____ ...._..__--.:The North Carolina Mlllta:ry Historical Sodety, _____ _

VOLUME VII FALL 2001 ISSUE 2

The Son Tay Raid Saturday, November 21, 1970

by 'Lieutenant General Le Roy Manor United States Air Force, Retired

Reprinted by permission of the auth01; Lt. General Le Roy Manoi; from the Air Commando Association '.s Web Site aircommqndol@eartlzlink.net through the kind assistance of Jim Yea/y, Air Commando Association, P.O. Box 7, Mmy Esther, Florida 32569-0007.

AN HISTORIC OPERATION Shortly before midnight on November 20, 1970, at Udom

Royal Thailand Air Base in Northern Thailand, 56 US Army Special Forces Troopers (Green Berets) boarded two USAF HH-53s and one HH-3 for a mission deep into enemy territory to res­cue 75 or more Americans held by the North Vietnamese author­ities. These Americans, mostly aviators of all services, were being held under conditions that can be best described as horrible in all respects - torture, diet, lack

missing and presumed captured. Reports of the cruelty suffered by these men at the hands of their barbarous captors were received along with reports of resultant deaths from various sources. Anxiety, concern and anger among the next of kin, friends of the captives, comman~ers and government officials were very much in evidence throughout this country. What was being done to alleviate the growing concern? Negotiations were being conducted in Paris on a sporadic basis depending on the mood of the North Vietnamese representatives. An attempt was made to reach an agreement whereby an exchange of prisoners of war could be made. After over two years of such negotiations, the results were ZERO.

The mood of the country demanded that something be done to help these suffering POWs. Was the time ripe for an initia­tive- feas ible alternative?

THE TASK FORCE of medical care and devoid of hope for return to freedom in a timely manner.

One hundred sixteen aircraft from seven air bases and three air­craft carriers comprised the total force. The task force was under the command of the author, Brig General LeRoy J. Manor. The weather was clear, all aircraft had been thoroughly checked and were in a-one condition, the "Red

Editor~~ Note: Although the main story was written by Gen Manor, included are side stories by other Daedalians who were there as well. Contributors:

It is often said that being at the right place at the right time can result in unforeseen benefits. I believe this to be !rue in my case. During 1970 I had a wonderful assignment, Commander of the USAF Special Operations Force with Headquarters at Eglin AFB, FL. My responsibilities included the training of all special opera-

CoJ(Ret) Benjamin K.raljev, planner, Col(Ret)William J. Kornitzer, HC-130. Line 01; Col (Ret) Warner A. Britton, HH-53, Apple l; Col (Ret) John Allison, Aircraft Commander and Col (Ret) Jay Strayer, Co­pilot, .ffil-53, Apple 2; Col(Ret) Robert M. Senko, A­l E, Peach 2; and a spqcial insight from Col(Ret) Julius S. "Jay" Jayroe, POW Son Tay Prison Camp.

Rocket" message bad been received from Washington, the troop­ers and air crew members were suited up and all exposed skin areas were painted and the command post communications had been checked and ready. The Commander declared the mission ready and ordered the launch.

WHY THE MISSION? By 1970, the US had secured the names of over 500

Americans held i:o North Vietnam prisons. Many more were

tions personnel and units of the Air Force and the coordination of these force capabilities with the US Army and US Navy. Joint training exercises were conducted pri­marily with the Army's Special Forces under the command of Maj General "Flywheel" Flannigan and later Maj General Hank Emmerson.

On 6 August, by telephone, I was summoned to the Pentagon and instructed to report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 0800 hours on 8 August. I was told that my Air Staff con­tact was Brig Gen James Allen. It was requested that on my T-39

-~- -.. Reconnaissance photo taken by SR-71 "Blackbird" revealed that Son Tay "was active." The camp was in the open and surrounded by rice paddies. ln close proximity was the 12th North Vietnamese Anny Regiment totalling approximately 12,000 troops.

flight to Washington on Sunday the 7th I plan a stop at Pope AFB, NC, adjacent to Fort Bragg, to pick up an Army Colonel who, also, had instructions to report at 0800 hours to the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His name was Arthur D. "Bull" Simons. Simons was then the G-4 for the US Anny XVIII Corps.

Over dinner on Sunday evening at the Andrews AFB Officers' Club Simons and I specuJatcd regarding the purpose of our being summoned to Washington. We suspected that due to the similar circumstances, we were being caJled for the same pur­pose. Early on the morning of the 8th I reported to Brig General Allen and "Bull" Simons reported to Allen's counterpart on the Army staff, Brig General Clarke Baldwin.

A brief preview of the reason we were called plus a short meeting with the Chairman's principal staff member for Special Operations, Army Brig General Don Blackbum, prepared us for our meeting with Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chainnan of the Joint Chjefs of Staff. T found the Chainnan to be a real gentle­man- down to earth, friendly and to the point. He asked tis if we were prepared and willing to take on an assignment to explore the feasibility of attempting to rescue some US POWs held by North Vietnam-with the ultimate responsibility of conducting the operation should it be deemed feasible. Our responses were inunediatcly affirmative. He appointed me commander of a joint task force and Col "Bull" Simons as the task force deputy com­mander. He advised us that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin Laird, had authorized the formation and training of a task force and that whatever resources we needed were to be made avai I.­able. Admiral Moorer instructed us to advise the JCS as early as possible regarding the feasibility of such an operation, and should it be deemed feasible, when we would be ready to conduct the operation, Both Simons and 1 were delighted and fell honored

PAGE TWO

with the task placed before us. Our first priority was to establish a planning group. Thanks

to our high prio1ity on resources we were able to assemble a small group of the most dedicated and innovative planners avai l­able. The group represented each of the four services so it was truly ')oint." The assembled group consisted of 26 members. Space does not pennit recognizing each member and outlining his or her contribution to the concept that developed. Suffice to say that it included such superb performers as Norman Frisbie, Larry Ropka, Ben Kraljev, Art Andraitu, Joe Cataldo, Dick Pesh.kin, Keith Grime, Warner Britton, William Nonnan, Richard Beyea, Max Newman and John Knops.

Next we turned our attention to the task force operational element An early decision was made to assemble an all volun­teer force. The ground element would be composed of men from the Anny Special Forces and the air element would be from tbc Air Force. The insertion and extraction of the force, along with the rescued POWs, would be by helicopter.

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, was selected as the training site. Security was a prime consideration and the Eglin area was well suited because it is a vast area - one where seeing military personnel wearing different unifonns does not create any specu­lation that something unusual is being planned. Also, the needed air resources were located primarily at Eglin and nearby Hurlburt Field.

Col Simons and Dr. Joe Cataldo went to Fort Bragg, home of the Anny Special Forces and asked for volunteers. We wanted 100 men possessing certaiJ1 identified skills and preferably hav­ing had recent combat experience in Southeast Asia. Approximately 500 men responded. Each was interviewed by Simons, Cataldo and Sergeant Major Pylant. From that group 100 dedicated volunteers were selected. All the required skills were

R.ECAl. L

covered. All were in top physical condition. The ground component commander selected was Lt Colonel

"Bud" Sydnor from Fort Benning, Georgia. Sydnor had an impeccable reputation as a combat leader. Additionally selected to be a member of the task force from Fort Benning was another superb combat leader, Capt Dick Meadow. Meadows would later lead the team that made the risky landing inside the prison com­pound. At the time we decided that the force needed l 00 men we believed that the number might be excessive; however, some degree of redundancy and a reservoir of spares were deemed nec­essary.

the planners by establishing contacts with the various intelligence agencies and providing guidance to the group. Among the impor­tant decisions:

a. The raid would be conducted during nighttime. b. Weather and moonlight were important considerations.

- Weather: Cloudless skies ideal for air refueling. - Moonlight: Quarter moon/35 degrees above horizon.

c. We must achieve surprise and capitalize on the element of shock.

d. Once launched, the operation must be one of precision with timing and navigational accuracy strictly according to plan.

The air element (primary force) would include five HH-53s, one HH-3, two MC-130 Combat Talons and five A-lEs. The selection of crew members for these aircraft was based on expe­rience and proven perfonnance. They were all highly experi­enced and had recent combat tours. They were assembled and given the same information as that given to the Army troops regarding the purpose of the project and were invited to become participants. All accepted. We then

The importance of light conditions led us to select a ''win­dow" during which the desired conditions would prevail. Tue period was 21-25 October, with the same conditions during 21-25 November. The date of 21 October was selected. With the counsel of Blackbum, Simons and me, the air and ground ele­ment leaders and the planners deemed the mission to be feasible. BlackbtLrn arranged for our meeting with the JCS on 16

September 1970. We indicated the h.ad an all-volunteer force.

PLANNING AND TRAINING By late August the joint task

force was assembled in the Eglin area. Primary activity was at Duke Field, known as Eglin Auxiliary Number 3. A remote, but not far from Duke, site was selected for the construction of a replica of the Son Tay camp. This is where the detailed training was accomplished, includ­ing precision helicopter operations.

The Central Intelligence Agency provided a scale model of the Son Tay compound. The model proved to be a valuable device for detailed training of the raiders­espccially members of Meadows' assault clement.

Ben Kraljcv, one of the raid planners, said - "Aircrew training began with night formation involv­ing dissimilar aircraft. As the crews became comfortable with the phase, low level was introduced as well as objective area tactics which includ­ed helicopter landings and extrac­tions; air-drops by the C-130s of

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant General LeRoy J. Manor was born in Morrisonville, NY, in 1921 and entered Aviation Cadet training in 1942. He received his pilot wings and com­mission in 1943. During WW U he flew 72 combat mis­sions in P-47s over Europe. Following the war, there were various assignments including two tours overseas and one in the Pentagon in the Office of the AF Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. Gen Manor com­manded a tactical fighter wing in L968-69 during the Vietnam War, flying 275 combat missions in F-lOO's. In 1970 he assumed command of a Joint Task Force whose mission was to rescue POWs at Son Tay. From 1971-73, he served as Deputy Director of Operations and Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to the Joint Chicrs of Staff at the Pentagon. From 1973-1976, he commanded the 13th Air Force in the Philippines where he was Chief of Staff for the US Pacific Command. Following retirement in 1978, Gen Manor represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lhe Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, as the senior military negotiator and advisor to the US Ambassador to Lhe Philippines. He also was military advisor for an inde­pendent analysis of the unsuccessful 24 April 1980 raid to rescue American hostages held in lran. A Command Pilot with over 7 ,000 flying hours, he bas been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal w/3 OLC, Legion of Meril w/I OLC, the Distinguished Flying Cross w/l OLC, the Air Medal wfl.5 OLC and the Purple Heart as well as many awards from foreign governments. Presently, General Manor and his wife, Dolores, reside in Shalimar, FL.

mission was feasible, outlined our concept and reported we would be ready to execute on the night of 21 October. No changes to our concept were suggested. The plan was approved .. We briefed Mr. Laird, Secretary of Defense, on 24 September and obtained his approval without change to our con­cept. Higher level approval would still be required. On 8 October we briefed the plan at the White House. It was presented to lhe National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and Brig General Alexander Haig, his military assis­tant. We received an enthusiastic response. T indicated that final approval would be necessa!)' within the next 24 hours in order tb execute on 21 October. Kiss inger responded that it would not be possible to get President Nixon's approval by the next evening because he was not available, but that he was confident we would have it in time to make our next "window" which was 21 November. the delay was a disap­pointment largely because of con­

flares, fire fight simulators and napalm; and close air support by the A- Is. During this training aircrews flew 1,054 hours without so much as scraping a wing tip or rotor blade - most of it at night with dissimilar aircraft in low level formation while blacked out - a true reflection of the superb skill of each and every aircrew. Training culminated with two five and one-half hour full profile missions flown for the benefit of JCS observers who pronounced the force ready."

stant concern about an intelligence compromise. On the rplus side was an extra 30 days available for additional rehearsals, more intelligence, plan refinement and possible equipment improve­ments. We made nwnerous refinements during the extra 30 day period. The two most important were adding the FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red) equipment on the MC-130 and obtaining a suitable night sight for the weapons. Dr. Cataldo refined his plans for providing care for the rescued POWs, who were expected to be in a debilitated condition. Both the planning by the Pentagon group and the training in

Florida progressed exceptionally well. Simons and I divided our time between the two. Don Blackburn was most helpful assisting

FALL2001

We received authorization to visit COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, and his Air Deputy, General Lucius Clay, Jr.,

PAGE THREE

on l November I 970. Simons, Blackbum and I flew to Saigon for this purpose. We stopped in Hawaii enroute and re-briefed Admiral John McCain (CINCPAC). The plan was well received by Abrams and Clay. They assured their full support.

Next, Simons and l made arrangements to confer with the U.S. Navy Commander of Task Force 77, which operated in the Tonkin Gulf. We visited Admiral Fred Bardshar on the flagship Oriskany. We briefed the Admiral on our project and solicited his participation. We requested that concurrent with the raiding force approaching the Hanoi area from a westerly direction, he launch a force from the carriers and make a feint toward the North Vietnamese coast. The purpose was to deceive the air defense system of North Vietnam. Such a raid, which would appear on their radar, would convince them that an attack from the east was imminent and cause them to be unaware of our raid approaching at low level from the west. The admiral agreed.

DEPLOYMENT On I 0 November the two MC-130s departed from Eglin-des­

tination Tak.bli, Thailand. Transportation to move the task force and its equipment for the mission was arranged personally between me and General Jack Catton Commander, of the Military Airlift Command. Transport consisted of four C-14ls. They depa11ed Eglin on 14 November and arrived at Takbli two days later. By 17 November the force had closed at Takhli. A CIA operated secure compound was made available. It was here that fina l preparations were made.

F-105 Wild Weasel aircraft were added with the mission of engaging surface to air missiles (SAM's) should those batteries become active. F-4s were added to provide protection against possible MIG interference. The F-105s were from a unit at Korat, the F-4s from Ubon and the A- l Es were based at Nakhou Phanom. All bases were in Thailand. KC-l 35 tankers were pro­vided by a SAC unit at Utapao, Thailand, a base south of Bangkok. The helicopters originated from various bases and were brought to Udom and prepared for the mission.

The CIA compound at Takhli became a beehive of activity. Weapons an other equipment checks were carefully conducted. Ammunition was issued. Simons, Sydnor and Meadows made the final selection of the force numbers. Of the original 100 SF mem­bers of Lhe force, 56 were selected for the mission. This was unwelcome news for the 44 trained and ready, but not selected. It was known from the beginning that the si.ze of the force would be limited to only the number considered esse11tial for the task.

The "Red Rocket" message was received. This meant that President Nixon had given his final approval to launch the mis­sion. The major decision, which was mine to make, was when to launch. The planned date of, late the night of, November 21st now appeared to be in jeopardy. A typhoon in the area of the Philippines and moving slowly toward the mainland was forecast to bring bad weather to North Vietnam by the night of the 2 1st. The weather over the Tonkin Gulf would certainly be such to pre­vent the US Navy from launching the diversionary force. The weather en.route to and at the objective area would be unsuitable. lt was a grim situation.

Keith Grimes, the task force weather officer, and weather support personnel from the 1st Weather Wing exhaustively ana­lyzed the weather patterns. They predicted formation of a high pressure area over Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf which would

PAGE FOUR

dominate the weather conditions and provide suitable mission conditions prior to arrival of the typhoon weather. The good weather, however, would prevail on 20 November- not 21 November. I made the decision to advance mission launch by 24 hours. Thus, D-day became 20 November instead of 2 1 November as previously planned. I informed all participants (US Navy and all supporting activities) and Admirals Moorer and McCain. Weather conditions confinned that the decision was a correct one.

O nly Col. Ar th ur D. "Bull" Simons (above) and three others knew what the mission was to be until five hours before takeoff.

EXECUTION Final briefings were conducted on 20

November. All were told the exact loca­tion of the objective area and that the lat­est information indicated between 70 and 80 POWs should be at that location - the Son Tay Prison. While we were confident that the plan bad not been compromised, we would not be certain until we made the landing. If the enemy had foreknowledge of our p lan, the reception would not be a pleasant one. even though the task force was small, it was extremely potent for its size. While it could bave been over­whelmed by a much larger force laying in waiting, the enemy would have paid a heavy price. Escape and evasion proce­dures were thoroughly covered. Satisfied that the mission force was fully in a "go" position, I proceeded to Monkey Mountain

where a staff hali arranged for a command post from which the

entire operation could be controlled. Communications were available to all clements including US Navy Carrier Task Force, as well as to Admira ls McCain and Moorer. With me at the com­mand post were Morris, Pesh.kin, Newman, Knops and Willett Kraljev and Ropka were at Tak:bli and Udom, respectively, and immediately available on direct communication lines. Frisbie, with a small staff, was airborne in a radio relay aircraft that could function as an alternate comm.and post if I were Lo lose my com­munications capability. An intelligence staff member, Art Andraitus, was in Japan monitoring the SR-71 photo results of a mission during late 20 November. He reported to me that the photo Intel was positive (signs of habitation - vehicle tracks, etc.).

For the troops Friday, 20 November, was a day for "crew rest." Dr. Joe Cataldo issued steeping pills. At 2200 hours the men boarded a C-130 and left Takbli for Udoro where helicopters were waiting. Upon landing at Udom the men transferred to three of the helicopters- two HH-53s and one HH-3-carefully rechecking aU the equipment that had been deemed necessary for the mission that lay ahead. At 2318 hours the first helo launched; at 2325 hours the last belo launched. They were led by two HC-130 refuelers enroute to an air refueling area over Norther Laos.

Jay Stayer recalls: "We had a last minute ' huddle' type briefing to check weather and to go over the radio-out procedures for the 'umpteenth' time, and one of the mission planners pulled the cover off a large sign that said, · F- COMMUNISM.' We all cheered and the tension seemed to subside for most of us. We boarded C-130s for the short trip to Udorn Air Base. 1 remember

RECALL

I was in a sort of a slow-motion dream-state as I disembarked with my personal gear and walked by my squadron friends, all standing out on the porches and wherever there was a place to watch. They all spoke a quiet word of greeting and wished us good luck, but none asked what we were up to. They had been ordered to stand down a couple of days or so before, to ensure their aircraft were in top mechanfoal condition for us to use. Even the tower operator was ordered to ignore our taxi-out without radio transmissions.

"I climbed aboard into the left seat of Apple Two and worked through the starting checklist with the aircraft command­er, Lt Colonel Jack Allison, our flight mechanic and the two pararescuemen.

"Just as we had practiced, the formation lead HC-130P refu­eler aircraft, Lime One, got off on lime, as did the rest of us, the HH-3 Banana, and five Apple HJ-l-53s. We routinely fell into the seven ship formation, three helicopters stacking high on each side of the leading HC-130 at about 1500 feet AGL. There was a partial moon and some clouds that we climbed through, when suddenly the call came to 'break, break, break!' indi­cating that someone had lost sight of tbe fonnatioo lead and we were to execute the formation break-up procedure.

final assault, we immediately returned to Udom for refueling. We were to refuel as soon as possible and return to Northern Laos area to provide air refueling and search and rescue support as needed."

Happily, the weather in the refueling area was clear. All refuelings were accomplished without difficulty. All six helos then joined formation with an MC-130 Combat Talon for the low altitude flight toward North Vietnam. The area over Laos is a mountainous area requiring precise navigation by the MC- 130 crew.

In the meantime the five A- ls had departed Nakbon Phanom and joined formation with the second MC-130 Combat Talon. This formation was in close proximity of the MC-130/helo flight All were enroute at low altitude for Son Tay.

"Each helicopter turned to a predetermined heading and climbed to a predetermined alti­tude for one minute and then returned to the original landing. The effect was a very widely sepa­rated formation, each helicopter 500 ft above the other and at vary­ing distances away from the lead HC- 140. I could see other mem­bers of lhc formation flying in and out of the clouds, and I thought we had blown the mission we had hardly started. Apparently a

Using in-flight refueling, six helicopters flew flew from T hailand, across Laos, and into North Vietnam. While various diversions were taking place locaJJy and across North Vietnam, the task force closed on the camp under cover of darkness.

strange airplane had almost flown through the formation and someone had called the lost contact procedure to avoid a mid-air collision. As it turned out, our plan11i11g for such possihle events, and the training for such, resulted in a rather routine fonnation break and with a subsequent rejoin being completed successfully.

"In the meantime, we had all topped off our fuel tanks from the lead HC-130 and had quite deftly exchanged formation leads from him to the just-arrived, blacked-out C-130 with all the fancy electronic gear."

Bill Kornitzer, A/C of the lead HC-130, "Lime One," recalls: "Our mission was to launch from Udorn, join up with the six helicopters and lead them lo the North Vietnam border. After joining up we refueled the five HH-53s and the HH-3. This was done in total silence without any incidents. The HH-3 stayed close behind our left wing in order t~ maintain the speed required by the rest of fonnatjon. After leaving the helicopters for their

FALL 2001

Close air support was the job of the A-1 s because they were ideally suited. They bad long endurance capability, carried a big load of ordnance and their relatively low speed permitted small orbits which would keep them close by overhead should assis­tance be needed on short notice.

Ten F-4s had taken off from Ubon to provide a MfG a'ir patrol and five F-105 Wild Weasels had launched from Korat to provide protection from the SAM sites. The F-4s and fl- I 05s would be flying at a high altitude providing cover over the gen­eral area and would not interfere in any way with the primary force.

The Navy force launched on time with a total of 59 sorties. As the primary force reached the Laos/North Vietnam border, the enemy radar's became aware of the Navy force coming from over the Tonkin Gulf. The diversionary raid was having the desired effects. The presence of the Navy on enemy radar caused near

PAO!! l'!VE

panic conditions within the North Vietnamese defense centers. It became obvious that the North Vietnamese total concern was directed eastward. Our raiding force, coming from the west, in effect had a free ride.

Meanwhile, in Apple Two, as Jay Strayer vividly remem­bers: "Tension was building up by this time, as we neared the fP for the final approach to the camp. I bad done most of the flying up to thjs point, and Jack Allison took over the controls for the final phase. I in turn picked up the navigation duties during this critical phase of the mission.

"As we had rehearsed so many times, the lead C-130 led us over the last mountain range and down to 500 ft above the ground. At the TP, they, along with Apple Four and Five, popped up to l,500 ft to fly directly for the camp. A single radio trans­mission with the last vector heading to the camp was made by the C- l 30's navigator and we continued on, maintaining a disci­plined radio silence.

''Now we were only four: Apple Three in the lead with the HH-3, Apple's One and Two following in trail , with 45-second separations between. I was particularly interested in this phase, for I had done the procedural planning for getting us separated in a manner that would allow room for each to 'do his thing,' while at the same time not delaying the following bird's initial assault details."

Upon reaching the IP (Initial Point), the MC-130 climbed to I ,500 feet. The 130's mission at this point was to drop flares over the Son Tay Prison. Helos 4 and 5 were to provide a backup and were to drop flares should the C-130 flares not be effective. The flares worked as intended. The helos made a left turn and pro­ceeded to a pre-selected landing area which was on an island in a large lake. There they would wait, hopefully to be called to move to Son Tay to pick up some POWs. The C-130 made a right tum and dropped fire fight simulators (deception) and napalm to cre­ate a fire as an anchor point for the A-ls. The C-130 then left the area for au orbit point over Northern Laos. Immediately after the flares illuminated the prison compound HH-53 Apple Three, under the command of Marty Donohue, flew low over the prison firing at the guard towers with bis Gatling machine guns. The plan called for neutralizing the guard towers to eliminate that potential source of enemy opposition.

Immediately following Donohue's pass the HH-3, whose crew was Herb Kalen, Herb Zender and Leroy Wright and carry­ing Meadows with his 13-man assault force, landed in a relative­ly small space inside the prison walls. So far all is going strictly accordi11g to plan and precisely on time.

The landing was a hard one, but successful. Rotors contact­ed some of the tall trees which bordered one side of the landing area. It was anticipated that damage would occur and the plan provided for the HH-3 to be considered a loss. By means of an explosive charge with a timing device, it was to be destroyed upon departure of our troops from the compound. The hard land­ing caused a fire extinguisher to dislodge and crashed against Sgt LeRoy Wright (HH-3 Engineer), fracturing an ankle. While undoubtedly this caused severe pain, the Aow of adrenaline apparently was such that Sgt Wright ignored the pain and contin­ued with bis du lies to perform as a member of Meadows' assault force. (Sgt Wright was later awarded the Air Force Cross by President Nixon).

Dick Meadows and his highly trained and rehearsed assault

PAGE SIX

force, including the helicopter Air Force crew members, went into action immediately. With bullhorns they announced that it was a rescue raiding party and were there to bring out the POWs. North Vietnamese military personnel exited the buildings in var­ious states of undress and fired their weapons against the intrud­ers. The rai.ders, however, having the benefit of initiative, a rehearsed plan of action and not suffering from the element of shock that was imposed on the defenders, quickly disposed of the camp contingent. Meadow's primary concern now was to enter the buildings to search for Americans held prisoner by the North Vietnamese. The timed explosive charge was placed in the HH-3 to ensure its destruction upon departure of the raiders. With the use of another explosive device a hole was blown in tl1e south­west comer of the prison wall. The raiders and the POWs would exit through this hole. Col Bud Sydnor's command post would be established just outside the wall at the site of the hole.

Simultaneous with the landing of the assault force, HH-53s Apple One and Two were to land opposite Lhe south side and immediately fan out and conduct a search of all the buildings in search of Americans and to prevent reinforcements from inter­fering in any way with the rescue effort. Apple One, with Simons and 21 raiders aboard, mistakenly landed at a site enclosed by a fence that presented an appearance not unlike the Son Tay com­pound. it was approximately 200 meters south of the objective area.

A fire fight immediately ensued wl1ere the estimate of enemy killed ran as high as 200 - a number which may be somewhat exaggerated. This raiding element was on the ground for not more than five minutes when the mistake was realized. Simons and his men re-boarded the helicopter and moved to the correct position at the Son Tay Prison ..

Jay Str ayer from Apple Two observed: "As we neared our objective I sensed we were not going the right way to the Son Tay camp, and mentioned it more than once to Jack. Quite suddenly I was sure of it; we were about to land at th.e military camp to the south of Son Tay! The amazing thing to me at the time, and remains so, is that no one had the forethought to break radio silence and say so! Indeed, Apple Three had almost taken the camp under fire, discovered his error in time, and turned nortb to the correct place."

Warner .Britton in Apple One remembers: "l saw the flares dropped by the C-130 ignite and was impressed by the surrealis­tic appearance of the illuminated landscape. This Light enabled me to see Donohue (Apple Three) hover across the building complex toward which we were heading. I noticed that he didn't fire as scheduled and commented on this to Montrem. Then Kalen fo llowed the first aircraft and he did fire. That was the last Montrem and I saw, as just after Kalen crossed the buildings, we were landing on a heading slightly away from the buildings, so that our troops could proceed out the rear ramp and have their objective in sight. We had no idea we had landed in the wrong p lace unti l we had taken off and turned toward the holding area. My memory of what happened next differs slightly from that of some others. I believe that we took off, flew to our holding area about a minute away and landed. We returned immediately when Donohue, in Apple Three, told us we had landed in the wrong place. We were also in contact with Col Simon's group. Others, including Montrem, believe that we returned to pick them up without landing at the holding area. ln any case, very little time

RBCALL

passes before we were back on the ground at the so-called 'school'."

In the meantime, Jack Allison in Apple Two carrying Bud Sydnor and his force, bad landed at the correct predetermined spot and, realizing that Apple One was not with him, immediate­ly put an alternate plan in effect. Within a few minutes, however, he returned to the primary plan when the erring force was in place.

Jack Allison, in the holding area, recalls: "Sitting in the holding area waiting to be recalled to pick up the POWs at1d ground forces, Apple flight was treated to a spectacular fireworks display. 14 to 16 SAMs were fired at the F-105 "Wild Weasel" aircraft, although one was at such a low angle, one of the depart­ing helicopters took evasive action. One SAM was observed to explode and spray fuel over Firebird Three. The aircraft descend­ed in a ball of fire and appeared to be a loss. However the fire blew out and the crew continued with the mission. Another SAM exploded near Firebird Five, inflicting damage to his fli ght con­trols and fuel system. The crew later bailed out over the Plaine des Jarres and were picked up at first light by Apple Four and Five."

While all the helicopters were engaged with the compound, the A-l s, which had arriv~d with the second C- 130, were doing their thing.

Bob Senko in Peach Two recollects: "Ed Gochenaur and T were in Peach Two. We were on Major Rhein's wing. We had an automatic radio frequency change when we entered the target area. Only one aircraft forgot, and that was me. But we were able to keep up with what was going on visually. Both Goch and I knew right away that none of the helos hand gone to the wrong area, but were pretty helpless to do much other than support the troops as best we could. Everything got better organized for us when 1 got the frequency right. It got better for the troops when they got to the right area.

"Because they were out of position, we got called to pay close attention to the road from the south, to make sure no-one took advantage of our situation. When we got the order lo shut down the foot bridge between the Citadel and Son Tay, lead and Goch got lined up headed east to take the bridge out with a cou­ple of LOO# Willie-Pete bombs. 1 ho llered at Goch that he was too shallow, but he let the WPs go anyway and they were pretty short. Fortunately, his run in line was across a chemical factory (if that was what it was), and he greased il. There was a beautiful display of different color flames, with the bright green ones go ing up way over the altitude we were working. Major Rhein's bombs were pretty good and the combination allowed us to get the job done. Ob, by the way, the reason Goch was so low on his run in was that the SAMs had already started . They seemed to be pretty ran­dom at first but slowly we saw that they were at Least aimed in the general direction of Son Tay and were being fired on a very low trajectory. So we stayed as low as we could. T don't think any were actually targeted specifically on us. But they got our atten­tion, and we stayed pretty well in the weeds. It wasn't too hard since we had about 15-20 percent moonlight to work with and the target area was pretty well marked by the small anns going off.

"We were circling the camp about 100-200 AGL and when we were on the north side, we'd drop down to water level over the Red River. Again, because some of the ground troops were not in position to blow the bridge on the north side of the camp,

FALL 2001

we got called to take it out. Since we couldn't get enough altitude to drop any heavy stuff, we started strafing it. I don't know bow productive that was, but I'm pretty sure we kept any traffic off the bridge even if we didn't drop it. When the ground guys wrapped it up, we dumped our left over stuff in the Red River and headed home. One other thing I remember vividly is that when the helos went in, they were to take out the guard towers with their mini­guns (7.62). We were only to help as a last resort. When they opened fire, either they hit something explosive, or the sheer number of tracers rounds caught the bamboo/wood towers on fire. Actually, it looked like they exploded. It was amazing, cer­tainly stopping any reaction from those towers."

The entire camp was searched. All North Vietnamese forces were annihilated and the devastatingly disappointing discovery was made that there were no Americans at the camp. The coded message-NEGATIVE ITEMS- was received in my command post. ln disbelief I hoped that the message had become garbled in transmission. Simons and I had previously discussed this unlike­ly probabili ty but know that the possibility existed. The raiding party was on the ground at Son Tay for 29 minutes, ·within one minute of the planned time of 30 minutes. We experienced no losses. Sgt Wright suffered a broken ankle and Sgt Murry suf­fered a bullet wound on !he inside of a thigh, a minor injury. The estimate of enemy killed was determined to be about 50.

The helicopters were called in and the raiding party went aboard. A fl.er every man was accounted for, they launched for the long ride back to Udorn. The SA-2 missile sites became active and were engaged by the F-105 Wild Weasels. A missile hit and severely damaged an F-105. There was a loss of fuel and an effort was made to return to the KC-135 tankers on an orbit over Laos. A flame-out was experienced prior to contact with the tankers, and the crew of two, Major Kilgus and Capt Lowry, ejected, land­ing in a mountainous area, uninjured. The progress of this emer­gency was monitored at my command post. Location of the downed airmen was relayed to the crew of HH-53s Apple Four and Five, Lt Col Brown and Major Kenneth Murphy, with instructions to search for and pick up the F-105 crew members. The pickup was successfully accomplished after more helo air rcfuelings and flare drops; all returned to Udorn safely. At Udom I met a dejected force of raiders. They were ctisappointcd because our hopes of returning with POWs were dashed. We had failed. This thoroughly dedicated group expressed the belief we should retum the next night and search for tho POWs. For many reasons, Ll1is could not be done.

AFTERMATH The first order of business at this point was to send a top

secret message to Admiral Moorer giving him a preliminary assessment of the mission results. Later that morning T received a message from Admiral Moorer instructing me and Simons to return to Washington post haste. The North Vietnamese had announced to the world that we had bombed a POW camp and various allegations. Our presence was needed to answer ques­tions and counter the North Vietnamese's inaccurate pronounce­ments. That same day, 2 1 November, Simons and I proceeded to Saigon where we boarded a Pan Am flight for Washington with an intermediate stop in Honolulu. On arrival in Honolulu we

were met by Admiral McCain who had canceled our onward Pan Am flight and replaced it with a C-1351command post aircraft.

PAGESEVl!N

We visited with Admiral McCain for about two hours, explaining the details of the mission. McCain's final comment on our departure was, "Don't let anyone tell you that this mission was a failure. We will learn, as the results develop, that many benefits wiJl accrue as a result of having done this." We appreci­ated his comment, but at the time believed that il was intended to ease our disappointment of having failed to rescue POWs. In ret­rospect it is astonishing to realize how accurate his prophesy was.

Shortly after arriving in Washington we attended a joint meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and members of his staff. A lengthy discussion of the whole oper­ation took place. The disappointment with the results of the mis­sion was apparent, but all were pleased with the absence of loss­es. The media were clamoring for statements, and it was held by Moorer, Laird, Simons, and myself and attended by a host of media representatives. There we tried to set the record straight by presenting the purpose of our efforts and, within the bounds of security, explain the conduct and results of the mission.

This was fo llowed by a visit with President Nixon, who was anxious to receive a first-hand report. While disappointed that we didn 't rescue a11y POWs, he was pleased that we had experienced no losses. He expressed the belief that the rescue attempt would resuJt i:n the improvement of morale among the POWs, tbe next of kin, and, in fact, the whole country. Congressional reaction was mixed, with more favorable than Ullfavorable. The end results were proclamations by both the House and the Senate praising the effort..

Participants in the raid, as well as planners were recognized by appropriate awards. Some were presented by President Nixon and others by Secretary of Defense Laird.

Did the mission result in benefits as Admiral McCain pre­dicted? Yes, definitely. The North Vietnamese, fearing a repeat performance but not knowing when and where, closed the outly­ing POW camps and consolidated all POWs in the two main pris­ons in downtown Hanoi. These were the o ld French prisons of Halo and Cu lac. The number of POWs at these two prisons now grew to the extent that POWs lived in groups, rather than what for many had been solitary confinement. Morale immediately improved and, as a result, general health improved. POWs have stated that Jives were saved. Prison conditions to some degree generally improved. Mail delivery and food both improved sub­stantially. Morale among next of kin, for lhe most part, also improved.

Jay Jayroe, former Son Tay POW, recalls: "When the fire­works went off that clear night in November of 1970, we knew exactly what was happening-a raid on Son Tay was in progress! Some 52 of us had been moved from Hanoi to Sou Tay in late 1968 and had immediately recognized it as a place for escape or rescue. During the following months we did what we could to indicate our presence there, hoping our efforts would result in success via US airborne surveillance. However, for reasons unknown to us, in July, 1980 our captors moved us a short dis­tance to a newly opened complex, where we were aggregated with other POWs from outlying prison camps. I do not believe the Vietnamese suspected an impending rescue attempt, because the move was quite routine with no sense of urgency.

"The raid, as we have learned, was perfectly executed and highly successful with the exception of one minor detail- no one was rescued. But, short of being there, one cannot imagine the positive effect it had on those of us who were destined to spend some two and a half years more as POWs. One should recall that it had been two years since the US had stopped bombing North Vietnam, and our faith was being severely tried. But the Son Tay rescue attempt dispelled all doubt: WE WERE NOT FORGOT­TEN; OUR COUNTRY CARED!! During the hard times ahead, our renewed faith in God and Country served us well."

In 1973, when the 591 POW s were released, we learned that those at Son Tay had been relocated in mid-July-almost one month before the Joint Contingency Task Force was formed and trained for the rescue mission. Intelligence sources were not ade­quate to reveal the actual presence of POWs at specific locations on a real-time basis. Some critical intelligence had several weeks delay.

The successful demonstration of our capability to execute this type of rescue mission undoubtedly had some impact on the fonnation, albeit 16 years later, of a Unified Command (USSOC) whose sole mission is special operations. I will always feel a great sense of admiration of the brave men who volunteered for the risky mission to rescue Americans in the heart of the enemy country. ram reminded of a scripture reading taken from the Old Testament:

ISAIAH Chapter 6, Verse 8: Then I heard the Lord asking, "Whom shall I send as a messenger to my people? Who will go for us?" and I said, "Lord, I'll go. Send me."

HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE Frances Bellamy ( 1855-193 1) wrote the Pledge of Allegiance

for the observance of the 400th Anniversary of the discovery of America by Columbus. Since l891 , he bad been working on a journal for juveniles entitled, Youth's Companion. He worked closely with James B. Upham, the editor of the paper. Bellamy's job on the paper was lo promote patriotism and the flying of the flag over the public schools. He was made chainnan of the execu­tive committee for the national public school celebration of Columbus Day in 1892.

Bellamy visited President Benjamin Harrison to ask him to endorse the idea of a flag over every schoolhouse and the teaching of patriotism in all the schools. On June 2 1, 1892, 'President Harrison signed the proclamation lhat said, "Let the national flag float on every schoolhouse in the country and the exercises be such

PAGE EIGHT

as shall impress upon our youth the patriotic duties of American citizenship!

Francis Bellamy wrote these now famous words, first printed in Youth's Companion September 8, 1892:

"I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States and to the Republic for which it stands. one Nation, indivisible, with lib­erty and justice for all. "

At the Second National Flag Conference held in Wasbington, D.C., on Flag Day, 1924, they added the words, "of America."

A further change was made in the Pledge by House Joint Resolution 243, approved by President Eisenhower 011 June 14, 1954, which added the words, "under God," so Lhat it now reads: "one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Source: ··111st1>ry O/fh6 Pl«lfld of Allcgiam .. -c" by Mnjor SU(I.; W, Ql)Ss~ OflltXir'S' H~1f40\~ September 200 1.

RECALL

Memorial Service & Grave Marking Ceremony fora

Revolutionary War Hero By Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Joe Harris

ln the fall of J 780, Samuel Johnson was a 23-year-old Wilkes County backwoods farmer. With little formal education, he depended upon a keen sense of outdoor know-how rather than his unusually good ability to read and write. The fiercely inde­pendent backwoods people of Wilkes County had been little threatened by the northern was of the American Revolution, now five years old. Not yet married, Samuel Johnson was eager to vol­unteer for militia duty when the call for able-bodied men was made. Enlisting in Captain Benjamin Cleveland's Company of North Carolina Volunteers as a pr1vate in 1776, Sam Johnson was eventually promoted and awarded an officer's commission.

exposed position." Amidst the chaos, Captain Johnson sustained a bullet wound through bis abdomen. There also were a number of bullet holes in the skirts of his coat. Wounded in action, Captain Johnson continued to issue directions and shout encour­agement to his men without regard to his own safety. Another eyewitness reported that Captain Johnson's immediate reaction upon enemy contact resulted in the successful accomplishment of his mission but not before five of his neighbors were killed in action. The combat lasted approximately an hour, but to one of the attackers the mountain appeared "volcanic; there flashed

along its summit and around its base and up its sides, one long sulphurous blaze." The violent description of the attack to secure the sununit of Kings Mountain could be summed up as a complete victory for the volunteer militia. This combined force of over-mountain volunteers bad slain 225 Loyalists, wounded 163, and taken 716 pris­oners, with a loss to themselves of 28 killed and 62 wounded.

After many years of fighting to a stale­mate in the northern colonies, England had changed military strategies and moved an anny under the command of British General Charles Cornwallis into South Carolfaa. Within weeks, Cornwallis' troops had over­run the entire state. It was this southern -invasion that aroused the inhabitants of North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and western Virginia to gather a volunteer army to stop and eliminate the British threat in the south. Now four years

T he NC Society of the Sons ofthe American Revolution, the National Park Service, and the NC Army National Guar d participated in a memorial service for Captain Johnson.

During Samuel Johnson's lifetime, he repeatedly said that the gunshot wound to his body would have been fatal had it not been that for three days before the battle be did not eat. Constantly on the move as they tracked the Loyalists to Kings Mountain, the over-mountain men did not stop and cat

later, C-0lonel Benjamin Cleveland's crude minuteman unit, con­sisting mainly of about 400 Scot-Irish descendants, was again mustered for service. Captain Samuel Johnson was one of those minuteman volunteers. Cleveland 's little brigade marched to an area called Quaker Meadows near where modem day Morganton is located. Joining another force of over-mountain men hailing from valleys west of the Alleghenies, the combined strength of frontiersmen assembled reached approximately 1,600 strong.

For several days in steady rain, this militia group followed one of General Cornwallis' Loyalist Regiments numbering about 1, 100 men w1til trapping it atop the crest of Kings Mountain, South Carolina. On 7 October 1780, about 3 o'clock in the after­noon in a misty rain, this volunteer militia of over-mountain men formed in a horseshoe around the base of the mountain behind their mounted leaders. As they began to close the noose of the encirclement, Loyalist pickets began to skirmish. At that moment, a coordinated assault was launched. From the crest in their defensive positions the Loyalist rained down volley after volley of fire, but the densely wooded sides of the mountain pro­vided the attackers with cover. As the militia clawed their way near the summit of Kings Mountain, the Loyalists, now facing possible destruction, charged from their positions witb fixed bay­onets. It was reported by witnesses of the battle that Samuel Johnson "rushed his men forward into the most dangerous and

FALL2001

or rest. They consumed tack and water on the move. This depri­vation resulted in the empty condition of Johnson 's bowels and therefore attributed to his escape from death and speedy recovery.

Samuel Johnson was married to Mary Hamon in Wilkes County on 25 June 1782. Soon afterward, the couple settled on the headwaters of the Roaring River in what is now Traphill, Wilkes County. They lived out their lives there and arc buried on the old home place in what is now called the Old Newt Johnson Cemetery. Samuel Johnson was 77 years old at his death. The Jobnsons produced nfae children. The youngest, Rachel Wa'lker Johnson, is my great-great-great-grandmother.

Various affidavits and testimonies on file in the Revolutionary War Pension files state, "Captain Johnson was known as a brave man and most effective officer and soldier dur­ing the Revolutionary War. He was highly esteemed by the c iti­zens of the country and entitled to distinguished consideration for his service."

Compatriot Joe Harris, a lieutenant colonel (ret) of the Virginia Army National Guard and member of the North Carolina Society of Sons of the American Revolution, conducted a memo­rial service for bis ancestor, captain Samuel Johnson, NC Militia, on 5 August 200 I, at Little Stone Mountain Baptist Church in Traphill, NC. Col. Harris is a 7th general descendent of Captain

PAGE NINE

• Lt. Col. (ret.) Joe Harris con­ducted the memorial service for bis ancestor, Capt. Samuel . Johnson.

Johnson. Representatives from the NC Society, National Park Service, and the NC Army National Guard participated in tbe tribute to Captain Johnson 's heroic

1 deeds in the Battle of Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780. On the day of the memorial

service, Senator Jesse Helms revealed that the US Flag flown atop the capitol was dedicated to the military service and memo­ry of Captain Johnson .

Following tbe memorial service, the Johnson family and the NC Society delegati9n traveled to the Old Newt Johnson Cemetery where a graveside service for Captain Johnson includ­ed cadets from the Ellciu High School Junior Army ROTC, NC Army National Guard, National Park service, and NC Society. Kemp Johnson and Compatriot C. D. Willfam, west area vice president of the Society, unveiled a new marble bead stone sup­plied by the Veterans Administration. Society President Randy Steele, assisted by Society Chaplain (Rev.) Richard Hefner, ded­icated the monument and SAR marker to the memory of Captain Johnson.

The Siege of Khe Sanh By Thomas W. H. Alexander

I n late 1967 General William Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, made

the decision to hold aud reinforce Kbe Sanh as a major combat base. This decision was made in the face of a major NVA buildup around Khe Sanh and was to spark controversy among the Marine commanders who were asked to abandon their existing tactics and place an entire Marine regiment (the 26th Marines, reinforced) into a purely defensive role at a location which the Marines felt was a poor choice to defend. Westmoreland was later to wrile that that decision broughl more criticism upon his shoulders than any other single battlefield event of the Vietnam War, and in his book, A Soldier Reports, he devoted a chapter to justifications for this decision.

The Khe Sanh Plateau, located in western Quang Tri Province, is in the far northwestern

to interdiction at countless potential bottlenecks. It was clear that it would not be a reliable supply route for a major presence as Khe Sanh.

Khe Sanh set astride a natural infiltration route for the North Vietnamese into Quang Tri Province and the heavily populated coastal areas. In his memoirs, General Westmoreland described the critical importance of Khe Sanh as serving as a base to block enemy infiltration from Laos eastward along Route 9, providing a base for special operations to harass the enemy in Laos, pro­viding an air strip for reconnaissance aircraft surveying the Ho Chi Minh trail, providing a western anchor for defenses south of the demilitarized zone, and providing an event1ial jtUnp off point for grow1d operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail. He felt that to give up Khe Sanh would insure that the battleground would be

shifted to the populated coastal strip corner of Souch Vietnam with North Vietnam to the immediate norlh and Laos to the west. This mountainous area is characterized by tree canopies up to 60 feet in height, dense elephant grass with bamboo thickets. The very nature of the terrain made it the natu-

Tom Alexander has written several articles for Recall. A lawyer with Maupin. Taylor and E llis, he has seen service in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is an active member of the Society of the Cincinnati of North Carolina

of Quang Tri Province and would afford the NVA an avenue along which to advance southward along the coast.'

The parallel to Dien Bien Phu some 14 years earlier and the tactics

ral infiltration route for NVA coming into South Vietnam from the north and west after their long trek down the Ho Chi Minh trail. The terrain provided the NVA the advantage of good con­cealment from aerial reconnaissance, and monsoon weather in the January through March time frame bad the potential for restricting or even eliminating air operations in support of the base.

American Green Berets had been the first to establish a pres­ence in the area when in J 962 they established a civilian irregu­lar defense group at the Khe Sanb site. Route 9 ran from the Laotian border east to Khe Sanh and then in a northeasterly direc­tion towards the coast where it joined Route l at Dong Ha. However, it could hardly be described as a road and was subject

PAGE TEN

of the Viet Minh under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap in defeating the French in that epic battle was not lost on the American commanders. fn May 1967 when the First Battalion, 26th Marines, moved into the Khe Sanh combat base, they immediately seized several key hilltops west of the base in heavy fighting. These hilltops were to remain occu­pied and defended by the Marines dming the entire siege.

While the battle of the Khc Sanh can be measured as lasting approximately a year, beginning in April 1967 and ending in April 1968, the so-called siege lasted for a shorter period- from approximately the end of January 1968 at the time of the Tet offensive to early April of that same year.

Jn August 1967, when Colonel David Lownds took over as commanding officer of the 26th Marines, he immediately set out

R£CALL

to improve the 3,900-foot airstrip. This work was com­pleted in October. Jo addition, bunkers and trenches were constructed. Later in the year as enemy activity around the base increased, forces which had been with­drawn from Col. Lownds' command to support other operations began to return. One of the constant con­cerns was whether the forces stationed at the base would reach a size which could not be effectively resup­plied by air if Route 9 should be blocked by the NVA.

At the beginning of 1968 intelligence reports indi­cated that large numbers of NVA units were moving into the Khe Sanh area, including the 325C NVA Division and the 304th NVA Division. These units attacked outposts around the main base in January 1968 and, not unexpectedly, severed Route 9. From that point to the end of the siege, all resupply was by air.

The main base and tbe units on the outpost hills were regularly subjected to enemy fire from 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, 122-mm rockets, and long range 130-mm and 152-rnm artillery pieces, operating from as

FAI.L 2001

KHE SANH

KHE SA.NH VALLEY

far away as Laos. The landing of a C-130 supply air­craft on the base mnway became a sure invitation to a mortar barrage, and, as the intensity of enemy activity increased, supply and evacuation of wounded by air became more difficult.

Due to deadly accurate mortar fire which bad been permanently registered on the air strip, C-130 landings were canceled by 12 February. A 300 square yard drop zone was established outside the Marines' defense perimeter, and for a time almost all resupply was by air­drops or by helicopter. Much credit must be given to the 3 l5th Air Division of the Air Force, which flew 12,430 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh bet\veen 21 January and 8 April 1968. This did not include 4,661 tons flown in by Marine Air Group helicopters, particularly to the hill out­posts, and additional tonnage by C-130s of Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Squadron 152.

John T. Williamson of Raleigh provided an example of bow interesting a flight into Khe Sanh could be.2

Williamson, at the time a young Second Lieutenant fresh out of the United States Naval Academy and basic school at Quantico, arrived at Da Nang on 27 January 1968 with what he described as somewhat casual orders to get to Khe Sanh any way he could. That same day, he found himself wedged in among pallets of small arms ammuni­tion and artillery rounds as the only passenger on a C-1 30 flying into Khe Sanb. As the aircraft maneuvered for its approach to the 3,900 feel airstrip at Khe Sanb, Williamson noticed that the crew chief, who was poised by the controls that operated the rear ramp on the C-130, was putting on a flack jacket and helmet and becoming increasingly jittery as the plane made its steep final approach. Almost immediately after the tires hit the nm­way matting, the pilot rapidly reversed the engines, and the ramp at the rear of the aircraft started coming down.

Oblique aerial pltotogravlt of the Khe Sa11h combat base.

PAORBLEVEN

When the aircraft reached the end of the runway still traveling at a good rate of speed, the pilot stomped the brakes, and the aircraft pivoted in a tight l 80-degree turn at which time the crew chief and his assistant began shoving pallets down the ramp. Williamson said he was patiently waiting for the aircraft to stop when the crew chief yelled, "Get off! Get offi" and gave him a slight shove to assist him. He described hitting the runway in a pile with all of his gear between two pallets of ammo just as the first NVA mortar round exploded. The plane finished is tum and, without fully unloading, roared down the runway in the direction from which it had come with the ramp still closing as it lifted off. Williamson said that by the time the fourth mortar round had landed, he began lo figure out that he was not in a particularly good position sitting in tJ1e open surrounded by boxes of ammu­nition, so he jumped up, sprinted across the runway, and dived into a trench. This was a quite typical arrival at Khe Sanb- a

Tiie enemy plan

gauntlet of fire that the brave Air Force and Marine pilots ran on a daily basis to keep the base supplied.

Significant air and artillery assets were assigned to the defense ofKhe Sanh and were on call by the Fire Support Control Center (FSCC) adjacent to the regimental CP. General West­moreland gave air and artillery support ofKhe Sanh priority over all other operations in Vietnam, and the FSCC thns had a tremen­dous amount of firepower at its disposal. Including the Anny's 175-millimeter guns supporting the base from Camp Carroll and tbe Rock Pile, Khe Sanh had integral to the base a 4.2-incb mor­tar battery, three I 05-mm howitzer batteries, and one 155-mm howitzer battery. There were five 90-mm tank guns and nlllner­ous I 06-mm recoilless rifles, either single or Ontos mow1ted. Air assets included Marine, Navy, and Air Force fighter-bombers, South Vietnamese prop-driven A 1 Sky Raiders of Korean War vintage, and B-52 Stratofortresses based on Guam and in Thailand.

Bad weather set in almost immediately when the base was placed under siege and continued to worsen in February I 968. NVA forces used the advantage of cloud cover that limited con­ventional air strikes and began constructing siege works around Khe Sanh which included the digging of trench lines toward the American positions just as the Viet Minh had done at Dien Bien Phu. On 7 February, the NVA attacked the Special Forces camp at Lang Vci near Khe Sanh in force and for the first time intro­duced armor in the fom1 of nine Soviet PT-76 tanks. Defensive artillery fire and air strikes were called in, but the camp was quickly overrun, and the American survivors clustered together in a concrete command bunker while the indigenous forces evad-

PAGE TWELVE

ed into the jungle. Artillery fire was then called in directly on tbe camp and airbursts from American artillery shells finally cleared the invaders from the camp just as daylight arrived. Colonel Lownds was criticized itl some quarters for not sending a relief column over land during the night attack to aid the beleaguered camp. One should remember, however, that the main base was thinly defended and was w1der a tremendous aitillery barrage that was felt to pre-stage a ground attack. Due to the darkness, the dis­tance to cover, the rngged terrain, and the presence of numerical­ly strong enemy forces with armor, it was clear that any effort to send troops down the road to Lang Vei that night would have been suicidal. As soon as it was light the next day, helicopters supported by close air support swooped in and picked up the sur­vivors.

On 8 February, the NVA launched a battalion-sized attack on Hill 64 some 500 meters west of the Khe Sanh perimeter. Hill 64

was occupied by a platoon of Marines. The Marine perimeter was temporarily breached and enemy sol­diers attacked Marine bunkers with RPG rocket launchers and satchel charges. Savage hand-to-hand fighting ensured. This was typical of the repeated efforts oftheNVA to eliminate the outpost units which were holding the critical high gro1md around Khe Sanh and preventing the NVA from situating direct fire weapons on the high grow1d onJooking the base as they had during the siege of Dien Bien Phu.

In spite of the terrible weather, the U.S. forces found effective methods to continue air operations against the NVA and their positions surrounding Khe

Sanh. The enemy buildup provided troop concentrations which gave us a rare opportunity to use "arc light" strikes on well­defiued targets by B-52 bombers. Each Stratofo1tress carried as many as 108 500- and 750-pound bombs. Each bomb pattern sat­urated an area I 000 x 3000 meters. Ultimately, Colonel Lownds requested that tbe B-52 strikes be brought within I 000 meters of the combat base. John Williamson, who watched the first strike to be authorized at that dangerously close distance, described it as follows:

As 0100 arrived, we strained for any sound of aircraft engines, but heard nothing right up to the moment that U1e first string of bombs hit the ground. Then it was one long, thunderous, ground-shaking rumble, as U1e bril­liant orange flashes of the bomb pattern spread all the way across the horizon like a slowly moving cu1tain. rt seemed to go on for a full minute and then just as sud­denly it was quiet again ...

No one knows for sure the exact number of casualties the NVA suffered from these and other American air attacks, but the numbers must have been enormous. Periodically, NVA survivors of B-52 strikes would approach the base perimeter to su1Tender, bleeding from their ears from the concussion and telling stories of entire companies wiped out without warning.

During February, the NVA shelled the base continuously with all the forms of artillery IJlat they could bring within range. [n periods of low overcast, enemy artillery was particularly active. Resupply of the hilltop outposts was particularly difficult since there were no connecting roads, and all resupply was by helicopter. The supply helicopters were subjected to a continual barrage of enemy fire, and the pilots joked that you could find the

RECALL

"'----- '/ 9 _____,)

• DROP l ON [

GREY MAfCU

SECTOR rsec e COH~

r TOW[R

1126 • OASC

CP • MARINES GC&

MAlff

C ltf RY AMMO

1/26 IOOnun OUMP

1/26

BLUE SECTOR

' .......... ___ ,,,,.. ~-- ....

YIATIR POINT

1126

heavy casualties without ever penetrat­ing the ARVN perimeter and ultimately withdrew.

Although we didn't know it then, this was to be the last large attack against the base. BlesscdJy, the weather began to clear, and each day more fixed-wing aircraft were able to pene­trate the clouds and pound the NVA trenches. In March, intelligence noted movement of enemy troops away from the Khe Sanh area. Although the enemy continued to shell the base, the Marines began to push out from the base with patrols.

Finally, the U.S. Anny First Air Cavalry Division along with the First Marines and the Third ARVN Airborne pushed up Route 9 and leapfrogged with helicopter assaults to reinforce the Marines at Khe Sanh. On 3 J March, operational control passed from the 26th Marines to the First Air Cavalry Division, which officially marked the end of the Marines' defense of the com­bat base.

j--0--

In the final analysis, it is clear that the NVA badly underestimated Ameri­can air power and its ability to resupply the base and lo hit the enemy hard, even in inclement weather. Another factor was the dogged determination of the Marines which prevented the enemy from seizing key hilltops around the combat base which had been a part of Viet Minh strategy at Dien Bien Phu. While aspects of the siege produced substantial controversy, it is clear in ret­rospect that a positive effect of the defense of the combat base was the infliction of terri fie casualties upon the NVA.

37th ARVN RANGER BN

Kite Sa11h combat base

outposts just by looking for downed helicopters around them. The Marines ultimately deve loped a system whereby A4 Skyhawks and helicopter gunships would converge and lay down suppressive fire as the helicopters scooted in to deliver their loads.

Ou 21 February, the NVA launched a company-sized attack against the 37th ARYN Ranger Battalion which occupied part of the perimeter of the main base, but, after exchanging fire, with­drew w ithout closing with the South Vietnamese. On 25 February, a Marine patrol south of the base was caught in an ambush and was wiped out. By now the NVA had dug trench lines to within eyesight of the southern perimeter of the base and appeared ready to jump off from those trenches into an all-out attack on the main perimeter. Intelligence reported significant enemy movement arou11d 29 Febniary, and U1at evening an NVA battalion again launched an attack against the 37th Ranger Battalion perimeter. Three separate assaults were met with heavy concentrated fire from U.S. artillery and a ir. The NVA suffered

FALL2001

£ . 1,., Wll.SON

l. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 336. Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, NY (1976).

2. After the siege ofKhe Sanh was lifted, Williamson wenL on to command a rifle platoon and company and saw combat throughout the l Corps area until he was wounded. His decorations include the Bronze Star with Combat V, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Purple Heart.

Sources: The Battle for Khe Sanh, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps ( 1969). John Turner Williamson, 12401 Six Forks Road, Raleigh, NC 27614. A Soldier Reports. William C. Westmoreland, Doubleday & Company, lnc.,

Garden City, NY ( 1976). Khe Sanh's Deadly Deluge, The Airman, Ju ly 1968. lifeline lo Khe Sanli, The Airman, July 1968.

RENEW YOUR ANNUAL DUES Have you renewed your annual membership? Remember: your annual membership nms from January 1 through December 31 each year. Your SI0.00 renewal is needed now to keep and con­tinue our publication. Your dues are the primary source of funds for printing and mailing Recall. Please do not delay in renewing!

PAGI! THIRTEEN

The Tuscarora Indian War of 1711-1712

By Richard M. Ripley

THE single greatest dfaaster to have befallen North Carolina was the Tuscarora War of 1711-1712. In a surprise attack that

culminated in a protracted frontier conflict, the Tuscarora devas­tated white settlements in the Pamlico-Neuse region and raised serious fears for the continuance of English occupation in North Carolina. Only the timely arrival of outside help and an absence of unity among the Tuscarora enabled the colonists to survive the struggle and, ultimately, to defeat the Indians.

When Europeans first arrived in North Carolina, there were more than 30 Indian tribes ranging in size from a few hundred in the smaller tribes to several thousand in the larger tribes. The three largest included the Cherokee in the western mountains, the Catawba in the Piedmont, and the Tuscarora of the Coastal Plains. As the settlers moved westward from the coast, they came into contact with these tribes at different times, and, because of their location, the Coastal Plains Indians were the first to attract attention. Jn addition to the Tuscarora, the natives of tills region included several small tribes that were important only because they existed at a time when the white settlers were also few.

About 1660, the Coastal Plains Indians nwnbered approxi­mately 30,000. About a half century later, rum, smallpox, and intertribal warfare bad reduced them to no more than 5,000, which was about the same as the white population at the time. In 1709, John Lawson published a detailed description of the

~ OCCAll EEC.11 I

the coast to the vicinity of the present Wake County, and lands along the Tar-Pamlico River up to the Roanoke River. Their hunt­ing area extended south to the Cape Fear River region. The pres­ent day cities of Raleigh, Smithfield, Goldsboro, Wilson, Rocky Mount, Tarboro, Greenville, and Kinston are located in fonner Tuscarora territory.

The tendency bas been, in looking at the hlstory of North Carolina, to represent the Tuscarora as a significant influence on the colony only in th is brief interval of confrontation. What is wanting in this view is a fu ll appreciation of the formidable power and strategic dominance of the Tuscarora and the apparent persistence of their historical aims over a period of more than a century, and the restrictions imposed by them on white settlement for over half a century prior to L 712. A closer examination sug­gests that the Tuscarora from 1654 to 1712 defined the limits of Engljsh settlement in North Carolina. There is also reason to sup­pose that this territorial restriction may have influenced the char­acter of internal conflicts among the colonists, including the Culpeper Rebellion or 1677 and the Cary Rebellfon in 1711.

The aims of Tuscarora policy appear to have been broadly persistent during the 130 years between their first contacts with the English and their disastrous defeat in the second phase of the war in 1712-1713. Sir Waller Raleigh's Roanoke Island colonists found the Tuscarora locked in intermittent conflict with the

Tuscarora and other North Carolina Indians. When Lawson prepared his account of these people, he little dreamed that he was soon to be vic­tim of their cruel tortures. The Tuscarora, in Tndian Skaruren mean­ing "hemp gathers," the largest tribe numbered about 5,000 people. Lawson listed them in 1701 as hav­ing 15 towns and about 1,200 war­riors. The Tuscarora Indians enter hlstory in present eastern North Carolina between the Roanoke and Neuse rivers and were divided between the Upper or Northern Tuscarora, those living between the Roanoke and Pamlico Rivers, and the Lower or Southern Tu.scarora, found between the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers. At this time their ter­ritory embraced the countty drained by the Neuse River and its tributar­ies, Contentnea and Trent, from near

Eastern North Carolina Indian and Colonial Settlement Areas Approximate Locations of Tuscarora Towns/Forts Colonial Selllements A. Tosneoc D. Tunarooka G. Nayharuka J. New Bern K. Bath B. Konta E. Jounonitz H. Harula Tuscarora Reservation C. Noabunla F. Ucouhnesunt l. Cotechna L. Ooneroy M. Resoutskeh

rAGE l'OUR'.rEEN RECALL

Chowanoke, largest of the Algonquian tribe of the Carolina coastal plain. The Iroquois Tuscarora had at least two main objec­tives: (1) to absorb the Chowanoke or evict them from the valu­able Roanoke-Chowan hunting grounds on the eastem perimeter of the Tuscarora domain; and (2) move toward the ultimate extension of 1\iscarora influence to the Carolina sounds and seaboard.

The Tuscaroras evidently welcomed the beginning of English settlement on Albemarle Sound in the 1650s. The land taken by the whites was purchased by them from otl1er smaller coastal tribes on the margins of the sound and posed no problem for the Tuscarora further inland. It soon became clear, however, that the whites would not be able to expand with impunity into the Tuscarora interior. When several Quaker families attempted to settle in the southwestern corner of the Roanoke-Chowan region in the early 1660s, the Tuscarora attacked the squatters and drove them off.

Peaceful relations were formalized in 1672 when leaders of the Albemarle colony met with Tuscarora chiefs and reached an accord. Thereafter it was understood the Albemarle colony was to be the region bordering Virginia, which "on ye southern part is separated by Albemarle Sound and Chowan River." Strictly con­strued, these limits made of Albemarle a reservation for white people, and such, in effect, it remained unchallenged for the next 30 years. The apparent unwillingness of the English to test again 1\Jscarora resolve reflected the relative strength of the two sides. The white population of 1,672 amounted to only a few hundred individuals, and it would be many years before it exceeded a few thousand. Tuscarora population figures, on the other hand, far exceeded these numbers. For many years, the colonists did not venture far from the coast, but they did gradually expand their occupation southward. Because roads were nonexistent, the set­tlers sometimes bypassed extensive areas to establish their ho01es on tlle banks of the next navigable stream that would provide them with a convenient means of transportation.

Because of this system of settlement, many miles of wilder­ness often separated a group of colonists from their nearest neighbors. As a result, the various areas of settlement, particular­ly those on tlle outer edge of white occupation, were more exposed to lndfan attack than they would have been bad the set­tlers remained close together. The loss of this strength of unity was especially dangerous in view of the fact the Indians usually occupied the land along the streams desired by the whites and for the same reason. This competition over these small areas brought the two races into open conflict sooner than might have been the case had one or both been satisfied with any kind of land.

The creation of separate and isolated areas of settlement can be traced in the actual movement of the Europeans southward. By 1675, colonists had already crossed over and occupied the south shore of Albemarle Sound. By 169 L, others had settled along the Pamlico river, leaving between them and Albemarle Sound "about fifty miles of wilderness to pass through, witllout a human creature inhabiting it." This wilderness remained unoccupied for many years. By 1703, other colonists had crossed over the Pam­lico River and settled on the Neuse. This was the southern limit of settlement at the time, and the area above Cape Fear had become known as North Carolina to distinguish it from the Lords Proprietors' land below Cape Fear known as Soutll Carolina.

The relations between the white settlers and the Indians were

l'J\LL 2001

not as sweet, peaceful, and friendly as many historians have pic­tured. The Indians from the very first resented the colonists' encroachment upon their domain and used every means in their power to show this resentment, at times resorting to harassment and to out-and-out war. The Tuscarora had from the first watched the steadily growing settlements with distrust and bad resented each movement into a new area. When the tide of civilization flowed into the Pamlico-Neuse region, they saw the handwriting on the wall. A more immediate cause might have been tl1e found­ing of the town of New Bern in 1710 by Baron Christoph de Graffenried, the leader of a group of Swiss and Gennans settling the area. To the Tuscarora, it was evident that they must make a stand or gradually be inundated, and by the summer of 1711 a decision was reached to destroy the whites.

Other factors entered into this decision by the Tuscarora. Perhaps nothing contributed more to their hatred and resentment of the settlers than the kidnapping and enslavement of tllcir peo­ple, i11cluding children, by the whites. Close akin to this were the ill feelings and misunderstandings which accompanied the Indian trade. The Indians found that the white traders were cheating them in their trading activities. Cc1tainly aJ1otber fundamental reason for their decision for war was the indignities and humilia­tions to which the settlers subjected them. The Tuscarora were a proud, dignified people unaccustomed to the condescending and often times insu !ting treatment they received at the hands of the whites.

The Indians, on the other hand, were not always without blame. Unfort1.111ately, they acquired the vices of the white people more readily than the virtues. The Indians rarely stole from each other, but they saw no evil in taking tlle property of the colonis1s. Stealing the settlers' hogs, household goods and food, accompa­nied with threats if the settlers objected, was typical behavior. By burning the woods on hunting expeditions near the settled areas, tlle natives destroyed desirable tin1ber and, sometimes, the homes of tlle whites. The wrongs of the natives may not have been so great as the wrongs they suffered, but they did add to the grow­ing antagonism between the two races.

By 1703, bad relations between the Indians and the colonists had become serious, especially in the Pamlico River area. Smaller tribes were becoming more and more aggressive. The Coree Tndians had become so abusive in their conduct that the North Carolina government declared war on them. This was not an important war, but the Indians perceived that a far more seri­ous one would follow. ln tlle winter of 1704, there were wide­spread reports tllat the powerful Tuscarora were plol!ing witll other nearby tribes to destroy the colonists. [n the next few years relations became even worse, and the Tuscarora decided they would rather leave North Carolina tllan to live under the condi­tions that existed. In 1710, they sent an emissary to Pennsylvania asking pennission to settle in that colony. They gave as U1eir prin­cipal reasons for their request their desire to be able to move about freely and to bunt in the forest without the constant fear of murder or enslavement. The Pennsylvania officials agreed to per­mit the move provided the Tuscarora obtained a certificate of their good behavior from tlle North Carolina government. Their failure to obtain the certificate resulted in one of the greatest tragedies of North Carolina history. Unable to escape from oppression, tbe Tuscarora turned to violence on their oppressors.

During the summer of 1711, the inhabitants of North

PAOll FlFTEEN

Carolina were far too plagued with rebellion, drougbt,and disease (smallpox) to observe the actions of the Indians closely. Further, the land areas of the lower Neuse and Trent rivers appear to have been opened indiscriminately to settlers in 1707 by virtue of an upheaval within the North Carolina government. Recall this was contrary to the agreement Albemarle made with the Tuscarora in 1672. The emergence of Thomas Cary as de facto governor in 1706 brought to power the land-hungry element in the Pamlico region who bad been restrained heretofore by the more conserva­tive Albemarle establishment. Tbe Cary expansionists were soon turned out of power and crushed with an armed showdown, but their land policy had helped sow the seeds of a conflict that would almost destroy North Carolina. There had been one alarm during the summer when word spread that the followers of Thomas Cary were attempting to incite the Tuscarora to fall on the followers of Governor Hyde. This both Cary and the lndians denied, and it was quickly forgotten. While it was doubtful that Cary or any of his followers invited the Indians to take the warpath, there can be little question that the Indians saw the con­fusion the rebellion created. It was an opportune moment for them to strike.

The lndians began their plotting in complete secrecy, and until the moment they struck, no hint of their plans reached the settlers. The chief leader in the conspiracy was King Ilancock, chief of the southern Tuscarora. Hancock was able to persuade tbe chiefs of six smaller tribes in the Pamlico area to join in the plan. These small tribes together had a fighting force of about 500 men. Hancock himself was able to furnish about 1,200 Tuscarora, although the greater portion of the Tuscarora under the leadership of Chief Tom Blunt refused to join him. Hancock had also expected support from the Five Nations of the Iroquois, located in New York. However, this did not materialize. The plans of the hostiles called for the massacre of all settlers and the complete destruction of every platitation in Bath County. It was agreed among the conspirators that the attack would fall without waming al dawn on September 22, J 711.

What Tuscarora militants seem to have envisioned io 1711 was a quick strike against outlying white plantations aimed at blunting further colonization, an action similar to that of 1665 against Albemarle. Hancock probably assumed that a similar treaty, or a reaffirmation of the 1672 tenns, might be arranged with the English once he had made his point by attack.

In considering Hancock's perspective, it is important to bear in mind the Tuscarora were not a nation and probably not even a confederacy though colonial perceptions viewed them without any internal divisions. Tuscarora allegiance was staked firmly to the village level ; however, a powerful chief might earn recogni· tion as the leader over many villages in a given area or even over the whole tribe. Those villages north of the Pamlico River in 1711 adhered to Chief Tom Blunt, those south of the river to Chief Hancock, and some villages may have wavered between the two. Thus, Hancock's plans bore no necessary relation to the villages allied with Tom Blunt, and it is unlikely that the north­ern Tuscarora were privy to Hancock's intentions.

In devisitig his attack, Hancock may have projected onto the white settlements a political division parallel to that existing among his own people. He probably regarded Albemarle County as a separate colony from Bath County and seems not to have realized that an assault on Bath would necessarily broaden onto a

conflict with Albemarle, let alone with Virginia or South Carolina. If true, all this was, of course, a misunderstanding of the fact that Pamlico and Albemarle settlers were under the same administration, however the reality in 1711 favored Hancock's assessment. The Cary Rebellion had pitted Afbemarle against Bath and had left the colonists of the two counties somewhat at odds with each other. It was by no means clear that Albemarle would rush to the defense of Bath County and, in fact, it did Dot.

In mid·September, 1711, as the Indian plans for attack were maturing, John Lawson together with Baron de Graffenried set out in a canoe to explore the Neuse River. A few days later they were seized by an anned force of Indians and carried to the near­by Tuscarora town of Catcchna, Hancock's town and the center of his conspiracy. John Lawson was executed while de Graffenried was spared. How Lawson was killed is unknown. One account says he was stuck full of small lightwood splinters and set gradually on fire, a method of execution that Lawson described in great detail in his publication on tbc history ofNorth Carolina. De GrafCenried was informed of the pending attack and was held for several days until the attack was completed.

On 21 September, 1,200 Tusearoras together with 500 allies from the smaller tribes divided into small war parties and began their march to all points on the Pamlico, Neuse, and Trent Rivers and the Core Sound region. These little groups filtered into and around the settlements. At sunrise on the morning of 22 September 1711, the blow fell with a simultaneous attack. The Indians were well armed with guns and ammunition and made short work of those taken at the first surprise. Men, women, and children, regardless of age or condition, fell victim to their vengeance. Houses were pillaged and burned, crops were tram­pled and destroyed, and livestock driven off or killed. Por three days the Tndians burned, plundered, and killed with impunity.

At last, loaded with plunder and prisoners, the fndians with­drew to their towns. They had killed some 140 people and left many others dangerously wounded. They also took some 30 women and children as prisoners. The Swiss and Palatine losses were the heaviest. They accounted for about 70 of those slain in the massacre. The Indians spared the town of New Bem. From devastated Bath County went messengers to the Albemarle requesting immediate help. Albemarle County had emerged unscathed from the massacre, saved by the neutrality of Chief Blount and the Upper Tuscarora. Governor Edward Hyde imme­diately dispatched messengers to Virginia and South Carolina requesting aid, and began to collect a force to be sent to the belea­guered settlers on the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers. The Quakers, who formed a large portion of the Albemarle population, refused to bear arms, and the ill will that Cary's Rebellion had engeD­dered hampered North Carolina's efforts throughout the entire Indian War.

By mid-October, plans for a counterattack on the Indians had been perfected. Thomas Pollock, as Major General of the North Carolina forces, had managed to raise 150 men to undertake the attack. These were dispatched to Bath Town and were to join forces with a group that had been raised on the Neuse and placed w1der the command of Captain William Brice. Brice, under orders from Pollock, marched his company of 60 men up the Neuse to an abandoned lodian village where the forces at Bath were to join him. The troops at Bath, however, refused to go out, and Brice found himself in Indian country with no support.

RECALL

Despite the Lack of support from Bath, Brice continued to advance into Indian territory until overwhelmed by at least 300 warriors. He was forced to fall back to his fortified plantation on the Trent River.

Here matters stood while North Carolina troops awaited aid from the neighboring colonies. Virginia, despite promises and much talk, never dispatched a single soldier to the aid of No1tb Carolina. The plea to South Carolina was for Indian allies. In making this request, Governor Hyde was following an estab­lished policy of all European nations in America: the use of lndians against Indians. There were several advantages to this policy. The Indians were more effective than whites in fighting Indians since they were familiar with the combat tactics employed. It also relieved the whites of the hazardous task. At times, too, the practice served to djvert native hostility that otb­e1wise might have been directed against the whites. To gain the cooperation of the Indians, the whites played on the increasing desire of the natives for English goods. They purchased captured Indian enemies as slaves and also paid for scalps in order to encourage their alJies to kill as well as capture.

Help soon came from South Carolina. Soon afterwards, an army moved northward under the command of Colonel John Barnwell. On the long overland march through the interior, many of Bamwell's Indians deserted, but others joined him. Some had no weapons other than bows and arrows. When be reached the Neuse, far above New Bern, in late January 1712, his force con­sisted of 30 white men and nearly 500 Indians, mainly Yamassees. When Barnwell reached the appointed place, he found that the promfaed food, guides, and troops were not there. In fact, the North Carolina legislature had fail.ed to take any steps to defend the colony. Disappointed, Barnwell pushed on to the Tuscarora town of Norhunta, or Norhantes, an open village with farms scattered over an area of several miles. About the village were rune palisade fotts standing about a mile apart. Barnwell attacked the largest fort and within an hour the fort had fallen. Among the most desperate of the defenders were a number of women who fought with bows and arrows. Of the 52 enemy killed, at least 10 were women. Thirty were taken captive and the remainder abandoned the village and its forts, leaving behind much plunder that had been taken from the colonists. Bamwcl I's casualties were 7 killed and 32 wounded. A more serious loss was the desertion of many of his Indians who took their captives and plunder and slipped away. This was to happen frequently after every successful battle. Before leaving Norhw1ta several days later, Barnwell destroyed it and its forts and five nearby towns as well

From Norhunta, Barnwell marched through the Tuscarora country to Bath Town on the Pamlico where he arrived on I 0 February. On the way, he passed through a number of enemy towns and did considerable damage. Loaded with plunder, many of his Indians slipped away.

Late in February, 67 North Carolinians joined Barnwell. Their arrival increased his strength to 94 whites and 148 lndians. The new arrivals also created a problem, because they came with­out food, and the scarcity of food was already a matter of grave concern. Barnwell set out for Hancock's town of Catechna, near the junction of the Neuse and Contentea Creek. The town was

deserted, but the Indians had constructed a strong, palisaded fort across the river. Within the enclosure were 130 warriors, and a

FALL 200l

call bad gone out for others to join them. On 12 March 1712, Barnwell attacked Hancock's Fort, confident of taking it. Instead he found himself forced to agree to a lrnce. Prior to the attack, the Indians had brought some of their white captives into the fort. During the attack these prisoners were subjected to torture. To the attackers, only a few yards away, the screams of the victims were hea1t-rending sounds. To Barnwell's shouted demands for the release of the captives, the Indians stated the attack must be aban­doned or the defenders would die fighting and take their prison­ers with them. Barnwell accepted the Indian demand on condition that 12 captives were to be released immediately and the remain­der were to be brought 12 days later to a place near New Bem. At the same time the Chiefs were to come to discuss peace.

The day after the truce, Barnwell left Hancock's Fort and marched to New Bern. The enemy fai led to appear on J 9 March, the day appointed for the meeting. Angered, Barnwell prepared to strike Hancock's Fort again. On the Neuse River near the mouth of Contentea Creek he built Fort Barnwell. This was the base from which be planned to march once more against Hancock's Fort.

On 1 April, a message came from Governor Hyde that much needed food and men were on the way. Without waiting for the arrival of the relief, on the night of 7 April Barnwell moved against Ha11cock's Fort. The siege continued for 10 days, when on 17 April he unaccountably agreed to a conditional surrender of the enemy. Bamwell's peace was made without the knowledge or approval of Governor Hyde. His casualties were light and "extreme famine" was the only excuse he gave for not fighting to the end.

Hyde, however, felt that hunger hardly justified the failure to pursue a victory that was only a few hours away. Hyde was par­ticularly critical of Barnwell for not waiting for the relief that North Carolina had on the way. However justified he might have been, Barnwell was the subject of bitter and widespread criticism in the colony he had done so much to help earlier, and the honors he expected were denied bim.

The unpopular peace of Barnwell was not long lasting. Hungry and disappointed at the few scalps and slaves taken, the South Carolina Indians soon were ravaging through the enemy country. Barnwell and his Indians enticed a number of the local natives into Fort Barnwell under the pretense of peace. They were then seized and taken to South Carolina to be sold as slaves. This breach of the surrender terms embittered the hostiles, and they prepared for the warpath once again.

Soon after Barnwell and his men returned to South Carolina, the horror oflndian war once again swept through the Neuse and Pamlico regions. The hostiles, hungry and seeking food , roamed the country taking what they wanted and destroying all else. Many of the inhabitants who ventured back to their plantations were killed. The wiser people returned to the security and con­finement of fortified garrisons, but even they were not free from attack. Only the generosity of the people of Albemarle relieved a serious shortage of food in the stricken areas. Under these condi­tions, inhabitants began to leave the colony. Efforts were made to protect those that remained, but the efforts were nol enough. Yellow fever added its horrors to the dreadful summer of 1712 in North Carolina. It claimed the Life of Governor Hyde on 9 September 1712. With his passiog, Thomas Pollock assumed the leadership of North Carolina as president oflhe council and com-

PAGE snVENTEEN

mander-in-chief of the government. Pollock made every effort to supply the garrisons in Bath

County and to maintain the smaJI forces operating there, but it was not enougb. ln June 1712, a request went to South Carolina to send 1,000 Indians with a few whites and a commander other than Barnwell. South Carolina assembled a new fo rce command­ed by Colonel James Moore. Anticipating ~is aid, North Carolina had already gathered a company of some 140 men on the Neuse River to join the South Carolina troops when they should arrive. This action proved unwise. Moore did not arrive for many weeks, and the North Carolinians, too few to attack alone, waited in idleness. Finally, in November, they disbanded and returned to their homes. Their only contribution had been to eat the food that bad been sent to the Neuse for the coming expe­dition. As a result, when the South Carolina army arrived in December, North Carolina was again unprepared. In addition to 33 white men, Moore's army consisted of 850 Jndians. Among these were over 300 Cherokee and 50 Yamassee. The balance included warriors or some smaller tribes of the Carolinas. Among the officers was Colonel Moore's brother, Captain Maurice Moore, with the Yamassee Company. To feed such a large body of men was no small problem. Because food was more plentiful in Albemarle County, the men marched there until adequate sup­plies could be shipped around to lhe Neuse.

There was another reason for diverting Moore's force to

Albemarle County. Fear persisted that the Five Nations and the Upper Tuscarora would join the enemy. Enemy captives had to.Id Barnwell that the beginning of the war had resulted from prod­ding of visiting waniors of the Five Nations. They had taunted the Tuscarora over their failure to avenge the mistreatment of a drunken Indian by the whites. In the summer of 1712, informa­tion received from the Governor of New York showed that the French in Canada bad persuaded the Five Nations to send war­riors south to aid the hostile Tuscarora in their war against the English. This concern subsided the following autumn with re­ceipt of information that the New York government had persuad­ed the Five Nations not to go south. They went to war against the French Indians instead.

The status of the Upper Tuscarora, however, remained uncer­tain. They had not joined the hostiles, but neither had they come to the aid of the whites. The government had attempted to per­suade them to end the conflict by going to war against the enemy Indians, but they had not done so. King Blount came into the set­tlements from time to time to declare his continued friendship for the whites, and he alone of the chiefs of the Upper Towns was trusted. But he could speak for his town only. The govenunent, nevertheless, sought to use his influence with the chiefs of the other towns to persuade them Lo join with the whites. It was hoped that their desire for the resumption of trade would be suf­ficient to win them over. The government, however, hesitated to force the issue for fear of driving them to join the hostiles while the colony was in such a weakened condition. The coming of Moore and his anny to North Carolina gave its officials the con­fidence they needed. On a visit to Governor Thomas Pollock, Chief Blount expressed his desire for the resumption of trade wilh his people. He was told that this could be done if they would bring in King Hancock and the scalps of the other hostiles. The offer was accepted after consulting Chiefs of the other neutral towns, and King Hancock was delivered and executed. Blount

PAGE BIGJITREN

and bis people were given until 1 January to bring in the enemy scalps. This allotment of time for the fulfillment of Blount's agreement was pennitted by the diversion of Moore's troops to Albemarle County. ff Blount succeeded, peace would have been won for the whites. If he fa iled, Moore could then move out to accomplish the same goal.

Tfthe stay ofMoore's troops in Albemarle County solved one problem, it created another. At first his Indians were confined to a designated area where tbey consumed what food they could find. Then the hungry horde began to spread out over the sur­rounding country, killing cattle and taking com. The people of Albemarle County became so disturbed that many of them seemed "more than ready to fall on the South Carolina Indians, than march against the enemy." they were not only angry but worried. The danger of using Indians for purposes of war was clearly apparent. The little control that could be exercised over the lndians came from the authority of a single individual, their leader. Some of the more thoughtful people began to consider the possible consequences of the death of this single individual, Colonel Moore. Without a leader and made up of various tribes and language groups, his Indians would be unreslrained. Such a disorderly band could be as destructive as the enemy it came to fight. 1 January came and Blount had not brought in the scalps of the enemy. Moore then made ready to march against the hostiles.

By the middle of the month, food had been shipped around to Fort Barnwell, the supply base on the Neuse. On 17 January, Moore's army, enlarged by the addition of some 85 North Carolinians, left Albemarle County to the great relief of its inhab­itants.

After crossing over Albemarle Sound, Moore headed into the country of the Lower Tuscarora where the hostile Indians already had fled to the protection of their forts. Reports indicated the largest concentration or warriors was gathered in Fort Neo­hcroka, located on a branch of Conteutea Creek, a few miles above Hancock's Fort. Accordingly, Neoheroka was the destina­tion of Moore's expedition as it pushed forward through the harsh cold of winter. Progress was slow because of supply difficulties combined with bad weather and deep snow.

Fort Neoheroka was an irregularly shaped enclosure of one and one-half acres contained within a palisaded wall. Along this wall, at strategically located points, were bastions and block· ho\lses. Within the enclosure were some 20 to 28 bunkers con­nected by tunnels. The bunkers were constructed by digging large boles four to six feet deep into the ground and covering the holes with logs and earth. The bunkers provided protection and were used as dwellings. An enclosed tunnel led to a nearby branch of Contenlea Creek. The tunnel furnished a way to obtain water and a means for escape. When Colonel Moore arrived before this impressive fortifi cation, he bega11 carefu l preparations to destroy it. About I March 1713, Moore laid siege to the fort. Three bat­teries were constructed nearby, and from the Yamassee Battery facing the fort a z igzag trench was dug to within a few yards of the front wall. Thjs trench provided protective cover ro allow men to approach and build a blockhouse and battery near the fort. Both of these structures were higher than the walls of the fort so that the euemy within might be subjected to direct fire. A tunnel also extended from the trench to the front wall so that it might be undermined with explosives. On the morning of I 0 March, every man was at his post when a trumpet sow1ded the signal for the

RECALL

attack. Three days later, Fort Neoheroka lay a smolderiug ruin and the enemy acknowledged defeat. The enemy loss was around 950, about half killed and the balance taken into slave1y. Moore's loss was 57 killed and 82 wounded. With this one crushing blow, the power of the Tuscarora Nation was broken.

Following their defeat, most of the enemy Tuscarora who escaped fled north to New York to live among the Five Nations Confederation, which afteiward became the Six Nations. Some thought was given to clearing the colony of all members of the tribe, but that was abandoned. First, there was not sufficient food to sustain a mili tary campaign. Second, it was felt that some friendly natives on the frontier would protect the settlements against hostiles. For these reasons, a treaty of peace was finally concluded with Ki11g Blount and the Upper Tuscarora. By the tenns of the treaty, Blount was acknowledged Chief of the Tuscarora and of a LI other Indians south of the Pamlico River. All who accepted Blount's leadership became tributary Indians under the protection of the government of North Carolina and were assigned a reservation in Bertie County. All who rejected him were considered enemies of the government. These included only a small number of the hostile Tuscarora who remained in the colony and a few from some smaller tribes.

The war was not over, however, for at the time Moore was conducting his attack on Fort Neoheroka, the Machapunga and Coree had been striking at the settlements along the Pungo River

a short distance below Bath. At first there were only about 50 of the hostiles, but they proved to be an elusive enemy. A few lurked about Core Sound, but the balance hid out in the great Alligator Swamp, a vast and almost impenetrable region of lakes and cane swamps lying between the Matchapunga River and Roanoke Island. From this hiding place, they raided the outlying settle­ments. In the spring of 17 13, 20 settlers on the Alligator River were killed, A short while later, 25 more met the same fate on Roanoke Island. Many others were killed in frequent and less dramatic raids involving no more than Mo or three families. After their attacks, the Indians retreated back into their swamp world where it was almost impossible to follow them. Colonel Moore, with more than a hundred of his lndfans, remained in North Carolina for some time in a futi le effort to seize them. Blount and bis Tuscarora fiually came to the aid of the colonists and were more successful. By the autumn of 1713, they brought in about 30 hostile scalps. However, other warriors joined the enemy from time to time. This nagging problem had dragged on for almost two years when the government finally turned from a policy of extermination of the hostiles to one of peaceful agree­ment. On 11 February 1715, a treaty of peace was made with the surviving hostiles, and they were assigned a reservation on Lake Mattamuskect in Hyde County. This was the final act of the Tuscarora War.

The collapse of the Tuscarora in 1713 removed the last major

- · ' · ft . 9;9.... ~

Drawing of the Battle of Fort Neolzeroka, 1-3 March 1713. Original drawi11g i.~ located with the South Carolina Historical Society, Columhiu, SC.

PALL2001 PAGE NTNE'ICllN

obstacle to European ex ans. . period that whites speni c~o~ in North Carolina. The 60-year then followed by a 60-year da~g to the northeastern area was Apart from his own miscalcuJa:othe Appalachians and beyond. ~done by the failure of support ;s, H~nco_ck may have been Ltfe came virtually to a halt . om t e Five Nations. Public Hancock's initial assault, but his ~n North Carolina following the arrival of a large outsid orces held the upper hand until accomplished much without ~h:n~~ folU' m~nths later. Hancock the Upper Tuscarora, the Five N . p that might have come from sour.ces. There arc many 'd attons, the French, or any other

d . ev1 ences of h ·

an potential danger that confr d o~ serious was the real South in 1711. Hancock onte . Eoghsh colonization in the

1 . was strategist e h

co orus. ts were sharply di 'd d noug to strike when the f h v1 e among th I o t e harvest season but h cmse ves and on the start

ti k ' ' e was not d · 1 1e md of wide-ranging all ' h .1p omat enough to build

E 1ance t at might h

cess. ven so, his attempt brou h ave assured his suc­fatal disaster. g t North Carolina to the edge of

Sources: Barnwell John ,.,.,.._ ' . 'ue Tuscarora E ed' . f :~~Cf9o~7~s~~~orical anX: G~~,~~io1;::;s ~~~~l;~:~I ~~~ 1~arnwell.'' Barn~ell, Joseph W. "The . · , No. 1,

Historical d G . Second Tuscarora E ped' · ClarBk, Wklalter.a£1dia~:1e;;:sf;:,~ ~~gdazThin~. Vol. X, ~o. 1

1

~1

~~::1

;~~9~3-4/iSna oo et Vol n N

3 scarora War 1711 13 ' · Lawson J~h La. ' o. • 10 July 1902. Capital p · t' C- · North Carolina

' n. wson'.S' Hislo .r M nn mg o., Raleigh NC Latham, Editor 2nd ed G ry OJ orth Carolina. 1714 H . , F . 1952 ' · arrctt & Massie Publ' b : amss, ranees . ' is ers, R.ichmo d Vi . .

Lee, Lawrence .E. Indian W. . n ' irg1ma. The Carol' Cb ars m North Carolina 1663 I 1963 ma artcr Tercentenary Comnu· « - 763. A Publication of . ss1on, Box 1881 R I .

Parramore Th • a e1gh, NC. H' ! omas C. The Tuscar . i:i~~;':,0~~~:;v. The North ear~r~nt~~~~1~:c~f The . North ca~olina

Rights, Douglas L ,,.,· LAIX, N.o. 4, October 1982. 307-326Arcb1ves and History, p b . · ' '1e merica11 Jndim · Ni ·

S d

u lisber: ".\'inston-Salem. 1957 1111 orth Carolina. 2nd ed. John P BJ . aun ers, William L C l . · · air,

1712 · oomal Record >JN. NC. !~~~.Vol. 11, 1713-1728. Broa~7oot ~~1~1li;~:!i~~~886. Vo!. I,_ 1662-

Styma Chr' · 0

pany. W1hrungton • 1stine Ann Th · ds • Tuscarora War · e_ "'"' 01 war and and chm . h .

of Wi.lliam ando~rop~~~ry North Carolina. /690-11f9 ~~ impact of the Carolina UnivcrsityiC St pakgesF. l 990. Call number: J~)'ll~:·L'.hbe College ' · ac s 257 S79 1990. ·

1 rary, East

~THE NORTH CAROLINA MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY ~ 7410 CHAPEL HILL ROAD, RALEIGH, NOl<fH CAROLINA 27601

PAGE TWENTY

Dear Society Members: On October 1, 2001, by vote of the North Carolina Military Historical Society Board of Directors, I was selected to the President's position. Tbis is a role I believe I am well qualified for

and I look forward to the challenge. I am not prepared at this time to detail the state of the NCMHS; however, I do plan to call a general membership meeting by the January/February tiroe frame to discuss the state of the society and establish our future strategy. In the meantime, it is roy intent to con­tinue the operation of the Fort Fisher Museum and publishing of the

RECALL. The Society needs your membership and support more than ever. Operating funds are at an all time low, so our membership dues are critical right now. Please respond by paying your annual dues by December 31, 2001 , and if you are able to make a donation to the general operating fund, this would also be greatly appreciated.

1 look forward to working with the Board and members in defining our mission and putting in place the programs to achieve the agreed

to goals and objectives.

Thank you,

~~Jt)~ Franklin D. Waldron President

RECAtL

Colonel David Fanning and the

Battle of Beatti' s Bridge By John Hairr

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following account of the Revolutionary Ware Battle ofBeatti's Bridge is excerpted from the book, Colonel David Fanning: The Adventures of the Carolina Loyalist. The book chronicles the remarkable life of the contro­versial Loyalist partisan who was the most successful commander of either side dlu·ing the Tory War of 1781-1782. Fanning never lost a battle in which he commanded, captured the Whig governor ofNorth Carolina, and remained active in the field long after most of his comrades had given up. 111e book is available for $19.95 plus $2 shipping and handling from Averasboro Press, P.O. Box 482, Erwin, NC 28339.

On the afternoon of27 August 1781, Colonel David Fanning and his troops left Elizabethtown for McFall's Mill, which

they reached by the 29th. There they stopped to rest, hoping to gain news from other Loyalists active in the area who utilized this place as a base for their activities. Colonel Hector McNeill, a promiJJent leader of the Scottish Highlanders, encamped often at Mcfall 's Mill.

Two days passed at McFall's MHI before news ofMcNeill's whereabouts reached Fanning, and, unfortunately, it was not good news. McNeill and a force of about seventy Scotsmen had stirred up a proverbial hornet's nest over in Montgomery County by raiding Richard Fanning's Mill on Little River, taki11g a num­ber of Whigs prisoner. Most of the captives were under the com­mand of Colonel Thomas Wade of Anson County, and Wade was now in hot pursuit of McNeill. Wade's force numbered around 400, and he was expecting to be reinforced at any time. 1

As soon as Fanning heard ofMcNeill's predicament, he sent word to the old Scotsman offering his assistance if needed. " ... in three hours I Received for answer he would be Glad for to see me and my party ... " wrote Fanning.2

McNeill was at that time about eight miles west of Mcfall's Mill about one half mile from a place known as Beatti's Bridge, which spanned Lumber River on almost the identical spot where today Highway 401 crosses that watercourse near the small town of Wagram. For many years the bridge across this point on the river was known as Gilchrist's Bridge.

"For years Beatti 's Bridge was the main causeway on upper Lwnber Rjver, being the only crossing that was always passable, it became a strategic point for the Whigs and Tories," wrote Governor Angus McLean. "An adjacent island, large enough to quarter equipment and afford protection for a large body of troops, added another distinct advantage to the place. Besides this, the heavy traffic in stores and produce, the dense swamp, the wretched condition of the road, and the narrowness of the pas­sageway made it an easy base from which to forage and other­wise harass the enemy. "1

Panning gathered 155 of his men and headed for Beatti's Bridge through the night with all speed. As the sun was rising, he found Colonel McNeil! encamped aboutthree miles from Beatti's Bridge, witl1 scouts out keeping track of Wade's movements. Wade was reported to have crossed Lumber River and encamped on a hill which was identified by Governor McLean as " ... on the identical spot where old Montpelier Church now stands in Hoke County." The church the governor used as a landmark is no

FALL 2001

longer standing and its congregation has since relocated on the opposite side of the river in Wagram. The site of Wade's encamp­ment would have been on the hill over which 40 I passes on the east side of the river, near the intersection with Hilltop Road.~

Fanning listened to all of the reports which McNeill 's men were able to give him, tl1en quickly formulated a plan. Wade's men were encamped on the hill with a thick swamp in bis front and Lumber River in his rear. He had thrown out his men into line of battle facing the swamp since bjs skimushers had tangled briefly with those of the Highlanders. He was expecting an attack at any moment. There was only one way across the swamp, a "crossway" which was apparently unguarded. Fanning directed his men to cross the swamp along the "crossway" two abreast, and when they emerged on the western side, bis troopers were to quietly tum to the right and take up a position all dowu Wade's line.

Since be was outnumbered nearly two to one, Fanning resorted to a stratagem that would hopefully inflate his numbers in the eyes of the enemy. "When fonned my little party I left great Vacancies in order to appear as munerous as possible and to pre­vent the turning my flank."'

McNeill's men, meanwhile, were to cross the swamp and turn left, passing around Wade's right flank and taking up a posi­tion overlooking the approach to Beatti 's Bridge. There he was to sit and monitor the progress of the battle. IfFanning's men were in danger of being defeated, McNeil I was to attack Wade's right flank and rear. lf all went well, however, McNeill's HighJauders were to cut off Wade's retreat by securing Beatti's Bridge. Thus, Fanning hoped to not only defeat his numerically superior adver­sary, but to totally eliminate them as an effective fighting force.6

By 11 o'clock, l September l 781 , the Loyalist horsemen were nearly in position, having crossed the swamp (Fanning being the first across) and proceeded down Wade's front as instrncted. Before they had covered the total distance to Wade's left flank, however, one of the Loyalists .fell from bis horse and the shock ofhis landing caused his weapon to fire. This gave the alarm to the Whigs, who fired a volley which brought down eighteen of the Loyalists' horses. The battle was now on.

Fanning ordered his men to dismount and form a line of bat­tle. They began firing methodically and advancing up the hill, all the while the red-coated Fanning directing them. The terrain proved to be an advantage to the Loyalists, as the hill upon which Wade formed his line had little vegetation save a few scattci:ed pines. rn addition, the hill was just steep enough to provide cover

PAGB T\VBNTV-ONE

for the advancing Loyalists-if a Whig stood to get a clear shot, he made of himself an easy target, while most shots from Wade's men passed harmlessly over their enemies' heads.

As the battle raged, Falllling was riding up and down the Loyalist lines between the two forces, urging his men on and directing the advance. "Dressed in rich British uniform, be rode between the lines during all the fight, and gave his orders with the utmost coolness and presence of mind. It is strange that be had not been selected by some of Wade's men, as he was at the close of the fight not twenty yards distant from them."7

Wade's men stood their ground until the Loyalists were with­in twenty-five yards ofthcir lines. At this point, the Whigs broke and ran, fleeing towards Beatti's Bridge and Fanning's well-laid trap.

At the bridge, Mcneill had placed only a token force which was quickly swept aside by Wade's fleeing men as they contin­ued their flight across Lumber River t0ward safety. Fanning arrived on the scene, and with what forces he could gather pur­sued the fleeing Whigs for seven miles until he was finally forced to admit that they bad escaped decimation.

The Loyalists were victorious. Two hours of hard fighting had resulted in the defeat of a numerically superior force with a loss of only five wounded and five dead horses. This is even more remarkable when one realizes that the victory was won solely by Fanning's 155 men, as McNeill's 70 men were in reserve behind Wade's right flank, and few of the Highlanders saw action at the bridge itself.

The Whigs' losses were extensive. Fanning noted, "we pur­sued them 7 miles and took 54 prisoners 4 of which died that night. Ou our Return we found 19 Dead and the next day several Came in and surrendered all of which were wounded, and we had Reason to suppose the several died in the Swamps by accounts Received from those who Came in afterwards."8

Though stunning, the victory was not a total success. It was well within the power of the Loyalists to have totally crushed Wade's force, but despite Fanning's best directives, the Highlanders had failed to cut off Wade's avenue of retreat across Beatti 's Bridge.

Why had McNeill failed? Carnitbers places the blame on a lack of communication between Fanning and McNeil!. He also mentions the fact that the Ifighlanders refused to serve under Fanning. The latter reason was an aversion which materialized after the war, when it was politically expedient to dist,ance one­self from Fanning and his actions. As for a lack of communica­tion between McNeill and Fanning, the fact that McNeill's men were where they were supposed to be and put up a token struggle discounts this hypothesis.

Governor McLean, however, notes the most plausible expla­nation. "lt is quite probable, too, so local historians say, that if Colonel Hector MacNeill had obeyed orders and moved prompt­ly, Colonel Wade's whole force would have been captured before they escaped over the bridge. But there seems to have been good reasons for the Tory commander's dilatory action: his own broth­er 'Red' Alex Mac Neill bad joined the Whigs and was a captain in Colonel Wade's command, and a number of his own men's rel­atives were among the revolutionary forces. Therefore Colonel Hector MacNeill delayed lhe attack in order to give his brother opportunity to escape or defend himself. When he was at last ready to attack, his half-hearted and lu.kewann actions had helped

PAGE TWENTY -TWO

the Whigs so much that they were not only able to resist capture, but to escape easily over the bridge. "9

That afternoon, the Loyalists regrouped and took stock of what they had won. "Besides a few wounded we took 250 hors­es most of which were loaded with effects they bad plundered from the friends of Government," wrote Fanning, "and as I had formerly ordered that whoever found concealed goods of any kind Should hold them, I also ordered that Every man should Keep that he had taken that day. "10

Following the division of booty, the Loyalists began taking care of the prisoners. Most of these were paroled, except for thir­ty of the more troublesome ones who were turned over to Major Craig in Wilmington.

When the Loyalists began sorting out the prisoners they had taken, they discovered that one Joseph Hayes had fallen into their hands. Hayes was recognized by Captain Elrod as the same per­son who had recently raided bis house on the Yadkin and assault­ed members of his family. With little deliberation, Hayes was sentenced to be hanged for his crime.

The rope was tied to a convenient tree limb, and the noose secured around the neck of the prisoner, who was sitting upon the back of a horse. The signal was given, the horse bolted, and Hayes dangled at U1e end of a rope.

Hayes hung for fifteen minutes, at which point he was cut down from the tree. The Loyalist surgeon examined the prisoner, and to the amazement of all found the condemned man lo be clinging to life. The stugeon quickly asked Elrod for pennission lo resuscitate the prisoner, which was given, and soon it was evi­dent that Hayes would survive.11

When the action and post battle activities finally came to an end, Fanning headed with his men for their familiar grounds at Cox's Mill on Deep River. NOTES:

I. Butler lo Burke, l September 1781 , SR XXll, 5&4. 2. Fanniog, Davi~. The Narrative of Colonel David Fanning, Lindley Butler, cd.ilor.

Briarpatcb Press. 1981, p. 53. 3. Mclean, Angus, The Highland Scots in North Caroli11a, writicn in 1919, published by

the Nonh Carolina Scottish Herilage Socieiy 1993, p. 243. 4. Ibid., 244. S. Fanning, 53. 6. Hoyi, William (ed.), 'fl1e Paper$ of Archibald D. Murphey. Nonh Carolina Historical

Commission, 1914, Volume Il, p. 390. 7. Ibid, 39J. 8. Fanning. 53. 9. McLean, 245.

IO. Farming, 53. 11. Hoyt, n. 392.

Origins of Veterans Day In 1921 , an unknown World War I American soldier was buried in

Arlington National Cemetery. This site, on a hillside overlooking the Potomac River and the city of Washington, became t.he focal point of rev­erence for America's veterans.

Similar ceremonies occurred earlier in England and France, where an unlmown soldier was buried in each nation's highest place of honor (in England, Westminster Abbey; in France, the Arc de Triomphe). These memorial gestures all took place on November 11, giving universal recog­nition lo the celebrated ending of World War I fighting at 11 a.m., November 11 , 1918 (the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11 lh month). The day became known as "Annistice Day."

Armistice Day officially received its name in America in 1926 through a Congressional resolution. It became a national holiday 12 years later by similar Congressional action. If the idealistic hope had been realized that World War I was "the War to end all Wars," November JI might still be called Armistice Day. But only a few years after the holiday was pro­claimed, war broke out in Europe. Sixteen and one-half million Americans

RECALL

BOOK REVIEW

New Civil War Book on Beaufort & Union-Occupied Eastern N.C.

More than 200 previously unpublished Civil War letters are now available in a new book from the N.C. Division of Archives and History. Written by John A. Hedrick, who was the U.S. Treasury Department collector for the port of Beaufort, these let­ters provide a unique, compelling look at day-to-day life in Union-occupied eastern North Carolina.

Edited by Judkin Browning and Michael Thomas Smith, "Letters from a North Carolina Unionist: John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, 1862-1865" contains one of the largest col­lections of correspondence by a Southern Unionist still in exis­tence. Hedrick's letters are one of the longest unbroken chains of civilian letters written from Union-held North Carolina.

John Hedrick arrived in Beaufort in June 1862, Jess than three months after Union capture of the town, and remained there until the war's end. His letters are addressed to his brother, Benjamin, who in 1856 had been driven from his professorship at UNC-Chapel Hill for supporting Republican antislavery presi­dential candidate John C. Fremont. Both Davidson County broth­ers supported the U11ion cause.

In his letters, Jolu1 shared with Benjamin facts, rumors,aod opinions on a broad range of topics. He wrote a great deal about the Civil War and political affairs, liberally expressing his views on military leaders and politicians. He passed on the latest war news, including an account of the panic in Beaufort in 1864 when a Confederate attack was thought to be imminent. He discussed Federal expeditions from Beaufort and New Bem into the Confederate hinterland between l862 and 1865.

One of the most valuable aspects oftbe Hedrick letters is the description of the relationship of Union troops and other Federal personnel to the citizens of eastern North Carolina. Hedrick made frequent references to the two North Carolina white Union regi­ments in Beaufort and also to African American Federal troops in the area.

John Hedrick's correspondence is filled with comments on

almost all aspects of life in Beaufort and eastern North Carolina during the war. He reported on food, births, deaths, church atten­dance, economic conditions, racial and social relationships, and the frightening yellow fever epidemic of 1864. Hedrick frequent­ly recorded accounts of Afiican American activities, such as the 1863 Independence Day celebration blacks held on Shackleford Banks.

Judkin Browning received a B.A. degree in history at Florida State University and an M.A. in public history from N.C. State University. He is currently working on his Ph.D. at the University of Georgia. Browning has published articles in the Colwnbiad and the North Carolina Historical Review. Michael Thomas Smith received a B.A. in history from UNC-Chapel Hill and an M.A. in American history from N.C. State University. He is currently working toward a Ph.D. at Pennsylvania State University. Smith has published articles in the Maryland Historical Magazine and the North Carolina Historical Review.

"Letters from a North Carolina Unionist" is indexed and includes a list of sources for further reading. The introduction and notes by the editors place John Hedrick's letters in the broader context of the Civil War in North Carolina and provide infonna­tion on the controversial Hedrick brothers before, during, and after the war. The book's dust jacket features a view of Fort Macon, Beaufort Harbor, from Morehead City.

"Letters from a North Carolina Unionist: John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, 1862-1865" (hardbound, 287 pages, illus­trated, index) sells for $25.00 plus $3 .50 shipping. North Carolina residents please add 6% sales tax. Order from: Historical Publications Section (N), Division of Archives and History, 4622 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, NC 27699-4622. For credit card orders call 919-733-7442.

An agency of the N.C. Department of Cultural Resources in the Division of Archives and History, the historical publications section offers more than 150 titles, including other publications about Civil War No1th Carolina. For more info11T1ation and a free

took part. Four hundred seven thousand of them died in service, more than catalog, write the address above or call 919-733-7442. The his-292,000 in battle. torical publications section 's catalog and order fom1 are also

Realizing that peace was equally preserved by veterans of WWlJ and online at www.ah.dcr.state.nc.us/sections/hp. Korea, Congress was requested to make this day an ,- ·-· - ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·-· - ·-· - ·-·- ·-·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·-·- ·-·- ·- ·- ·- ·-· - ·-·- ·, occasion to honor those who have served America in all wars. In l954 President Eisenhower signed a bill proclaiming November 11 as Veterans Day.

On Memorial Day 1958, two more unidentified American war dead were brought from overseas and intetTed in the plaza beside the unknown soldier of World War I. One was killed in World War II, I.he other in the Korean War. la 1984, an unknown serv­iceman from tbe Vietnam War was placed alongside the others,

A law passed in 1968 changed the natiomtl commemoration of Veterans Day to the fourth Monday in October. But November 11 was the date of historic significance, and in 1978 Congress returned lhe observance lo ils traditional date.

FALL 2001

MEMB E R S HIP APl'LI C ATtON

North Carolina Military ffistorical Society Class of Membership: 0 ANNUAL (Sl0.00 a year) 0 LTFE ($100.00 one time

Amount enclosed: $ for calendar year (.Jan.-Dec. 2002) 0 NEW MEMBER 0 RENEWAL

ADDRESS CITY _________ _____ _ _ STATE _ _ ZIP _ ___ _

TELEPHONES: (Office) ___ _ _ _ _ _ (Home) ______ ___ _

Please make check payable to NCMJTS and mail to:

NCMHS, 7410 Chapel Hill Road, Raleigh, NC 27607-5096

L·- ·- ·- ·-·-·-·-·-·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·-·- ·-·-·- ·-·J PAGE lWENTY-TnREB

EDITOR'S TACK ROOM By Richard Ripley

Congratulations to Franklin D. Waldron in assuming the position of Society President. His letter is included in this Recall.

We wish him all the best in his new role. He will need the help and sup­port of every Society member. We can do this by getting new members and serving on committees and projects.

1 wish to thank Mrs. Frances Wynn for the splendid work she is doing toward preparing an index for all Recall publications to date. This has required her to put in endless hours of detailed work toward com­

pleting her project. We hope to print it as a separate publication so that it can be a handy reference. Publication is planned for early 2002.

BOOK REVIEW

The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina

Few topics in North Carolina's long history provoke more interest than accounts of the Civil War and stories about the Tar Heel coast. Now, these two fascinating subjects are combined in The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina, an impo1tant new book recently published by the North Carolina Division of Archives and History.

The book portrays the explosive events that took place in North Carolina's coastal region during the nation's great section­al conflict Written by John S. Carbone, the volume discusses the strategic importance of coastai North Carolina, battles that took place there, blockade-running, and the impact of the war on civil­ians all along the Tar Heel coast.

The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina (paperbound, xxvi, 175 pages, illustrated, index) sells for $18.00 plus $3.50 ship­ping. North Carolina residents please add 6% sales tax. Order from: Historical Publications Section (N), Division of Archives and History, 4622 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, NC 27699-4622. For credit card orders call 919-733-7422.

Photos, Interviews Sought of Late 20th Century N .C.

Veterans In 1998, the N.C. Division of Archives and History began

Phase Ill of its effort to better document the state's 20th century military experience. Previous phases have focused on the period from 1900 through the end of the Korean War. Though still actively collecting and preserving items from this era, the Archives is seeking to honor North Carolina veterans who served North Carolina and the nation from 1954 through the present.

In keeping with this state's long and proud military tradition, Large numbers of North Carolinians served in the military forces of the United States both in time of war and in operations other than war, primarily in support of humanitarian efforts around the world.

If you have a photograph or photographs of a North Caro­linian in uniform, consider making a donation to the Military Collection Project. The Archives also seeks to collect and pre­serve military related papers and memorabilia so that future stu­dents, researchers, historians, and others can better understand the nahire of military service and sacrifice.

The Military History Collection Project also is engaged in an extensive oral history program. People around the state are encouraged to tape interviews with veterans of all time periods and services for deposit in the Military Collection of the State Archives. If you have items to share, please mail them to or con­tact: Sion Harrington Ill, Coordinator, Military Collection Project, North Carolina Division of Archives and History, 109 East Jones Street, Raleigh, N.C. 27601-2807; or call 919-733-3952. E-mail: sharrington@ncsl.dcr.state.nc.us.

Contribute Articles to Recall Readers are invited to submit material to Recall. In choos­

ing material for publication, the editor of Recall will give prefer­ence to articles of unusual significance and transcripts or abstracts of difficult-to-locate records. Material Sllbrnitted for publication will be reviewed by persons knowledgeable in the areas covered for validity, significance, and appropriateness. AU material will be edited for clarity and conciseness. Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor, 4404 Leota Drive, Raleigh, N.C. 27603. Tel. 919-772-7688.E-mail:rmripley@aol.com.

The North Carolina Milita1y Historical Society 7410 Chapel Hill Road

Raleigh, North Carolina 27607-5096

NONPROFIT ORG U.S. P03TAGE

PAID CARY, NC27511 Pennit No. 551

Examples of Mater ial Suitable for Publication

Articles on military history I Biog­raphies of military figures I Personal and family papers pertaining to the military I Military society i·ecords I Military censuses I

Col Richard M Ripley

44 04 Leota Drive

Raleigh, NC 27603

PAGE TWTh'TY-FOUR

Personal experiences I Records, diaries, Jot­ters pertaining to service I Impressment records I Oral histories I Military and pen­sion records

Abstracts should be for a full record series. lf an abstract is not complete, it should include all individuals and families within the pages abstracted.

RECALL