what is right is in u.s. interests

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What is right is in U.S. interestsBarry Rubin aa Deputy director of the Begin‐Sadat (BESA) Center forStrategic Studies , IsraelPublished online: 07 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Barry Rubin (2001) What is right is in U.S. interests, The WashingtonQuarterly, 24:3, 127-134

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01636600152102278

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Barry Rubin

What Is RightIs in U.S. Interests

D,'iscussing what role the United States should play in the MiddleEast in an ideal world is difficult because the Middle East is probably furtherfrom an ideal world than any other region on the planet. Nevertheless,evaluating what has and has not worked—and examining some powerfulmyths about U.S. involvement in the area—helps show what a relatively op-timal policy would be.

Fundamentally, the United States can best play a role in the region byproperly pursuing its own interests, which are generally reasonable and basi-cally beneficial to the Middle East. These broad interests include promotinga stable peace and avoiding war, rejecting extremism, fighting terrorism, en-couraging democracy and human rights, helping allies, promoting economicdevelopment, and seeking to maintain a high level of U.S. influence. In anarea where so many forces seek to promote war, instability, and violence,these goals are very relevant.

At the same time, however, doing the right thing—one might say, doing thenecessary thing—does not make the United States popular. Ironically, in theMiddle East many countries want the United States to behave as it currentlydoes—and benefit from those policies themselves—yet they seek domesticand regional gain by endlessly criticizing these U.S. policies.

To cite one of the most important examples of this system, Persian GulfArab monarchies enjoy U.S. protection from Iran and Iraq while often dis-tancing themselves from U.S. policy stances. Egypt, the second-largest re-cipient of U.S. aid ($2 billion annually), usually attacks and rarely helpspromote U.S. efforts in the Middle East, where trying, and often succeeding,to have one's cake and eat it too is a normal state of affairs.

Barry Rubin is deputy director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studiesin Israel and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA).

Copyright © 2001 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and theMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyThe Washington Quarterly • 24:3 pp. 127-134.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • SUMMER 2001 127

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Tauthority, thepotential popularityof the United Statesis frightening.

The public reaction to U.S. policies should not be the yardstick for mea-suring these strategies' correctness or even the actual local attitudes towardthem. Three anecdotes from Iran make this point. In 1946, a U.S. diplomatasked an Iranian newspaper editor why he always attacked U.S., and neverRussian, policies. "The Russians kill people [who criticize them]," he re-sponded. In other words, speaking ill of U.S. policy is safe and profitablewhile criticizing one's own government, that of other Arab states, or that of

more vengeful foreigners is dangerous.

On the eve of the seizure of the U.S. em-. . bassy by Islamic militants after the 1979 revo-

o t h o s e in , . , TIC ,. , , . .Union, the U.b. chiet ot mission wrote in anofficial dispatch that he had just finished atypical meeting with the new government's of-ficials. They spent the first hour berating theUnited States and then asked for visas for theirrelatives.

Finally, a security officer who was held hos-tage told me that he concluded that the longlines of people waiting to visit the embassy

convinced Iranian leaders that the bilateral relationship had to be de-stroyed, lest many of the revolt's key participants turn to the United Statesfor help in gaining power for themselves. In short, to those in authority, thepotential popularity of the United States—including its cultural invasion—is frightening.

Another example can be seen on the other side of the Gulf. For years, Ku-wait and other Gulf monarchies harshly criticized the United States and saidthey opposed any U.S. involvement in the region. Yet, when the spillover ofviolence from the Iran—Iraq War threatened them in the late 1980s, they didnot hesitate to ask the United States to put U.S. flags on their oil tankersand then to protect them from Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Oncethe crisis was over, however, and the United States had saved them, they re-verted—publicly at least—to traditional attitudes. Nevertheless, they al-ways know that the United States is waiting just over the horizon to rescuethem again if the need arises.

Ideology might trump interests when rhetoric is involved, but this truismdoes not apply to the actual behavior inspired by power politics. Despite sev-eral decades of threats of anti-U.S. policies, often in response to U.S. supportof Israel, those policies never came to fruition. When the Arab world—in-cluding the Palestinians—needed the United States as protector, helper, andmediator, these requirements always took priority over anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Equally important are the real roots of the most common and virulentcriticism of the United States and its policies: that certain radical ideologies,

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • SUMMER 2001128

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What Is Right Is in U.S. Interests |

countries, movements, and individual politicians revile the United Statesfor trying to stop them from doing what they want. Such goals include unit-ing the entire region, or at least some other countries, under their own con-trol; the expulsion of Western influence from the region so that their ownauthority can replace it; the systematic subversion of neighbors; the imposi-tion of extremist systems; the destruction of Israel; and the use of violentstrategies to seize power within countries.

Because the United States opposes the efforts of these states, regimes,and individuals, they demagogically portray the United States—as theycarry out a propaganda war for their own interests—as being against "theArabs" or Islam or self-determination, democracy, and human rights. Ofcourse, blaming the United States allows many people to avoid taking re-sponsibility themselves for their own mistakes and misdeeds, a commonpractice in other parts of the world but perhaps more widespread and super-ficially successful in the Middle East.

Having enemies, however, does not necessarily prove the United Statesguilty or represent any cause for shame. Extremist leaders like AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar Qadhafi, Hafiz al-Asadand others were not expressing a misperception when they said they hatedthe United States. They knew what they wanted and were correct to see theUnited States as blocking their way. The United States was, and is, correctto stand in their way.

At the same time, the United States must necessarily ignore the sirensong of those who do not wish it well. They promise to like the UnitedStates only if it lets them destroy Washington's real friends, and pledge toinstitute democracy and human rights if the United States just ignores theiruse of terrorism and repression. They ask for pity as victims after they haveprovoked the violence and crises that produce the very conditions fromwhich they could have easily escaped.

Thus, an ideal situation is not one in which the United States acceptsIraqi domination of the Gulf, Iranian exportation of its own version of Is-lamic rule, Palestinian and Syrian rejection of a compromise peace with Is-rael, or other such activities. The best situation involves the United Stateseffectively seeking a moderate and peaceful outcome and gaining sufficientsupport in the region for these endeavors.

A Look at the Past

In this context, U.S. policy and interests in the Middle East have done quitewell during the last three or four decades, especially after accounting for theseriousness and the extent of the challenges faced there. Obviously, the list


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Biaming the United

many people avoid

taking responsibility

themselves.

of miscalculations, misperceptions, and mistakes is long, including such no-table events as the U.S. failure to foresee Iran's 1979 revolution, the 1990invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the failure to bring down Iraqi presidentSaddam Hussein in 1991.

Nevertheless, the United States generally achieved its aims in the region.First and foremost, it stopped any expansion of Soviet influence. Even be-fore the USSR's collapse, the United States had assumed the role of princi-

pal power in the region. In the Gulf, ithelped maintain the area's stability and pre-served the independence of the Arab monar-

o . ^ chies. The United States was able to blockStates is a way that . L T • T J r u i

' either Iranian or Iraqi domination or the oil-rich subregion.

In addition, the United States helped pre-serve the stability and sovereignty of most ofits allies in the face of huge domestic and re-gional efforts to overthrow them. It seizedopportunities to mediate the Arab—Israeliconflict when possible. Oil prices rose and

fell at various times, but access to petroleum was always maintained in a waythat made continued economic development possible in much of the world.

No one should neglect such achievements while obsessing over shortcom-ings and errors. Perhaps the outcome of Middle East developments—at leastinasmuch as the United States could have shaped them—was as beneficialas possible, given regional attitudes, problems, and conditions. Nor shouldU.S. policy be judged on the basis of exaggerated expectations. Just as Wash-ington did not cause the area's conflicts, it cannot easily solve them. TheUnited States could not end the Iran-Iraq War unilaterally and cannot endthe Arab-Israeli conflict until the belligerents wish to do so.

Another important point in considering what might be the best possibleU.S. policy is to remember that there was not nor will be any single idealpolicy because situations constantly change, as demonstrated by the historyof Gulf and Arab-Israeli issues. In the Gulf, the U.S. goal was preserving theindependence of the Arab monarchies and preventing any radical force fromseizing power in the area. In the 1970s, this policy resulted in U.S. supportfor Iran to counter Iraq's ambitions. In the 1980s, the strategy was to backIraq's war effort against Iran's proclaimed desire to spread Islamic revolu-tion. In the 1990s, the strategy involved direct U.S. involvement and dualcontainment of both Iran and Iraq.

Each of the transitions between these phases was badly handled. Still, theproblem was not that the policy was inconsistent but that changing condi-


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tions required revised approaches. It is often glibly asserted that the dualcontainment strategy and sanctions have failed, but this statement is nottrue regardless of whether the effort is outdated today. Sanctions havegreatly weakened a revival of Iraqi and Iranian military might and economicpower, thus making them less threatening to their neighbors.

Similarly, regarding Arab-Israeli conflict issues, the United States hasusually not created opportunities, but it has recognized them and tried toact productively to bring them to fruition. Among the waves of diplomaticeffort were the shuttle activities of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in themid-1970s, the Camp David agreements brokered by President JimmyCarter in the late 1970s, President Ronald Reagan's plan of the early 1980s,the Madrid peace conference organized by President George Bush's adminis-tration in 1991, and President Bill Clinton's high priority during his entireterm on helping the peace process initiated by Israel and the Palestinians.

Highlighting specific U.S. misjudgments or, at the least, controversiesraised over such decisions is easy. Still, U.S. efforts must be rated fairlyhighly as they played a central role in fashioning Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel peace treaties and helping to reduce the likelihood of war. Over time,the United States correctly learned that only those directly involved in theissue could make peace. The United States could help these efforts butcould not guarantee success either by pressure or by some ingenious planthat dissolved all conflicts. This pattern also must prevail in the future. Inthe year 2000, the United States helped bring Israel and the Palestinians tothe verge of an agreement, only to discover that the Palestinians were un-willing or unable, or both, to make any compromise deal.

Time has shown that strong U.S. support for Israel has been and remainsa sensible policy. Israel is a democratic state that has been openly and con-sistently threatened with extinction by its neighbors. Israel's record of sup-port for the United States is strong. Considering the radicalism andambitions of several regional governments, Israel has been a bulwark againstsuch activities both when the radicals were allied with the USSR and after-ward, as they pursue their goals on their own.

The Lessons of the 1990s

In a sense, the 1990s were a laboratory for test ing^and rejecting—thepropositions most often advocated to alter U.S. Middle East policy sharply.To understand what the "best possible" U.S. strategy should be, one mustclosely study the lessons of this decade.

The United States' role and influence as the world's sole superpower wasrecognized and further consolidated in the Kuwait crisis. Thereafter, moder-


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ate Arab states continued efforts to maintain good relations with the UnitedStates and to use it as a protector, no matter how their public posture dif-fered from that image. Syria tried to give the impression that it was cooper-ating with U.S. efforts to further the Arab-Israeli peace process. ThePalestinian Liberation Organization, at least in its form as the PalestinianAuthority (PA) governing the West Bank and Gaza, became a virtual U.S.client. After a long struggle involving U.S. sanctions, even Libya surren-dered two intelligence agents for trial in the bombing of a U.S. airliner overLockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.

Only Iraq remained openly defiant of the United States. Yet, althoughsanctions remained, Baghdad did not suffer greatly for its actions, for sanc-tions remained but were steadily weakened. The Gulf war coalition brokeup, with France, Russia, and China leading the way in opposing the toughU.S. strategy on Iraq. The United States launched limited bombing raids,maintained no-fly zones, and preserved the Kurdish autonomous area in thenorth.

Most noticeable were the limits on U.S. power and influence that couldbe attributed either to mistaken U.S. policies or to the nature of the region,its problems, and its regimes. The United States was unable to press the PAor Syria into signing peace agreements with Israel, despite many Israeli of-fers of concessions on almost all key points. Equally, it could not keep somecountries from breaking the sanctions on Iraq or the U.S.-imposed sanctionson Iran. The United States had very little success persuading other Arabstates to move closer to peace with Israel, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran,even though it had protected both countries during the 1991 Iraqi crisis.

Although the Arab world frequently complains that the United States isa bully, the prevailing attitude seems to be ensuring that such a splendidbully is on one's own side. Moreover, there is ample reason to argue thatU.S. failures occurred not because it was perceived as a bully but because itdid not use its influence powerfully and effectively.

Why should various Arabs show gratitude to the United States as theirprotector and liberator when they did not have to do so in order to obtainthe benefits? Indeed, the countervailing factors on this point were interest-ing. To indicate dependency on, and appreciation for, U.S. help would bringU.S. demands for reciprocal behavior. Moreover, in the context of theirworldview, Arab leaders feared that the United States might seek to controlthe Gulf, or the Middle East in general, subordinating them in an imperialmanner.

In short, although U.S. power was predominant and Gulf Arab stateswere ready to grant Washington a more important role than ever in protect-ing their security, the gains made by the United States during the decade fell


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Just as Washington

did not cause the

region's conflicts, it

cannot easily solve

them.

far short of earlier expectations. The apparent lesson in the Arab world fromthe Kuwait crisis was that the United States could be more helpful, but theGulf states could avoid paying much of a price for that assistance.

At the same time, Arab states in the Gulf are relatively less afraid ofU.S. involvement and intervention than ever before. They are very muchaware that the United States has been a source of arms and their protec-tor, often exercising influence on their be-half. Consequently, despite all itsproblems—criticism and the undermining ofsanctions against Iraq most obvious amongthem—U.S. Gulf policy, although requiringperiodic adjustment, is probably about asgood as can be expected.

An equally important lesson has been thatattempts to make peace with militant statessuch as Iran, Iraq, and Syria have repeatedlyfailed. From the conciliatory policies ofCarter that helped precipitate the Iran hos-tage crisis, to the efforts to prove U.S. friendship to Saddam Hussein beforehis invasion of Kuwait, through the humiliating visits of Secretary of StateWarren Christopher to persuade Syria to join the peace process, to the dis-appointing campaign to persuade Yasir Arafat to conclude an agreementwith Israel, U.S. flexibility has not persuaded the other side to act accord-ingly. For example, during the time that the United States tried to get Syriato make peace with Israel, U.S. policy never tried a systematic campaign ofpressure on Syrian interests, including its occupation and control over Leba-non, to push Damascus in that direction.

This failure is extremely regrettable; a different outcome would be prefer-able. Nevertheless, such factors and experience must shape U.S. policy inthe region. Whatever the specifics required, the United States must take afirm stand against radical states and movements. Too often, U.S. attempts toprove its good intentions and willingness to make concessions for this pur-pose have been interpreted as signs of exploitable weakness.

Israelis want a strong, successful U.S. policy in the region to ensure theirsurvival. During the last decade, based on U.S. assurances, Israel has largelyfollowed U.S. advice by taking risks and making concessions in the peaceprocess with the Palestinians and Syrians. These risks are no mere abstrac-tions but have helped lead to the deaths of dozens of Israelis, major securityproblems, and huge economic damage.

Now that this situation has blown up, they have a reasonable right to ex-pect U.S. support in the resulting crisis. As before, the United States is the


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indispensable sponsor of peace negotiations, although progress can only bemade if the Palestinians end the violence and show an interest in a realistic

compromise solution.The other vital issue for Israelis is U.S.

deterrence of Iran and Iraq as they threatenIsrael and seek to obtain missiles andnuclear weapons. Whatever the shape ofsanctions against Iraq, they must be effec-tive in slowing Baghdad's ability to rejuve-nate its war-making capacity as much aspossible. However the United States ap-proaches Iran, its strategy should try to re-duce the likelihood of an Iranian attackand its promotion of anti-Israel terror.

Arab states in the

Persian Gulf are less

afraid of U.S.

involvement than

they have ever been.

The situation is not simple, but then the Middle East is a very dangerousneighborhood and the world's most unsettled region. The basic problem isnot some U.S. misperception or mistaken policy but the extremism and am-bitions that make a protective U.S. stance so necessary. U.S. choices in theMiddle East, as so often happens in foreign policy situations, must be predi-cated on the best conceivable choices with the knowledge that no perfectoptions or easy solutions exist.


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what is right is in u.s. interests

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