war peace and love

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Lingua ac Communitas | ISSN 1230-3143| Vol. 22 | 2012 | 33-58

Stanisaw Barszczak

War, Peace and Love by Emmanuel Lvinas

The possibility of peace phenomenology of warfare violence

Emmanuel Lvinas is now widely recognized as one o the most importantContinental philosophers o the twentieth century. His abiding concern wasthe primacy o the ethical relation to the other person and his central thesiswas that ethics is first philosophy. His work has had a proound impact ona number o fields outside philosophy, such as theology, Jewish studies, liter-ature and cultural theory, psychotherapy, sociology, political theory, interna-tional relations theory and critical legal theory. Emmanuel Lvinas is knownas the author o many books, including otality and Infinity, (1961) and

Otherwise than being or beyond essence (1981). In the first book a think-er is presenting still the same subject, his words reer to the dialogic stylethat respects both sides o the relationship, and reedom, on which it willhave no the place later. Te next book takes up the idea o human subjectiv-ity sensu stricto. Philosopher presents them in close connection with every-day, yet extraordinary event o responsibility or another human being, to thesubstitution, or else made the ultimate sacrifice o their lives. His thinkingis an interpretive, phenomenological description o the rise and repetitiono the ace-to-ace encounter, or the intersubjective relation at its precogni-tive core, being called by another and responding to that other. I precogni-tive experience, that is, human sensibility, can be characterized conceptual-

ly, then it must be described in what is most characteristic to it: a continuum


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o sensibility and affectivity, in other words, sentience and emotion in theirinterconnection. Levinass assertion o the transcendence o the ace should

be understood as the most telling point o departure among the thinkers oinstrumental reason o today.No serious reader can be spared by the shock generated by the provocative

declaration o Lvinas at the very beginning o his book otalit et Infini, inwhich he stigmatizes the realm o being as the state o war: war is producedas the pure experience o pure being, nothing henceorth is exterior. War doesnot maniest exteriority and the other as other; it destroys the identity o thesame. Te visage o being that shows itsel in war is fixed in the concept ototality, which dominates Western philosophy.1Tis statement, however, is

implementing a simplification in the world o mental situation. Lvinas read-ing o the history o Western philosophy is wrong, Jacques Derrida argues,reality is never as black as depicted by him.2Needless to say, the subsequentdevelopment o human history shows amply that Kants project o eternalpeace remains a pious hope. Lvinas, who himsel has witnessed both worldwars o the 20th Century and was a prisoner o war in a German concentra-tion camp during five long years in the Second World War, has certainly theright to express his disappointment and the authority to cast his doubt onthe easibility o a project o peace basing on the concept o enlightenmentby the mere means o knowledge. Tat history o a peace, a reedom andwell-being promised on the basis o a light that a universal knowledge pro-jected on the world and human society that history is not recognizable inits millennia o ratricidal struggles, political or bloody, o imperialism, scornand exploitation o the human being, down to our century o world wars, thegenocides o the Holocaust and terrorism; unemployment and continual des-perate poverty o the Tird World; ruthless doctrines and cruelty o ascismand national socialism, right down to the supreme paradox o the deense oman and his rights being perverted into Stalinism,3So, Lvinas also wrote:

Western philosophy has most ofen been an ontology: a reduction o the oth-er to the same by interposition o a middle and neutral term that ensures thecomprehension o being o know ontologically is to surprise in a conront-ed existent that by which it is not this existent, this very stranger, but that by

1 Emmanuel Lvinas, Totalit et Inni, Essai sur lextriorit, The Hague 1961,pp. IX-X.

2 Jacques Derrida, Violence et mtaphysique, essai sur la pense d Emmanel Lvi-nas, in:Lcriture et la diffrence, Paris 1967, p. 122.

3 E. Lvinas,Paix et proximit, in: E. Lvinas,Les Cahiers de la nuit surveilleNo. 3, ditions Verdier, Paris 1984), p. 340; eng. transl. asPeace and proximity, in:Alterity and Transcendence, eng. transl. Michael B. Smith, New York 1999, p. 132.


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which it is somehow betrayed, surrenders, is given in the horizon in whichit loses itsel and appears, lays itsel open to grasp, becomes a concept.4By

means o the concept, philosophy keeps jealously her reedom to search ortruth. Keeping her reedom means keeping her own identity, in spite o theimpenetrable strangers which bar her road to sovereign ruth. Perceived inthis way, philosophy would be engaged in reducing to the same all that is op-posed to it as other. It would be moving toward auto-nomy, a stage in whichnothing irreducible would limit thought any longer, in which, consequently,thought, not-limited, would be ree. Philosophy would thus be tantamountto the conquest o being by man over the course o history.5Tus or Lvi-nas, Western philosophy is a thinking o totalization:6it has the character-

istics o absorbing all elements o alterity in the immanence o the same. Itcontinues to exercise the violence upon all Other as Other in the conquest oBeing. When the Other can only be grasped as an object o knowledge, she isonly a generic existence, she loses orever her unicity and irreducible alteri-ty. She is always the same, and she can never be the different Other. Philos-ophy o totalization is totalitarian philosophy.

Emmanuel Lvinas is attentive to the two versions o phenomenologicalontology represented by Hegel and Heidegger. o Lvinas, both Hegelian andHeideggerian ontologies are philosophies o totalization.7Lvinas summariz-es the dark heritage o Hegelian ontology in the ollow terms: Since Hegel,we are accustomed to thinking that philosophy exceeds the ramework o an-thropology. Te ontological event accomplished by philosophy consists in sup-pressing or transmuting the alterity o all that is Other, in universalizing theimmanence o the Same (le Mme) or o Freedom, in effacing the boundaries,and in expelling the violence o Being (tre).8Reducing the Other to the Same,

4 E. Lvinas, Totalit et Inni, pp. 13-14.5 E. Lvinas, La philosophie et lide de lInfini, in: En dcouvrant lexistence avec Hus-

serl et Heidegger, 3rd ed., Paris 1974, p. 166.6 Cfr. Lvinas acticle Totalit et totalisation, originally a contribution to theEncy-

clopaedia Universalis, Paris 1968, now in:Altrit et Transcendance(Saint-Clment1995); eng. transl. as Totality and Totalization, in:Alterity and Transcendence, pp. 39-51.

7 E. Lvinas, Transcendance et hauteur, in:Libert et commandement, Saint-Cl-ment 1994;Le Livre de poche, Biblio Essais No. 4240, Paris 1999, p. 61.

8 E. Lvinas refers to Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlsungin thePrefaceto Totalit etInni(p. XVI; Totality and Innity, p. 28) and other interviews, e.g. inPhilosophie, jus-tice, amour, in:Entre nous. Essais sur le penser--lautre, ditions Grasset & Fasquelle,Paris 1991. Lvinas has contributed a philosophical essay to Rosenzweig in thePref-ace(pp. 7-16) to a study written in French by Stphane Moss, Systme et revelation.

La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris 1982. S. Moss has also published a small

volume on Lvinas:Au-del de la guerre. Trois tudes sur Lvinas, Paris-Tel Aviv 2004.


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suppressing all boundaries within the realm o being to create a vast space ohomogeneity: the final orm o Hegelian ontology as System o Science and

Absolute knowledge is justification o generalized violence by the elegant cos-tume o speculative dialectics. Te history o humanity, throughout religions,civilizations, states, wars and revolutions, is nothing but this penetration, orthis revelation, o reason within Being, long beore the philosophers thoughthas become aware o it in ormulating the System.9In the all-embracing He-gelian system, every single event loses its specificity, every human individualis alienated rom the singularity o its ate. On this system, in its unction torealize the reedom and autonomy o the Spirit, the State is a greater individ-uality than the single person. Tus or the sake o the State, the lie and prop-

erty o individual persons should be sacrificed. So, war is a necessary meansto this end. Lvinas does not have more tender words towards the ontologi-cal philosophy expressed in Sein und Zeit by Martin Heidegger, which hequalifies as philosophy o power and philosophy o injustice.10Te authoro otalit et Infini thinks that when Heideggerian ontology subordinates allrelation with beings (Seiendes as individuals) under the relation with Being(Sein), it affirms the primacy o reedom over ethics.11It is in act a tyran-ny, Levinas writes, just as the system in Hegelian ontology.12Tus reedom isnot that o the individual; on the contrary, reedom emerges only as the re-sult o obedience to Being. Tus the ontological thematization and concep-tualization in Sein und Zeit is not peace with the other but suppression orpossession o the other.13Te Heideggerian Dasein always relates to other asshown in its structure o being-with (Mitsein). But this is true only in theeveryday inauthentic state. Te situation o the authentic Dasein is solitude.In Daseins totalizing potentiality o being, the Other disappears. Te authen-tic Dasein can relate to is nothing other than its/her ownness. Not only theauthentic Dasein cannot consider the death o other Dasein, or Heidegger itsimply makes no sense to talk about the death o the other Dasein. It is clearthat in the eyes o Lvinas Heidegger opts or the ormer the Same whichis always his own authenticity and declines in advance, like a disclaimer,any responsibility towards the Other. Tus Heideggerian ontology ends up

9 E. Lvinas,Hegel et les Juifs, in:Difcile libert. Essais sur le judasme, 2nd ed.,Paris 1976; eng. transl. asHegel and the Jews, in:Difcult Freedom. Essays on Juda-ism, eng. transl. S. Hand, London 1990, p. 235.

10 E. Lvinas, Totalit et Inni, pp. 16-17.11 Ibidem, p. 16.12 Ibidem, p. 17.13 Ibidem, p. 16.


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affirming a tradition in which the same dominates the other, in which ree-dom precedes justice. Worst, it thus continues to exalt the will to power,

whose legitimacy the other alone can unsettle, troubling good conscience.14

Humanity needs and merits peace! Such is Lvinas pathetic cry. How ispeace possible? Exit rom totality, transcendence towards the Other! How torejoin the Other afer two thousand years o domination o philosophies oidentity? Lvinas urges us to inverse the tendency: listen to the call o peaceprior to the call o truth. In the practice o philosophy, that means wisdom atthe service o love instead o love at the service o wisdom.15o Lvinas, it alldepends on how we understand dialogue and discussion. In opposition to theinteriority o sly passions and the secret perfidy o subjective opinions, Rea-

son would be the true inner lie. Reason is one. It has no one lef with whomto communicate; nothing is outside o it. And consequently, Reason is like thesilence o inner discourse, Lvinas said. Te concept o dialogue in questionis an old one, one basing on the Enlightenment model o unitary Reason. It isa predominantly cognitivist or intellectualist model o sovereign Reason. It ig-nores the act that each subject entering into dialogue is an absolutely unath-omable subjectivity. It is ignorant o what Husserl has shown in the 5th Carte-sian Meditations: that we can never have intuitive presentation o the psychiclie o the Other, because the latter is always at the exterior o our own sphereo immanence. We can only imagine our entering into the soul o the Otherby appresentation, which is presentation in an analogical sense. We neverknow how two phantoms embrace each other when they greet one another.We are never sure whether we can touch the heart o the person we hug orkiss, i this very act o hugging or kissing is just a convention o reciprocal po-liteness. Te ethics o discussion tries to obtain peace among interlocutors bysuppressing the difference and the alterity o the speaking subjects. Consensusis obtained by virtue o the unification o the voices o the multiple. We mustask ourselves whether the dynamism and exaltation o peace by truth derivesuniquely rom the suppression o alterity and not just as much rom the verypossibility o the Encounter with the other as other, or which a commontruth is the pretext.16o say, we must go back to the field where war actuallytakes place and observe how the stopping o hostility is brought about. Onlythrough this specific backward questioning is it possible to understand howpeace is possible. In Lvinas terms, this is the question o how the domain o

14 E. Lvinas,La philosophie et lide de lInni, p. 171;Philosophy and the Ideaof Innity, p. 53.

15 E. Lvinas,Paix et proximit, p. 342;Peace and proximity, pp.136-137.16 E. Lvinas,Le dialogue, op. cit., p. 217.


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totality can be broken such that human beings no longer exist simply as ge-neric being but also as individuals with flesh and bone, and thus can relate to

the Other as Other. I in a war, a human being is just like a pure object undermechanical control, we cannot see how it is possible to create a crack with-in this domain o totality. What is paradoxical about warare is that in actu-al act, war is ar rom simply an immanent domain o totality, precisely be-cause the individuals who take part in the war reuse to be simply an object omathematical calculation or mechanical manipulation. And this is because itis a question o lie and death. On the battlefield, no one is sure that he will beon the side o victory. In order to save their own lie, soldiers in an army ac-ing deeat will choose to surrender or even to deect. In this case, they reuse

to be part o the original community. In choosing deection, they even trans-gress the law. By these acts, they exit rom the totality! Tis is the first possibil-ity o transcendence. All this is described by Lvinas in terms: War thereoreis to be distinguished rom the logical opposition o the one and the other bywhich both are defined within a totality open to a panoramic view, to whichthey would owe their very opposition. In war beings reuse to belong to a total-ity, reuse community, Lvinas is writing, they reuse law; no rontier stops onebeing by another, nor defines them. Tey affirm themselves as transcendingthe totality, each identiying itsel not by its place in the whole, but by its sel.17

Since in war no one is sure o victory in advance, tactics and strategies areimportant. Tus war is never a pure being o totality. Tere is fissure inher-ent in it, rom where rupture and exit is possible. Tat is why transcendenceis possible. In war the adversaries seek out one another.18Te urther prob-lem is here: what kind o relation do two antagonistic soldiers entertain withone another? Tey are two individuals seeking out one another in order to killthe other. Tey are engaged in a relation o mortal conrontation. So it is their

very mortality which relates them together. As a soldier, my mortality is relat-ed to the Other. Tis is the first point o difference o Lvinass understandingo death in contrast to Heidegger: in Sein und Zeit, my death has nothing todo with other Dasein, and the death o other Dasein does not concern me. Tesoldier is animated by the will to kill. But at the same time he risks being killed.I he succeeds in killing the first enemy he sees, he is not sure whether he willnot be killed in subsequent conrontations. Tus i a soldier is still in lie, itis simply the postponement o his death. So the being o a soldier is a beingpostponing his death.19As a soldier, as ar as I am still in lie and able to kill,

17 E. Lvinas, Totalit et Inni, pp. 197-198.18 Ibidem, p. 198.19 Ibidem, p. 200.


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I enjoy reedom. But I am still in lie only because I am postponing my death.It is the Other who sustains my reedom by granting me the reprieve o not

yet killed, so my reedom depends on the Other. Here what the phenomenono warare violence shows is a paradoxical concept o reedom: my reedomdepends on the Other. Tere is neither absolute nor unilateral reedom, ree-dom and dependence are like the two sides o the same coin. In granting mereedom, the Other also grants me the possibility o transcendence. A tran-scendence o the Other with regard to me which, being finite, does not havethe same signification as my transcendence with regard to him, Lvinas said.Te risk that war involves measures the distance that separates bodies with-in their hand-to-hand struggle (les corps dans leur corps--corps). Te Other,

in the hands o orces that weaken him, exposed to powers, remains unore-seeable, that is, transcendent.20Te phenomenon o warare violence showsthat my mortality, my reedom and my transcendence, which enable me toexit totality, all depend on the Other. Tat is why I owe my temporary surviv-al to my enemy. Tis is the debt I owe him. My responsibility then consists inrepaying this debt. Tat is why this relation o the first order is an ethical re-lation: because I owe to the Other my possibility o reedom and transcend-ence, my relation with him is asymmetrical.21

Freedom and transcendence break totality, they open up the space o peace.My anguish comes rom seeing the ace o the Other. Since the Other as tran-scendence is at the origin o my reedom and transcendence, and since myrelation to the Other is a relation o debt, on seeing the vulnerability o theace o the Other, I have to respond to my debt I owe him. I cannot help romsaying to mysel: Tou shalt not kill! Te orce o the Other is already andhenceorth moral.22In Lvinass phenomenology o warare violence, thereis possibility o exteriority and transcendence; individuals can enjoy reedom,even i this reedom is never total. Yet it is a game o fify-fify in which no oneis sure o winning in advance. Precisely because war is a orm o undecided vi-olence which renders possible reedom, transcendence and relation betweenindividuals. It is even a question o lie and death between human individu-als. However, the above sketch remains incomplete in terms o the search orpeace. Because the stop o hostility between the belligerent parties does notmean total peace, not to say perpetual peace. What the phenomenon o war-are violence succeeds in showing is: the transcendence o the Other is a key topeace. Tis have to be completed by a phenomenology o love, or love is the

20 Ibidem, pp. 200-201.21 Ibidem, p. 201.22 Ibidem.


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movement o transcendence towards the Other as Other. Love is simply thedesire o the Other. In otalit et Infini, the phenomenology o war is con-

tinued by the phenomenology o Eros and ecundity. Love is blind, or thereis no concept. Tere is not a fix structure o subject and object. In a love a-air, the lovers are engaged in a game which advances towards infinity. Loveas Eros is rather the affair between two persons, which is extremely complexand paradoxical. Lvinas gives patient and detailed descriptions o the phe-nomenon o erotic nudity which involves the moments o modesty (pudeur),proanation, caress and voluptuous pleasure or voluptuosity (volupt). In thecase o voluptuosity, it is a game o hidden desire, o going beyond the person-al while the personal never completely submerges. It is an experience o quasi

death. Lvinas has vivid descriptions o the metaphysical character o eroticlove: It disrupts the relation o the I with itsel and with the non-I. An amor-phous non-I sweeps away the I into an absolute uture where it escapes itseland loses its position as a subject. Its intention no longer goes orth unto thelight, unto the meaningul. Wholly passion, it is compassion or the passivity,the suffering, the evanescence o the tender. It dies with this death and sufferswith this suffering.23In short, a subject in love loses her sovereignty as a sub-ject. She loses her reedom and becomes passive. Te descriptions o eroticlove show that love is neither riendship, as it is not something among sev-eral persons or within a community but rather an affair o extreme intimacybetween two persons. Nor is love the possession o the soul o the Other, be-cause the two consciousnesses are not united to orm a single consciousness.Since the union passes by voluptuous pleasure, so love is not an intellectualand reflective relation but as such immediate and passive. In a love affair, I ex-pect the one I love to love me, so this is a reciprocal relation. But the loving

relation is not merely reciprocal, because I am moving towards an Other, tothe proound depth o an alterity. In short, love is a movement o transcend-ence, a relation with the Other who is entirely at the exteriority. Love doesnot transcend unequivocably-it is complacent, it is pleasure and egoism be-tween the two. But in this complacence it equally moves away rom itsel; itabides in a vertigo above a depth o alterity that no signification clarifies anylonger.24Yet as movement o transcendence, love is not satisfied with the pre-sent, it projects towards the uture. Tis is shown by the phenomenon o e-cundity: giving birth to a new generation. Giving birth to a child brings abouta new relation with the Other, a relation o absolute uture, o infinite time.

Tis uture is neither the Aristotelian germ (less than being, a lesser being)

23 Ibidem, p. 237.24 Ibidem, p. 244.


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nor the Heideggerian possibility which constitutes being itsel, but transormsthe relation with the uture into a power o the subject.25It is because a child,

my child, is at the same time my own and not-mine, a possibility o myselbut also a possibility o the other, o the Beloved my uture does not enterinto the logical essence o the possible.26As parents, we get older, but we donot need to abandon ourselves. On the contrary, with the new generation, e-cundity is the continuation o history. Te coming o a child, I am able to tran-scend the world by renewing my substance by someone who is at the sametime the Same and the Other. Lvinas summarizes his conception o peacein the ollowing terms: Peace thereore cannot be identified with the end ocombats that cease or want o combatants, by the deeat o some and the vic-

tory o the others, that is, with cemeteries o uture universal empires. Peacemust be my peace, in a relation that starts rom an I and goes to the other, indesire and goodness, where the I both maintains itsel and exists without ego-ism. It is conceived starting rom an I assured o the convergence o morali-ty and reality, that is, o an infinite time which through ecundity is its time.27In short, through love, Eros and ecundity, the movement o transcendencetowards alterity projects onto an infinite time, then peace is possible.

The moral awakening and acceptance of your own responsibility

Te pope Benedict XVI warns against rule o reason. In the German par-liament (Bundestag) the pope has said that the final standard (measure) andthe reason or the work o a politician should not be successul and certainlynot material gain. Te policy must be efforts to bring about justice and thuscreate the prerequisite or peace. As people o conscience we do over our atecontinuously, or the good o our world. So, or instance, listen to Chopin.ake long walks. Ask yoursel what you did now. Do that every night. Beoreyou go to sleep, ask yoursel i the world is better because o you. Afer all, itsyour world. You are the world. So, take responsibility or your actions. Some-one once said, Excuses wont lif your butt? Listen to that. Believe that withall your heart. Plus ratio quam vis. Coness something about yoursel toa riend-something awul, something youd never want anyone to know. Youlleel better. Youll still see that youre worthy o love. And since your riend isyou, you are really just telling yoursel. Have an interest in everything. Tirst

25 Ibidem, p. 244.26 Ibidem.27 Ibidem, p. 283.


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or knowledge. Remember that its all about you. When you learn about otherthing, you are actually learning about yoursel. Get to know you better. Now,

your behaviour is worthy o praise. You ace me, I am the one who, while en-joying my lie in the world, am summoned to make place or you. By address-ing me, you are the first who shows me the meaning o a human ace. Youopen the dimension o ethics by the command that targets me when you lookat me or speak to me. Independently o all your wishes and motivations, bysimply being yoursel, but against the ego-centered intentions o my enjoy-ment, you offer me a meaning or my lie, which, thereby, is revealed as beingmore and different than a possibility o enjoying everything that comes myway. Te meaning you impose on me lies in my devotion to you, my respon-

sibility or you, not only or your uture, but also or your past and presencewith all the right and wrong they contain. I can become a saint by carryingyour burdens with you. By serving you, I will at the same time accomplish, asar as I can, my own destinyBut the Other is described in our work. I ap-pear to mysel otherwise than others appear to me: I do not look at myseland I do not speak to mysel as i I were two persons at the same time, but, ina certain, urther to be determined sense, I too am an Other or mysel. I itis at all possible to experience mysel as somehow commanding, summoning,or obligating me, this experience o my own otherness must be described ina simultaneously different and analogically similar way. Other is me! For you(the Other) also are needy, my responsibility or you includes your enjoyableuse o worldly goods or making you good and happy. Your enjoyment o theearth and its elements is a purpose, and thus a part, o my dedication to you;even i I must sacrifice my pleasures to your well-being, such devotion be-longs to the accomplishment o both your and my own destinyTe Other,Autrui, is you who, by acing me, awaken me to my incessant responsibility oryou. Tis responsibility does not stop at eeding, clothing, healing, and pro-tecting you against dangers. Your humanization demands education and civ-ilization. It also includes my responsibility or your moral growth, which in-cludes your moral awakening and your acceptance o your own responsibility.Within the limits that your singular destiny and your reedom impose on me,I am responsible or your responsibility. I awaken and encourage you, andcooperate with your taking responsibility or other Others: him, her, them,and me! Your being responsible or me confirms what I said above it linksyou and me by a double bond, which is stronger than any unilateral devotion.Mutual and generous (asymmetric) responsibility, implied in the meeting oyour and my own heights, is essential or the universal responsibility thatregards not only you, but all those others who may become and are alreadywaiting or being linked to you or me: he, she, they and all o them.


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When Emmanuel Lvinas insists on my responsibility or the entire hu-manity, this seeming exaggeration is a consequence o the act that every hu-

man individual has a ace and that the unicity o each potential you is as ab-solute as that o you who ace me here and now. Te problem that emergesrom the multiplicity o yous that obligate me, is that it seems to annul theinfinity o your command and my total dedication: how could I be as com-pletely and endlessly responsible or all possible or virtual yous as I am oryou who here and now regard me? Will my being-or-you then not be scat-tered into minimal and irrelevant portions o service to innumerable yous?It is certainly important to prevent your unicity and my own rom drowningin the anonymous mass o a totalizing realm. Each individuals destiny is so

radically different rom each others that no You or I can ever be reduced toa mere component o some higher, all-encompassing union or communalunity. Insoar as You or I are merely parts o a supra-individual or inra-sin-gular reality, we are no longer You and I, but instances o one and the sameuniversal that only allows or variations. In the strong sense o You-as-high,you correlate with me, your servant, who find mysel dedicated to you de-spite mysel (malgr-moi). I discover my sel as ethically situated and deter-mined by your existence.28But there are other figures o the Other in think-ers work, and, since each figure o the Other induces a corresponding figureo Me, there are as many configurations o the I. Within the horizons o theegocentric economy, my dwelling in the world would be cold and certain bar-ren without intimacy with a eminine other, who creates the homely climateo a house. Phenomenology o dwelling shows that being at home (chez soi)in the world demands more than material protection. It also includes a hu-man and humane companionship. When written by a man, such a phenom-enology will easily evoke the eminine tenderness o someone who, as such,

veils and mitigates the rigor o persistent demands and commands by show-ing the welcoming warmth o ongoing hospitality. Tinker emphasized thatthe eminine component o homeliness can also be represented by men.

Love opens a dimension that is neither merely needy, nor already ethical.It shapes a person, happens, it becomes a miracle o creation, but there is likenew a beginning o something great only in the relay o generations. Here I amnot yet conronted with my ethical destiny. Being at home in the world andbelonging to a history o love and procreation condition my sel-appropria-tion and the realization o my destiny, but they do not yet show the ultimate

28 Dear reader may have already noticed one distinction here, between the subject as a subject, showing the anthropological nature of man and subject as a self describ-ing its site more psychological, authors emphasis.


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meaning o human lives. Te lie always limited but real, degree ulfilled orto live, like Moses, or a history that goes on afer ones death. Te infinition

o a mortal lie that is relived in others, history as messianic endeavor and ex-pectation, is that the final hope that emerges rom obedience to the unchosenbut embraced election that consumes our lives? Is this the final meaning othe I, o Me who find mysel subjected to each and all o those who comemy way? I suppose even the greatest uncertainty about the meaning o histo-ry cannot destroy my substitution or the Other(s). I like You. I mysel. De-sire, Needs, You, He/She/Tey, the beloved Companion, the Father, and theSon, all o these reveal correlated figurations o Me. I am a multitude o fig-ures, while maintaining one unique happiness. How can these figurations o

my sel compose one singular individuality? Te main tension, or rather, thereal struggle, that seems to split me in two different orientations is caused bythe opposition between the Desire o the Absolute that draws me out o my-sel, on the one hand, and the needs that imprison me in a hedonic interi-ority, on the other. Both orientations are constitutive o my existence, butthey seem to exclude a synthesis. What I must learn and perorm is a trueor a conversion rom my being steeped in narcissism to complete devotion.I must give my bread to the hungry, my energy to those who need help, mythoughts to the child that needs education. I must spend my lie and workor the survival o the wounded, the liberation o the persecuted, and the sal-

vation o the abused. But giving my lie or others implies that I die and myneeds with it. Are we summoned to sacrifice ourselves and to become saintslike the Servant o the Lord? Must I hate my own lie in order to be devoted?Insoar as human existence participates in being-as-intressement, it is es-sentially egoistic. A thinker evokes a primordial level or dimension o beingthat precedes the interested endeavour o lie. Te be-ing o there was orthere is must be characterized as the opposite o any giving or granting, asanother thinker would have it when he evokes beings generosity through theGerman ormula es gibt. Tinker describes our being steeped in the unlimit-ed and indefinable kind o being evoked by a burden rom which we cannotescape, a meaningless charge that weighs on me and resists my liberation. Itmakes me guilty and accusable beore I have had any chance to position my-sel with regard to the existence o the world, humanity, or mysel. Its imper-sonal and wholly indeterminate obscurity is what weighs me down and makesme guilty by association. For it is only by awakening to aces that light andgoodness are revealed to me, so that my existence may discover a meaningand a destiny. Being itsel is driven by a tendency that prefigures the volun-tary preerence or my own interest over yours. But the Good itsel, as uncon-taminated by being, is generous. I my sel-interested effort, my enjoyment,


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as participation in the all-encompassing intressement o being, constitutedmy happiness, I would never be able to be completely dedicated to the Other,

completely yours. Not only would I then never be able to perorm the in-finite task o serving you, but I must then continually expiate the sel-pre-erence that I cannot stop perorming. I I cannot put an end to my sel-enjoy-ment, because I am imprisoned in my egoism, I am and remain necessarilyguilty and stand rightly accused o not taking my being-or-you seriouslyenough. My guilt is aggravated i my obligations do not only signiy my re-sponsibility or your well-being, but also, more radically, my incessant sub-stitution or you. As such, I am guilty o your guilt and responsible or yourresponsibility, liable or your misdeeds and the entirety o your lie, like the

servant o the Lord.

My life is meaningful

I am responsible or you, so I cannot and should not take away your lib-erty, does not mean that my lie can replace the entirety o your lie, becausethis would erase your reedom and your own responsibility. Nor can I bur-den you with the entirety o my words, deeds, and thoughts. My lie is thennot empty but meaningul. as I live or you, I realize what I am supposed torealize as being always already dedicated to you, even i the ensuing empty-ing exhausts me. I I die because I let you eat my bread, I cannot indulge inmateriality o lie and neglect the interestedness o my needs; but does therealization o an utterly dedicated and thus meaningul lie exclude allkinds o joy, contentment, delight, or jubilation? No! Even suffering can beundergone without destroying the experience o a certain joy that accom-panies devotion. It is ofen necessary to accept pain, suffering, and death oryou. A different point o view on your and my survival can arise rom scar-city. But always I am happy about your success. I enjoy our conversationand your enjoying it. I intensely desire that your best desires be ulfilled,even i it costs me a lot. I am happy because you are happy and I wouldnot be happy i you were not. However, i it is possible to show that my ser-

vice and responsibility or your true interest does not exclude but includesthe realization o my own lies true interest, then my being-or-you does notdestroy, but, on the contrary, osters the main task o my lie and the ulfill-ment o my destiny. Tis would not exempt me rom sacrificing certain kindso interest, not even rom suffering and dying in your place, but it would in-tegrate these sacrifices into the decisive meaning o my own lie as much as

yours. Now a thinker says: I am respectable. I I with you am responsible not


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only or your corporeal well-being, but also or the orientation and qualityo your entire lie, this presupposes in me the necessary conditions or such

a huge task: benevolence, reedom o action, some wisdom about human des-tiny, a certain degree o prudence, acquaintance with a good tradition, and soon. In the love o neighbor, conatus seems to disappear, or to love a neighboris always put in question power.29But this love which goes to the substi-tution, sacrifice, he does not hire the Other par excellence? Is there not hereas a movement o the immanentisation o transcendence itsel? Yet Lvi-nas speaks a word o God which must precede the revelation in positivereligions.30Conusion, again: what is it, this word o God? Commandmentincredible, or proclamation o a right? Revelation, or affirmation o a natu-

ral privilege? Im certainly still second, but it is no longer present on the modeo sonship, but on that o the afer-you! Between the word o God and thecreature (me): a man! Any move to this by the third party, by the intermedi-ary. Te law, in place o the ather, my brother installs. But to accept respon-sibility or your lie would be irresponsible i I cannot bear responsibility ormysel. But how, through which experiences, do I discover my responsibilityor my own lie? How do I awaken to the respectability o my own, non-cho-sen but amazing and amazingly worthy existence? How do I become awareo the height o that in me, which orders me to take good care o mysel?o ollow my conscience presupposes that I discover what calls me throughit. Te substantial or hypostatic core o my lie precedes my acceptance othe responsibility to which my given sel trusts the unolding o my possibil-ities. Te conscientious realization o my own sel is a service that I desire toperorm in order to honor the conscience that targets me. On the elementarylevel o lie, my happiness is confirmed and unolded by an enjoyable trans-ormation o the earth into my home, but the deepest, originary interest orDesire in me is the most disinterested, unselfish, and un-egoistic o all inter-ests. Lvinas said: i we are not motivated by this Desire o the Absolute,neither my own, nor any other sel could inspire any interest in the Good be-yond being. Ten I think being the result o any kind o cognition, the sel sresponsibility to the other who aces is immediate, originary, and irreducible.

Now, You looked at me, his (your) ace pained. Lets wait outside, I said.And luck was with us. Probably yet not an interesting lie but only the tribula-tion is gaining on the cosmos. For this reason at last time it would be a greattribulation close to us. We need to invest new orum o collaboration behinda market and bureaucracy also. It is very important to use the sanctions or the

29 E. Lvinas,Alterity and Transcendence, pp. 147-148.30 Ibidem, p. 135.


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irresolute people now It is a need o the reason now, o the political and eco-nomical actions or them, an using o your era o power. Once more the pro-

cess o a responsibility or a power o a state and the church in a new millenni-um has begun. Te church is on the boat o Peter always. But I am never ableto see the other as she or he really is. Te third impel you to think. So, it is nec-essary, one should, one ought to fight or every inch o Sels land, in my sel-imposed exile or this a just cause. Im only responsible or my own attitude;and I have a duty to other people not to lay a downer on them. Tats my ownchoice, I picked that duty up, nobody laid it on me, I chose it or mysel thatis that I dont want to lay something on somebody else. We have a choice topick out duties. But Im responsible or me. You cant drink a glass o water

or me. You cant eat a sandwich or me. You could cook a beautiul steak andput it in ront o me, but you cant eat it or me, is that correct? And you cantgo to the bathroom or me. So Im responsible or all that. Im responsibleor how I eel. You cant think or me. You cant act or me you cant do anyo those things. Now, we pick up duties or other people. Tats a ree choice.I did it or I did not. I can also lay the duties down. Again, its a ree choice,ok? And I dont choose to keep some duty or eternity, thats my own choice.And I was responsible or accepting the duty, nobody laid it on me. I did thaton my own. Duty and responsibility are two different things. Duty is whatyou would have or whoever you want to do it, your mother, your riends, orboth, a job, Lie whatever you wanted to. But you can pick it up and lay it down.Responsible is what you are or yoursel whether you like it or not. Tere is anethics in which responsibility is seen to precede reedom has been based onan exercise o any violence. A tribulation o the world may be overcome bya dressing o my owns wound. So, I am called by your ace and you are calledby mine, I suppose by our lit up and young eyes more and more. I am con-cerned about my own destiny because I experience it rom within as an awe-somely lovable burden, whereas I experience your destiny as the call that lib-erates me rom being imprisoned in endless sel-reflection. My caring or youalso takes care o my own true sel because it promotes me as i I were anoth-er Other. For this reason I must honor and love the Sel in me as much as You,because You and I meet in the trace o the Good, which has made us respon-sible keepers o one anOther.31

31 Cfr. Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak and Emmanuel Levinas, To the Other: AnIntroduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,Purdue University Series intheHistoryofPhilosophy, 2005; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak,Beyond: The Phi-losophy of Emmanuel Levinas (SPEP), 1997; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak,Ethicsas First Philosophy: The Signicance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy,Litera-ture and Religion, 1995.


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Te other is the same as sel So, like masters o the height (or depth),speaking in his uniqueness. Te other man in this relationship is beyond any

knowledge He remains absolutely in its otherness Te other has to bear as anequal among equals Te thinkers described the ontological determination othis I, they also described that on the interpersonal level as a way rom theothers to mysel. Te Other is also the ace and appearance, the deendantand sel. Even i youve seen the end in Auschwitz, the death o ethics, that isno reason, ethics regarded as dead. I still believe in ethics. Te crisis o eth-ics is no reason not to conduct yoursel in accordance with ethical. A thinkerwrites: What we are talking about, namely education, civilization, culture, sci-entific and aesthetic there is a garment spirit o the nation. Why its so different

colors we see in this or that time, the other in the east, the other in the north,the west and the south? Naturally, since each people, strange in the old ages,another had a different imagination and poetic inspiration, even the memo-ry o another past time, another reason in philosophy, at the end o anothermethod, or procedures to improve the science and skills. Know but yourselis to have the ground beneath himsel, and shot inside, Maurycy Mochnacki,a writer o Poland said. Ten the people have always lived on hope alone.So, not quite here, but yet at hand A thinker said: Te Lord did not createdreligion, but the world. Ten since it is suffering, God by all possible meanswrites itsel. Te bible says: At the end o the world would be the great trib-ulation. Now or that reason we may ask: what is suffering? Te most unda-mental in me is coming uppermost, and the transient, the sensational, is dis-persing. For it cant adversely influence what is essential to me. Tats why mywork is now more powerul and less arbitrary, as i seen by another person,and illuminated rom outside. In the midst o the conusions o nature oneperson trusting eternally in another, and making himsel and the other securethrough aith. All thats lef now is purely poetic work, putting more lie intoindividual places, as Ive made so sure o the undamental mood and dimen-sion o expression that it wont leave me groping around in uncertainty anymore. So I used to be too subjective, and I was always tempted to find my in-ner sel in the exterior and dissipate my imagination on other people and onlie. Te great theologian Hans Kng in an interview said: I estimate that whatconvincingly in Jesus inside were overcome, what occurred, survived was thathe was imposing Gods will the specific direction in understanding the inten-tion, in the mood, a sense o meaning, the sense o (ull) pleasure (and incli-nations), at such and such way o thinking, in this sense that the will o Godis truly holy man, and (that) the man also important is as injunctions, but itremains true, and that the Sabbath, or example, is the human will, and that itis more important-that it depends more on the more-which includes a single


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man does, as that what believes. Goes also to all the many (powerul) thingsthat we know o Jesus, which we learned rom him, which we initiated, we re-

member. We are able to do it, or which we are grateul to him. But in princi-ple this was the so-called, that it is not the knowledge, skills, which leaves usthat with us end, peel, and relaxes. Not We should keep it very well in prac-tice: and also by the leadership o the Church should finally once in this way(it) be done. As or the statue o Jesus, it should also be every man or her him-sel a little care, it should disturb him. I do not want this in a ew seconds ur-ther developed. o an actual, detailed explanation is not to say we have thisconversation almost no pop-up time, time present and so there was no time.Teologian continued in the same interview: I is (something) recognized as

legitimate, and it will do. But now trying to convince people. Tese are thethings or which intercede, which I designate as, describe because o the glob-al ethos (Weltethos) Here the problem arises because the question o sentence,opinions, otherwise (very different) sound, etc. For this (to investigate thesecases) is required not only political will but also an ethical will, to be able totalk about it. I am o the opinion that it is-what-I said here a very, very basicneed some confidence. Well, precisely because (a) all there is deep respect, es-teem (Ehrfurcht) with respect to lie, you see not kill, you should not kill.32

Tis paper, there is the outcome o several years research supported bya tiring and exhausting work. So, we have this idea that we are supposed to beresponsible and have responsibility within us. And I question mysel i I re-ally know what responsible is. So ar Ive been taught that responsibility iswhen someone does something or you or gives you something or vise versa,and when you dont give them what they want or dont give then Respon-sibility is questioned. For me the responsibility is as while on the way o Love.I chose the responsibility. And whats more Im serious connate with the eth-ical now. For Im not in power Ive begun to hold in great respect a individ-ual contribute, states contribute also to happiness o mankind and glory oa Lord God. Im o the opinion that there is caring o today. Namely a callingto be in own proession. For example the people want to be representativethemselves on the television and have satisaction also. So I never cite otherphilosophers as yours. I bear or the person beore me an infinite responsi-bility which is regularly betrayed or the sake o justice in responsibility orother people, too. Te deeper question is how the court can be ounded onthis betrayal, and how institutions in general can work or the sake o jus-tice through the use o violence. Looked at in this light, these ideals are not

32 Cfr. Hans Kng, Why I Am Still a Christian, 2006; H. Kng,My Struggle forFreedom: Memoirs(2003), New York-London.


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merely renewed, but also radically deepened. Instead o being a declarationo individual reedom, they must now be read as a recognition o responsi-

bility or every other human, a responsibility limited only by the finite natureo ones individual assets. So, without an account o the problem o subjectiv-ity, it is impossible to construct any adequate and satisactory theory o con-sciousness. On the other hand although the thinkers o contemporary arguethat justice must be globalized But there is lie o yours. A poet says: Youdropped your whispers: We are never going to die, you ool! he essence oour soul most pure will speak to you. No more the flesh but still providingecstasy. We bards orever never do depart. But whys your picture witherednow? Why does your ace look pale and grey? Teres sorrow in your tone.

And slowly, oh so slowly all your words will ade. We grieve about our art.Its nothing but a shadow. Weve touched upon the essence but still we gropethe dark. Go on ahead, you brave man! Search urther, urther still. Lead usdown the hall where Stillness rules. Tat finally our voice may rest. And youmay rest upon the imeless. Voices o time once golden! May Stillness beyour arts transcendence. Find out the longing o your youth. Make ignorancelook pale. Do not betray the resh desires o spring. Tat autumn yield abun-dant happiness. And ertile be the soil o winter. Somehow lie needs other-ness also. I come to you rom above, he descends on me, like God spokerom the heights o mount Sinai to his people. My own sel is always the ex-ception (E. Levinas) I may try to picture the other as a sel too, but I neversucceed in doing so. Te sel o the other always remains enigmatic, escap-ing all objectification o consciousness. I am never able to see the other asshe or he really is. Tis makes my small, relatively amiliar `I` the exceptionin a world o silent, hidden and mysterious selves. But it is the most unda-mental difference between us and Lvinas is the axiom o mine that the oth-erness o the other is just an illusion. At a undamental level I and the otherare the same. We have the same divine substantia. We all share the same Selwith a capital. When I look the other in the eye and when the other looks atme, we recognize ourselves in our eyes. We love and respect each other, be-cause we are basically the same. Tis is not a metaphor meaning we are allin it together or we are put up with each other, no, this is very literally so:my deepest `sel is no different rom your deepest `sel. oday we speak toourselves happy new year. Now we look to the uture and gather our hopes orthat. As you know that the North Pole is not where it was two weeks ago andthe length o our days is different rom what it was in the past, not by much,but the whole planet changed. Looking back can be difficult, and it helps meto remember that, even though we speak o the celebrating o days and hol-

idays, nothing is very ancient right now. We live in a very resh new world.


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And we have a long, long way to go. As a human amily we have a long wayto go to become ully responsible or each other.

The problem of the isolation of individuals from communities

One o the major themes o Faulkners Light in August is the isolation oindividuals rom communities and rom one another.33In the first our chap-ters o the novel, Faulkner presents our major characters, each o whom isseparated rom society in some important way. Lena Grove, though she re-lies cheerully on the kindness o strangers, is morally isolated because o her

illicit pregnancy and socially isolated because o her constant traveling. Tesullen Joe Christmas is isolated because o his seemingly mixed racial her-itage, which causes him to emphasize the differences between himsel andthose around him. Byron Bunch is, like Lena, morally isolated, though by hisown choice; he makes no riends except Gail Hightower and works almostall the time because he is so araid o how he might spend his time otherwise.Hightower himsel is isolated as an outcast, rejected by society in his case be-cause he ailed in his appointed task as guardian o public standards, deliv-ering incoherent sermons while his wie carried on obvious sexual affairsCharacters interior states, with all their inconsistencies and unspoken moti-

vations, overlap with the generalized voices o the community to create a dy-namic and realistic portrait o individuals constantly asserting and renegoti-ating their places in the larger social order Tough the characters search ora sense o stability, belonging, and consistency, their inherently ractured na-tures consistently conspire to thwart these desires In plumbing the depthsthat exist beneath peoples words the vulnerabilities, ears, and evasions thatofen do not register in articulated speech Faulkner portrays inherently in-consistent and sel-contradictory nature o identity. People, he argues, in alltheir complexity, cannot be reduced to a simple summation or generalizeddescription. What exist instead are warring impulses and an ofen wide gulbetween private and public worlds In telling the backstory o Joe Christ-mas, Faulkner continues to explore the notion o a fluid, unstable, indeter-minate identity. Christmas is literally a man without a name His unknownparentage and ambiguous racial heritage condemn him to a lie as a shadowfigure. He is a man who walks on the edges o society, just as he restlessly andsilently wanders the streets o Jefferson, passing unnoticed through the blackand white neighborhoods alike, a stranger to both realms and accepted ully

33 William Faulkner,Light in August, Editor

Noel Polk and Joseph Blotner, 1991.


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by neither. At times mistaken or a oreigner, Christmas is variously taggedas being either white or black absolute distinctions that deny his essential

nature as a biracial man, a person with roots in both worlds AlthoughFaulkner ofen shows us that competing interpretations and perspectives canreveal new truths, we see that they can also result in misunderstandings andpave the way or tragic events. When the five-year-old Christmas is caughtbehind a screen in the dieticians room, a black comedy o misinterpretedintentions and mistaken impressions ensues. Faulkners authorial eye dartsorward and backward in time, ofen presenting a scenario rom one char-acters point o view and then revisiting the same incident rom an alternateperspective Nameless and mysterious figures the matron, the janitor, the

dietician (revealed to be named Miss Atkins only at the episodes end) pop-ulate a classic setting o childhood deprivation and abuse: the orphanage.Ultimately, Faulkners portrait o Joes ormative years serves to complicatethe moral questions o his tale.

Troughout Light in August, Faulkner explores the importance o mem-ory amid the various layers o consciousness and thought that contribute toan action, motivation, or story. Tis approach gives us a more dynamic andcomplex understanding o character, gesturing to the parts o an individu-al that words cannot access or elucidate. For all the thoughts, impulses, andarticulation that help define a person, there is always an unspoken element,the haunting record o the past that can never be expunged. Amid this seem-ing conusion, memory emerges as a potent and supreme orm o knowledge,or personal truth. For Joe Christmas, memory consists o a painul personalhistory, an autobiography told not in acts and events but in an ever-presentand instinctively reerenced record o humiliation, abuse, and shame. For Joe,memory is a burden that cannot be erased or escaped. With his own lie andsense o sel so emptied and devalued. Yet Faulkner does not seat his char-acters in a tidy world o moral absolutes, and we cannot label Joes upbring-ing as the sole cause o his vagrancy and criminal activity. Joe himsel alsoplays an active role in seeking his own demise and sel-destructionHer ba-by represents a hope and a boundless possibility that Joe was never able toulfillHe slides urther and urther rom his own existence, crossing overa threshold to embrace and embody his bestial associations. Hightower mus-es that, since being derocked, he has slowly slipped out o conventional timeand entered an existence o his own making. He believes that suffering is thelot o the wicked and good alike. He also believes that joy and pleasure arecomplicated gifs that most people do not know what to do with Womenorm a curious, tangential presence in Light in August. Te novel resides ina male-centered, male-dominated world, exploring masculine brutality and


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the idea o the Byronic hero (named or the nineteenth-century English poetLord Byron) a brooding, restless, and flawed individual wounded by lies

cruelties and slights. Women exist on the edges o this world, scapegoats orthe rustrations and unrealized potential o the men in their lives, and ofenthe victims o physical brutality Surprisingly, Hightower, despite his isola-tion, emerges as the philosophical center o the novel a humanist presencewho rejects the rigid moral codes that confine Jeffersons residents. Hightow-ers static, abstract journey to sel-knowledge and sel-acceptance contrastswith the strivings o the other main characters, who either ail to attain in-sight or ail to act on it. Hightower, Lena, and Christmas all attempt to salvagetheir pride, turn rom the harsh realities o the past, and inuse their lives with

a newound purpose. Tey all are damaged individuals whose reputationsand senses o sel have been compromised, both by their own actions and bysocial orces beyond their control. Hightower eventually makes peace withhis lie o internal struggle, stoically embracing his impending death, armedwith the understanding that suffering is an unavoidable component o exist-ence Faulkner equates lie with a game o chess, with its various strategiesand attacks and missteps, all obscuring the act that these individuals are ul-timately moving toward a predetermined and inalterable conclusion. In theinterim, the characters maintain the sustaining illusion that they are the mas-ters o their own ate, when in act they are actually pawns being manipulat-ed by orces larger than themselves and beyond their control Hightowerwas raised in the presence o these phantoms o the past, his ather, moth-er, grandather, and the slave woman his grandather had owned until thewar. Hightower entered the seminary and later married, intent on being giv-en a church in Jefferson. It is because a ellow is more araid o the troublehe might have than he ever is o the trouble hes already got Memory be-lieves beore knowing remembers. Believes longer than recollects, longer thanknowing even wonder I had to do it already in the past tense; I had to doit. She said so hersel Perhaps he realized that he could not escape. Any-way, he stayed I mind how I said to you once that there is a price or be-ing good the same as or being bad; a cost to pay Maybe it takes longer topay or being good than or being bad.

Can I be the prodigal son? I want to say something yet. Once I was theonly country. Oak there was so high and delicate violets. In it all becamea dream. And it is embraced me completely in German, said to me in Ger-man, now you can see better (unortunately, almost did not evaluate how wellit sounded, how wonderully it sounded), this phrase: I love you madly, be-cause this country the dream was I still have the love o our mothers lit-

tle storms, thunderstorms, scattered in the woods by the cataclysm o allen


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trees thats all. Already it getting used to normal But what is the utureo history? History has not stopped with Christ Paul says that Christs su-

ering is missing something what? O Our suffering! Because the suffer-ing is no longer price, it is priceless, you cannot evaluate them, nor estimate.Tere is no improvement, it is only hope. We have none, to replace shortag-es o hope. Marta rom the Gospel she must tackle the sense o its activity.Tere is a new parable o the child prodigal. Neighbor is the one who needsyour help now. Good Samaritan rom the Gospel, the man who had compas-sion (hatte Mitleid), was seized with pity (il le vit et fut saisi de piti). Do thisand you will live (fais ainsi et tu auras la vie). (We) are the presence o Christamong men, even i only through our offering, but as much by how we act

(We) have not only some excellent estimates and projections, although theseare still present. Until 1800, the world needed a million years to the emer-gence o human to one billion people. Acceleration o civilization is aston-ishing, this is only afer two hundred years, the year two thousand, we werealready 6 bln. By 2050 it is expected that the world will be 20 percent o Mus-lims suffering As each o us turns out to be priceless today already, henceit is the huge our hope. So is estimated to assess, or a better tomorrow weshould take part in the vast resurrection o Christ, and not only in his death, itmay be participation in the resurrection o Christ and not just his death. Tisfinding may be that in the attention and listening peaceul and welcomingDo you know what last summer has meant or me? Constant raptures overEmmanuel Lvinas and a whole series o spiritual delights which Ive neverexperienced beore. No student has ever studied so much on his course, andlearned so much, as I have this last summer. Earlier I have spent many timein an emotion and an enthusiasm. Now I want to give these gifs to the peo-ple away. I want to bestow on them my deepest sel and pray that each manwould find employment based on a natural and a rational joy. We may be inown proession. Tere is precisely today responsibility o mine.

However, it seems that there is still a responsibility only or holiday. Tir-ty-three years ago I read about the Adventures o Lord Jim on the IndianOcean. Joseph Conrads novel describes the sinking o the Patna. Te pas-sengers are swimming on the ship to Mecca. Surprised is that it was no pan-ic there. Jim, whom Marlow time afer time called romantic, he was char-acter, and dreamed o a great things at sea, he aced suddenly ace to ace

-beore the expected disaster o Patna with the absurd situation, that isvery closed on any o his actions. Jim cannot save o the ship, or any o thepassengers; he also cannot make a disaster o any sense while remainingon the Board. Staying there will be equal to escape because the one and the

second possibility will constitute the proo o the helplessness, absolutely


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silent and visible sign decoupling rom reality, the hero is so ar that he willbe in some way to orm ones situation. Jim finally exposed asking whether

it is enough courage; not exposed to any question. Te questions is not thesame as there is no choice: there is only the sudden breaking o the illusionsveil, according to which man is master o his ate and itsel. I had jumped...He checked himsel, averted his gaze.... It seems, he added. (Lord Jim, chap-ter 9). Not he himsel so much has done that what some instinct in itsel haschosen or him. Atonement, which the Conrads hero imposes himsel, aimsto fix ruptured vesicle image o himsel on Patna, as an entity having con-trol over themselves and trustworthy people. Joseph Conrad commentatorsinterpret Jims elections differently i not very optimistic that this is the story

o a poor decision and its consequences, but also clear statement about thepossibility o overcoming the latter. Assume that there is a possibility o re-demption o the ault, while or Conrad more important than accusing (initsel, questionable) was the tragic situation o the hero, that the final choiceo death rom the Doramin hand the only strengthened this, creating ur-ther hardship, not deeated or overcame. Te final irony o the Narrator ispertinent: Not in the wildest days o his boyish visions could he have seenthe alluring shape o such an extraordinary success! (Lord Jim, last chapter).However, it seems to us constantly, that such an extraordinary success, isonly an effect rom the side, due to the lost trust, albeit it may not be any dis-appointed love o a woman.

Conclusion

Te philosopher Emmanuel Lvinas is best known within contemporarydiscourse or his renewal o the question o ethics. He asks us to think aboutexperiences in our lie which be lie the assumptions o totality o the selas complete, as the origin o all knowledge and the justification or all moral-ity. He then treats these aspects as instances which point towards a new wayo thinking about what it means to be a human subject, which is not sel-ab-sorbed, but in which our responsibility to another comes beore our sel-in-terest. He began to think in the context and the wake o great trauma and vi-olence. And his purpose is this: to explain it, and explain above all why thesuffering o others matters to us. Only in a world o infinite responsibilitywould uture oppression prove inconceivable. We can kill the other but inthat very moment they escape their subjection once and or all and hauntour dreams orever the duty o care just happens to you Lvinass work

is concerned with the very opening o the question o ethical-the ground o


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its possibility and impossibility-prior to the production and elaboration oall moral codes. Lvinas describes ethics as an interruption o the sels habit-

ual complacency that occurs in the encounter with the ace o the other. Ashe demonstrates in his main philosophical books, and in numerous impor-tant essays, consciousness in not reducible to a conciousness o being. Con-sciousness is radically put into question by the ace. Rather than being the re-sult o any kind o cognition, the sel s responsibility to the other who acesis immediate, originary, and irreducible. We do not and never have existed

in and or onesel. Beore the neighbour I am summoned and do not justappear; rom the first I am answering an assignation. Moreover, it is neitherthe state nor contract that constitutes us, but rather this unique and primary

responsibility to an other. It is the oundation o our consciousness, our so-ciety and our selves Already the stony core o my substance is dislodged.But the responsibility to which I am exposed does not apprehend me asan interchangeable thing, or here no one can be substituted or me Sub-

jectivity is not one or mysel; it is, one more time, initially or the other. osay: here I am. o do something or an other. o give. It obliges me as some-one unreplaceable and unique, someone chosen Tis responsibility is notmerely social and expedient but personal and ethical. It is directed not to-wards the preservation o autonomy, but instead towards the recognition osuffering. Te combination o these two eatures provides us with a new wayo conceiving o the justification o a system o private actions in tort lawResponsibility establishes both a sense o sel and a sense o relationship, andit is these in turn which create the very possibility o agreement, and law, andjustice. But Lvinas is not satisfied also with love as Eros, he wants to extendlove to the stranger, to the Other as neighbour and ellow human, which islove without concupiscence. For the child is still a being o the Same and theOther, while love o the neighbour and ellow human is to accept the abso-lute alterity o the Other. Every Other is an unathomable subjectivity whichrepresents infinity. Ultimately peace is possible only i we can love the stran-ger as neighbour and ellow human. a persons decision is always an inevita-ble result o their genetic makeup combined with environmental influenc-es. So i a person decides to commit a crime, this can always be explained asa result o past influences. Any individual who had the same genetic make-up and the same environmental influences would have decided exactly thesame thing. Tis is because a persons decision is always completely causedby what happened in the past. Te above results have several implicationsor our understanding o moral responsibility. First, not morally responsible level o agreement was assessed to the ollowing questions: in such a world

it is impossible or a person to be ully morally responsible or their actions.


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Second, blameworthy people should still be morally blamed or commit-ting crimes; third, I these scientists are right, then it is impossible or people

to make truly ree choices-not ree. As or responsibility, our results indicatethat should neuroscience or philosophy lead the olk to come to think, cor-rectly or mistakenly, that our minds are mechanistic and our choices are de-termined, our judgments about moral responsibility will remain largely in-tact. We should not be deterred rom a scientific appreciation o the mindby ears o nihilism or social disintegration. So, we should give hospitality tothe stranger, let them enjoy the rights we enjoy. We have to establish institu-tions to guarantee justice. For this purpose, we have to employ our knowl-edge and wisdom. But knowledge and wisdom at the service o love and not

vice versa. So or Emmanuel Lvinas, love is prior to knowledge and wisdom.Tough, you make love.

Bibliography

Derrida J., Violence and Metaphysics. Essay on the thoughts of E. Levinas, in: Scrip-

ture Philosophy, chose by B. Banasiak, Cracow 1992.

Faulkner W., Light in August, EditorNoel Polk and Joseph Blotner, 1991.

Kng H., Why I Am Still a Christian, by M.L. Asselin, 2006.

Kng H.,My Struggle for Freedom: Memoirs, New York-London 2003.

Lvinas E., Of God Who Comes to Mind, Palo Alto 1982

Lvinas E., otality and Infinity, Pittsburgh 1969, hardcover.

Lvinas E., Ethique et infini. Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, Paris 1982,

Lvinas E.,Alterity and ranscendence, transl. by M.B. Smith, New York 1995.

Lvinas E.,Altrit et transcendance, Saint-Clment 1995.

Lvinas E.,Autrement quetre ou au-dela de lessence, Te Hague 1974.

Lvinas E., Cao i nieskoczono: esej o zewntrznoci, transl. by M. Kowalska,

Warsaw 1998.

Lvinas E., Etyka i Nieskoczony: rozmowy z Philippe Nemo, transl. by B. Opole-Ko-koszka, Cracow 1991.

Lvinas E., Des anderen Menschen Humanismus, bers. von L. Wenzler, Hamburg 1989.

Lvinas E., Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, Pittsburgh 1974.

Lvinas E., Inaczej ni by lub ponad istot, transl. by P. Mrwczyski, Warsaw 2000.Lvinas E.,Jenseits des Seins oder anders als Sein geschieht, bers. von . Wiemer,

Freiburg 1992.

Lvinas E., O Bogu, ktry nawiedza myl, transl. by M. Kowalska, Cracow 1994.

Lvinas E., Otherwise than being or beyond essence, transl. by A. Lingis, Te Hague1981.


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Lvinas E., otalit et Infini. Essai sur lextriorit, Te Hague 1961.

Lvinas E., Totalitt und Unendlichkeit. Versuch ber die Exterioritt, bers. von

W.N. Krewani, Freiburg 1987.Lvinas E., Wenn Gott ins Denken einfllt, bers. von . Wiemer, Freiburg 1988.

Peperzak A.T., Beyond: Te Philosophy of Emmanuel Lvinas (SPEP), 1997.

Peperzak A.T., Ethics as First Philosophy: Te Significance of Emmanuel Lvinas for

Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 1995.

Peperzak A.T. and Lvinas E., To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of

Emmanuel Lvinas, PurdueUniversity Series inthe Historyo Philosophy, West

Laayette 2005.

War, Peace and Love by Emmanuel Lvinas

Abstract

In a world in which everything is reduced to the play o signs detached rom whatis signified, Levinas asks a deceptively simple question: Whence, then, comes theurge to question injustice? By seeing the demand or justice or the other-the home-less, the destitute-as a return to morality, Levinas escapes the suspect finality o anyideology. Levinass question is one starting point or la Proximity. I it is true thatwe are, through technology, moving closer and closer to one another, writes someeditors o the Levinass books, then the importance o proximity and our responseto it cannot be overstated. For the author to this article, to which he can contrib-ute something o significant value, the question o whether we may, ethically, ap-propriate the object o study or our own causes has become vital. Levinas asks usto see ourselves, our own reading, in proximity to what is not ourselves, not ourunderstanding o the world. Driven Back to the ext demonstrates that what is atissue here is the Holocaust, and how it drives Levinas back to the Bible, the Kabba-lah and the almud to fight against Hegelianism, totalitarianism and modern pro-gressivist liberalism. Tis very return suggests a certain hermeneuticone that bothbrings out o the texts what the readers society needs to hear as well as one oundin the texts; that is, it is an ethical hermeneutic and is part o the texts ethics. Be-ginning with a clear introduction to Levinas, the article argues that i, as is accept-ed, contemporary continental philosophy is heavily influenced by Levinas, and iLevinas is heavily influenced by the bible, then contemporary continental philoso-phy is at least to some extent influenced by christianism.

Keywords: transcendence, meaningul, subjectivity, responsibility, love

war peace and love

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