candidatesrepeatedlyunderscoretheissueinpublicforums,hopingtoconvince

votersthatitshouldbetheirprioritytoo.Throughsuccessfulissuepriming,the

salienceofthechosenissueisincreased,hopefullyleadingtopublicsupportforthe

party’s(orcandidate’s)stanceand/orrecognitionoftheissueasbeingofnational

importance(JacobsandShapiro2000;TraugottandLavrakas2000).

Issueprimingmaybeinfluencedbythecandidate’sownviewsbutmustalsotake

intoaccountexistingpublicdiscourseandexternaleventsthatmaylimitorbroaden

thepublicagenda.Voterdecisionsmaybeinfluenced,inpart,bythepolitical

campaign,buttheimpactofissueprimingwillalsodependuponaperson’s

individualbeliefs,religion,ideologyandpersonalhistory.18Somevotersarestaunch

supportersofaparticularpoliticalpartyorfaction(Reid1988:42).Thesepeople

aregenerallynotthetargetsofpoliticalcampaigns,whichareaimedatswingvoters

whoaremorelikelytorespondtodiscussionsoncontemporaryissues.Conversely,

as(Capelos2010)contends,ifavoterissympathetictoaparticularcandidate,they

mayalsotendtoagreewiththemintheirevaluationofpolicyissues.Amongstthese

voters,thecandidaterepresentstheprimaryvehicleofdebate,providinga

justificationforcandidate‐centriccampaigns(Reid1988:38).

Developinganarrative

Politicalsymbolscanbeconstructedintwomainways.Thefirst,asdiscussedinthe

workofPetrocik,isthroughlong‐termattentiontowardsaparticularissueorsome

otherdemonstrationofcommitmentthroughperformance.Thesecondisthrough

persuasion.Persuasivenarrativesrepresentakeymethodofconstructing,

preservingandsellingpoliticalsymbols.Ifapartycannotdemonstrateanongoing

historicalcommitmenttotheissueitwishestouseasasymbol,itmustdevelopa

17Issueprimingisalsoreferredtoas‘agendasetting’(IyengarandSimon2000:157).18HuckfeldtandSprague(1992:83)notethatindividuals’politicalpreferencesareinfluencednotjustbypartiesasorganizations,butalsobyfactorssuchaseducation,age,gender,religionandethnicattachment.Inaddition,anumberofstudiesinvestigatevoters’perceptionsandreactionstopoliticalcandidates.ThisresearchwasprimarilypioneeredbypoliticalscientistsintheUnitedStates,suchasLazarsfeldetal.(1948).ForotherexamplesseeHuckfeldtandSprague(1992);Lodgeetal.(1995);Rahnetal.(1994).

33

coherentandconvincingnarrativethatpositionsthepartyinrelationtothat

symbol.BennettandEdelman(1985:159)definenarrativesas‘sociallyexistent,

patternedinterpretationsoftheworld…thatframepeople’sviewsofsituations,of

“rationality,ofobjectivity,ofmorality,andoftheirconceptionsofthemselvesand

others”’.Politicalcommunicationisbasedonthecreationof‘stockpoliticalplots’:

formulaicstoriesthatdissolveambiguitybycreating‘blackandwhitereplaysof

politicaldramas’whicharedesignedtopacifythepublic.19Apter(2006:223)

describessuchdiscoursesas‘masternarratives’,inwhichpoliticianstakeissuesof

everydayconcern,playinguponmoraldiscontent,tocreate‘expressionsofgoodand

evilastheultimatepoliticaldivide’.

Politicalsymbolsareprimarilybroadcastthroughlanguageandactionsthatare

deliberatelyfashionedtopersuadevoters.20Inhistreatiseonrhetoric,Burke(1969:

41)describesitastheartofpersuasionitselfwiththebasicintentionofinducing

actionsinhumanagents.21Rhetoriccantakeanumberofforms,butisbroadly

definedbytheintentiontopersuadeobservers,toorganizetheirattitudesandalter

theirviewsofobjectsandissues(Gusfield1986:170).Itisabehaviourthatisboth

instrumentalandsymbolic:instrumentalbecauseitisintendedtoprovokea

particularactionandsymbolicbecauseitdrawsuponexamples/wordsinorderto

elicitmuchbroaderideasoremotionswithintheaudience(BowersandOchs1971:

2).Specificvocabulariesaredevelopedtodeliverthesenarratives,resultingin‘a

particularmodeorethosofmoralreasoning…thatincludesnotonlyparticular

formsofmoralargumentation,butalsoparticularsymbols,signs,codewords,and

othermoralresources[emphasisintheoriginal]’(Lowe2002:108).Intermsof19PioneeredbyBennettandEdelman,the‘narrativeapproach’topoliticalcommunicationviewsitastheadaptationoffacts,newsandeventstocreate“stockpoliticalplots”intendedtopersuadevoters(Lahusen1996:21).Itshouldbenoted,though,thatthefactthatapoliticalplotisconsidered‘stock’,doesnotmeanthatitisnotcontroversial—indeed,acontroversialplotmaybemoreusefulbecauseitgarnersmoreattention.Whatpartiesmustdowithsuchissuesisensurethattheyfallonthe‘right’sideofthecontroversialdebateinordertoappealtotheirtargetaudience(Edelman1988:14).20This‘artofpersuasion’refersbothtotheactofcommunication(fromthelistener’sperspective),andpersuasionbeingtheintention/successfuloutcomeofthatcommunication(fromthespeaker’sperspective)(Chateris‐Black2005:8).21Burke(1952:x‐xvi;1969;1989),apioneerinthestudyofpoliticallanguage,arguesthatlanguageandsymbolsarequintessentiallysignificanttopoliticalandsocialprocesses.Moreover,thefunctionoflanguageis‘whollyrealistic,andiscontinuallybornanew;theuseoflanguageasasymbolicmeansofinducingcooperationinbeingsthatbynaturerespondtosymbols’(Burke1969:43).Burkeproposeda‘dramatismpentad’,inwhichmotiveisattributedtolanguagebasedonananalysisofact(whathappened),scene(whereitwasdone),agent(whodidit),agency(howtheydiditandwhatmethodsortechniquestheyused)andpurpose(whyithappened)(Burke1989:14‐15).Hecontendsthattextualanalysisusingthistechniqueallowsobserverstodiscernthemotivesbehindrhetoric.

34

politicalmarketing,wordsalsomatter;theycreatea‘positiveresidualstimulus’

whilealsoattractingattentionviasound‐bites(Reid1988:37).

TheclassicalnotionofsuccessfulrhetoricwasfirstdefinedbyAristotleasthe

demonstrationofethos,logosandpathos—tohavemoral‘worthiness’orcredibility

(ethos),prooftosupportargument(logos),andthecapacitytoarousefeelingsinthe

audience(pathos)(citedinChateris‐Black2005:11).Investigatingthesethree

elementsprovidesavaluablestartingpointforassessingwhyrhetoricmaysucceed

orfailinitsaims.Forexample,aspeechbyapoliticianmayevokeasenseofmoral

worthiness,butiftheoratorfailstoprovideprooftosupporttheargument,or

deliveritpersuadingly,thentherhetoricwillfailtomovetheaudience.

Aristotle’stheorydoesnotclarifytherelativeimportanceofeachoftheseelements,

butwiththesignificanceofimageandpersonalityinpolitics,themethodof

communicatinghasbecomeincreasinglymeaningful.Withregardtopathos,the

impactofcharismaandrhetoriconemotionssuchasfear,weaknessand

ignorance—orwhatissometimesreferredtoasdemagoguery—canbeparticularly

influential,dependingonthecontextandaudience.22Charismacanneverbeentirely

divorcedfromactions(Keane1997:12),butwhataleaderlacksinmoralcredibility

andproofmaybecompensatedforbyhisorherabilitytostirtheemotionsofthe

audience,usingbothanarrestingstyleofdeliveryandsymbols.Drawingfrom

Weber’stheoryofcharismaticleadership,thebenefitsofthischarismacanbe

transferredtoothermembersofthepartythroughthecoordinatedadoptionof

matchingsymbols,linkingothersinthegroupwiththeimageofitscharismatic

leader(Starratt1993:12).23Inotherwords,ifcommunicatedeffectively,the

symbolswithwhichtheleaderisassociatedmaycometobeassociatedwiththe

partyasawhole.Intheabsenceofcharismaordemagoguery,anarrativemust

demonstratealogicalandmeaningfulrelationshipbetweenthefacts,events,objects

andpersonsinvolvedifitistobecredibletoanaudience(Lahusen1996:24).

Withoutsucharelationship,thenarrativebecomesunintelligibleandincoherent.

22Lindholm(1990:7)definescharismaasarelationshipbetweenleaderandfollowersinwhichtheleaderisimbuedwithextraordinaryqualities.Forexample,peoplewhoare‘downtroddenandoppressedbyasystemtheyconsiderillegitimate’maylooktoa‘charismaticsaviour’toaddresstheirconcerns(Lindholm1990:175).23Weber(1947:328)definesthree‘pure’typesoflegitimateauthority:rationalgrounds,traditionalgroundsandcharismaticgrounds.Charismaticlegitimacyisbasedon‘devotiontothespecificandexceptionalsanctity,heroismorexemplarycharacterofanindividualperson,andofthenormativepatternsororderrevealedorordainedbyhim’.

35

ReturningtoAristotle’sfacetsofsuccessfulrhetoric,rhetoriccannotsucceedifthe

linguisticchoicesofthespeaker(thelogos)donotmatchthelistener’sevaluationof

thespeaker’sethos.24

Thenotionthatthedesiretoinfluenceopiniondetermineslanguagechoiceisalso

thefoundationfortheconceptof‘dramatism’(Burke1952;1989;Gusfield1986).

Dramatismrepresentsthedistinctionbetweenpoliticalactionas‘significantperse’

and‘asameanstoanends’(Gusfield1986:166).25Language,here,isdramatic

becauseitsprimarymotiveistoinspireacertainactionintheaudience.Theconcept

ofdramatism,or‘politics‐as‐theatre’,alsoprovidesaframeworkforunderstanding

themotivationsbehindcertainpromisesortokenisticactionsthatmaybevery

visiblebutyieldlittleintheformofactualchange.26Apter(2006:222)claimsthat

decisionsmadebypoliticiansshouldbeviewedasinstrumental,astheirultimate

intentionistomanipulatepublicopinioninordertogenerateormaintainpower.27

Theinfluenceofpoliticaltheatreshouldnotbeunderestimatedbecause:

Itoffersopportunitiestobeguile,entice,orentrapaudience,apublic,ora

citizen.Itisalsoawayofencouragingapreferenceforpassionoverreason

…Inshortitis,amongotherthings,amethodofinstrumentalgulling…It

canbesimplyfun,entertaining,butnotwhenthatpreventscitizensfrom

takingamorepropermeasureoftruth(Apter2006:247).

24Thefailuretounderstandtherelationshipbetweenthesetwofacetshasledtoanegativeviewofrhetoricasmerelyan‘over‐decorativeuseoflanguage’(Chateris‐Black2005:9).Rhetoricisoftennegativelyequatedwithstyleoversubstance,thoughthisunderstandingignoresthenotionthatcredibilityis,infact,anintrinsicfacetofsuccessfulrhetoric.25Burke’stheoryofdramatismwasexpandedinthepoliticalcontextbyGusfield(1986)inhisseminalworkontheAmericantemperancemovement.Throughthisstudy,Gusfieldelaboratedtheideaofdramatisminpoliticsandthe‘state‐as‐theatre’,arguingthattheuseofsymbolsisofcrucialsignificanceforshapingpublicopinion.26Blackbourn(1987:149),inhisstudyofGermanpoliticsfrom1848–1933,contendsthattheconceptofpoliticsastheatrefirstemergedin1848whenalooselycoordinatedrevolutioneruptedintheGermanstatesagitatingfortheunificationofallGerman‐speakingstates.Therevolutionwasunsuccessful,butthisperiodbecamerenownedforthecharismaandpublicimagedevelopedbyrevolutionaries:‘Fewwhohavewrittenontheeventsofthatyearhavefailedtonoteinpassingtheself‐consciousnessoftherevolutionaries,theirverbal,gesturalandsartorialtheatricality.’27Anderson(1990:152‐193)outlinesseveralformsofpoliticalcommunicationinIndonesiathatcanbeviewedthroughthelensofdramatism,includingthebuildingofmonuments.Aimingtorousenationalistsentimentamongstthemasses,severalmonumentswerebuiltinJakartaduringtheSukarnoPeriod,eachwithitsownassociatednarrative.TheactofbuildingthesemonumentswasadramaticgestureintendedtodemonstrateSukarno’sowncommitmenttothenationwhilstalsoencouraginganimpassionedresponsefromcitizenstosupporthisregime,evenwhileitwasfailingpoliticallyandeconomically.ThepoliticalandeconomichistoryofSukarno’sOldOrderruleisdiscussedfurtherinChapterTwo.

36

Thereisnothingbanalaboutpolitics‐as‐theatresincethepurposeofdramatismlies

inthemanipulationofpublicsentiment,whichisinturnusedtoseize,retainand

exercisepower(Apter1992).28Becausepeoplearegenerallydistrustfulofpolitical

rhetoric,apolitician’ssuccessliesnotonlyintheirabilitytoselectpertinent

politicalsymbolsbutalsotoportraytheminawaythatconvincesvotersthattheir

‘dramatic’selfisatruereflectionoftheir‘authentic’self(Giesen2006:354‐355).

Symboldiffusionacrossscales

AsSartori(1976:71)argues,farfrombeingasingleunit,partiesareinfact

miniaturepoliticalsystems.29Withinthesesystems,symbolsaredefinedand

communicateddifferentlyatdifferentlevels.Theoriesofdiffusion,whichseekto

explainhowideasspread,provideawayofunderstandingthesedifferencesin

termsofthetypesofinteractionsthatvaryinglevelsofapartymayhavewith

voters.30Classicaldiffusiontheoryholdsthatideascantravelthroughrelational,

non‐relationalormediatedchannels(Givanetal.2010:2;Tarrow2011:192).

Relationalchannelsrelyondirectcontactbetweenpeople,mostoftenthosewho

trusteachother.Non‐relationaldiffusionoccursdirectlybetweenpeoplewhodo

nothavearelationshiporindirectlythroughthesharingofideasviathemedia.

Mediateddiffusionoccursthrough‘brokers’whotalkabouttheideasofothers,

actingasabridgebetweenpeoplewhomightnototherwisehaveknowneach

other.31Morerecentdiscussionsofdiffusionassertthattheprocessisfluidand

oftentheideabeingdiffusedisneitherclearnorevenafinishedproduct.Attention

28Forexample,Rauer(2006)describestheoutpouringofnationalandinternationalsupportgarneredthroughthesymbolicactionofGermanChancellorWillyBrandtkneelingattheWarsawMemorialin1971,whichhonouredmembersoftheJewishGhettoUprisingof1943.Treisman(1998:15),inanotheracademicdiscussionofthepowerofpoliticalsymbols,contendsthatinRussia’sdemocratictransitionduringthe1990s,theuseofcontroversialissues,languagethatflatteredvotersandsexualimageryledtoanelectionthatfocusedlessonthe‘credibilityandattractivenessofpoliciesthanonentertainmentvalueandthecatharticreleaseofthepoliticalspectacleitself’.29Sartori’sanalysisfocusesupontheunitsthatcompriseapartyandintra‐partyrelations.Hedoesnotseektoexplainhowthedifferentelementsofparties’internalpoliticalsystemsaffecttheflowofpoliticalsymbolsandtheproductfinallypresentedtovoters.30Predominantlyassociatedwithstudiesofsocialmovements,thetheoryofdiffusionwasadoptedbyacademicsduringthe1990stounderstandhowideasspreadwithin,andbetween,socialmovements(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).Earlystudiesfocuseduponhowinnovationsspreadfromtransmittertoadoptercommunities(StrangandSoule1998).Theconceptlaterexpandedtoincludethetransmissionofideas(BaybeckandHuckfeldt2002:197).31Whilethereisageneralconsensusintheliteraturethatthesethreechannels,eitheraloneorincombination,areameansforthetransferofideas,forexamplesseeMcAdamandRucht(1993);StrangandMeyer(1993),therehasalsobeendebateovertheessentialistnatureofdiffusiontheoryinitsclassicalform(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).

37

mustbepaidtohowagroupreceivinganoutsideideamakesittheirown.Also,

diffusiondoesnotnecessarilyoccurinlinealprogressivestagesbutisrathera

dynamicprocessthatismultidirectionalinitsmovementsacrossscalesandcanskip

steps(ChabotandDuyvendak2002).32

Thenotionofdiffusionasaprocessthatoccursacrossscales,butnotnecessarilyin

aunidirectionalmanner,providesaframeworkforanalysinghowpoliticalsymbols

arebothinfluencedandtransmitted.Inapoliticalcampaign,thediffusionof

symbolsworksprimarilyintwodifferentways.First,therearenationalcampaigns

thatreach‐outvotersvianon‐relationalchannels,suchasadvertisingandreporting

inthenationalmedia.Inasense,these‘skip’alevelbecausethemessageis

broadcastdirectlyfrompartyheadquarterstoindividuals,by‐passingpartyofficials

atthelocallevel.Inacentrally‐organizedelectioncampaign,thecentralparty

leadershipselectswhatitbelievestobethemostpertinentsymbols,thencreatesa

campaignthatpresentsthemasbeingrepresentativeofthepartyasawhole.It

decidesuponnarrativeandcampaigntechniques.Discussionsamongstseniorparty

membersdeterminetheoverallcampaignprioritiesofthepartyandtheuseof

resourcesatthenationallevel.Centralizedfundsearmarkedforpublicityareused

todisseminatethesymbolsthroughvariousadvertisingmethods.Withthe

‘professionalization’ofelectioncampaigns,thecentralpartyofficealsohasan

increasedimportanceasasiteofcoordinationforthedifferentfacetsofa

professionalcampaign,includingtraditionalcommunicationsandevents,television,

andnewtechnologies(FarrellandWebb1998:4‐6;GibsonandRömmele2001).33

Partieshiremediaandmarketingprofessionalsascampaignconsultantstodevelop

targetedmessages,whicharethenbroadcasttovotersacrossthecountryusing

variousnon‐relationalchannels.Themarketingteamaregenerallychargedwith

lobbyingnationalmediaoutlets,aswellasusingthemforpaidadvertising

(Hopmannetal.2012),furtherconsolidatingtheroleofsymboldevelopmentatthe

nationalscale.

32InhisstudyoftheIndonesianpro‐democracymovement,Uhlin(1995)employsdiffusiontheorytoexplainthespreadofdemocraticideasfromforeigncountriestoIndonesia.Whilethisthesisfocusesonthetransferofideasdomestically,itdrawsfromsimilarunderstandingsofdiffusiontheory.33FarrellandWebb(1998:4)definetraditionalmeansofcampaigningascommunicationthroughpartypress,posters,massralliesandcanvassingaswellaseventscentredaroundpartyleaders,suchas‘whistlestoptours’andmassrallies.

38

Second,thecandidatesthemselvescanbeviewedasconduitsthattransmitthe

symbolviarelationaldiffusion.Partysymbolsareconceptualizedandrecordedin

manifestos,‘visionandmission’documents,andactionplans,itissharedwiththe

individualcandidates.Onceinthefield,itisthecandidateswhoaresingingthe

praisesofthepartyandtryingtopersuadevotersthattheirgroupisthebest.

However,oncecandidatesare‘released’intotheelectionwild,sotospeak,they

decide,basedontheirownideasandexperiences,howbesttoexhibitthesymbolin

ordertooptimizeresults(i.e.gainthemostvotes).Inrealitythen,candidatesare

notonlyachannelfortheparty’sideas,butalsoasymbolcreatorthemselves,

instillingtheirownvalues,historyandpersonalityintothesymbolsasthey

translatethemintotheirlocalcontext.Indonesia’sdemocraticsystemrequiresthat

partiesnominatecandidatestorepresentthemineachelectorateandtocompetein

nationalelections,butthecampaignfocusofmostcandidatesisatthelocallevel(a

few,thoughnotmany,maybeactiveonthenationalscale).Thelackofoversightof

localcampaignsbythecentralpartyofficefostersanenvironmentinwhich

candidateshaveagreatdealofautonomyovertheimagetheyprojectandthe

campaignstrategiestheyuse.Asaconsequence,candidatesfeelentitledtoadopt

theirownsymbols,regardlessofwhathasbeendecidedatthenationallevel.

Giventhatvotersarealreadyexposedtopartysymbolsvianon‐relationalmeans,it

wouldappeartomakesenseforindividualcandidatestoappropriatethesesymbols

intotheirownelectioneering,buildingupontheeffortsofthenationallevel

campaign.34However,candidatesdonotalwaysusesymbolsidentifiedbydecision‐

makersatthenationallevelinthesameway,ifatall.Theymayholdverydifferent

ideasaboutvoterinterestsfromprofessionaladvisorsbasedinJakarta,orthe

attitudes,habitsandbeliefsofvotersmayforcethemtoadapttheircampaign

(Fionna2014:12‐13).35Thepoliticalsymbolisthus(re)constitutedwiththe

prioritiesoflocalvotersinmind.36Thesocialcontextissignificanthere:for

example,ifacommunityismostlypessimisticinitsviewofpoliticsoraparticular

34Hicken(2009:5)referstothisintermsof‘economiesofscale’,notingthatthereareadvantagestocooperatingwithothercandidatesunderacommonpartybannerbecauseallcandidatescanbenefitfrompartyinvestmentinvotereducationoreffortstoincreaseturnout.35ResultsofanIndikator(anIndonesianpollingcompany)pollconductedinDecember2013suggestthatvotereducationandincomeplayasignificantroleinattitudestowardsvote‐buyinginIndonesia,withmoreaffluentandbettereducatedvotersmorelikelytoshunsuchpractices(Halim2013).Thismayaccountfordisparitiesintheacceptanceofvote‐buyingbetweendifferentregionsinIndonesia,furtherunderscoringtheimportanceoflocalcontext.36ThesepointsareaddressedinfurtherdetailinChaptersFiveandSix.

39

candidate,thensocialnetworkswillensurethatthisviewspreads.Inthesecases,

candidatesmayfindthatpoliticalsymbolshavenoeffectonvotersthatmayinturn

leadthemtovote‐buying,which,althoughillegal,iscommonintheIndonesian

context.37

Candidatesthemselvesalsocarrytheirownideas,views,historiesandnarratives,

whichinfluencehowtheyconstructtheirsymbols.Forexample,along‐timeanti‐

corruptioncampaignerislikelytousethisanti‐corruptionsymbolregardlessof

whetheritresonateswiththelocalvoters,whereasabusinessperson‐turned‐

candidatemayavoidananti‐corruptionsymbolbecauses/hehaspaidbribesto

officialsinthepastandfearsexposureasahypocrite.Somecandidatesmayidentify

verystronglywiththenarrativeofbeinga‘clean’candidate,whileothersmayhave

noqualmsaboutofferingcashinreturnforvotes.Moreover,since‘oneperson’s

bribeisanotherperson’sgift’(Rose‐Ackerman1999:5),candidatesmayunderstand

differenttypesofpracticesinvariousways.Forsomecandidates,givinggifts,money

orfavourstovotersdoesnotconstitutebribery,butisinsteadframedaspartof

socially‐embeddedandexpectedpracticesofclientelismwhichdemonstraterespect

orgratitude,orareintendedasareimbursementforthetimeandeffortofvoters.38

Furthermore,candidateswillnotnecessarilyadheretooneparticularstrategy.

Randall(1988:177)referstothis‘schizophrenicblend’ofcorruption/clientelism

andideology,that‘ambitious’politiciansmayusetodiversifytheirstrategy,to

demonstratethatsymbolsmaybeconsideredoneofmanycampaigntoolsavailable

tocandidates,andatotalcommitmenttothesymbolisbynomeansaprerequisite

foritsattempteduse.

37LawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofmembersfortheDPR,DPDandDPRDstatesinarticle87(1)thatcandidateswillbesanctionedifitisproventhatacampaignerhaspromisedorgivenmoneyorothergoods,directlyorindirectly,inreturnforparticipantsto(a)notusetheirrighttovote,(b)usetheirrighttovoteinsuchawaythattheyselectacandidateinawaythatinvalidatestheirvote,(c)voteforaspecificpoliticalpartyparticipatingintheelection,(d)selectaspecificcandidateforDPR,DPRDI,DPRDIIor(e)selectaspecificcandidatefortheDPD.38Clientelism,definedbyHicken(2011:289‐290)as‘thecombinationofparticularistictargetingandcontingency‐basedexchange’withinadyadicrelationshipbetweenpatronandclient,canalsobeviewedsimplyasanormalandnecessarycomponentofsecuringsupportforelectionsratherthanaformofiniquity.KitscheltandWilkinson(2007)alsodistinguishbetweenclientelisticandprogrammaticlinkagesintermsofthetargetofbenefits.Forexample,clientelisticlinkagestargetindividualsandsmallgroupswhileprogrammaticlinkagesdeliverbenefitstolargegroupsorrepresentacollectivegood.ForfurtherdiscussiononthedefinitionofclientelismseeHicken(2011);Hutchcroft(2000:214‐216);KitscheltandWilkinson(2007);Randall(2001:249‐251).

40

Why(anti)corruptionsymbols?

Selectingsymbolsthatdrawheavilyuponideasofwhatconstitutesrightandwrong

isapopularstrategyamongstpoliticalparties.Contextualunderstandingsof

morality—thecriteriausedtoevaluatesocialbehaviourandgoalsasgoodorbad,

desirableorundesirable(LidzandWalker1980),orientinganddirectingsocial

actionwithinboundariesofculturalacceptability(Ben‐Yehuda1986:495)—playa

roleindeterminingwhatsymbolsapartymaychoose.AccordingtoBen‐Yehuda

(1986),theuseofmoralarguments—specifically‘moralpanics’inpolitics—canbe

viewedintwoways:fromamoralperspectivetheyreflectstruggleswithinsociety

itself.Fromaninterestperspective,moralargumentsareusedtoadvancethe

politicalinterestsofcertainpeople/groupsandchallengeexistingpowerrelations.

Whilethetwoapproachesarenotmutuallyexclusive,theinterestperspective

explainsthemotivationforpoliticalpartiestolatchontoaparticularmoralissue

duringcampaigningandtouseitasasymbolinthecontestagainstotherparties.

AsBecker(1973:2)asserts,thereisasenseofcommunitasforthosewhoidentify

withtheseideasofmoralitythatpromotesthesocialattachmentthatpartiesseek

fromvoters.39Thosewhoexploitmorality,usingthefeargeneratedbymoralpanics

fortheirownbenefit,aredescribedas‘moralentrepreneurs’(Becker1973).Their

manipulationofmoralitysuggeststhattheyaredrivenbyfunctionalismratherthan

anactualsenseofinjustice,‘imply[ing]thatmoralitymaybeusedfornonmoral

issues’(Ben‐Yehuda1986:496).Inacontextwherecorruptionisseenas

ubiquitous,theidentificationofcorruptionasaformofdeviancefromacceptable

socialbehaviourservesaparticularpoliticalfunction.Sincethebehaviourisnotout

oftheordinary,anti‐corruptiondiscoursesmustdrawonmoral(andsometimes

legal)understandingsofcorruptionratherthanonsociologicalunderstandings.The

easewithwhichtheideacanbeengineered,andwhocanbedeemedcorrupt,is

39Lahusen(1996:51)identifiesBourdieu’sconceptofthe‘classhabitus’inrelationtothispoint.Acommunitymaybeunitedbya'specificpatternofperception,judgementsandevaluationsthatdetermineswhatparticularindividualsandclustersofindividualsjudgeasbeingmoralorimmoral,asmakingsenseornosense,beingmeaningfulormeaningless,tastefulortasteless'.

41

appealingtopoliticalcampaignersaimingtoattractsupport,inspiretrust,represent

‘good’andattackenemiesinonefellswoop.40

Whilecorruptionisnormativelyunderstoodashavinganegativeimpact,

intensifyingsocietalinequalitiesandunderminingdemocraticsystems(Mény1996:

309‐310;Sampson2010;UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme1997),itis

inextricablylinkedtothepracticalitiesofholdingpoliticaloffice.41AsGronbeck

(1978:156)contends:

Wearedealing…witharangeofpoliticaloffenceswhichperhaps

characterizeanygovernmentatanytime—graft,kickbacks,overzealous

promotionthroughthemeritocracy,slushfundswhichhavepubliceffects

withoutpublicaccountability,favorswhichbypassnormalchannels.Weare

dealing,insum,withthosebehaviorswhichmanypeopletakeaspartofthe

everydaycostofgovernment.Indeeditistheveryroutinenessofpolitical

corruptionwhichmakesitspublicairingandtreatmentsofascinating

rhetorically.Itsroutinenessandubiquity…makeitatoncefarcicaland

tragic.

YetwhilesomeIndonesiansmayviewcorruptionasnormal(orevennecessary),

thisdoesnotmeanthatanti‐corruptionsymbolsmustbeavoided.Asnotedearlier,

therearepolitically‘safe’symbolsthatpeoplearesoaccustomedtotheideological

formulationofthesestockplotsthattheyseemtobe‘naturalandadequate

characterizationsofreality’(BennettandEdelman1985:185).Thesimplificationof

corruptionwithinamoralframeworkofgoodversusevilmeansthatpoliticiansare

onlyrequiredtoelaborateontheissueinordertoaffirmthattheyfallonthe

virtuoussideofthedivide.Asatopicthatisneitherradicalnorpolarizing,40HighlightingcorruptionasapoliticalconcernisnotuniquetoIndonesia.McCoyandHeckel(2001)arguethataglobalanti‐corruptionnormemergedinthe1990s.Examplesofcountry‐specificstudiesinclude:McCannandDomınguez(1998),whodiscusstheroleofanti‐corruptiondiscourseinmobilizingvotersinMexicobetween1986and1995,concludingthatlongstandingcorruptionissuesdidnotnecessarilyleadtosupportforoppositionparties;Lawson(2009),whoresearchedtheanti‐corruptionsymbolsusedinKenyaandNigeria,wheresuchcampaignshavesufferedfromissuesoflegitimacy;andCostas‐Pérezetal.(2012),whostudiedtheimpactofcorruptionscandalsonincumbentsinSpain,findingthatacandidatecanloseupto14percentoftheirvoteifmediacoverageisextensive,butmayloseveryfewvotesifthescandalisnotwidelypublicized.41Functionalistargumentsportraycorruptionasplayinganimportantroleinfacilitatinggovernmentprocessesbecauseitcanpromoteflexibilityand‘unblocksystems’inordertogetthingsdone,particularlyinstateswithbureaucraciesthataredifficulttonavigate(Becquart‐Leclerq1990:193).

42

corruptionisabroadandmalleableissuewhichcanbeusedtoinfluenceundecided

voterswithoutalienatingexistingsupporters.Moreover,sincecorruptionis

notoriousinIndonesia,theissuehasalreadybeenprimedandpartiesdonotneed

tospendtimeconvincingvotersofitssignificance.Thestrong,almostuniversal,

identificationofcorruptionasagravepolitical,economicandsocialproblemhasled

toageneralconsensus,atleastpublicly,thatitneedstobeeradicated.

Campaigningonananti‐corruptionplatformpresentsanopportunityforpoliticians

topositionthemselveswithinamoralframeworkwhichhasbroaderimplications

thanjusttheeradicationofcorruption.Tobuildanimageofbeingstaunchlyagainst

corruptionspeaksnotonlytoa(declared)commitmenttofightingcorruption,but

alsopaintsthepartyinapositivelightoverall.Cultivatinga‘persona’isanintegral

partofthepoliticalcampaignprocess,andbeing‘anti‐corruption’isnotonly

publiclypalatablebutbrandsthepartybyassociatingitwithkeypoliticalvalueslike

ensuringruleoflawandequalaccesstogoodsandservicesfromthegovernment.

Animageofbeingcorruption‐freealsoplaysintotheelectabilityofa

party/candidate.Partiesthathavenotsufferedfromcorruptionscandals(likenew

parties)arewell‐placedtoadoptananti‐corruptionsymbolgiventheir(relatively)

‘clean’histories.Thisprovidesthemacomparativeadvantagewhichfacilitatesissue

ownership(IyengarandSimon2000:157)andthusincreasestheirsymboliccapital.

Ifapartycanconvincethepublicthattheirdedicationtocombatingcorruptionis

strongerthanthatoftheirrivals,itwillboosttheirsupportamongstvoterswho

agreethateradicatingcorruptionshouldbeprioritized.

Oppositionpartiesandcandidatesmayhaveanumberofothermotivationstouse

anti‐corruptionsymbols.First,drawingattentiontocorruptionissuesduringthe

earlystagesofcampaigning,particularlyaspectsrelatedtoelectoralfraud,allows

themabasistoquestionunfavourableresults(McCannetal.1998:485).Second,

usingsuchsymbolsassistsinattackingopponents,especiallyincumbents,levying

chargesofimproprietyorcorruptionagainstthem,promotingcampaignsfocused

onmoralcharacter,personalfinances,familylifeanddailyhabits(Welchand

Hibbing1997:228).Oppositionpartiesoftenappealtovotersforsupportonthe

groundsthattheyarebestplacedto‘banishelectoralfraudandcorruptionforever’

insituationswheretheincumbentgovernmenthasfailedinthisregard(McCannet

al.1998:485).Third,anti‐corruptionrhetoricmayalsoprovideameansfor

conveyingveiledcriticismsofotherparties,cloakingunpalatablepowerstruggles.

43

Asaninstrumentalsymbol,itdoesnotopenlyinsultopponents,butprovideswhat

Graber(1976:25)termsa‘codedmessage’ofcriticism.

However,adoptionofananti‐corruptionsymbolmayalsobeperilous.Corruption

reinforcesasymmetricalpowerrelationsandthusbenefitsthosewithavested

interestinmaintainingthesystem.Moreover,becausecorruptionandpowerareso

closelyassociated,candidates’attemptstoportraythemselvesortheirpartiesas

‘anti‐corruption’maybegreetedwithscepticism.Becquart‐Leclerq(1990:191)

arguesthatthepubliccaneasilybecomedeaftopoliticiansclaimingthattheyare

notorwillneverbecorrupt,becausetheybelievepoliticsisaninherentlydirty

game:

Feelingsofdislike,evendisgust,forpoliticsarequitefrequentandtranslate

intoapathy,orcynicism,orarejectionofpolitics.Thesesentimentsare

ambivalent,becausecorruptionseemsinherenttotheexerciseofpower.

Thelinkcanbefatal:couldonedobetterintheplaceofthosewhogovern?

Isitpossibletoplaypoliticswithoutdirtyingone’shand?

Ifcorruptionisconsideredaninherentaspectofwieldingpower,thenananti‐

corruptionsymbolmaynothavethedesiredeffectonvotersbecausetheyexpect

politicianstobecorrupt,andthereforetheexposureofcorruptactivitiesisjustthe

confirmationofsomethingalreadysuspected(WelchandHibbing1997:238).Voter

sympathiescanalsoleadthemtorationalizecorruptionscandalsinvolvingparties

thattheyhavepreviouslysupported.AstudybyAnduizaetal.(2013)inSpainfound

thatvotersaremorelenienttowardscorruptionifitaffectsapartytowhichthey

aresympathetic.42Theargumenthereisthatcognitivedissonancebetweena

preferredpartyandacorruptcandidateisaddressedbymodifyingoneofthe

cognitions,suchthatvotersaremorelikelytodownplaytheimportanceof

corruptionratherthanchangetheirpoliticalpredisposition.Researchsuggeststhat

citizensarestilllikelytovoteforcorruptpoliticiansiftheyperceivethatitwillbring

materialbenefittotheirdistrict(KonstantinidisandXezonakis2013).Ananti‐

42Inarelatedstudy,MullainathanandWashington(2006)assertthatvotersarelikelytobemoreforgivingofpoliticiansthattheyhavevotedforbecauseoftheirinternalneedforconsistency,resultingincognitivedissonancerationalizingbetweentheiractionsandtheirmorals.Theargumentisthatvotersdonotwishtobelievethattheyhavedoneabadthinginvotingforaparticularcandidateandarethereforemorelikelytojustifythecandidate’sactions.

44

corruptionsymbol,therefore,holdnoguaranteesforthosewhochoosetoadoptit

andadopteesshouldunderstandtheprioritiesandattitudesoftheiraudienceifthey

wishtomaximizethebenefitsofaligningthemselveswithananti‐corruptioncause.

Conclusion

Thisthesisdrawsuponthesetheoriesofsymbolicpoliticsasastartingpointfor

examininghowIndonesia’spoliticalpartiesconstructtheiridentity.Thedesireto

winvotescompelspartiesandcandidatestoidentifyandshapesalientsymbolsthat

elicitsupportfromvoters.InthecaseofpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia,official

symbolsaredevelopedatthenationallevel.ThecentralizedstructureofIndonesian

politicalpartiesmeansthattheyaredevisedalmostexclusivelybyparties’central

management,usuallywithlittlefeedbackfromlocalbranchoffices.Their

manifestos,platformsandmediaimagesarecontrolledfromJakarta,wheretheir

centralcommitteesarebased.Butwhiledecision‐makingovercorepartyideasare

thedomainofthesecommittees,itisindividualparliamentarycandidateswhoare

chargedwithpromotingthepartytoconstituentsatthelocallevel.Thecentral

committeehavelittlecontroloncethecampaignisinthehandsoflocalcandidates,

lackingtheresources,andarguablyinterest,tomonitorhowcandidatesconstruct

theirindividualcampaignsorhowtheyusesymbols.43

Alltheemergingpartiesdiscussedinthisstudyadoptedananti‐corruptionsymbol

duringtheir2014legislativecampaigns.Therewasawidespreadperception—

confirmedbyanumberofsurveysconductedbetween2012and2014thatfound

thattheIndonesianpublichadlowlevelsoftrustintheirrepresentatives44—that

incumbentparliamentariansandpoliticalpartieswereoverwhelminglycorruptand

drivenbyeliteambitionratherthantheaspirationsofthepeople.Atthenational

level,Hanura,GerindraandNasdemadoptedrhetoricanddramatismintendedto

persuadevotersthattheyweretheanti‐corruptionpartytosupport.Atthesame

time,individualcandidateswereaffordedtheopportunitytoestablishtheirown

43AsGantanandBusrya(2014)note,politicalpartiesdoverylittletoensurethatpoliticalcandidatesdonotbuyvotesortoestablishabetterpoliticalcultureinIndonesia.Furthermore,asMietzner(2013:83)argues,candidatesarerarelypartycadresandaremorelikelytobeindividualsseekingpartyendorsementfortheirelectoralbid.Inthiscontext,hequotesacentralpartyofficialwhostatedthattheprimarycriteriaforselectingcandidateswerepopularityinsurveys,theirabilitytofundtheirowncampaignandgovernmentexperience.Whiletheyshouldnotcontradictpartyideology,thereisnocompulsionforthemtobepartycadres.44ThesesurveysarediscussedfurtherinChapterThree.

45

symbolsandcampaignstrategies.Theprevalenceofmoneypoliticsandvote‐

buying,combinedwiththelackofpartyoversight,meantthatcandidatesfaceda

difficultdecisionofwhethertomarketthemselvesas‘clean’andanti‐corruption,to

buyvotesorto—somewhatprecariously—doboth.

Inordertounderstandhowcorruptionbecamesuchanentrenchedaspectof

Indonesia’spoliticaldiscourseand,asaconsequence,suchapopularpolitical

symbol,itisimperativetounderstandthehistoricalcontextofcorruption.

Indonesia’sdeeppoliticalhistoryregardinganti‐corruptiondiscoursegoessome

waytoexplainingitscontemporarypopularityasapoliticalsymbol.Immortalizedin

theearlyyearsoftherepublicasaproblemofmoralimperative,anti‐corruption

discoursecametorepresentthemyriadillsfacingIndonesia;itwasthereasonwhy

theelitesmaintainedpower;itwasthereasonforbureaucraticinefficiency;andit

explainedtheincreasingdisparitybetweentherichandthepoor.Theneedto

eradicatecorruptionbecamearallyingpointbothforthoseingovernment,who

usedittodenounceadversaries,andoppositionforces,whousedittoattackthe

statusquoandcallforchange.Yet,allthewhile,noneoftherhetoricorstepstaken

tocombatcorruptionseemedtosuccessfullyputanendtoits(perceived)endemic

nature,anditremainsaprevalentconcerninIndonesiatoday.

47

ChapterTwoTracingthehistoryofanti‐corruption

Precisedefinitionsandinterpretationsofcorruptionareelusive;however,the

embeddednatureofanti‐corruptionsymbolisminIndonesianpoliticsisapparent,as

evidencedbyitsrecurringprominencesinceindependence.Followingindependence,

Indonesia,likemanyfledglingpost‐colonialstates,facedtheproblemofentrenched

governmentcorruption(Khan1998:17‐19;Myrdal1968:948;Smith1971:23‐24).

Severalscholarsarguethatthesocialnormsofpre‐colonialIndonesiansociety,such

asstrongpatronagenetworksandafocusonfamilythatencouragednepotism,

providedabasisforcorruptpractices(Anderson1990:59‐62;Smith1971;Soedarso

1969).1Deep‐seatedcorruptioninthebureaucracyisalsoattributedtothe

continuationofmanycolonialinstitutionsfollowingindependence(Cribb1994:1).2

Whileanti‐corruptioneffortsinIndonesiahavebeenvisible(thoughinconsistent)

sinceindependence,itwasduringcolonialismthatthefirstconcertedattemptsto

addresstheproblemweremade.Dutchcolonialleadershipidentifiedcorruptionasa

prominentissueduringthe1920s,whenGovernor‐GeneralDirkFock,whopresided

overtheNetherlandsEastIndiesfrom1921–1926,commissionedinvestigationsinto

corruptofficialswhohadacceptedkickbacksorembezzledfromthetreasury.The

Governor‐Generalappearedintentontacklingcorruptionwithinthecolonial

administrationandanumberofconvictionsandseveraldismissalsensued

(Wertheim1963:144).Fock’sactionshighlightedchangingperceptionsinthe

1Inparticular,Anderson(1990:58‐60)arguesthatJavaneseideasofpower,basedaroundpatron‐clientrelationshipsandaculturallyembeddedpatrimonialmodel,fosteredsystemsofdependencyevidentinthemorphologyofcorruptioninmodernIndonesia.2ThemechanismsofDutchbureaucracyduringthecolonialperiodinstitutionalizedcorruptionintheeverydaydealingsofthestate(Kahin2003:10;Smith1971:23;Sundhaussen1978:54).Atfirst,theDutchdidlittletodevelopstateinstitutionswithintheircolony,theNetherlandsEastIndies,insteadattachingthemselvestopre‐existingfeudalisticsystemswiththeJavaneseeliteoverseeingagriculturalproduction(Kahin2003:2;McCarthy2011:95).ThecomplicatedadministrativefunctionsoftheDutchEastIndiesCompany(VereenigdeOost‐IndischeCompagnie,VOC),establishedin1602,asbothacompanyandanadministrator,shapedthebehaviourofbureaucrats(Day1904;Smith1971;Wertheim1963:142).WhiletheVOC’sprofitswerehigh,theadministratorsthatoversawthevaluableshipmentsofgoodsreceivedlowwages,encouragingillicitconduct.Later,around1830,theDutchintroducedtheCultivationSystemwhichinvolvedtheproductionofcashcropsoverseenbylocalregentsandsoldtotheadministrationatfixed,low,prices(Kahin2003:11).ThesystemintroducedIndonesianelitestoacasheconomy.Meanwhile,Dutchadministratorswerediscouragedfromreprimandinglocalregentswhoabusedtheirsubjectsinordertomaximizepersonalprofitsfromcashcropproduction,fosteringanenvironmentwhereelitescouldexploitvillagerswithrelativeimpunity(Fasseur1994:52‐53;Ricklefs2001:157).

48

acceptabilityofsuchpracticeswithinthestate,butthesemeasuresdidnotassumea

symbolicsignificancebecausetheywereprimarilyaimedatsecuringgovernment

revenueratherthanboostingtheadministration’spopularity.

ChangingattitudestowardscorruptionwerealsolinkedtotheriseofIndonesian

nationalismandthedesireforindependence(Smith1971:25).Asconceptualizations

of‘acceptable’and‘non‐acceptable’behaviouramongstgovernmentofficialsaltered,

ideologiesofequalityandsocialjusticealsocametothefore,drivingthenationalist

movement.3CorruptionbecameyetanothersourceofgrievanceagainsttheDutch,

viewedasunderminingthevaluesofdemocracyandjusticethattheindependence

movementwasfightingfor(Kahin2003:52).Fromthe1920s–1930s,suchideals

werelargelyconfinedtotheeducatedelite(McVey1996:13)and,asWertheim

(1963:149)argues,therevolutionreflectedaburgeoningnationalsolidarity,but‘this

senseofunityhasnotpenetrateddeeplyenoughtoguaranteestrictloyaltyfromcivil

servantsandcitizensintimesofpeacefulconstruction’.Nationalistsidentified

corruptionasacolonialproblem,buttherewasworsetocomefollowing

independence.

Thischapteroutlinesabriefhistoryofthemannerinwhichanti‐corruptionsymbols

weremobilizedinIndonesiafromindependenceupto2009,establishingthatanti‐

corruptionhasbeenapersistentpoliticalsymbol.However,thelonghistoryofanti‐

corruptionrhetoricisnotnecessarilyreflectiveofagenuinedesiretoeradicate

corruption.Thishistorydemonstratesthatalthoughcorruptionhaslongbeenan

issueofpublicconcern,anti‐corruptionsymbolsemergepredominantlywhenthey

offerpoliticalleverage.Conceptualizinganti‐corruptionasapoliticalsymbolallows

forthefurtheranalysisofanapparentparadoxwithinIndonesianpolitics:while

manypoliticiansandpartieshavetalkedwithgreatfanfareaboutcombating

corruption,generalpublicsentimentisthatverylittleprogresshasbeenmadeonthe

issuesince1998.

AfterIndependence

SukarnoandHatta,Indonesia’sfirstpresidentandvice‐president,declaredIndonesia

anindependentstateon17August1945,twodaysafterthesurrenderoftheJapanese

3TheseideologiesofequalityandsocialjusticewerelaterenshrinedinIndonesia’snationalideology,Pancasila,asdiscussedintheIntroduction.

49

duringWorldWarTwo.4FollowingawarforindependenceagainsttheDutch,which

endedin1949,afledglingparliamentarydemocracywasestablished.Theearly

periodofparliamentarydemocracywasmarkedbyintensebattlesbetweenarange

ofactors,includingpoliticalparties,figuresintheArmyandSukarnohimself(Lev

1994:41).Politicalpartiescompetedforpower,themostsignificantbeingthe

NationalistParty(PartaiNasionalisIndonesia,PNI);Masyumi,whichrepresented

Islamicpoliticalinterests;theSocialistParty(PartaiSosialisIndonesia,PSI);andthe

CommunistParty(PartaiKommunisIndonesia,PKI).5Mostcabinetswerebasedon

precariouscoalitions,withpartiesfocuseduponsecuringtheirpoliticalsurvival

ratherthanaddressingpolicyconcerns(CribbandBrown1995:64;Feith1962:

165).6

Partiesbegantoplayanimportantpatronagefunctionsoonafterparliamentwas

established.Severalministersusedtheirpositiontohelpfamilymembers,repay

personaldebtsandcreatelucrativebusinessopportunities(Feith1962:147;Vickers

2013:137).Recognizingpotentialcareerbenefits,manybureaucratsalsojoined

politicalpartiesandbytheendof1950mostcivilservantswerealsopartymembers

(Feith1962:125).Partyleaderswereobligedtodistributefavoursandmaterial

rewardstoloyalsupportersthroughcabinetposts,businessopportunities,overseas

junkets,housesandcars(CribbandBrown1995:59‐60;Feith1962:123),whichalso

ledtofactionalismandtheriseofintra‐partycompetition(Feith1962:126).

Politicianswhorefusedtodistributepatronageriskedfacingoppositioninparliament

andlimitingtheircareers.7

4Japansurrenderedunconditionallyon15August1945,presentingtheIndonesianleadershipanopportunitytodeclareindependencebeforetheDutchcouldrestoretheirauthority(Ricklefs2001:259).However,thisstatuswasnotinternationallyrecognizeduntil1949whenIndonesiaprevailedintherevolutionagainsttheDutch.ForfurtherdetailsontheIndonesianstruggleforindependencefrom1945–1949seeReid(1974)andKahin(2003).5Differentideologiessupportedspecificpartiesandthisphenomenoncametobeknownasaliran(literally‘stream’).AlirantendanciesgainedtractionduringtheOldOrderandremainedprominentthroughouttheNewOrderregimeaspeopleidentifiedwithparticular‘streams’ofpolitics(Ufen2008).Theconceptofaliranhasalongpoliticalhistorythat,infact,pre‐datestheOldOrder.ForfurtherdiscussionoftheinfluenceofaliranonIndonesianpoliticsseeCrouch(1980);Feith(1962);FeithandCastles(1970:13‐18).Forfurtherinformationonthesepoliticalparties,theirbackgroundsandideologiesseeFeith(1962),McVey(1994)andRicklefs(2001:292‐294).6FromSeptember1950toApril1957thereweresixseparatecabinets,lasting,onaverage,ayeareach(Brown2003:181).7Forexample,Feith(1962:169)assertsthattheNatsircabinet(September1950–April1951),ledbyMasyumipoliticianMohammadNatsir,facedoppositionbecausetheFinanceMinister,SjafruddinPrawiranegara(alsofromMasyumi),refusedtodistributepatronage.

50

Ingrainedcorruptioninthebureaucracyisoftenattributedtothelowremuneration

ofcivilservants(Legge1972:331;McLeod2008;Smith1971;Wertheim1963).After

thestruggleforindependence,thegovernmentslashedthesalariesofhigh‐ranking

bureaucratswhohadservedundertheDutch,placingthemonsimilarpay‐gradesto

newercivilservants.Benefitstobureaucratswereagaincutin1952whenthe

governmentwasunabletoaffordwageincreases,provideIdulFitribonusesorrice

allowances(Feith1962:256‐247).8Thedisparitybetweensalaryandstatusfostered

discontent,asmanycivilservantsperceivedthattheirearningsdidnotbefitthe

importanceoftheirpositions.9Dissatisfactionwithpayledcivilservantstoseekother

sourcesofincome,oftenusingtheirauthorityasleverage(Legge1972:331).Withthe

governmentincapableofimplementingstrictsanctionsagainstcorruption,such

practicesflourished.

Militaryinvolvementineconomicactivities,whichalsoencouragedcorruption,

becamenormalizedduringthewarforindependenceandcontinuedintothe1950s

(Crouch1975;1980:38‐41;Ricklefs2001:306).High‐rankingofficerslaunched

businesses,collectingprofitsforboththemselvesandthemilitary(CribbandBrown

1995:75;Crouch1975;Penders1974).Armyleadersrationalizedthesepracticesas

subsidizingtheinadequatebudgetreceivedfromthestate(CribbandBrown1995:

75;Crouch1980:39;Ricklefs2001).Inaddition,militaryofficersturnedapersonal

profitfromtheirbusinessdealingsandsubsequentlydistributedpatronageto

subordinates,fosteringnetworksofloyalsupporterswithinarmyranks(Crouch

1979;McLeod2011a:56).Whilesuchpracticesweregenerallytoleratedbyarmy

leaders,theirexistencewas,nevertheless,sometimesusedwhenofficerswishedto

publiclydefamerivals.Forexample,oneoftheearliestpublicaccusationsof

corruptioninthenewrepublicwasmadein1952,stemmingfromaconflictbetween

theChiefofStaff,ColonelNasution,andstaunchSukarnosupporter,ColonelBambang

Supeno,resultinginaflurryofaccusationsbetweendifferentfactionsinthe

8IdulFitriistheIslamicholidayfollowingthefastingmonthofRamadan.Itistraditionallymarkedbythegivingofgifts,includingemployeebonuses.9Aliteraryexamplefromthisperiod(1954)detailingthisdilemmaisthenovelKorupsi(Corruption)byrenownedIndonesianauthorPramoedyaAnataToer.Thebookdetailsthemoralstruggleofacivilservantwhoisunabletoprovidehisfamilywitha‘respectablestandardofliving’onhismeagregovernmentsalary(Foulcher1995:167).Therationalizationusedbythebook’sprotagonist,Basir,isbaseduponasenseoffinancialentitlement,whichisatoddswithhiscurrentstandardofliving.Basirturnstocorruption,adecisionheagonizesover,ontheonehandknowingitis‘immoral’butontheotherhandfeelinghehastherighttoabetterstandardoflivingbyvirtueofhisposition(Toer1954:12).

51

military.10Whilethechargesyieldednoconvictions,theyintensifiedfactionalschisms

withinboththearmyandthegovernment.

Mirroringtheinternalallegationsinthemilitary,accusationsofcorruptionbecame

commonamongstparliamentarians.Theneedtoeradicateitbecameagovernment

catch‐cryinthelead‐uptoIndonesia’sfirstdemocraticelection,heldon29

September1955.Keentoestablishtheiranti‐corruptioncredentials,thecaretaker

cabinetledbyBurhanuddinHarahap,basedonacoalitionbetweenMasyumi,PSIand

NahdlatulUlama(NU),claimeditwantedtoreinstatethemoralauthorityofthe

governmentintheleaduptotheelection.11Adoptingapublicanti‐corruption

campaign,itsetouttocleanuptheadministrativeandexecutivebranchesofthe

government(Penders1974:151;vanderKroef1956:131).Whiletherewaslittleto

suggestthatthenewcabinetwasanylesscorruptthanitspredecessors,theHarahap

cabinetaccusedpreviouscabinetsofseveralcountsofcorruptionandworkedwith

thearmytoarrestindividuals(Penders1974:151;Ricklefs2001:303;Teik1972).12

Thoughthegovernmentstatedthatthearrestswerenotpoliticallydriven,most

arrestedweremembersofrivalpartyPNI.

Theprosecutionofthosearrestedproveddifficult.Thecaretakergovernmenthad

troublebuildingcasesagainsttheaccused,claimingtheyhadbeencarefultocover

theirtracks.Themootedsolutiontothiswasthepassingofanemergencylaw,which

allowedforseparatetribunalstohearcorruptioncases,compellingdefendantsto

answerquestionsputtothem(Feith1962:438‐439).Thisbillwaspassedinthe

10Severalleaders,alldeemedtobesympathizersoftheIndonesianSocialistParty,wereaccusedofcorruption(Feith1962:252).Inresponse,amotionwascalledinOctober1952foraspecialparliamentaryinvestigationintoadministrativeandfinancialfraudintheMinistryofDefenceandArmedForces.TheMinisterforDefence,SultanHamengkuBuwonoIX,sawthisasapersonalattack.Asawell‐respected,independentmemberofthecabinet,theSultanhadsupportfromanumberofsmallerpartieswhorejectedthemotion,claimingitwoulddestabilizethegovernment.PSIalsocounteredthemotion,statingthatmostparliamentarianswerehypocriteswholived‘luxuriouslyandirresponsibly’andwereessentiallyinnopositiontojudgeothers(Feith1962:256).11NahdlatulUlama(NU)isanotherIslam‐basedgroupwhichsplitfromtheMasyumipoliticalpartyon6April1952.Thetwohadhadanuneasyallianceuptothispointanddisagreedovertheleadershipofthepartyandrepresentationsinthecabinet,whichtendedtobegiventoWesterneducated,modernistMuslims.ForfurtherdetailsseeFeith(1962:233‐237).12ThedayoftheHarahapcabinet’sformalinstallationthemilitaryarrestedtheformerMinisterofJustice,DjodyGondokusomo,forcorruption.Althoughthenewcabinetclaimednoknowledgeofthearrest,thepublicsupportedthemeasures,gladthatstepswerebeingtakentopunishcorruptofficials.FollowingthistheformerMinisterforEconomicAffairs,IskaqTjokroadisurjo,wasalsoarrested,aswereemployeesfromtheCentralImportOfficeandanumberofbureaucratsfromtheMinistryofJustice.SeeFeith(1962:422‐424)foradetaileddiscussionoftheseevents.

52

cabinet,buttherewasoppositionfromNU,whoseranksincludedsomeindividuals

accusedofcorruption.Moreover,Sukarnorefusedtosignthebill,meaningitcould

notbecomelawandputtinghimatoddswiththeHarahapcabinet.Thealternative

wastopresentthebilldirectlytotheparliament,whichwouldbetimeconsuming

andpotentiallydamagingtothegovernment’sreputationifitwasnotpassed.

Harahapdidinfactpresentthebilltotheagendacommitteeoftheparliamenttobe

presentedduringaparliamentarysitting,butitwasneverhandeddown(Feith1962:

440).

Corruptionwasidentifiedasacampaignissueinthe1955election.Vice‐President

MohammadHatta,whowaslinkedtoPSI,expressedhisconcernsaboutcorruptionin

thelead‐uptopolling.Duringhisannualnationalco‐operativesdayaddresson11

July1955,heobservedthat:

Amoralcrisishasblurredthedistinctionbetweengoodandbad,between

legalandillegal,betweendecencyandmoralobnoxiousness,betweenright

andwrong.Corruptionrunsriotthroughoursociety;corruptionhasalso

infectedagreatmanygovernmentdepartments,andunlessdrasticmeasures

aretakenverysoon,thisevilmaybecomefirmlyrootedintheorganizationof

oursocietyandourcountry.Briberyandgrafthavebecomeincreasingly

common,tothedetrimentofourcommunityandourcountry(Hatta1957:

84).

Politicalpartiesalsocompetedtodiscreditrivals,especiallyevidentinthe

accusationsbetweenPNIandIslamicoppositionpartyMasyumi.Masyumicriticized

previousPNI‐ledcabinetsfor‘inflation,theshortagesofessentialimportsandthe

abundanceofluxuryautomobiles,“arbitrary”politicalappointmentsanddismissals…

andthe“speciallicenses”fornationalimporters’(Feith1962:354).Masyumi’s

newspaperAbadiandotherpro‐governmentmediaoutletsalsogavesignificant

coveragetothecorruptionchargesofformerministers(Feith1962:424).Indeed,it

wasinthemedia,notparliament,thatmanyofthemostheatedclashesofideology

andscathingattacksonrivalsoccurred(Hill2010:3).13Severalaccusationsof

corruptionagainstrivalsweremootedthroughthepress,requiringalowerthreshold

forevidenceandgreaterscopetosensationalizecharges(Feith1962:424).For

13Duringtheperiodofconstitutionaldemocracy,almostallnewspaperswereattachedtoapoliticalparty(orthemilitary)(SenandHill2000).

53

example,inthelead‐uptotheelectionsofSeptember1955,PSI’snewspaperPedoman

publishedascathing,anonymouslettertotheeditorclaimingthatSukarnowasa

lackeyofthe‘Co‐operativeOrganizationforCorruption’,theMasyumi‐PSInickname

forthosewhosupportedthefirstAliSastroamidjojocabinet(Feith1962:427).

Inspiteofpre‐electiontensions,PNI,MasyumiandNUformedarulingcoalition

(withoutPKIorPSI)underpreviousPrimeMinisterAliSastroamidjojoinMarch

1956.14Shortlyafterthecabinet’sformation,conflictwithinthemilitaryspilledover

intoparliamentaryaffairs,signallingthebeginningofthemosthigh‐profile

corruptioncasesoftheOldOrder.Thearmyhadsufferedinternalpowerstruggles

sincetherevolutionandlegaciesoftheseriftsemergedduring1956(Reid1974).15

CleavageswidenedwhenarmyChiefofStaff,Nasution,whohadrecentlyallied

himselfwithSukarnoandPNI,begantoorderpersonneltransfersinaneffortto

combatsmugglingactivitiesandregionalismthathadtakenholdwithinthemilitary

(Teik1972:238).OneofthemajoractorsaggrievedbythesetransferswasDeputy

ChiefofStaff,ColonelZulkifliLubis,anofficeralignedtoPSIandMasyumi,whowas

alsoresentfulthatNasutionhadbeenpromotedoverhim,whichheperceivedtobea

politicalappointmentratherthanonebasedonmerit.16

TheresultingpowerstruggleeventuallyledtotheindictmentofRoeslanAbdulgani,a

PNImemberandthethen‐MinisterforForeignAffairs.The‘RoeslanAffair’wasaclear

exampleoftheuseofcorruptionallegationsforpoliticalgain(Ricklefs2001:307;

Teik1972).On13August1956,oneofNasution’srivalsissuedanarrestwarrantfor

Roeslaninconnectionwithcorruptioninthedisbursementofstateprintingcontracts.

RoeslanwasaccusedofconspiringwithLieHokThay,theformerdirectorofthe

nationalprintingplant,andofacceptingRp.1.5millioninbribes(vanderKroef1957:

49).ThearrestwarrantwasquicklyrevokedbyNasution,andRoeslansubsequently

leftIndonesiaforLondononadiplomaticvisit.Anti‐Nasutionofficersthenaccused

NasutionofcondoningcorruptionbyallowingRoeslantoleavethecountrywithout

properinvestigationintotheallegations(Teik1972:238).

14Thiscametobeknownas‘thesecondAlicabinet’.15Thiswasnotunexpected,giventhatthemilitaryhadbecomeheavilypoliticizedduringtheearlyOldOrder.Withthefragilenatureofparliamentarycabinetsfollowingindependence,thearmyhadcometoseeitselfas‘theguardianofnationalinterestwiththeresponsibilitytointerveneinpoliticalaffairswhenevertheweaknessesofciviliangovernmentmadeitnecessary’(Crouch1980:30).16ForfurtherdiscussionofinternalmilitarydiscordduringthisperiodseeTeik(1972).

54

UponRoeslan’sreturn,aspecialcommissioncomposedmostlyofothercabinet

membersclearedhimofcomplicity,butthisfailedtoendspeculationabouthisguilt.

Thecabinet’s‘whitewash’oftheaffairgeneratedintensemediascrutiny,primarily

fromMochtarLubis,therespectededitorofIndonesiaRayaandalsoadistantrelative

ofZulkifliLubis(Hill2010:64‐65).MochtarLubislambastedthegovernment,

runningasensationalheadlinestatingthatRoeslanhadengagedincorruptactivities

withLieHokThayandmustbeprosecuted.ThenewspaperquotedZulkifliLubisas

sayingthat‘thePrimeMinisterandtheChiefofStaffhaddefendedevilbyreleasing

Roeslanfromthehandsofhiswould‐bearresters’(Feith1962:503).IndonesiaRaya

andPSI’snewspaperPedomancontinuedtheattack(Feith1962:504).Aftertheaffair

dieddown,MochtarLubiswaschargedwithdefamingcabinetmembers,butwas

acquittedinDecember1956.Inthemeantime,tensionscontinuedtomountwithin

thearmy.Whenitbecameclearthattheplantodestabilizethegovernmenthad

failed,ZulkifliLubisinstigatedafailedcoupinNovember1956(vanderKroef1957:

50).Later,inApril1957,theSupremeCourtfinedRoeslanforunintentionally

breachingforeignexchangeregulations;however,hewasnevertriedforcorruption

(Hill2010:48;Ricklefs2001:307).Theaccusationsagainsthimremained

unsubstantiated(Setiyonoetal.2012:42‐45).

DefendingGuidedDemocracy

ParliamentarydemocracycollapsedinDecember1956whenofficersfromthearmy

regionalcommandseizedthegovernmentsofWest,NorthandSouthSumatra,

declaringthemselvestobethe‘RevolutionaryGovernmentoftheRepublicof

Indonesia’(PemerintahRevolusionerRepublikIndonesia,PRRI)andprompting

Sukarnotodeclaremartiallaw.17Sukarnoappointedanemergencycabinetunder

DjuandaKartawidjaja(April1957–July1959),whichmanagedgovernmentaffairs

untilhecouldofficiallyreinstatethe1945Constitutionanddissolveparliamentin

July1959,pavingthewayforGuidedDemocracy(Lev1966;Penders1974:157).18

ChargesofcorruptionwereusedbySukarnotoemphasizetheflawednatureofthe

partysystemandtojustifyhisgrowingalignmentwiththePKI(Ricklefs2001:308‐

309).Eagertojustifyhisnewregime,Sukarnoblamedgreedyandimmoral

individualsformanyofthefailingsoftheperiodofconstitutionaldemocracy.For

17ForadetaileddiscussionofthePRRIrebellionanditsconsequencesseeFeith(1962:578‐608)andLegge(1972:281‐284).18ForadetailedexplorationofthetransitionfromconstitutionaldemocracytoGuidedDemocracyseeLev(1966).

55

example,inhisIndependenceDayaddressin1959headmonishedthosewhohad

usedtheirpositionsinstateenterprisesforpersonalgainnotingthat:

thosebodies[havebecome]thenestofpeoplewhofilledtheirownpockets

tilltheybulged,peoplewhobecamewealthy,peoplewhobecamemillionaires.

Theremustbeanendtothis!Suchasituationmustbechanged!...Itmaynot

beallowedtohappenagainthat...afewspeculatorsorafewprofiteerscan

shakeourwholenationaleconomy(Sukarno1964:52).

Inthesamespeech,Sukarnoassertedthat‘Whoeverscoopsupwealthattheexpense

ofthepublic,whoeverdisruptsthepubliceconomy,willbearrested,willbe

sentencedtodeath!’(Sukarno1964:55).Inhis1961IndependenceDayAddress,

Sukarnoalsoreferredtotheprominenceofcorruptionwithinthegovernment,

classifyingitasoneofthe‘threesi’s—tjaripromosi,birokrasi,korupsi[emphasis

inoriginal]’—theseekingofpromotion,bureaucracyandcorruption.Hewentonto

proclaimitwouldbebetterif‘suchpeoplewerepushedaside!’(Sukarno1964:153).

Sukarnodefendedhisnewregime,evenasitbecameincreasinglyevidentthatithad

manyofthesameflawsasthepreviousestablishment.Hemaintainedthatcorruption

ingovernmentwastheresultofindividualgreed,ratherthaninstitutionalized

practicesdrivenbythesystemitself.

Sukarnoalsoboostedhisownanti‐corruptionreputationbyachievingwhatnoneof

thepreviouscabinetshadbeenabletodo:actuallypassanti‐corruptionlaws.Priorto

this,corruptionarrestshadbeenfacilitatedbyamilitarymandatetoactinthe

interestsofthepeople(Crouch1980:40).Itwasnotuntil1960thatanofficial

governmentdefinitionofcorruptionwascodifiedandpunishmentsforrelatedcrimes

institutionalizedthroughLawNo.24/1960ontheDetermination,Prosecutionand

InspectionoftheCriminalActofCorruption.Inthefirstparagraphofthislaw,

corruptionwasbroadlydefinedashavingtwofacets.First,itinvolvedaviolationof

thelawcausinganeconomiclossforthestate,anareaoranyotherlegalbodywhich

usesstatefundingandconcessions.Second,corruptionwasalsotheabuseofposition

orauthorityforself‐enrichment,orthatofanotherpersonorbody.Inreality,the

passingofsuchlegislationwashardlyafeatgiventhatSukarnoheldcloseto

dictatorialpoweroverthegovernment.However,itsenactmentdemonstratedthat,at

theveryleast,Sukarnobelievedsuchalawtobenecessary.

56

However,itwasdifficulttofocuspublicattentiononcorruptionwhenSukarno’spoor

economicmanagementwasplungingthecountryintoeconomicandsocialchaos.

CallsforchangemountedasthePKIandthemilitarybothcompetedforpower

(Brown2003;Crouch1980:69‐96).Theeventsof30September1965,inwhichPKI

supportersattemptedacoupandassassinatedsixarmygenerals,broughtthisrivalry

toahead(AndersonandMcVey1971).Whilethecoupfailed,itunleashedachainof

eventsculminatingintheriseofSuharto,Indonesia’ssecondpresident.19On11

March1966SukarnosignedanordergrantingSuhartofullauthoritytorestorethe

peace(Ricklefs2001:349).20BetweenJuneandJuly1966theParliamentratified

Suharto’sposition,bannedthePKI,outlawedMarxismasapoliticalideologyand

calledforelectionstobeheldin1968(Ricklefs2001:351).

TheNewOrder

IntheearlydaysoftheNewOrder,Suhartowaseagertobuildanimagethatwould

sethimapartfromearlierpoliticians(Elson2001:140).Alongwithpromisesof

developmentandprosperity,ananti‐corruptionsymbolwasanimportantpartofthis

effort.Suhartopromisedthathewouldaddresscorruptionandsupport‘notonly

goodgovernmentbutalsocleangovernment’(Robertson‐Snape1999:589).Eventhe

regime’sname—the‘NewOrder’—wasintendedtodistanceitfromthepreviousera,

whichhadbecomesynonymouswiththeextravagancesoftheeliteandthe

corruptionofbureaucratsontheonehand,andthesufferingofthepoorontheother

(Feith1994:16;Ricklefs2001:342).

Ananti‐corruptionsymbolbecameacorepartoftheimageofthenewregime.In

April1966SuhartoestablishedtheTeamtoRegularizeStateFinances(Tim

PenerbitanKeuanganNegara,Pekuneg)tocollect‘incriminatingmaterial’asevidence

ofcorruptactivitiesundertakenbymembersoftheOldOrdergovernment(Crouch

19ThiscoupwasawatershedmomentinIndonesianhistory.Theeventsofthefailedcoupremainmysterious,withspeculationthattheUnitedStatesSecretServicewereinvolvedandcontinuedquestionsaboutwhatroleSuhartoplayedintheevents.Themasskillingsthatfollowedthecouphavecontinuedtodrawacademicinquiryduetothecomplexnatureofthemassacres—whokilled,whowaskilledandwhytheywerekilled.TheNewOrderregimeusedthecoupextensivelyinitsanti‐CommunistpropagandaandtopromoteSuharto’sroleinprotectingthenation.ForadetailedanalysesofthecoupanditsfalloutseeAndersonandMcVey(1971),Cribb(1990),Roosa(2006)andKammenandMcGregor(2012).20Duringthisperiodofuncertainty,Suharto’seffortstodiscreditSukarnoweresubtle,fearingretaliationfromdie‐hardSukarnoists,butitdidnottakelongforhimtomanoeuvrehimoutofpoliticsaltogether(CribbandBrown1995:111;vanderKroef1971:38‐40).Beforelong,SuhartohadremovedenoughofhisdetractorsfromthegovernmenttobeconfidentthatthePeople’sConsultativeAssemblywouldsupporthim(Ricklefs2001:351).

57

1980:296).ShowtrialswereconductedagainstformerOldOrderministers,

highlightingtheireconomicmismanagement,corruptionandgeneraldisregardfor

publicwelfare(CribbandBrown1995:111;Pauker1967:145‐146).Publicattention

wasalsodrawntoongoingmilitaryandbureaucraticcorruption(Dahm1971:262;

Feith1968:95).21Inresponse,Suhartomountedaconcertedpubliccampaignagainst

corruption,makinganumberofpublicstatementsinthelatterhalfof1967.Suharto’s

effortsreflectedhisdesiretoprojectareformistimage,withactionsandspeeches

usedasrhetoricaltoolsdesignedtopaintSuhartoastheleaderthatIndonesians

wanted.

Yet,despitethispublicanti‐corruptioncampaign,progresswasslow.Suhartowasina

difficultposition,needingtobuildananti‐corruptionimagetoappealtothemasses

butalsorequiringthesupportofmilitary,parliamentaryandbusinessleaderswho

benefitedfromthestatusquo(Mackie1970:88).PekunegandtheAnti‐Corruption

InvestigationTeam(TimPemberantasanKorupsi,TPK),launchedinAugust1967,

werechargedwithinvestigatingcorruptioncasesandreferringsuspectsforarrest

andtrial;however,thesebodieshadlittleimpact(Crouch1980:296).InDecember

1967SuhartoissuedaninstructiontotheAttorney‐General,withassistancefromthe

MinisterforJusticeandcommandersofthearmedforces,to‘takefirmmeasures

againstallformsofcorruption’(citedinPauker1968:137).However,Attorney‐

GeneralSoegihArtocomplainedinApril1968thattheTPKwasunabletodoitsjob

effectivelybecausethedefinitionof‘corruptconduct’inexistinglawswastoovague.

Atthesametime,TPKemployeescomplainedthattherelativelyshorttimewithin

whichalleged‘corruptors’hadtobechargedandbroughttotrial(sixmonths)made

convictionsdifficult(vanderKroef1971:76).Corruptionsuspectswereregularly

releasedduetoaproclaimedlackofevidence(Crouch1980:296;vanderKroef1971:

77).22

21Oneexampleofacorruptionscandalreportedinthemediawasthe‘HoldenAffair’ofNovember1967,inwhichtheplannedtax‐freeimportofAustralian‐madeHoldencarsforthebenefitofMPs‘eruptedintoablackmarketscandalinNovember1967,attheverytimewhendemandsforamoreintensifiedtaxcollectionprocedureandforageneralausteritywerebeingheardinParliamentitself’(vanderKroef1971:76).22InFebruary1969thepoliceannouncedthatover159officialsandprivatebankingenterpriseshadbeenfoundguiltyoffraudand85percenthadbeentried(vanderKroef1971:77).Twogeneralswerealsotriedandconvictedforcorruptionin1969(Crouch1980:293).Therewasaflurryofannouncements,withthegovernmenthopefulitwouldbeseentobetakingaction.DetractorsnotedthatthearrestsweremostlyofinsignificantindividualsorpeoplewhohadfallenoutoffavourwithSuharto,suchasthetwomilitaryofficialsindicted,andnoparliamentarianswerearrested.

58

Bymid‐November1968,theanti‐corruptionmovementwasgainingmomentum.

Between1965and1970,asMackie(1970:88)asserts,‘there[were]fewburning

issuesofcomparablehorse‐powerforopponentsorcriticsoftheregime’.Student

groupsralliedaroundtheissueandthreatenedvigilanteactionagainst‘corruptors’.A

numberofnewspapersfuelledstudentconcerns,includingMochtarLubis’Indonesia

RayaandNusantara,aswellasotherstudentpublicationssuchasHarianKamiand

MahasiswaIndonesia(Crouch1980:294‐295).Concernedaboutpublicorder,the

governmentbannedallnon‐approveddemonstrationsinJanuary1970.Subsequent

meetingsbetweenstudentleadersandcabinetministersledtopromisesthatanti‐

corruptionmeasureswouldbeagovernmentpriority(Dahm1971:263;vander

Kroef1971:232).

Arenewedanti‐corruptionoffensivebeganon31January1970whenSuharto

announcedtheformationofthe‘CommissionofFour’ledbyformerPrimeMinister

Wilopo,workingwithformerVice‐PresidentHatta.TheCommissionwascharged

withinvestigatingtheextentofthecorruptioninthegovernmentandproviding

recommendationsforitseradication(Elson2001:195;Mackie1970;vanderKroef

1971:78).SuhartoalsoreleasedapublicstatementprintedinthenewspaperKompas

on2February1970;inwhichhestated:

Corruptionanddeviantactionsintheeconomicfieldingeneralnotonly

conflictwiththelawandwithsecurity,butareclearlyincompatiblewith

morals,andpuncturethefeelingofjustice[sic].Corruptionblocksthe

implementationofthestate’sprograms,damagestheprinciplesandreduces

theauthorityofthegovernmentapparatus,ifitisnotcurbed,lessenedand

supressedasmuchaspossible(citedinElson2001:195).

SuhartohighlightedcorruptionagaininhisIndependenceDayspeechofAugust1970,

assertingthat‘thereshouldnolongerbeanydoubtsaboutit.Imyselfwillleadthe

fightagainstcorruption’(citedinElson2001:196).Inthesameyear,Attorney‐

GeneralSoegihArtointroducedanew,moredetailedanti‐corruptionbilltothe

parliament(vanderKroef1971:233).Thebill,passedasLawNo.3/1971onthe

EradicationofCriminalActsofCorruption,waswelcomedbyactivists(Brata2009:

136).23

23Suhartoalsoagreedtoregularweeklymeetingsinwhichstudentactivistscouldpresentevidenceofofficialcorruptiontohim.Whilethisseemedapositivedevelopmentforactivists,

59

AttemptsbySuhartotoconsolidateananti‐corruptionimagewere,however,

underminedbylackofaction.Thenewanti‐corruptionlegislationwasnot

retroactive,muchtothedisappointmentofactivists(vanderKroef1971:233).

SuhartoalsorefusedtopubliclyreleasetheCommissionofFour’sfindings(Crouch

1980:297),althoughtheyweresubsequentlyleakedtothemedia(Crouch1980:297;

Elson2001:196;Mackie1970:87).TheCommissionsubmittedreportsonthe

Attorney‐General’sOffice;thenationaloilcompany,Pertamina;thestate

procurementagency;thestateforestryenterprise;aswellastworeportsadvisingthe

governmentonwaystoaddresscorruption.Thefindingssuggestedthatthelackof

transparencyinbudgetspendingcontributedtocorruptionandrecommended

structuralreformsfortheAttorney‐General’sofficeandPertamina.TheCommission

alsoadvocatedthearrestsofsomeofSuharto’skeysupporters,includinghiscousin

Sudikatmono(Elson2001:196).TheCommission’seffortsledtothepunishmentof

someminorofficials,butrecommendationsthatofficialsmustdeclaretheirprivate

assetsandtheimplementationofalawregulatingtheoversightofPertaminawere

neverexecuted(Elson2001:196).

TheCommissionwasaccusedofbeinga‘whitewash’bystudentgroups,whostepped

uptheircampaigningtohighlighttheongoingnegativeimpactsofcorruption.

Newspapers,suchasIndonesiaRayaandHarianKami,continuedtoreportoncorrupt

dealingsbetweenprominentbusinessandpoliticalfigures(vanderKroef1971:78).

Pamphletsaccusingtopmilitaryofficialsofcorruptionwerealsocirculatedinthe

maincitiesofJava(vanderKroef1971:78).Suharto’spersonalaides,whowerealso

militaryofficers,weresingledoutforpeddlinginfluenceonbehalfofpartiesor

businesses(vanderKroef1971:82).Inresponse,thegovernmentexpeditedthetrial

ofninestateelectricitycompanyofficials,facingchargesofembezzlingbetweenRp.

150(USD0.40)andRp.34,000(approximatelyUSD90)(Crouch1980:298).This

episodedemonstrateddiscrepanciesinhowthepublicandthegovernmentviewed

corruption—thegovernmentfocusonsmall‐scalecorruptionwasseentoglossover

thelargerissue.Meanwhile,Suhartohadformalizedhispowerthroughanelection

deemedtobe‘heavy‐handed’andundemocratic(Elson2001:194;Jackson1978),and

theagreementwasshort‐lived,withSuhartodismissingmuchoftheevidencepresented(Brata2009:136).

60

activistsremainedtroubledbytheabuseofpositionbythepresident’sinnercircle

(Aspinall2005b:23;Crouch1980:299).24

Fromthebeginningofthe1970s,thegovernmentbeganattemptingtocurbpublic

anti‐corruptionsentiment.TheNewOrdergovernment’santi‐corruptionsymbol

sufferedanumberofblowsduringthisperiod.InSeptember1971,respectedPolice

Commissioner‐GeneralHugengImamSantosowasdismissedfromhispositionafter

heannouncedthathisteamhadbrokenasmugglingringwhichimportedluxurycars

forresale(Elson2001:198;Jenkins1984:330‐331).Thesmugglingringreportedly

hadmilitarybackingaswellasinvolvingSuharto’swife,IbuTien.From1971,Tien

wasalsoheavilycriticizedforherplantodevelopaculturalthemepark(TamanMini

IndonesiaIndah,BeautifulIndonesiaMiniaturePark),fundedby‘donations’from

businessleadersandgovernmentofficials.ProtestsaroundtheTamanMiniproject

becameviolent,promptingpresidentialaidestorequestmilitaryintervention(Elson

2001:199;Samson1973:128).Afurtherexampleofanti‐corruptionactivismduring

thisperiodwasthe‘PetitionofOctober24’,signedinOctober1973byagroupof

studentsfromtheUniversityofIndonesia.Itoutlinedgovernmentcriticismsincluding

risingprices,corruption,abuseofpower,unemploymentandthelackofeffective

publicparticipationingovernmentdecision‐making(Hansen1975:148).

Therewereongoingprotestsuptothemid‐1970s,foreshadowingmoreserious

demonstrationsagainstthegovernment.InJanuary1974,massstudentprotestswere

sparkedbyanofficialvisitbytheJapanesePrimeMinistertoIndonesia.TheMalari

Affair,asitisknown,wasmotivatedprimarilybyangeratthestate’seconomic

policieswhichmanysawasfavouringforeigninvestors.However,italsotouched

uponcorruptionandtheundueinfluenceofseniormembersinSuharto’sgovernment

(Elson2001:207;Liddle1996:188).25Theriotsturnedviolent,leaving11dead,200

24Forfurtherdetailsonthe1971electionsseeJackson(1978:31‐32).Followingthe1971electionstherewerefurtherrestrictionsagainstrivalparties,pressuringtheremainingpoliticalpartiestoformtwogroups,theUnitedDevelopmentParty,representingIslamicgroups(PartaiPersatuanPembangunan,PPP)andtheIndonesianDemocraticParty,representingnationalistandnon‐Islamicpoliticalparties(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia,PDI)in1972.25Theriotsthemselveswerelargelytheresultofpowerstruggleswithinthearmy,withthemilitarycommanderinchargeofthearea,GeneralSumitro,hopingtodestabilizeSuharto’sgovernmentbyallowingstudentstoprotestfreelyandembarrassthegovernmentinfrontofitsinternationalguest.Thegamblebackfired,though,whenthedemonstrationsbecameviolent.Suhartohimselfacknowledgedtheriotsastheoutcomeofa‘powerstruggle’betweensectionsoftheArmyandhisadvisers(Elson2001:207).

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seriouslyinjuredandover800arrested.26TheoutcomeoftheMalariaffairwasa

heightenedvigilancetowardsdissentandamovetowardsstrongerpolitical

repressionandthesuppressionofpublicprotest(Elson2001:209;Liddle1996:189).

Suhartodidtrytopacifythemovementbyamendingforeignownershiplawsto

facilitatemorebusinessopportunitiesforIndonesiansandaskedthatfriends‘tone

downexcessivedisplaysofwealth’(Vatikiotis1993:38).Furthermore,theregime

embarkedonanewdevelopmentfocus,leadingtoincreasedspendingonlocallevel

projectsincludingschool,healthcentres,roadsandotherendeavours,seenas

coercivemeasurestoboostsatisfactionwiththegovernment(Liddle1996:189).

Thesemeasuresandthecrackdownonprotestingdampened,butdidnoteradicate,

studentactivism.Whilemoststudentsstillsawthemselvesthemoralguardiansofthe

nation,protestsalsobegantotakeonamore‘anti‐government’tone(Aspinall2005b:

119;Glassburner1978:164).ThediscontentgeneratedbytheNewOrder’sfailureto

deliverhigh‐levelsofdevelopmenttoordinarypeoplewhileelitesprospereddueto

corruptionledtoangertargetedatSuharto,hiswifeandhiscronies(Vatikiotis1993:

38).ThiswasevidencedbytheinterestsurroundingtheSawitoAffair,namedafter

theJavanesemysticandformeremployeeoftheDepartmentofAgriculturewho

denouncedSuhartoasthesourceof‘moraldecay’inthestateandassertedthathe

hadbeendivinelychosentoruleJava(Bourchier1984;Grant1979:143‐144;Liddle

1977:103).Hewasarrestedafterwritinganumberofinflammatorydocuments,

whichweresupportedbyanumberofprominentIndonesians,includingformerVice‐

PresidentHatta(Bourchier1984:1).TheSawitoAffairisnoteworthyfortheharsh

reactionitprovokedfromSuharto:Sawitowastriedforinvolvementinanillegal

movementandsentencedtoeightyearsimprisonment.Suhartoeventookthestepof

respondingtoSawito’sallegationsinapublicstatement,claimingthat‘neitherhenor

anymemberofhisfamilyhadusedhispositionforpersonalfinancialgain’(Liddle

1977:103).Thetrialitselfbecameaforumfordissent,withwitnessesusingitasan

opportunitytocondemnthecorruptionandweakleadershipofSuharto’sregime

(Bourchier1984;Grant1979:143‐144).27

QuestionssurroundingSuharto’santi‐corruptionagendaalsostemmedfromhis

reluctancetoaddressglaringproblemswithinthestatebureaucracy.Forexample,in

26SeveralprominentstudentleaderswerearrestedincludingSyahrir(Liddle1996:148),whobecameaprominenteconomistandwaslateraneconomicadvisortoPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonofromApril2007untilhisdeathinJuly2008.27ForadetailedaccountoftheSawitoAffairseeBourchier(1984).

62

1975,aseriouscorruptionscandaleruptedinvolvingthestate‐ownedoilcompany,

Pertamina,whichhadamassedapproximatelyUSD10billionworthofdebts,

apparentlythroughmismanagementandembezzlementbyitsmanager,IbnuSutowo

(Chalmers2006:222;Liddle1977:96‐99;Vatikiotis1993:37).Despitetheearlier

misgivingsoftheCommissionofFour,PertaminahadbeenhailedasaNewOrder

‘successstory’andan‘icon’oftheregime’seconomicperformance(Elson2001:215).

ThePertaminascandalthreatenedtounderminetheregime’slegitimacy,whichwas

premiseduponsteadyeconomicdevelopment,whilealsochallengingitsfinancial

credentials(Suryadinata1998:123).Sutowowaseventuallydismissedbutwasnever

chargedwithanycrime,eventhoughthesubsequentinvestigationrevealedboth

grossmismanagementandlavishbehaviour(McCawley1978:5‐6).Dickand

Mulholland(2011:71)arguethatSutowohad,infact,loyallyservedasatrusted

subordinatewhoSuhartocouldcalluponforcreditatshortnotice.Suharto’s

reluctancetoapproveprosecutionagainstSutoworeflectedanaversiontopunishing

corruptionifitunderminedhisowninterests.

ItwasinthisclimatethatagroupofBandungstudentsissueda‘WhiteBook’(Buku

Putih)inJanuary1978—amanifestodemandingthatSuhartostepdownaspresident

(Indonesia1978:165).28TheWhiteBookwasadirectattackonSuhartoandhis

government,detailinganumberofcorruptionscandalstoarguetheywere‘self‐

serving’and‘greedy’(Indonesia1978:181).Thegovernmentreactedimmediately,

banningthebook,shuttingdownfournewspapers,includingKompasandSinar

Harapan,androundingupstudentactivists(Elson2001:224).Later,atotalofseven

dailynewspapersandsevenstudentpublicationswerebannedaspartofthe

crackdownonintellectualsandstudents(SenandHill2000:57).Thegovernment

temporarilyclosedmanyprominentuniversities,anduniversityleadershipwere

directedto‘depoliticise’campuses(Aspinall2005b;Jackson2005:185‐187).

StudentsinvolvedinwritingtheWhiteBookwerearrestedandtriedinJanuary1979

undertheanti‐subversionlaws.29Theseactsofrepressionandlegalretribution

markedthegovernment’sdecreasingtoleranceforpubliccriticismandthatsilencing

28ThejournalIndonesiapublishedthedefencestatementsfromstudentsontrialinApril1979.Theaccompanyingeditorialcontentwaswrittenanonymously,presumablytoavoidramificationsfromtheNewOrderregime.29Anti‐subversionlegislationwasfirstenactedin1963viaPresidentialDecisionNo.11/1963andwaslaterratifiedbyparliamentin1969asLawNo.5/1969.ThisoutlawedpublicdisplaysofhostilityorcontempttowardsthegovernmentandotherpopulationgroupsinIndonesia.In1971theSupremeCourtruledthatsubversionincludedactsthatdidnothavesubversiveintentbutresultedinsubversiveoutcomes(Pompe1992:398).

63

and/ordiscreditingcriticswasnowacommonmethodofdealingwithcorruption

allegationsagainstthoseinpower.30

TheWhiteBookwasoneofthefinalpubliccritiquesofthegovernmentduringthe

NewOrder.Thesubsequenttrialsandcrackdownoncampusactivismquashedthe

studentmovement,whichhadbeenoneofthelastbastionsofcensureagainstthe

prevalenceofcorruption.Moreover,thebanningofsomenewspapersandanew

emphasisontheresponsibilityofthepresstopromotenationalstability(Brown

2003:224;SenandHill2000:53)curtailedthefreedomofthemediaandreportingof

corruptionscandals.31Anti‐corruptionprotestswerenotcompletelysilencedandthe

issueremainedoneofpublicconcern.32Therewereperiodicattemptsto‘defuse’the

issueusingthearrestsandtrialsofindividuals,butthosefoundguiltyweremostly

lowormid‐rankedbureaucrats(CribbandBrown1995:154;Liddle1996:87).Inan

attempttore‐establishafirmanti‐corruptionimage,thegovernmentcreatedanew

anti‐corruptioncampaign(OperasiTertib,OPSTIB)in1980,aimedateradicating

corruptionandsmuggling.However,OPSTIBwascriticizedforselectivelytakingup

casesandavoidinginvestigationagainsthigh‐levelofficials(Palmier1982:5;Pauker

1981:236).33Liddle(1996:24)suggeststhat‘theseperiodic

crackdowns…encourage[d]thepublictobelievethatthegovernment[was]atleast

well‐intentioned’.

30Inanotherexample,inMay1980agroupof50prominentIndonesians,includingretiredarmygeneralsandformerprimeministers,signedapetitionknownas‘ThePetitionof50’whichwascriticalofSuhartoandhismanipulationofPancasila,whichtheybelievedhewasusingtothreatenpoliticalenemies.Inordertodiscreditthepetition,someofSuharto’saidesdoctoredadocumentwhichtheyreleasedtothepress,claimingthatthosewhohadsignedthepetitionweresecretlycallingforacoup.Thosewhohadsignedthepetitionwerepunishedwithvariousarbitraryrestrictions,suchasrestrictingtheirabilitytoaccesscredit,restrictingtheirtravelanddenialofgovernmentcontracts.SeeElson(2001:231‐232)andRicklefs(2001:374‐375)forfurtherdetails.31Theregimewasalsosensitivetoreportingoncorruptionbyinternationalmediaoutlets.Forexample,in1986anarticleintheAustraliandaily,TheSydneyMorningHerald,whichinvestigatedthebusinessholdingsofSuharto’sfamily,ledtoa‘briefcrisisinAustralia‐Indonesianrelations’(Ricklefs2001:381).32A1980Temposurveyfoundthat42.8percentofrespondents,whichwasthehighestnumber,singledout‘corruptionandabusesofpower’asthegreatestinternalthreatfacingIndonesia(Pauker1981:237).33(Tanter1989)contendsthattheabolitionofOPSTIBin1988wasdrivenbyhigh‐levelmilitaryofficersinvolvedinsmugglingwhohadlobbiedfortheclosureoftheoperation.

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CorruptionandthefallofSuharto

Whilevocalanti‐corruptionprotestswerequashedinthepublicsphere,corruption

remainedan‘opensecret’(rahasiaumum).34Theinstitutionalizednatureof

corruptioninthebureaucracyledtowhatMcLeod(2011a:52)callsa‘parasitic’

relationshipbetweenthepublicsectoranditsclientsinwhichpublicservants,police

andthemilitaryextortedcitizenstosupplementtheirlowwages.35Fromthe1980s,

thebusinessdealingsofSuharto’sfamilyandhiscroniesbecameincreasingly

brazen.36TheSuhartofamilyanditscroniesestablishedacomplexnetworkof

‘foundations’(yayasan)tomaskcorruptionandlaundermoney.Bribescouldbepaid

intoafoundationownedbyamemberofthefamilytoescapedetectionandwithout

subjecttooversight(Vatikiotis1993,51).Donationsbystate‐ownedenterpriseswere

alsomadeintofoundationsasameansforsiphoningfundsfromthegovernment

(Aspinall2005b:93;Elson2001:281).Meanwhile,corruptionthatthreatenedthe

interestsofSuharto’sallieswascurbed,eitherthroughlawenforcementormore

sinistermeans(Widoyoko2011).37

The1980stotheearly1990swasaprofitableperiodforSuharto’schildrenand

cronies(Chalmers2006:233;Winters2014:19).38Theemphasisoneconomic

developmentandmarketderegulationcreatedopportunitiesforbusinesspeople

34Aspinall(1995:28)arguesthattherehadbeena‘traditionofdissent’amongsturbanelitesthroughouttheNewOrderandthisthesisdoesnotdisputethis.Anti‐corruptiondiscoursewasused,albeitsuperficially,byPPPandPDIduringelectioncampaigns,highlightingtheopennessofcorruptpractices.35McLeod(2008;2011a)identifieslowpublicservantwagesasakeydriverofcorruptionamongstgovernmentofficials.Asaresult,muchofhisresearchincombatingcorruptioninthegovernmentfocusesonpayingcivilservantsaliveablewage.36AsRicklefs(2001:366)argues,theeconomicsuccessesoftheNewOrderdidmuchtomollifyIndonesians,particularlythemiddleclass,whoenjoyedtheadvantagesofaboomingeconomy.Atthesametime,villagersinruralareaswerealsobenefitingfromtargeteddevelopmentprograms(Suryadinata1998:120‐121).37Forexample,Widoyoko(2011:168)arguesthattheprivatizationofthecustomsofficeinthemid‐1980swasaresponseagainstsmugglingwhichthreatenedtheIndonesianeconomyand,therefore,Suharto’sinterests.38MuchhasbeenwrittenonSuharto’suseofpatronageasbeinglinkedtohisJavaneseroots,thatheessentiallysawhimselfasamonarchwhodistributedfavourinreturnforfinancialbenefitandsupport(Anderson1990:187;Elson2001:301‐302;Vatikiotis1993:111‐114).Counter‐argumentstothishavealsobeenmade,forexampleRobinson(1981;1982)whodescribestherelationshipsaslessdrivenbycultureandmorebypoliticalfunctionalismandasnecessarytogarnerandcementsupportforhisleadership.Similarly,Ascher(1998)contendsthatpatronageismorecloselylinkedtotheneedtounifyadisunitedgovernmentundermutuallybeneficialcircumstancesthanculturaltraditions.

65

interestedinnewventures.39Suhartopubliclyendorsedpoliciessuchasfinancial

deregulation,butheensuredthathischildrenandcroniesenjoyedprivilegedaccess

toloansfromstatebanks,governmentfundingandconcessions(Elson2001:279).

Suharto’swifehadalreadybeennicknamed‘MadameTienPercent’,referringtothe

allegedshareofprofitsshedemandedfromthosegrantedbusinessfavoursbyher

husband(CribbandBrown1995:126).40Suharto’syoungestson,HutomoMandala

Putra(commonlyknownas‘Tommy’),wasawardedacontractin1996toproduce

Indonesia’snationalcar—inreality,aone‐yearlicensetoimportcarsfromSouth

Koreawithoutpayingdutiesorluxurytax,allowinghimtoundercutcompetitors

(Hale2001:631).Theprojectwasestablishedagainsttheadviceofboththeministers

fortradeandfinance.41SimilaropportunitieswereaffordedtoSuharto’sother

children.42Bytheearly1990stheSuhartofamilyassetswereestimatedatUSD2–3

billion(Vatikiotis1993:50)andSuhartohadcreatedanetworkofsupportersaround

himwhowereextremelywealthy,butalsoheavilydependentonthePresidentfor

businessfavours(Liddle1996:88,188;Vatikiotis1993:50).

WhileSuharto’spatronagenetworksinthebusinessspherewerestrong,hissupport

fromthemilitarybegantowane.Fromthelate1980s,militaryleaderswere

particularlyconcernedwithSuharto’ssuccessionplan,pressuringSuhartotoresign

attheupcomingelectionstomakewayfornewleadership(Jenkins1984;Liddle

1992:545).MilitaryleadersalsofeltmarginalizedasSuhartoexpandedhisinfluence

amongstciviliansandseniorbureaucratsbutseemedtoneglectthem(Aspinall1995:

23).Atthesametime,internationalsupportfortheregimeweakenedwiththeendof

theColdWar(Crouch1993:91;Ford2011)andstudentpressureonthegovernment

toaddressinequality,humanrightsandcorruptionmounted,asdidcondemnation

39Fallingoilpricesintheearly1980smeantIndonesiacouldnolongerridethecoat‐tailsofoilprofits(Liddle1987:206;Ricklefs2001:374).Robertson‐Snape(1999:595)alsoarguesthatderegularizationimpactedbureaucratsasthenumberoflicenses,permitsandfeeswerereducedsothey‘losttheiropportunitytobenefitfrom'gratuities'frequentlyconferredforperformingsuchservices’.40Liddle(1977:104)statesshewasalsonicknamed‘MadameFifty‐Fifty’.41TheTimorcarprojectfacedproblemsfromthestart.ShortlyafteritbegantherewasasharpdecreaseinautomobilepurchasesinIndonesia.Kia,themanufacturer,alsofacedfinancialtroublesinitshomelandofSouthKorea,andtheAsianEconomicCrisisfollowedsoonafterin1997.In1998IndonesiasignedarequestforfinancialassistancefromtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)whichdemandedanendtoconcessionsfortheprojectaspartofthestructuraladjustmentplanandtherewasthethreatofsanctionsfromtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)iftheydidnotcomply.ForfurtherinformationabouttheTimorprojectseeHale(2001).42FormoreexamplesoftheconcessionsgrantedtoSuharto’schildrenseeVatikiotis(1993:152‐153)andRobertson‐Snape(1999).

66

fromIslamicleaders.43Inthepoliticalsphere,theDemocraticPartyofIndonesia

(PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia,PDI)andthePeople’sDemocraticUnion(Persatuan

RakyatDemokratis,PRD),formedfromradicalelementsofthestudentactivist

movement,alsobecamemoreoutspokenintheirreproachesoftheregime.

ItwasthesechallengesthatpromptedSuhartotobroadenthepoliticalspacein

Indonesiainthelate1980sthatcametobeknownastheperiodof‘openness’

(keterbukaan).44Keterbukaansawcensorshipofthepressrelaxed,theestablishment

ofacommissionforhumanrightsandsometolerationofpoliticalprotests,

demonstrationsandgovernmentcritiques(Bertrand1996:325).In1990,Suharto

alsoannouncedthecreationoftheAssociationofMuslimIntellectuals(Ikatan

CendekiawanMuslimIndonesia,ICMI)which—whilenotuniversallyacceptedby

Islamicintellectuals—appealedtomanyurban,educatedandmodernistMuslims,

presentingthemameanstoinfluencestatedecision‐makingandadvancethecauseof

Islamwithinthegovernment(Aspinall2005b:40).45Suhartoalsoreorganizedthe

armedforces(AngkatanBersenjataRepublikIndonesia,ABRI)removingperceived

threatsincludingformerprotégéBennyMurdani(Bertrand1996).46However,

Keterbukaanendedin1994,withthesuddenclosureofthreemajormedia

publications,Tempo,DetikandEditor,aftertheypublishedaseriesofnegativereports

aboutadecisionbythen‐MinisterforResearchandTechnology,B.J.Habibie,to

purchaseEastGermanwarships(Bertrand1996:336;Eklof2003:230;Ricklefs2001:

399).Thepresshadalsobeguntoinvestigateanumberofpotentiallyembarrassing

corruptionscandalslinkedtoSuharto’sinnercircle,providinganadditionalimpetus

forthebans(Bertrand1996:336).

43Aspinall(2005b:128),describingthenatureofstudentprotestsinthemid‐1990s,writes:‘studentsincreasinglyraisedwhattheysometimesreferredtoas“elite”issuesconcerningnationallevelcorruptionandpoliticalleadership.ThiswashighlightedbyaseriesofprotestsdirectedagainstSuhartoin1993…theirtypicalmodusoperandiwasrelativelysmalldemonstrationswhichinvolvedconsiderablerisk.’44Eklof(2003:107)arguesthattheexactperiodisdifficulttodefineasbyMarch1988MPRparliamentarysessionswerealreadyengaginginlivelydebateonissuesregardingthevice‐presidency,electoralreformandeducation.However,thetermketerbukaanfirstgainedpopularityin1989,followinganarticleintheFarEasternEconomicReviewwrittenbySuhartodetractor(retired)GeneralSumitrocallingforgreaterpoliticalopennessinIndonesia.45OneprominentcriticwasAbdurrahmanWahid,fromNU,whobelievedICMIwouldfosterdivisionswithinIndonesiansocietyandsoestablishedarivalgroup,theDemocracyForum(Barton2002:184‐185).46SuhartoalsowentontheHajpilgrimageandselectedadevoutMuslim,FeisalTanjung,asABRIChief,whichwasseenasamovetoappealtotheIslamiccommunityasacounterbalancetothemilitary(Aspinall2005b:40‐41;Bertrand1996:331;Ricklefs2001:401).

67

Alongsideincreasinglyprominentmediacriticism,politicalrivalsalsobeganto

challengeSuhartoandhisregime,especiallymembersofPDIandPRD(Aspinall

2005b).47Fromthelate1980s,PDIbecamea‘semiopposition’(Aspinall2005b:168)

anditsattemptstoassertitsownanti‐corruptionsymbolalsohighlightedthe

government’slackofaction.Forexample,in1987,PDIpointedlyproposednewanti‐

corruptionandanti‐monopolylegislationdirectedatthePresident’snepotistic

policies(Eklof2003:109).TheproposalwasrejectedbyGolkarandthemilitary

factionwithintheMPR.PDI’scampaignsleadinguptothe1992electionsalsofocused

oncorruption,collusionandnepotism(korupsi,kolusi,nepotisme,KKN)and

monopolies(Aspinall2005b:175).Furthermore,outspokenPDIpolitician,KwikKian

Gie,releasedareportin1991claimingtherewasan‘alarmingmentalandmoral

erosioninalmostallofthenation’selitecircles,’andin1992presenteddraft

legislationforaneweconomiccompetitionlawpromotingtransparencyandareview

onmonopolyrights.However,nootherfactioninparliamentsupportedthebillandit

wasneverformallyintroduced(Eklof2003:121).

In1993,PDIelectedSukarno’sdaughter,MegawatiSukarnoputri,asitschairperson.48

Megawati’sappointmentwasrecognizedasanopportunitytouniteopposition

againsttheNewOrder(LiddleandMallarangeng1997:170).49Theappointment

emboldenedPDImembers.Forexample,outspokenPDIlegislatorssometimesgrilled,

orevenboycotted,governmentministersduringparliamentarycommissionhearings

andPDIwastheonlyfactionintheDPRtocondemnthe1994pressbans(Aspinall

2005b:167).Duringthisperiod,PRDwasalsoorganizingprotestsandproducing

publicationstargetingSuhartoandhisfamily,claimingthatallsocialandpolitical

problemsinIndonesiacouldbetracedbacktohim(Aspinall2005b:138).50The

growing,andincreasinglycoordinated,oppositionmovementprompteda

governmentefforttosabotageMegawati’sre‐electionasPDIchairpersonin1996

(Aspinall2005b:178;Eklof2003:251).ThegovernmentsupportedformerPDI

chairpersonSoerjadifortheposition,intimidatingpartymembersandusingfraudto

47ThePeople’sDemocraticParty(PartaiRakyatDemokratik),thatwasbornoutofthePRDstudentmovement,publiclydeclareditselfapoliticalpartyinJuly1996(Aspinall2005b).48Eklof(2003:207‐216)arguesthatMegawati’srisetothePDIleadershipwasacomplicatedaffairinvolvingdealswiththegovernmentandmilitaryinreturnforsupport,mobilizingherfather’sreputation,aswellasout‐manoeuvringothercontendersandwas,therefore,basedonmorethanoutrightpopularity.49Wantingtobuildacoalition,PRDmembersassistedPDIactivistsviainformalchannels,sharingwiththemtheirmobilizationtechniques(Aspinall2005b:186).50Aspinall(2005b:138‐139)writesthatthiswasdenotedbythephrase‘ujung‐ujungnyaSuharto’(UUS),roughlytranslatingto“somethingthatcanbetracedbacktoSuharto”.

68

securehisnominationandsubsequentappointmentatanextraordinaryparty

congressinMedanduringJune1996(Aspinall2005b:177‐184).

WhileSoerjadiwasofficiallybeingselectedasPDIChairpersoninMedan,Megawati

wasaddressingsupportersinJakarta.Pro‐democracydemonstratorsthatmarched

throughthecityfollowingthespeechweremetbygovernmenttroops,whoassaulted

protestors.Morethan100peoplewereinjuredandover50peopleweredetained,

sparkingmoreproteststhroughoutthecountry(Aspinall2005b:178).Meanwhile,

Megawati’ssupportersrefusedtoacknowledgeSoerjadi’snewposition,prompting

legalactionwhichalsospilledoverintoprotestsandpublicrallies(Aspinall2005b:

188;Ricklefs2001:403).Thetensioncametoaheadon27July1996,when

Megawati’sJakartaPDIofficewasattackedbythugssaidtorepresenttheopposing

factionofPDI(butwerealsofoundtoincludemilitaryofficersoutofuniform)and

twodaysofriotingensued,inwhichfivepeopledied,149werewoundedand74

peoplewent‘missing’(Ricklefs2001:403).Thegovernmentlaterblamedthese

attacksontheleft‐wingPRD,withABRImembersclaimingitwasareincarnationof

theoutlawedPKI(Aspinall2005b:192).SeveralPRDleaderswerearrestedfor

subversion,however,thesearrestsweremorelikelyaresultoftheparty’srecent

successinmobilizingworkers’strikesinanumberofcitiesratherthananyactual

involvementintheriots(LiddleandMallarangeng1997:170).Thecrackdownon

PRDspurredraidsonotherNGOofficesandthedetentionofactivists(Aspinall

2005b:192;Bird1998:169).

ThefinalyearsoftheNewOrderwerecharacterizedbygrowingdissatisfactionwith

theregime,includingagrowingconcernoverthegovernment’sbrutalitytowardsits

owncitizens.51Governmentcorruptionalsoattractedsignificantpublicdiscontent

(Liddle1996:88;Schütte2009:83),astheblatantwealthofSuharto’sfamilyand

croniesgrewincreasinglyobvious.52TheissuewasracializedasmanyofSuharto’s

cronieswereChinese‐Indonesian,leadingtoangeramongst‘native’(pribumi)

51ThesituationinEastTimorfuelledgrowingdiscontenttowardstheNewOrderamongsthumanrightsactivists(Anderson1999;Ricklefs2001:395).Workers’rightsalsocameunderscrutinyastheinternationalcommunitydevelopedatougherstanceonworkingconditionsandthebrutaldeathofprominentactivistandfemaleworker,Marsinah,highlightedtheuseofviolencetosuppressdissent(Ford2003:93‐94;MacIntyre1994:117).52Ricklefs(2001:402)discussesspeculationthatafterthedeathofSuharto’swife,IbuTien,therewerenoremainingchecksonthemoney‐hungrybehaviourofhischildren,whichinturnledtoevenmoreflagrantexamplesofcorruption.

69

entrepreneurs(Crouch1993:80).53DiscontentwasintensifiedbytheAsianFinancial

Crisis.54Indonesia’seconomyhadexperiencedhighsandlowsinthe1990s,but

nothingofthescaleofthecurrencycrisisof1997.55Priortothecrisis,theUSdollar

hadbeenworthapproximatelyRp.2,500.ByOctober1997ithadincreasedtoRp.

4,000,thenRp.17,000inJanuary1998(Ricklefs2001:404).Thedramatic

devaluationoftherupiahcausedthestockmarkettoplummet,leadingnumerous

businessestodeclarebankruptcy,wipingoutthesavingsofthemiddleclassand

causingmassunemployment(Wade1998;Wie2003:186‐187).TheCentralBank

providedliquidityinjectionstoflailingbankswhoseownersborrowedheavilyto

managetheirglobalportfoliosinsteadofusingthefundstostabilizesavingsand

reserves(McLeodandDuncan2007:79‐80).Inanotherexampleofgrowing

frustrationwiththecountry’sleadership,Bird(1998:174)assertsthecredibilityof

thegovernmentsanktonewlowsafteritwasrevealedthattheMinisterofManpower

hadusedUSD1.3millionfromtheworkers’socialinsurancefundtopayfor

parliamentarians’accommodationandexpenseswhiletheyweredeliberatinganew

billonmanpowerin1997.

WhenitbecameclearthattheRupiahwouldcontinuetoplummet,thegovernment

soughttheassistanceoftheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheWorldBank,

whorespondedwithaUSD38billionrescuepackageinOctober1997(Bird1998:

173‐174;MacIntyre1999:157).However,inspiteofagreeingtoanumberof

conditionsthatrequiredIndonesiatoadoptausteritymeasures,strengthenits

financialsectorandoverhaulthegovernment’sroleintheeconomy,Suhartostill

attemptedtoblockreformsthatinterferedwiththeprojectsofhiscronies(Bird

1999:28;Ricklefs2001:404;Sherlock1998).Nepotismcontinued,illustratedbythe

appointmentofB.J.Habibie,widelyregardedasSuharto’sheirapparent,asVice‐

President,hisdaughter,SitiHardiyantiRukmana(commonlyknownas‘Tutut’),and

severalclosefriends,ascabinetministerswhenhewasre‐electedPresidentinMarch

53Forexample,in1994,anumberofstudentsfromtheMuslimStudents’Association(HimpunanMahasiswaIslam,HMI)andICMIstagedprotestsagainstcorruptionintheIndonesianDevelopmentBank(BankPembangunanIndonesia,Bapindo)afterascandaleruptedinvolvingChinese‐Indonesianelites(Aspinall2005b:135).54WhiletherewereseveralfactorsleadingtotheAsianfinancialcrisis,theimmediatecausewasthefloatingoftheBahtbytheThaigovernmentafteritcouldnolongersupportthecurrency’sexchangerate.AsthevalueoftheBahtdroppedsignificantly,sotoodidthecurrenciesofneighbouringcountries.ForfurtherdetailsontheAsianfinancialcrisisandtheimplicationsforIndonesia,seeWie(2003)andHillandShiraishi(2007).55AccordingtoLiddle(1992:542)theearly1990switnessedimpressivegrowthandanincreaseintheannualnationalbudget.Incontrast,MacIntyre(1993:208)arguesthattherehadbeensomealarmin1992atthehighlevelsofnationalforeigndebtandoffshoreborrowing.

70

1998.DissatisfiedwithSuharto’sreformssofar,theIMFmootedanewagreementin

April1998,requiringaraftofnewpolicyreformsaccompaniedbyclosemonitoring.

Soonafter,on4May1998,Suhartoapproveda70percentincreaseinfuelprices,

sparkingriotsacrossthecountry(Bird1999:29).Demonstrationsagainstthe

subsequentpriceincreasesledtocallsforReformation(Reformasi)(Siegel1998:74).

WhileSuhartoattemptedtomanoeuvrehiswaythroughthecrisis,soldiersopened

fireonprotesterson12May1998,killingfourstudentprotestersfromTrisakti

Universityandinjuringseveralothers(Bird1998:29).Publicoutrageatthedeaths

sparkedriotsinJakartaandseveralothermajorcities.Suhartofamilyenterprisesand

thoseofChinese‐Indonesiansbecameprimetargetsforarsonandlooting,with

hundredsperishinginshoppingmallfires(Aspinall2005b:232;Siegel1998).56The

riotsconfirmedthegovernmentwasunabletomaintainruleoflaw(Aspinall2005b:

232).Suhartolostnotonlythesupportofeverydaycitizensbutalsothatofthe

businesselite,manyofwhomfledthecountry.Politicalelitesalsorebelledwith14

cabinetmemberswhohadbeenappointedbySuhartorefusingtoserveunderhim.In

addition,themilitary,underWiranto,withdrewitssupportforthepresidentand

Islamicleadersadvisedhimtoresign(Aspinall2005b:234‐237;Ricklefs2001:406‐

407).57Suhartosteppeddownon21May1998andwasreplacedbyVice‐President

Habibieuntilnewelectionscouldbeconducted.

Reformasi

TherelativelyswiftcollapseoftheNewOrderregimethrewIndonesiaintochaos.

Recognizingtheneedtoaddresspublicdemandsforincreasedtransparencyand

accountability,Habibiesignedtwobillsintheimmediatepost‐Suhartoperiod.InMay

1998hesignedLawNo.28/1999ontheEstablishmentofaCommissiontoExamine

theWealthofStateOfficials(KomisiPemeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara,

KPKPN)andinAugust1998hesignedLawNo.31/1999ontheEradicationofthe

CrimeofCorruption(Butt2011b:15;King2000:621).Theselawsauthorized

investigationsintothedealingsofpoliticiansandbureaucratswhocouldbe

reasonablysuspectedofcorruption,aswellastheformationofananti‐corruption

commissionwithintwoyears(Butt2011b:15;Crouch2010:212‐213).Thelaws

56Chinese‐Indonesians,whohadbeensuspectedofprofiteeringfromthecrisis,wereparticularlyvictimized(Elson2001:288;Purdey2006:Chapter4;Siegel1998:76).Foradetailedaccountofanti‐ChineseviolenceinIndonesiabetween1996and1999,seePurdey(2006).57ForfurtherdiscussionofthefracturingoftheeliteinthefinaldaysofSuharto’spresidency,seeAspinall(2005b:234‐238).

71

werewell‐received,buttheupheavaloftheearlyReformasiperiodandtheupcoming

electionsin1999soonovershadowedtheseanti‐corruptionefforts.Asaresult,the

commissionforinvestigatingthewealthofstateofficialswasnotsetupuntilJanuary

2001(Crouch2010:213).

Later,inNovember1998,theMPRalsopassedaresolutioncommittingtothe

investigationofallcorruptionduringtheNewOrder,includingSuhartoandhisfamily

(Bird1999:31;Crouch2010:200).AlthoughSuhartoclaimedtohavefewsavingsand

deniedowningoffshorebankaccounts,in1995fourofthefoundationshecontrolled

werevaluedatRp.2.5trillion(overUSD310million).InDecember1998,sevenmore

foundationswerefoundtobeholding‘quintillionsofrupiah’(Ricklefs2001:409).

SubsequentinvestigationsconductedunderHabibie’spresidencyfoundnoevidence

tosuggestthatSuharto’swealthhadbeengainedthroughinappropriatemeans(Elson

2001:295).The‘show’oftheinvestigationwasunconvincing,leadingtopublic

demandforamorethoroughinquiry(Hadiz2000:27).

Presidentialpressures

Habibieoptednottorunasapresidentialcandidateinthe1999generalelections.58

Asthefieldnarrowed,AbdurrahmanWahidandMegawatiSukarnoputri,whoformed

herownpartycalledtheIndonesiaDemocraticPartyofStruggle(PartaiDemokrasi

IndonesiaPerjuangan,PDIP)followingSuharto’sresignation,emergedasthetwo

maincontendersforthepresidency.AlthoughMegawati’spartywonthelargestshare

ofseatsinthenationallegislature,theMPRchoseWahidaspresident(Liddle2000:

33).Wahidbenefitedfromaninitialreputationofbeing‘clean’andrecognized,at

leastrhetorically,thatcombatingKKNshouldbeagovernmentpriority(King2000:

604).Healsosupportedincreasedpublicspaceformediaoutlets,whichcouldnow

reportopenlyoncorruptionscandalsinwaysthatwerenotpossibleduringtheNew

Order(Hara2001:314).

Acknowledgingthepublicpressuretoinstitutereformsacrossthepoliceforce,

judiciaryandthepublicprosecutor’soffice,Wahidsoughttoportraycorruption

eradicationasa‘centralplank’ofhisadministration(HadizandRobinson2014:49).

58Thesewerethefirstelectionssince1955inwhichpartyrepresentationwasnotrestricted.Severalpartiesparticipated,themajoronesbeing(inorderofvotesgarnered):PDIP,Golkar,theNationalAwakeningParty(PartaiKebangkitanBangsa,PKB),PPPandtheNationalMandateParty(PartaiAmanatNasional,PAN).Forafulloverviewoftheelectoraloutcomes,seeLiddle(2000).

72

Accordingly,WahidestablishedtheJointTeamtoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption

(TimGabunganPemberantasanTindakPidanaKorupsi,TGPTPK)asastop‐gap

measurewhileprovisionscouldbemadefortheestablishmentofaCorruption

EradicationCommission(KomisiPemberantasanKorupsi,KPK).Wahidalso

establishedtheNationalOmbudsman’sCommissionin2000,withPresidentialDecree

No.44/2000,taskedwithreceivingcomplaintsfromthepublicregardingtheconduct

anddecisionsofpublicofficials(Sherlock2002:367).Moreover,therewereattempts

toreinvigoratethestateauditinstitutionsandimproveoversightofgovernment

spending(Hamilton‐Hart2001:73).

Theseearlyattemptstocombatcorruptionweremetwithresistance,particularlyas

membersofthejudiciarywereaprimarytargetoftheTGPTPK.Thoseseekingto

uncoverthecorruptactivitiesoftheelitewereoftenmetwithcounter‐claimsof

defamationbythosetheyhadaccused.Forexample,thecaseofwomen’srights

activist,YeniRoslaini,who,afterprovidinglegalassistancetoavictimofrape,was

prosecutedforlibelbytheaccused.Duringthecase,Roslainicontendedthatthetrial

hadbeenunfairandthedefencehadbribedthejudgesforafavourableruling.59In

anotherexample,EndinWahyudinwassentencedtothreemonthsinprisonandsix

months’probationin2003afterreportingbriberyinvolvingthreejudgesinMalang.

Thejudges,whowerefoundnotguilty,latersuedWahyuddinfordefamation(Butt

andLindsay2011;Liputan62003:199‐204).

WhileWahidhimselfappearedcommittedtofightingcorruption,hewasnotabove

usingcorruptionaccusationforpersonalpoliticalinterests.InJuly1999,aGolkar

electionfundingscandalcametolightinvolvingfinancialmisdealingbetweenBank

BaliandacompanynamedPTEraGiatPrima(EGP).60EGPhadstruckadealto

channelfundsfromBankBalitomembersofGolkar.TheGovernorofBankIndonesia,

SyahrilSabarin,whohadbeenappointedbySuhartoin1998,wasaccusedofhaving

knowledgeofthedealings.WahidwantedtoappointhisownBankIndonesia

GovernorandgaveSabarintheoptiontoeitherresignorfacecorruptioncharges.

Refusingtoresign,SabarinwasarrestedinJune2000andconvictedofcorruptionin

March2002.61Wahidalsochargedkeymembersofhiscoalitionofcorruptionsothat

hecouldreplacethem.HamzahHazfromtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(Partai59SeeCollins(2007:125‐126)forfurtherdetailsoftheRoslainicase.60ForfurtherexplanationoftheBankBalicorruptionscandalseeCrouch(2010:207‐209),Goodpaster(2002:95‐96)andHamilton‐Hart(2001:76‐77).61ThisconvictionwasoverturnedbytheJakartaHighCourtinAugust2002(Crouch2010:209).

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PersatuanPembangunan,PPP),LaksamanaSukardifromPDIPandJusufKallafrom

Golkar,wereallaccusedofcorruption,althoughthecaseswerenotinvestigatedand

nochargeswerelaid(Liddle2001:209).62Despitethefactthattheaccusations

remainedunsubstantiated,Wahidusedthemasabasisfordismissal.Thisstrategy

backfiredwithWahidlosingtheconfidenceofhiscoalitiongovernmentand

subsequentlybeingaskedbyparliamenttoaccountforhisactions(Liddle2001:209).

Wahid’santi‐corruptionrhetoricwasinconsistentwiththeongoingleniencyshown

towardsNewOrderelites(Barton2006:345‐346).63Withanewleadershipinstalled,

thepublichadhighhopesthatSuhartoandhisassociateswouldfinallybepunished

fortheircorruption.Hamilton‐Hart(2001:66)arguesthatpublicperceptionswere

thatthefinancialcrisiswasintensifiedbygovernmentcorruptionandthatKKNhad

cometo‘symbolisethesocialcosts,inequitiesandabusesoftheSoehartoregime’.

Pressuremountedtore‐opentheinvestigationintoSuharto—legalchargeswere

finallylaidagainsttheformerpresidentinAugust2000(Elson2001:295‐296)—but,

thechargesweredroppedinFebruary2001asdefencelawyersandtherulingjudges

agreedSuhartowastooilltofacetrial(Aditjondro2002;Brown2003:243).Itwas

widelyknownthatWahidalwaysintendedtopardonSuhartoifhewasfoundguilty,

undermininghisanti‐corruptioncredentials(Brown2003:243;King2000:624).

TheonlychildofSuharto’stobetriedwasTommySuharto.AsprogressinSuharto’s

casestalledongroundsofillness,TommycametorepresenttheexcessesoftheNew

Order,withhis‘playboylifestyle’andpenchantforluxuryvehicles(Tupai2005).

Tommywassentencedto18monthsimprisonmentinlate2000forswindlingthe

StateLogisticsAgency(BadanUrusanLogistik,Bulog)outofRp.95billion

(approximatelyUSD11million)(Crouch2010:202).The18monthsentencefor

corruptionwasseenasbeinginadequate.Hewentintohidingafterhisappealwas

rejectedandwassubsequentlyimplicatedinthemurderofthechiefjudgeinvolvedin

hisconviction,SyafiuddinKartasasmita(Brown2003:243;Crouch2010:202).

Reportsofspecialtreatmentwhileinprisonandoutingstonightclubscontinuedto

62Kallawentontobecomevice‐presidentin2004,contestthepresidency(unsuccessfully)in2009andbecomevice‐presidentagainin2014.63AnotherexampleofthiswasthecaseofAkbarTandjung,StateSecretaryin1999andGeneralChairmanofGolkar,whowasaccusedofusinggovernmentfundingintendedforsocialwelfareprogramstobankrollGolkar’s1999electioncampaign(Crouch2010:209).TandjungwasaccusedofdivertingRp.40billion(USD4million)fortheparty’selectoraleffort.HewastriedinMarch2002andsentencedtothreeyearsinprison,however,theconvictionwasoverturnedinFebruary2004andTandjungservedonlyamonthofhissentence.

74

feedpopularsuspicionsthattherichremained‘abovethelaw’(Hainsworth2007).64

TheonlyothermemberoftheSuhartoclantobechargedandjailedforcorruption

wasSuharto’shalf‐brother,Probosutedjo,whowasconvictedin2003for

misappropriatingRp.49billion(approximatelyUSD5million)fromagovernment

reforestationproject(Kompas2001).

Tommy’strialputWahidinadifficultposition.Whilethepresidenthadnocontrol

overjudicialprocesses,thelenientsentenceswereinterpretedasfurtherevidence

thatthenewleadershipwasunwillingtobetoughoncorruption.Wahid’sreluctance

tocondemnSuharto(andhisfamily)hadalreadydisappointedthosewhobelieved

thatbringingNewOrdercorruptorstojusticewouldreflectbroadergovernment

reform(Liddle2000:42).Havingalreadylostthesupportofmostcoalitionmembers,

Wahidfacedincreasedscrutinythateventuallyledtohisimpeachment.In2000,

allegationsofcorruptionwerelevelledatWahidwhenitappearedthatfundinggiven

toBulogbytheSultanofBrunei,whichwastobespentinAcehinordertogainthe

supportofreligiousleadersinordertohaltcivilunrest,hadbeenmisused(Barton

2006;Liddle2001:210).ThelackoftransparencyinBulog’sprojectsinAcehcast

doubtoverhowmuchhadactuallybeenspentintheprovince(Collins2007:163;

Crouch2010:30).Crouch(2010:30)describesWahid’suseoffundingas‘casual’and

theuseofhispersonalmasseuseasago‐betweenwithBulogas‘bizarre’,leavinghim

vulnerabletoattacksfromaparliamentthatnolongersupportedhisrule.65The

impeachmentprocessbeganinFebruary2001andWahidwasdismissedfromthe

presidencyandreplacedbyMegawatiSukarnoputriinJuly2001.

WhenMegawatibecamepresidenttwentymonthsafterthe1999election,shetoo

spokeabouttheimportanceoferadicatingcorruption.Shesuggestedthatindividuals

neededtoexercisebettermoraljudgementandresisttheirgreed,ratherthan

implementinginstitutionalchangestoaddressanentrenchedproblem(Sherlock

64Tommywaslaterconvictedto15yearsinprisonforhiringhitmentomurderKartasasmita(Brown2003:243).Crouch(2010:202)outlinesthedetailsofthetrial,notingthatalthoughTommySuhartowasconvictedfororderingthemurderheservedonlyfouryearsofhissentence,whilethetwomenfoundguiltyoftheactualshootingweresentencedtolifeinprisonandremainincustody.AfteranumberofremissionsTommywasreleasedin2006,havingservedjustfouroutofthefifteenyearsofhisprisonterm(Kingsbury2007:157).65Itisdifficulttoascertainwhethertheseactsweredeliberate.Ricklefs(2001:421)arguesthatWahidwasinfactthevictimofrichcorruptorswho‘circledaroundtheAbdurrahmanregime’,whileBrown(2003:244)concursthatitwasunlikelythatWahidhadintentionallyembezzledstatefunds:‘theevidenceforWahid’smalfeasanceinthesetwocasesisthin;whatdoesseembeyonddoubt,though,isthathehasprovedtobeapoorjudgeofhispersonalassistants’.Barton(2006),authorofWahid’sofficialbiography,isalsosympathetictotheleader,portrayinghisdownfallasa‘tragedy’.

75

2002:379).LikeWahid,sheneededtoappeaseGolkarandthemilitaryinorderto

gainparliamentarysupportforherleadership.66UnlikeWahid,though,shepacified

herreluctantsupportersratherthanconfrontingthem,resultinginthe‘stonewalling’

ofreformefforts(Brown2003:272;Sherlock2002).67Shealsoseemedreluctantto

openlysupportTGPTPKinvestigations.68AlongsideMegawati’sreluctancetoact,

PDIPgainedareputationforcorruption,withmembersusingtheirnew‐found

authorityfortheirownbenefit(Crouch2010:32;naThalang2005:330),whichmay

havecontributedtothisreluctance.Wanandi(2004:124)contendsthatmembersof

Megawati’sownfamilywerealsoundersuspicionofbeinginvolvedincorruption

(althoughnoarrestshaveeveroccurred).Someinthejudiciaryandlawenforcement

agenciesalsoseemeddeterminedtoundermineanti‐corruptionefforts.InMarch

2001ateamofthreeSupremeCourtjudgesannulledthelawallowingfortheTGPTPK

altogether.69ProgressoftheCommissiontoExaminetheWealthofStateOfficials

(KomisiPermeriksaKekayaanPenyelenggaraNegara,KPKPN)wassimilarlystifledas

itrequiredsupportfromthePoliceandtheAttorney‐General’sofficetomount

prosecutionagainstcorruptionsuspectsandcooperationbetweenthetwowaspoor

(Butt2011b:19).TheKPKPNonlyreportedeightofficialstothepoliceonsuspicions

ofcorruptionthroughoutitslifetime.ItwassubsumedintotheKPKin2003.Thelack

ofprogressonissuesofcorruptionacrossalllevelsofgovernmentwassymptomatic

ofmoregeneralcriticismsoftheMegawatiregimeasshewasderidedforlacking

visioninguidingthecountry(Crouch2010:32).70

66ThisalsoincludedtheinstallationofHamzahHazasvice‐president,despitepreviouslybeingdismissedfromWahid’scabinetonsuspicionofcorruptionandeventhoughhehadrejectedherpresidencyin1999onthebasisthatshewasawoman(Crouch2010,32).67Crouch(2010:210)contendsthatMegawatipurposefullydidnotpushfortheconvictionofAkbarTandjung,leaderofGolkarchargedwithdivertingfundsfromBulogforGolkar’selectioncampaignin1999,asallowinghimtomaintainhispositioninspiteofcontroversialcorruptionchargeswasofpoliticalbenefittoPDIP.Furthermore,whenMegawati’sgovernmentpassednewanti‐corruptionlegislation,whichprovidedforanewcommissionandcourts,severalamendmentsweremadetothebillsintheparliament,wateringthemdownbeforetheywereenacted(Crouch2010:34).Thecourtsystemswerereputedtoberunbya‘legalmafia’(mafiahukum),whoacceptedbribesinreturnforfavourablecourtrulings(Lindsey1998),andthegovernmenthaddonelittletoreignthemin.68TheTGPTPKneededofficialpresidentialapprovalbeforequestioningseniorofficials,whichMegawatirarelygranted(Crouch2010:215).69MembersoftheTGPTPKbelievedtherewasaconspiracyagainsttheteam,laterconfirmedwhenapetitionwassubmittedtotheSupremeCourttoreviewthestatuteunderwhichtheteamhadbeenestablished.ThecaseledtheSupremeCourttoannulLawNo.31/1999,whichwasthelegalbasisfortheTGPTPK(ButtandLindsay2011:202‐203).TheannulmentwasviewedasanattemptbySupremeCourtjudgestoprotecttheircolleagues(Crouch2010:214).70Despiteadisinclinationtoopenlysupportanti‐corruptionefforts,MegawatisignedtheLawfortheCommissiontoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption(LawNo.30/2002)inDecember2002,pavingthewayforanewanti‐corruptioninvestigativebodywithbroader‐rangingpowers.TheAnti‐CorruptionCourts(PengadilanTindakPidanaKorupsi,Tipikor),however,

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TheriseofYudhoyono

In2004,SusiloBambangYudhoyono(oftenreferredtoas‘SBY’)bestedMegawatiin

Indonesia’sfirstdirectpresidentialelection.71Yudhoyonohadservedasacabinet

ministerforbothWahidandMegawati,butwasdismissedbyMegawatiaftershe

realizedthatheintendedtochallengeherforthepresidency.Asearlyas2001

YudhoyonowasinvolvedintheDemocraticParty,whichlaterbecametheelectoral

vehicletosupporthispresidentialnomination(Crouch2010:35;Slater2004:64).In

thefinalrun‐off,whichpittedYudhoyonoagainstMegawati,bothcandidatespledged

thattheywouldcombatcorruption(Anantaetal.2005).72Withapoortrackrecord

ontheissue,Megawati’scredibilityregardingthispromisewasquestionable.Thelack

ofreformsimplementedduringherpresidencyfuelledperceptionsthatcorruption

hadworsenedunderherrule(Slater2004:64;Wanandi2004:116).Bycontrast,

Yudhoyonowasabletopainthimselfasbeingcommittedtocombatingcorruption

(Anantaetal.2005:117;Hadiz2003:596).73Withsurveysillustratingthatthe

economy,socialwelfareandcorruptioneradicationwerethehighestprioritiesof

Indonesiancitizens(Aspinall2005a:124),supportemergedforanewleadershipthat

couldreversethestagnationofearlieryears.Reflectingthissentiment,Yudhoyono’s

DemocraticPartygained7.5percentofvotes,whilePDIP’svotedeclinedfrom39per

centin1999to19percentin2004(Wanandi2004:117).

YudhoyonowonadecisivevictoryoverMegawatiinthepresidentialelection’s

secondroundrun‐off,winning60.6percentofthepopularvote(LiddleandMujani

2005:122).Afterbecomingpresident,Yudhoyonoembarkedonamuch‐laudedanti‐

corruptiondrive.HeauthorizedtheKPKtoinvestigateseniorofficialsand

parliamentariansandin2004announcednewmeasuresto‘accelerate’the

eradicationofcorruption(Crouch2010:217).By2006,Yudhoyono’santi‐corruption

driveledtotheinvestigationand/orarrestofatleastsevengovernors,63district

headsand13nationalparliamentarians(McGibbon2006:325).Duringhisfirstyear

aspresident,Yudhoyonosignedoffoninvestigationsinto57officials(Crouch2010:

218).ThefirstTipikortrialinvolvingformerAcehnesegovernorAbdulSaleh,who

werenotestablisheduntilOctober2004(Butt2011b:32),largelyindicativeofagenerallackofenthusiasmforthebody,notleastfromMegawatiandtheparliament.71Upuntil1999,thepresidentwaschosenbytheMPR.Foradiscussiononthetransitiontodirectpresidentialelections,firstheldin2004,seeTan(2006).72Aspinall(2005a:118)assertsthatwhilethe‘dominantdiscourseoftheelectionswasdemocratic,againstcorruptionandevenpro‐‘change’(perubahan),thiswasmerelyanemptyrhetoricaldeviceintendedtomaskcontinuedelitedominance’.73AfocusgroupstudyconductedbyAnantaetal.(2005:91)foundthatYudhoyonowasseenas‘firm’(tegas)andparticipantsfelthewouldbefirmindealingwithcorruptioninIndonesia.

77

wassentencedtotenyearsimprisonmentinApril2005,wasseenasalandmarktrial

(Crouch2010:218).Followingthis,aslewofhigh‐profilecorruptioncaseswere

mounted,includingsomethatMegawatihadpreviouslyrefusedtoapprove.

AcknowledgingthelimitedresourcesoftheKPKandtheanti‐corruptioncourts,

YudhoyonoapprovedtheformationofanadditionalbodycalledtheCoordination

TeamfortheEradicationoftheCrimeofCorruption(TimKoordinasiPemberantasan

TindakPidanaKorupsi,TimTastipikor).DrawnfromtheAttorney‐General’soffice,

thepoliceandtheFinanceandDevelopmentBoard,theteamanswereddirectlytothe

presidentandbroughtcasestotheordinarycourtsinsteadoftheanti‐corruption

courts.It,too,ledsomehigh‐profileprosecutionsincludingthecaseagainst

Megawati’sMinisterofReligion,SaidAgilHusinAlMunawar,whowaschargedand

convictedofembezzlingfundsdesignatedtoassistIndonesiancitizensintheir

pilgrimagetoMecca(Crouch2010:219).

YudhoyonosteadfastlysupportedtheKPKandanti‐corruptioneffortsthroughouthis

firstterminoffice(2004–2009).However,asconvictionsbegantomount,critics

accusedhimoffocusingonrivalparties.Moreover,theinvestigationsdidnotreach

thehighestechelonsofpowerinthegovernmentandbusiness(Crouch2010:38).74

Nevertheless,withhisrelativelycleanbackgroundandlessinvolvementinpatronage

politicsthanhispredecessors,Yudhoyonowasabletocapitalizeontheseconvictions

inordertoboosthispopularity.Therewasmuchpraiseforhisleadershipashewas

seenashavingstabilizedthenation’seconomyafterseveralyearsofpooreconomic

growth(Sukma2009:350),whilethecountry’scontinuedeconomicgrowthappeared

tospareIndonesiafromtheworstoftheglobalfinancialcrisisin2008(Aspinall2010:

105).Meanwhile,Yudhoyono’sdeputy,JusufKallafromGolkar,hadbrokeredapeace

74Forexample,YudhoyonofacedcriticismforgrantingclemencytoTommySuhartoandreducinghissentenceandfailingtoprosecutehimforothercrimesasnewevidencecametolight.Anti‐corruptionandhumanrightsactivistsvoicedstrongoppositiontoTommy’sparoleearlyin2006,claiminghehadreceivedspecialtreatmentduetohispositionandinfluence(Cochrane2006).Tommyhasbeenlinkedtoanumberofothercorruptionscandals,includingacourtcasebroughtbythestatelogisticsagencyagainsthimforUSD70millionoveralandscamin1995inwhichheusedgovernmentconnectionstoswapswamplandsinNorthJakartaforprimerealestateintheheartofJakarta.ThecasewasdismissedandTommywasawardedUSD630,000inacounterclaim,adecisionthatangeredanti‐corruptionactivists(Quarrata2008;Thompson2008).In2012allegationscametolightthatTommyhadreceivedaUSD20millionbribefromRollsRoycein1990forthecontracttoprovideairplanestoIndonesia’snationalcarrierGaruda,buthedidnotfacefurtherprosecution(Aditjondro2002:14).

78

agreementinAcehprovinceafterdecadesofcivilunrestdatingbacktotheDarul

Islamrebellionofthe1950s.75

Mobilizinghiscleanimageandcommitmenttofightingcorruption,Yudhoyonoand

theDemocraticPartyrepeatedlyusedananti‐corruptionsymbolincampaign

advertisementsleadinguptothe2009elections.Recontestingthepresidency,

Yudhoyonospokeofhisongoingcommitmenttoeradicatingcorruption,while

membersofhispartyappearedina(nowinfamous)‘say“no”tocorruption’campaign

onnationaltelevisioncampaign.76In2009,withapositivereputationandtrack

record,theDemocraticPartyincreaseditsnumberofseatswithinthenational

legislature,gaining93seats,witharesoundingvictoryforYudhoyonointhe

presidentialelection.

Conclusion

ThischapterhasoutlinedhowanumberofpoliticalfiguresinIndonesiaattemptedto

usecorruptionissuesfortheirownpoliticaladvantage.Theprevalenceofcorruption

reinforcedperceivedinequalitiesbetweenprivilegedeliteswithaccesstopatronage

networksontheonehandandordinaryfolkontheother.Leveragingcitizens’

discontentwithpoliticalleadership,anti‐corruptionrhetoricdrewuponthese

prevailingimagesofcorruptofficialsandpoliticians.Theperceptionsofinjustice

associatedwithcorruptionhavebeenaconsistentrallyingpointforanti‐government

sentiment,whilepromisestoseriouslyaddressitremainapopularcatch‐cryfor

politicians.

CorruptionhasbeenaconstantpartofIndonesia’spoliticallandscapesinceDutch

colonizationFollowingIndonesia’striumphinitsbattleforindependence,thenew

governmentthatwasestablishedseemedtobeperpetuatingratherthancombating

corruption.Thiswastruebothfortheparliamentariansandcabinetmembersaswell

aspublicservantswhoseremunerationwasoftenviewedasdisproportionatetotheir

socialstanding.Corruptioninallbranchesofgovernmentseemedubiquitousand

therewasageneralperceptionthatthoseingovernmentweremoreintenton

protectingtheirownintereststhanservingtheIndonesianpeople.

75TheDarulIslamrebellionbeganin1953andaimedtocreateanautonomousAcehwithinaFederalIslamicIndonesianstate.Foranoverviewofthelong‐standingconflictbetweenAcehneseseparatistsandtheIndonesiangovernment,whicheffectivelyendedwiththesigningoftheHelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstandingin2005,seeAspinall(2009);Kramer(2009).76FurtherdetailsofthisspecificadvertisingcampaigncanbefoundinChapterFour.

79

Asthepubliccametoseecorruptionasapervasivepoliticalevil,theuseofanti‐

corruptionsymbolsgainedtraction.FromasearlyastheSukarnoyears,purportingto

standagainstcorruptionwasapopularwayforpoliticianstogainpublicsupport

fromthemanypeoplewhodidnotbenefitfromcorruption.TheNewOrderregime

attemptedtowinpublicsupportwithanearlyandhighlyvisibleanti‐corruptiondrive

inthelate1960sandearly1970s,butthelackofmeaningfultransparencyand

accountabilityreformsledtoevenmorepublicoutcry.Thoughthissentiment

dissipatedwithincreasedeconomicdevelopment,corruptionremainedasourceof

publicdiscontent,attimesbecomingarallyingpointforanti‐governmentprotests.

PubliccynicismtowardsSuhartoreachedfeverpitchin1998,whenhisassertionsof

beingopentoreformspromotingaccountabilityandtransparency,andthathisown

familyhadnotbenefittedfromhisposition,fellondeafears.Indonesianscouldno

longerbepersuaded,evenwiththreatsofviolenceand/orimprisonment,tosupport

theregime.AfterSuhartoresigned,newleaderssoughttodemonstratethattheyhad

brokenfromthelegaciesoftheNewOrder.Being‘anti‐corruption’wasadesirable

image.But,inreality,asevidencedbyPresidentsWahid,MegawatiandYudhoyono,it

proveddifficulttomaintain.

Ofcourse,anti‐corruptionrhetoricisnotalwaysdivorcedfromaction.Thereare

severalexamplesofconcretestepstakenbysuccessivegovernments,particularly

duringReformasi,tocombatcorruption.Lawsallowingfortheestablishmentofthe

KPKandTipikor,coupledwiththeeffortsoftheseinstitutions,ledtothearrestand

prosecutionofanumberofsuspects,bothwithinthegovernmentandtheprivate

sector.However,eventhemostsuccessfulrhetoricandanti‐corruptionsstepscanbe

undonebyscandalsthatcontradictthedeclaredvaluesofthepartyorperson.After

thedisappointmentsoftheearlyReformasi,suchasthefailuretoprosecuteSuharto

andhisfamilysatisfactorily,allegationsofcorruptionagainstPresidentWahidand

Megawati’sreluctancetocountertheinterestsofold‐schoolelites,Yudhoyono

representedanewhope.TheDemocraticParty’stoughstanceoncorruptionwas

supportedbynotonlyYudhoyono’swords,butalsohisactions—atleast,asfarasthe

publiccouldsee—markingthisasthepinnacleoftheparty’spopularity.His

continuedsuccessin2009demonstratedasuccessfulmaintenanceoftheanti‐

corruptionsymbol.However,corruptionissueswouldsurfaceforthepartyfollowing

its2009victoryandthesignificantnumberofcorruptionscandalsarisingthroughout

Yudhoyono’ssecondtermwouldsettheagendaforthe2014electoralcampaigns.

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ChapterThreePoliticsandcorruption,2009–2014

Theoutcomeofthe2009electionreflectedcontinuingsupportfortheincumbent

administration,withGolkarandPDIPlosingseatstoPresidentYudhoyono’s

DemocraticPartyinthenationallegislatureandtheProsperousJusticeParty(Partai

KeadilanSejahtera,PKS)becomingthemostdominantIslamicpartyinthe

parliament.GerindraandHanura,competingintheirfirstnationalelections,obtained

asmallproportionofthevote,butenoughtomeetthethresholdrequiredtosecurea

presenceinthenationalparliament.WhilethesepowershiftsgavetheDemocratic

Party‐ledcoalitioncontrolofbothparliamentandtheexecutive,theensuingfive

yearswerefarfromsmoothsailing.Approachingthe2014election,theYudhoyono

administrationhadlostmuchofitspopularity,withapprovalratingsfallingsteadily

from2011.ManyfeltthatYudhoyonofailedtomaintainthevigourwithwhichhehad

addressedcorruptionduringhisfirstterm,contributingtovoterdisenchantment

(BurkeandResosudarmo2012:300;Mietzner2012).

ThischapterbrieflydiscussesIndonesia’snationallegislativeelectionsin2004and

2009beforehighlightingvariouscorruption‐relatedcasesthataffectedpublic

sentimenttowardsthegovernmentduringthisperiod.Thechapterunderscoresthe

dominanceofcorruptionthemesinthepublicsphere,outliningsomeofthe

prominentanti‐corruptioneffortsandcorruptionscandalsduringthisperiod.The

chapterconcludesthatthevolumeofcorruptioncasesandmediaattentionon

scandalsdamagednotonlythereputationofparticularpartiesandindividuals,but

alsothatofthepoliticalsystemasawhole.Thisaffordedemergingpartiesthe

opportunitytopresentthemselvesasanewer,cleanerandbetteralternativeintheir

2014electoralcampaigns.

The2004and2009elections

The2004nationallegislativeelectionswerecontestedby24parties.Indonesia’sfour

majorparties—Golkar,PDIP,theNationalAwakeningParty(PartaiKebangkitan

Bangsa,PKB)andtheUnitedDevelopmentParty(PartaiPersatuanPembangunan,

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PPP)—wonthemostseatsinparliament(Sebastian2004:274).1However,some

minorpartiessurfacedasseriouspoliticalcontenders,particularlytheDemocratic

Party,ledby(soontobepresident)Yudhoyono,andPKS.Thissuccesswasallthe

moreunexpectedgiventherelativelylowprofilesofbothpartiespriortotheelection

(Aspinall2005a).Yudhoyono’sDemocraticPartyreceived7.5percentofthepopular

voteintheparliamentaryelectionwhilePKSgarnered7.34percentofthepopular

vote,asharpincreasefromthe1.36percentitobtainedwhenitranastheJustice

Party(PartaiKeadilan,PK)in1999.

TheemergenceofbothYudhoyonoandPKSinthe2004electionsreflectedageneral

dissatisfactionwithMegawati’spresidencyandtheparliamentmorebroadly(Liddle

andMujani2005:125;Sebastian2004;Wanandi2004:117).Drawinguponthis

discontent,Yudhoyonopresentedhimselfasaviablepresidentialalternativeto

Megawati,eventhoughhispartywassignificantlylesspopularthanPDIP.By

contrast,PKS’successwasattributedtoatwo‐foldstrategy.Ontheonehandit

focusedongrassrootscampaigningandtargetingnewrecruits,oftenbyappealingto

religioussentiment(Permata2008).Ontheotherhand,itdrewsecularappealby

demandingmoretransparencyandaccountabilityingovernment(CollinsandFauzi

2005;Machmudi2006).PKSwasthusabletoexploitgrowinganti‐corruption

sentimentamongstthebroaderpopulationwhilemaintaininganauraofbeinga

conservativeIslamicparty.

Partiesthathadnotfaredwellin2004facedadditionaldifficultiesin2009.LawNo.

3/1999onGeneralElectionshadalreadyprecludedpartiesgarneringlessthan2.5

percentofparliamentaryseatsinthepreviouselectionfromrunninginsubsequent

elections.LawNo.10/2008onGeneralElectionsforthePeople'sRepresentative

Assembly,theRegionalRepresentativeAssemblyandtheRegionalHouseof

Representativesputinplacestrictereligibilityrulesforparticipatinginnational

parliamentaryelections(Mietzner2009;Sherlock2009a:11;Sukma2009).Changes

werealsomadetothewayvoterscouldselecttheirrepresentatives.InDecember

2008theConstitutionalCourtruledthattheseatsobtainedbyeachpartyweretobe

allocatedtoindividualsbasedonthenumberofpersonalvotestheygarnered,as

opposedtotheorderofcandidates’namesontheparties’candidatelist(Sherlock

1SeetheElectoralCommissionwebsiteforfulldetailsofthe2004nationallegislativeelectionresults(KomisiPemilihanUmum2009a).Theresultswerecontestedbysomeofthesmallerparties,with14partiesrefusingtoendorsetheelectionresults,citing‘electionirregularities’(Sebastian2004:264).

83

2009a:8).Thisincreasedcompetitionwithinpartiesandledtoanumberof

incumbentDPR‐RImemberslosingtheirpositionstocelebritycandidatesorother

contenderswithlegitimatelocalsupport(Sukma2009:321).Inaddition,LawNo.

42/2008alsolimitedtheabilityofpartiestonominatepresidentialandvice‐

presidentialcandidates.In2004,allpartiesthatreceivedover3percentofthe

popularvoteorheld5percentofDPR‐RIseatswereallowedtonominatea

presidentialcandidate(naThalang2005:332;Tan2006).However,in2009,parties

neededover20percentofthepopularvoteor25percentofDPR‐RIseatsinorderto

nominateacandidate.PartysuccessintheDPR‐RIelectionsbecamemoreimportant

thanever,asthosefailingtopassthisthresholdwereforcedtoformstrategic

coalitionswithotherpartiesiftheywishedtoputforwardapresidentialteam.

TheDemocraticPartyacquiredanadditional93seatsintheDPR‐RIin2009,gaining

over20percentofthepopularvote.ThisallowedthepartytoadvanceYudhoyonoas

theirpresidentialcandidate,andBoedionoasvice‐presidentialcandidate,without

needingtonegotiatewithotherparties.GolkarandPDIP,previouslythetwomost

popularparties,bothlostseveralseatscomparedtotheir2004results,fallingto

secondandthirdrespectively(Aspinall2005a;Wanandi2004)(seeTable3.1).2While

theelectionsawageneraldeclineinsupportforIslamicparties,PKSincreasedits

parliamentaryshareby12seats,makingitthemostinfluentialIslamicpartyinthe

nationalparliament.PKS’successarguablyreflectedthestrongcommitmentof

cadres,providingPKSwithconsistentsupportthatotherIslamicpartiessimplydid

nothave(Tomsa2012).3

2Electoralproblemsfacedduringthe2009electionincludedissuessuchas:incorrectvoterregistry,ballotsprintedincorrectly,alackofballotsatcertainpollingbooths,ballotpaperssenttothewrongprovincesanddistrictsandalackofexperiencedstaffoverseeingoperationsontheground.ForacomprehensiveoverviewoftheelectoralmanagementproblemsfacedbytheKPUseeSukma(2009;2010).3While2009sawPKSbecomethemostpowerfulIslamicpartyinthenationalparliament,theresultwasonlymarginallybetterthanin2004.Despiteextensivecampaigning,inasimilarveintothestrategiesusedforthe2004elections,thepartywasunabletopickupvoteslostbyotherIslamicparties(Pepinskyetal.2012;Sukma2009:321).ThiswasindicativeofanoverallshiftinvotesawayfromIslamicpartiestosecularparties.Mietzner(2010:187)assertsthatthiswastheresultofatrendtowards‘politicalcentrism,’frombothsidesofthepoliticalspectrum,withsecularpartiesincreasinglyembracingIslamicvaluesandIslamicpartiespresentingamorepluralistimage.

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Table3.1Outcomeofnationallegislativeelections,2009.

Party

%of

popular

vote

+/‐changein

popularvote

from2004

No.ofseatsin

parliament

+/‐no.ofseats

from2004

election

Democratic

Party20.81 +13.4 148 +93

Golkar 14.45 ‐7.13 106 ‐22

PDIP 14.01 ‐4.5 94 ‐15

PKS 7.89 +0.54 57 +12

PAN 6.03 ‐0.43 46 ‐7

PPP 5.33 ‐2.83 38 ‐20

PKB 4.95 ‐5.63 28 ‐24

Gerindra 4.46 — 26 —

Hanura 3.77 — 17 —

Source:KomisiPemilihanUmum(2009b).

Sukma(2009:320)contendsthattheincreasedsupportfortheDemocraticPartywas

moreareflectionofYudhoyono’spopularityandthegeneralsatisfactionwithhis

performance,ratherthananincreaseinpublicaffinityforthepartyitself.His

successesprovidedthepartywiththegroundstocampaignwiththepartyslogan

‘lanjutkan!’or‘continue[asbefore]’(Aspinall2010:106).Votersevidentlysupported

asecondYudhoyonoadministration,withYudhoyonoandBoedionosubsequently

receivingover60percentofvotesinthefirstroundofthepresidentialelection,

easilydefeatingthepairingsofMegawati–PrabowoSubiantoandJusufKalla–Wiranto.

ThoughbothMegawatiandKalladisputedtheoutcomeoftheelectionsinthe

ConstitutionalCourt,theywereunsuccessful.Yudhoyono’sdecisivewinmeantthat

therewasnoneedforasecondroundrun‐offbetweenthefirstandsecond‐placed

candidatesastherehadbeenin2004(Aspinall2010:111).

HanuraandGerindraalsoperformedwell,competingforthefirsttimeinthenational

elections.Althoughthenumberofvotesreceivedwasrelativelylow—Hanuraonly

gained3.77percentandGerindragained4.46percent—bothpassedthe3.5percent

thresholdrequiredtotakeupseatsintheDPR‐RI.Theirperformancewasimpressive

whencomparedtothatofestablishedIslamicparties,whichdidnotfaremuchbetter

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despitehavingmoreprominentpublicprofiles.4WithafootinthedooroftheDPR‐RI,

thesetwonewpartiescouldworktowardsimprovingtheirresultsinthe2014

elections.

Anunstablecoalition

Severalscholarshavearguedthattheelectionsof2009demonstratedtheon‐going

successofdemocraticconsolidationinIndonesia(see,forexample,Mietzner2010;

Sukma2009;vonLuebke2010).However,inthefollowingyears,somesuggested

thatthereformprocesshadstagnated(Mietzner2012;Tomsa2010).5One

explanationforthiswasthediversityoftherulingcoalitioninthenationallegislature

formedbythepresident.Followingtheparliamentaryelections,Yudhoyono

convincedGolkar,PKSandmostotherminorpartiestoformacoalitiongovernment

(oftendubbedthe‘RainbowCoalition’)withtheDemocraticParty,leavingPDIP,

GerindraandHanurainopposition(Aspinall2010;Tomsa2010).ThePresident

assignedmostofthe34ministerialcabinetpositionsalongcoalitionlines,withsix

goingtotheDemocrats,fourtoPKSandthreetoGolkar(Aspinall2010:110).Non‐

partymemberswereassignedtotheremainingpositions(JakartaPost2009b).

Concernsabouttheefficacyofsuchagrandcoalition,giventhedisparateinterestsof

thepartiesinvolved,turnedouttobewell‐founded(Sherlock2009b).Divergent

politicalinterestsofcoalitionpartnersbegantomanifestthemselvesthroughvisible

disagreements.LessthanayearintoYudhoyono’ssecondtermtherewasacabinet

4TheresultsforthesenewpartiesasseeminglyattheexpenseofthemoreestablishedpartiesofGolkarandPDIP(Ufen2010:284).However,asTomsa(2009)argues,theresultsoftheelectionwereprobablydisappointingforHanuraandGerindrainlightofthelargefinancialinvestmentallegedlymadebyeachparty.Gerindra’sleader,Prabowo,wasrumouredtohavespentoverUSD100milliononhismediacampaign(Tomsa2009),whileHanuracertainlyhadenoughfinancialbackingtoensureitwashighlyvisible(Ufen2010:282).KPUauditsfrom2009reportthatHanura’scampaignbudgetwasRp.19billionandGerindra’swasapproximatelyRp.308billion(KomisiPemilihanUmum2009c).However,thereweresuspicionsthatthesefiguresdidnotreflectthetrueamountinvestedincampaigns(Mietzner2007:258;SiswantoandSusila2009).5Forexample,arguingthatlocalelectionswereexpensiveandpronetomoneypolitics,Yudhoyono,supportedlegislationtoendthedirectelectionsofgovernmentleadersandforthemtobechosenbylocallegislativecouncilsinsteadofvoters,reversinglegislationpassedin2004(Mietzner2012:122).Mietzner(2012:123)arguesthattheseplansdefiedpopularopinion,with2011pollingsuggestingthat66percentofrespondentswereinfavourofdirectelectionsattheprovinciallevel.Furthermore,theproposalwaslambastedbyanumberofprovincialheads(Buehler2012).Theunpopularbidwastemporarilyshelvedin2012,onlytoberevivedinJuly2013,whentheMinisterofInteriorreiteratedthedisadvantagesofdirectgubernatorialelections.Itwasraisedagainin2014,justpriortotheendofYudhoyono’sterm,thoughbythistimethepoliticallandscapehadchangedandthepresident’sattitudetothechangeswasunclear.TheDemocraticPartyboycottedtheparliamentaryvotebutthebilltoenddirectelectionsforprovincialleadershippassed,supportedbythenewMerahPutih(RedandWhite)Coalition,whichhadformedafterthe2014legislativeelectionandincludedGolkarandGerindra(Asril2014b;Puspita2014).

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reshuffleinresponsetodecreasingpublicapproval(Kimura2012:188‐189).

Althoughtherewasspeculationthatthereshufflewasaformofrevengeagainst

GolkarandPKSforvotingagainsttheDemocraticPartyinparliament,thecabinet

representationofboththesepartiesremainedrelativelyunchanged,withonlyPKS

losingaministerialposition(Mietzner2012:121).Somepostulatedthatthereshuffle

representedthePresident’sownformofpatronagepolitics,withanumberof

controversialappointeesappearingtohavebeenrewardedforpersonalloyaltyto

Yudhoyono(Kimura2012:189).6

Corruptionandanti‐corruptionaspoliticalthemes

Scandal,especiallycorruptioncases,dominatedIndonesianpoliticsbetween2009

and2014(Amiruddin2012;Kramer2013).Asenseofdisappointmentwasevidentin

publicandmediadiscourse,drivenbythefailureofpoliticalpartiestoaddress

corruptioneffectivelyandimprovetransparency,evenwithintheirownparties.7Yet,

evenwhenfacingallegationsofcorruption,partiesusedcorruptionscandals

involvingtheirrivalstotheirpoliticaladvantage.Severalmembersofthepolitical

eliteownedmediafranchises(Tapsell2010;Winters2014)andusedtheir

newspapers,radio,televisionandinternetvehiclestoderidepoliticalopponentsand

underscorethegovernment’slackofprogressineradicatingcorruption.Themedia

highlightedmanycorruptioncasesduringtheperiod,illustratingthatcorruptionwas

wide‐reachingandconcernedallarmsofgovernment.Thesecasesreflectednotonly

continuingproblemswithgovernanceandtheruleoflaw,butalsotheabsenceof

generationalchangethathadbeenanticipatedwiththenewwaveofpost‐Reformasi

civilservantrecruits.8Politicalcommentatorsandanti‐corruptionactivistsalikehad

6Intra‐coalitionclashesoverthecessationoffuelsubsidieswerealsodivisive.InJanuary2012,parliamentvotedagainstaproposaltomakesubsidizedfuelavailableonlyforpublictransport,motorcyclesandfishingvesselsandamotiontoendsubsidiesforfuelsaletoprivatecarsinGreaterJakarta(MahiandNazara2012).Whenthebillwasreintroducedin2013,themostcontroversialoppositioncamefromthePKS,whichnotonlyrefusedtobackitscoalitionpartners,butbeganacounter‐campaign,urgingcitizenstoattenddemonstrationsagainstthefuelpriceincreases.PKS’rejectionofthebillwasseenasapopulistmoveandthepartywasaccusedoftryingtoappealtovotersinthefaceofdamagingpublicityrelatedtocorruptionscandals(ChenandPriamarizki2013).7ThiswasreflectedbyanumberofarticlesthathighlightedhowongoingcorruptionandalackoftransparencycontinuetoimpactdemocraticchangeinIndonesia.SeeKimura(2012)forfurtherdetails.8Forexample,aneditorialinKompaslamentsthefocusonmaterialismandwealthamongstyoungIndonesiansthatwasleadingthemtofollowthecorruptpracticesofthepreviousgenerations(Kompas2011).AnotherarticlehighlightsthattheCentreforReportingandAnalysingMonetaryTransactions(PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan,PPATK)hadfoundatleast10youngcivilservants(undertheageof35)withassetsworthbillionsofrupiahandsuspectedthatthereweremanymore(SeputarIndonesia2011).

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hopedthatpost‐Reformasiyouthtakingoverfromoldguardcivilservantswould

bringwiththemnewidealsthatwoulddiscourageinvolvementincorruption.

However,thesehopesfadedwhenyoungpoliticiansindictedforcorruptionwere

joinedbyyoungpublicservantsalsochargedwithgraft‐relatedcrimes.Arashof

corruptioncaseswithinthebureaucracyconfirmedthatanti‐corruptionmeasures

hadfailedtoreinincivilservants,policeofficersandjudges.

Thissectiondiscussessomeofthemostprominentcorruptioncasesofthisperiod,

demonstratingthatcorruptionremainedaprominentpoliticalthemefrom2009to

2014.Theincessantmediacoverageofthesecasessawthatcorruptionremained

squarelyinthepubliceyeandscrutinyofthecharactersinvolvedinthesecases

fosterednegativesentimentstowardsthoseinparliamentwhohadpreviously

promisedtofightcorruptionwholeheartedly.Conversely,theconvictionofseveral

defendantspromotedpublicsupportfortheKPK’sworkasaninstitutioncommitted

tocombatingcorruptionregardlessofambivalentgovernmentsupportandinspiteof

the(perceived)lightsentenceshandeddownbyjudges,whichwereoftenlessthan

requestedbyprosecutors.Assuch,attacksonthemuch‐laudedKPKbysome

parliamentariansandmembersofthepoliceforcesparkedoutragefromcitizens.

AttacksontheKPK

Followingitsestablishmentin2003,theKPKdevelopedareputationfortenacityafter

severalsuccessfulconvictionsforcorruption.9ItbecameoneofIndonesia’smost

respectedinstitutions,enjoyingstrongsupportfromcitizens(Butt2011a:384;

Schütte2013).However,thissuccessalsomadeitatargetforeliteswhowereintent

onmaintainingthestatusquo.From2009,therewereconcertedattemptsto

underminethelegitimacyoftheKPK,primarilybyattackingitsleadership.InMay

2009theChiefoftheKPK,AntasariAzhar,wasarrestedformurder,accusedof

orderingtheassassinationofaprominentbusinessman,NasruddinZulkarnaen,who

wasshotintheheadon14March2009(Aspinall2010:114;Butt2011b:72).Itwas

allegedthatAntasarihadbecomeromanticallyinvolvedwithNasruddin’sthirdwife,

9Itwasestimatedthat,in2001alone,thecommissionrecoveredRp.139.8billionasaresultofsuccessfullyprosecuting31cases(Aspinall2010:114).AftertheKPK’sinception,Indonesia’srankingonTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionIndeximproveddramatically(Aspinall2010:114).In2001,IndonesiarankedpoorlyintheIndexasthethird‐mostcorruptcountryintheworld,whereasin2009itwasranked111outof180countries.In2013itfellslightlytonumber114outof177countries,rankingbetterthan62othercountries(TransparencyInternational2013).Thefall,possiblyareflectionofdiminishingconfidenceasaslewofcorruptioncasescametolightafter2009,stillreflectedanimprovementfromitspositionin2001.

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who,inturn,haddecidedtoblackmailAntasariwiththisinformation.Butt(2011b:

88‐89)contendsthatthecaseagainstAntasariwasfarfromiron‐cladandthathis

involvementinthemurderremainsunclear,withtheevidenceputforwardduring

thetrialbeing‘weak,unreliableorcontradictory’.Nevertheless,theSouthJakarta

DistrictCourtfoundAntasariguiltyandhewassentencedto18years’

imprisonment.10ThecaseledtocallsfromsomepoliticalelitestoreducetheKPK’s

powers,ortoabolishitaltogether(Aspinall2010:115).11

Towardstheendof2009,inthewakeoftheAntasaricontroversy,theKPKbecamea

battlegroundforanti‐corruptionactivistswhoaccusedothergovernmentbodies,

includingthenationalpoliceandpublicprosecutor’soffice,ofahigh‐levelconspiracy

toweakentheKPK(Aspinall2010:113;Sukma2009:332‐333).Theconflictallegedly

stemmedfromtheBankCenturycase.12Theheadofthepoliceforce’scriminal

investigationsunit,SusnoDuadji,(whowaslaterjailedforcorruption)wassuspected

ofinterveninginthebailoutofBankCenturyonbehalfofbusinessmanBudi

Sampoerna,inreturnforaUSD1millionkickback(Kurniadi2009).TheKPKacted

uponthesesuspicions,tappingthetelephoneofSusnotoinvestigatehisinvolvement.

Theinquiryintoatop‐levelpoliceofficerpresentedathreattothepowerofthepolice

elites,promptinganallegedplottounderminetheKPK.

InSeptember2009,YudhoyonoformallysuspendedtwoKPKDeputyCommissioners,

BibitSamadRiantoandChandraM.Hamzah,fromtheKPKafterthepolicenamed

themassuspectsintheirowncorruptioninvestigation.Subsequently,thepairwere

arrestedandchargedwithabuseofpowerandextortioninrelationtoAnggoro

Widjojo,abusinessmanwhowasbeinginvestigatedbytheKPKforbribingthehead

oftheDPR‐RI’sForestryCommissioninOctober2009(Butt2011b:91;JakartaPost

10In2011,AntasarifiledanappealwiththeSupremeCourtwhichwasrejectedduetolackofnewevidence.However,inMarch2013AntasarilodgedasecondjudicialreviewwiththeConstitutionalCourtwhichruledinhisfavourinMarch2014,statingthathecouldmountasecondappealtohisconviction.AsofNovember2014,AntasarihadanappealintheTangerangDistrictCourt,claimingthatevidenceinthecasehadbeentamperedwith.FormoredetailsseeSaragih(2014).11WhileitisdifficulttoidentifyexactlywhichindividualswantedtoweakentheKPK,somemembersoftheDPR‐RIweredescribedas‘understandablykeentocurtail[theKPK’s]powergiventhattheKPKarrestedsomeoftheircolleaguesoncorruptioncharges’(Sukma2009:137).Asanindependentbody,detractorsarguedthattheKPKwasapoweruntoitselfthatdidnothavetoreporttootherlawenforcementagencies.TherewasalsospeculationthattheKPKwouldbestrippedofthecapacitytoprosecuteandwire‐tapsuspects.Whilethisdidnoteventuate,thedebatesurroundingitspowersanditslackofaccountabilitydrewfurtherattentiontothecommissionanditsleadership.SeeButt(2011a)forfurtherdetails.12‘Centurygate’willbediscussedlaterinthischapter.

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2009a).ArecordingwaslaterproducedinwhichWidjojoadmittedthathehadbribed

membersoftheKPKtohalttheinvestigationintohispersonalfinances.Therewasno

evidencethattheseaccusationsreferredtoBibitorChandra,butthepoliceused

them,alongsideothercircumstantialevidence,tochargethepairwithextortion(Butt

2011b:90‐91).13Meanwhile,BibitandChandrachallengedtheirsuspensionon

constitutionalgrounds,arguingtheyhadtherighttobepresumedinnocentuntil

provenguilty.Aninjunctiontothesuspensionwasgrantedand,whilethelegalityof

thiswasdebateable,thehearingallowedanumberofKPKwire‐tappedrecordingsto

beplayedduringtheproceedings(Butt2011b:99‐102).Theserecordingsincluded

conversationsbetweensomeofIndonesia’smostseniorlawenforcementofficials

disclosingplanstoframethepair,aimingtoruintheKPK’sreputation(Jansen2010).

Uponhearingtherecordings,theConstitutionalCourtdeclaredBibitandChandrathe

victimsofaset‐upandorderedtheirreinstatement(Butt2011b:102).

PriortotheConstitutionalCourt’sruling,therewasanenormouspublicoutcryatthe

arrestofthetwodeputycommissioners,particularlyafterSusnoDuadjilikenedthe

KPK’sconflictwiththepolicetoageckotryingtofightacrocodile,animage

subsequentlyadoptedbycivilsocietyactivistsandthemediaintheirsupportforthe

KPK(Aspinall2010:116).14Publiccommentaryviasocialmediaoutletssuchas

Facebook,YouTubeandTwitterhelpedrallysupportandraisepublicawarenessof

thecase(Lim2013).Forexample,IndonesianCorruptionWatch(ICW)used

FacebooktoorganizeamarchinJakarta,attractingover5000people.Thoughthe

mediareducedthenarrativeofthecasetoasimplisticbattleof‘good’(KPK)versus

‘evil’(oldelites)(Lim2013:644),theon‐goingpublicsupportenhancedthestanding

oftheKPK,nowoneofthemosttrustedinstitutionsinthecountry(Agustiaand

Manggiasih2010).AsthemovementtodefendtheKPKgrew,theanti‐corruption

commitmentofIndonesia’sleadersandlawenforcementbodieswastested.The

government’sresponse,particularlythatofYudhoyono,waslambastedonsocial

media,withpublicassertionsthatthegovernmentwascomplicitinweakeningthe

KPK.Withmountingcriticism,Yudhoyonowasforcedtoactandestablishedan

independentteam,knownasthe‘TeamofEight’,toinvestigatetheallegationsagainst

BibitandChandraandthehandlingofthecasebythepolice.Theteamproduced

13AdetaileddescriptionandanalysisofthecaseagainstBibitandChandraandthesubsequenteventsoftheindictmentcanbefoundinButt(2011)CorruptionandLawinIndonesia,ChapterFive.14Thegecko(cicak)versuscrocodile(buaya)analogyisanIndonesianequivalentoftheBiblicaltaleofDavidandGoliath.Aspinall(2010:113)assertsthatthemovementdrewpublicsupportattheleveloftheproteststhatsawtheresignationofSuhartoin1998.

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findingsandrecommendationsforthePresident,suggestingthatseveralseniorpolice

officersbedismissed(includingSusno)andthatthechargesagainstBibitand

Chandrabedropped.

AlthoughtherewerefarmorearrestsforcorruptionunderYudhoyono’sleadership

thananyotherpresident,thegeckoversuscrocodilecaseexposedYudhoyono’sown

concernsoverthepowersoftheKPK(Sukma2009:332).ThePresidenteven

commentedthattheKPKseemedaccountableonlytoGodandsuchpowershouldnot

gounchecked(Butt2011b:93).TherewerealsocriticismsthatYudhoyonohadonly

becomeinvolvedinthecasewhenhisownreputationwasjeopardizedbyrising

publicdissatisfaction(Aspinall2010:117).Asaconsequence,whiletheKPKmay

haveemergedunscathed,Yudhoyono’sreluctancetodefendtheKPKweakenedhis

anti‐corruptionsymbolintheeyesofIndonesiancitizens(Fealy2011;Kimura2012;

Mietzner2012;Tomsa2010).

Centurygate

EarlytensionswithinthecoalitionparliamentwerebroughttotheforebytheBank

Centurybailoutscandal,whichimplicatedVice‐PresidentBoedionoandtheMinister

forFinance,SriMulyani,oneofYudhoyono’sclosestaides.Alsoknownas

‘Centurygate’,thecaseinvolvedagovernment‐approvedbailoutofRp.6.7trillionfor

theprivately‐ownedBankCentury,underwhatGolkarclaimedweresuspicious

circumstances.Thebailoutpackagewasallegedlyfarlargerthanrequiredandthere

wereindicationsthatasubstantialproportionwassiphonedoffandusedforpolitical

purposes,includingelectoralcampaigns(Soesatyo2012).SeveralGolkarandPKS

memberssuccessfullylobbiedforaparliamentaryinquiryintothebailout,even

thoughadversefindingswouldreflectpoorlyontheDemocraticParty.Regardlessof

thelegitimacyoftheinquiry,itappearedthatthecasewasbeingemployedbyGolkar

andPKSwhowerekeento‘settleoldscores’,especiallywithMulyani,whowasa

knownreformistanda‘thornintheside’ofGolkar(Tomsa2010:311).15Patunruand

vonLuebke(2010:11‐12)surmisethatmanyparties,bothoppositionandthosein

thecoalition,stoodtobenefitfromtheBankCenturycase.ForIslamiccoalition

15MulyanihadrepeatedlyclashedwithGolkarchairmanAburizalBakrie,aprominentbusinesstycoon,overtaxevasionandhiscompany’sinvolvementintheLapindomudflowdisaster(Kimura2011:187;Tomsa2010:312).TheLapindomudflowdisasteroccurredinSidoarjo,EastJava,allegedlyasaresultofdrillingbythecompanyPTLapindoBrantas,inwhichtheBakriefamilyownedacontrollingstake.Thedisasterhadgraveenvironmentalandeconomicimpactsuponlocalresidentsandeffortstodealwiththedisasterandcompensatevictimswereheavilycriticized.ForfurtherdiscussionseeMcMichael(2009).

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partners,itwasanopportunitytoattackVice‐PresidentBoedionoandpressfora

more‘Islam‐friendly’replacement.Thecasealsogaveoppositionpartiesan

opportunitytounderminetheanti‐corruptionimagethatYudhoyonohadspentso

manyyearsfostering.

On3March2010,theparliamentaryinquiryfoundthattherehadbeenanabuseof

powerinthebailoutandrecommendedthatMulyaniandBoedionobeinvestigatedby

theKPK.TheKPKtookupthecase,butMulyaniandBoedionowerenotidentifiedas

primarysuspects,withMulyanionlybeingquestionedinMay2013(Setuningsih

2013c).Whilecallsto‘solve’Centurygatecontinuedtoresoundamongstanti‐

corruptionactivistsandotherpartiesuptothe2014elections,Golkar’sinterest

wanedafterMulyaniresignedfromherpositionasFinanceMinisterinMay2010to

becomeManagingDirectoroftheWorldBankinWashingtonD.C.(Kimura2011:188;

Tomsa2010:313).DaysafterMulyaniresigned,Golkarchairman,AburizalBakrie,

wasappointedchairofanewjointsecretariataimedatimprovingthecoherenceand

cooperationbetweencoalitionmembers.Themovewasregardedasatriumphfor

BakrieandademonstrationofhispoliticalcloutinthewakeofMulyani’sdeparture

(Kimura2011:188;Tomsa2010:314).16DPR‐RIrepresentativesfrommostofthe

RainbowCoalitionpartnersstoppedpursuingthecaseonceSriMulyaniresignedas

FinanceMinisterinMay2010.Thescandaldieddownbetween2010and2011,but

thecaseremainedanongoingirritantforYudhoyonoduringhissecondterm.

Avocalminorityofoppositionparliamentarians,however,continuedattacking

YudhoyonoandhisgovernmentfortheirlackofactiononCenturygate(Aritonang

2013;McBeth2013;PatunruandvonLuebke2010:12).Inresponse,thenew

ChairpersonoftheKPK,AbrahamSamad,vowedin2011toprioritizetheresolution

16However,whileaimingtoimprovecommunicationandunityamongstcoalitionmembers,thejointsecretariatwasunabletopreventongoingpublicdisagreementswithinthecoalition.Forexample,in2010,GolkarproposedtoconferRp.15billiononeachDPR‐RImembertobespentondevelopmentprojectsintheirconstituencies(Tomsa2010:315).AlthoughtheproposalwasconditionallysupportedbyPDIP,Golkar’spartnersintherulingcoalitionrejectedtheproposal.Islamicparties,inparticular,arguedthatthemoneywouldlikelybeusedformoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingandthatitblurredthelinesbetweenlegislativeandexecutivepower(Maulia2010).Surprisedbythisopposition,inSeptember2010Golkarthreatenedtoblockthegovernment’splannedstatebudgetfor2011ifthe‘aspirationfund’wasnotaccepted.GolkarlegislatorandHouseDeputySpeaker,PriyoBudiSantoso,wasquotedassaying:‘Thegovernmentisbeingverymeanbynotgivingusachancetodiscussit.Don’tforgetthatjustastheycanteardownourproposal,Golkarcanalsoteardowntheirproposalforthestatebudget’(JakartaGlobe2010).However,followingpublicoutcryagainsttheproposal,includingcampaignsonTwitterandFacebook,theproposalwasdropped(Kimura2011:189).

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ofthecase(JakartaPost2011;Suhartono2012).MediacoverageofCenturygate

intensifiedagaininAugust2012whenformerKPKchiefAntasariAzhar,bythenin

prisonformurder,allegedthatYudhoyonohadmetanumberofotherhighprofile

officialsinOctober2008todiscussthelegalramificationsoftheBankCentury

bailout.AntasariaccusedthePresidentofpersonallyapprovingthebailoutplan,

contradictingstatementsfromthePresidenthimself,whoclaimedthathehadleftthe

approvaltotheFinanceMinistry(Gunn2013:120).Antasari’sallegationswere

deniedbyseveralhigh‐rankingpeople,includingHattaRajasa,then‐Coordinating

MinisterfortheEconomyandleaderoftheNationalMandateParty(PartaiAmanat

Nasional,PAN),andDennyIndrayana,theDeputyMinisterforLawandHuman

Rights.17Therevivalinmediaattentioncreatedrenewedpressureforconvictionsin

thecase.

InDecember2012,theKPKnamedformerBankIndonesiaDeputyGovernorBudi

Mulyaasacriminalsuspectforabusinghispowerinapprovingashorttermloanto

BankCenturyeventhoughitwasnottechnicallyeligibleforone.18But,evenwitha

potentialconvictiontobehad,oppositiongroupsintheDPR‐RIcontinuedtovoice

disappointment.Somepoliticians,particularlyfromtheCoalition,accusedtheKPK’s

AssetRecoveryTeamofbeingawasteofgovernmentmoneybecauseithadnotbeen

abletorecoupmuchofthelossestothestatefromthiscase(Waskita2013a).InJuly

2014,MulyawasconvictedofcausinglossestotheStateandreceivingaRp.1billion

inkickbacks.However,whiletheprosecutionhadrequesteda17yearsentenceanda

Rp.800millionfine,hewassentencedtotenyearsimprisonmentandfinedRp.500

million(BBCIndonesia2014;Mahmudah2014).Thesentencewascriticizedbymany

inthegovernment,includingtheexistingBankIndonesialeadershipandtheMinister

forFinance,whoclaimedthatBudihadactedwithinthelawandthathissuperiors,if

anyone,shouldbeprosecuted(Galih2014a;b).19InvestigationsbytheKPK

recommencedinYudhoyono’sfinalyearinoffice(2014),particularlyintotheroleof

17ForexamplesofmediacoverageseeBeritaSatu(2012)andSundari(2012).SpeculationaboutYudhoyono’sdenialwastypifiedinaTempo(2012)editorial,whichventuredthatthePresident’sswiftdenialwasindicativeofdeeperconcerns:‘Oddlyenough,thePresidentseemedtofeeltheneedtoreinforcethedenial.ItcreatedthesensethattheissueisveryworryingforthePresident’,suchthatevenissuingadenialofinvolvementspurredfurtherspeculationofhisroleinCenturygate.18AntaraNews(2013b)reports:‘BudiMulyawasnamedasuspectinDecember,2012onchargeofabusinghispowerbyapprovingashorttermloanfacility(FPJP)fortheailingBankCenturyalthoughitwasnoteligibleforit.TheSupremeAuditBoardsaidBankIndonesiachangedaregulationitmadeitselftoallowBankCenturytogettheloanfacility’.19Theelectionin2014ofanewpresident(Jokowi)sparkedrenewedpubliccallsforinvestigationintoCenturygate(Akuntono2014;Faizal2014).However,atthetimeofwritingtherehadbeennofurtherdevelopmentsintheinvestigation.

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Vice‐PresidentBoedionoinCenutrygate(Asril2014c;Setuningsihetal.2014),butno

chargeswerelaid.20

Thedrivingsimulatorprocurementcase

Between2009and2014,severalcorruptionscandals,inadditiontoCenturygate,

underminedthereputationofthepoliceforce(Schütte2012:39‐40).Oneparticularly

prominentcaseinvolvedallegedgraftintheprocurementofdrivingsimulatorsfor

thetrafficpolicein2011.Atthecentreofthecasewasformertrafficpolicechief,

DjokoSusilo,whowasaccusedofacceptingbribesinreturnforcontractstoprovide

thesimulators.Whenirregularitiesintheprocurementprocessweredetectedin

2012,boththepoliceandtheKPKlaunchedinvestigations.InlateJuly2012,theKPK

raidedtheformerheadquartersofthetrafficpolice,sparkingoutragefromsome

policeleaders(AritonangandDewi2012).TheninAugust2012,theKPKannounced

thatithadintervieweddozensofwitnessesinconnectionwiththecase.Atthesame

time,thepolicecriminalinvestigationteamalsoclaimedtheywereinterrogating

witnesses,focusingtheirsuspicionsontwoofSusilo’spersonalassistants(Paraqbueq

andRosarians2012).ThepolicenamedSusiloasawitnessinthecaseratherthana

suspect,whiletheKPKbelievedhehadmastermindedtheplot(Rosarians2012).The

caseevolvedintoanotherconflictbetweentheKPKandthepoliceforce,withthetwo

institutionsattemptingtoasserttheirauthoritytoinvestigatethecase.

Threemonthslater,thepolicefiledacivillawsuitagainsttheKPKrelatingtoaraidit

hadconductedonpoliceoffices,contendingthattheKPKhadcausedRp.425billion

worthofmateriallossesandRp.6billionworthofnon‐materialdamages.They

arguedthattheirowninvestigationhadbeenunderminedbytheKPKseizingcrucial

documents(JakartaPost2012b).21Inthesamemonth,thepolicerecalled

investigatorssecondedtotheKPK.Thisstrategybackfiredwhensomeinvestigators

refusedtocomplywiththeorder.Oneinvestigator,NovelBaswedan,wasthevictim

ofapolicesmearcampaign,withthepolicetryingtoarresthimattheKPKofficesfor

20AsquotedfromTheJakartaGlobe,13September2013:‘AwidelyheldbeliefamonglegislatorsandcriticsoftheRp.6.7trillionbailoutofBankCenturyisthatthedecisionwasmadetoprotectdepositorswithcloselinkstoPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono,theDemocrats’chiefpatron.’(Sihaloho2013a).TheJakartaGlobealsowrotethat‘criticscontend[thebailout]wasfartoocostlyandpoliticallymanipulatedtorescuedepositorslinkedtoPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono’sDemocraticParty’(Amelia2013a).ItwasalsoallegedthatYudhoyono’sparents‐in‐lawwerebeneficiariesofthedealalongwithanumberofotherwealthyIndonesians(Guntensperger2009).21Thecivilsuitsubsequentlyseemedto‘disappear’,withnooutcomeshavingbeenmadepublic.

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hisallegedinvolvementinshootingsuspectsin2004whileservinginBengkulu

(Pramudatamaetal.2012).InsteadofprovidingpolicewithleverageovertheKPK,

Baswedanwasdepictedinthemediaasaherowhohadchosentodefythecorrupt

policeleadership.FollowinganattemptbypolicetostormtheKPKbuildingand

arrestBaswedan,anti‐corruptionactivistsstagedavigilaroundtheKPKofficeto

preventfurtherattemptsbythepolicetoraidthepremises(JakartaGlobe2012a).

ThepolicefurtherthwartedKPK’sinvestigationbyrefusingtosubmitevidence

relatingtothepurchaseofdrivingsimulatorequipmenttotheKPK,claimingthe

investigationwastheirjurisdiction.ThelegislationthathadestablishedtheKPKshed

littlelightonthedelineationofresponsibilitiesbetweenthetwoinstitutionsand

neitherlookedsettoacquiescetotheother,eventhoughpublicsupportlaysquarely

withtheKPK(McRae2013:299).Afterbeingcriticizedforhissilence,Yudhoyono

wasforcedtointervene,declaringtheKPKresponsiblefortheinvestigation,butalso

stressingtheimportanceofcooperationbetweenthetwobodies(Gunn2013:120;

JakartaPost2012c).On8October2012,thePresidentorderedthepolicetohandthe

investigationovertotheKPKandrefrainfrominterferingwiththeprogressofthe

case(JakartaGlobe2012b).Thepolicechosenottocomplyimmediately,continuing

topursuethecaseagainstBaswedanandrefusingtohandoverdocumentsrelatingto

theinvestigation.Inresponse,theKPKsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwith

theArmyforon‐goingsupportininvestigatingcorruptionwithinthepoliceforce,

compellingthepolicetorespectthepresident’sdirective(Rastika2012).

Actingonitsauthority,theKPKnamedSusiloasasuspectandhewasarrestedon4

December2012(Febriyan2012).22Followinganinvestigation,theKPKidentified

overRp.200billionworthofgraftrelatedassetslinkedtoSusilo(Setuningsih2013a).

Inaddition,itwasallegedthathehadusedhisseveralmarriagestohidehiswealth,

mostsensationallymarryinga19yearoldbeautyqueenwhenhewas48and

reportedlygivingheradowryofRp.15billion(Jong2013b).InSeptember2013

Susilowassentencedto10years’imprisonmentandaRp.500millionfine.Thiswas

lessthantheprosecution’sdemandthathebeimprisonedfor18yearsandthathebe

barredfromparticipatinginelectionsbothasavoterandacandidate,thus

disappointingthosewhohadhopedthataharshpunishmentthiscasewoulddeter

otherpoliceofficersfromcorruption(Suharman2013).However,thesentencewas22OncetheKPKarrestsasuspectthecaseislegallyrequiredtogotocourtunderLawNo.30/2002ontheCommissiontoEradicatetheCrimeofCorruption(RepublicofIndonesia2002).

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subsequentlyincreasedto18years’imprisonment,aRp.32billionfineandthe

removalofhispoliticalrightswhenSusiloappealedthedecisionintheSupreme

Court(Amelia2013b).

ThecaseofGayus

InJuly2009,30yearoldtaxofficebureaucratGayusTambunanmadenational

headlinesasevidencemountedthathehadengagedinembezzlementandmoney

launderingonbehalfoflargeIndonesiancorporations(JakartaPost2012a;McLeod

2011b:7;Ranfurlie2011).Thescandalhighlightedproblemsinseveralstate

institutionsincludingthetaxoffice,policeforce,judiciaryandimmigrationoffice.It

alsoillustratedthatgenerationalchangewouldnotsolvecorruptionproblems.Asthe

caseunfolded,Gayusthreatenedtoimplicatemanymoretaxofficials,thereby

focusingattentionuponthepoorperformanceofthetaxofficeandthedifficultiesof

cleaningupbureaucraticinstitutionswithsignificantopportunitiestoengagein

corruption,oftenreferredtoasbasah(literally‘wet’)departmentsordirectories

(BairdandWihardja2010:144).

Gayuswasinitiallyaccusedofmoneylaunderingwhenhewasfoundtohaveover

USD3millioninhisbankaccountin2009(Kimura2012;McLeod2011b).Hewas

chargedbutacquittedbytheTangerangDistrictCourtinMarch2010(McLeod

2011b:8).Gayuswasagainarrestedon31March2010atahotelinSingaporeand

broughtbacktoIndonesiaafterSusnoDuadji,ofcicakvsbuayafame,claimedthat

Gayushadpaidtwopoliceofficerstobrokerhisacquittal(AntaraNews2010;Baird

andWihardja2010:145;Kimura2012:187).Gayussubsequentlyadmittedthathe

hadacceptedbribesfromanumberoflargecompanies,includingsomebelongingto

AburizalBakrie,politicalhopefulandformerchairpersonoftheIndonesian

conglomeratetheBakrieGroup(McLeod2011b;Saragih2010).Atthesametime,he

wasindictedforobstructingjusticebybribingjudgestoobtainanacquittalinhis

previouscourtcase,thoughintheendhewasnotchargedwithbribingthepolice

officers.InJanuary2011,theSouthJakartaDistrictCourtfoundhimguiltyof

acceptingbribes,sentencinghimtosevenyearsinprisonandaRp.300millionfine,

whichwasdeemedcontroversialforitsleniency.23

23Onlookersatthetrialweresaidtohavebooedandyelledatthejudgesindisappointmentatthelightsentence(Ramadhan2011).

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ThemostsensationalaspectofthecaseemergedinSeptember2010whenGayuswas

photographedataBalitennistournamentwhilehewassupposedtobeinpolice

detentioninJakarta(McLeod2011b).Widelypublishedinthemedia,the

photographsledtorevelationsthat,havingbribedhisjailers,Gayushadtravelled

domesticallyandinternationally—includingtoSingapore,KualaLumpurand

Macao—onafalsepassportwhileawaitingtheoutcomeofhissecondjudicialappeal

(Kimura2012:187).24InMarch2012,hewastriedagainbytheAnti‐Corruption

Courtforacceptingbribes,moneylaunderingandbribingpoliceofficers(Firdaus

2012).Havingamassedapproximately28yearsofcumulativeprisontimeand

additionalfines,GayuslodgedanappealinAugust2013.TheSupremeCourtupheld

thedecisionsofthevariouscourts.Furthermore,sincethesentenceswerehanded

downbydifferentcourts,hisoverallsentencecouldnotbecommutedandhewas

requiredtoserveallhisprisontermsconsecutivelyratherthanconcurrently

(Natahadibrata2013).

Thetravellers’chequescandal

TheTravellers’Chequescandalcaughtpublicattentionnotonlybecauseofthe

flamboyantcharactersinvolved,butalsobecauseitexposedapervasivecultureof

briberyinparliament.AtthecentreoftheincidentwasNununNurbaeti,wifeofaPKS

politician,whowasaccusedofdistributingapproximatelyRp.20.65billionin

travellers’chequestomembersoftheDPR‐RICommissionXI,whowereresponsible

forelectingthenation’sReserveBankleadership.25Inreturn,theywereaskedto

appointMirandaGoeltomasdeputychairpersonoftheBankofIndonesia.Whilethe

bribesweresaidtohavebeenpaidin2004,thecaseonlycametotheattentionofthe

publicin2009whentheKPKpubliclyidentifiedfourparliamentariansassuspectsin

thecase.26ByMarch2010,39parliamentariansfromPDIP,PPPandGolkarhadbeen

chargedforacceptingbribesfromNurbaeti(Rayda2010).27

Nurbaetiabscondedonceherstatusasasuspectwaspublicized,claimingthatshe

wassufferingfrommemorylapsesthatrequiredspecialisttreatmentinSingapore.24Hewaslatersentencedtoanadditionaltwoyears’imprisonmentforusingafalsepassport(Kimura2012:187).25WithintheDPR‐RIthereare11commissionsresponsibleformanagingparliamentarybusinessinrelationtovariousaspectsofthestate’saffairs.CommissionXIisresponsibleformattersrelatingtofinance,developmentplanningandbanking.ForfurtherdetailsseeDPR‐RI(2014b).26ThesesuspectswereidentifiedaslawmakersDhudieMakmumMurodfromPDIP,EndinAJSoefiharafromPPP,aswellasformerlawmakersHamkaYandhufromtheGolkarPartyandUdjuJuhaerifromthepoliceandmilitaryfaction(JakartaGlobe2009).27Thisnumberwasrevisedto24inSeptember2010(Hapsari2010).

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ShewasrecognizedwhileoutshoppinginBangkokandwasextraditedtoIndonesia

inDecember2011.Themediafocusedonthelifeofluxurysheledwhilehidingfrom

Indonesianauthorities(Kramer2013:66).28Evenwiththeresolutionofthecase—

mostofthepoliticiansaccusedweretriedandfoundguilty,whileGoeltomreceiveda

three‐yearprisonsentenceandNurbaetireceivedtwoandahalfyears—itremains

unclearwhofundedthebribesandwhatintereststheyserved.Goeltomhas

maintainedherinnocence,assertingthatshehadnoconnectionwiththebribespaid

forherappointmentanddidnotknowwherethemoneycamefrom(Pramudatama

2012).

TheTravellers’Chequescandal,involvingpartiesfromboththerulingcoalitionand

theopposition,highlightedtheinstitutionalizednatureofcorruptionwithintheDPR‐

RI.Thecasewasusedstrategicallybythosenotinvolvedtodiscreditthosewhowere.

ThisprovedausefultacticfortheDemocraticPartywhichhadanumberofmembers

implicatedinothercorruptioncasesatthetime.MarzukiAlie,leaderoftheDPR‐RI

andDemocraticPartymember,urgedallparliamentarianssuspectedofaccepting

bribestoresign,statingthatitwashypocriticalofthemtodemandothersaccusedof

corruptiontostepdownbeforetrialwhentheywouldnotdosothemselves

(Munawwaroh2010).InMarch2010,leadinguptotrialsoftheaccusedpoliticians,

Megawati,leaderofthePDIP—oneofthepartiesinvolved—defendedherparty’s

members,statingthatalldefendantsareinnocentuntilprovenguiltyandderidingthe

politicizationofcorruptioncases(Simatupang2010).Inadditiontothefantastical

natureofNurbaeti’scaptureandtheintriguesurroundingwhohadsuppliedthe

travellers’cheques,thispolitickingsawthescandaldrawevenmoreattentiontothe

cultureofcorruptioninparliament.

CorruptionintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcise

InOctober2013,themediareportedthearrestofaprominentcustomsofficial,the

Sub‐DirectorfortheExportDirectorate,HeruSulastyono,whowasaccusedof

acceptingbribesandmoneylaundering.HeruhadallegedlyreceivedRp.11billionin

returnforassistingcompaniestoevadepayingtaxbetween2005and2007(Perdani

2013b;Tempo2013b).Investigationslaterrevealedtransactionsintohispersonal

bankaccounttotallingoverRp.60billionbetween2009and2011,andthatheowned

fivehouses(Perdani2013a).TherevelationsledtoclaimsbyICWthatacutelevelsof

28Forexample,anarticleintheJakartaGlobe(2011a)describedNurbaetiashavingbeenona‘nine‐monthshoppingspreeinSingaporeandThailand’whileanarticleinTempo(Septian2011)highlightedherlavishaccommodationwhileinBangkok.

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corruptionafflictedtheofficeonthebasisthatHerucouldnotpossiblyhaveacted

alone.Furthermore,thebribesweresupposedlypaidviainsurancepolicies,notcash,

representinganew,lessvisiblemeansfordisbursingmoneytoofficials(Muhyiddin

2013).

SeniorfiguresintheDirectorateGeneralofCustomsandExcisedeniedallegationsof

acultureofcorruption,arguingthattheyhadthemselvesdetectedandsuspended

severalofficersforacceptingbribesfromimporters.Theycitedthereforms

undertakenbyformerMinisterforFinance,SriMulyani—includingthere‐assignment

ofofficerstobreak‐uppatronagenetworksandasalaryincrease—asevidencethat

thedirectoratewasseriousabouteradicatingcorruption.29SeniorCustomsofficials

alsonotedthatin2012,84officialshadreceivedsanctionsforethicalanddisciplinary

violations,whilein2013,41officialshadbeenpunished(Perdani2013a).InFebruary

2014,thedossierforSulastyono’scasewasofficiallyhandedovertotheAttorney‐

General’sOfficeforprosecution(JakartaPost2014c).Sulastoyonowasprosecuted,

foundguiltyofacceptingbribes,moneylaunderingandembezzlement,sentencedto

6.5yearsimprisonmentandaRp.200millionfine,aswellasbeingorderedtoreturn

themoneyheembezzledfromthestate(Kurniawan2014).

Corruptioninlocalgovernment

Localgovernmentswerenowresponsibleforlargerbudgetsthantheyhadbeenin

thepast,exacerbatingcorruptionandcollusionatthesubnationallevel.30Several

localgovernmentcorruptioncasesattractedpublicattentionandhadimplicationsfor

theKPKandothernationalbodies.OnesuchcasewastheSocialAid(BantuanSosial,

Bansos)scandalintheBandungadministrativeregioninWestJavafrom2012.The

Bansosscheme,whichprovidedgoodsand/ordirectcashtransferstocitizensin

need,wasalreadynotoriousforitsvulnerabilitytoembezzlement.In2012,theKPK

chargedsevenmembersoftheBandunglocalcouncilwithcorruption,citing

cumulativelossestothestateofoverRp.66.5billion.Thecase,whichwastriedina

regionalanti‐corruptioncourt,gainednotorietywhenthoseconvictedwereonly

sentencedtooneyearimprisonmentandaRp.50millionfine(Yulianti2012).The

prosecutorshaddemandedsentencesofthreetofouryearsandthepunishments

29SeeEvan(2012)foranoutlineofthesesalaryincreases.30Thisreflectedoneofthemajorcriticismslevelledatgovernmentdecentralization:thatcorruption,too,hadbeendecentralized(Hadiz2004;Pepinsky2008:238‐239;vonLuebke2009).

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wereperceivedtobetoolenient,giventhatprecedingcasesinvolvingfarsmaller

amountsofmoneyhadattractedharshersentences(Hardi2012;Yulianti2012).

Evenafterthetrialhadconcluded,thecasecontinuedtoattractattention,feedinginto

debatesaboutthesuccessofthedecentralizationoftheanti‐corruptioncourt.Priorto

theestablishmentofregionalAnti‐CorruptionCourtsinIndonesianprovincial

capitals,thesinglecourtinJakartahada100percentconvictionrateandthelength

ofsentenceswasincreasing,inlinewithbroaddemandforharsherpunishmentsfor

corruption(Butt2011a:381).Butwiththedecentralizationofthecourtscamehigher

ratesofacquittalandperceivedlightersentences.InMarch2013,theKPKarresteda

deputychiefjudgeinBandung,oncorruptionchargesrelatedtothecase.Thejudge

wasaccusedofacceptingabribeinreturnforhandingdownlightersentencesinthe

faceofoverwhelmingevidenceagainsttheaccused(AntaraNews2013a).InApril

2013,oneofthesuspectsfoundguiltyofcorruptionadmittedtobribingthejudge,

spurringtheKPKtocontinuewiththecase(Setuningsih2013d).TheKPKmademore

subsequentarrests,includingofBandung’sactingheadofregionalassetsand

financialoversightandthesecretaryoftheBandunglocaladministration.Finally,the

mayorofBandunghimselfwasarrestedinAugust2013(AlfiyahandSuharman2013;

Amelia2013d).WhenhewasfinallyconvictedforembezzlingpartoftheBansos

budgetinApril2014,hewassentencedtotenyears’imprisonment(Yulianti2014),a

significantincreaseonthepunishmenthandeddowntohiscolleaguestheprevious

year.Thecasealsoledtoquestionssurroundingtheintegrityofregionalbranchesof

theAnti‐CorruptionCourt,whichhadbeenaccusedof‘failing’duetolowconviction

rates(Butt2012).31

ThefalloftheDemocrats

Themostdamagingcorruptionscandalsforpoliticalpartieswerethoseinvolving

theirownparliamentarians.Aselectedrepresentatives,DPR‐RImembersare

entrustedwithpursuingthepublicinterestsandprotectingcitizens.Their

involvementincorruption,notunexpectedly,provokedwidespreadpublic

31DickandButt(2013:21‐22)arguethatthelowerconvictionratesbyregionalAnti‐CorruptionCourtsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheirintegrityhasbeencompromised,assertingthatthe100percentconvictionrateoftheJakartaAnti‐CorruptionCourtsuggestedthatthecourtshadbeen‘forgoingthepresumptionofinnocence’andthat‘giventhedeepabhorrencethatmostIndonesiancitizensfeeltowardscorruptionwithintheirinstitutionsofgovernment,itmightalsobearguedthatAnti‐CorruptionCourtjudges–particularlytheadhocjudgeswhohavebeenemployedaspartofeffortstomaintaintheintegrityoftheAnti‐CorruptionCourts–feelunderunduepressuretoconvictincorruptioncaseslesttheybelabelledanti‐reformist’.

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dissatisfactionnotjustwiththeparliamentbutwiththegovernmentoverall.

Furthermore,withpartiesjockeyingforinfluencewithintheparliament,these

scandalsplayedintobroaderpowerstrugglesbetweenparties.Oppositionparties,for

example,couldusethecorruptionscandalsasevidenceoftherulingparties’

untrustworthiness.Yudhoyono,inparticular,wascalledtoaccountfortheactionsof

severalDemocraticPartymemberswhowereaccusedofcorruption,withcritics

arguingthattheprevalenceofcorruptionwithinthepartyreflectedweakleadership

andevenpersonalmoralbankruptcyonthepartofthePresident.32

TheDemocraticPartysufferedasignificantdeclineinpopularityinthe2009—2014

period,insomepartduetothecorruptionscandalsembroilingitsmembers.The

partyhademphasizedtheiranti‐corruptioncredentialsduringits2009electoral

campaign.Ithad,forexample,runatelevisioncampaignentitled‘saynoto

corruption’(katakantidakpadakorupsi),inwhichhigh‐profilepartycandidates

sternlyrejectedcorruptpracticesinparliament.Twoyearslater,anumberofhigh‐

profilememberswereimplicatedinseveralcorruptionscandals.Giventhe

DemocraticParty’sprioruseofananti‐corruptionsymbol,itwasparticularly

susceptibletocriticismanddisappointmentwhenitsownrepresentativeswere

exposedasbeingnolesscorruptthanthoseofotherparties(Aspinall2010;Mietzner

2009).33

InApril2011,MuhammadNazaruddin,a33year‐oldlegislatorandnationaltreasurer

fortheDemocraticParty,wasaccusedofacceptingbribesinrelationtothe

constructionofanathletes’villageinSouthSumatra,aspartofthe2011Southeast

AsianGames(SEAGames).ThecasecametobeknownastheWismaAtlet(Athletes’

guesthouse)scandalandwasoneofthemostreportedcorruptionscandalsofthat

year,notablysalaciousbecauseNazaruddinfledthecountryandwaspursuedinan

internationalmanhuntbytheKPKandwasarrestedinColombiainAugust2011

(Fealy2011:341;MahiandNazara2012:9).InApril2012,hewassentencedtofour

yearsand10monthsimprisonmentforacceptingRp.4.6billioninreturnforrigging

constructiontendersforthevillage(ParlinaandAritonang2012).Theruling

32Forexample,tomarkInternationalAnti‐CorruptionDayon9December2013,ICWpublishedadocumentdetailingtherolesoffiguresclosetothePresident,includinghiswife,inanumberofcorruptdealings,implyingthatYudhoyonomusthavehadsomeknowledgeofthem.WhilethePresident’sofficedeniedaccusations,thedocumentreceivednationalmediacoverage(Jong2013a).33SeeMietzner(2014a)forapreliminarydiscussionoftheresultsofthe2014electionsandthedeclineinsupportfortheDemocraticParty.

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promptedoutrageamonganti‐corruptioncampaignersforitsleniencygiventhatthe

prosecutionhaddemandedasevenyearsentence(ParlinaandAritonang2012).

Thoughtheverdictsaidnothingtolinkthebribetothepartymorebroadly,

Nazaruddindidimplicateseveralcolleaguesduringhistrial,claimingtheywerealso

involvedinahigh‐levelwebofcorruption(Fealy2013:105;MahiandNazara2012:

9;ParlinaandAritonang2012).

Nazaruddin’saccusationsweredamagingbecauseheandmanyoftheother

DemocraticPartysuspectswereyoungrecruitswhohadbeenheraldedasanew

generationofcleanpoliticians.Nazaruddin’saccusationshadseriousrepercussions

forparticularpartycolleagues,includingAngelinaSondakh,whowasfoundguiltyof

acceptingRp.2.5billioninbribesinreturnforawardingSEAGamesconstruction

contractstospecificbidders(Rastika2013).InJanuary2013shewassentencedto

4.5yearsimprisonmentandfinedRp.500million.Dubbed‘Angie’bythepress,she

wasaformerbeautyqueenandastarrecruitfortheDemocraticPartyin2009.Her

casewascloselyfollowedbyIndonesia’smedia,withsomecoverageresemblingthat

giventocelebritiesbythepaparazzi(Kramer2013).Angelina’scaseattracted

renewedinterestinNovember2013when,onappeal,theSupremeCourtincreased

hersentenceto12yearsandherfinetoRp.27.4billion,theoriginalpunishment

soughtbyprosecutors.Theincreasewassignificantbecauseinseveralothercases

Tipikorjudgeshadbeencondemnedforhandingdownlightsentencesforthose

foundguiltyofcorruption.TheharsherSupremeCourtsentencewaspossiblya

responsetopublicdemandsthatthoseguiltyofcorruptionfacetougherpunishment.

Alsoindicted,thoughinadifferentsports‐relatedcase,wasAndiMallarangeng,then

MinisterforSports.MallarangengresignedfromhispositioninDecember2012in

responsetoaccusationsthathehadabusedhisministerialpowerinthetenderingof

constructionworksfortheHambalangsportingcomplex,asportsfacilityforelite

athletesontheoutskirtsofBogor,resultinginstatelossesofRp.463.3million

(RahmanandMahmudah2013).HewasaccusedofacceptingRp.4billionandUSD

550,000(cash)inbribesinexchangeforawardingtenderstospecificconstruction

companiesandhewaseventuallyarrestedbytheKPKinOctober2013.Hewas

convictedofabuseofauthorityinJuly2014andsentencedtofouryearsinprisonand

finedRp.200million(Maharani2014b).

102

EvenmoredamagingfortheDemocraticPartywastheindictmentofitsChairman,

AnasUrbaningrum,forusingmoneyearnedillicitlyfromtheHambalangprojectand

othergovernmentschemestofundhis2010campaigntobecomepartyleader(Mahi

andNazara2012:9).Becauseofhisposition,hisimplicationinthescandalinferred

thatcorruptionschemespervadedtheupperechelonsoftheparty.Yudhoyono

rejectedthissuggestion,proclaimingcorruptiontobetheexceptionratherthanthe

rule.Nevertheless,thescandalfuelledthedecliningpopularityoftheDemocratic

Party(Fealy2013:105).34ThedownfallofUrbaningrumpromptedapanicwithinthe

party,resultinginYudhoyono’selectiontothechairmanshipin2013inanattemptto

restoreconfidenceintheparty’sleadership(Nehru2013:141).However,thismove

indicatedthattheDemocraticPartylackedasuitablenextgenerationofleadersand

wasoverlyreliantuponYudhoyonoasitsfigurehead(Cochrane2013b).

UrbaningrumwaseventuallyconvictedforhisroleintheHambalangscandalandfor

moneylaunderinginSeptember2014.Hewassentencedtoprisonforeightyearsand

finedRp.300million.Intheirverdict,theTipikorjudgesappearedtoreflectpopular

sentiment,statingthathehadfailedtosetagoodexampleasbothapublicofficialand

partychairmanand‘failedtosupportthespiritofsocietyinfightinggraft’(Jakarta

Post2014a).

ThefallofPKS

Atthebeginningof2013,thecleanimagethatthePKSspentyearsfosteringwas

threatenedbytheso‐calledBeefgatescandal.35PKSchairpersonandlegislator,Luthfi

HasanIshaaqandAhmadFathanah,wereaccusedofacceptingbribesfromabeef

importcompany,PTIndonguna,inreturnforincreasingtheirbeefimportquota.36

TheKPKarrestedAhmadFathanahinafive‐starhotelroominJakartaon29January

2013.Thecasebecameasensationwhenitwasrevealedthathehadbeencaught

sharingaroomwithanakedcollegestudent,withwhomhehadsexualrelations

(Subkhan2013).HewasalsoinpossessionofasuitcasecontainingRp.1billion

(Cochrane2013a),whichwasallegedlyapaymentforLuthfifromPTIndoguna

executives,receivedbyFathanah.LuthfiandFathanahwerelaterchargedwith

acceptingbribesandmoneylaunderinginMarch2013.

34Growingpublicconcernabouttheparty’sintegritywassupportedbyWikiLeakscablespublishedin2012,suggestingthatYudhoyonohadpersonallyintervenedtoinfluencejudgesandprosecutorstoprotectofficialsclosetohim(Kingsbury2012:19).35AspartofYudhoyono’sRainbowCoalition,Suswono,amemberofPKShadbeenappointedtheMinisterforAgriculture.Suswonowasnotimplicatedinthescandal.36ForadetailedrecountofthiscaseandtheimplicationsforPKSseeKramer(2014a).

103

Mediascrutinyintensifiedasmoredetailsofthecasebecamepublic,paintingan

increasinglynegativepictureofcertainpartymembersandthepartyasawhole.PKS

ralliedsupportfromitscadres,alludingtoaconspiracyagainstthepartyand

contendingthatpoliticalinterestsseekingtodamagethereputationofPKSwereat

play.37ThepartylaunchedacounterattackupontheKPK,claimingthattheanti‐

corruptionagencyhadlostitsindependenceandwasthepuppetofPKS’political

rivals.TheKPKattemptedtoseizefivecarsbelongingtoLuthfifromthepartyinMay

2013,claimingthattheymayhavebeenpurchasedwithproceedsfromcorruption.

PKSofficialsrefusedtohandoverthevehicles,insteadlodgingapolicecomplaint

againsttheKPK,claimingthatKPKofficialshadabusedtheirpower,enteredPKS

premisesbyforceandfailedtoproduceawarrantfortheseizureofthecars(Perdani

andAritonang2013;Saragih2013b).

Theattacksonthewell‐respectedKPKtookatollontheparty’simagebuttheillegal

importquotadealwaslaterovershadowedbyanincreasedfocusupontheprivatelife

ofFathanah,whowaseventuallylinkedtoover45women.Itwasallegedthat

Fathanahhadgiventhesewomenexpensivegifts,insomecasespossiblyinreturnfor

intimaterelations,despitealreadyhavingtwowives.TheIndonesianmediafocused

onwhothesedifferentwomenwere,whattheirexactrelationshiptoFathanahwas

andwhattheydidinreturnforthesegifts.Therewasalsospeculationthatthese

womencouldthemselvesbetriedformoneylaunderingthoughthisdidnoteventuate

(Apriantoetal.2013;JakartaPost2013a).FurthermoreinDecember2012,during

thecourseoftheinvestigation,itwasrevealedthatLuthfihadgottenmarriedfora

thirdtimetoahighschoolstudent.ManyIndonesianswerecriticaloftherelationship

betweenthe52yearoldandtheteenager,furtherdamagingthepolitician’s

reputation(Ucu2013).

ThechargesofcorruptionandmoneylaunderinglevelledagainstLuthfiandFathanah

weresufficienttodamagetherelativelycleanreputationofthePKS,butthemedia

focusontheirrelationshipswithvariouswomenpresentedanevengraverchallenge

totheparty’sstanding.Theparty,withitssolidIslamicvalues,andconservative

viewsonwomenwearingshortskirtsandpublicdisplaysofaffection,nowfound

itselffirmlylinkedtotwohigh‐profilemenwhoseprivatelivesdidnotseemtofit

withinthePKS’moralframework(Cochrane2013a).PKS’attemptstolaytheblame

37On1February2013itwasreportedthatPKS’DPR‐RIleadersuggestedthatPKSmayhavebeenframedbyotherpartiesbecauseofitsstronganti‐corruptionstance(Alford2013a).

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on‘beautifulwomen’temptingIslamicpoliticianstotarnishtheirreputationsgained

littlepublicsympathy(SuaraPembaruan2013;Sukoyo2013b).Thenegative

publicitywasreflectedinnumeroussurveysthatpredictedPKSwoulddopoorlyin

the2014nationalelection(Damarjati2013;Ruslan2013).

Afterahighlypublicizedtrial,Fathanahwasfoundguiltyofcorruptionon4

November2013forreceivinggrantsandincentivesonbehalfofLuthfi.TheJakarta

Anti‐CorruptionCourtsentencedFathanahto14yearsinprisonandfinedhimRp.1

billionoranadditionalsixmonthsinprison(JakartaGlobe2013).Oncethisverdict

waspassed,LuthfiattemptedtoshifttheblametoFathanah.Luthfi’strialbeganafter

Fathanah’sandduringquestioningLuthficlaimedthatFathanah,along‐timefriend

sincetheystudiedtogetherinSaudiArabiainthe1980s,haddeceivedhimandused

hisnametomakeunsavourydealswithouthisconsent.Heclaimedthathehad,ashis

friend,attemptedtoprotecthim(JakartaPost2013b).Thedefencepleafellondeaf

earsandLuthfiwassentencedto16years’imprisonmenton9December2013.He

wasalsofinedRp.1billionoranadditionalyearinprison.Luthfiimmediately

claimedthathewouldappealthesentence.Inthemeantime,PKShaddistanceditself

fromLuthfi,statingthatitplannedtofocusontheupcomingelectionsandwouldnot

seektointerveneorinfluencethecaseinanyway,hopingtorecoverbeforenational

pollinginApril2014.38

CorruptionintheConstitutionalCourt

Oneofthemostsensationalscandalsrevealedbetween2009and2014wasthearrest

andconvictionofAkilMochtar,theChiefJusticeofIndonesia’sConstitutionalCourt,

foracceptingbribes.39TheMochtarscandaldominatedthenationalheadlinesinearly

October2013whenrumoursbegancirculatingthattheKPKhadbeeninvestigating

him.HewaschargedwithreceivingalmostRp.4billionforfavourablerulingsin

disputesoverthedistrictelectionsofGunungMas,inCentralKalimantan,andLebak

intheprovinceofBanten.Later,hewastriedforacceptingbribestofix11electoral

rulings(SetuningsihandCahyadi2014).Hewasalsochargedwithmoneylaundering

viahiswife’scompany(Amelia2013c).Tomakemattersworse,marijuanaand

methamphetamineswerefoundduringasearchofhisoffice,requiringhimto

38ThePKSvotedecreasedfrom7.88percentofthepopularvotein2009to6.79percentin2014,thoughthiswasabetterresultthanexpected(Fealy2014;Kramer2014a).39TheConstitutionalCourtwasformedunderarticle24CoftheIndonesianConstitutionalamendmentspassedin2001.ItrulesonmattersrelatedtotheConstitution,thepowerofstateinstitutions,thedissolutionofpoliticalpartiesanddisputesoverelectoraloutcomes.ForfurtherdetailsseeMahkamahKonstitusi(2014).

105

undergoDNAanddrugtesting(Primandari2013).Whileurinetestsfoundnotraces

ofdruguse,hewaschargedwithdrugpossession.40AlthoughNationalNarcotics

Agency(BadanNarkotikaNasional,BNN)statedinFebruary2014thatitwouldnot

seekprisontimefortheoffence(JakartaGlobe2014a),Mochtar’scredibilityhad

alreadybeenfurtherdamaged.Finally,Mochtarwassentencedtolifeimprisonment

forreceivingRp.57.78billioninbribesandlaunderingRp.160billionduringhis

tenureasaConstitutionalCourtjudge(Alford2014).

ThecaseprovokedparticularlyvisceraloutcrybecausetheConstitutionalCourthad

developedareputationforbeingcleansinceitsinceptionin2003—andso,unlike

othermoreestablishedjudicialinstitutions,waswidelyrespectedbytheIndonesian

public.TheCourt’spreviousChiefJudge,MahfudMD,wasrenownedforhishard‐line

stanceagainstcorruption.41ThescandalwasalsounexpectedbecauseMochtarhad

promotedhimselfasananti‐corruptioncrusader,atonepointstatingthatthose

guiltyofcorruptionshouldhaveafingercutoff(MacLaren2013).Yudhoyono

releasedapublicstatementalmostimmediatelyafterthearrest,expressingshockand

dismaythatthecourthadbeencompromised(Prihandoko2013).Thiscasewasalso

damagingforthePresidentbecauseoneofhisexplicitlystatedaimsduringhissecond

termwastocombatthe‘judicialmafia’(SuaraPembaruan2011).42Withrevelations

thatcorruptionhadinfectedeventheConstitutionalCourt,Yudhoyonowasagain

deridedforfailingtocurbthejudicialcorruption.43

ThecasewasalsodamagingforGolkar.NotonlyhadMochtarrepresentedtheparty

inparliament,butseveralGolkarofficialswereimplicatedinthebriberycases.In

March2014,ChairunNisa,aGolkarparliamentarianfromCentralKalimantan,

receivedafouryearprisonsentenceandaRp.100millionfineforbrokeringthe

40BNNconfirmedthechargesinJanuary2014,sayingthatalthoughMochtar’sdrugtestshadprovennegativetheyhadfoundseveralwitnessestotestifythattheformerjudgehadusednarcoticsinthepast(Maharani2014a).41Forexample,Mahfudhadstatedinthepastthatthedeathpenaltywassuitableinsomecorruptioncasesandoncefloatedtheideaofa‘zoo’forcorruptionperpetratorsinwhichmembersofthepubliccouldgoandjeeratthecriminals(JakartaGlobe2011b).42AtaskforcewasestablishedinDecember2009totakeonthejudicialmafia,butwaswidelycriticisedanditsmandatewasnotrenewedwhenitendedinDecember2011.ForanextensivediscussionofthejudicialmafiainIndonesiaseeButtandLindsay(2011).43Thesurprisegeneratedbythescandalechoedthroughinternationalmediareporting.TheAustralianassertedthat‘AkilMochtar’sarresthasraisedangerabouthigh‐levelcorruptiontoanewpitchandthecourt'sfoundingchiefjustice[JimlyAsshidique]hascalledforthedeathsentence’(Alford2013b).TheEconomist,(2013)meanwhile,reportedthat:‘itisthoroughlydepressingthatthisnewinstitutionisnowbeingaccusedofthesamebadbehaviourastheoldones’,especiallygiventhatithad‘wonrespectforitsimpartialrulings’.

106

briberydealbetweenGolkarmembersandMochtar(Setuningsih2014a;Wanto

2013).Astheinvestigationscontinued,Banten’sGovernor,RatuAtutChosiyah,also

madeheadlinesasheryoungerbrotherwaslinkedtothebriberycase(Firdaus

2013).44AtutherselfwastriedinAugust2014forallegedlypayingMochtarRp.1

billiontosecureaGolkarvictoryintheregencyofLebakwhenGolkarappealedthe

electoralresultsintheConstitutionalCourt(Rikang2014).Althoughprosecutors

soughtatenyearprisonsentenceforAtut,shewasonlysentencedtofouryears’

imprisonmentandaRp.200millionfine.Publicoutrageatthelightsentencewas

widespread,especiallyacrosssocialmedia,where‘netizens’complainedthatit

underminedthedeterrenteffectthataharsherpunishmentwouldhaveotherwise

achieved(Soares2014).Mochtar’sarrestandconvictionwereseenasagross

betrayaloftrust,whileAtut’sconvictionreflectedtheongoinguseofbriberytofix

politicaloutcomes,demonstratingthatcorruptionstillreachedthehighestechelons

andcontinuedtounderminedemocraticprocesses.

Publicopinion

Themediafocusoncorruptioncasesnodoubtfuelledpublicresentmenttowardsthe

governmentbetween2009and2014.Therearetwomainargumentsastohowmedia

reportinginfluencespublicopinion:audiencesmayinterprettheincreasedvisibility

ofcorruptioninvestigations,arrestsandconvictionsasreflectingpositiveprogressin

the‘war’oncorruption,orthehighvolumeofcorruptionreportingmaysimply

reinforceexistingperceptionsthatcorruptionisendemicandthattheinvestigations

andconvictionsmerelyscratchthesurfaceofthisendemicproblem.45Themajorityof

surveys,opinioncolumnsandacademicliteraturepublishedbetween2009and2014

suggestthatmanyIndonesiancitizensweredisappointedinthegovernment’santi‐

corruptionefforts.Beinglinkedtocorruptionscandalsalsocontributedtoadeclinein

thepopularityofYudhoyonoandseveralpoliticalparties,andfosteredageneral

distrustofseveralstateinstitutionssuchasthejudiciary,thepoliceandtheDPR‐RI.

44ForascholarlyanalysisofRatuAtutChosiyah’sfamilydynastyinBantenseeGunn(2014:52)andHamid(2014a).InOctober2014theKPKfiledanappealagainstthefiveyearprisonsentenceandRp.150millionfinehandeddowntoAtut’sbrother,TubagusChaeriWardana,forbribingAkilMochtar,claimingitwastoolenient(Setuningsih2014b).45ThisargumentisprogressedbySchmidt(1993)inheranalysisofpublicresponsestomediareportingabouttradeunions.

107

Surveysconductedduringthisperiodindicatedthatcitizensweredissatisfiedwith

thegovernmentinspiteoftheincreaseincorruptionconvictions.46Despitegrowing

convictionnumbers,yearlysurveysconductedbytheIndonesianSurveyGroup

(LembagaSurveiIndonesia,LSI)showedthatpublicsatisfactionwiththe

government’santi‐corruptionendeavourshaddeclined.47In2008asurveyrevealeda

77percentapprovalrateforthegovernment’sworkoncombatingcorruption.By

2011thisnumberhadfallento44percent(LembagaSurveiIndonesia2012).A

numberofsurveysundertakenin2012and2013alsoreflectedthedepthofpublic

discontentwiththegovernment’santi‐corruptionprogress,especiallyhighlighting

disappointmentwithYudhoyonoandparliament(Table3.2).48

46Anumberofinstitutionswereengagedinpublicsurveysofthisnaturefrom2013‐2014.14ofthemaininstitutionswere:BiroPusatStatistik,CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Indonesia(CSIS),FoundingFatherHouse(FFH),IndonesianNetworkElectionSurvey(INES),LembagaSurveiIndonesia(LSI),LembagaSurveiNasional(LSN),LingkaranSurveiIndonesia,PoliticalWeatherStation,PusatDataBersatu,SaifulMujaniResearchandConsulting(SMRC),SoegengSarjadiSchoolofGovernment(SSSG),SPACE,TransparencyInternationalIndonesia(TII)andUniversitasGadjahMadaPusatKajianAnti‐Korupsi(UGMPUKAT).NumerousinformalconversationswithstaffinpoliticalpartyheadofficessuggestthatitisdifficulttodeterminethereliabilityofsurveydatacollectedinIndonesia,primarilybecausepoliticalpartiessometimescommissionsurveystosuittheirownagendas.Acommonmodusoperandiforpoliticalpartieswhowishtoreceivefavourablemediacoverageistocommissionasurveywithfavourableoutcomes,whichisthenreleasedtothepressasanindependentstudy.Nevertheless,thereisanevidenttrendacrossthesurveys,supportedbymediareports,illustratingthattheIndonesianpubliccontinuedtoviewthegovernmentascorruptduringthisperiod.47In2013,theKPKreleaseddatashowingthatithadsecured59convictionsforcorruptioninthatyear,upfrom50convictionsin2012and39convictionsin2011butlowerthanthe65convictionsitsecuredin2010.In2014KPKreported58corruptionconvictions.Whencomparedtoearlierfiguresfrom2004(4convictions),2005(23convictions),2006(29convictions)and2007(27convictions),thenumberofconvictionshasincreasedsignificantly(KPK2014).48Itshouldbenotedthesurveysareusedheremerelyasanindicationofpublicsentiment.SurveyinstitutionsinIndonesiaaresometimesknowntobepartisan,orevenpaidbypoliticalparties/candidatestoconductsurveysthathavebeneficialresultsforthem.Therefore,thisthesisavoidsreadingtoomuchintothespecificstatisticsandinsteadhighlightscommonlyidentifiedtrendsinpublicsentimentbylookingatarangeofsurveysbydifferentsurveyinstitutes.

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Table3.2.SurveysfromJuly2012‐2013addressingcorruptionissuesinIndonesia49

Released Institution Findings

Jul2012 CSIS 77%of respondentsbelievethemajorityofgovernment

officialsarecorrupt.50

Jan2013 BiroPusatStatistik Onaverage,respondentsratecorruptioninthe

Indonesiangovernmentas3.5outof5(with5beingvery

corrupt,0meaningnocorruption).51

Jul2013 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

52%ofthosesurveyedsaytheydonottrustpoliticians.52

Sep2013 IndonesianNetwork

ElectionSurvey

86%ofrespondentsbelievethatallpoliticalpartiesare

corrupt.53

Oct2013 LembagaSurvei

Nasional

55.9%ofrespondentsbelievecorruptioneradicationis

themostimportantissuefacingthegovernment(the

highestrankingissueinthesurvey).55.4%of

respondentsbelievedthatthestateofthenationhadnot

improvedduringYudhoyono’ssecondtermand25.9%

believedithadgottenworse.54

Dec2013 Indikator 41.5%ofrespondentsbelievethatpoliticalpartiesare

theprimarygroupresponsibleforpreventingmoney

politics.55

Dec2013 Transparency

International

CorruptionPerceptionsIndexfindsthatnational

parliamentariansareperceivedasthemostcorrupt

figuresinIndonesia.56

PollingfromarangeoforganizationspredictedthattheDemocraticPartywould

concedeitsparliamentarymajorityin2014,whileseveralpollsalsosuggestedthat

PKSwouldfailtowinenoughvotestomeettheparliamentarythresholdrequiredto

49Fromtheendof2013,surveysbegantofocusmuchmoreonthepopularityofpartiesandpotentialpresidentialcandidates.ThisstudyfoundnosurveysconductedbetweenJanuaryandApril2014thataskedgeneralquestionsabouttheexistinggovernment’santi‐corruptionefforts.50AsreportedbyDetik.com(Dhurandara2012).51AsreportedintheWallStreetJournal(IsmarandHusna2013).52AsreportedinRepublika(Rini2013).53AsreportedinKompas(Gatra2013).54SurveyresultspostedtothewebsiteofLembagaSurveiNasional(2013).55AsreportedinTempo(Purnomo2013).56AsreportedintheJakartaGlobe(Setuningsih2013b).

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takeupseatsatall(seeAppendix1).57Themostpopularpresidentialcandidatesalso

camefromtwooppositionparties:JokowifromPDIPandPrabowofromGerindra.

MostsurveypredictionsfortheDemocraticPartyaccuratelypredictedthatitwould

pollfarbelowits2009achievement.WiththeDemocraticPartylosingoverhalftheir

seatsandPDIPunderperforming,severalotherpartiesdidbetterthanexpected,

particularlyIslamicparties(Fealy2014)(seeTable3.3).

Table3.3.Outcomeofthenationallegislativeelections,2014.

Party%ofpopular

vote

+/‐changein

popularvote

from2009

No.ofseatsin

parliament

+/‐no.of

seatsfrom

2009

PDIP 18.95 +4.92 109 +15

Golkar 14.75 +0.30 91 ‐15

Gerindra 11.81 +7.35 73 +47

Democratic

Party10.19 ‐10.66 61 ‐87

PKB 9.04 +4.10 47 +19

PAN 7.59 +1.58 49 +3

PKS 6.79 ‐1.09 40 ‐17

Nasdem 6.72 — 35 —

PPP 6.53 +1.21 39 +1

Hanura 5.26 +1.49 16 ‐1

Source:KomisiPemilihanUmum(2014a).

Growingdiscontentwithpoliticalpartieswasalsoillustratedbygrowingreluctance

toassociatewiththem(Fealy2011:340).58Surveysconductedin2011byLSIfound

thatonly20percentofrespondentsconsideredthemselvesto‘belong’toaparty,

comparedto86percentin1999(LembagaSurveiIndonesia2011).TheSPACE

survey,conductedinJuly2013,foundthat43percentofthosesurveyedwerenot

planningtovoteatall.Italsosuggestedthat,ninemonthsaheadoftheelection,a

largeproportionofcitizensfeltnopartyloyalty,wereopentovotingdifferentlyin

2014thantheyhadin2009and/orwerenotplanningtoparticipateintheelection.59

57TheDemocraticPartyandPKS,wereconsistentlyshowntohavelostsupportafter2009,indicativeofanoveralldeclineintheirpopularity.58Slater(2004:88)arguesthatthistrendexistedbeforethe2004elections,inwhich‘votersfeltlessbeholdentothedictatesofpartymachines’.59Golput,theactofnotcastingavalidvote,wasdiscussedintheIntroductionofthethesis.

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TheSaifulMujaniResearchCenterpollinMarch2014istellinginthat47.7percentof

respondentsdidnotnominateapreferredparty.Thedeclineofpartyloyalty—

althoughaphenomenonthatexistedpriorto2014—representedastarkcontrastto

thealiranalignmentsprominentduringtheOldandNewOrders.60Whileitis

impossibletoidentifyasinglereasonforthislackofpartyloyalty,orindeedpolitical

engagementmorebroadly,theapparentprevalenceofcorruptioninthegovernment,

acrossallbodies,certainlybredcynicismamongstvoters.

Howsuccessfulwereemergingpartiesinthe2014nationallegislativeelections?

Noneoftheemergingpartiesperformedaswellastheyhadhoped.Gerindrabecame

oneofthe‘bigthreeparties’,butfailedtoreachitselectoraltarget.61Gaining11.81

percentofthepopularvote,whichwas13.04percentofparliamentaryseats,

Gerindraimproveduponits2009result.However,thepartyfellshortofitsaimto

garner20percentofparliamentaryseatssoitcouldnominatePrabowoasa

presidentialcandidatewithoutneedingtoformacoalition.HanuraandNasdem,

whichhadalsoaimedtobecomeoneofthe‘bigthree’parties,received5.26percent

and6.72percentofthevotesrespectively.Yet,whilethesepartiesalsohadnotdone

aswellastheywished,theresultsensuredthattheyremainedimportantplayersin

thepresidentialelections.Bothpartieshadtheabilitytomakeasignificant

contributiontothecoalitionforthepresidentialcandidatetheyoptedtosupport.In

theend,bothNasdemandHanurachosetobackPDIP’scandidates,JokowiandJusuf

Kalla,whereasGerindranegotiatedwithotherpartiestoformacoalitiontonominate

Prabowoandhisrunningmate,HattaRajasa,fromPAN.62

60AliranwasdiscussedinChapterTwo.61Theresultsofthe2014nationallegislativeelectionsproveddifficulttopredict.PDIPwastheclearfavouritetowinbyawidemargin,especiallyafteritannouncedthatitwouldnominateJokowi,ratherthanMegawati,asitspresidentialcandidate.PDIPhopedthatitwouldbenefitfromthe‘Jokowieffect’(Kwok2014;McRae2014;Simanjuntak2013;Witoelar2014),butwhileJokowiwentontonarrowlywinthepresidentialrace,hisnominationdidlittletoenhancesupportforPDIPduringthelegislativeelection.62Twomajorcoalitionswereformedforthepresidentialelection.PDIPledonecoalition,supportedbyPKB,NasdemandHanura,nominatingJokowiandJusufKallaforpresidentandvice‐president(respectively).TherivalcoalitionwasledbyGerindraandbackedbyGolkar,theDemocraticParty,PAN,PPPandPKS.ThiscoalitionnominatedPrabowoforpresidentandHattaRajasa,leaderofPAN,ashisrunningmate.Thedifficultyinnegotiatingcoalitionshighlightstheadvantagestobegainedinmeetingthepresidentialthreshold.

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Conclusion

The2014legislativeelectionsheraldedachangeinfortuneforanumberof

Indonesia’snationalpoliticalparties.PDIP,whichhadpreviouslybeeninopposition,

wasthefavouritetowinamajority.Eventhoughitfellshortofexpectations,itstill

wonmoreDPR‐RIseatsthananyotherparty(Hamid2014b;Tomsa2014a).63The

maincasualtywastherulingDemocraticParty,whichlost87seatsanditsdominance

inparliament.PKS,whichgainedasignificantnumberofvotesin2009,becamethe

onlyIslamicpartytoloseseats.64ThedeclineinpopularityforboththeDemocratic

PartyandPKSappearedtobecloselytiedtonumerouscorruptionscandals,which

underminedtheparties’anti‐corruptioncredentialsintheleaduptotheelection.65

Thischapterhasprovidedabriefoverviewofsomeofthecorruptionscandalsthat

emergedbetween2009and2014,highlightingthatcorruptioncontinuedtobea

prominentpoliticalconcern.DespiteYudhoyono’selectoralpromisesthatheandthe

DemocraticPartywouldcondemncorruption,emergingscandalsunderminedhis

politicalimageandledtoasignificantdecreaseinsupportforthepartyinthe2014

election.Thehypocrisyofthoseingovernmentwascompoundedbyattacksonthe

much‐lovedKPK,leadingmanycitizenstobelievethatmanyingovernmentwere

moreinterestedinprotectingthemselvesratherthaneradicatingcorruption.Surveys

alsoindicatedthattheIndonesianpublicwasgrowingwearyofthepoliticaleliteand

politicalpartiesingeneral,reflectedbythefallingassociationwithpoliticalparties

63PDIPofficiallygained18.95percentofvotes,whichwasfarlessthanitstargetof27.02percent(Sadikin2014).Theresultwassurprisingtomanyobservers.Forexample,prominentIndonesiapoliticalanalystWimarWitoelar(2014)stated‘Iwaswrong.Themediawaswrong.Thepollswerewrong…PredictionsthatPDIPwouldcapture35percentormoreinthelegislativeelectionsprovedtobegrosslyillusoryastheygotlessthan20percent,justafewmorepercentagepointsmorethanGolkar,GerindraandeventheDemocratParty.’64PKSdid,however,dobetterthananticipated.Itgained6.79percentofthevotein2014inthefaceofpredictionsthatitmaynotevenpasstheparliamentarythresholdof3.5percent(Fealy2014;Kramer2014a).65WhilesurveyresultsinIndonesiacannotalwaysbetakenatfacevalue,theoverwhelmingtrendreflecteddecliningsupportfortheDemocraticParty.InaMarch2013survey,theNationalSurveyInstitute(LembagaSurveiNasional,LSN)foundthat40.4percentofrespondentssawtheDemocraticPartyasthemostcorruptpartyinIndonesia.Itselectabilityalsofell,withonly4.3percentofrespondentsselectingthemastheirpreferredparty(Ledysia2013).AsurveypublishedbyTransparencyInternationalIndonesiainApril2013foundtheDemocraticPartytobetheleasttransparentpartyinparliamentinrelationtoitsfundingandpartybudget(alongwithGolkarandPKSwhowerealsodefinedas‘nottransparent’)(BBCIndonesia2013).PollingbytheUnitedDataCentre(PusatDataBersatu,PDB)releasedinJuly2013foundthatonly9.4percentwouldvotefortheDemocraticParty,comparedto26.43percentofvotesattainedin2009.AnIndikatorsurveyreportreleasedon4April2014foundonly7.2percentofthosesurveyedplannedtovotefortheDemocraticParty(Indikator2014).TheDemocraticPartyactuallygained10.19percentoftheofficialvote(Pemilu2014),slightlyhigherthanmostpredictions.

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andtheriseof‘non‐elite’presidentialcandidate,Jokowi.Furthermore,theperception

thatpoliticiansweremoreinterestedinmaintainingthestatusquothancombating

corruptionledtogrowingdiscontentwitholdguardelitesandpresented

opportunitiesforemergingparties.

Partofthe‘projectofnewness’adoptedbyemergingpartieswastoposition

themselvesastheantithesistotheexistingpoliticalelites.WithYudhoyono’s

perceivedlackofprogressincombatingcorruptionandadecliningtrustinthe

parliament,emergingpartieswerepresentedwithaclearandconvenientplatform

uponwhichtobothcriticizethegovernmentanddepictthemselvesascleanand

staunchlyanti‐corruption,incontrasttothoseinpower.GerindraandHanurawere

abletocapitalizeonthegainstheymadeinthe2009nationallegislativeelection

(Sukma2009:320).ByoptingtoremaininoppositionratherthanjoinYudhoyono’s

RainbowCoalitionbetween2009and2014,GerindraandHanurawereableto

distancethemselvesfromthefailingsoftheYudhoyonoadministration.Nasdem,too,

capitalizedontheongoingdissatisfactionwiththeincumbentgovernment.Although

itwasanewparty,Nasdemcampaignedonthesloganofbeinga‘Movementfor

Change’(GerakanPerubahan),adoptingoppositionalrhetoricwhichpositioned

themselvesagainstthoseinpower.Projectingananti‐corruptionsymbolwasone

meansfornewpartiestoemphasizethedifferencebetweenthemandrivals.In

articulatingtheirstaunchsupportforanti‐corruptionmeasuresandstressingthe

absenceofnationallevelcorruptioncaseswithintheirownparties,theseparties

attemptedtopresentthemselvesasbroaderforcesofchangeandrighteousness.

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ChapterFourEmergingpartiesandcampaigningon

corruption

Inthelead‐uptothe2014legislativeelection,thecentralcommitteeofemerging

partiesdecidedwhatsymbolswouldbeacampaignfocusandfacilitatedtheir

transmissionacrossthecountryviaprintmedia,televisionandtheinternet.Party

leaders,particularlypresidentialcandidates,hadaprominentroleinconstructing

anddisseminatingthissymbolastheytouredthecountryinthelead‐uptothe

election.Withtheprevalenceoffigure‐drivenpoliticsinIndonesia,muchattention

wasgiventowhatpartyleaderssaidwhileelectioneering.Officialstatementswere

alsomadebypartyspokespeople,dependingontheirpositionandexpertise.

Whoeverthespeaker,thesepublicannouncementswereintendedtoreflectparty

idealsasawhole.

Intracinghowemergingpartiesdevelopedtheiranti‐corruptionsymbolnationally,

thischapterfirstinvestigatestherationaleforselectinganti‐corruptionasacore

politicalsymbol,drawinguponinterviewswithseniorpartyofficialsregardingtheir

useofanti‐corruptionideasintheircampaigns.Itthenexaminesthemechanisms

usedbythepartiestodevelopananti‐corruptionsymbol,lookingparticularlyatthe

nation‐widestrategiesthatwereconceptualizedandfundedfromthecentralparty

office.OrganizingthesecampaignsfromJakarta,theseapproachesfocusedheavilyon

non‐relationaldiffusionofpartyrhetoric,namelyviapartypublicationsandthe

mediacoverageofstatementsbypartyleaders.Whileitisimpossibletoknowhow

parties’useofanti‐corruptionsymbolismaffectedvotingoutcomes,electoralresults

fellshortofpartyaspirations,eventhoughalltheemergingpartieswereabletopass

theparliamentaryelectoralthreshold,suggestingthatananti‐corruptionsymbolwas

notthepanaceathatpartieshadhopedfor.Inexploringtheintegrationofthissymbol

intonation‐widepartycampaigns,thischapterlaysthefoundationforaclose

discussionoftheengagementofthecentralpartywithcampaignsofindividual

candidatesandtheimpactthishadforthedevelopmentanduseofanti‐corruption

symbolsoverall.

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Theanti‐corruptionstrategy

Parties’rationaleforadoptinganti‐corruptionsymbolsinthe2014national

legislativeelectioncampaignisimportantgiventhewidespreadacknowledgement

thatthesesymbolshadbackfiredfortheDemocraticPartyandPKS.Inspiteofthis,

partiesstilljudgedcorruptiontobeakeyconcernforvoters—sometimesreferredto

asa‘vote‐getter’issue.Thepublicsoughtapartythatwouldbringaboutfundamental

changestothewaygovernmentworkedandastronganti‐corruptionsymbolwas

intendedtopromotethisgood(newparty)versusbad(oldparties)dichotomy.

Emergingpartiesalsoidentifiedthisrealmasoneofcompetitiveadvantage,asthey

themselveshadneversufferedfromanymajorcorruptionscandalsandcould

thereforecriticizeotherpartiesfromapositionofrelativevirtue.Another

rationalizationespousedbysomepartyofficialswasthatapowerfulanti‐corruption

messagewoulddiscourage‘non‐genuine’candidatesfromjoiningtheparty.This,they

argued,wouldensurethelongevityoftheparty’scleanimage,intermsofbeingfree

ofcorruptionandahostofotherundesirableactivities,suchasillicitdrugtakingand

infidelity.Emergingpartieswereacutelyawareofthedangersofbeingseenas

hypocritical.Havingseenthepublicrelationsdamagecausedbycorruptmembers,

partieshopedtominimizefuturerisksbydeterringcandidatesthattheybelieved

couldjeopardizetheparty’simage.Eachpartyclaimedtheyhadstrictproceduresfor

selectingpartycandidates,includingpsychologicaltestingandbackgroundchecksfor

druguseand‘suspicious’earnings.PartyofficialsinbothGerindraandHanura

contendedthattheirleadershipswereextremelyunforgivingofcorruption,having

madeseveralpartydecreesdemandingthatanymembernotfullycommittedtothe

partyshouldleaveimmediately.1

AccordingtoseveralHanurapartyofficials,being‘clean’wasaniconicpartof

Hanura’simage,sothatwhenpeoplethoughtofcorruption‐freeparties,they

immediatelythoughtofHanura.2OneHanuraofficialacknowledgedthatHanura

mightnotbe100percentclean,butaddedthatitsmemberswerewellawareofthe

consequencesoftarringthepartyname,includingexpulsion,quiteapartfrom

damagetotheirpersonalreputation.Thisofficialwas,therefore,confidentthatthe

1InterviewwithHanuraofficial,24October2012;interviewwithGerindrapartyparliamentaryaide,February42013;interviewwithGerindraparliamentaryrepresentative,9March2013.2Thispointwasbroughtupseveraltimesinofficialinterviewswithatleastfourdifferentpartymembers,aswellasduringoff‐the‐recordconversations.Animpressionemergedthatthisargumenthadbeengeneratedbycentralpartymembersandthatpartycadreswereinstructedtoadvanceitindiscussionswithoutsiders.

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partywas,infact,cleanerthanitsrivals.3Hanuraleader,Wiranto,assertedthat

advocatingforanti‐corruptionmeasures,suchasincreasedtransparencyandthe

swiftresolutionofcorruptioncasesthathavedraggedonforyears,werepopular

withcitizens.4WirantoalsocontendedthatinIndonesiacorruptionisrelatedto

issuesofjustice—thatordinarypeopledesperatelywanttoseethosewhoarecorrupt

punishedfortheircrimes.HearguedthattheIndonesianpeoplewantedaleaderwho

wouldactwith‘firmness’(ketegasan)inthefaceofcorruption;astrongleaderwho

couldappropriatelypunishthoseprofitingattheexpenseofthenation.Infact,

Wirantohadsuchfaithinthepowerofananti‐corruptionsymboltoattractvotesthat

hepushedforittobeincludedinHanura’sbranding,againsttheadviceofhischief

mediaadvisor.5

Standingfirmagainstcorruptionwasalsoidentifiedasapartysymbolbyseveral

Gerindraleaders,withoneofficialassertingthatpeoplewereattractedtoGerindra

becausetheysawitasthepartythatwouldfightcorruptionwithoutmercy.6He

believedthatcampaigningonthisissuewouldnotbackfireforGerindrabecauseit

hadconsistentlyrejectedcorruptionsincethepartywasformed.7SeveralGerindra

membersalsoassertedthatitsactionsinparliamentsupportedtheparty’srhetorical

anti‐corruptionsymbol,sothatitcouldlegitimatelybillitselfas‘clean’withoutfearof

backlash.Gerindraleader,PrabowoSubianto,wasadamantthathewasafearless

anti‐corruptioncampaignerandwouldridthegovernmentofsuchevils.Prabowo’s

useofanti‐corruptionsymbolismwasobservedbyMietzner(2014:114)whostated

he‘presentedhimselfasaclassicpopuliststrongman,lambastingtheweaknessand

corruptionofIndonesia’spoliticalclass.’

3InterviewwithHanuraofficial,24October2012.4InterviewwithWiranto,24October2013.5OneHanuramediaadvisorsaidthatWirantohadinsistedonmakinganti‐corruptionideasacentralfocusofthecampaignandhebelievedthatthiswasprimarilyoutofpersonalconvictionratherthanstrategicbenefit.Initially,Wirantohadbeenadvisedtopromotesocialwelfareandaddressinginequalityastheparty’schiefpoliticalsymbols,onthegroundsthattheyhadbroaderappealandwerelesspronetocynicismthananti‐corruption.Themediaadvisorbelievedthattalkingaboutcorruptioncouldbedangerousandthatmoreadvantageouscampaignsymbolsexisted(interviewwithHanuramediaadvisor,17February2013).Thisscenario,inwhichtheclient(theparty/politician)overrulesthemediaspecialistisidentifiedbyBowlerandFarrell(1992b:4)asoneofthetypesofstructuralrelationshipsobservedduringcampaigns.Theyarguethat,ingeneral,mostrelationshipsbetweenthe‘client’andthe‘mediapeople’willfallsomewherebetweentwoextremes:devolvingpowerandauthorityformarketingentirelytomediaprofessionalsortheclientdominatingthemediateam,dictatingtothemwhattheyshoulddo.BowlerandFarrell(1992a:226)alsoassertthatstudiesacrossanumberofcountriesdemonstratethatpartiesand/orcandidatesareoftenreluctanttogiveupcontrolofcampaignstoconsultants.6InterviewwithGerindrapartyparliamentaryaide,4February2013.7InterviewwithGerindraparliamentaryrepresentative,9March2013.

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Nasdemofficialsdidnotovertlyidentifyusingananti‐corruptionsymbolasavote‐

getterfortheirparty;however,theyrecognizedtheappealofapartythatcouldbe

trustedtofighttheproblem.8Allpartiesemphasizedtheimportanceofpublicly

denouncingcorruptioninallitsforms,deemingthatthepublicdemandedit.Nasdem

officialsacknowledgedthattheiranti‐corruptionrhetoricwasnotasintensiveasthat

ofHanuraorGerindra.Oneofficialclaimedthat,asthenewestparty,‘Wedon’tneed

totalkaboutittoomuchbecauseitisexpectedwewillsayweareanti‐corruption…

theproofliesmoreinouractionssofarratherthanwords’.9However,Nasdem

certainlydidnotrefrainfromusingitasapoliticalsymbol.Throughoutitscampaign,

Nasdemcontinuedtodrawattentiontogovernmentfailuresincombatingcorruption,

particularlypressuringthegovernmenttoresolveon‐goingcorruptioncasessuchas

Centurygate.10Bymaintainingthispressure,theofficialcontendedthat‘Nasdemwill

showitselftobeabetteralternativetotherest[oftheparties]’.Inassertingtheir

cleanstatus,Nasdemofficialsalsocapitalizedonitsstatusasanewparty.For

example,anotherpartymemberstatedthatifaspiringpoliticiansmerelywanteda

seatinparliamentformoney‐makingpurposesthentheywouldjoinabiggerparty

becauseemergingpartiesgenerallyremainedunderdogs.11Inlinewiththis,another

Nasdemofficialalsoclaimedthatthepartywas‘pure’,assertingthatitsmembers

werededicatedtorealreformratherthanjustseekingself‐gratification.Whether

thesejustificationsweregenuineorawhite‐washwasdifficulttodiscern;however,

theirrepetitionoftheseassertionsillustratedentrencheddiscoursewithinemerging

parties—thatupholdingacleanimagewasparamount.

Whiletherationaleforthesepartiestopromoteananti‐corruptionsymbolwasbased

onsubjectiveopinionsandsteepedinpoliticalrhetoric,itwasapparentthatparties

usedanti‐corruptionasasymbolinthe2014legislativecampaignbecausetheparty

elitebelieveditwouldwinthemvotes;partieswantedtobeassociatedwithbeing

clean.Ostensibly,eachpartywasconfidentinitsabilitytocarrythroughwiththeir

electoralpromisesandbeaforceofchange.Partieswereconsciousofthedangersof

portrayingthemselvesasanti‐corruptioncampaigners,however,whethertheycould

maintainthisimagefollowingtheelectionwasseeminglyamatterforthefuture.

Theypronouncedthattheywouldnotsufferthesamefateasotherparties,notonly

8InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2013.9InterviewwithNasdempartyofficial,11April2013.10Frequentpublicstatementsensuredthatmajorcorruptioncasesremainedinthepubliceye,somethingoneofficialidentifiedasbeingcrucialbecause‘peopleforgetthecrimesofpoliticalpartiestooquickly’(interviewwithNasdemcandidate,25May2013).11InterviewwithNasdemofficial,16May2013.

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becausetheirmembersknewthatcorruptionwasillegal,butbecauseitwouldbea

seriousbetrayalofpartyvalues.

Creatingandmobilizingthesymbol

ChapterOneidentifiedanumberofconceptsthathelpinunderstandinghowpolitical

partiesdevelopasymbol,includingthenotionsofmorality,issueownershipand

narrativedevelopment.Byportrayingcorruptionasamoralissue,partiesareableto

castthemselvesintheroleofthe‘good’(asopposedtorivalpartieswhoaretainted

andtherefore‘evil’).Theongoinguseofrhetoricdevelopsanarrativewhichparties

hopewillconvincethepublicoftheirgenuinecommitmenttoanti‐corruption,

eventuallyleadingtoissueownership.Anotherwaytoobtainissueownershipmight

besimplybybeinguntaintedbyaproblem(Petrocik1996:827).Inthecaseof

corruption,emergingpartieshavetheadvantageofashort,(relatively)untarnished

historyinwhichtheyhavenotfacedacorruptionscandal.12Comingto‘own’theissue

ofanti‐corruptionandcreatingasymbolwhichissynonymouswiththepartyitselfis,

inthisinstance,facilitatedbytheirshorthistory.However,theymuststillprojectan

anti‐corruptionsymbolthatovershadowsthatofrivals,especiallysincetheyare

competingwithotheremergingpartieswithsimilarlyshorthistories.

Thepromotionofthisanti‐corruptionsymbolisneededsothatthevotingpublic

connectsthepartywiththisparticularissue.13Havingconceptualizedhowtheparty

wishedtopresentthemselvestothepublic,Hanura,GerindraandNasdemrelayed

theiranti‐corruptionsymbolthroughanumberofnon‐relationalmechanisms.Parties

hiredmediaandpublicrelationsspecialistsandteamstodevelopandcoordinatethe

promotionofthepartyimage,usingbothpaidadvertisingandthemedia.Social

mediawasalsousedincampaigning,withpartiespromotingthemselvesviawebsites

suchasFacebook,TwitterandYouTubeinordertoappealtoIndonesia’smore

internet‐savvyvoters.Themulti‐channelapproachwasadoptedtobroadenthereach

ofpartysymbols,asmediaadvisorsunderstoodthatsuchanapproachwasimportant

tomaximizingtheimpactofmessagediffusiontothepublic.

12Partyreputationswere‘relatively’untarnishedbecause,asdiscussedlaterinthischapter,someminorcasesdidcometolightbeforetheelection.13Itisalsonecessarytomanagepartysymbolsbyensuringthatmembersmaintainaunitedvoice,inlinewiththeprioritiesestablishedbycentralpartyrepresentatives.Whilethecentralcommitteemaybeabletomanagethesymbolcreationatthenationallevel,thisismuchmoredifficulttocontrolatthelocallevel,aswillbediscussedinChapterFive.

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Partypublications

Partypublicationsincludematerialssuchasthepartymanifesto,missionstatement

andpamphletsthatpromotethepartyanditsobjectives.Earlydocumentssuchasthe

manifestoareintendedtoestablishtheaimsofthepartyandthepremiseforthe

party’sformation,whilelaterdocumentssupplementand/orprovidefurther

clarificationoftheseoriginalpublications.Intheirofficialdocuments,Hanura,

GerindraandNasdemallhighlightedthefailingsofthecurrentgovernmentin

hyperbolicandemotiveterms,withtheapparentaimofgalvanisingmistrustand

consequentlypromotingsupportforthealternativetheyoffered.Therhetoricusedis

intendedtojustifythecreationofanewpartyandoutline,atleastintheory,howthis

partydiffersfromexistingparties.

Hanura’spartydoctrinebooklet(2009a)assertsthatIndonesiawasfullofleaders

whohad‘forgottenthemselves’and‘shamelesslyexploittheirpositions’.These

officialshad‘losttheirconscience’,fuelling‘acultureoftheft,collusionandcorruption

whichhadledtogrosssocialsuffering’.Therepeateduseoftheterm‘conscience’is

intendedtoevokeconceptsofmoralityintheaudience.Tobecompelledbyyour

‘conscience’,asdefinedbyHanura(2008),istobedrivenbyhonesty,truth,goodness

andabeliefinGod.Hanura’smanifestocontendsthatwithoutconsciencethereisno

hopeforimprovement.Therefore,asHanuraisthepartydrivenbyconscience,

citizenswantingtoseeajustandmoralgovernmentshouldvoteforit.Hanura’s

publicationsalsoemphasizedanti‐corruptionsymbolismbyreferringtoideassuchas

beingclean,honest,transparentandaccountable.Forexample,thefirstpoint(outof

eight)inHanura’smissionstatement(2010:9)isthe‘creationofagovernmentthatis

clean...toserveademocraticstatethatistransparentandaccountable’.Moreover,

accordingtopointseveninHanura’shandbook,thepartyiscommittedto‘thetotal

eradicationofcorruptiontofacilitatethecreationofanadvanced,independentand

prestigiousnation’(Hanura2008:15).

Gerindra’sdocumentsframedthepartyasacrusaderforchange,depictingthe

politicalsceneasabattlefoughtinthenationalinterest.Thelanguageemployedby

Gerindrawasverymuchthatofacalltoarms,vowingtofightforprosperityand

justiceinallspheresofIndonesianlife(Gerindra2012c).AccordingtoGerindra’s

‘manifestoofstruggle’,Indonesiahasbeenbattlingpovertysinceindependencebut

couldnotovercomeitduetoanunjustpoliticalsystempopulatedbyweakand

corruptofficials(Gerindra2012b).Itwastimeto‘standfirmtoachievejustice’by

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givingGerindratheopportunitytoleadafair,prosperousandharmoniousIndonesia

(2012b:5).TheideathatGerindrawasfulfillingacallingwaselaborateduponinThe

HistoryofGerindra(2012d),whichstatedthatthepartywasinspiredbyEdmund

Burke(famouslyquotedassaying‘Theonlythingnecessaryforthetriumph[ofevil]

isforgoodmentodonothing’).InpamphletsdistributedatGerindraralliesinthe

lead‐uptovotingduringApril2014,‘buildingagovernmentthatisfreefrom

corruption,strong,firmandeffective’wasidentifiedasoneoftheparty’score

electoralpromises.Thepamphletendedwith‘Ifnotus,thenwho?Ifnotnow,then

when?’SuchrhetoricalquestionsimpliedthatGerindrawastheonlypartycapableof

improvingIndonesia’srecordagainstcorruption.

Initspoliticalmanifesto,Gerindraspecificallyaddressedcorruptionasalegalissue,

assertingthatwhilethelawswereadequatetheywereinconsistentlyappliedbythe

judiciary.Thepunishmentsforthoseinvolvedincorruption,collusionandnepotism

(korupsi,kolusidannepostisme,KKN)mustbeharsheriftheyaretoactasaneffective

deterrent(Gerindra2012b:33).ThisstanceisreiteratedinGerindra’sofficial

regulations,whichstatethatoneofGerindra’sresponsibilitiesistoinfluenceand

overseethecreationofan‘honest,cleananddignified[government],thatisalsofree

ofcorruption,misappropriationandmisuseofpoliticalpower’(Gerindra2012a:7).

Thedocumentclaimsthatthepartywouldaddresscorruptionbystrengtheninglaw

enforcementandthebureaucraticsystem,assertingalsothatitsmembershada

unique‘identity’whichmeantthey‘willnevercheat,stealorcorruptlyusemoney

fromtheParty,letalonemoneyfromthepeopleorthestate’(Gerindra2012a:31).

GerindraalsopublisheditsownnewspaperfromApril2011toNovember2013,

GemaIndonesiaRaya,featuringarticlesbyPrabowoandotherseniorfiguresabout

partyideologyandactivities,includingafocusonGerindra’santi‐corruptionstance.

Whilethenewspaperhadalimitedreadershipoutsideoftheparty,itprovideda

writtenrecordofpartydiscoursewhichcouldbeusedbycommentatorsand

journalists.

Intheyearleadinguptotheelection,GemaIndonesiaRayaprovidedadedicated

mouthpiecefortheparty,featuringrepeatedreferencestoGerindra’sstatusasaclean

partycommittedtocombatingcorruption.Forexample,intheJune2013edition,

Prabowowroteafrontcoveropinionpiecetitled‘Wewanttowinbybeingclean’,in

whichhestatedthat‘wewanttowinbybeingclean,honest,transparentand

legitimate[emphasisinoriginal]’(Subianto2013).Inthesameedition,the

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newspaperalsofeaturedanarticlewrittenbyoneoftheparty’scommunication

advisorsaboutBeefgate,describingthearrestofPKSpresidentLuthfiHasanIshaaq

as‘anewchapterinIndonesia’sfightagainstcorruption’thatdemonstratedhow

politicaleliteswerenowbecomingKPKtargets,aswelltheyshould(Nasution2013c).

ThesamecommunicationadvisoralsowroteintheOctober2013editionthatthe

PresidentialPalacewashometoanelite‘mafia’(Nasution2013b).IntheNovember

2013editionhearguedthatYudhoyonomusthaveknownaboutthescandalbecause

itseemedtoinvolvesomanyDemocraticPartymembersandthatthePresident

shouldbeinvestigatedforinvolvementinCenturygatefollowingtheendofhisterm

(Nasution2013a).

WhileNasdem’sreferencestoananti‐corruptionagendainofficialpublicationswere

lessovertthanthoseofHanuraorGerindra,thediscourseremainedanimportant

facetoftheparty’sidentity.Partydocumentationoutlinesthatthe‘restoration’of

Indonesiaisaprocessthatrequiresbothastructuralandmoraladjustmentof

government,butalsoamoraladjustmentofthoseinpolitics,toovercometheir

‘materialisticandhedonisticnature’,toinsteadprioritizepublicwelfareover

personaldesires(Nasdem2011b:19).Inpoint17ofitsplatformoutline,oneofthe

party’sstatedgoalswastocreateacleanandprofessionalbureaucracythatworks

onlyintheinterestofthepeople.Inlinewiththisgoal,accordingtotheparty

handbook(Nasdem2011a),allpartycadresarerequiredtosignacontractstating

thattheywillnotundertakeanycorruptionorotherimmoralactivities.Nasdem’s

brandingalsoattemptedtoframethepartyasanti‐eliteandpro‐people(pro‐rakyat).

Itsmanifestostatedthatpartymembers‘rejectademocracythatisamerecirculation

ofpoweramongsteliteswhoarenotleadersofqualityorworthyoftheposition’

(Nasdem2011a:3).ThisreferencetothenegativeinfluenceofelitesinIndonesia’s

governmentintendedtoappealtoalienated‘ordinarycitizens’whoviewedpoliticsas

thedomainoftherich.InNasdem’snationalistnarrative,thepoorhadbeen

marginalizedfortoolongbecausethoseinchargefailedtofulfiltheidealsof

IndonesiannationalismbasedonPancasila.Thepartyreferredtoitselfasa

movementfor‘restoration’(restorasi)and‘change’(perubahan),aimedatchanging

thementalandmoralattitudesofthegovernmentinordertobuildanhonestand

productivesocietybasedonintegrity(Nasdem2011b:21).Indepictingitselfastrue

nationalists,Nasdempositioneditselfashavingamoralauthorityoverthecurrent

governmentleaders,whowere,byimplication,nottruenationalists.

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Theprevalenceofanti‐corruptionsentimentwithintheseofficialdocuments

illustrateshowpartiesattemptedtosellthemselvesaspreferablealternativestothe

existingparties.Thesedocuments,inasense,formthebasisformuchoftherhetoric

usedinsymbol‐building.Inidentifyinggoalssuchasabeing‘clean’andcondemning

the‘exploitation’ofIndonesiabysomewithinthegovernment,emergingparties

aimedtoalignthemselveswithreadily‐acceptableprinciples.Partiesdid,however,

recognizethatmostvoterswouldnotreadtheirmanifestos,letaloneconductin‐

depthresearchintotheir‘visionandmission’.Thismeantthatpartieshadtofind

otherwaystoappealtothemasses,forexample,establishingapositivepublicprofile

forseniorpartyfigurestonotonlypromote,butindeedexemplify,thecoresymbols

oftheparty.

Partyleaders

Partyleadersplayanintegralroleinestablishingtheimageofapartyandembodying

thesymbolsthatitwishestopresent.Harrop(1990:279)contendsthatleaders’

wordsandactionsareimportantinthecreationandpromotionofpartysymbols

becausevotersliketoputahumanfacetoaparty.AsdiscussedinChapterOne,the

imageofpartyleadersiscrucialandtheircredibilityrestsonaclosealignment

betweenpersonalandpartyimage(Capelos2010;Druckmanetal.2004;Harrop

1990).Inthelead‐uptothegeneralelections,selectedmembersoftheparty

leadership,particularlythepresidentialcandidates(orseniorpartyfiguresinthe

caseofNasdem)touredthecountrygivingspeechesatpoliticalralliestopromote

theirrespectiveparties.Theserallies,oftenpopulatedbypaidattendees(Pepinsky

2014;Simandjuntak2012:101),weremoreaspectaclethananythingelse—ashow

ofstrengthtothepublicratherthanatruereflectionofpopularity.Still,knowingthat

theseorationswereanopportunitytopublicizethepartyandgiventhehigh

likelihoodofmediacoverage,partyleadersusedtheseopportunitiestofurther

establishananti‐corruptionimage.

Leadersofemergingpartieshadalreadybeguntoaligntheirpartiestoananti‐

corruptionsymbolwellbeforetheofficialcampaignperiod.Wiranto,Prabowoand

SuryaPalohallpublishedbooksintheyearsleadinguptothe2014electionthatwere

designedtobuildtheirimageasagentsofchange.Forexample,Paloh’sbookMari

BungRebutKembali(2012)wasacompilationof‘inspirational’speechesbyPaloh

invokingtherevolutionaryandpatrioticspiritofformerpresidentSukarno.In2013,

Prabowoalsopublishedabookinasimilarvein,entitledSuratUntukSahabat(Letter

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toaFriend),arguingthatIndonesianeededtoworkhardertoachievethedreamsof

thenation’sfoundingfathers.Wirantoalsoauthoredanumberofbooks,including

MeretasJalanBaruEkonomiIndonesia(PavingaNewRoadforIndonesia’sEconomy)

andMeluruskanJalanDemokrasi(StraighteningtheRoadtoDemocracy),presenting

hisvisionforthecountry’sfuture(Wiranto2009b;c).

Inthe2014electioncampaigns,leadersfromeachemergingpartycultivatedmedia

relationsinordertobroadcasttheirmessageviapresscoverage.Atthesametime,

partiesorganizedpublicappearancesandranadvertisingcampaignsthat

prominentlyfeaturedimagesofthepartyleader(s).Wiranto,Hanura’spresidential

candidate,andmediatycoonHaryTanoesoedibjo(oftenreferredtoas‘HaryTanoe’),

thevice‐presidentialcandidate,werefrequentlyquotedinthemediadiscussing

issuesofcorruption.Similarly,Prabowospokerepeatedlyabouttheneedfor

corruptioneradication,usinghismediatopromotenotonlyhimself,butalsothe

party’santi‐corruptionsymbol.Nasdem,whichdidnothaveapresidentialcandidate,

neverthelessalsosolditsanti‐corruptionsymbolthroughseniorpartyfigures

includingSuryaPalohandpartychair,PatriceRioCapella.

Gerindra’sPrabowowasalsoconsistentlyvocalinhisstanceagainstcorruptionin

electioncampaigningleadinguptothe2014nationalelections.InMarch2013,he

observedthat‘thelevelsofcorruption[inIndonesia]areinsane’andmuchofthe

nationalbudgetwentmissingeveryyear.Theseleaks(bocoran),hesaid,werethe

resultofapoorlyrungovernmentthatneededtoimproveitstransparencyand

accountability(Kompas2013b).DuringhisIndependenceDayaddressinAugust

2013,PrabowoaccusedtheYudhoyonogovernmentofbeingfullofcorruptpeople

whowerebeingcaught‘onebyone’bytheKPKfortheircrimes(Riadi2013).Indeed,

sostrongwashisproclaimedcommitmenttofightingcorruptionthathewaswilling

todieforthecause(Tribunnews2013b).A2014pollreleasedbyIndonesiaSurvey

Center(ICS)foundPrabowo’s‘competence’and‘bravery’concerningcorruptionwere

identifiedasmajorcontributorstohispopularity(Alfiyah2014).Thepoll’scredibility

aside,Prabowolatchedontoitsfindingsinhiscampaignrhetoric.14Later,inMarch

14Anumberofsurveyswereconductedinthelead‐uptotheelection,donebycompetingsurveyinstituteswishingtopredicttheelectoraloutcome.Theveracityandneutralityofsurveyinstitutescameintoquestionsduringthistime,particularlyduetothefactthatpre‐electionsurveyresultswerevastlydifferentfromtheactualoutcome.ThiswasmostevidentinthefailureofPDIPtogainover20percentofvoteswhenithadpolledsowellinthelead‐uptovoting.Thismightbeexplainedonthebasisthatsomeoftheseinstitutesareprivatelyownedandsurveyresultsplayaroleinshapingpublicopinion(notjustviceversa).Plus,

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2014,PrabowodeclaredthatanyGerindramemberaccusedofcorruptionwasa

‘bastard’andthat,whilehecouldnotbecertainthateverymemberofGerindrawas

clean,hewassurehewouldhavenotroubledismissingthemiftheywerefoundtobe

corrupt(Asril2014a).

Billingtheircandidatesasleadersofthefuture,Nasdemcontendedthatits

parliamentarycandidateswouldbe‘forwardthinking,freefromanylegaland

corruptioncharges,andpro‐thepeople’(BeritaTVIndo2012).Nasdemchairperson,

PatriceRioCapella,claimedthepartyhadbeenformedbyconcernedcitizensin

responsetodecreasingpublicregardforpoliticiansandthereforehadaresponsibility

toofferbetterleadership(Republika2013).15Nasdemleadershipalsocriticized

PresidentYudhoyono’sinabilitytocontrolparliamentariansfromhisownparty.For

example,inJune2013SuryaPalohaccusedthegovernmentofshirkingitsanti‐

corruptionresponsibilities,arguingthatthecontinuedpresenceofcorruptparty

membersindicatedapartyleadershipthatwas‘half‐hearted’intheircommitmentto

fightingcorruption(Gustaman2013).InanotherpublicstatementinJune2013,Paloh

statedthatNasdemwouldacceptresponsibilityforanycorruptioninvolvingitsparty

members,whichhedidnotbelievewouldbeaproblembecauseNasdemcandidates

wereclean(Badudu2013;Nasdem2014a;c).16

Hanura’spresidentialteamcandidates,WirantoandHaryTanoe,usedsimilar

rhetoricduringtheirorations.DuringaspeechinBali,March2013,Wirantostressed

thatHanurawasapartyofjustice,including‘justiceagainstcorruptors’andagainst

allthosewhocausedsufferingtothepeople.Wirantoalsorepeatedlycalledformore

severepunishmentstobeimposedforcorruption,sayingthosefoundguiltyshould

notonlybestrippedofallassets,butalsofacethedeathpenalty.17Demandingthe

deathpenaltyforcorruptionnotonlyemphasizedthatHanurawascleanitselfand

hadnothingtofearfromharsherpenaltiesforcorruption,butalsodemonstratedthat

itwassocommittedthatitwaspreparedtosupportthedrasticmeasureofcapital

somesurveyinstituteswereassociatedwithspecificcandidates.Foranindividualaccountofthedifficultiesinrelyingonsamplesandpolls,seeSalim(2014).15Thisstatementwasmadeinresponsetosurveyresultsrevealingthatover52percentofpeopledidnotthinkthatpoliticianssetagoodexampleofethicsandmorality.16Inordertodiscouragecandidatesfromspendingtheirownmoneyoramassingdebt,Nasdemagreedtofundseveralindividualcampaigns.Thepartyclaimedithadbillionsofrupiahsetasidetoassistcandidates,claimingthiswouldboostcampaignaccountability(Badudu2013).17ForexamplesofreferencestothedeathpenaltyforcorruptioninWiranto’sspeeches,seeBeritaSatu(2014a);SoloposTV(2014).

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punishment.Thoughhedidnotadvocateforthedeathpenalty,HaryTanoealso

emphasizedthenegativeimpactofcorruptioninIndonesia.InhisJuly2013

nominationacceptancespeechhestatedthathehadbeendriventoenterpolitics

becauseofalltheconcernshehadforthecountry.Helamentedthat‘theproblemsof

corruption,ruleoflaw,educationandmanyothersocialproblems’hadprevented

Indonesiafromreachingitsfullpotential(Tanoesoedibjo2013).18Astheelection

approached,HaryTanoeemphasizedtheneedtoeradicatecorruption,sayingthat

Indonesia‘hasmanyissuestoface,includingtheproblemofunresolvedcorruption

cases’andthat‘whenwegetridofallcorruptioncasesthiscountrywillhaveastrong

economythatisabletohelpallIndonesians’(Hidayat2014).

Theprevalenceofanti‐corruptionrhetoricmeantthatwhencorruptionaccusations

arose,partyleadershipwereforcedtoact.Forexample,inMarch2014,Wirantowas

forcedtoannouncethatBambangSoeharto,aseniorpartyofficialinLombokand

chairmanofHanura’selectionboard,hadsteppeddowninthelead‐uptothe

electionsfollowingallegationsbytheKPKthathehadbribedmembersofthe

Attorney‐General’sofficeandjudgesinreturnforafavourablecourtrulinginaland

ownershipcaseinwhichhehadapparentlylodgedfalseownershipdocuments(Lubis

2013;Manggiasih2013).Whileapotentialblowtotheparty’simage,thisstatement

wasalsoanopportunitytodemonstrateHanura’szero‐tolerancepolicyagainst

corruptionwithinitsranks.Inannouncingthedismissal,Wirantostressedthatsince

Hanura‘hasalwaysbeencommittedtobeingclean’,hehadnochoicebuttodismiss

Soehartowhileawaitingtheoutcomeofcriminalinvestigationsagainsthim(Berita

Satu2013a).Whilethepublicannouncementwasembarrassingfortheparty,itwas

notthepublicrelationsdisasteritcouldhavebeen,withthedismissalframedas

evidencethatthepartywouldrootoutcorruptionthroughoutIndonesia,starting

fromwithinitsownranks.

Partiesinthemedia

Emergingparties,likeothers,believedthatextensivemediacoveragewasessential

fortheircampaignsandtheyweredeterminedtouseallthepromotional

opportunitiesavailabletothem.Mediacoverageallowedemergingpartiesto

commentoncurrenteventsastheybrokeandtoreinforcetheirsymbol(s)

throughoutthecampaign.AsbothHanuraandNasdemhadmediabaronsinkey

18Inanotherexample,on1October2013,theJakartaGlobenewspaperranafeaturearticleentitled‘HaryTanoeasCorruptionFighter’(Bastian2013),profilinghimfollowingapresentationhemadeattheSingaporeanChamberofCommerceinJakarta.

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leadershippositions,theywereaffordedextraordinaryopportunitiesformedia

coverageinthelead‐uptothe2014elections.Concernsarosethatthesemedia

ownerswouldencouragepartisancoveragebytheirmediaoutlets.Itwasextremely

difficulttoregulatepartisannewscoveragegiventhat,arguably,thiswasnotabreach

ofthelaw.19Assuch,inFebruary2013PresidentYudhoyonoappealedtothemediato

self‐regulateandmaintainbalancedandfairreportingonpartiesinthelead‐uptothe

2014election(Perdani2013c).PalohrejectedaccusationsthatNasdemhadflaunted

campaignregulationsbyusingitsMetroTVconnectiontocampaignbeforetheofficial

period(Iman2014).HaryTanoepledgedthatHanurawouldnotbreachanyelectoral

campaignregulations(BeritaSatu2013b).20WhileGerindrahadnotiestoany

specificnewsoutlet,itreportedlyhadacampaignbudgetofsomeRp.300billionand

spentsignificantamountsonmediaadvertising.21

Havingprivilegedaccesstomediaoutletsdidnotmeanthatpartypromotionwas

unfettered.UndertheKPU’s2013regulationsonpartyadvertisingduringelections

campaigns,politicalcommercialsandopenmeetingswereallowedbetween16March

2014and5April2014butpartieswereprohibitedfromusingmassmedia,printor

electronic,forcampaignpurposesbefore15March2014.22Thisdidnotpreventnews

reportingonactivitiesorpublicstatementsfrompoliticalpartiesduringthisperiod.23

Inaddition,throughout2013,manypartiesairedcommercialsdesignedtofamiliarize

thepublicwithparticularpartymembers,especiallypresidentialcandidates.While

theseadvertisementsviolatedthespiritoftheKPUregulationstheydidnot

technicallybreachthem.

19McCargo(2012:207‐211),inabroadstudyoftheconnectionbetweenmediaandpoliticsinAsia(thoughfocusedonThailand),assertsthattherelationshipbetweenthetwoisoftenmurkyandmediaownershiptendstopromotepartisanreporting.20Hanura’svice‐presidentialcandidate,HaryTanoe,istheowneroftheMNCmediagroupandRCTItelevisionstation,whileNasdemleader,SuryoPaloh,ownsMediaIndonesianewspaperandMetroTV.21ThisbudgetfigurewastheofficialamountreportedbyGerindraintheirmandatoryreportingtotheKPU.However,therewasmuchspeculationthatmostpartiesspentfarmoreontheircampaignsthanreported.DidikSupriyanto,fromtheNGOElectionHouseforDemocracy(RumahPemiluuntukDemokrasi,Perludem)suspectedthatGerindra’sactualspendingwasmuchhigherthanitsreportedpoliticalfundingofRp.300billion(AfriantiandDewi2013).22AcopyofLawNo.01/2013onGuidelinesfortheImplementationofElectionCampaignsbyMembersfortheDPR‐RI,DPDandDPRDcanbefoundattheKPUwebsite(KomisiPemilihanUmum2013).23SuryaPalohevenclaimedthatgaggingmediacoverageandrestrictingadvertisingviolatedfreedomofthepress(Rochmanuddin2014).

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Partyrhetoricinthemedia,bothbeforeandduringtheofficialcampaignperiod,

clearlydrewuponanti‐corruptiondiscourse,withnewpartiesseekingtodrawmedia

attentiontothepoorperformanceofthegovernment.Inthelead‐uptotheelection,

Hanuramadeseveralpublicstatementsaboutthegovernment’sfailuretoprosecute

officialsovertheBankCenturycorruptionscandal,callingforaninvestigationinto

theinvolvementofBoediono,Indonesia’sthenVice‐President.Hanuraspokespersons

accusedthegovernmentofacover‐up.24Atthesametime,Hanurapromotedpolls

conductedinOctober2012andMarch2013thatnamedthemasthe‘cleanest’party

inIndonesia,havingneverbeenimplicatedinanycorruptioncase.25Thisframing

clearlysoughttoportraythegovernmentas‘bad’andHanuraascleanandtherefore

‘good’.Inanotherexample,WirantodeclaredtoRepublikanewspaperthatIndonesia

wasindireneedofnewleadershipthatwastrustworthy,cleanandcorruption‐free—

notingthat,ifcalledupon,hewasreadyforthejob(Sudiaman2013).Laterinthe

campaign,WirantohighlightedmorerecentsurveyswhichagainnamedHanuraas

thenation’scleanestparty.HereinforcedHanura’s‘clean’statuswiththepublic

statement:‘Hanuraisfreeofcorruption;canotherpartiesclaimthesame?’

(Kuswandi2013).

Hanurauseditsmediaprofiletodrawattentionexplicitlytoitsanti‐corruptionstance

severaltimesinthecampaign.First,revelationsthatparliamentariansconvictedof

corruptioncouldstillreceivestatepensionsspurredanangryresponsefromHanura.

Itbecameamediaheadline,withseveralreportspublishedcriticaloftheYudhoyono

administration’sreluctancetoamendlegislationinordertostripcorruptpoliticians

ofparliamentarybenefits(Kurniawan2013;Sihaloho2013b;Yulika2013).In

November2013,Hanura’sparliamentaryfactionheaddeclaredthatany

parliamentarianfoundguiltyofcorruptionshouldlosealltheirentitlements,

includingtheirpensionandaccesstogovernmentfacilities,nomatterwhatpartythey

werefrom(Hanura2013a).Thestatementcoincidedwithinvestigationsintothe

corruptdealingsofDemocraticPartylegislatorAndiMallarangeng,whowasdetained

amonthearlier.Second,HanuraalsoprovokeddebatessurroundingtheKPK’sarrest

24Hanurareleasedapublicstatementonitswebsiteon30November2012entitled‘KPKconfirms2newsuspectsintheCenturycase’.InthisarticleaHanuraspokespersoncondemnedtheKPKfortakingsolongtonamethesesuspectswhentheirinvolvementhadbeenknownsince2010.Thespokespersonalsoclaimedthatthesetwomenmaybetakingthefallfortheirsuperiors,includingVice‐PresidentBoediono,whoarebeingprotectedbythecurrentleadership(Hanura2012).25PollingbytheNationalSurveyInstituteinOctober2012foundHanuratobetheleastcorruptpartyintheDPR(Fadly2012;Giyanto2012).AsimilarsurveyinMarch2013bythesamecompanyfoundthatHanurahadmaintainedthisstanding(Ferri2013;Khaddaf2013).

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ofChiefJusticeoftheConstitutionalCourt,AkilMochtar,inOctober2013.26Ina

statementtothemediainOctober2013,HanuraDeputySecretary‐GeneralforLaw

andHumanRights,Kristiawanto,lambastedotherpoliticalpartiesas‘ambitiousfor

powerandmoney’andsupportingcorruptioninthejudiciary(Wijaya2013).He

urgedthegovernmenttocooperatewiththeKPKtoacceleratetheinvestigationso

thattheperpetratorwouldhavelessopportunitytohideevidenceoftheir

wrongdoing.Third,duringtheofficialcampaignperiodWirantoandHaryTanoe

repeatedlyhighlightedthedelayedimplementationofinfrastructureprojectsdueto

corruption,blamingthelackofdevelopmentforongoingpoverty(Bramantyo2014;

Dzulkarnaen2014).Finally,inMarch2014,HaryTanoealsostatedthatIndonesian

‘regulationsforbudgetmanagementneedtobeclearandtransparent…andwith

clean,firmleadership,corruptioncanbeended’(Waskita2014),implyingthatthe

currentgovernmentwaseithernotcleanorcommittedenoughtocombatcorruption

effectively.

WhileGerindraitselfdidnothavedirectlinkstoanynationalmediaoutlets,its

campaignteamfocusedongettingpartycoverageviamediareportsofstatementsby

seniorfigures.Sensationalstatementsandaccusationswereparticularlyusefulin

attractinggeneralmediaattention.Forexample,GerindraaccusedPresident

YudhoyonoofhidinghisowninvolvementinCenturygateandusinghispositionto

protectmembersofhiscabinetfromcorruptioninvestigations.27InMarch2013,for

example,aGerindraspokespersonclaimedthatYudhoyonohaddeliberatelyshifted

theMinisterofFinance,AgusMartowardojo,tothepositionofGovernoroftheBank

ofIndonesiainanattempttoshieldhimfromtheHambalanginvestigation(Gerindra

2013a;Malau2013).28Astheelectioncampaignintensified,Gerindramedia

statementsbecameincreasinglybelligerenttowardstheYudhoyonoadministration.

Earlyon,inDecember2012,Prabowoclaimedthathispartywastheonlychoicefor

citizenswhowantedaleaderfreefromcorruption(Ratya2012),whileanother

GerindraofficialexplainedthatGerindrawouldgainmorevotesthantheDemocratic

Partyinthe2014electionbecauseofitsreputationforbeingclean.29Later,Gerindra’s

attacksagainstthegovernmentbecameevenmorevociferous.Forexample,inJune

26DetailsoftheAkilMochtarcasecanbefoundinChapterThree.27TheHambalangscandalwasdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.28ItisunclearfromGerindra’sstatementsexactlyhowthismovewould‘shield’him,buttheimplicationappearedtobethatifhewasnolongerMinisterforFinancehewouldcomeunderlessscrutiny.29SpokespersonandGerindraparliamentarymemberMartinHutabarat,quotedinVivanews,20February2013(KusumadewiandYulika2013).

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2013,PrabowoattackedYudhoyonoandhisadministrationinastatement,urging

citizensnottoelectanother‘thief’aspresidentin2014(Gerindra2013b).Following

Yudhoyono’sNationalDayaddresson17August2013,aGerindraspokesperson

criticizedthepresidentforfailingtoprioritizeanti‐corruptionefforts,despiteitbeing

oneofIndonesia’smajorpoliticalchallenges.Hiscommentssuggestedthat

Yudhoyonodidnotmentioncorruptioneitherbecausehedidnotfeelitwas

importantorbecausemembersofhispartywerebeinginvestigated,whereas

Gerindra’splatformclearlyprioritizedcorruptioneradication(Tribunnews2013a).

Gerindraalsoseizedonsurveyresultsthatreflectedpositivelyontheparty,using

themtosupportassertionsoftheparty’ssuperiorityoverrivals.Forexample,in

January2014,itpromotedtheIndonesianSurveyCentre’sfindings,whichindicated

Gerindrapartycadreswereconsidered‘relativelycleanofcorruptioncases’andthat

Prabowowasthepotentialpresidentialcandidatewiththe‘highestcompetencyfor

eradicatingcorruption’(Alfiyah2014).Theseresultswerepublishedbyseveral

mediaoutletsincludingreputableonlinenewswebsiteTempo.co.id.30Gerindraalso

usedthemediatopromoteinternalpoliciesthatfosteredananti‐corruptionsymbol.

ItpublicizeditspolicyofprohibitingGerindraparliamentariansfromundertaking

overseasstudytours.Thepartyarguedthatthesetripsweremerelyjunketsanda

wasteofgovernmentfunding.InDecember2013,PrabowocontendedthatGerindra

wastheonlypartywithsuchapolicy,claimingithadsavedthegovernmentaround

Rp.26billion(Fitrat2013).31PrabowoalsomadeheadlinesinNovember2013when

hecondemnedtheplannedrenovationsofthenationalparliamentbuilding,claiming

thattheyweremerelyanopportunityforskimmingmoneyfromthestate(Waskita

2013b).Thebuildingcompaniesawardedthetender,PTAdhiKaryaandPTDGI

(DutaGrahaIndah),werealsoimplicatedintheHambalangscandal,linkingthe

renovationprojecttodisgracedDemocraticPartypoliticianssuchasNazaruddin,who

wasalreadyinprisonforcorruption.

NasdemalsoattemptedtokeepCenturygateinthespotlight,determinedtomaintain

publicinterestintheunresolvedcase.32Inanotherexample,Nasdemlauncheda

30ThestorywasalsoreportedbyBeritaSatu(2014b),PosKota(2014)andRepublika(2014)amongstothers.31Otherpartymembershavemadesimilarstatements,see(HarianMetro2013;Paparazie2013;Prihandoko2014).32Forexample,inMarch2013,themediareportedthatNasdemwaslobbyingtheKPKtoquestionformerfinanceminister,SriMulyani,abouttheBankCenturybailout,eventhoughshehadalreadyrelocatedtoWashingtonD.C.tobecomeManagingDirectorattheWorldBank

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mediacampaigninDecember2013toencouragecitizenoversightofpollingbooths

andvote‐countinginordertodecreasethelikelihoodofmoneypoliticsinthe

legislativeelections.Arguingthatsmallerpartiesweredisadvantagedinelections

becauselargerpartieshadmoremoneyandinfluence,Nasdemleaderscalledon

voterstoensuretherewereimpartialwitnessesateachpollingstation(Media

Indonesia2013;Novaria2013).Soonafterthelaunchofitsvote‐monitoringappeal,

Nasdemalsohighlightedareportfromthegovernment’sCentreforFinancial

TransactionReportsandAnalysis(PusatPelaporandanAnalisisTransaksiKeuangan,

PPATK),whichfoundanincreasein‘suspicioustransactions’bypoliticalpartiesin

theyearleadinguptotheelection,urgingthattheybefullyinvestigated(Nasdem

2014f).Intheseappeals,Nasdemcapitalizedonitsstatusasapoliticalunderdog,

threatenedbythetreacheryoflarger,moreestablishedparties.Inarguingthatmore

independentoversightwasneeded,Nasdemalsoportrayeditselfastrustworthyand

clean:ithadnothingtohidefromthepublic,sothemorewitnessesandinvestigations

thebetter.

Parties’OnlinePresence

AsHoward(2003:213‐214)argues,technologicalinnovationhasradicallyaltered

powerrelationsinpoliticsascampaignscanbelessexpensivewhilesimultaneously

morereflexive,operatingwithfewerbarrierstoentry.Asopposedto‘modern’forms

ofcampaigningwhichrelyuponthenewsmedia,campaigninginits‘postmodern’

formusestheinternetasitsprimarymeansofpoliticalcommunicationtovoters.33

Digitalmediafacilitatesanewwayforboththeproductionandconsumptionof

politicalinformation(Howard2005:154).Althoughgenerallyamediumfor

mobilizingexistingsupportersratherthanpersuadingundecidedvoters(Vaccari

2008:649),Indonesianpartywebsitesprovideinformationaboutwhattheparty

standsfor,withmostsitescontainingelectroniccopiesofkeydocuments,suchasthe

partymanifestoand‘visionandmission’.Partywebsitesalsoenablethereal‐time

disseminationofpublicstatements.

Allthepoliticalpartiesstudiedinthisthesishadanofficialwebsite,establishedwell

beforethe2014election.However,thefrequencyofpostingsandstatements

(Rimanews2013).NasdemalsopartneredwithLilyWahid,daughterofformerPresidentAbdurrahmanWahid,tosubmitdocumentstotheKPKthat,theyclaimed,shedlightonCenturygate(Irianto2013).However,thecontentofthesedocumentswasnevermadepublic.33Foramorein‐depthdescriptionofwhatconstitutespremodern,modernandpostmodernpoliticalcampaigns,seeHoward(2003).

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increaseddramaticallyinthemonthsleadinguptopollingday,particularlyduring

theofficialcampaignperiodwhenthereweremoreralliesandeventstocover.34

Althoughnotasreflexiveassocialmedia,officialwebsitesprovidedaforumfor

disseminatingpartymessagesintwomainforms.First,partiescirculatedreport‐style

piecesonsurveyresultsorpartyactivities,forexampletheturnoutataparticular

rally,ornewsofapartybranchundertakingcharitablework.35Thesestories

inevitablyportrayedthepartyinapositivelight.

Second,partywebsitespublishedseveralopinionpieces.Someofthesewerewritten

anonymously,appearingasagenericpartystatement.Notonlydidpartiesmount

politicallystrategicattacksonrivalsandcorruptioningeneral,theyalsousedtheir

websitestorestatetheirowncommitmenttotheissue.Forexample,inFebruary

2014,Nasdempostedanarticleentitled‘Nasdemurgesareturntothefightagainst

KKN’,insistingthatNasdemmembersmakethefightagainstcorruptionapriorityin

theirlives,justasNasdemhadcommittedtodoingovernment(Nasdem2014b).On

30March2014,Hanurapostedanarticlenamingitselfasthe‘cleanestandmostanti‐

corruptionparty’inthelegislativeelections(Hanura2014b).Gerindra,too,

continuallyreiterateditsanti‐corruptionstanceonitswebpage.Forinstance,in

February2014itclaimedthat‘fullysupportingtheKPK,Gerindrainstructs

candidatestorefusetheuseofallformsofinducements(gratifikasi)’statingthat

Gerindrabelievesacorruption‐freeelectionwillbe‘awinforallIndonesians’

(Gerindra2014a).Eveniftheaudienceforthesestatementswaslimitedtothose

alreadyinclinedtosupporttheparty,thewebsiteswereashowcaseforkeypolitical

symbols,allowingcitizenstoeasilygainasenseofpartypriorities.

Websitearticlesalsoreinforcedandjustifiedcriticismofpoliticalrivals.Forexample,

Gerindra’sofficialwebsitepostedcommentaryonthecorruptioninvestigationsinto

Atut,whowasinvestigatedforlarge‐scalecorruptionalongwithseveralmembersof

herfamily.Inaddition,everyGerindrapostonthetopicofcorruptionwasfollowed

byashortsummaryofGerindra’sowncommitmenttocorruption.Thesummary

34Basedonauthorobservations,Gerindraseemedthemostprolificpublisherofwebsitecontent,sometimespostingupto6timesperdayonitswebsiteinthemonthsleadinguptotheelection.35Forexample,on14January2014anarticlewaspostedonHanura.comentitledWirantobantukorbanbanjirdiPurworejo(‘WirantoassistsfloodvictimsinPurworejo’)(Hanura2014a);NasdempublishedNasdemPekalonganBantuKorbanBanjir(NasdeminPekalonganHelpsFloodVictims’)on23January2014(Nasdem2014d).Alsopublicizingtheirfloodassistance,GerindrapostedPrabowoBantuKorbanBanjirSoppeng(‘PrabowoassistsFloodVictimsinSoppeng’)on28January2014(Gerindra2014f).

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reads:‘Gerindraisapoliticalpartythathasthevisionofbecomingthepartythat

bringsprosperitytothepeople,socialjustice,andorderbasedonnationalismand

religionwhilepreservingtheUnitaryStateofIndonesia…Gerindraistheonly

politicalpartywithaclearandstructuredprogramenshrinedinthe6pointaction

planfortheTransformationoftheNation.Amongstthenumerousawardsreceivedby

GerindraareawardsfromTransparencyInternationalIndonesiaandICWastheparty

withthebestfinancialtransparency’.36Inonepost,FadliZon,DeputyLeaderof

Gerindra,demandedthatAtutresignimmediatelyandallowanewgovernortobe

appointedforBanten.Zoncriticizedexistinglegislation,whichallowedagovernorto

continuetoruleevenifindictedoncorruptioncharges(Gerindra2014c).37Gerindra

alsopostedanopinionpieceontheHambalangscandal,condemningAnas

Urbaningrum,formerChairmanoftheDemocraticParty,forfailingtoattenda

hearingcalledbytheKPK.Inthestatement,ZonstressedGerindra’sunconditional

supportfortheKPK,whilecontendingthatafailuretocooperatewiththeKPKseta

poorexampleforotherpoliticians(Gerindra2014b).Inanotherexample,on12

March2014thepartyissuedanopinionpieceassertingthatvotersneededto‘punish’

corruptpoliticalpartiesbyrefusingtovoteforthemintheelection(Gerindra2014d).

Nasdemsimilarlyuseditsofficialwebsitetodrawattentiontothecorruptbehaviour

ofitspoliticalrivals.Forexample,inJanuary2014itarguedthatthree‘stars’ofthe

DemocraticParty’santi‐corruptionadvertisementshadbeendishonest,referringto

thenowinfamous‘saynotocorruption’politicaladvertisingcampaignfrom2009

(Nasdem2014e).38Thestoryquotedanexpertinpoliticalcommunicationfromthe

UniversityofIndonesia,TjiptaLesmana,whostatedthattheadvertisementreflected

inconsistenciesbetweentherhetoricandactionsoftheDemocraticParty,whilealso

warningthatthepartywaslikelytosufferpoliticalbacklashintheelectionbecauseof

thishypocrisy.NasdemalsopublishedarticlesoncorruptioncasesinvolvingAnas,

AkilandLuthfi.Althoughthesearticleswereopinionpieces,theywereusuallyframed

asamediaarticlereportingfacts,unlikethoseontheGerindrawebsite.Incases

whereopinionwasincluded,Nasdemtendedtoquoteoutsidersratherthanmembers

ofitsownparty.Incontinuingtopublicizethesecorruptioncases,Nasdemfocused

36AnexamplecanbeseenatGerindra(2014b).37Zonnotedthatgovernmentofficialsareonlytechnicallyrequiredtoresignoncefoundguiltybythejudiciary.38ThisadvertisementwasscreenednationwideduringtheDemocraticParty’s2009legislativecampaign.Itfeaturedrisingstarsoftheparty,aswellasYudhoyono,filmedsaying‘no’tocorruption.

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publicattentiononthelargenumberofscandalslinkedtotheYudhoyono

government.

Whilesomeemergingpartieshadprivilegedaccesstotraditionalmediaoutlets,the

internetandsocialmediaplayedanimportantroleinelectioncampaigning.39Offering

instantandunrestrictedaccesstoofficialpartystatements,aswellasthosemadeby

individuals,socialmedia—inparticularTwitterandFacebook—wasameansof

communicatingdirectlywithvotersvianon‐relationalchannels.40Thesenew

technologies,tosomeextent,reducedtheimportanceofpersonalsocialrelationships,

aswellason‐the‐groundcampaigningbypartymembers,becausemessagescould

diffusedirectlyfromthepartyelitetovoterswithouttheneedforanintermediary.Of

course,moretraditionalformsofcampaigningcontinuedtoexistaselectioneeringin

ruralandregionalareasstillreliedontelevisionandtheprintmedia,aswellaseven

moretraditionalcampaigntechniques,suchasposters,pamphletsand‘whistlestop

tours’,especiallywhentheinternetwasunavailableorunreliable.

Socialmediawasanimportantcomponentofthecampaigns,particularlyinreaching

outtoupperandmiddleclassvoterswhoweretechnologicallysavvy.41Itallowed

partiestodevelopanonline‘trackrecord’oftheiranti‐corruptionrhetoric,

reinforcingtheireffortsinotherspheresandbuildingandentrenchingtheiruseof

anti‐corruptionasapoliticalsymbol.Thiswasparticularlyimportantforemerging

39WhilethereislittleinthewayofpublishedacademicstudiesontheimpactofsocialmediaintheIndonesianelection,thereismuchanecdotalevidenceshowingitplayedakeyrole.Indonesiaisoneofsocialmedia’slargestmarkets.AccordingtofiguresreleasedbyTwitterinJune2014,thereareapproximately20millionactiveTwitterusersinIndonesia(Lukman2014).IndonesiaisalsothefourthlargestcountryforFacebookuse,witharound60.5millionregisteredusersaccordingtoasurveybyresearchfirmeMarketer(Ross2014).ForsomeexamplesofcommentaryontheimportanceofsocialmediaduringIndonesia’selections,seeBelot(2013)andHearne(2014).40MuchofthesocialmediapresencewasalsofragmentedbecauseseveralcandidateshadtheirownFacebookandTwitteraccounts.EnliandSkogerbø(2013)arguethatFacebookandTwitterare,bytheirnature,anindividual‐focusedarena,andthereforearemoreusefulforpersonalizedcampaigning,particularlygiventhateventhoughcandidatesrepresentparticularparties,theyessentiallycampaignforthemselves.However,duringthepresidentialelections,thesocialmediapresencewasmuchmorecoherent,withthecampaignmessagesclearlyemanatingfromthecentraloffice.Formoreacademicstudiesontheroleofsocialmediainelections,seeBennettetal.(2008);Howard(2003);andHoward(2005).41Inastudyontheuseofsocialmediaforthe2014electionsinIndonesia,Yuliatiningtyas(2014)foundthatalthoughtelevisionandnewspaperadvertisingwerestillthemostpopularcampaignstrategies,theuseofsocialmediadidhavesignificantresults.Thisissupportedbyresearchfromothercountries.ForexampleBean(2011:27),researchingtheuseofinternetforpoliticalengagementinAustralia,foundthatasignificantamountofvotersgainedinformationfromtheinternet.InNorway,EnliandSkogerbø(2013)assertthattheuseofsocial‐medialedtoincreasinglypersonalizedcampaignstrategiesandhigherindividualprofilesofcandidates.

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partieswithlittlehistoryofanti‐corruptionactivismtodrawuponinconstructing

theirsymbols.Partieshopedthatconsistentonlinepostsdiscussingtheparty’santi‐

corruptionstancewouldhelpthemto‘own’theissue.Gerindra,whichwas

acknowledgedashavingoneofthemoretech‐savvycampaignsduringtheelection,

wasattheforefrontofthisstrategy(AsiaCalling2013).Gerindrahadanentireoffice

dedicatedtotheparty’ssocialmediamarketing,respondingtomessagesand

tacticallyuploadingpictures,statementsandmedialinksthatportrayedthepartyina

positivelight.42Toalesserextent,HanuraandNasdemalsousedtheinternetto

promotethemselvesandtheiranti‐corruptionideas.

SocialmediaformatssuchasTwitter,FacebookandYouTubewereanotherpopular

meansforcommunicatinginformationtovoters.Oftenechoingorlinkingtowebsite

posts,theseforagavepartiestheopportunitytoprovidereal‐timeinformationto

votersandresponsestoquestionsandcriticisms.Eachofthethreepoliticalparties

hadaprofessionalcommunicationsteamresponsibleforupdatingsocialmedia

content.Theseteamscontrolledtheofficialpartyaccounts,aswellasthoseofthe

mainleaders.Forexample,inHanura,Wirantowouldsometimescontactthe

communicationsteamtoputupacertainmessage,butoftentimestheteamwould

postupdatesonhisbehalf,followingthedirectionsofthecampaignmanager.Linksto

televisioninterviewsandpositivemediaarticlesdominated,buttheteamalsoposted

messagesofgratitudetocitizensfortheirsupportandgenericstatementsaboutthe

politicalprioritiesoftheparty.43

Gerindrawasthemostpopularandprolificacrosssocialmedia,amassingover3

million‘likes’onitsofficialFacebooksiteandover180,000‘followers’onitsofficial

Twitterhandle.44Thepartypostedregularlyinthelead‐uptothelegislativeelections,

linkingtoarticlesaboutGerindraanddisplayingphotosofitsleadersinaction.45The

Twitteraccountalsoprovidedoneoftheonlyup‐to‐datesourcesofinformation

regardingwhenandwherepoliticalrallieswouldbeheld.46Similarly,Nasdem’s

Twitteraccount,withover25,000followers,linkedtonewsarticlesabouttheparty,

42InterviewwithGerindrapartyofficial,28May2013.43InterviewwithHanuramediaadvisor,17February2013.44Thesefigureswerecorrectasof2May2014.45Gerindra’ssocialmediaactivityincreasedafterthelegislativeelectionasPrabowolaunchedhispresidentialcampaign.46TheauthorusedTwittertokeeptrackoftheralliesorganisedbytheDPPduringtheofficialcampaignperiod.

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aswellasprovidingdetailsofrallies.47WhileitdidhaveapresenceonFacebook,this

wasmostlyaforumforuserstopostopinionsaboutNasdemratherthanamedium

forpropagatinginformation.Activityonthepageincreasedduringthepresidential

campaign,inwhichNasdemultimatelybackedJokowi‐JusufKalla.48Hanuraalsohad

activeFacebookandTwitteraccounts,withover500,000and11,000followers

respectively,thoughtheywerenotupdatedasoftenasthoseofGerindraandNasdem.

Hanura’sonlineactivityalsointensifiedintheweeksleadingupto9April2014but

droppedoffaftertheofficialelectoralresultswereannounced.

EmergingpartiesalsomadeuseofYouTubetopostvideosrelatingtotheir

campaigns.YouTubeeffectivelyprovidedafree‐of‐chargeonlinedepositoryforopen‐

accessadvertisingmaterial.Clipspostedbythepartiesduringthelegislativeelection

campaignaimedtoportrayapositivepartyimageoverall,unlikevideoclipspostedin

thelead‐uptothepresidentialelections,whichhadaclearfocusoncandidates.One

exampleoftheuseofviralvideocampaigningwasGerindra’s‘MasGaruda’series,

whichfeaturedasuper‐herolikefiguredressedinaneaglemaskaddressingvarious

politicalissuesincludingcorruptionand‘voteselling’(votersacceptingbribesfrom

candidates).49TheofficialGerindraYouTubechannelcontainedavarietyofother

videosonthetopicofcorruption.Theseincludedtitlessuchas‘Prabowo:whatwill

happenifweallowcorruptiontocontinue?’(GerindraTV2013b),‘Prabowo’s

struggle:anIndonesiafreefromcorruption’(GerindraTV2013a)and‘Prabowo:At

thistimethegovernmentsystemisweak,inefficientandcorrupt’(GerindraTV

2013c).Hanura’sofficialYouTubechanneloperatesunderthename‘Wiranto

Channel’.WhileHanura’schannelhadfewervideosthanthatofGerindra,itfeatured

similarclipsemphasizingHanura’scommitmenttobeingclean.Forexample,itposted

anineminuteillustratedvideoentitled‘YourConscienceEradicatesCorruption’

(Hanura2013b),explainingthelinkbetweencorruptionandtheothersocialills

facingIndonesia.50

47Thesefigureswerecorrectasof2May2014.48Nasdemwasquicktodeclaretheir‘unconditional’supportforthepresidentialcandidateJokowiandhisrunningmate,JusufKalla,releasinganofficialstatementon14May2014(Hutasoit2014).Hanurafollowed,declaringtheirbackingforthepairon17May2014(RuqoyahandAnsyari2014).49ThefullrangeofvideoscanbefoundattheMasGarudaYouTubechannel:https://www.youtube.com/user/MasGaruda.50Nasdemdidnothaveanactive,party‐runchannelonYouTube;however,advertisementsandspeechesbypartyleaderswerepostedbyindividualNasdemmembersanddistrictofficesandwere,therefore,availableonline.MediaoutletsalsopostedsomeinterviewsandnewsstoriesfeaturingNasdemleaders,suchasSuryaPalohandPatriceRioCapella.

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Conclusion

Emergingpartiesacknowledgedtherisksofusingananti‐corruptionsymbolintheir

electioncampaignsbutchosetodosoanyway.Whiletheyidentifiedthesesymbolsas

vote‐gettersthatwerepopularwithvoters,thelackofhesitationinadoptingthem

suggeststhatpartiesonlysuperficiallyconsideredtheserisks,judgingthatanti‐

corruptionsymbolswouldbackfireonlyifthepartylaterbecameembroiledina

corruptionscandal.Underscoringtheneedtoremaincleanandensurethatparty

membersdidnothingtojeopardizetheparty’sreputation,thesepartiessimply

threatenedtoexpelanyoneaccusedofcorruptionandhopedthattheirmembers

wouldupholdpartyvalues.

Assessingthisstrategyintermsofthebenefitsofusingsalientissues,emerging

partiesneeddonothingtopromotetheimportanceofcorruptionasaseriouspolitical

concern.Giventheongoingattentioncorruptionscandalsreceivedbetween2009and

2014,aswellasitslongpoliticalhistorysincecolonialtimes,emergingpartiesdidnot

needtoconvincevotersthatcorruptionwasbad,oreventhatitwasprevalent—both

wereobvioustocitizens.Ascorruptionwasalreadyastockpoliticalplot,issue

priming,whichcanbedifficultandtimeconsuming,wassimplynotrequired.What

partiesdidneedtodowasconvincevotersthattheywerethemostcommittedto

addressingcorruptioninIndonesia,moresothanallotherpoliticalrivals.Assuch,

partieshadtoconstructanarrativethatcasttheminapositivelightwhilevilifying

otherparties.

Tothisend,emergingpartiesusednon‐relationalchannelstohighlightcorruption

casesandthefailingsofthegovernment,hopingtodemonstratethatcurrentpolitical

eliteswereinsincereintheiranti‐corruptionpromises.Moreover,newparties

developedtheirownanti‐corruptionsymbolthroughmasternarrativesaround

corruptionissues.Throughthisnarrative,partiescouldcapitalizeonthemoral

discontentofvotersandcasttheproblemasoneofgoodversusevil.Havingalready

outlinedthefailingsofolderpartiesandtheneedforchangeintheirparty

manifestos,otherpartypublicationsreinforcedtherhetoricofemergingpartiesof

beingcleanerandmorecommittedtobuildingabettercountry,freefromcorruption.

Duringtheelectioncampaign,thesemessageswereaugmentedandfurthermarketed

throughcoverageofpartyleadersinthemediaaswellasthroughmoretraditional

articlesandadvertisingformats.The2014electioncampaignalsosawariseinthe

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useofonlinecommunicationtoreachouttovoters,appealingparticularlytomiddle

andupperclassvoterswithreadyaccesstotheinternet.

Inspiteofthesecampaignefforts,emergingpartiesdidnotachievetheirstated

electoralgoalsanditmayappearthatthecampaignssimplyfailedtoinspirethe

publicsupportthatemergingpartieshadhopedfor.Thisfailure,however,cannotbe

putdowntothefailureofnon‐relationalcampaigning.Whilethesecampaignswere

costlyandintendedtoswayvotersacrossthecountry,theywerefarfromtheonly

inputreceivedbyvoters.Whilecampaignsatthenationallevelweredesignedto

constructtheanti‐corruptionsymbol,thisremaineddifficulttoreconcilewiththe

experiencesofvotersintownsandvillagesacrossthearchipelago.Inorderto

understandthelatter,itisnecessarytoconsiderhowpartysymbolsweresoldto

voterswithinthemulti‐scalarframeworkinwhichcampaignsoperated.An

examinationofhowpartiescampaignednationallycanonlyanswerquestionsabout

whatthepartiesdid,nothowvotersrespondedtopartyattemptstoowntheissueof

anti‐corruption.Asexpensiveorexpansiveasthesenationalpoliticalcampaigns

were,theinfluenceofindividualcandidatesremainedparamountinlegislative

electionsinIndonesia.Thenextchapterexploresthreecasestudiesofindividual

candidatesfromeachoftheemergingpartiesandexamineshowtheypersonally

interpretedandpresentedtheanti‐corruptionsymbolthattheirpartieswereso

desperatetoown.

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ChapterFiveCandidatesonthecampaigntrail

Whilepoliticalpartiesundertakenationalcampaignstoattractsupport,individual

candidatesstillplayanintegralroleincampaigning,bothforthemselvesandtheir

parties.Mostcandidatesstillcampaigninpersonatthelocallevel,hopingtouse

relationalchannelstowinvotes,ratherthansimplyrelyingonthepopularityofthe

partytoensuretheirsuccess.Relyingonpartyreputationisinsufficient,notleast

becausetheopenpartylistsystemmeansthatthepartycandidatethatgarnersthe

mostpersonalvoteswillwinoffice.1Underthissystem,theimportanceofindividual

campaignsisparamount,ascandidatescompetenotonlyagainstthosefromother

parties,butalsoagainstothercandidatesfromtheirownparty.2Giventhatthe

electionsforthenational,provincialanddistrictparliaments,andtheDPD,occur

concurrently,votersareexposedtothenamesandfacesofhundredsofpolitical

hopefuls,placingcandidatesunderadditionalpressuretostandoutfromthecrowd.3

Furthermore,Aspinall(2014a:96‐97)arguesthattheintroductionoftheopenparty

listsystemhasledtoanincreaseinmoneypoliticsasvotersbecomemorepragmatic

inassessingcandidates‐assessingthemontheirabilitytodelivercashorgoods

ratherthantheirpoliticalideals.

Thischapterdrawsonclosestudiesofthreeemergingpartycandidates,representing

Hanura,GerindraandNasdemrespectively.4AllwerecandidatesfortheDPR‐RIand

1AsnotedintheIntroduction,inthepast,politicalpartiesrankedandnumberedtheircandidatesandvoteswereallocatedaccordingtoacandidate’splaceonthepartylist.From2004,voterscouldopttovoteforaparticularindividualandtheremaybeuptotencandidatesfromanygivenpartycontestingaparticularelectorate,correspondingwiththenumberofseatsavailabletobewon(Sherlock2004).2Theinfluenceofthepartylistsystemcanalsobeseenintheshiftofallegiancefromtradeunioncandidatestopartycandidatesinelections(Carawayetal.2014).Previously,candidateswithstrongunionlinkswererecruitedbypoliticalpartiesas‘vote‐getters’andplacedbelowpartycadresinordertoboosttheparty’soverallvote.Someunioncandidatessuspectedthatinthe2009electionpartyofficialsbribedelectoralofficerstoreallocatevotesintendedforthemtocandidateshigheronthepartylist.Forfurtherdiscussionofthisrelationship,seeCarawayandFord(2014).3Mietzner(2013:121)touchesonthisissueinhisdiscussionoftheneedfornationalcandidatestohavegoodrelationswithdistrictbranchesinordertobettercompeteagainstrivalsinelections.However,whilethepointiswidelyaccepted,theinfluenceoftheopenpartylistvotingsystemuponintra‐partycompetitioninIndonesiaisasyetunderstudied.4Informationwasgatheredviainterviewsandparticipantobservationconductedfrom2013–2014.AsdiscussedintheIntroduction,thisparticipantobservationwas‘moderate’.Iattemptedtobalancemyrolesasanoutsider(Ididnotjoinanypoliticalpartyoroffersupportinanyformtoapartyoritscampaign)andinsider(Itravelled,ate,socializedwith,andstayedinthesameaccommodationasmysubjectswhileinthefield,whichallowedmetodevelopa

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werethefirst‐rankedcandidatesonthepartylistintheirelectorate,butdifferedin

termsofgenderandexperience.TheHanuracandidateobservedinEastJavawas

female,whiletheothertwocandidates,inSouthSulawesiandNorthSumatra,were

male.TheGerindracandidateinNorthSumatrawasanincumbentwhiletheother

twowerenot.TheSouthSulawesiNasdemcandidatewasaformerDPR‐RI

parliamentarianwhoresignedin2013afterchangingparties.5

Inthe2014legislativeelections,thesecandidateswereinfluencedtodifferentextents

bythenatureoftheirrelationshipswithcentral,provincialandlocalparty

committees.6NominationsfortheDPR‐RIcandidateswereregisteredandapproved

bythecentralcommittee,whichalsodeterminedthecandidate’srankingontheparty

list.However,ontheground,candidatescampaignedalongsidefellowparliamentary

hopefulsfromthenational,provincialanddistrictlevelsoflegislature.Thisprovided

scopeforbothcooperationandfurthercontestation.Furthermore,acandidate’s

relationshipwiththecentralcommitteeaffectedtheresourcestheyreceived.

Althoughthecasestudiespresentedhereareallbasedontheexperiencesoffirst‐

rankedcandidateswithclosetiestothecentralofficeinJakarta—boththeNasdem

andGerindracandidateswereinvolvedintheirparties’centralcommittees,whilethe

Hanuracandidatehadlongworkedintheaccountsdepartmentoftheparty’scentral

office—theyreceiveddifferentlevelsofcentralsupport.

Candidatesfacedmanydecisionsinoperatingtheirowncampaigns.Withthe

autonomytodecidehowmuchmoneytheyspent,whotheyemployedandhowthey

campaigned,theywereabletodrawuponsymbolschosenbythecentralcommittee,

createtheirownsymbols,or,iftheydecidedthatcampaignsymbolsandrhetoric

werenotuseful,theycouldinsteadchoosetobribevoters.Candidatescouldevenopt

tomobilizeanti‐corruptionsymbolismandpayforvotesiftheywished(Aspinall

leveloftrustwiththemasthecampaignsprogressed).ThroughoutthischapterIhavereferencedthespecificdateofinterviewswhererelevant,butnotwherecommentshavebeenmadethatappliedtothecampaigningeneral.InthesecasesIhaveindicatedwhetherthecommentwasmadeattheoutset,duringthemiddle,ortowardstheendofthecampaigninordertoproviderelevantcontextforstatements.5DPR‐RImembersarevotedinaspartyrepresentatives.Assuch,ifamemberoptstoleavetheirparty,theymustalsoresignfromtheirpositionasamemberofparliament.6InteractionbetweenDPR‐RIcandidatesandtheprovincialbranchofficewasleastevident.Whilecandidatesknewtheprovincialpartyleadership,nonewerecampaigninginprovincialcapitalareasandthereforetheydidnotcooperateorcoordinatecloselywithlocalleaders.However,thesenationalcandidatesdidhaveindividualrelationshipswithspecificprovincialcandidateswithwhomtheycampaignedintandem.

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2014b;MuhajirForthcoming).7Theextenttowhichtheindividualcandidatesstudied

hereusedanti‐corruptionsymbolsdependedmainlyonhowtheywishedtopresent

themselvestothepublic,whichinturnwaslargelydictatedbytheirownhistoryand

idealsandthoseoftheirtargetaudience.Eachcandidatestressedininitialinterviews

theimportanceofcombatingcorruptionandatotalrejectionofmoneypoliticsand

vote‐buying.Byfollowingtheprogressionofthethreecampaignsfromtheir

commencementduringthefirsthalfof2013throughtotheelectionon9April2014,I

wasabletocomparehowcandidateswereinfluencedbyexternalfactors.8The

candidatesrespondeddifferentlytothepressuresplacedonthembytheirpartiesand

voters:theHanuracandidateseeminglyacquiescedtodemandsforgoodsandmoney

andbegantodownplayanti‐corruptionsymbols,theNasdemcandidatebecameeven

moreferventinhisanti‐corruptionandanti‐vote‐buyingrhetoric,whiletheGerindra

candidatemaintainedasteadycourseinhisuseofanti‐corruptionsymbols.

Hanura,EastJava

WhenIfirstmettheHanuracandidateinOctober2012,shewasintheplanning

stagesofherbidforpartynomination.9Asthedaughterofapreviousmemberofthe

MPRselectedbyformerPresidentSuharto,shehadworkedforthepartysinceits

inception,havingknownandrespectedthepartyfounder,Wiranto,forsometime.As

sheexplainedit,herfatherhadbeeninthemilitaryatthesametimeasWirantoand

theywerefriends,andthiswashowshemethim.Herinitialmotivationforjoining

thepartywashersupportforWiranto’spresidentialbid.ShedescribedWirantoas

‘patientandwise’,andbelievedhecouldleadIndonesia‘backontothetrackof

Reformasi’.HersupportforWiranto’spresidentialbidwas,therefore,animportant

motivationforbecomingaHanuracandidate,ratherthanaparticularaffinitywiththe

party’sideologyorplatform.Herimpetusforrunningforofficealsostemmedfrom

herfamilyhistory—shehadobservedandadmiredherfather’sworkwhenhewasa

7Forexample,duringapresentationonvote‐buyinginIndonesia,Aspinall(2014b)relayedananecdoteaboutaPANcandidateinRembang,CentralJava,whosentouttwosetsofenvelopestovoters.Hedistributed12,000envelopestomiddleclassvoterswithananti‐corruptionmessageenclosedand15,000envelopestoothervoterswithmoneyinside.Inanotherexample,Muhajir(Forthcoming:203‐204)discussesthecampaignofsomePKScandidatesinSouthKalimantan,describingthatwhilecandidatesmadeashowofrefusingtobuyvotes,thereweresuspicionsthatsomecandidatesdidsoinspiteofthisrhetoric.8SeetheIntroductionforthedefinitionof‘campaignperiod’adoptedinthisstudy.9Hanuraopenednominationsforcandidatesatthenational(DPR‐RI),provincial(DPRDI)anddistrict(DPRDII)levelsinNovember2012,withfinalcandidatelistssubmittedtotheKPUinMarch2013.TheKPUwasthenresponsibleforensuringthatcandidatesmetallthenecessaryeligibilitycriteriaforparticipationinthe2014election.TheconfirmedlistofapprovedcandidateswasreleasedbytheKPUinMay2013.

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parliamentarian.Thecandidatedid,however,highlightanumberofissuesthatshe

supportedthatwerepartofHanura’simage‐building,includingitsstanceagainst

corruption.ShestatedthatWirantohadidentifiedanti‐corruptionasapartypriority,

bothformaintainingHanura’sintegrityandinpresentingitselfasanalternativeto

thecurrentleadership,whichHanuraclaimedwasthoroughlycorrupt.10

Attheoutsetofthecampaign,theHanuracandidatemadeitclearthatshebelieved

thatbeing‘clean’wasveryimportantfortheparty’scampaign.Shecontendedthat

thefundamentalaimofthefightagainstcorruptionwastoimprovethelivesof

ordinarypeopleandthateradicatingcorruptionwouldalsoalleviatepovertyin

Indonesia.ThecandidateacknowledgedthatitwascrucialthatHanuramaintainits

anti‐corruptionreputationbecausethisdifferentiateditfromtheotherparties.For

her,theanti‐corruptionsymbolprovidedapointofdifference,andthepartywouldbe

atriskifthissymbolwasco‐optedbycandidateswhothenengagedincorruptionand

briberytowinseats.Becauseanti‐corruptionsymbolismgavethepartyacrucial

advantage,ensuringthatHanura’sreputationwasupheldbypartymembersand

politicalaspirantswasapartypriority.TheHanuracandidatewasadamantthatshe

wasagainstbuyingvotesandusingbribes.11

However,whilethecandidatefeltthatcombatingcorruptionwasbothaparty

priorityandusefulforherowncampaign,shewasapprehensiveaboutexplicitly

usingtheterm‘anti‐corruption’.DuringmyfirstsitevisittoherelectorateinMarch

2013,shediscussedconcernsabouttheterminologyusedinhercampaignmaterials

atsomelength.Someofhercampaignteamwereworriedaboutusingtheterm‘anti‐

corruption’,andsuggestedthatthecandidateinsteadusetheword‘clean’—theterm

usedintheparty’sofficialslogan.Presentingherselfas‘clean’,ratherthanasbeing

‘anti‐corruption’,waspreferableasitwasseenasamoreencompassingterm.Itcould

refertoanumberofhercharacteristics,suchascomingfromamodestbackground,

beinghonestandhard‐working.Thecandidateandtheteamagreedthattheterm

10ThisstatementwasreiteratedinanumberofpublicpresentationsmadebyWiranto.Forexample,inhisinitialspeechespresentedinearly2013,therewererepeatedreferencestoHanurabeingthe‘cleanest’partyinIndonesia(2013a;2013b).ThisclaimwasframedaslegitimizingHanura’sclaimtopower,centringonitsdistinctionfromthecurrentleadership,whichitclaimedwascorruptanduntrustworthy—aclaimthatWirantofeltHanuracouldaffordtomakegiventhatitremainedinoppositionthroughoutthe2009‐2014termandhadnoparliamentariansaccusedofcorruptionduringthisperiod.11Itwaspossibletospeculate,though,thatshetookthisstancebecauseshefeltshehadlessfundingtodrawonthanseveralofhercompetitors.Evenifshehadwantedtofloutpartysymbolsandgivemoneyforvotes,shesimplycouldnotcompetewithwealthiercandidates.

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‘anti‐corruption’hadbeentaintedbyitsuseinthe2009election,whenthe

DemocraticPartyused‘saynotocorruption!’asitsnationalcampaignslogan.The

Hanuracandidatewantedtoavoidanyparallelsbetweenthetwocampaigns,given

thesubsequentfateoftheDemocrats.

Duringtheearlystagesofcampaignplanning,theHanuracandidateoftentalkedof

herintentiontoconductacleancampaign,regardlessofthesedebatesover

terminologyandtheidentifiedrisksofusingsuchsymbolism.Shehadrunforofficein

2009andthereforeknewthatshelackedthecapitaltoeffectivelyusevote‐buyingto

winoffice.Thecandidatealsofeltthatvote‐buyingwasnotonlyexpensive,buthadan

uncertainreturn.Therewasnomeansforensuringthatpeopleactuallyvotedasthey

saidtheywouldandnorecourseifvoterstookthemoneybutvotedforsomeoneelse.

Instead,sheplannedtofocusuponbuildingapositiveimageassomeonecommitted

topublicwelfarewhilesupplementinghercampaignrhetoricwith‘charitableworks’,

suchaspurchasingnewequipmentforthecommunitymosque,donatingtolocal

schools,andbankrollingentertainmentevents.12Inadditiontogivingmoneytosuch

causes,thecandidateoftensubsidizedthecostsoffood,tea,cigarettesandtransport

forvillagerswhohadtravelledtoattendmeetings(whichthecandidateoften

referredtobytheArabic‐derivedtermsilaturrahmi,meaninggroupdiscussionsthat

areintendedtobuildfraternityoraffectionforapersonoranidea).Paymentswere

sometimesinkind,andsometimesinsmallamountsofcashthat(atleastintheory)

compensatedpeoplefortheirtimeandeffortinattending.

TheHanuracandidatedidnotconsidersmallgiftsandothergratuitiestobeaformof

moneypolitics.13Thesegiftsweresecondarytohermainaimofgeneratingsupport

bymeetingvoterspersonally,andherprimarycampaignstrategyrevolvedaround

villagevisits.Whiletimeconsuming,thisapproachcircumventedthebanonmass

ralliesoutsidetheofficialcampaignperiod.TheHanuracandidatestatedthatshewas

followingJokowi’sstrategyofblusukan,whichinvolvedwalkingthroughvillagesand

12ObservationofconversationsbetweentheHanuracandidate,herstaffandotherpartymembersshowedthatthiscandidatehadpurchasednewsoundsystemsforlocalmosques,refurbishedthewashingareaatlocalmosques,providedfemalestudentsatalocalIslamicboardingschool(pesantren)withnewheadscarves,rancolouring‐incompetitionsatlocalprimaryschoolswithsmallcashprizesforwinners,purchasednewpercussioninstrumentsforalocalmartialartsgroupandfundedashadowpuppet(wayang)performance.13Aspinall(2014a:104)foundthattherewereanumberofcommonlydistributedgiftsduringcampaigns,rangingfromtokensbearingthepartylogoandthecandidate’spicture,religiousgiftssuchasprayermatsorheadscarvestobasicfoodstuffs,whichwerecommonlydeliveredbythecandidate’scampaignteamratherthanthecandidatesthemselves.

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talkingtopeopleintheirownenvironments,andhadprovenpopularduringhis

tenureasbothmayorofSoloandgovernorofJakarta.TheHanuracandidateargued

that,asmanyJavanesevillagersstilldidnotuseTwitterorFacebook,campaigning

throughsocialmediawasbetterdirectedtowardsurbanvoters.Eventelevisionand

printmediacampaigns,shecontended,werenotguaranteedtoreachmanyofthe

ruralconstituentsandsocouldbeawasteofmoney.Shethereforeoptedtovisither

potentialconstituentswhereshecouldpresentherself,answerquestionsandhand

outtrinkets,t‐shirtsorfood.

Thesevisits,whichwereusuallysetupinadvancebyhercampaignteam(often

referredtoinIndonesiaastimsukses),variedinnature.14Sometimestheywerebrief

andconfinedtomeetingswithvillageleadersandothertimestheyweregatherings

attendedbyupto50people.TheHanuracandidatewouldusuallyintroduceherself,

highlightherlinkstotheareaandthefactthatshehadfamilythere,anddiscussher

educationalbackground(sheheldaMaster’sDegreeandtaughtatauniversityin

Jakarta).Shealsoattemptedtoengagewithvillagersinordertodiscovertheir

‘aspirations’(aspirasi),hopingtobuildtrustwithvillagersbyseeminginterestedin

andempathetictowardstheirproblems.Thisstrategymetwithdifferentdegreesof

success.Sometimestherewasdialoguebetweenthecandidateandtheattendees,but

onotheroccasionsattendeeswereunresponsive.Shewassometimesmetwith

requestsformoneyorservicestothevillage.Shewasdisappointedbythese

experiences.Onotheroccasionsshesuspectedthattheunresponsivenesswasdueto

thefactthatthevillagehadalreadybeen‘bought’byanothercandidateandwas

irritatedwithhercampaignteamforsettingupapointlessmeeting.

Inspiteofherfrustrations,theHanuracandidatecontinuedtovisitvillagesandmeet

withvotersintheseforum‐styleevents.Sometimesshewenttofivevillagesinone

day,focusingparticularlyonthoseinmoreremoteareasthatwereunlikelytohave

beenvisitedbyotherparliamentaryhopefuls.Herpersonalphilosophywasbasedon

anoldIndonesiansaying:‘Ifyoudon’tknowthem,youcan’tlovethem’.Inmyearliest

interviewwithher,shearguedthatapoliticalpartycouldnotexpectsupportwithout

beingtrusted,orhavinga‘mandate’(amanat)fromvoters.Talkingtopeoplein

personwas,tohermind,thebestwaytobuildthistrust.Shealsoidentifiedthisasa

pointofdifferencebetweenHanuraandotherparties—Hanuracandidateswere

14‘Timsukses’hasalsobeentranslatedliterallyas‘campaignteam’intheworkofscholarssuchasAspinall(2014c:546)andMietzner(2013).

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willingtogotovillagesandengagewithordinaryvoters,unlikeofficialsfromother

partieswhoweretoo‘arrogant’(sombong)todoso.

TheHanuracandidatefocusedparticularlyongainingaccesstocommunitiesthrough

twowomen’sgroups:theFamilyWelfareDevelopment(PembinaanKesejahteraan

Keluarga,PKK),alocallybasedmothers’associationwhichwasestablishedduringthe

Suhartoperiodandusuallyrunbythewifeofthevillagehead,15andJemaahTalil,an

Islamicdevotionalgroupwherewomengathertosing/recitepassagesfromthe

Qur’an.Sheconcentratedonwomenfortworeasons.First,thecandidatebelieved

thatwomenoftenfeelignoredbyparliamentarycandidatesand,therefore,were

morelikelytovaluesomeoneshowinganinterestintheirconcerns.Second,the

candidatesaidthatshesometimesfoundmenirritatingandcondescending.During

hermeetingswithwomen’sgroups,shewouldemphasize‘women’sspirit’(semangat

perempuan)asareasonforvotingforher,arguingthatwomenunderstandeach

other’sproblemsandafemalecandidatewasmorelikelytosympathizewiththeir

priorities.

Intheearlystagesofcampaigning,theHanuracandidateusedmeetingswithcitizens

toexpressHanura’spartylineoncorruptionandvote‐buying—namely,thatasking

formoneypromotes‘low‐qualityleadership’(pemimpinyangkurangberkualitas).

Thisargumentwasbasedontwocontentions.First,ifacandidatehaspaidmoneyto

gaintheirpositionthentheywillhavespentlargeamountsofmoneyduringthe

campaign,whichwillthenneedtoberecoupedonceinoffice.Second,ifacandidate

haspaidvotersfortheirpositionthentheyhavenoresponsibilitytovotersonce

electedbecausevotershavealreadybeencompensated.Thisideawasadvancedto

discouragecitizensfromaskingfororexpectingmoneyinreturnforvotes.Italso

echoedargumentsusedbytheparty’scentralleadership,playingupontheparty’s

cleanreputationanditspurporteddesiretoremainfreefromcorruption.Shealso

usedthisargumenttoemphasizetheirloyaltytovoters—thefactthatshedidnot

offermoneywasademonstrationofherlong‐termcommitmentbecausesheintended

todeliverbenefitstocitizensbydoingagoodjobasaparliamentarian.16

15FormoreonthehistoryandworkofPKK,seeMarcoes(2002).16Forexample,shehaddeclaredtoanumberofvillagersduringdifferentmeetingsthat‘Youshouldn’tsellyourselvessocheaply’andhadsuggestedthattheydeserved‘morethanRp.20,000orRp.50,000foryourvotes’.

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ThecandidatechosetoadoptHanura’sofficialslogan—clean,caring,decisive(bersih,

peduli,tegas)—asherownsloganduringthecampaign.Thiswassignificant,because

Hanuracandidatesweregivenautonomyindesigningallaspectsoftheircampaigns,

includingalltheirpublicitymaterials.Therewasnodirectivefromthecentralparty

officerequiringtheuseofaparticularsloganorformat.Assuch,candidateshad

controlovertheimagetheywishedtoportray.Thisparticularcandidategavea

numberofreasonsforchoosingtodirectlyalignherselfwithnationalpartysymbols.

First,shebelievedthatinusingtheofficialpartysloganandpicturesofWirantoon

someofhermoreprominentadvertisements(suchaslargebillboards);shewas

aligningherselfascloselyaspossiblewiththevaluesofthepartyandthefigureof

Wirantohimself.Shesawthisasbeingamajordraw‐card,explainingthatoneofthe

mainreasonswhypeoplewouldchooseHanurawasbecausetheysupported

Wiranto’spresidentialbid.Second,asacandidatewhowasneitherindependently

wealthynorwishingtogointodebt,shefelttheargumentthatbuyingvotes

promotedapoorlevelofparliamentaryrepresentationwasoneshecouldusetoher

advantage.Third,shealsomentionedthatitwasaclaimthatcouldbesupported,

citingasurveyundertakeninMarch2013thatnamedHanurathecleanestpolitical

partyinIndonesia.17

Despiteherinitialrejectionofvote‐buyingasastrategy,theHanuracandidatecame

underincreasingpressuretopaycashtovillagersinreturnfortheirvotesasthe

electionneared.Thispressurecamechieflyfrommembersofhercampaignteam.

Respondingtointernalpollingdoneinthesecondhalfof2013thatsuggestedshe

wouldnotsecuresufficientvotesforelection,somewithinhercampaignteamurged

theuseofcashpayments,especiallytovillageheadsorrespectedfigures(tokoh)who

couldpromiseanumberofvotesinreturnforthemoney.18Manymembersofher

campaignteamwhohadworkedonvariousotherelections,eitherthenational

electionin2009orotherlocalelections,arguedthatmoneywastheonlywayto

securevotesinthearea.Becausevote‐buyingwassuchaprominentstrategyinEast

Java,someteammemberswereconcernedthatifsherefusedtooffercashthenshe

hadnochanceofsuccessasitwasassumedthatseveralrivalcandidateswoulddoso.

17SeeChapterThreeforsurveydetails.18Peoplecapableofrallyingvotesaresometimesreferredtoas‘brokers’.Thecampaignteamisusuallycomprisedofatleastsomevotebrokers,peopleofinfluencewhoclaimtobeabletopersuadeotherstovoteforaparticularcandidate.Thephenomenonofusingbrokerswaswidespreadin2014andbrokerswieldedsignificantinfluenceovercampaignsandtheirsuccessfuloutcomes(Aspinall2014c).

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Asoneteammemberputit,‘Ithelpsifpeoplelikeyou…Butit’shard[towin]if

someoneelseisofferingthemmoney’.

ThesesuggestionsconcernedtheHanuracandidate,whowastornbetweenherdesire

tomaintainherprinciplesandkeephercampaignbudgettoaminimumandhowbest

towin.Tofurthercomplicatematters,notallcampaignteammembersagreedthat

usingcashwasagoodidea.Mosthadnomoralobjectionstovote‐buying;rather,they

didnotbelieveitwouldbeaneffectivestrategyforher.Theyalsoreasonedthatshe

lackedthelocaltiesneededtowinusingmoney,asshewasanoutsiderfromJakarta.

Inshort,evenifshechosetoengageinvote‐buying,shecouldnotbecertainthat

thoseshepaidwouldactuallyvoteforher.Moreover,shehadalreadytoldvoters

duringmeetingsthataskingformoneyreflectedpoorlyonthemandwouldleadto

theelectionofleaderswhodidnotreallycareabouttheirneeds.Thesediscussions

highlightedatensionwithinhercampaignthatworsenedastheelectiondrewnearer.

WhiletheHanuracandidatefocusedherenergyonblusukan,shealsoadoptedother

commoncampaignstrategies.InAugust2013,afewmonthsintocampaigning,a

posko—akintoacampaignofficewherecitizenscancomeandtalktothecandidateor

theirteam—wassetup.Massrallieswereusedlaterduringtheofficialcampaign

period.Laterthatyear,shepurchasedspaceinsomelocalmediaoutletsand

organizedtohavepositivebiographicalpiecesaboutherpublished.19Thecandidate

lackedconnectionswithinthelocalmediaandfoundthatrivalcandidates,even

withinherownparty,hadmadedealswithcertainmediaoutletsthatmadeitdifficult

forhertoadvertiseinthem.Consequently,themediaoutletsshepaidweresmalland

hadlowcirculations.Atthebeginningof2014,theHanuracandidatealsosetup

FacebookandTwitteraccounts.Thoughshehadpreviouslystatedthatshewaswary

ofusingsocialmediainhercampaign,shenowsaidthatcandidateshadbeen

encouragedbythecentralofficetomakeuseoftheinternet,particularlysincemany

serviceswerefree.TheHanuracandidatewasnotespeciallytechnologicallysavvy,so

mostoftheFacebookupdates,tweetsandphotospostedwerehandledbyherstaff.

ThereweresomeoccasionswhentheHanuracandidatewasquizzeddirectlyby

audiencemembersaboutherowndedicationtoremainingcorruption‐free.Onone

19Thesewerefundedbytheparty.Thoughshehadbeenreluctanttopayformediastoriesaboutherself,shehadreceivedmoneyfromthecentralofficespecificallytodoso.However,thisparticularstrategywasnotoverlysuccessful.Whileonearticlewenttoprint,anotherdidnot,beingpurchasedinamagazinethatsubsequentlywentbankruptbeforetheelection.

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suchoccasion,shewastoldnevertobecomelikeAngelinaSondakh,apoliticianwho

becameinfamousforherinvolvementincorruptionandeventuallyimprisoned,an

admonitionshereadilyagreedto.Othertimes,villagersrequestedpaymentsor

favours,implyingtheywerenecessaryforhertowintheirvotes.Veiledrequestsfora

‘contribution’(kontribusi)tothevillagewerenotunusualandearlyinhercampaign

theHanuracandidatewouldtrytoexplainwhyshecouldnotprovideanything.

Shearguedthatthiscouldbeseenasatypeofvote‐buyingandevenifshecould

affordit,itwouldstillbewrong.Forexample,duringonemeetinginMarch2014she

wasaskedtocontributemoneytoaPKKtostartanewtrainingprogram.Sherefused,

sayingthatunfortunatelyshecouldnotdothisbecauseshewasafraidpeoplewould

thinkshewasbuyingtheirvotes.Latersheexpressedannoyanceattherequestasshe

believedthatthevillagewasfairlywelloffandthewomendidnotreallyneedtraining

andwerejustfishingformoney.Onyetanotheroccasion,shewasaskedwhather

contributiontothevillagewouldbe.20Thecandidaterespondedbyassertingthat

candidateswhospendlotsofmoneyontheircampaignsandhavetogetloanswill

havetoresorttocorruptiontopaytheirdebtsbecausethesalariesof

parliamentariansarenotthatbig.Thisstatementwasinitiallywelcomedbythe

women’sgroupbeingaddressed,butthediscussionchangedcoursewhenadifferent

womanaskedifthecandidatemightconsiderdonatingmoneysotheycouldpurchase

newuniforms.Thisrequestwasdeflectedwiththerationalethatshewasaclean,

simplecandidatewhodidnothavelotsofmoneylikesomeofherrivalsandshecould

notaffordtocontributemuchmoney.Furthermore,shearguedthatifshebought

uniformsforonegroup,shewouldhavetobuythemforallgroups.Inmakingthis

statement,sheusedtheopportunitytohighlightthefactthatshewasnotacorrupt

candidate,andalsothatshehadasenseoffairness.However,afterleavingthe

meeting,sheexpressedirritationattherequestandsaidthatshefeltthatthewomen

wouldnotvoteforherbecausetheyhadnotreceivedanythingfromher.

Aftercampaigningforseveralmonths,thecandidatehadbecomecynicalaboutthe

motivesofvoters.Havingbeenrepeatedlyaskedforcontributions,bothsubtlyand

overtly,thecandidatebegantoexpressasenseofhopelessnessabouthercampaign

towardstheendof2013.Shebelievedthatpresentingherselfasacleanandhonest

candidatewasnotappealingtovotersbecausetheyweremoreinterestedinthe

materialbenefitsofferedbycandidates.Subsequently,theHanuracandidatereferred

20Thecandidateadoptedachidingtoneduringthisinteractionon6June2013butagreedtocontributeRp.500,000tothelocalmosque.

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tothetopicofcorruptionlessandlessfrequently.Ifshewasaskedaboutitbya

villagershewouldmethodicallyrehashHanura’s‘tagline’(whichwasalsoherown)of

being‘clean,caringanddecisive’.However,evenwhengiventheopportunitytotalk

inmoredepthaboutbeing‘clean’,thecandidatedidnotchoosetofocusonthis

symbol.Theexplanationshegaveinvillagesaboutbeing‘clean’wasas

straightforwardassaying:‘ourpartywantshonestcandidatesandwon’ttolerate

memberswhoarenothonest…thatliketo“playgames”(main‐main)’.Inadifferent

villagesheexplainedbeing‘clean’asmeaning‘wedon’thavecandidateswhoare…

likethat(sepertigitu)’,butprovidednoelaboration.21Herdiscussionofthepartyand

itsstanceagainstcorruptionbecameincreasinglyvagueasherinterestinpromoting

herselfasbeingalignedwithHanura’santi‐corruptionsymboldiminished.

Astheelectionapproached,theHanuracandidate’sreferencestocorruption

diminishedsignificantly.Bythetimeoftheofficialcampaignperiod,shehad

developedaformulaicapproachtomeetingsthatofteninvolvedasimilar,rehearsed

introductionwhichincludednomentionofanyanti‐corruptionstance,eitherasan

individualorfromapartyperspective.EvenindiscussingHanura,herfocuswasupon

theparty’sleaderratherthanitsgoalsorpolicies.Bythisstage,theHanuracandidate

feltthatrhetoricwouldnotpersuadevotersandthemostimportantaspectofher

meetingswasprovidinginstructionsonhowtovote,includingwherehernamewas

ontheballotpaperandhowtoavoidcastinganinvalidvote.Sheevendevelopedatip

tohelpvotersrememberher.Sinceshewasthefirst‐rankedcandidateforHanura,

shesuggestedthatvotersthinkoftheshapeofanail,whichIndonesianvotersuseto

piercetheirballotpapers,asresemblinganumber‘1’toremindthemthatshewas

the‘number1’candidate.

Whileherfocusonanti‐corruptionsymbolsdiminishedoverthecourseofthe

campaign,thecandidate’sstrategicdonationstomosques,schoolandartsgroups,as

wellasfundingvillageworks,increased.TheHanuracandidatebecameless

concernedaboutupholdinga‘clean’symbolandincreasedcontributions,eventhough

shewasuncomfortableaboutthem.Usually,membersofhercampaignteamwould

scoutareastofindinstitutionsorschoolsthatcouldbenefitfromadditionalfundsand

thennegotiatewiththeleadersoftheareastoarrangeadonationinreturnfor

electoralsupport.Alternatively,theywouldapproachlocalfiguresandaskthemhow

21Thesecommentswerebothmadeonthesameday(11March2014)whenthecandidatevisitedfourdifferentvillages.

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thecandidatecouldhelpthevillage—thatis,towhatpurposecouldshedonate

money.22Thecandidate’sdiscomfortwiththesetransactionsreflectedthefactthat

shesawthisasagreyareaandwasworriedabouthowheractionswouldbe

perceivedbyonlookers.Whiledonationscouldbejustifiedasactsofcharity,ifthey

weregivenwiththeintentiontoinfluencevoting,thenthiswas,technically,illegal.

Thecandidatewaswaryofherbudgetlimitations,andsoughttostrategicallydonate

formaximumreturn.Abigbudget,sheasserted,providedadistinctadvantagewhen

campaigningbecauseitcouldfundseveraldifferentprojectsandifonegroupdidnot

voteforyou,othergroupswould.Shecouldnotafforddonationsthatdidnotresultin

votes.OnedonationmadebytheHanuracandidatewastoalocaltraditionalmartial

arts(pencaksilat)groupwhoperformedatpublicevents.Therationalebehindthis

donationwasthatitwouldgivehertiestothegroup,enablinghertoaskthemto

performatherfunctionswhentheofficialcampaignperiodbegan.However,other

donationsappearedtobelesssuccessful.Shemadeasubstantialdonationtoan

Islamicboardingschool(pesantren).However,duringalatermeetingwiththe

school’sleader,theHanuracandidatewasdisappointedtofindthattheschooland

villagewereflyingbannersandflagsfromanotherpoliticalparty.Thepreacher

explainedthatthevillagechiefhadafamilymembercompetingintheelectionand

therewasnothinghecoulddoaboutthebanners.Afterthemeeting,thecandidate

expressedherfrustrationthatherdonationappearednottohavegarneredthe

influenceshehadhopedforandworriedthatshehadwastedhercampaignfunds.On

anotheroccasion,theHanuracandidateagreedtouseherownmoneytofinancethe

provisionofanewpipingsystemforavillageinreturnfortheirsupport.Atthetime,

thecandidatejustifiedtheupfrontdonationasagoodstrategybecausepeoplewere

usedtounfulfilledpromisesfrompoliticians.

Anothercommoncampaignstrategywastoteamupwithothercandidatesfromthe

samepartywhowerecompetingatotherparliamentarylevels.Thisisoftenreferred

tousingtheEnglishword‘tandem’,meaningtocampaigntogether,sometimeswith

namesappearingonthesamepostersorbanners,andsharingthecostofrallies.In

thisEastJavaelectorate,therehadbeenmuchin‐fightingbetweenlocalcandidates,

precipitatedbycontestednominationsandrankingsonthepartylist.TheHanura

candidateherselfhaddisplacedasittingparliamentarian,whowasmovedtoanother

22Thelanguageusedwhendiscussingthistopicwaseuphemistic.Nooneeverreferredtothisprocessas‘vote‐buying’.Thepaymentswerealwaysreferredtovaguelyas‘contributions’or‘donations’(donasi).

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electorate.Thishadcausedconsternationandfactionalism,astheincumbenthad

severalfamilymembersinthepartywhodisagreedwiththepartylistrankings.This

frictionalienatedthecandidatefromsomefactionswithintheparty.However,asthe

electiondatedrewcloseritbecameevidentthatHanurawaspollingpoorlyandthat

cooperationwasneededifthepartywastowinanyseatsatall.Thispromptedthe

HanuracandidatetoreachouttocandidatesattheDPRDII(district)level.She

alreadyhadsometandemagreementswithothercandidatesinplace,buttheywere

lowlyrankedandpoorlyfunded.Thecandidateneededtofindamorelucrative

tandemarrangementthroughwhichtobetterpromoteherselfduringthecruciallast

weeksofcampaigning.Sheenteredintoanarrangementwithanincumbentwho

camefromawealthyfamilyandhadahighprofileinherdistrict.Throughthis

arrangementshewasabletopiggybackonabetter‐fundedcampaign,butwasalso

expectedtocontributemoremoneythanshewouldnormallyspend.Theeventsof

hertandempartnersweremuchmorelavishthanherowneventshadbeen,andshe

wasobligedtocontributetothecostofmarchingbands,dancers,singersandother

entertainment,aswellastheusualpaymentstoattendeesforfoodandtravelcosts.

Shewasalsorequiredtopurchaseseveralmotorcyclesandarefrigeratorrequested

as‘doorprizes’attheirsharedrallies.

Asthecampaigndrewtoaclose,theHanuracandidateadmittedthatherstrategies

hadchangedovertimeandthatheremphasisonbeingcleanhaddiminished.She

gaveseveralreasonsforthis.First,shehadfoundthatcorruptionwasan

uncomfortableissuetodiscusspublicly(nggakenakdibahas).Everybodyknewwhat

corruptionwasandtherewasnopointinbringingitup—peoplecouldseethatshe

wasnotcorruptsimplybecauseshedidnotseektobuytheirvotes.Second,itwasan

awkwardsubjectbecauseshebelievedmostpeopleactuallydidwanttobebribed.

Shefearedalienatingthembytalkingaboutanti‐corruptionissuesormoneypolitics,

makingthemfeelguiltyandherunpopular.Third,peoplethoughtallpoliticianswere

corruptinsomewayandfoundithardtobelievethatcandidatesgenuinelycared

aboutfightingcorruption.Inotherwords,shebelievedthattalkingaboutcorruption

alienatedvotersandmadeherseemlikeahypocrite.Asaconsequence,anti‐

corruptionsymbolismbecamesomethingofadefensivetoolfortheHanura

candidate;adiscourseusedtocounterrequestsformoneyorgoodsthatshewasnot

willingtogive.Shelamentedinanobservationthatunderscoredthecynicismwith

whichmanyviewtheelectoralprocess,‘evenablindpersonherecanstillread

money’.

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Ultimately,theHanuracandidatepulledbackfromusinganti‐corruptionsymbolism

inhercampaignbecauseshefeltthatvotersdidnotreallyconnectwiththeissue.

Duringapost‐electioninterviewinApril2014,sheobservedthat:‘anti‐corruption

doesn’tmeananythingtothosepeople...theydon’tcare’.Sheaddedthatpartiestried

theirbesttoavoidbeingcorrupt,butitwasjustan‘intellectualexercise’because

thereisamarketforvotesandvotersdemandmoney.Expectationsofbeingpaidin

exchangeforvotesweretoostronginEastJavaandtoohardtofight.Contemplating

herexperiences,theHanuracandidatedescribedthecampaignas‘unfair’(nggakfair)

and‘amess’(kacau)becauseitwasallabout‘playinggames’(main‐mainan):

Everyelectionislikeaparty(pesta).Peoplewantapresent.Thepeoplewho

takethemoney,theyaren’ttakinganyrisks…who’sgoingtoarrestthem?It’s

thepeoplewhogivethemoneywhogetblamed…thecandidates.

ShethoughtIndonesiawasnotreadyforacleanelection,sinceevensomeofherown

staffurgedhertobuyvotesontheeveoftheelection(ngebom).23Reflectingonher

loss,theHanuracandidateopinedthatherelectoratedidnotsupportclean

candidatesandthattheelectionhadreinforcedmoneypolitics.Commentingonthe

issueingeneralterms,sheobserved:

Innewspaperstherearealwayscommentsaboutelitespaying[forvotes],but

theyarequietabouttheothersideofthestory.Nooneeverwritesaboutwhat

peopledemandfromcandidates.Butit’sthetruth…whywouldanybodypay

[forvotes]iftheydidn’thaveto?

Theexperiencewasabitteroneforthecandidate.Shefeltforcedtogoagainsther

ownvaluesinthecampaignandwasstillunsuccessfulinherbidforparliament.Her

cynicismtowardstheelectoralprocessunderscoredheroverallfrustrationthatvote‐

buyingstillplayedacrucialroleintheelection,andthatcandidateswithlargecoffers

hadadistinctadvantage.

23Oneofthecandidate’sstaffreportedthattheyhadbeenaskedtowithdrawRp.200millionon8April2014(thedaybeforetheelection)anddistributeittomembersofthecandidate’scampaignteam(personalcommunication,Hanuracampaignteamstaffer,8March2014).Thissuggeststhatthecandidatemayhaverenegedonherresolvenottobuyvoteswithcash.

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Nasdem,SouthSulawesi

MyfirstmeetingwiththeNasdemcandidatetookplaceinMay2013.Asnotedearlier,

hehadjoinedNasdemearlierthatyearafterresigningfromparliament,wherehehad

representedadifferentpoliticalparty.Thecandidatefeltheneededtoexplainthis

movebecauseallegationsofpoliticiansswitchingpartiesbecausetheythinkitwill

improvetheirchanceofsuccessarecommoninIndonesiaandhedidnotwanttobe

accusedofactingoutofself‐interest.Suchmovesareoftencriticizedasbeingself‐

servinganddevoidofideologicalconviction.Hestressedthatthedecisionhadbeen

verydifficultbuthefelthispreviouspartyhadnotsupportedhisstanceonanumber

ofissues.InjoiningNasdem,thecandidatesoughttoreturntoparliamentwitha

partythathebelievedwasmorecommittedtoimprovingthecountryanda

leadershipthatwasmoregenuineinitsintentions.Nasdem’sstatedpledgetochange

thelotofordinaryIndonesianswassomethingthecandidatebothrelatedtoand

believedin.Whileheknewhewouldbecriticizedfordefecting,hefeltitwasarisk

worthtaking.Thecandidate’sexplanationforjoiningNasdemwasindicativeofthe

discourseandsymbolismhewouldusethroughouthiscampaign.

TheNasdemcandidatewasaseniorpartyofficialandamemberofthecentralparty

committeeresponsibleforoverseeingthenation‐wideelectoralcampaign.While

Nasdemhadmadeuseofanti‐corruptionsymbols,theparty’snationalcampaign

focusedmoreuponbroaderthemesofchange(perubahan)andrestoration

(restorasi),playingtotheparty’snewness.24However,thecandidatestrongly

supportedanti‐corruptionissuesasakeyplankoftheparty’splatform.Thisfitwell

withhisownbackgroundasanactivist.Havingbeeninvolvedintheprotestsagainst

Suhartoin1998andhavingworkedasajournalist,hedecidedthatbeinganactivist

wasnotenoughandresolvedtotrytochangethesystemfromwithin.Hisspeeches

duringralliesdrewonthisnarrative.Nasdemwascommittedtochange,justashe

was,andhewasconvinceditwouldsupporthiseffortstofightcorruptionifelected.

Throughouthiscampaign,thecandidateleveragedhispasttojustifyhisuseofanti‐

corruptionsymbols.Accordingtohisnarrative,hewasunlikeothercandidates,who

wereprimarilyinterestedinbeingelectedfortheirownpersonalprofit,whether

moneyorprestige.Inspeechestovoters,herepeatedlydiscussedhisexperiencein

theDPR‐RI,claimingthathehadlefthisformerpartybecause,amongstother

24Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,Nasdem’sadvertisingbilledthepartyasamovementtorestorethespiritofthe1945constitutioninIndonesia.

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reasons,hedidnotwanttobetraythepeople.Hehadfeltlikeatraitorforaccepting

thesalaryandperksofparliamentaryofficewhilenotbeingabletofightforwhathe

believedin.Referringtohimselfsatiricallyas‘stupid’forleavingthelarge,secure

salaryandlifestyleofaDPR‐RImember,hesaidhewouldratherresignthanbepart

of‘adirtyplace…fullofcorruptorsandtraitors’.Indoingso,hepositionedhis

actionsasevidenceofhiscommitmenttothepeople:hewassodisgustedbythe

behaviourandprioritiesofotherparliamentariansthathesimplycouldnotbeoneof

them,evenifitwasacomfortablejob.Bycontrast,hearguedthatNasdemwas

differentanditsmemberswoulddotheirutmosttoworkforthepeopleratherthan

forpersonalgain.

TheNasdemcandidatealsomobilizedanti‐corruptionsymbolisminstressinghis

commitmenttoagitatingfortheresolutionoftheBankCenturycase,usingthis

commitmentbothasproofofhistrackrecordagainstcorruptionandasafuture

promise.25Thecandidatehad,duringhistimeintheDPR‐RI,crusadedtohavethe

BankCenturycaseinvestigatedfurther,workingtokeepitinthemediaspotlightand

findingnewevidencerelatingtothecase,whichhepresentedtotheKPK.26His

campaignrhetoricandparaphernaliadrewheavilyuponhisinvolvementinthe

investigations,includinginhiscampaignslogan.Indemonstratingaprior

commitmenttofightingcorruption,forwhichhehadmadesacrifices,hebelievedhe

wouldhaveanadvantageovercompetitorswholackedexperienceorevidenceof

ongoingengagementinanti‐corruptionefforts.Healsohopedhisdedicationtothe

casewouldmakehimseemtrustworthy.Heconcededthatanti‐corruptionsymbols

mightnotappealtomostvotersbecausemoneypoliticswasstillveryinfluentialin

SouthSulawesi.But,heargued,thosenotswayedbyfinancialbenefitwouldbemore

inclinedtovoteforsomebodylikehim,whohadprovenhiscommitment.Hewas

targetingthesepeoplewithhiscampaigning.

25Nasdem’sfocusonthisparticularcorruptioncasewasdiscussedinChapterFour.26Thisnewevidencewasgiventohimbyanunnamedsource,butitwashewhoofficiallypresentedittotheKPK.Itscontentswereneverrevealed,butthecandidatemaintainedthatthedocumentswouldhelptheKPKtoprosecutethoseinvolvedinCenturygate.Itispossiblethatthiswasmoreamediastuntthanthesubmissionofbeneficialevidencefortheinvestigation.

153

Becausethecandidate’scampaignsymbolsdrewsoheavilyonhispersonalhistory,

herarelydiscussedotheraspectsofNasdem’splatforminhispublicappearances.27

Whenhediddiscussthepartymorebroadly,hedrewparallelsbetweenitsstatusas

anemergingparty,anditsneedtobe‘brave’and‘unyielding’initsapproachtopolicy.

Heusedtheexampleof‘attacks’againsttheKPK—byDPR‐RImemberswhowished

tocurtailitsauthority,particularlylimitingitssurveillancepowers—andasserted

thatNasdemwasnotafraidtovigorouslyopposesuchmoves.Inthecandidate’sview,

Nasdemcouldnotignorecorruption,andmakingitacoreelectionissuewasboth

strategicandnecessary.HearguedthatbecauseNasdemwasanewparty,its

candidateshadtoworkhardertoconvincevotersnotonlythattheywereserious

aboutfightingcorruption,butalsothattheyweremoreseriousthancandidatesfrom

otherparties.

Inmanyways,thecandidate’suseofanti‐corruptionsymbolswasmoreprominent

thantheparty’s.Hespokeoftenaboutthenegativeimpactofcorruptioninhis

speeches,reflectinghispersonalopinionthatwasthesinglebiggestthreatto

Indonesiandemocracy.TheNasdemcandidate’scampaignrhetoricwasmuchmore

individualizedthanthatoftheHanuracandidate,portrayinghimselfasachange.28

TheneedtopresentNasdem(and,byextension,himself)asevenmore

uncompromisinglyagainstcorruptionthatotheremergingpartyrivals,Hanuraand

Gerindra,wasalsosomethingthatheconsideredwhendetermininghowtopresent

himself:

WehavetolearnfromHanuraandGerindrainparliament…theyhaveno

corruptioncasesagainstthemandwecanlearnfromthat…[But]asthe

newestparty,wehavetoaimhigher[thanHanuraandGerindra],bemore

thoroughandmoredisciplinedaboutit…ifwebreachitevenonce,we’llbe

finished.Ithinkotherpartieshavealreadyfelttheeffectofthat.

27Forexample,Nasdem’ssloganinthe2014electionwas‘therestorationofIndonesia’(restorasiIndonesia),claimingthattheDPR‐RIhadbecometoopowerfulandcallingforareturntothe1945constitution.Thisincludedadvocatingforstrongerexecutivepowers,givingthepresidentcontroloverthepoliceanddispensingwithdirectelectionsatthedistrictandtownlevel.Whilethiswaspartoftheparty’scentralplatform,frontandcentreinpartyadvertisingandontheNasdemwebsite,theseaspectsofpartypolicywerenevermentionedduringanyofthecampaignactivitiesIwitnessed.28IncontrasttotheHanuracandidate,theNasdemcandidaterarelyspokeabouttheleaderofNasdem,SuryaPaloh,ormadeanymentionoftheparty’spresidentialaspirations,relyingmuchmoreonsellinghisownpersona.

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Besidesacknowledgingthatanycorruptionsscandalswithinthepartywouldbe

dangerous,theNasdemcandidatealsoassertedthatNasdemwasstricterthanmost

otherpartiesintryingtoensurecandidatesdidnotviolatepartyrulesorthelaw.29In

thecandidate’sopinion,anypartymemberaccusedofcorruptionshouldbe

immediatelyexpelledandonlybereinstatediftheirnamewascleared.30Evenifthere

weresubsequentindicationsoftheirinnocence,thepartycouldnotaffordtobe

underminedbyanysuspicion.TheNasdemcandidateexplainedthatasanewparty,

thesemechanismsfordealingwithcorruptionallegationshadnotbeentested,buthe

wasinfavourofbeingstrictand‘merciless’(tanpaampun).

WhilethefundinghereceivedfromNasdemtoconducthiscampaigncoveredmostof

hiscosts,thecandidategenerallyaimedtominimizespending,andtoavoidusinghis

ownfunds.Hisformercareerasajournalistgavehimaccesstolocalmedia,whichhe

usedtobuildapositiveimageofhimself,Nasdemanditsothercandidates.Coming

fromNasdem,healsohaddirectaccesstonationalandlocalmediaoutletsownedby

SuryaPaloh.Duringtheofficialcampaignperiodhewasfollowedbyatelevisioncrew

fromMetroTV,whorecordedfootageandreportsforbroadcastonlocaltelevision.

Healsoparticipatedinteleviseddebates,whichhelpedhimtofurthercementhis

mediaprofile.Inaddition,hecampaignedviaFacebookandTwitter,tweetingdaily

(oftenmorethanonce)andansweringquestionsposedbyhisfollowers.His

Facebookpagewaslessactive,butstaffwoulduploadphotosfromhiscampaigning

activitieseveryfewdays.31

Likeothercandidates,theNasdemcandidatealsomadestrategicdonations,most

commonlytolocalmosques.Heclaimedthathewouldnotmakepaymentsto

individuals(evenforacharitablecause)ortovillageprojects,becauseitwastooeasy

forindividualstoembezzlethefunds.Fearingthathemightbeperceivedasengaging

inmoneypolitics,hediligentlycheckedreceiptsforservicesandgoods(thoughhe

acknowledgedthatthesewereeasilyforged).Gift‐givingwasalsoasensitiveissuefor

29Theselectionofcandidates,accordingtoaNasdemmember,carefullyconsideredthebackgroundofpotentialcandidates,claimingthatsomehadbeenrejectedbecausethepartycouldnotascertainexactlyhowtheyhadgainedtheirwealth(interviewwithNasdemcentralcommitteemember,23May2013).30Partyruleswere,infact,moreflexible,withmembersaccusedofcorruptionbeinggiventheopportunitytopresenttheircasetoaninternalcommitteethatdecided,alongwiththepartyexecutive,whetherthemembershouldbesuspendedorexpelled.31TheNasdemcandidate’sFacebookpageactuallybecamemuchmoreactiveinthelead‐uptothepresidentialelection,inwhichNasdemoptedtopubliclybackJokowiandJusufKallaforpresidentandvice‐president.

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thecandidate,whodidtakepartintheusualcampaignactivitiesofgivingoutt‐shirts

andothermemorabilia,providingfoodandorganizingevents,includingatraditional

JavanesepuppetperformanceforJavanesemigrantsinhiselectorate,andasoccer

clinicforyoungboysinhishometown.

TheNasdemcandidateundertooktheseactivitiesreluctantly,andwhenaskedwhyhe

didso,herespondedthatitwasexpectedandthathewouldnotliketolosebecause

ofa‘trivialthinglikenotgivingawayt‐shirts’.Tohismind,thecampaignshouldfocus

ondemonstratinghiscommitmenttoimprovingthelotofordinarypeople.Inone

addresstoalocalpartybranchoffice,hebecameiratebecausehefeltthathis

campaignstaffwerefailingto‘sell’himtolocalvoters.Hewasannoyedtosee

membersofhiscampaignteamsimplygivingoutt‐shirtsandwalkingaway.Thisdid

notmeethisexpectationsthattheywouldusetheirinteractionwithvotersto

promotehispoliciesandideas.Inthesamemeeting,theNasdemcandidatereiterated

thatmoneypoliticswascompletelyagainsthisethosandurgedhisstafftoreportany

suspiciousbehaviouronthepartofotherNasdemcandidatessothathecouldhave

themdismissedfromtheparty.Healsoaskedthatdetailsofviolationsbycandidates

fromrivalpartiesbeconveyedtothenationalElectionSupervisoryBoard(Badan

PengawasPemilu,Bawaslu).

TheNasdemcandidate’suseofmeetings,andlaterrallies,followedatypical

campaigntrajectory.However,duetohisseniorityintheparty,hewasforcedto

dividehistimebetweenlocalcampaigningandnationallevelcommitments.The

candidatethereforereliedgreatlyonlocalstaffmembersandhiscampaignteamto

campaignonhisbehalf.LiketheHanuracandidate,hebelievedthattheoptimal

campaignstrategywastomeetandconversewithvotersdirectly,eventhoughitwas

time‐consuming.Thesizesofthemeetingsvaried,usuallybetween15and50people,

andwererelaxed:hewantedtoavoidlavish,formaleventsinordertopromotehis

imageas‘oneofthepeople’.Healsoexplainedthathepreferrednon‐formalsettings

becausetheymadeiteasierforhimto‘connect’withvoters.TheNasdemcandidate

metwithvotersinmosques,atpeople’shousesorathisownposko.

IncontrasttotheHanuracandidate,whoseuseofanti‐corruptionsymbolismwaned

overtime,theNasdemcandidate’spersonalpledgetocontinuetofightcorruption

gainedincreasedvisibilityduringtheofficialcampaignperiod.Hisviewson

corruptiondidnotneedtobesolicitedthroughquestionsfromtheaudience;he

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invariablysharedthemwithoutprompting.Atmeetingswithvoters,thecandidate

presentedhisideasongovernmentandencouragedaudiencememberstosharetheir

concernsandaspirationswithhim.Becausehewasaknownanti‐corruption

campaigner,instancesofallegedlocalcorruptionweresometimesraisedduringthese

meetings.Forexample,onevillagercomplainedthatthevillagechiefhadmadeadeal

withaprivatecompanytosetupanirrigationsystemforcrops.Inreturn,villagers

hadtogive15percentoftheircrops(orcashequivalent)tothecompany,andthey

wererequiredtobuyalltheirfertilizerfromit.Thecompanywasownedbyalocal

districtparliamentarian,whowasexploitingthevillagersbymarkingupthecostof

fertilizer.TheNasdemcandidaterespondedpassionatelytothisstory,sayingthatit

wasclearlyacaseofrent‐seeking.Heencouragedthevillagerstosharethestorywith

neighboursandfriendstopreventtheownerfromgainingre‐electionandalsoto

documentthecasesothathecouldreportthevillageheadtotheauthorities.His

responsewasreceivedpositivelybyvillagers,whowerepleasedthatsomeonein

powerwouldtakethetimetolistentotheircomplaintsandlobbyontheirbehalf.

Asthisexamplesuggests,theNasdemcandidatewascertainlynotafraidtocondemn

(perceived)moneypoliticswhenhesawit.OnoneoccasioninJuly2013,meetinghis

teammembersinafive‐starhotelinMakassar,hediscoveredthatarivalfrom

anotherpartywashostinga‘workshop’fordistrictheads(bupati)attheconference

centreofthehotel.Thisrivalcandidatehadpaidfordistrictheadsfromalloverhis

electoratetocometoMakassar,accommodatingtheminthehotel.WhentheNasdem

candidatediscoveredthis,hewasoutragedandexpressedhisfrustrationtosomeof

histeammembers.Heclaimedthatthelavishtripwasclearlyanattempttowin

favourwiththebupatiandthatifthemeetingwasjusttodiscusslocalissuesthen

therewasnoneedtoholditinsuchanexpensivehotel.Atonepoint,herecognized

someofthebupatiandconfrontedtheminthehotellobby.Hetoldthem,infullpublic

view,thathehopedtheywereashamedtobeacceptingfavoursfromamanwho

wantedtousethemtogetvotes.Heurgedthemtothinkaboutthevillagersandwhat

wasbestforthem,notwhowouldgivethemostnightsinafancyhotel.The

confrontationwasawkwardandthetargetedbupatisdidnotdefendthemselves

againsthisaccusations.Hetoldthemthatiftheysoldthemselvesformoneythey

riskedlosingtheirdignity,andweretraitorstothenation.

Oncetheofficialcampaignperiodbegan,theNasdemcandidatefocusedonattending

largerallies—bothhisownandthoseofotherNasdemcontenders—atwhichhe

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introducedandendorsedothercandidates.Thoughheclaimednottoenjoythem,he

feltthattheyweremoreeffectiveforbroadcastinghismessagesbecauseofthelarger

audiences,ofteninthethousands,whichtheyattracted.Asamemberofthecentral

partycommitteeandtheparty’sfirst‐rankedcandidate,hereceivedsignificant

fundingfromthecentralcommitteeanddidnotenterintotandemarrangementswith

anyprovincialordistrictlevelcandidates.Hedid,however,attendanumberof

differentralliesinordertopromotetheparty.32

LiketheHanuracandidate,though,theNasdemcandidatebecameincreasingly

cynicalabouttheelectionasthecampaignprogressed.Hisdisillusionmentwasclear

whenIinterviewedhimaftertheelectoralquickcountresultsbecameavailable.

Whilehewassuccessful,hereceivedfewervotesthanpollinghadsuggestedinthe

weekleadinguptotheelection.Beingalocal—a‘sonoftheregion’(puteradaerah)—

hewasdisappointedthathedidnotreceivemorevotesinhisown‘backyard’

(kampunghalaman).Hisdisappointingresultwasnot,hefelt,areflectiononhis

efforts,butratherthefactthatvote‐buyingremainedthenorm,makingitdifficultfor

honestcandidatestosucceed.Heblamedhispoornumbersontheuseofmoney

politicsbyhisrivals,claimingthat‘thewinneroftheelectionwasmoneyandbasic

goods’.Heclaimedthatthebriberyhadbeen‘brutal’,muchworsethaninthe

previouselection,andreflectedtheothercandidates’lackofmorals.Afterthe

electionstherewereseveralreportsinthemediaofcandidatescomplainingaboutthe

useofvote‐buyingandmoneypolitics.Forexample,itwasarguedthatwomen

candidatesweredisadvantagedbymoneypoliticsandthiswaswhytheyperformed

poorlyintheelection(Syafari2014).InBandung,hundredsofcandidatesregistered

dissatisfactionswiththevotecount,suspiciousoftheelectionoversightcommittee

(Rizal2014).33

Upsetbytheextentofmoneypoliticsintheprovince,thecandidateformedacoalition

withothercandidatesinSouthSulawesiwhosharedhisconcerns.Coalitionmembers

fromarangeofpartieswereunitedintheirdisappointmentattheinfluenceofmoney

ontheelection.Theywereparticularlydisheartenedbythefactthattheirattemptsto

runcleancampaignshadbeenunderminedbyunscrupulousrivals.Thecoalition

receivedsomemediacoverageintheperiodafterthewinnerswereannouncedbut

32Forexample,atarallyon19March2014,theNasdemcandidategaveaspeechendingwith:‘Voteforanyofthesepeople,theyareallgood,butdon’tforgettochooseNasdem!’33Forfurtherexamplesofcandidatesreportedinthemediaformoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingsee,JPNN(2014),Khosir(2014)andSyahni(2014).

158

otherwisedidnotgainmuchtraction.Accusationsofvote‐buyingandmoneypolitics

werecommonplaceandcomplaints,evenwhenreportedtotheelectoralcommission,

rarelyendedinprosecution.Accusationsthatelectoralprocesseshadbeenunfair

wereregardedasjustified,butevenso,theconcernswerenottakenupbytheKPU.

Gerindra,NorthSumatra

TheGerindracandidatehadbeeninparliamentforover25years,havingfirstbeen

electedin1987asamemberofGolkar.InourfirstmeetinginApril2013,he

recountedhisdecisiontojoinGerindrainthelead‐uptothe2009nationallegislative

election,theparty’sfirst.Indecidingtoshiftpartyallegiance,thecandidate

highlightedhisinterestinpromotingeconomicequalitywithinIndonesia,particularly

assistingthe50percentofIndonesiansworkingintheagriculturalsector.Ashis

interestinagriculturalpolicygrew,hebecameinvolvedintheIndonesianFarmer’s

Association(HimpunanKerukunanTaniIndonesia,HKTI),ledbyPrabowo

Subianto.34AfterdiscussionswiththeGerindraleadership,hedecidedtorepresent

thepartyinthe2009elections.ThecandidateassertedthathehadmovedtoGerindra

becausethepartywasbetteralignedwithhispriorities,notbecauseofill‐feeling

towardsGolkar.

Inourfirstinterview,thecandidateassertedcorruptionwastiedtobroader

problemsofinequalityinIndonesiaandwasthereforeoneofthemostimportant

challengesfacingthecountry.ThiswaswhyGerindrawasfirminitscommitmentto

combatingcorruption.Intermsofitssymbolism,thecandidatearguedthatGerindra’s

imagehadbecomesynonymouswithfightingcorruptionandthatitwaswidely

recognizedasthecleanestpartyinIndonesia.Thepublic,hesaid,appreciatedthat

consistency:

Gerindrahastakenaleadingpositionineradicatingcorruption.That’swhat

wehopewilldifferentiateusfromotherparties…Liketheseriousnesswith

whichwedefendtheKPK…thatincreasesourvalue[topeople]…now

Gerindraisseenasoneofthecleanestpartiesbecausewedon’thaveany

cadresinvolvedincorruption.

Thecandidatecontendedthateverypersonwhojoinedthepartywasobligedto

upholdthesevalues,withoutexception.ThefactthatGerindrahadneverhadany

34FormorehistoryoftheHKTI,seeHadiwinata(2003:126).

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membersarrestedforcorruptionremindedpeoplethatthiswasapartyintenton

remainingclean.Membersaccusedofcorruptionwouldreceivenoprotectionfrom

theparty,andfacedimmediateexpulsion(thoughifabsolvedbythecourtstheycould

return).Fortunately,accordingtothecandidate,Gerindrahadyettofinditselfinthis

position.

Thecandidateadmittedthatthiselectionwouldnotbeaseasytowinasprevious

electionsbecausetherewasincreasingcynicismtowardsparliamentarians,drivenby

prevailingstereotypesthatallwerecorruptandself‐serving.Heclaimedthatevenhe

hadbeenaccusedofcorruption,notbecausetherewasevidenceagainsthimbut

becausepeoplerefusedtobelievethattherewereanycleanparliamentarians,buthe

concededthatvotershadarighttofeelangryaboutthehighlevelsofcorruptionin

thenationalparliament.Thelackoftrustgeneratedbythesestereotypesledthe

GerindracandidatetodrawheavilyonhisethnictieswithintheBatakcommunity.As

arespectedBatakelder,hehopedthatancestraltieswouldgivehimanadvantage

overothercandidates.Duringspeechestoaudiencesfromrelatedfamilygroups,he

wouldmakereferencetotheircommonancestors(samanenek)toencourage

support.Healsoappealedtoreligiousties.BeingChristian,thecandidateoptedto

concentratehiscampaignactivityinmajorityChristianareas,arguingthatitwas

unlikelythatMuslimswouldvoteforaChristiancandidate,regardlessoftheirviews

onotherissues.Healsonotedthatvotescouldneverbetakenforgranted,andhe

wouldneedtofocusparticularlyonareasthathadsupportedhimpreviously,butthat

hehadnotmanagedtoassistthroughdevelopmentorinfrastructureprojectsduring

hispastterm.

ThecampaignstrategyoftheGerindracandidatedifferedfromtheNasdemand

Hanuracandidatesforanumberofreasons.First,asanincumbent,theGerindra

candidatecoulddrawuponhispreviouselectionresults.Duetothelargesizeofhis

electorate,itwasimpossibletocampaignacrosstheentirearea.Thushechoseto

focusonareaswherehehadpolledwellinthepastandhewasmostlikelytowin.The

candidatebelievedthatifyoupreserveda‘goodreputation’(namayangbaik)

throughoutaparliamentaryterm—whichhefelthehad—peoplewouldprobably

voteforyouagain.Hiscampaignstrategywasthustoreclaimpreviousvotesrather

thantoseekoutnewsupporters.Second,thecandidatecoulddrawuponatrusted

networkofpeoplewhohadassistedhiminpreviouscampaigns,allowinghimtobe

morehands‐offthantheothertwocandidates.Thiswasapracticalnecessitybecause

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helivedandworkedinJakarta.Hismodusoperandiwastomeetwithpower

brokers—usuallyinfluentialpartyorethnicgroupfiguresandbusinessmenwith

whomhehadworkedinthepast—andrequesttheirassistance.They,inturn,would

rallyvotesonhisbehalf.Thesemeetingswereoftenfamiliar,resemblingaget‐

togetherbetweenoldfriends,andrevolvedmostlyaroundhowthevotecollecting

wasprogressingandwhetheranyadditionalgoods(suchast‐shirtsorbusiness

cards)ormoneytopayforeventswererequired.Theyalsodiscussedwhetherthere

wereanylocalissuesthecandidateshouldbeawareof,especiallywhetherhisrivals

werecampaigningintheareaandwhethertheypresentedathreat.Inthemeetings,

combatingcorruptionwasnotdiscussed.Thecandidatedidnotfeelthatheneededto

talktohiscampaignteamaboutthepartyoritsplatformbecausetheywerealready

willingtochampionhim.Hearguedthesepeoplewantedtohelphimbecausethey

‘knowmyname,knowmywork…knowIamagoodperson’.

Third,thecandidate’shistoryinparliamenthelpedhimattracttheattentionof

journalists.Beingaseniorpartymember,hewasoftencontactedbythemedia,

especiallylocaloutlets,forcommentonpoliticalissues,subjecttoatacitagreement

thatthepaperswouldpainthiminagoodlight.Healsohadgoodrelationswith

certainjournaliststowhomhegavemoneyinreturnforfavourablenewsstories.

This,heexplained,wasapaymentforaserviceinrecognitionthatjournalists

receivedlowsalariesandthereforeneededadditionalincome.Thecandidatehad

FacebookandTwitteraccountsbuttheseweremanagedbyoneofhisassistants.He

admittedthathewasnotverygoodwithtechnology,butunderstoodthatGerindra

expectedcandidatestomakeuseofsocialmedia.However,hedidnotthinkthat

socialmediawasparticularlybeneficial,believingthatitwasmoreusefultonew

candidateswhoweretryingtobuildtheirprofile,butnotsomeonelikehimselfwho

wasalreadyafamiliarface.

Inhisspeeches,theGerindracandidatealsoemphasizedsomeofthesmall‐scale

effortsthatGerindrawasmaking,withoutsupportorendorsementfromother

parties,toreducecorruptionwithinthenationalparliament.Oneoft‐repeated

examplewasGerindra’sbanonlegislatorstakingpartinoverseasstudytours.The

candidatearguedthatthiswasanunnecessaryexpensewhichdidlittletobenefitthe

country;forhimtheywereaformofcorruptionandanexcuseforparliamentarians

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togoonholiday.35WhileevensomeothermembersofGerindrahadaskedifPrabowo

mightmakesomeexceptionstothisban,thecandidatewasunwaveringinhis

supportforit.Inpresentingthisstancetohisaudience,heframedtheissuein

comparativeterms,suggestingthatbecauseotherpartiesdidnotcareenoughtoask

theirmemberstorefrainfromparticipatinginthese‘unnecessary’studytours,they

weremorallybankruptanduninterestedinsavingthegovernmentmoney.

AnotherachievementthecandidatepromotedwasGerindra’spublicrejectionof

planstorenovatetheparliamentbuildinginJakarta.Thepartycontendedthatthe

projectwasmerelyamoney‐makingopportunityfortherulingDemocraticParty.In

severalspeeches,thecandidateoutlinedhisviewabouttheproposedrenovations

andtheirbudgetofRp.1.8trillion.Heallegedthattheprojectbudgethadbeen

markedup,andstatedthatthecompanyawardedtheprojecttenderwaslinkedto

Nazaruddin.36Hesaidthathesuspectedthatthemark‐upwasameansforthe

DemocraticPartytochannelfundingintoitscampaigncoffers.Healsonotedthat

Gerindrahadconsultedwiththebureaucratstaskedwithbuildingmanagementand

maintenance,whohadestimatedthatthecostoftheproposedrenovationswasRp.

700billion—lessthanhalfoftheallocatedbudget.Theprojectwasslatedtogoahead

inspiteofGerindra’sopposition,butitwashaltedatthelastminuteduetothearrest

oftheconstructioncompany’sdirectoronanunrelatedcorruptioncharge.The

candidatereferredtothisarrestasan‘interventionfromGod’,allowingprotestto

mountuntiltherenovationplanswerefinallyabandoned.

Thecandidateusedtheseexamplestoillustratehiscommitmenttothetransparent

andresponsibleuseofpublicfunds.HisspeecheslinkedGerindra’soverallanti‐

corruptionsymbolismtohisownvisibleeffortstofightcorruption,whichhethen

comparedtotherecordofotherparties,whichhadmanyseatsintheparliamentbut

hadachievednothing.Withasmallnumberofseatsinthenationallegislature(26

seats),Gerindrawasnotinapositiontodrivechangestothelaw,budget,orpolicy.

Nevertheless,thepartywasdoingwhatitcouldtoimprovethegovernment.These

small‐scaleachievementswerepresentednotonlyasconcreteevidenceoftheparty’s

anti‐corruptionstance,butalsoasanindicationofwhatcouldbeexpectediftheparty

gainedpower.Inhisspeeches,thecandidaterepeatedlyunderscoredthefactthat35Forexample,inaspeechon13July2013hestatedthat:‘Flyingoverseasisabigwasteofthepeople’smoney…They[parliamentarians]flyBusinessClass,theygetperdiems,theystayinexpensivehotels.GerindrahassavedthegovernmentoverRp.40billionoverthepastfouryearsbecausewerefusetogo[onthesetrips]’.36TheNazaruddincasewasdiscussedinChapterThree.

162

evenwithitssmallrepresentationinparliament,Gerindrastrivedtobehonest(jujur)

andsupportanti‐corruptionmeasuresinanywayitcould.

Thecandidateemphasizedhisown‘trackrecord’(rekamjejak)topromotehimselfas

asymbolofanti‐corruption.Whileinparliamenthehadbeenvocalinthepress,for

example,speakingindefenceoftheKPKandagainstperceivedgovernmenteffortsto

undermineit.Hewasfrequentlyinterviewedbyjournalistsaboutthis,whichfurther

fosteredhisanti‐corruptionreputation.Thecandidatebelievedhewasobligedto

highlightcorruptionissuesinthegovernmentandtodemonstrate,throughthe

media,thatGerindrawasstaunchlyagainstcorruption.Whilehecommentedona

rangeofissues,corruptioncaseswereapriorityforhim.Healsobelievedthatthe

medianowsoughthimoutforcommentsbecausetheyknewthathewouldhavean

opiniononthevariouscorruptionscandalsfacedbythegovernment.Atthesame

time,headmittedthatamemberofasmalloppositionpartywouldfinditdifficultto

makelarge‐scalechanges.Indeed,hepresentedthisasanotherreasontovotefor

Gerindra:ifGerindracouldincreaseitsparliamentarypresence,itcouldimplement

government‐widestrategiestocombatcorruptionmoreeasily.

Inordertofurtherestablishhisanti‐corruptionimage,thecandidatedistributed

bookletsathismeetingsandrallies.Thebookletboretheslogan‘corruptionbreeds

poverty,fightcorruptionforaprosperoussociety’(Korupsiakarkemiskinan;Berantas

korupsi,rakyatsejahtera)andincluded36pagesofmediaarticlesinwhichthe

candidatehaddiscussedarangeofissues,mostprominentlycorruption.Some

articlesincludedinthebookletwereentitled:‘[Name]choosesthelonelyroad

amongstthe“cowboys”atSenayan’,‘[Name]:Consistentineradicatingcorruption’,‘A

newparliamentbuildingisnotwhatthepeoplewant’and‘Gerindraispreparedto

protecttheKPKfromthreatstodissolveit’.Allthearticlesfirmlyalignedthe

candidatewithanti‐corruptionsymbolism,whichsupportedGerindra’shard‐line

anti‐corruptionrhetoric.

Duringtheofficialcampaignperiodthecandidate’sspeechescontinuedtoemphasize

theimportanceoftrustbetweenvotersandleadership,drawingalinkbetweenthe

needfortoughreformsandfirm(tegas)leadershipinordertore‐establishpublic

faithintheparliament.Thispresentedanopportunityforthecandidatetofocuson

someoftheadvantagesofPrabowo’sleadership,whichhedescribedas‘strong’and

having‘provenintegrity’.HepresentedPrabowoastheonlyleadercommitted

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enoughtoeradicatecorruption,somethingwhichhehadpromisedsincefounding

Gerindrain2008.Thecandidatecontrastedthiswithotherleaderswhohadnotmade

corruptionapriority.HealsoreferredtoPrabowo’smainrivalforthepresidency,

Jokowi,as‘untrustworthy’,especiallybecausehehadbetrayedPrabowobyelecting

torunforPresident.37Incontrast,thecandidateportrayedPrabowoasatrustworthy

leaderwhohadclearlystatedhisplatformtothepublicandintendedtofollow

throughwithit.Tosomeextenthewasalsopragmaticinhiscampaigning,admitting

thathesometimessaidthingsthatwereuntrueinordertoappealtovoters.For

example,atonerallyhestatedthatGerindrawasstaunchlyagainstpolygamyandthat

nomanwhowasapartymemberwaspermittedtohavemorethanonewife,

expectingthiswouldbewell‐receivedbyhisfemaleand/orChristianaudience.38He

laterconcededthatGerindrahadneitherpoliciesagainstpolygamynoranyparty

rulesaboutitformembers,admittingthathemadethestatementtoincreasehis

popularity.

Whileearningtrustwasimportant,theGerindracandidatealsoacknowledgedthat

moneywascrucialinpoliticalcampaigns.Hewasopenaboutthisfact,statingthathis

owncampaignhadcosthimaroundRp.3.5billion.This,heacknowledged,wasa

significantsum,thoughmuchlessthananewcomerwouldneedtospend.Hedidnot

needtoworryaboutbrandingasmuchasothercandidates,becausehehadalready

hadalongandsuccessfulcareerinpoliticswithoutanyhintofscandal.Healsosaid

thatwhilearoundRp.1billionofhiscampaignfundscamefromhisownpocket,the

remainderwasprovidedbythepartyordonated.Donations,thecandidatestated,

mostlycamefrombusinesspeoplewithwhomhewasongoodterms.Whilehe

acceptedthatsomepeoplemayseethisasbuyinginfluence,hearguedthathehad

neverdoneanythingillegalinreturnforthesedonations.Hegaveanexampleofa

donorwhohadfacedcourtandwasaskedformoneybythejudgeinordertorulein

hisfavour.Thecandidateclaimedthatwhenthebusinessmanhadaskedhimto

intervenesothathecouldhaveafairtrialwithouthavingtopay,thecandidateranga

friendofhisinthejudiciaryonthebusinessman’sbehalfandrequestedheaskthe

judgetorescindhisrequestforabribe.Intheend,thedonordidnothavetopaya

37ThisaccusationofbetrayalwasbasedonthefactthatPrabowohadsupportedJokowi’smayoralcandidacyinJakartaduring2012andcontributedsignificantlytohiscampaign,andtheallegedbreachoftheBatuTulisPact(PaktaBatuTulis)inwhichMegawati,chairpersonofPDIP,hadallegedlypromisedinwritingtosupportPrabowo’spresidentialbidin2014.38ThedebateoverwhethertolegalizepolygamyinIndonesiaiscontroversial,withproponentsonbothsides.FormoreinformationaboutthehistoryofthisdebateseeButt(1999).

164

bribeandthejudgestillruledinhisfavour.Thecandidatealsoclaimedthathehad

beenaskedtomediateinlanddisputesinvolvingpeoplewhohadbackedhis

campaign,butassertedthathehadneverbeencorrupt.39

Accordingtothecandidate,theavailabilityoffundsplayedakeyroleincampaigns

becauseitdeterminedthefeasibilityofdifferentcampaignstrategies.Ralliesand

meetingswerecostly.Asinglerallywithjust500attendeescouldcostuptoRp.35

millionincludingrentalcostsforequipment,food,t‐shirts,entertainmentand

‘transportationmoney’(uangtranspor)fortheaudience.40Thecandidatefoundthese

expensesirritating,butacceptedthemasanintegralpartofIndonesia’s‘campaign

culture’(budayakampanye).LiketheHanuracandidate,healsolamentedthateven

afterthisexpendituretherewasnoguaranteethatpeoplewouldvoteforhim.He

estimatedthatforeveryrallyheld,acandidatemightexpect40percentofthe

audiencetovoteforher/him.Forthisreason,candidateshadtoholdasmanyrallies

astheycouldaffordinordertobeassuredofwinningthenumberofvotesthey

needed.

Thecandidatewasnotopposedtoindividualpaymentstopeopleatrallies,stressing

thatsuchpaymentswerenotbribes,butratherreimbursementsforthecostsof

attending.Itwasimportantthatpeoplewerenotleftout‐of‐pocket.Moreover,hesaid

thatifattendeesdidnotreceiveapaymenttheywouldbedisappointed,becausethey

expectedtobecompensated.Withoutasmallpayment,therallycoulddomoreharm

thangood,becausetheattendeescouldendupdisgruntled.Thecandidatecontrasted

suchpayments,whichhedescribedastokensofappreciation,with‘moneypolitics’,

whichusuallyinvolvedmuchlargersumsofmoneyandwasimproper.Whenasked

whathedeemed‘alargeamountofmoney’herepliedthathewouldnotgivemore

thanRp.10,000toanyindividual,andthattheamountwoulddependonwhere

peoplehadtravelledfrom.Iftheylivedneartherallysitehesaidhewouldnotgive

themanymoney,butwouldprovidefoodanddrinks.Thesemoralqualmsaside,the

candidate’srationalewasalsopragmatic.Becausehewasanationalparliamentary

candidate,distributinglargeamountsofcashacrosshiselectoratewouldhavebeen

39TheuseofpoliticalcampaigndonationstobuyinfluenceisnotuncommoninIndonesia,especiallysinceindividualcandidatesoftenhavetosourcetheirownfunds.BoththeHanuraandGerindracandidatesacknowledgedthatcampaigndonationsoftenheldimplicitexpectationsofpoliticalfavoursiftheywon.However,bothalsodeniedthattheywouldacceptsuchdonationsiftheybelievedthedonorwouldaskforsomethingillegalastheywouldprefertostaycleanratherthanhavethemoney.40Thecandidatesaidhedistributedover80,000t‐shirtsduringthecampaign.

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prohibitivelyexpensive,claimingthatevengivingRp.10,000torallyattendees,in

spiteofitbeingasmallamountofmoney,addeduptoasignificantexpense.41

Inadditiontoexpenditureonrallies,theGerindracandidate,likeothercandidates

describedhere,madedonationstolocalcausesandgroupsinordertocurryfavour

withvoters.Hesaidthatthesepaymentsdemonstratedhisgenerosityandhelpedto

ensurethatpeopledidnotforgethim.Manyofhisdonationsweregiventhrough

churchcommunities.HesupportedlocalChristianyouthgroupsandparishesand,in

turn,manyyouthgroupmembersvolunteeredtobepartofhiscampaignteam.When

askedaboutcontributingtolocaldevelopmentprojects,thecandidatesaidthathe

rarelydidthisunlesshewasapproachedbyafriendandcouldtrustthatfundswould

bespentappropriately.Also,asanincumbent,hehadaccesstoparliamentaryfunds

suchas‘SocialAssistance’(BantuanSosial,Bansos)and‘AspirationFunds’(Dana

Aspirasi),whichhecouldchanneltowardsvillagelevelinfrastructureandsocial

development,andthereforedidnotneedtofundsuchprojectshimself.Hehadno

qualmsabouttakingcreditfortheseprojects,eventhoughtheywerefullyfundedby

thegovernment.

Healsoacknowledgedthat,sincehisstafforganizedtheevents,itwassometimes

difficulttosayexactlywhathappenedtoallthemoneyheprovidedtocoverexpenses.

Forexample,hedidnotpersonallyselectwherethefoodwasbought,soheconceded

itwaspossiblehisstaffmightchannelmoneyforthispurposestrategicallyinorderto

getvotes,butaslongastheeventransmoothly,thiswasnotaproblemforhim.In

essence,delegatingplanning,procurementandpaymentresponsibilitiestohis

campaignteamallowedhimtobemoreblaséabouthowcampaignfundswerespent,

solongastheeventsweresuccessful.

TheGerindracandidatewascertainlythemostexperiencedandrelaxedcandidateof

thethree.However,whilehewasafrontrunnerforre‐electionandseemedconfident

ofretaininghisseat,thecandidatestillexpressedfrustrationattheexpectationsof

hisparty,especiallyinthelead‐uptovoting.Hesaidthathehadbeentoldby

Gerindra’scentralcommitteethathemustwinatleast150,000votesinNorth

Sumatra.Whenhecomplainedthiswouldbeextremelydifficult,thecentral

41WhilefollowingtheGerindracampaigninNorthSumatraIwitnessedseveralexchangesofmoneyinreturnforattendingrallies.WhiletheGerindracandidateseemedtobeexemptfromhavingtofind‘supporters’toattendhisrallies(possiblybecauseofhisstatus),otherGerindracandidates(runningforalllevelsofparliament)whowerenotsohighlyrankedweregivenquotasofhowmanypeopletheyhadtofindtoattend.Paymentswitnessedforattendanceatanothercandidate’srallyinMedanrangedbetweenRp.20,000andRp.30,000.

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committee’sresponsewasthatheshould‘dowhatisnecessary’togetthevotes,even

ifhehadtobuythem.Whilethisclearlywentagainsttheparty’sownanti‐corruption

rhetoric,thecandidatewasnotmorallyoutragedattherequestitself,arguingthat

entrenchedelectionpracticeswereunfortunatebutdifficulttoignore.Whilethenew

quotasputhimunderconsiderablestress,hewasconfidentofwinningwithout

buyingvotesbecauseoftherelationshipshehadfosteredovertimewithhis

constituents.Hegaveanexampleofhelpingresolvelanddisputesintheearly2000s,

whenhewasaskedbysomelocalpeopletocallthepoliceandthejudgestoexplain

theirsituation.Thesepeople,hesaid,werenowpartofhiscampaignteamandhe

couldrelyonthembecausehehadhelpedtheminthepast.Healsobuiltrelations

withpeopleincommunitiesbyusingtheirservicesduringcampaigns(suchas

purchasingfoodorpayinglocalyouthstoputupposters).Hisstrategiespaidoffashe

wasre‐electedforanotherterm.

ThecandidatesfromHanuraandNasdembotharguedthatacceptingpaymentin

returnforvoteswasimmoralandwouldleadtopoorleadership.Bycontrast,the

Gerindracandidateacknowledgedthatitwasnormalforcandidates,especially

newcomers,tobuytheirwayintoparliament,eitherthroughlavishcampaignsand/or

vote‐buying.Inonediscussion,theGerindracandidategaveanexampleofan

acquaintancefromapartythatwasunlikelytopasstheparliamentarythreshold,and

saidthathewasamazedathiscampaignspendingbecausehebelievedhewas

wastinghismoney.Outofconcernforthispersonhesaidherangandadvisedhimto

stop‘wasting’hismoney.Healsojokedthattheperiodfollowingelectioncampaigns

wasagoodtimetobuylandbecausesomanycandidateswentintodebtasaresultof

campaignspending.Whilethiscandidatedidwanttoupholdhisanti‐corruption

imageanddidnotcondonevote‐buying,hisprimaryargumentagainstitwasbased

onpracticalityratherthanmorality;itwasexpensive,couldnotguaranteehimvotes

andwaspotentiallyawasteofmoney.

Intra‐partyrelationships

Allthreecandidatestrackedinthisstudywerepartystaff.TheGerindraandNasdem

candidateswereintheirrespectivecentralpartycommittees,whiletheHanura

candidatehadworkedforthepartysinceitsinception.Ofthethree,theHanura

candidatewasthemostremovedfromthecentralpartycommitteeasshewasthe

onlyonewhowasnotpartofthedecision‐makingteamthatdevelopednational

campaignstrategies.Forothercandidates,whowerenotpre‐existingpartymembers,

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sometrainingwasavailabletobriefthemonthebasicsofthepartyplatform.While

therewasan‘induction’programdesignedtointroducenewrecruitstotheparty’s

visionandmission,thiswasseeminglydoneonanad‐hocbasis,ifatall.Regularparty

meetingswereheldinkeypartyoffices,usuallyinlargertowns,buttheseweremore

gearedtowardsplanningstrategyratherthaneducatingnewrecruits.Partymembers

reportedthatthefrequencyofthesemeetingswasusuallydrivenbythebranch

leader—iftheywereorganizedandcommittedthentherewouldberegularmeetings.

However,thiswasnotalwaysthecaseandsomebranchleaderswerelaxincalling

suchmeetings.Mostcandidateshadlittleinteractionwiththelocalbranchoffice

beyondthis,letalonethecentralpartycommittee.

Thethreecasestudiesexhibiteddifferentdynamicsbetweenthecandidateandthe

centraloffice.TheHanuracandidatereceivedfundingfromthecentralofficeinmid‐

2013.Astheparty’sfirst‐rankedcandidate,shewasgivenfundingtoleasebillboards,

printpostersandbanners,rentaposkoandhireateamofofficestaff.Thisfunding

wasinsufficienttocovermostofthedonationsandsmall‐scaleprojectsthatshe

offeredtovotersinordertosecuresupport.Towardstheendofthecampaign,the

candidatewasspendingherownmoneytopayforrallies,prizesandtravel.Similarly,

theGerindracandidatereceivedsomeinitialfundingbutwasexpectedtofinancethe

majorityofhiscampaigncosts.Beinganincumbent,hehadaccesstogovernment

fundswhichhecoulddirectstrategicallytopleasehisexistingsupportbase.Whilehe

diddrawuponsomepersonalfunds,heacknowledgedthathehadasignificant

advantageasanincumbentbecausehecouldtakecreditforgovernmentdevelopment

projects.TheNasdemcandidatereceivedmuchmorefundingfromthecentralparty

officethantheothercandidates.Hedidpaysomedonationcostsoutofhisown

pocket,butotherexpensesweremetbytheparty.Asoneoftheparty’smost

prominentcandidates,withahighpotentialforsuccess,thepartyinvested

substantiallyinhiscampaign,withmuchofthefundsspentonralliesduringthe

officialcampaignperiodwhichhesharedwithothercandidatesfromtheprovincial

anddistrictlevels.ThiswasinlinewithNasdem’spledgetosupportcandidateswith

fundingofRp.5‐10billionineachelectorate(Badudu2013).42

42AsnotedinChapterFour,Nasdemhadundertakentofundcandidates’campaignsinanefforttodiscouragecorruption.Therationalewasthatifacandidatedidnothavetospendtheirownmoneythroughoutthecampaign(whichcanbeverycostly)thentheywouldbelesslikelytoneedtorecouptheirspendingthroughcorruptionwhileinparliamentiftheyweresuccessfulintheelection.

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Nationalcandidates’interactionwithlocallevelpartyofficesalsodependedupon

theirpersonalrelationshipwithlocalbranchleaders.FortheGerindraandNasdem

candidates,whowerebothnativesoftheirelectoratesandseniorpartymembers,the

localbranchesprovidedintegrallogisticsupportduringcampaigns,suchasputting

upbannersandorganizingrallies.TheNasdemcandidate,inparticular,drewheavily

uponlocalcadrestocampaignonhisbehalf,alsowantingthemtoapproachpeoplein

publicanddiscusswiththemthebenefitsofvotingforthecandidateandNasdem.In

thecaseofHanura,therelationshipbetweenthelocalbranchesandthecandidate

wereinitiallystrainedbecauseshehadtakenthepositionofanotherHanuramember

whohadstronglocalsupport.Shereceivedlittlesupportfromlocalcadresformostof

hercampaign.Additionally,whiletheofficesofothercandidateswerestaffedbyparty

cadres,theHanuracandidatewasforcedtohirecontractstaffforthedurationofthe

campaign.Thisreflectedthefactthatshewasnotalocaltotheareaandcouldnot

drawuponfamilyorclosepartytiesforsupport.

Nationalcandidatessometimesagreedtosharecostswithothersinthepartywho

werevyingforpositionsinprovincialorlocalparliament.Thismeantorganizingjoint

electionactivitiesandsometimesevenprintingbannerswiththecandidatestogether,

hopingtoreducetheirownexpenditure.Althoughtandemarrangementswere

generallyinformal,theyprovidedameansforcandidateswithinthesamepartyto

worktogether,whichdidnotusuallyoccurbetweencandidatescompetingforseats

atthesamelevelofgovernment.Whilethearrangementswereprimarilyfinancial

ones,therewasscopeforintra‐partyinfluencethroughthesecooperativeefforts.

Tandemarrangementscouldbolsteranti‐corruptionsymbolismifthecandidates’

rhetoricwasinalignment,butitcouldalsounderminesuchasymbolifrhetoricwas

inconsistent.Forexample,ifonememberofthetandempartnershipdecidedthey

wouldgivepeoplemoneyinexchangeforvotes,theotherswithinthepartnership

mightbepressuredtocontribute.Moreover,ifonememberinthetandem

arrangementdidbuyvotes,citizensmayassumethatalltheassociatedcandidates

wouldfollowthesamestrategy.Ifcandidateshadpreviouslyattemptedtoprojectan

anti‐corruptionsymbol,vote‐buyingbytandempartnerscouldweakenit.

Theprimaryconcernofthecentralpartycommitteewastomaximizevotes.Targets

wereidentifiedforeachelectorate,nominallybasedontheparty’shistoryinthearea

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andtheestimatednumberofvotesneededtowinaseat.43Whilethecentralparty

fundedandapprovedmarketingwhichithopedwouldpositivelyinfluencevoters,

theyalsoplacedsignificantexpectationsoncandidates.Yet,despitethedependence

partieshaveoncandidatesuccess,inthethreecasestudiesobservedtherewasvery

littleoversightovercampaignactivitiesatthelocallevel.Allcandidateschosetheir

ownslogans,designedtheirowncampaignmaterialsandselectedtheirownmeeting

andrallysites.Therewasnoformalapprovalprocessoroversightforanyofthese

activities.44Candidatescoulddecidehowcloselytheywishedtoalignwithparty

symbolsastherewasnorequirementforthemtobeincludedinthecampaign

publicitymaterial,orsystemstoenforceuniformityofsymbolsamongstcandidates.

Monitoringwasfurtherconstrainedbythesheernumberofcandidatescompetingin

thenationalelection.Evenifpartieswantedtoensureuniformityofsymbols,or

monitortheuseofvote‐buyingacrossthecampaignsofcandidates,itwouldbe

difficultgiventhattherewerearound180,000candidatesacrossfourlevelsof

governmentcompetingfor19,699positionsin2014(Aspinall2014a:97;Iqbal2014).

Whilecooperationcouldbebeneficialforbothcandidatesandpartiesasawhole,the

scalardimensionsofcampaigninginIndonesiamadeitdifficulttocoordinateacross

nationalandindividualcampaigns.

Conclusion

Thesecasestudiespresentanempiricalbasistoinvestigatehowanti‐corruption

symbolismisemployedintheconceptualizationandexecutionofacampaignstrategy

atthelocallevel,discussingtherelationaltransferenceoftheanti‐corruptionsymbol

(orlackthereof)fromthecentretothemasses,viatheconduitofindividual

candidates.Candidatescoulddrawfromthenationallevelpartysymbolscreatedat

thecentre;however,therewasnocompulsionforthemtodoso.Anti‐corruption

symbolswereused,tovaryingdegrees,byallthreenationallegislativecandidates.

Thecandidateshaddifferencesintermsofpastexperiences,standingwithinthe

communityandtheparty.Eachcampaignwasconductedinauniquepolitical

43Themeansthroughwhichthistargetwasdeterminedvariedacrossthecandidates.WhiletheNasdemcandidatedidhisowncalculations,createdhisowntargetandreportedthisbacktothecentralpartycommittee,boththeGerindraandHanuracandidatesweredictatednumbersbythepartyseparatetotheirowncalculations.AsidentifiedinChapterFive,theGerindracandidatewasannoyedatthehighexpectationsplacedonhimbyhisparty,concernedthattheywereunrealisticwithoutresortingtobribery.TheHanuracandidatewasalsoconsiderablyanxiousabouthertargets,especiallywhenitbecameapparentlaterinthecampaignthatshewasnotontracktoachievethem.44Thiswasevidencedbythewidevarietyofpostersandbannersamongstcandidatesfromthesamepartyduringtheelectionperiod.Therewaslittleconsistencybecausetherewasnoexternalimpetustoadoptpartysymbols.

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environmentandthecandidates’ownbackgroundssawthemrespondtoelection

demandsdifferently.Thesedistinctionsplayedintothenarrativesusedtoconstruct

theanti‐corruptionsymbols.

Thewaycandidatesusedsymbolswasnotstatic—thesymbolwaspromotedwhen

candidatesdeemeditbeneficialanddownplayedwhenitwasconsideredunhelpful.

Althoughcorruptionwasidentifiedasaprimaryelectionsymbolnation‐wide,

candidatesfoundthattalkingaboutfightingcorruptiondidnotalwayselicitthe

desiredresponseamongstcitizens.Voterswhorejectedtheanti‐corruptionsymbols,

forwhateverreason,sentamessagetothecandidatesaboutitslackofvalue.

Candidatesadaptedtheircampaignstrategiesindifferentwaystomanagethese

responses.TheHanuracandidateeventuallystoppedusingsuchsymbolsaltogether,

claimingtheywerecounterproductivewhiletheNasdemcandidateincreasedthe

intensityofhisanti‐corruptionsymbolandtheGerindracandidatemaintaineda

steadyapproachtoconstructinghissymbol,drawinguponhisyearsofelection

experience.Ontheotherhand,candidatesalsorecognizedthelimitationsofusing

moneypolitics,whichcouldbecostlybutunabletoguaranteevictory.Facedwiththis

dilemma,itwasthepersonalidealsofthecandidatethateventuallydeterminedwhat

campaignapproachtheywouldtake.

Evenanadamantself‐identificationas‘clean’or‘anti‐corruption’didnotpreventthe

candidatesfromusingmoneytoinfluencevoters.Candidatesoftenexpresseda

narrowdefinitionofelectoralcorruption,whichwasusuallydescribedasthe

exchangeofcashforvotes,orbribingelectoralofficialstomanipulateresultsintheir

favour.Butwhilegivingcashtoindividualsinreturnforvoteswasdeplorable,other

typesofcontributions,althoughsometimesgivenreluctantly,wereacceptedasa

normalaspectofpoliticalcampaigning.Thoughacknowledgingthatsuchcampaign

normswereexpensiveandnotideal,theydidnotnecessarilyconsidergivingout

moneyorgoodsasmoneypoliticsperse.Forexample,donatingtovillagefunds,

religiousinstitutionsorpayingcitizens‘transportmoney’asreimbursementfor

attendingrallieswereacceptableandstandardcampaignpractices,ratherthan

immoralorcorruptbehaviour.Aftertheelectionwasover,candidatesexpressed

differentopinionsregardingtheuseofmoneyinelections.WhiletheHanuraand

Nasdemcandidatesvocallybegrudgeditandblameditfortheirunsatisfactory

results,theGerindracandidatestoicallydescribeditasjustanotherpartofelections

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inIndonesia.Hissympathieslaywithnewcandidateswhodidnothavethebenefitof

incumbencyandaccesstogovernmentfundstoinfluencevoters.

Partieshadavestedinterestinthesuccessoftheircandidates,buttheyperformed

minimaloversightoftheircampaigns.Whilecandidateshadtoaccountfortheir

spendingwithreceipts,manytransactionsoccurred‘offthebooks’andinreality

partiesdidlittletopreventthispractice.Outwardly,partiestookastrongstance

againstcorruptionandmoneypolitics,butinrealitythedefinitionswereunclear,and

insomecasesthemessagegiventocandidatescontradictedthesymbol.Candidates

cameunderpressuretoengageinvote‐buyingfromthecentralpartycommittee,

whichsetambitiousvotequotasforcandidates,andsuggestionsfromcampaign

teamsthatwithoutvote‐buyingtheyriskeddefeat.

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ChapterSixAsuccessfulstrategy?

ThethreecasestudiesoutlinedinChapterFiveprovideabasisforexploringhow

anti‐corruptionsymbolswereimaginedandmobilizedbyindividualcandidatesinthe

2014legislativeelections.Consideredinthecontextofbroadernationalcampaigns,

theemploymentofananti‐corruptionsymbolbycandidatesrevealsboththe

influenceoflocalcontextandthenatureofintra‐partyrelations,uncoveringtensions

betweenpartystructureandindividualagency.Focusingontheconsistenciesand

inconsistenciesinhowanti‐corruptionsymbolswereimaginedanddeployedby

differentemergingparties,andtheresultstheygarnered,allowsustointerrogatethe

linkbetweennationalandlocalsymbols,andelectoraloutcomes.Thecoordination

(orlackthereof)thatexistswithincampaigns,inturn,helpstoexplainwhythis

campaignstrategyissoflawed.

Whilethenationallevelelectioncampaignswereintendedasanall‐encompassing

reflectionofpartyvaluesand,subsequently,thevaluesofitsmembers,local

candidateshadtheautonomytodecidewhethertheywishedtomobilizethesame

symbolsasthoseinthenationalcampaign.Evenwhencandidatesdidadoptthesame

symbols—aswasthecasetoagreaterorlesserextentforthethreecasestudy

candidates—theyadaptedthemtosuittheirlocalcontextandimbuedthemwiththeir

ownprinciples.Somecandidates,especiallythosewithpositionsintheirparty’s

centralcommittee,feltpressuretoupholdpartysymbols,but,inreality,therewas

littledonebypartyofficialstoensurethatcandidatesmaintainedthepartylineor

refrainedfromusingmoneypolitics.1Partiesdidnotforcetheirsymbolsupon

candidatesand,therefore,whetheracandidate‘stucktotheirguns’andmaintained

ananti‐corruptionsymbolwastheresultsofpersonaljudgement.

Justifyingtheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbol

Oppositionpartiesaroundtheworldoftenuseanti‐corruptionsymbolstopromote

themselvesandchallengerivalsandIndonesiaisnoexception.Viewedasmoral

1Thisthesisdoesnotseektogointodetailabouttheopinionsorrationalizationsforcorruptionandvote‐buyingfromthevoterperspective.Whilethefieldworkconductedcastssomelightonpossibletheoriesastowhymanyvotersintheparticulardistrictscoveredbythisresearchwishtobepaid(eitherincashoringoods/services)byparliamentarycandidates,itwasnotthefocusoftheresearch.Whiletherearefewin‐depthacademicstudiesonthistopic,Wahid(Forthcoming)providessomeinsight.

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resources,partiesseethefightagainstcorruptionasauniversallyappealingissue

alignedwithbroaderidealssuchastrust,honestyandhelpingordinarycitizens.

Decidingtovocallyopposecorruption,partiesdrawuponmoralargumentsto

portraythemselvesasbastionsofallthatisgood,whilehopingtocreateasymbol

thatisaneffectivevote‐getter.Establishingananti‐corruptionsymbolnotonly

presentsemergingpartiesinapositivelight;italsoframesexistingpartiesasvillains

withinablack‐and‐whitediscoursethatignoresthecomplexitiesandnuancesof

entrenchedpoliticalcorruption.Thesimplificationoftheproblemisevidentas

electioncampaignsusuallyseektoassignblameratherthanproposemeaningful

solutions.Presentedcrudelyasastockpoliticalplot,thecomplexityoftheproblemis

dissolvedandrhetoriccanbesimplified.Ananti‐corruptionsymbolalsorepresentsa

competitiveadvantageforemergingpartiesthathaveyettosufferfromany

significantcorruptionscandals.Theparties’lackofhistory,insomecasesa

disadvantage,canbeleveragedtopromotethepartyasacleanand,therefore,

preferablealternativetothoseinpower.2

Emergingpartieswereeagertoportraythemselvesaspoliticalsaviours,andoneway

todothiswastoembarkona‘projectofnewness’.Downplayingtheparty’slackof

pastachievementsandarguingthatchange,initself,isadesirablepoliticaloutcome,a

projectofnewnessemphasizeswhatnewpartiesarenot—mostparticularlythatthey

arenotresponsibleforthecurrentstateofgovernmentaffairs.3Anti‐corruption

symbolsfitwellwiththeprojectofnewness,especiallyasnewpartiescanportray

themselvesinoppositiontothestatusquo,relyingontheassessmentthatnothing

couldbeworsethantheincumbentgovernmentreturningtopower.Campaigns

contributedtothisprojectbypaintingoldpartiesasfailuresandnewpartiesas

much‐neededchange.ThiswasmostexplicitlyillustratedthroughNasdem’s

campaignslogan,‘GerakanPerubahan´(MovementforChange),althoughother

emergingpartiesusedsimilarthemesintheirrhetoric.However,simplybeingnewer

thanotherpartieswasnotenough,particularlyforindividualcandidateswhowere

competingagainstseveralrivals

Hanura,GerindraandNasdemallbrandedtheincumbentgovernmentasbeing

corruptintheir2014nationalelectioncampaigns.Thiswasnotsurprisinggiventhe2Thisisnottosaythattheemergingpartiesstudiedhadnocandidatesormemberswith‘questionable’pasts,butingeneraltheydidnothavememberswhohadbeeninvolvedingrossmisconductormisuseofpublicofficeforpersonalbenefit.3Whilethecampaignlanguageofemergingpartiescastolderrivalsinabadlight,therewasalmostnoantagonismamongstthethreenewpartiesthemselves.

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numberofscandalspublicizedbetween2009and2014.4Opinionsurveysinthelead‐

uptotheelectionsuggestedthatIndonesianvotersfeltthatmanyDemocraticParty

membershadhadnointentionof‘sayingnotocorruption’,despitetheparty’s

campaigntothateffect.Concentratingpublicattentiononcorruptionwasaneasy

wayfornewpartiestofueldisdainforthepoliticalelitesinpower.Althoughnotall

thescandalsinvolvedthecabinetorparliament—therewerenumerouscorruption

casesthataffectedthejudiciary,thepoliceandthebureaucracy—thepervasiveness

ofcorruptionmadethegovernmentseemallthemorehypocritical.Byattemptingto

keepcorruptioncasesinthepubliceye,emergingpartiesbecomemoral

entrepreneurs,hopingtocapitalizeontheperceivedflawsoftheincumbent

leadership,whilstmaintainingalevelofmoralpanicinordertoconvertanti‐

governmentsentimentintosupportfortheirparties.

Salientandprimed

Thesalienceofanti‐corruptionissuesinthe2014electioncampaignwasundeniable.

Thehistoryofcorruptionasapoliticalconcernmeantthatthepublicwerealready

awareoftheseriousnessoftheproblem.Withissuesaliencealreadyestablished,

partiesandcandidatescouldpositionthemselveswithinthedominantdiscourses

explainingwhycorruptionwassoprevalent.Pastattemptstolinkcorruptiontoelite

greedanddisregardforthegoodofthenationfosteredasenseofmoralpanicand

outragearoundcorruptionissues.Partiescouldpositionthemselvespositivelyby

exploitingthispanic,hopingtoprovokeanemotionalconnectionwithvoterswho

werefrustratedbycorruptgovernmentpractices.5Theyseizeduponnarratives

holdingthatcorruptionimpedednationalandsocialdevelopmentandwasdrivenby

selfishmaterialism.Whetherthesenarrativesreflectedrealitywasirrelevant.The

questionwastheextenttowhichtheycouldbuilduponthissaliencewiththeirown

declarationsinordertobetteralignthemselveswithananti‐corruptionsymbol.

Primingisintendedtoconvincevoters‘togivemoreweighttothoseareaswhen

assessingcandidates’(Druckmanetal.2004:1180).Althoughanti‐corruptionwas

alreadyasalientelectoralissue,emergingpartiesusedtheirnationalcampaignsto

furtherhighlighttheconcern,primingvotersusingextensivemediacoverageand

publicstatementsbypartyleaders.Indoingso,theyaimedtosettheagendaforthe

election,reinforcingtothepublicthatcorruptionwasacriticalnationalissue.Parties

4AsdiscussedinChapterThree.5ThisideaisdrawnfromBecker(1973:2),whoassertsthatpartiesseektoengenderasenseofcommunitaswithvoterswhoidentifywiththemoralspromotedbytheparty.

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alsoneededtoconvincethepublicthattheywerebestplacedtoleadthefightagainst

corruption.6However,whilehistorymayhaveprimedcorruptiontobeofgrave

concerntovoters,emergingpartiesstillhadtoexploittheissueeffectivelyinorderto

benefitfromsalienceandpriming.

Withonlyashorthistoryandsomesmall‐scaleanti‐corruptionefforts(generally

commensuratewiththeirexistingpoliticalinfluence),theemergingparties’successin

owningtheissuecameprimarilyfromtheirclaimsofnothavingbeencorruptrather

thanclaimsaboutwhattheyhaveachieved.Ownershipgainedundersuch

circumstancesis‘leased’ratherthanentrenchedandisgenerallyprecarious,

requiringeffectiverhetoricintheabsenceofconcreteexamplestoconvincevotersof

agenuinecommitmenttofightingcorruption,particularlyifpartieshavealong‐term

plantoestablishmorestableissueownership.

Theartofpersuasion

Edelman’s(1964;1971)earlyworkonpoliticalsymbolismallowsforthe

conceptualizationofanti‐corruptionissuesasatoolforpersuasionratherthana

partyplatformorevenarudimentarybasisforpolicy.Inthe2014elections,emerging

partiesbelievedasuccessfulanti‐corruptionsymbolwouldactasareflectionofthe

moralcredibilityofthepartyanditscandidates.Buildingmoralcredibilityrelieson

bridgingthegapbetweenthesymbolic(dramatic)andtheauthentic,convincingthe

publicthatthereisadirectcorrelationbetweentherhetoricusedandthevaluesheld

bypartiesandcandidates.InIndonesia,thisalignmentwaschallengedbypre‐existing

publiccynicism,aspastexperiencehasrepeatedlyshownthatpoliticiansoftensay

onethingbutdoanother.7Inthissense,attemptstoestablishananti‐corruption

symbolweretreacherousbecausepartieswhohadusedthesymbolinthepasthad

sincebeencastashypocrites.8

Withoutalong‐standingtrackrecordinfightingcorruption,emergingpartieswere

lefttoconvincevotersoftheiranti‐corruptioncredentialsusinglanguageand

dramatism.TheAristoteliandefinitionofsuccessfulrhetoric—consistingofethos,

6AsdiscussedinChapterThree,corruptionwaswidelyidentifiedasakeypoliticalconcerninIndonesiathroughanumberofpublicsurveysconductedintheleaduptothe2014election.7AsevidencedbythepoliticalcorruptionscandalsoftheDemocraticPartyandPKSdiscussedinChapterThree.8TheHanuracandidatearticulatedthisexplicitlywhensheadmittedthatheruseofanti‐corruptionsymbolswasinfluencedbyitsco‐optioninthe2009campaignsoftheDemocraticPartyandPKS.

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pathosandlogos—allowsustoassessthequalityofanti‐corruptionsymbolsinthe

Indonesiancontext.9Ifemergingpartiesweretoeffectivelyconfrontthepublic

disappointmentfosteredbythepreviousregime,theyneededtocraftrhetoricthat

wasmorallycredible,supportedbyevidenceandabletoarousesympathyfromthe

audience.However,whileethosandpathoswereoftendrawnupontoestablishan

anti‐corruptionsymbol,bothbythepartiesasawholeandindividualcandidates,

logoswasoftenmoredifficulttodemonstrate.

Emergingpartiesreliedontheirnewnessandtherelativeabsenceofscandalintheir

shorthistoriestoestablishethos.Whenscandalshaderupted,suchastheBambang

SoehartocasefacedbyHanura,theleadershipwasquicktocondemntheperpetrator

andmaintainthatthisindividualactwasnotareflectiontheparty’sculture.10

Individualcandidatesplayedontheircleanreputationstoprovetheirpersonalethos,

butalso,wherepossible,focusedonestablishingethosthroughtheirconnectionsto

thearea,especiallyhighlightingtheirkinshipand/orreligiousties.Indoingthis,

candidateshopedtowinthetrustofvotersastheywereaputeradaerah(‘localson’)

whowasmorecommittedtorepresentingtheirfellowlocalsthancandidatesfrom

otherareas.FortheHanuracandidate,wholackedstrongfamilialtiestoher

electorateinEastJava,establishingcredibilitywasespeciallydifficult.11

Pathosplayedacentralroleinthecampaignsofthetwosuccessfulcandidatesfrom

GerindraandNasdem,bothofwhomwereengagingpublicspeakers.Asahighly

emotiveissue,speakingabouttheevilsofcorruptioncompellinglyandpledgingto

fightitwascertaintorousepublicinterest,ifnotsupport.Conversely,eventhough

theHanuracandidatecouldlegitimatelypromoteherselfasuntaintedbycorruption,

shelackedthecharismaoftheothercandidatesobservedinthisstudy.12Sheshied

awayfromspeakingtolargeaudiencesofmen,andevenwhentalkingtogroupsof

womenherorationsweregenerallyshortandperfunctory.Moreover,asmentioned,

shewasuncomfortablespeakingopenlyaboutcorruption,claimingthatitwasan

9Theseare:tohavemoral‘worthiness’orcredibility(ethos),prooftosupportargument(logos)andbeabletoarousefeelingsintheaudience(pathos).TheseconceptswerediscussedinChapterOne.10TheBambangSoehartocasewasdiscussedinChapterFour.11TheHanuracandidatecomplainedthathereffortstodemonstratethatshewouldbeacleanandcommittedrepresentativewereoftenmetwithrequestsforacontribution,eventhoughshehadhopedthatthisrhetoricwoulddissuadepeoplefromaskingforgoodsormoney.12Thisassertionisbasedontheresearcher’sownexperienceswiththethreedifferentcandidates.

178

unsavouryissuethatmadeheraudiencesfeeluncomfortable,andsowaslessclearin

publiclyarticulatingherviewsoncorruptionotherthantoassertthatsheopposedit.

Whiledemonstratinglogosseemedthemostdifficultaspectofrhetoricconstruction

forpartiesasawhole,theabilityofindividualcandidatestoestablishitdependedon

theirpastexperience.Inparticular,theGerindraandNasdemcandidatesmademuch

oftheirpersonalcommitmenttofightingcorruption,usingstoriesoftheirpastanti‐

corruptionendeavours.TheGerindracandidatetalkedabouthiseffortsasa

parliamentarian;thathehadfullysupportedandimplementedthebanon

internationaltravelbyGerindralegislatorsatpublicexpenseandralliedagainst

unnecessaryrenovationstothenationalparliamentarybuilding,whichhebelieved

werepartofaplotintendedtochannelfundstotheDemocraticParty.TheNasdem

candidateunderscoredhispastasanactivistandhispreviousresignationfromthe

DPR‐RI,contendingthathehadbeendisgustedbytheimmoralandcorruptbehaviour

ofhispeers,andnowwishedtoreturninordertoexposetheirvenality.Whileboth

assertedthattheirpartieswerecommittedtoeradicatingcorruption,itwasdifficult

topresentconcreteexamplesofimpactfulanti‐corruptionmeasuresundertaken

becausethepartieshadneverbeeninapositiontomeaningfullyinfluenceanti‐

corruptionefforts.Itwasalsostrategictohighlighttheirowntrackrecordasshould

theirpartysufferfromamajorcorruptionscandalinthefuture,theycouldmaintain

theiranti‐corruptionsymbolbecausetheybaseditmostlyuponpersonal

achievementinsteadofpartyrhetoric.

Intheearlystagesofthecampaignthesecandidatesclaimedastrongassociationwith

theirparty’sideals,includingincombatingcorruption.However,theframingofthese

symbolswasdrivenmorebytheindividual’sownprioritiesratherthanthoseofthe

party.Forexample,whileHanurapublicationscriticizedthedeepentrenchmentof

corruptionattheelitelevelandWirantohadarguedforthedeathpenaltyforthose

foundguiltyofcorruption,theHanuracandidatedidnotmentionanypolitical

corruptionscandalsorspeakaboutpunishmentforcorruptionduringhercampaign.

Conversely,theNasdemcandidate’santi‐corruptionsymbolwasmorepronounced

thanthatofhisparty.Hiscampaigncentredonhiscommitmenttofighting

corruption,bothinCenturygateandagainstthe‘traitors’inparliament.Nasdemparty

rhetoricwasmuchmoregeneral,emphasizingnationalismandtheparty’s

commitmenttoaddressingallofIndonesia’sproblems,oneofwhichwascorruption.

TheGerindracandidate’santi‐corruptionsymbolwasthemostcloselyalignedwith

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thatofhisparty:hisstatusasaseniorpartymemberandincumbentmeantthathe

couldinfluencepartypolicyanditsnationalcampaign.Atthesametime,theredidnot

appeartobeanyadditionalcompulsionforhimtofollowthepartylineand,likeother

candidates,hewasfreetocampaigninwhateverwayhesawfit.Itwasclear,too,that

eachcandidatepresentedthesymbolinawaythatunderscoredtheirpersonal

achievementsandpromises,ratherthanthoseofthepartyasawhole.

Inaddition,whileallcandidatesstatedattheoutsetofthecampaignsthattheywere

opposedtocorruption,somewerecautiousabouttheuseofthisrhetoric,

acknowledgingthatithadbeenco‐optedinthepast.Thehistoricalcontextofthe

symbolmeantthatitwouldbedifficulttoconvincevotersthatthedramatism

surroundingtheuseofanti‐corruptionrhetoricwasatruereflectionofthe

candidate’sauthenticself.Inthisrespect,theparties’cleanimagewashelpfulto

candidatesandallowedthemtospeakaboutcorruptionfromapositionofauthority,

butwasnotthesolebasisfortheirpersonalanti‐corruptionsymbols.Ascandidates

werecompetingagainstahostofrivals,bothfromotherpartiesandtheirown,the

methodsofpersuasiontheychosewereofparamountimportance.Votersupportwas

fuelledbytwomeans:usingthemostconvincingrhetoricorbyofferingmaterial

rewards.Giventhedifficultiesinconvincinglyestablishinganti‐corruptionsymbolsin

thefaceofvoterscepticism,itisunsurprisingthatcandidatesdidnotrelysolelyon

rhetorictowinthemvotes.

Appealingcampaignsymbolspresentedacompetitiveedge,especiallyincaseswhere

numerouscandidatesofferedcomparablematerialrewardstovoters.13For

candidateswholackeddeeppockets,anti‐corruptionsymbolswerealsoamechanism

forjustifyingtheabsenceofsizeablematerialrewards.Thiswasparticularlyvisiblein

theHanuracampaign.Whenaskedwhethershecouldprovideacontribution,the

candidatedeflectedrequestswithresponsesthatidentifiedsuchcontributionsas

illegalandthatcandidateswillingtomakethemwouldnotservevoters’interests.

Ultimately,though,allthreecandidatesusedbothsymbolsandmaterialrewardsto

lurevoters,hopingthedualstrategywouldsecurevictory.Thescopeofmaterial

rewardswasdeterminedbythecandidates’campaignbudget.Thedecisionof

whethertoprovidematerialrewardswasalsolinkedtothecandidate’srelationship

13Aspinall(2014b)suggeststhatintheeventthatseveralcandidatesdistributedmoneyorgoodsforvotes,voterstendedtoselectthecandidatethattheypersonallylikedthebest.

180

withpartynetworks(localbranches)andtandemagreementswithothercandidates,

whichaffectedtheircapacitytomaximizethegeographicscopeoftheircampaign.

EventhoughLawNo.10/2008ontheGeneralElectionofMembersfortheDPR,DPD

andDPRDforbidstheuseofanyincentivestogainvotes,thefactthatthisbehaviour

hasbecomecommoncampaignpracticemeantthatcandidateshadtodecidehowto

confrontthechallengesthisposes.Inthecasestudiesobserved,candidateswalkeda

linebetweenacceptableandillicitpracticesandwherethislinefellwasmostly

determinedbytheirownconceptofmoralbehaviour.Materialrewardswere,infact,

anindispensableaspectofelectioncampaigning.Moreimportant,though,washow

thecandidatesthemselvesjustifiedtheiruseintermsoftheirownself‐identification

asbeingcleanandtheirdefinitionsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buying.Material

contributionswerealwaysframedasagiftandthecognitivedissonancewas

addressedbyrationalizingcontributionsasbothnormalandpermissible.Sociological

definitionsofcorruptionplayedacrucialroleinfacilitatingthisrationalizationas

ideasofwhatwasnormalandacceptablewereusedtojustifyactionsthat,strictly

speaking,wereillegal.Thecandidatesthemselvesseemedtooscillatebetween

acceptanceandfrustrationthattheboundariesofnormalbehaviourandillegal

behaviourwerenotoneandthesame.Asthecampaignsworeonandtherewas

increasingpressuretoengageinmoneypoliticstosecurevotes,allthecandidates

becameincreasinglyannoyedbutalsorespondeddifferentlytothepressure.

Candidatesmatter

AsAspinall(2014a:101)contends,votersaremoreinfluencedbyindividual

candidatesthanthepartiestheyrepresent.Logically,then,thecampaignstrategies

theyadoptatthelocallevelaremoreimportantthanthoseadoptedatanationallevel

bythepartiestheyrepresent.Thedecisionbyindividualstoadoptananti‐corruption

symbolfortheirpersonalcampaignsrestsontwofactors—whetherthecandidates

believesthesymbolwilldrawsupport(narrativepreference)andwhetheritfitswith

theirownmoralpriorities.Havinggreatautonomyinplanningandexecutingtheir

ownelectioncampaigns,thesymbolschosenbycandidatesneededtoresonatewith

theirownsetofvaluesand/orbeseenasavote‐getter.Ifasymboldidnotresonate,

theywerefreetoignoreit.Inotherwords,allthe‘bigpicture’rationalizationsfor

usingananti‐corruptionsymbolmayormaynothaveconvincedcandidatestoadopt

them.

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Justashistoryhadprimedtheelectoratetoscorncorruption,thenationalelectoral

campaignprimedthesymbolforindividualcandidates.Asaconsequenceofthe

symbioticrelationshipbetweenpartiesandcandidates—candidatesrequireparty

nominationinordertorunforoffice,whilethepartiesneedtowinseatsin

parliamenttogainpoliticalinfluence—theimageofcandidateswasnecessarily

affected,toagreaterorlesserextent,bytheoverallimageoftheirparty.Intheory,

candidateshavetheopportunitytocapitalizeonnationalagenda‐setting,relyingonit

tofill‘knowledgegaps’(GeysandVermeir2014).Intheabsenceofinformationabout

aparticularcandidate,votersdrawon‘partycues’,judgingthemonthereputationof

thepartythattheyrepresent.Inpractice,somecandidatesrecognizedthattheir

partieshadalreadydevelopedananti‐corruptionsymbolandcapitalizedonthisby

adoptingitasapersonalsymbolaswell.However,whilepartyimagecanplayarole

indeterminingvoterdecisions,mostcandidatessawnational–levelcampaignsas

‘secondarytotheirownefforts’(Aspinall2014a:107).

Amongstcandidateswhooptedtoconstructananti‐corruptionsymbol,the

conceptualizationoftheissuevariedleadingtodifferenttypesofnarrativesintheir

electioncampaigns.Theycould‘mobilize’votersbymakingtheirpersonalideological

prioritiesattractivetovotersor‘chase’thembycraftingrhetoricinlinewithwhat

theybelievedthepublicwantedtohear(Rohrschneider2002:368‐369).TheHanura

candidatewasclearlychasingvotes,illustratedbyherdecisiontostopusingananti‐

corruptionsymbolwhenshefeltitwasnotappealingorifitmadepeoplefeel

uncomfortable.TheGerindracandidate,whileusingaverydifferenttypeofrhetoric,

alsoappearedtobechasingvotes.Whilehetouchedupontheimportanceof

combatingcorruptionduringsomespeeches,hisfocuswasondemonstratinghis

commitmenttotheproblem.Heassumedthatpeoplewantedparliamentariansthat

wouldfightcorruptionandbelievedhehadtoprovethathewasthecontenderfor

thisjob.Partypoliciesweregenerallyonlymentionedwhentheysupportedhis

personalsymbol.Bycontrast,theNasdemcandidatetriedtomobilizevotes.Hespoke

ofcorruptionasaterribleevilthroughoutthecampaign,rampinguphisrhetoricas

theelectiondatedrewcloser.Heopenlycriticizedothers,inspiteofthediscomfort

thiscaused,andendeavouredtopersuadevotersoftheimportanceofdealingwith

whathebelievedtobemajorcasesofcorruption.Hisapproachreliedpartlyon

convincingvotersthathavingcleanlegislatorswhowouldnotbreakthelaw,rather

thanthe‘traitors’whowerealreadyinparliament,wascrucialtotheirowninterests.

182

Therelationshipbetweencandidatesandtheirparties’nationalleadershipplayed

someroleinshapinghowcandidatesusedthesesymbols.Allthecandidatesinthis

studywerepartymemberswithstronglinkstothecentralcommittee,ifnotmembers

ofitthemselves.Asseniorrepresentativesoftheparty,theyfeltmoreinclinedto

adoptapartysymbolastheirown.Itwasalsomademorelikelybythefactthatall

threeofthesecandidateshadbeenpartymemberspriortobeingnominatedand

werethefirst‐rankedpartycandidateintheirrespectiveelectorates.Theyfeltthe

needtoupholdthereputationofthepartyandpaintitinthemostpositivelight

possible.Inaddition,asspokespersonsfortheirparties,theGerindraandNasdem

candidateswerepublicfiguresanditwouldreflectpoorlyonthemiftheyignored

partyrhetoric.TheHanuracandidatewasakeensupporterofWirantoandthusalso

hadanallegiancetothepartyandincentivetosupportitsrhetoric.

However,ultimately,thedecisiontoupholdpartysymbolswasdrivenmorebythe

candidates’desiretowinthanbytheirsenseofpartyloyalty.Andwhileallthree

candidatesassertedthattheywishedtoappealtovotersbydenouncingcorruption

andportrayingthemselvesasclean,theystillhadtogaugetheirlocalcontextwhen

decidinghowbesttorousesupport(Figure6.1).

Figure6.1Influencesuponcandidates’politicalcampaignstrategy

183

Localcontextwasparticularlyinfluentialforcandidateschasingvotes,becausetheir

strategydependedonselectingsymbolsthatwerepertinenttovoters.Also

important,however,wastheirabilitytoinfluencevotersusingkinshiptiesand

brokernetworks.Wheresuchtieswerestrong,theuseofsymbolswasmore

consistentbecausethecandidatecould,onatleastsomelevel,beassuredofsome

votersympathyifnotoutrightsupport.Buttheselocalrelationshipsstillneededtobe

complementedwitheffectivecampaigns,especiallywherecandidatesneededto

appealtoswingvotersorifmorethanonecandidatehadstronglocaltiesinthesame

electorate.Theoretically,themosteffectiveapproachwouldincludeacoordinated

useofsymbols,representingthepartyasaunitedforcecommittedtoeradicating

corruptionandworkingforthebenefitofthepeople.However,giventhegeographic

distancesandthedifferentscalesacrosswhichelectioncampaignsoccurinIndonesia,

ensuringthatpartysymbolsarepromotedinaconsistentmannerismoreeasilysaid

thandone.

Diffusionofsymbols

Ingeneral,politicalcampaignsinIndonesiaarehighlyindividualized.Eveninnation‐

widepartycampaignsmediaattentionisoftenfocusedonkeypartyfigures,rather

thanonrelayingtheparty’svisionandmissionasawhole.Similarly,atthelocallevel

candidatestendtoemphasizetheirindividualfamilyorethniclinksandpersonal

historyratherthantheplatformoftheirparty.Thenatureofelectioncampaignsin

Indonesiaissuchthatitgeneratestwodifferentarenasofcampaign‘theatre’.14The

arenasaredistinguishedbywhoorganizesthecampaignsandthescopeofthe

audience.Aspinall(2014a:101)identifiesthesedistinctarenasinhisdiscussionof

thedifferentterminologyusedtodescribepoliticalcampaignsinIndonesia,namely

the‘air’and‘ground’wars.Ontheonehand,thereisanational‐levelcampaignledby

professionalmediapersonnelinconjunctionwithseniorpartyofficials,targeting

votersacrosstheentirecountry.Ontheotherhand,thereareindividualcandidates

lookingtoraisetheirprofilewithinspecificelectoraldistricts.Thesensethatnational

campaignsareremovedfromthoseofindividualcandidatesiscultivatedbythe

natureoftheirtargetaudienceandthestrategiesthosetargetaudiencesinspire.

Thesetwotheatricalarenasnecessarilyusedifferentcampaignmethodstosellthe

anti‐corruptionsymboltovoters(seeTable6.1).Nationalcampaignsaredesignedto

14ThetermisdrawnfromBlackbourn(1987)andApter(2006)(discussedinChapterOne),whoarguethatpoliticsisaformoftheatrebecauseitinvolvestheinstrumentalmanipulationofsymbolsinordertoattainpower.

184

appealbroadlybutarerelativelystatic.Atthelocallevel,becauseoftheirdirect

proximitytovoters,candidatesaremoresusceptibletocitizenscrutinyandrequests.

Table6.1Summaryofdifferenttypesofdiffusioninelectioncampaigns

NATIONAL INDIVIDUAL

Non‐relational Relational Mediated

Mechanisms

Mediaadvertising

Mediareports

Televisionadvertising

Officialwebsite

Socialmedia

Masspublicrallies

Grassrootsmeetings

Publicrallies

Donationsand/or

contributions

Campaignteam

Brokers

Contributionsand

othermaterialrewards

Characteristics

Centralized

Unidirectional,top‐

downdiffusion

Multi‐directional

diffusion;candidates’

campaignsinfluenced

fromaboveandbelow

Campaignstrategies

mayincludetheuseof

symbolsandvote‐

buying

Drawsuponexisting

socialnetworksfor

support

Usedtofacilitatethe

transferof

goods/moneyto

influencevoters

Outcom

es

Lessscopeforvotersto

directlyinfluence

strategy

Themesofthe

campaignand

strategiesrelatively

static

Votersareableto

personallymake

demandsofcandidates

Candidatespressured

torespondtovoter

requests

Candidatesmayadapt

campaignsinresponse

tovoterfeedback

Logisticallyeasierfor

candidatestogather

votes

Easierformoneyand

goodstochangehands

Cross‐scalardiffusionprovidesaconceptualframeworkforunderstandingthe

communicationofsymbolsduringanelectoralcampaign.Nationallevelcampaigns

occurprimarilythroughwhatdiffusiontheoristsdescribeasnon‐relationalforms

suchaspublications,themedia,theInternetandbillboards.Concentrationsof

funding,advertisingresourcesandmarketingandcommunicationsexpertisewere

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foundinthecentralpartyoffice,controlledbytheCentralCommittee.Whileparty

leaderstouredthecountrypriortotheelectiontoappearatrallies,theseeventscould

hardlybeconsideredrelationalformsofdiffusionastherewaslittledirectcontact

betweenthepartyleadersandattendees.Theefficacyoftheseralliesisalsodebatable

giventhatpeoplewereoftenpaidtoattend.15Politicalcommunicationinthese

nationalcampaignswasgenerallycharacterizedbyaunidirectionalflowof

propaganda.Inthenon‐relationaldiffusionofideas,scopefordynamismand

multidirectionalflowsisinherentlylimitedbythelackofdirectcontactwithvotersor

feedbackfromthem.16Usingdogmaticandabsolutistslogans,whichdonotinvitea

responsefromcitizens,partiesdiscouragedmeaningfulvoterengagement.17

Furthermore,marketingandpublicrelationsexpertswerebasedinJakartaandwere

unlikelytogooutoftheirwaytoelicitinputorcriticismfromthoseoutsideofmajor

urbancentres,letaloneincorporatefeedbackintothecampaignstrategy.

Whilenationalcampaignsreliedprimarilyonnon‐relationaldiffusion,many

candidateschosetocampaignontheground,hopingtogarnersupportviarelational

electioneering.AsnotedinChapterOne,relationaldiffusionispremisedonthenotion

thatideasarespreadbycontactbetweenpeople,flowingbetweenthemonthebasis

oftrust.TosaythatIndonesianvotersaregenerallydistrustfulofpoliticalpartiesis

reflectiveofthecountry’spoliticalreality(Tomsa2014b:249)socandidateshopedto

buildsocialcapitalwithvotersthroughdirectengagement.Inspiredbythepopularity

ofnow‐PresidentJokowi’sblusukanstyleofcampaigning‐gettingclosertovotersby

visitingthemintheirvillages‐candidateswantedtobeseentobelisteningtovoters.

Thus,trust‐buildingwaspremisedontheideathatmeetingthecandidatesinperson

wouldincreasesupport.AstheHanuracandidateexplained,‘Iftheydon’tknowyou,

theycan’tloveyou.’Whilecandidatesdiduseposters,stickersandthemedia,they

generallyfeltthatmeetingswithvillagersweremostinfluential.Allofthecandidates

studiedlivedinJakarta,andthereforehadtotraveltotheirelectoratestocampaignin

person.Eachassessedthatthiswasacrucialpartoftheircampaignsandmadetime

totourtheirlocalelectorate.

15AsdiscussedinChapterFour,ralliesareoftenpopulatedbypaidattendees(Pepinsky2014;Simandjuntak2012:101).16Fionna(2014)arguesthattheprominentmediacampaigntacticsadoptedbypartiesfailtotrulyinfluencetheirintendedaudience,withsurveyfindingssuggestingthatvotersdonotconsidertelevisionadvertisingandtheuseofbannersandposters,whicharetheprimarymodeofelectioneering,tobeeffective.17Forexample,oneofGerindra’sprimarycampaignsloganswas:‘GerindraWins,PrabowoisPresident’(GerindraMenang,PrabowoPresiden).

186

Ontheirvisitstoneighbourhoodsandvillages,candidatescouldnotsimplygivea

stumpspeech.Theyhadtobeopentovotercommentsandrequests—oratleastgive

theimpressionofbeingopentothem—inordertogaintheirconfidence.Thiswas

especiallyimportantiftheydidnothavefamilialtiestotheareaorotherkindsof

socialnetworks.Thisdirectinteractionbetweencandidatesandvotersfacilitateda

moremulti‐directionalflowofideas.Moreover,theinfluenceofvotersthemselves

becamemorecogent,sincecandidatesgenerallywantedtosecuretheirvotesin

advance.18Candidatesthusfeltpressuredtomeettheirrequests.Thiscouldbe

problematicbecausesomevillagesmadedemandsthatcouldnotbeaddressedwithin

thelimitsofthecandidate’sbudget.Inaddition,thecandidatehadtodecidehowto

proceed,knowingthatwhilevote‐buyingwasstandardpracticeinsomeplaces,itwas

alsoillegal.Althoughitwasunlikelythattheywouldbeprosecutedforbribingvoters,

theyriskedbeinglabelledahypocriteforprojectingananti‐corruptionsymbolwhile

atthesametimeusingmoneypoliticstogainsupport.19

Someofthedifficultiesinestablishingtrustonthegroundcouldbemitigatedbyusing

amediatedapproach.Campaignteamsareakeycomponentinthe‘groundwar’,

becausetheyallowcandidatestomakeuseofthetrustandinfluenceofrespected

communitymembersintheirteaminordertoreachawidergroupofpeople.20These

teamsoftenincludememberswhoarehiredspecificallybecauseoftheirpre‐existing

influencewithinareasoftheelectorate.Thispracticeisaformofmediateddiffusion,

whichoccursthroughtheuseofa‘broker’toconnectpeoplewhowouldnot

otherwiseknoweachother,thatis,thecandidateandthevoterviathebroker.

Brokersarevaluablebecausetheyprovideinsightintothevoterpatternsofa

neighbourhood:

18ResearchbyAspinall(2014a:101)onthestrategiesofindividualcandidatecampaignssupportsthisassertion.Heproposesthatvoterspreferredcandidateswhowereabletoconnectwithordinarypeople,speaktothemintheirownvernacular,werewillingtovisitthemintheirownhomesandweregraciousratherthat“arrogant”.Asaresult,manycandidatesadoptedcampaignstrategiesthatprioritizedgrassrootsmeetingsratherthanmediacampaignsandlarge‐scalepartyrallies.19Thornley(2014),inanopinionpiecewrittenfollowingtheelection,contendsthatvote‐buyingandmoneypoliticswasamalignantfeatureofthelegislativeelectionsandthattheElectoralSupervisoryBoard(BadanPengawasPemilu,Bawaslu)didnotdemonstrate‘aclearcommitmenttopreventandprosecutecasesofelectoralcorruption’.20Thispracticeiscommoninseveralcountriesacrosstheworld.Forexample,Callahan(2005)exploresvote‐buyingandsocialnormsinThailand;GonzalezOcantosetal.(2014)conductedastudyonvote‐buyingnormsfromarangeofcountriesinSouthAmerica;andWantchekon(2003)providesinsightintovote‐buyingandclientelisminBenin.

187

Ofparticularvaluearepeoplewholiveinthesameneighbourhoodastheset

ofvotersforwhoseactionstheyareresponsible.Itismucheasierfora

neighbourhoodinsidertoknowwhosechildrenareill,whoturnedoutinthe

lastelectionandwhostayedhome,whetheravoterturnedagainstaparty,or

whoseemstohavedefectedandvotedforanopponent,despitehaving

benefittedfrompartylargesse(Stokesetal.2013:19).

Mostbrokershavepositionsofinfluenceandusepoliticalconnectionstoassist

peopletogainvotesintheirneighbourhoods(GonzalezOcantosetal.2014).Wherea

decisionismadetodistributegoodsorcashtovoters,brokersdosoonbehalfofthe

candidate—therationalebeingthatthebroker’ssocialstatuswilladdvaluetothe

giftswhilealsoinsulatingthecandidatefromallegationsofwrongdoing.

Thebrokersystem,byitsverynature,requirescandidatestodeeplytrusttheir

campaignteamsasitcanbedifficultforcandidatestoensurethatbrokersfulfiltheir

promisesandthatvoterswhotaketheirmoneydoinfactvoteforthem(Stokesetal.

2013).21Employingbrokersisrisky.Theymaybetraythecandidatetheyagreedto

help,forexample,bytakingmoneyfromseveralopposingcandidatesinoneareaor

siphoningmoneyfromthefundstheyhavebeengiventodistributetovoters

(Aspinall2014c).Theuseofbrokersvariedbetweentheindividualcandidates

observedinthisstudy,influencedbytheirpersonalcircumstances—experience,

backgroundandpartystatusallmattered.TheHanuracandidatewasmostrelianton

advicefromhercampaignteam,whoconvincedhertoengageinvote‐buyinginthe

latestagesofthecampaign,eventhoughshehadclaimedfromtheoutsettobe

staunchlyagainstthepractice.TheGerindracandidateusedthesamepeoplehehad

usedinpreviouscampaigns,withwhomhefelthehadestablishedstrongtrust

relationships.Asaresult,hewasnotconcernedaboutbeingbetrayed.TheNasdem

candidateprimarilyusedpartycadrestoorganizehiscampaignanddidnotexpress

anysuspicionsaboutpeopleonhisteammisusingmoney.

Theseparatecampaignspheres,associatedwithdifferenttypesofdiffusion,alsohad

distinctpurposes.Thenationalcampaign,whichwasintendedtorepresenttheparty

asawhole,focusedonbuildingananti‐corruptionsymbolthatwouldnotonlyprime

theissueofcorruptionbutalsoestablishastrongownershipoftheissue.Non‐

21Foracomprehensiveoverviewoftheuseofbrokersinthe2014Indonesianlegislativeelection,seeAspinall(2014c).

188

directionaldiffusion,however,leftlittleroomfornuanceddiscussionandtended

towardspropaganda.Meanwhile,thetwo‐waycommunicationflowbetweenthe

individualcandidateandthevotersfacilitatedbyrelationalinteractionsaccountedfor

lesscohesivesymboldevelopmentaswellasdivergentstrategies.Ontheonehand

therewasadesiretoowntheanti‐corruptionsymbolandbeperceivedasjust,

righteousandclean.Ontheotherhand,therewasastrongtemptationtorespondto

voterdemandsformoneyandgoodsinordertosecurevotes,butgivingintothis

demandwoulddamagetheanti‐corruptionsymbolandpaintthecandidatesandtheir

partiesashypocrites.

Mixedmessages

Emergingpartiessoughttoowntheanti‐corruptionsymbolbecausetheythoughtit

wouldhelpthemachievetheirelectoralgoals.Gerindrabecamethethird‐largest

partyinparliament,Hanuraimprovedonits2009resultsandNasdemattractedmore

thanenoughvotestoensureitspresenceinparliament—yetallthreefellshortof

theirstatedtargets.Whilemanyfactorscontributedtotheseresults,includingover‐

ambitioustargets,itisclearthattheircampaignstrategiesdidnotdeliver.Using

symbolismwasonecampaignstrategyamongmany,andanti‐corruptionsymbols

wereoneofmanysymbolsadoptedbytheparties.Buttheevidencepresentedhere

suggeststhat,whilepotentiallyapositivecampaigntool,theparties’anti‐corruption

symbolsfailedtoinspiremasssupport.

Akeyreasonforthiswasthedisjuncturebetweenthenationalandlocalarenas.

Disparitiesbetweennationalandindividualrhetoric,asaconsequenceoftherelative

independenceofthetwocampaignarenas,ledtoaninconsistentuseofanti‐

corruptionsymbols.Whilethecampaignsoperatedsimultaneouslyandhadthesame

ultimategoal—tomaximizepublicsupportfortheparty—coordinationacrossscales

wasneitherprioritizednorencouraged.Moreover,therelationshipbetweenthetwo

arenasdependedonthecandidate’sownstatuswithintheparty.Asnotedabove,

candidateswithpartyleadershiprolesatthenationalleveltendedtoadoptcampaign

symbolsthatmatchedthoseselectedbytheparty.Attimes,also,theyusedtheir

positiontosteertheparty’scampaigninadirectionthatservedtheirowninterests.

ThiswasthecasewiththeNasdemcandidate,whosemainprioritiesincludedthe

resolutionoftheBankCenturycase,whowasabletomakethispartofthenational

partysymbol.Forthemostpart,though,individualcandidateshadverylittle

influenceuponthecampaignstrategiesdevelopedbytheirparty’scentralcommittee.

189

Theconverseprovedtobealmostequallytrue.Partiesrelyingonindividual

candidatestoadoptcampaignsymbolsusedatthenationallevelalsoignoredthe

possiblemotivationsthatcandidatesmayhaveforrunningforoffice.Whilesome

candidateswerealreadypartymembers,stafforevenleaders,manymorewere

recentrecruitswithlittlegroundingintheparty’s‘visionandmission’,orpeoplewho

simplywishedtorunforofficeandwentshoppingforapartytoallowthemtodo

so.22Becausethenumberofpartymemberswantingtorunforofficeoftenfellshort

ofthenumberofseatsavailableinanygivenelectorate,partiesoftenapproved

candidatesthatweremoreinterestedinwinningthanadheringtopartynorms.23

Recruitingcandidatesfromoutsidethepartywasevenencouraged,asmanyparties

chargedafeeinreturnfortheirbacking,providingarevenue‐raisingopportunity

(Mietzner2013:85).Furthermore,partiesmadelittleefforttoensurethatcandidates

weregenuinelycommittedtopartyvalues—infact,itwaswidelyacceptedthatmost

candidatesfeltlittleobligationtotheirpartyaftertheelection(Mietzner2013:85).In

manycases,theonlyrealrequirementwasthatthecandidatepaidtheparty

nominationfeeand/orthattheywerevote‐getterswhocouldpotentiallyamassvotes

throughtheirpopularityorconnections.24

Parties,moreover,hadnoinstitutionalmeansforensuringthatsymbolswereused

consistentlyorthatcandidatesrancleancampaigns.Half‐heartedattemptsto

sanctionwrongdoingfelltotheparty’sethicscommittee,whichhandledcomplaints

andreportsofelectoralmisconductinternally.Ifpartymemberswerefoundtohave

boughtvotesorotherwiseusedfundsillegallyduringthecampaign,thentheywere

(theoretically)answerabletoboththeethicscommitteeandthelawgoverning

electioncampaigns.25Giventheenormousnumberofcandidatesandthelimited

resourcesoftheparty,itwasnotsurprisingthattheethicscommitteewasrarely

22Tomsa(2014b:269‐270)arguesthatthishadledtothephenomenonof‘partyshopping’,inwhichcandidateswouldsimplyswitchpartiessothattheycouldattainthehighestpartyrankingpossible.Whiletheopenlistsystemhaseffectivelyabolishedthisneed,manycandidatesstillbelievethatafirst‐rankedpositionwillincreasetheirlikelihoodofsuccess.23Partieswantingtorunthemaximumnumberofcandidates,believingthatthiswilltranslatetothemaximumnumberofvotes,oftenneedtorecruitcandidatesfromoutsidetheparty.Thiswasparticularlythecasewithsourcingfemalecandidates,withpartiesrequiredbylawtohaveatleast30percentfemalecandidatesontheircandidatelists(Shair‐Rosenfield2012:579‐580).24Carawayetal.(2014)contendthatthisisthecasewithmanytradeunionleaderswhoareinvitedtobecomecandidatesforparties.Politicalpartiesassumethatthesecandidatescanrallyvotesfromthemembersoftheirunion,thereforeactingasa‘vote‐getter’fortheparty.25Theonlycorruptioncasetoaffectanemergingpartyduringthe2014campaignswasHanura’scaseofBambangSoeharto.Theparty’sethicscommitteeruledtosuspendSoeharto’smembershipuntilthecasewasresolved,butotherwisetherewerenoreportedcasesoftheethicscommitteesdismissingpartymembersforillicitactivityduringthecampaign.

190

calleduponduringthecampaignperiod.Moreover,ifused,thesemechanismshadthe

potentialtodrawpublicitytoillegalcampaignpracticeswithintheparty,whichcould

damageitsreputation.Whethercompelledbylackofresourcesorlackofwill,the

ethicscommitteecouldalsosimplychoosetoignorecomplaints.Themostcommon

accusationsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingwere,infact,usuallylodgedvia

informalchannelsbyfellowpartycandidates.26Sometimesthesecomplaintsreflected

disputessurroundingterritory,accesstoresources,orparty‐listcandidaterankings.

Suchcomplaintswereusuallyexpressedtobranchofficepartyleadersratherthan

nationalofficebecausethoserelationshipsweregenerallystrongerandlocalparty

elitesweremoreattunedtothecampaignactivitiesofcandidates.However,even

whensuchcomplaintsweremadefromwithintheparty,dismissalswere

uncommon.27Thelackofoversightofindividualcandidatesleadstoquestionsabout

whetherthepartiesweregenuinelycommittedtopreventingelectoralcorruption.As

notedearlier,partyrhetoricformulatedatthenationallevelaimedtoconvincepeople

thattheywerecommittedtomaintainingtheintegrityoftheirparties—thatis,

ensuringthattheirmembersdidnotactillegally—andtotheeradicationof

corruptionmorebroadly.Buttheparties’anti‐corruptionsymbolswereconveniently

vagueontheuseofmoneypoliticsinelections,andthelackofeffectiveoversight

mechanismsimpliedlittleinterestinpolicingtheproblem.

Withalmostnoinputoroversightoflocalcampaignsbytheparties’central

committeesafterthecandidateshadbeenselected,itwasultimatelyuptoindividuals

astowhethertheyadoptedananti‐corruptionsymbol,howtheyconstructedthat

symbol,whatrhetorictheyused,andwhethertheysustainedthesymbolthroughout

theirentirecampaign.Whilenationalpartysymbolshadsomeinfluence,candidates

26Partymemberscouldreportbacktothelocal,provincialorcentralpartyleader(s)aboutperceivedbreachesbyotherpartycandidates.DuringfieldworkthisprocesswasobservedonceintheEastJavaelectoratewhereaDPRDIIcandidatehadcomplainedaboutthetacticsofanationallevelcandidate,whowasalsoawell‐knownbusinessman,accusinghimofspendingvastsumsofmoneytobuyvotesinparticularvillageswithwhichtheDPRDIIcandidatewasconnected.Theaccusationswerecommonknowledgewithinthepartyandahottopicofconversationforseveralweeks.Inspiteofthis,thecandidatesufferednosanctions,norwasthereaninvestigationintotheallegations.TheHanuracandidateheldthatthepartyneededthebusinessman’smoneyandthereforewasreluctanttodismisshim.27Someeffortwasmadetopolicecampaignterritorytoavoidoverlappingcampaigns.Thiswasobservedanecdotallyinallthreecasestudies,althoughitsintensitydependedonhowinvolvedindividualpartyleadersatthelocallevelwerewillingtobecomeinthedisputesbetweencandidatesduringthecampaign.Hamdi(Forthcoming:186)describestheterritorialdivisionsbetweencandidatesinMadiun,EastJava,notingthatstrivingforterritorialdominanceinareasofinfluenceandadvantagewasapopularelectionstrategy.

191

focusedonpromotingapersonalrhetoricintheircampaigns.28Thedistinction

betweenrhetoricusedbythepartiesandindividualcandidatesreflectedthedifferent

arenasinwhichtheyoperated.Afurtherexplanationforthedisparitybetween

nationalandlocallevelcampaignswasthatthesymbolsidentifiedbythepartysimply

didnotresonatewithvotersinparticularelectorates.Individualcandidateswho

chosetoprioritizepersonalencounterswithvotersfoundthatanti‐corruption

discoursecouldbeunpersuasive.Forthosecampaigningontheground,itwasalltoo

evidentthattheprovisionofmaterialrewardsremainedanintegralpartofelectoral

politics.Candidatescommonlydistributedelectionparaphernalia(suchast‐shirts

andstickers)andprovidedfoodandentertainmentatralliesinordertoinvoke

backingfromcitizens.Butthatwasoftennotenough:voterswereusedtobeing

offeredmaterialrewardsfortheirsupportandprovedinmanycasesnotonlytobe

comfortablewiththepractice,butindeedtoexpectit.

Cognitivedissonanceisgeneratedbetweenthevoters’perceptionthatmoneypolitics

continuestobethemodusoperandiofcandidatesandparties’anti‐corruption

rhetoric,whichultimatelyunderminestheanti‐corruptionsymbolitself.Ethoswas

lost,asitisdifficulttoestablishmoralcredibilitywithinasystemthatseemsso

thoroughlycorrupted.Allthreecandidatescomplainedaboutmoneypolitics,but

eventheyhadtocarefullyconsidertheprosandconsofrefusingtoengageinit.For

example,theHanuracandidate—whodidnothavethesamelocalconnectionsas

othercandidates,andthusfounditmoredifficulttowinoverpeople—believedatthe

outsetofhercampaignthatshecouldgarnersupportthroughananti‐corruption

symbolandbypromotingherselfascleanandhonest.Shecautionedvillagersagainst

acceptingmoneyforcandidates,asvote‐buyingleadstopoorgovernment

representativesthatwillnotprotecttheinterestsofordinaryfolk.Citizens,she

argued,shouldselectthepersonwhoismostcommittedtorepresentingtheir

interests,notthepersonwhooffersthemostmoney.But,intheend,shefeltthatthis

28Thetraditionoffigure‐centricpoliticscontinuestobeevidenttoday,demonstratedbothbythenationalparty‐levelfocusonpromoting(potential)presidentialcandidatesandtheindividual‐centriccampaignsofthecandidatesthemselves.Alongsidecampaignsbasedonsymbols,partiesalsoattemptedtoappealtovotersbasedontheirpreferredpresidentialcandidate.Someparties,includingGerindraandHanura,identifiedtheirpresidentialnomineesfromtheoutset.Inthesamevein,PDIPusedthenominationofJokowitogarnerpopularsupportamongstvoters,hopingthatpeoplewouldvoteforthepartybecausetheywantedJokowitobecomethenextpresident(Kwok2014).Theso‐called‘Jokowieffect’wasexpectedtohelpPDIPgainenoughvotestonominatehimasapresidentialcandidatewithouthavingtoformacoalitionwithotherparties.PDIPdidgainmoreparliamentaryseatsthananyotherpartyintheelection,butfellshortofexpectations,withthepartyfailingtoobtainover20percentofvotes(Croft‐Cusworth2014;McRae2014;Mietzner2014:118).

192

approachwasineffective,notbecauseshewasunsuccessfulincreatingananti‐

corruptionsymbol,butratherbecausevoterswerenotactuallyinterestedinclean

candidates.HeropinionwassupportedbyanIndikatorsurveyreleasedinDecember

2013,whichfoundthat41.5percentofthosesurveyedconsideredvote‐buyingan

‘acceptablepartofdemocracy’whileonly4.3percentofthosesurveyedsaidthey

wouldnotacceptanyformofpaymentfortheirvote(Halim2013).29

Ultimately,allthreecandidatesfeltpressuretousemoneytogaininfluence.30This

puttheminadifficultposition—knowingthatthepartysymbolcontradictedthe

electionnormsofmoneypoliticsandvote‐buyingandthattheyjeopardizedtheir

chancesofwinningiftheyrefusedtousemoneyasatoolofpersuasionaltogether.

Whilethecandidateshopedthatanti‐corruptionrhetoricwouldappealtotheir

constituents—bothbecauseitwaspartoftheirownmoralbeliefsandvote‐buying

wasprohibitivelyexpensive—inreality,theydidnotfindthistobethecase.Research

fromothercountriessuggestsatleasttwofactorsthatmayfostersuchasituation.

First,asGonzalezOcantosetal.(2014)foundintheircross‐nationalstudyofLatin

Americanstates,themorenormalvote‐buyingis,thelessstigmatizedpeoplewhodo

itwillbe.Peoplerationalizetheirbehaviourtoavoidcognitivedissonance,becauseno

onelikestothinkofthemselvesas‘bad’.Thus,ifpeoplehaveacceptedmoneyinthe

past,theymaybereluctanttobuyintoanti‐corruptionsymbolismbecauseitwill

forcethemtoacceptthattheyhavebeen‘bad’inthepast.Second,asBalmasand

Sheafer(2010:208)contendinrelationtoIsrael,themoresalientanissueistothe

publicmind,themorelikelyitistobeacriterionforcandidateevaluation.Itseems

thatcorruption,atleastinsomeelectorates,wassimplynotassalientanissueas

candidateshadexpected.Asaconsequence,theyadoptedmultifacetedcampaigns

29Thisstudydidnotseektodeterminewhytheelectoratecontinuestoseekmaterialrewardsfortheirvotes.However,thecasestudiesdemonstratethatthiswasapersistentquestionfacedbycandidates.Anumberofacademicshaveproposedexplanationsforthisphenomenon.Goodpaster(2002:100)arguesthatcitizensunderstandthattheiropinionsareoflittleconsequencetooffice‐holdersonceelected—asentimentthatremainstruetoday—andsobelievethatcandidatesareaccountabletotheirconstituentsonlyduringtheirbidsfor(re)election.Havingbeenrepresentedbyparliamentarianswhopaidlittleattentiontotheirneedsinthepast,votershavebecomeaccustomedtojudgingcandidatesonthematerialbenefitstheyofferinthe‘hereandnow’.Votercynicismtowardspoliticiansisnotnew:Aspinall(2005a)arguesthatitwascommonearlyonintheReformasiperiod.ThecorruptionscandalsduringYudhoyono’ssecondtermdidlittletoquellthiscynicism.30ThisissupportedbyMietzner(2014:119),whoarguesthatthe2014electionsdemonstratedthe‘continuedimportanceofmoneyandorganizedmachinepoliticsinpost‐SuhartoIndonesia’.ResearchbyMcRae(2013:291)alsofoundthatthecostofrunningforofficecanbe‘prohibitivelyexpensive’,withparliamentariansinterviewedestimatingthattheywouldspendaroundUSD100,000ontheirre‐electioncampaignsfor2014.

193

thatintegratedanti‐corruptionsymbolismintoelectoralstrategiesthatalsoincluded

theuseofvotebrokersandmoneypoliticsinordertoinfluencevoters.

Inordertorationalizetheincongruenceofcombiningananti‐corruptionsymbolwith

moneypoliticsandvote‐buying,thecandidatesframedtheiruseofmoneyas

donations,reimbursements,orculturally‐necessarygifts—allofwhichwerenotonly

normalelectionpracticebutarewidelyaccepted.Theyopenlyadmittedto

strategicallyusingdonationsandgivinggiftsinordertopersuadevoters,but

vigorouslydeniedthattheyhadengagedinmoneypolitics.Indoingso,theymediated

theunderlyingcognitivedissonancetheyexperiencedbynarrowlydefiningmoney

politicsandvote‐buyinganddistinguishingitfromotherpayments,which,although

intendedtopersuade,falloutsidethenarrowlimitsofthedefinitionstheyadopted.

Thisalsoallowedthecandidatestomaintainthattheywere‘clean’inspiteof

distributingmoney,therefore,retainingtheiranti‐corruptionsymbolandsustaining

itslinktobroaderpartysymbols.

Conclusion

Politicalsymboltheoryallowsustounderstandthattheintentionofemerging

parties’useofanti‐corruptionsymbolswastoinfluencetheaudienceandgainvotes

ratherthannecessarilybeingasincerereflectionofpoliticalprinciples.Successful

alignmentwithaparticularpoliticalsymboldependsuponwell‐constructedrhetoric

thatisabletopersuadevotersthatthesymbolsputforwardareatruereflectionof

authenticgoals.Whileboththenationalcampaignsoftheemergingpartiesandthe

localcampaignsofthoseparties’individualcandidatesattemptedtomobilizeananti‐

corruptionsymbol,neithertrulyachievedownershipofthesymbol—letalone

coherenceacrossscales.Thedeepdisconnectbetweentheanti‐corruptionsymbol

constructedatthenationallevelandwhathappenedonthegroundcompromisedthe

symbol’sintegrity.Atthenationallevel,partiescompetedtobeseenasthe‘cleanest’

andthemostfirmagainstcorruption.Individualcandidates,however,foundthat—

despitetheapparenttractionoftheanti‐corruptionmovement—moneystilltalks.

Thislackofcohesionprovidesaprismforunderstandingoneofthekeypolitical

paradoxesofIndonesia:howcananti‐corruptionrhetoricbesowidespreadandyet

moneypoliticsandvote‐buyingbesoprolific?Thesimultaneousexistenceofthese

phenomenacanbeexplainedatleastinpartbythelackofcoherencewithinpolitical

partiesduringelectoralcampaigns.In2014,partyactorsinthenationalarena

constructedsymbolswithlittleinputfromthevoters,identifyingcorruptionasa

194

popularpoliticalissue.Whenindividualcandidatesinvokedthesesymbolsintheir

‘groundwars’,thereactionofvotersdemonstratedthattheassumedsalienceofthe

issuedidnotalwaysresultinelectoralsupport.Thecandidatesexaminedinthis

studytrulywantedtorunacleancampaign.However,theyfacedaconflictbetween

moralityandpracticality.Vote‐buyingisariskyendeavourwithuncertainreturns.

Butwhilepayingmaynotguaranteeawin,failuretodistributematerialrewards

almostcertainlyguaranteedaloss.Refusaltoengageinmoneypoliticsandvote‐

buyingthusmeantjeopardizingtheirelectoralfate.

Theincongruitybetweenwhathappensatthesedifferentscalesdemonstratesthe

fragmentednatureofpoliticalpartiesmorebroadly,reflectingthattheyarenota

single,coherententity,butacollectionofindividualswiththeirowninterestsand

priorities.Thesuccessfuluseofpoliticalsymbolsincampaignsdepends,tosome

extent,onconsistencyofrhetoricandaction.Whilealreadyprimed,ananti‐

corruptionsymbollosesallpersuasivepowerifitisnotcredible,demonstrableand

convincinglyrelayed.Aspoliticalpartiesandcandidatesalreadyhavetobattlevoter

perceptionsofbeinguntrustworthyandcorrupt,thelackofcohesioninpolitical

symbols—particularlybetweenwhatvotershearandwhattheyexperience—

underminestheuseofananti‐corruptionsymbolasawhole,squanderingresources

andopportunitiestotrulyconnectwithvotersandlimitingtheirchancesofsuccess.

195

ConclusionSeveralstudieshaveidentifiedtheimportantroleofpoliticalcampaignsin

determiningtheoutcomeofelections(Dalton2000:923‐924;Edelman1988;

Grofman1985;KrausandGiles1989;Rosenbergetal.1991;Smith2001;Trilling

1975).Studyingtheselection,developmentandmobilizationofpoliticalsymbols

duringelectioncampaignsallowsustobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetween

rhetoric,persuasionandpoliticaloutcomes.Acloseanalysisofemergingparties’

campaignsinthelead‐uptoIndonesia’s2014nationallegislativeelectionsprovidesa

basisforanalysingthesuccessesandfailuresofsymboldevelopmentandpromotion

bothbythepartiesandthecandidateswhorepresentedthem.Infocusingontheir

useofanti‐corruptionsymbols,thisthesishasofferedanexplanationforwhythese

symbolsfailedtohelppartiesachievetheresultstheywerehopingfor.

Intheopeningchaptersofthisthesis,thecontextualsignificanceofcorruptionasa

politicalissueand,subsequently,ofanti‐corruptionsentiment,washighlighted

throughahistoricalaccountoftheuseandmanipulationofanti‐corruptionsymbols

sinceIndonesianindependence.Appreciatinghowanti‐corruptionsymbolshavebeen

used(andabused)bypoliticiansinthepast,itisnotsurprisingthatcorruption

remainsaconcern,especiallygiventhefrequencyandseriousnessofcorruption

scandalsintheperiodprecedingthe2014nationallegislativeelection.Arecounting

ofboththelong‐termandmorerecenthistoryofcorruption,andattemptstofoster

ananti‐corruptionsymbol,providesthecontextbothforwhythesesymbolswereso

prominentin2014andwhytheirprojectioncarriedcertainrisks.Emergingparties,

inparticular,wereabletobenefitfromtherecentcorruptionscandalsfacedbyrivals,

butadoptingananti‐corruptionsymbolwasalsoperilousbecauseithadbackfiredfor

otherparties,namelytheDemocraticPartyandPKS,intheveryrecentpast,andthis

wasstillfreshinvoters’minds.

Usingaframeworkofanalysisdrawnfrominsightsprovidedbytheoreticalliterature

onpoliticalsymbolism,thethesisthenhonedinonthetwobasicelementsofelection

campaignsidentifiedbyNorris(2002):themessagesthatthecampaignwishesto

communicateandthechannel(s)ofcommunicationemployedtorelaythose

messages.Theframingofcampaignmessageswasdescribedusingthelensofrhetoric

anddramatismastoolsofpersuasion,whilechannelsofcommunicationwere

exploredusingpertinentaspectsofdiffusiontheory.Inanalysingthequalitativedata

196

collectedrelatedtothesetwoelements,thisstudyalsoassessedtheimpactofthese

messagesupontargetaudiencesandthefeedbackloopfromtheaudiencebacktothe

campaigningorganization.

Inordertomorecomprehensivelyunderstandhowanti‐corruptionsymbolswere

imaginedandpromotedtothepublic,symbolusewasstudiedatthenationaland

locallevels.Thenatureofcampaignsatthesescaleswasverydifferent,especially

withregardtothetargetaudienceandthetypeofdiffusioninvolved.Atthenational

level,emergingparties’professionalpublicrelationsmanagerscreatedhomogenous

campaignsintendedtoestablishanti‐corruptioncredentialsnationally.Sellingthe

symbolnon‐relationallytovoters,thepartiesinvokedasimplisticanti‐corruption

discoursethatblamedtheincumbentgovernment’slackofcommitmentandthe

greedofgovernmentofficialsfortheongoinglackofprogressincorruption

eradication.Perhapsmoreimportantly,thecentralizeddecision‐makingthat

underpinnedthesenation‐widecampaignswasfarremovedfromtheday‐to‐day

campaignactivitiesofindividualcandidates,whowerelefttopromotethemselves

withlittleguidanceoroversight.

Forthe2014election,thecandidatesfollowedinthisstudycouldchoosetoadoptor

ignoretheirparty’santi‐corruptionsymbol.Ineachcase,theextenttowhichthe

symbolwasharnesseddependedheavilyonthecandidate’spersonalhistoryandhow

usefultheythoughtthesymbolwouldbeinattractingsupport.Assuch,theirpersonal

choices,beliefsandlocal‐levelexperiencesshapedtheircampaignsfarmorethanany

nationalparty‐levelsymbolsevercould.Localcontextwasalsoextremelyimportant

insettlingonacampaignstrategy.Inadditiontofactorssuchastheextenttowhich

candidateswereembeddedinlocalcommunities,theprevalenceofmoneypoliticsin

thosecommunitieswasinfluential,ascandidateshadtogaugeitspotentialeffecton

theirchancesofbeingelected.Incaseswheretheuseofmoneypoliticsbyrivals

posedarealthreattoelectoralsuccess,thecandidates—allofwhomhadstatedatthe

outsetthattheywouldliketoportraythemselvesascleanandavoidmoneypolitics—

wereforcedtodecidewhethertheywouldmaintainananti‐corruptionsymbolornot.

ThisfindingshedsfurtherlightontheparadoxofcorruptioninIndonesia:althoughit

isalmostuniversallycondemneditisalsoexceedinglyprevalent,notonlywithinelite

politicalcirclesbutalsowithinvotercommunities.Moneypoliticsisseenasparfor

thecourse,notleastbyvoters,manyofwhombothexpectandembraceit.The

197

dilemmafacedbythesecandidates,whochosetoadoptanti‐corruptionsymbolsbut

werethenconfrontedbythedemandsofvotersthatcontradictedthissymbol,was

noteasilyresolved.ThestereotypeofIndonesiancandidatesaswantingtowinatany

costwaschallengedthroughthisconsideredportraitofthree(aspiring)politicians,

bothintermsofhowtheyviewedthemselvesandhowtheyreconciledtheirchoiceto

useanti‐corruptionsymbolswiththerealitiestheyfacedduringtheircampaigns.

Candidatesarecommonlyassumedtobe‘corrupt’,butthecasestudiespresented

heredemonstratethat,atleastforsome,thedecisiontoengageinmoneypoliticswas

nottakenlightly.Theillegalpracticestheyadoptedwereapragmatic,yetreluctant,

responsetolocalcontextandtheirinterpretationofvoterdemands,ratherthana

pre‐meditatedstrategyforvictory.

Diffusiontheory,meanwhile,providedavaluablemechanismforunderstandingthe

inconsistenciesthatoccurinelectioncampaignsexplainingthisparadoxintermsof

thedisconnectbetweenrhetoricatthenationallevelandactionsatthelocallevel.It

alsorevealstheinconsistenciesinthelegal,moralandsociologicaldefinitionsof

corruptionthatco‐existinIndonesia.Legaldefinitionsofcorruptionareroutinely

criticizedfortheirlimitations(ChengandZaum2008;Philp2008)whilemoral

interpretationsofcorruptionaredrawnfromreligionandculture,alsomakingthem

difficulttoclassify.Sociologicaldefinitionsofcorruption,whichframebehaviourin

termsofwhatisdeemedacceptableorunacceptable,areatoddswithboththelegal

andstatedmoralviewsofcorruptionheldbycandidates.Theillegalpracticesthey

engagedin,suchasgivinggoodsandcashtovoters,issonormalizedinIndonesiathat

candidatescouldre‐framethemasbeingacceptableandroutine;evenculturally

appropriate.Thelackofaccordbetweenthethreefacetsofthedefinitionundermines

thecoherenceofthesymboland,therefore,itsethos.Despitealltheresources

candidatesputintoconstructingasymbol,bothintermsoffinancesandtime,the

symbolpresentedisfundamentallyflawed,renderingtheseeffortslargelyfruitless.

Theoretically,thisthesisspeakstotheliteratureontheselection,developmentand

broadcastingofpoliticalsymbolsinelectioncampaignsbyelucidatingthe

relationshipbetweensymboldevelopment,mobilizationandeffectiveness.Indoing

so,ithasdeepenedourunderstandingoftheuseofpoliticalsymbolsby

demonstratingthatsymbolspresentbothanopportunityandarisktothosewho

adoptthem.Edelman’s(1964;1977)seminaldiscussionofpoliticalsymbolsframes

themprimarilyintermsoftheirpersuasivevalueandtheirimpactonpublic

198

acquiescence,aninterpretationthathascontinuedlargelyunchallenged.Marrying

politicalsymboldiscourseandtheoriesofpersuasionandrhetoric,thisthesishas

foundthatthecampaignrhetoricaroundtheissueofcorruptionwasnotcohesive,

ultimatelyunderminingthevalueoftheanti‐corruptionsymbol.Thislackofcohesion

placedadditionalweightonlocalcontextsandindividualstrategies.Candidates

exploitedtheirlocaltiesorusedmoneypolitics,ratherthandirectingtheireffortsto

formulatingamorecompellinganti‐corruptionsymboltocapturetheimaginationof

voters.Partyanti‐corruptionsymbolswereunderminedbyothers’attempts—and

eventhoseofthecandidatesthemselves—towinvotersoverwithdonationsor

favours.

Thisthesisalsoextendsdiffusiontheoryfromitsbasisinsocialmovementstudies,as

developedbyGivanetal.(2010)andTarrow(2011),tounderstandtheparameters

andconstraintsofelectioncampaigningatdifferentscales.Applyingdiffusiontheory

tocampaignstrategiesandclassifyingthemasnon‐relational,relationaland

mediated,allowsforamorenuancedunderstandingofhowdifferentaspectsof

campaigningcanbothsupportandweakensymbolconstruction.Whilemanystudies

focuseitherontheactionsofnation‐widecampaignsorindividualcandidates,this

thesiscombinedthetwoinordertofullyexplaintheimpactofintra‐partyrelations

oncampaignmessages.Theapplicationofdiffusiontheoryinthiswayillustratedthe

importanceofconsideringelectioncampaignsatavarietyofscalesinordertogaina

holisticpictureofhowsymbolsareusedandwhytheyfailtoresonate.

Theincongruencebetweennationalandindividualcampaignsdescribedinthisstudy

isaconsequenceofthelackofcoordinationacrossscale,confirmingthecritiquesof

Sartori(1976),Deschouwer(2003)andFabre(2011)ofthetendencytoviewparties

asmonolithicentities.Inobservingpartyinteractionsatanumberoflevels,this

thesisfurtherdevelopsthisinsightbyhighlightingtheimportancenotonlyofparties’

subunitsandinternalsystems,butofindividuals,whohavethepowertoestablish

theirownsystemsamongstvoterswiththeassistanceoftheircampaignteamsand

brokers.Furtherchallengingtheviewthatpartiesareunifiedorganizations,this

studydemonstratedthattheroleofindividualcandidatesisparamountinelections.

Whilejoiningapartywasnecessary,andmayhaveofferedcandidatesabrandname

torallybehind,theirownbackgroundandlocalcontext—includingthepervasiveness

ofmoneypoliticsatthegrassrootslevel,whichconstitutedanearlyinsurmountable

199

obstacletothosewishingtoretainacleanreputation—remainedinfluentialin

determiningtheirpopularitywithvoters.

Giventhatpoliticalsymbolsareconstructedforthepurposeofacquiringor

maintainingpower,theirsuccessorfailurespeakstothepoliticalparty’sabilityto

effectivelyusetheirresourcestoinfluenceelectoraloutcomes.Awell‐chosenand

convincinglyportrayedsymbolhastheabilitytoswayvotersand,consequently,

conferpoweronaparticularpartyorindividual.ThisthesisconfirmsKeane’s(1997)

assertionthatthesocialspacesinwhichsymbolsoccurplayacrucialrolein

determiningtheirinfluence.Partiesandcandidatesassumedthatanti‐corruption

symbolswouldbepopularbecausetheywereprimedbytheexistingpoliticalcontext;

however,aligningthemselveswiththesymbolprovednotonlydifficult,butinsome

casesineffective.Tosomeextent,nationalcampaignscouldaffordtooverlooklocal

contextbecauseoftheiremphasisonwidespread,non‐relationaldisseminationof

theircampaignsymbol.Yetwhiletheblack‐and‐whitenarrativeofcorruptionissues

presentedinthesecampaignssuggeststhatparties,andthecandidateswhochoseto

adoptthesymbol,viewedcorruptionasamoral‘non‐negotiable’,itwas,infact,a

highlymalleableconceptinthemindsofvoters.Keane’sargumentresonates

particularlyatthislocallevelbecausethesuccessofsymbolswasdeterminedbyhow

welltheywerereceivedbyindividualvoters.Whilecitizensmayhavesupportedanti‐

corruptionmovementsagainstthoseintheupperechelonsofpower—suchas

criticizingtheabuseofpowerbygovernmentofficials—theydidnotnecessarily

associatevote‐buyingormoneypoliticswithcorruption,despiteitbeinganillegal

exchange.

200

AppendicesAppendix1:SurveysfromJanuary2010‐2014addressingthepopularityofpartiesandthePresident


Jan2010 LembagaSurvei

Indonesia

YudhoyonoandVice‐President Boediono'sapprovalrating

downfrom85%inJuly2009to70%inJanuary2010.1

Dec2010 LembagaSurvei

Indonesia

Yudhoyono'sapprovalratingat63%.DemocraticPartythe

mostpopularpartywith21.4%ofvotes.2

May2011 LembagaSurvei

Indonesia

Yudhoyono'sapprovalratingat56%.3

Jun2011 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

Satisfaction with the Yudhoyono‐Boediono leadership at

47.2%.4

Sep2011 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

Satisfaction with the Yudhoyono‐Boediono leadership at

37.7%.5

Jan2012 LembagaSurvei

Indonesia

Only10.5%onlythosesurveyedplantovoteforthe

Democraticparty.6

Feb2012 CSIS Surveyshowednopartyhadaclearlead inthe2014

elections,althoughPDIPwasslightlyinfront.7

Jun2012 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

MegawatifromPDIP themostpopularcandidatefor

presidentwith18.2%ofthevote.Nocandidatefromthe

DemocraticPartyratedinthesurvey.8

July2012 CSIS 54%ofthosesurveyedarenotsatisfiedwithYudhoyono's

performanceasPresident.9

Apr2013 CSIS 2.7%ofrespondentsplantovoteforPKS.10

Transparency

International

Indonesia

Gerindra,PANandPDIP arethemost'transparent'parties

intheelectoralraceaccordingtothosesurveyed.11

May2013 LembagaSurvei

Nasional

3.8%ofrespondentsplantovoteforPKS.12

1AsreportedbyBBCIndonesia(BBCIndonesia2010).2AsreportedinTempo(Jusuf2011).3AsreportedinIndonesia‐2014(Indonesia‐20142012).4AsreportedbyDetik.com(Nugroho2011).5‘AsreportedbyOkezone(Wirakusuma2011).6AsreportedinRakyatMerdeka(Dalimunthe2012).7AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Dewi2012).8AsreportedinTempo(Wijaya2012).9AsreportedbyDetik.com(Dhurandara2012).10AsreportedinRepublika(Ruslan2013).11AsreportedbyBBCIndonesia(BBCIndonesia2013).12SurveyresultspostedtothewebsiteofLembagaSurveiNasional(2013).

201


Jul2013 SPACE 43%ofthosesurveyedplannottovote(golput).Golkar,

PDIPandGerindraleadthepartiesinpopularity.13

SoegengSarjadi

Schoolof

Governance

Inpartypolling, PDIP ismostpopularwith13.6%ofthe

vote,whiletheDemocraticPartyhasfallento10.3%of

votes.MeanwhileIslamicpartieshavedeclinedin

popularityandPKSholdsonly1.88%ofthevote.14

Jul2013 LembagaSurvei

Nasional

HanuraandGerindraareperceivedasbeingthetwo

cleanest(bersih)partiesintheelectionrace.15

Sep2013 IndonesianNetwork

ElectionSurvey

56.3%ofrespondentsarenotsatisfiedwiththeeffortsof

YudhoyonoandBoediono.90.2%ofrespondentsassociate

theirgovernmentwithcorruptionandscandal.16

Oct2013 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

JokowiandPrabowoarethepresidentialfavouritesand

thethreemostpopularpartiesare:Golkar,PDIPandthe

DemocraticParty.17

Oct2013 PoliticalWeather

Station

Prabowoisthefavouredpresidentialcandidatewith

16.7%ofrespondentssayingtheywillvoteforhim,

followedbyMegawati(12.5%).18

Nov2013 LembagaSurvei

Nasional

Only36.4%ofvoterspolledwhovotedforPKSin2009

willvoteforthepartyagain.19

Dec2013 CSIS Jokowiis themostpopularpresidentialcandidatewith

34.7%ofrespondentschoosinghim,followedbyPrabowo

with10.7%ofsurveyedvotes.20

Dec2013 SoegengSarjadi

Schoolof

Governance

Analysed30opinionpollsandfoundthatPDIPwasthe

mostpopularparty,forecasting17.4%ofvotes,followed

byGolkarwith17.01%andGerindrawith10.51%.21

Feb2014 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

NasdemandPKSmaynotpasstheparliamentary

threshold.PKSpredictedtogain3.12%ofvoteswhile

Nasdempredictedtowin2.68%.22

Feb2014 LingkaranSurvei

Indonesia

PresidentialcandidateJokowiwouldwin,receiving 22.3‐

35.6%ofthevote,againstPrabowowhowouldgarner

13AspublishedinKompas(Kompas2013a).14AsreportedbyDetik.com(Damarjati2013).15AsreportedbyDetik.com(Ledysia2013).16AsreportedinKompas(Gatra2013).17AsreportedintheJaakrtaGlobe(Sukoyo2013a).18AsreportedinTempo(Anam2013).19AsreportedinMerdeka(Simanjuntak2013).20AsreportedinTempo(Tempo2013a).21AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Saragih2013a).22AsreportedbyTribunnews.com(Ihsanuddin2014b).

202


12.6‐19.7%.23

Mar2014 SaifulMujani

ResearchCenter

PDIPpredictedtowintheelectionwith16.4%ofvotes,

Golkarsecondwith15%.However47.7%ofrespondents

decidednottochooseaparty.Thesurveyalsopredicted

thatallpartieswouldproceedtoparliamentexceptthe

CrescentandStarParty(PartaiBulanBintang,PBB)and

theIndonesianJusticeandUnityParty(PartaiKeadilan

danPersatuanIndonesia,PKPI).24

Apr2014 RoyMorgan

Research

PDIPexpectedtogain37%ofvotesandJokowitheclear

presidentialfavouritewith45%ofrespondentschoosing

him.25

Apr2014 PusatDataBersatu SurveyfoundJokowitobethepreferredpresidential

candidate.26

23AsreportedintheJakartaPost(Aritonang2014).24AsreportedintheJakartaPost(JakartaPost2014b)andMediaIndonesia(Mustain2014).25AsreportedinKompas(Ihsanuddin2014c)andtheJakartaGlobe(JakartaGlobe2014b).26AsreportedinKompas(Ihsanuddin2014a).

203

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