The Sinai Peninsula The Weapons Transfer Threshold

MSIS Information Report

March 2014

Introduction

THE SINAI PENINSULA

• 62,000 sq. km

• Few roads and crossings

to mainland Egypt, four

main longitudinal axis to

the Israeli-Egyptian border

• Few cities; Rural

population

• Most of the civilian

infrastructure is

concentrated near the

army deployment

POPULATION

A population of 500,000 reside in the Sinai Peninsula.

Ethnically diverse population:

Bedouins

Palestinians

Coptic Christians

Nile valley Egyptians ‘Araishiyyih’

> Tribal identity at the expense of national identity

Sinai Economics

• Most of the Sinai Bedouin residents believe that they

were left out of economic boom of Egypt – and such

marginalization is a primary reason that they have

turned to smuggling.

• Sinai Bedouins are generally poorer than Egyptians

in the Nile Valley.

• Unemployment and poverty are rampant in the area.

• Egyptians from the Nile Valley are the ones

employed in tourism sites instead of the Bedouin

local population.

MAIN EVENTS THAT AFFECTED SINAI

SECURITY SITUATION IN SINAI

• Groups linked to Global Jihad, Al Qaeda or Hamas in Gaza are engaged in an ongoing battle against Israeli targets

and Egyptian authorities.

• The growing presence of Global Jihad in Sinai, particularly in the northern part of the Peninsula, has led to an

extension of cooperation between these groups and Global Jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip, thereby further

increasing the threat of a terrorist attack from or through the Peninsula.

• These terrorist groups rely on a growing trend of Islamic radicalization and Salafism among the Bedouin tribes in

order to strengthen their hold on Sinai.

• The total number of attacks from this region has risen since Egyptian General al-Sisi came into power, posing a

security threat for Israeli, Egyptian and Western interests in the area.

Bedouin violence &

terrorism

Gaza Strip

Israel

Contacts

abroad

AQ&GJ

Individual

terrorism

Palestinian

terrorism

Ansar Beitel Makdas

The most independent and powerful organization in Sinai;

interested in harming Egypt and Israel.

Majalas Shurael Mujahedinfi Aknaf Beit-el Makdas

Activists in Sinai and the Gaza strip; supported by Al Qaeda.

Al-Tawahid WaAl-Jihad

Executed the terror act in Taba

Executed the release and escape from prison of

detainees during the “Jan 25” revolution.

Al Qaeda

Supports Global Jihad organizations in Sinai

Hizballah

Mostly financial support.

MAIN TERROR ELEMENTS IN SINAI

Radicalized Bedouins

Weapons Transfer

WEAPONS TRANSFER

The Sinai Peninsula functions as the main transit

point for weapons into the Gaza Strip

Egypt

Sudan

An example of a smuggling route

Due to regional instability, vast stockpiles of weapons have found their way to the black market.

WEAPONS FROM IRAN, WHICH IS STILL THE MAIN SUPPLIER

TO GAZA-BASED TERRORIST GROUPS, FIND THEIR WAY

THROUGH NORTHERN SUDAN OR THROUGH SYRIA AND THE

MEDITERRANEAN INTO THE SINAI. FROM THERE, THEY ARE

SMUGGLED INTO THE GAZA STRIP THROUGH THE TUNNEL

NETWORK AND MAKE THEIR WAY INTO HAMAS’S ARSENAL.

WEAPONS TRANSFER

QF Network: Smuggling Network

WEAPONS TRANSFER

11

11

Trucks

Rail

Sea

Estimated

Air

Land

smuggling

Estimated

Sea

Air

QF Network: Smuggling Network

Sinai

Smuggling

Zone

The intricate tunnel system serves five primary functions for terrorist groups:

• Arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip increases the size and strength of the Hamas forces.

• Tunnels can be dug for offensive terrorist operations into Israeli territory, as was the case in

the 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

• Terrorist organizations have booby-trapped certain tunnels and used them to provoke

Israeli soldiers into an ambush.

• The tunnels serve as a network for rapid transfer of forces to and from combat areas.

• The tunnels serve as concealed firing positions

THE TUNNEL NETWORKS

Hamas and other terrorist organizations have dug an intricate tunnel network over the last few years for the purpose of

smuggling weapons and other contraband into Gaza. Hamas directly and indirectly controls the entire tunnel network,

managing some of the tunnels itself, while taxing goods passing through tunnels not directly under its control. The

tunnel industry produced a nouveau riche component in Rafah, amongst the tunnel owners. During the operation a

majority of the smuggling tunnels in the GS were attacked

Through the use of these tunnels terrorist organizations have armed themselves with a surplus of mines and explosive

devices, AT launchers, AA missiles, mortars, rockets and light arms.

The International Route of Arms Smuggling:

1. Libya-Sinai-GS – most of the arms

2. Iran-Sudan-GS – strategic arms

Tunnel exit stairs

THE TUNNEL NETWORKS- SINAI AND GAZA

Mission: To provide an offensive attack in order to abduct

soldiers

Inland Depth: hundreds of meters

Mission: to allow the warriors a movement between

fighting positions

The amount: Hundreds of tunnels between houses and

positions

Offensive Tunnel Defensive Tunnel

Smuggling Tunnel

A calf is hauled out by Palestinian smugglers from a tunnel

beneath the Egyptian-Gaza

Although Egypt-Gaza Strip ties were strengthened

after the Egyptian uprising in 2011, the recent fall of

the Muslim Brotherhood in the summer of 2013 was

a turning point in Hamas-Egypt relationship. The

Hamas capability to smuggle weapons and other

contraband into Gaza from Egypt was severely

compromised, to great effect on the Gaza economy

and security arms smuggling.

This week, an Egyptian court banned all

activities of Hamas in Egypt (Updated March 5th,

2014)

However- even with the Egyptian

crackdown on Tunnels-

HAMAS TUNNELS FROM SINAI TO

GAZA ARE STILL VERY MUCH IN

USE.

THE TUNNEL NETWORKS

BEDOUINS

Following the Israel-Egypt peace

agreement, the Bedouin tribes

territory was re-divided.

The Bedouin are a

major part of the

smuggling

procedure.

Smuggling of Drugs from Sinai

INCREASING BEDOUINS’ INVOLVEMENT IN TERROR

1. Increasing Islamic tendency within the Bedouins:

• Pro-Palestinian sentiments among parts of the Bedouin population as an additional reason for their

involvement in terror.

• Networks of dozens of Bedouins facilitators without any organizational affiliation and several hundreds

Bedouins terrorists.

• Unstable tribal hierarchy – smuggling barons vs. the tribe elders.

• Lack of population registration.

2. Radicalization by Al-Qa’ida activists:

• The mix of global jihadist demands with local Bedouin grievances.

• A growing presence of Al-Qa’ida and foreign fighters in the Sinai: there are believed to be at least 15

different Salafi Jihadist groups operating in the Sinai.

• Since 2011, Sinai has become host to a plethora of Al-Qa’ida militants following the collapse of the Mubarak

regime.

3. Increasing cooperation between northern Sinai Bedouins and Hamas:

• Expansion of the tunnel networks that facilitate Hamas’s presence in Sinai with the a constant flow of

weapons in both directions, and the ability for Iran to transfer weapons to Gaza.

• Hamas considers the Sinai to be a vital operational platform to launch attacks against Israel.

Where as the IDF routinely respond to rocket attacks from Gaza,

by carrying out airstrikes, Israel refrains from doing so towards

Sinai to avoid jeopardizing the peace agreement with Egypt.

REGIME TENSION

Tension between Bedouins and the Egyptian regime

THREATS AND TERRORISTS MO’S

The terror in Sinai is bold, creative, complex, directed inside-outside

Uses the criminal platform and takes advantage of the lack of governance in the area

Terror attack at the Israeli -Egyptian border (Aug 2011) Standard Grads Rockets

• “Bursting” terror attack (without preliminary intelligence)

• Terror attacks against patrol/ambush/base infiltrating/kidnapping

• Air attacks

• Ground attacks – explosive devices, offensive tunnels, shooting towards

IDF and citizens

• Sea attacks – terrorist’s infiltration/seacraft against a sea/land target

• AT/Rocket fire

• Terror attacks inside Sinai – against government centers, security forces

and the MFO, strategic sites (gas pipelines) and tourist centers/ Israeli

civilians

• Combined terror attacks – towards the Egyptian forces and also against

the IDF

• Eilat’s area – increasing threats towards main tourist city

THREATS AND TERRORISTS MO’S

• From Sinai – terror via the U axis and the Sinai-Israel

axis, indirect fire and attacks along the border fence,

kidnapping (soldiers and civilians), attacks against IDF

targets (outposts, vehicles) along the border

• In Sinai – bombings and attacks against Israeli tourists

and Egyptian forces, attacks against the gas pipelines,

the border crossing points and against Western elements

• Attacks against Israeli cities (Eilat) – infiltration by suicide

bombers

• Quality attacks against Israel – MANPAD or AT fire

against AC landing in or taking off from Eilat, rocket fire,

fire against army and civilian ships in the Bay of Eilat

Palestinian terrorists in Gaza have continuously been attempting to carry out terror attacks using the "U" route

whereby terrorists maneuver from Gaza, through the Sinai and infiltrate southern Israel via the Israeli-Egyptian IBL. A

prime example of this type of attack occurred on 18 August 2011 and led to the deaths of 8 Israelis. Other similar

attacks were thwarted due to the IDF's preventative activity. Other elements of concern include rockets attack from

Sinai into Eilat (the last of which was intercepted on Friday, January 31st 2014).

TERROR THREATS IN SINAI

NEW TERROR FROM SINAI

TERROR IN SOUTHERN COMMAND

•Infiltration and smuggling: terrorists, weapons, people, drugs and other goods

•Terror attacks’ main characteristics:

•Abduction of civilians or soldiers from Israeli territory

•Killing sprees, hostage taking or suicide bombings

•Explosive booby-traps

•Live fire ambush: assault and sniper rifles, anti tank missiles and rockets

•Combined terror attacks

NEW TERROR FROM SINAI

Backgroud:

The Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM) took responsibility for

the blast. The salafist-jihadist group has two enemies:

the current Egyptian regime, led by General al Sisi, and

Israel.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood fall, the Egyptian security

forces are making gains in their efforts against Ansar

Bayt al-Maqdis: the large-scale military operation against

terrorist networks and political Islam in the Sinai

Peninsula continues (particularly in northeast and

central Sinai) and intelligence-driven arrests are being

made in the mainland. ABM suffered significant damages

and is now focusing on targeting the regime and the

security forces by carrying out wide-scale terrorist

attacks. ABM is also responsible for several attacks

towards Israel: 4 rocket launching and 3 Grad launching

between August 2011 and January 2014.During the same

period of time, 9 Israeli civilians and 1 Israeli soldier

were killed after ABM terrorist attacks in the Sinai

Peninsula

The event:

On the 16th of February 2014, an explosive was

detonated on a bus en route to Israel from Egypt.

The explosion occurred approximately 400 meters

from the Israeli-Egyptian border. The bus was

identified as a tourist bus, with tourists from

South Korea. 5 South Korean tourists were killed

and 25 injured were reported. As a result, the

Taba and Rabin crossings have been closed.

Soon after the attack Israel offered medical aid to

the Egyptians authorities to help the victims of

the attack.

GLOBAL JIHAD THREAT IN THE REGION

The local terror groups try to carry out AQSL’s vision of uniting them all under

the same umbrella organization. Once united they will share knowledge and

capabilities and also receive AQ official recognition, funding, logistics and

operational aid.

Security Fence

2012 Decrease Infiltrators

2135 1474 1667 1091 1973 997 346 225 135 43 25 33 0

5000

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

aug sept oct nov dec jan feb mar april may jun jul aug sept oct nov dec

Infiltration Attempts - Sinai 200

2013 Total number of illegal Infiltrators -

240 km

THE ‘HOURGLASS’ PROJECT

Project ‘Hourglass: Israel’s reaction to smuggling and infiltrators:

In order to confront the significant terrorist and criminal activity on the border, Israel built a fence

along the entire length of the border. This project took place in coordination with Egyptian authorities.

By January 2013, the fence was completed totaling 240 km. Razor wire, military surveillance, motion

sensors and cameras all included technology that aids IDF forces in patrolling the area. The Security

fence cost almost $400 million.

Since 2012, there was a drastic decrease of terrorist and criminal activity along the border.

The fence Prevents smuggling and cross border terrorist attacks.