unrwa resists resettlement · 18.07.2012 · unrwa resists resettlement by alex joffe t he...

/ 11Joffe: Refugee Resettlement

UNRWA ResistsResettlement

by Alex Joffe

T he Palestinian refugee problem lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Butsince the 1960s, the international institution charged with aiding the refugees,the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA), has resisted their resettlement in the Arab host countries. It has done so byshifting to an educational mission, devising expansive redefinitions of who a refugee is, andexpanding its legal mandates to “protect” and represent refugees. As a result, a well-intendedinternational relief effort has been progressively undone by the vagueness of its mandate,which allowed UNRWA to bend to the will of the U.N. General Assembly and be takenover by its own charges and by the bureaucratic imperative of institutional survival.

Alex Joffe is a Shillman/Ginsburg Writing Fel-low at the Middle East Forum and a New York-based writer on history and international affairs.His website is www.alexanderjoffe.net.

REINTEGRATION:A SHORT HISTORY

The idea of resettlement was implicitly en-coded into UNRWA through U.N. General As-sembly (UNGA) resolution 194 (III) of December11, 1948, which stated that “refugees wishing toreturn to their homes and live at peace with theirneighbours should be permitted to do so at theearliest practicable date, and that compensationshould be paid for the property of those choos-ing not to return.”1 Those choosing not to returnwould presumably be resettled, and the resolu-tion took care to ensure “the repatriation, resettle-ment and economic and social rehabilitation ofthe refugees and the payment of compensation.”2

The language and stipulations of resolution

194 have been used by the Palestinians and theirinternational champions as proof of a U.N.-sanc-tioned “right of return.”3 But UNRWA wasfounded “without prejudice to the provisions ofparagraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194(III),”4 and during its early stages, attempted toavoid the appearance of prejudice toward eitherrepatriation or compensation and resettlement.But as prevailing interpretations of resolution 194have changed, so too has UNRWA.

The overwhelming majority of the Palestin-ian refugees have not returned. Nor have theybeen “reintegrated.” This novel term was intro-duced by UNGA resolution 393 (V) of December2, 1950, which stated that “the reintegration ofthe refugees into the economic life of the Near

1 U.N. General Assemble (UNGA) res. 194 (III), Dec. 11, 1948,para. 11.2 Ibid.3 See, for example, G.J. Boling, Palestinian Refugees and theRight of Return: An International Law Analysis, Information andDiscussion Brief, Issue No. 8, BADIL Resource Center for Pales-tinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, Jan. 2001.4 UNGA res. 302 (IV), Dec. 8, 1949, para. 5.

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East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is es-sential in preparation for the time when interna-tional assistance is no longer available, and forthe realization of conditions of peace and stabil-ity in the area.”5

The formal articulation of repatriation andresettlement notwithstanding, as early as 1951,reintegration was understood in diplomaticcircles exclusively as resettlement.6 Refugeesshared that assessment, and, along with Arabhost countries, resisted it in a variety of ways,

so much so that by thelate 1950s, reintegration,resettlement, and reha-bilitation had reached adead end. In the wordsof the 1957 UNRWAdirector’s report:

in spite of the fact thatmany are establishingthemselves in new lives,the refugees collec-tively remain opposedto certain types of self-support projects which

they consider would mean permanent resettle-ment and the abandonment of hope of repa-triation. They are, in general, supported inthis stand by the Arab host Governments.On the other hand, the Government of Israelhas taken no affirmative action in the matterof repatriation and compensation. It remainsthe Director’s opinion that, unless the refu-gees are given the choice between repatria-tion and compensation provided for in reso-lution 194 (III), or unless some other solu-tion acceptable to all parties is found, it wouldbe unrealistic for the General Assembly tobelieve that decisive progress can be accom-plished by UNRWA towards the “reintegra-tion of the refugees into the economic life of

the Near East, either by repatriation or re-settlement” in line with General Assemblyresolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950.7

SHIFT TO EDUCATION

In his report for 1959, incoming UNRWAdirector John Davis noted that “the execution ofthe ‘long-term task’ of assisting refugees to be-come self-supporting requires certain conditionswhich so far have not prevailed.” He added:

It is no exaggeration to state that every as-pect of life and human endeavour in the NearEast is conditioned and complicated by thePalestine refugee problem. Its psychological,political, and social repercussions are of noless significance than its economic and hu-manitarian aspects. Any solution of the Pal-estine refugee problem must take these as-pects into account.8

Davis’s remarkable statement contrastedwith his immediate predecessor’s upbeat assess-ment that “the picture is not entirely black.”9 Tobe sure, by placing the refugee crisis at the heartof everything in the Middle East, Davis did notreject the notion of resettlement per se; yet heimplied that until the refugees themselves weresatisfied, their plight would remain at the centerof regional affairs. As such, his portentous as-sertion, an essential part of the Palestinian nar-rative, was perhaps the first high level officialindication of UNRWA’s intention to keep therefugees, and itself, at the center of Middle East-ern affairs.

Davis argued that UNRWA’s mandateshould be extended beyond June 30, 1960, whenit was due to expire, calling for a reorientation ofthe agency’s mission and an expanded empha-

5 UNGA res. 393 (V), Dec. 2, 1950.6 See, for example, minutes of the meeting of UNRWA represen-tatives, Oct. 20 and Oct. 22, 1951, “The Role of the AFSC inRefugee Reintegration,” U.S. National Archives, Record Group59, textual records from the Department of State, Bureau of NearEastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Office of Near EasternAffairs (1951-1958), ARC identifier 2558731 / MLR, no. A11437, UNRPR.

UNRWA’sdirector stated:“Every aspectof life … in theNear East isconditioned andcomplicated bythe Palestinerefugee problem.”

7 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1956-June 30, 1957,UNGA A/3686, para. 6.8 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1958-June 30, 1959,UNGA A/4213, para. 6.9 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1957-June 30, 1958,UNGA A/3931, para. 5.

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sis on “providing general education, both el-ementary and secondary … teaching vocationalskills, and awarding university scholarships; and… offering small loans and grants to individualrefugees who have skills and want to becomeself-employed.”10 This was a shrewd and suc-cessful adaptation and a fateful turning point inUNRWA’s relationship with the refugees and theidea of resettlement.11

Providing primary, secondary, and voca-tional training vastly expanded the agency’s con-tact with refugees. In 1950, UNRWA operatedsixty-four schools with 41,000 elementary pu-pils, employing approximately 800 teachers. By1960, this had expanded to 382 schools, almost124,000 pupils, and 3,500 teachers. By 1980, over54 percent of UNRWA’s resources were dedi-cated to education.12 In 2011-12, across its fivefields of operation, UNRWA’s education programcomprised 699 schools, 19,217 educational staff,and 486,754 enrolled pupils.13 Increasing accessto education and raising educational levels areinherently unobjectionable, a fact that UNRWAhas traded on since the 1950s. More controver-sial has been the content of that education.

Educational materials used in UNRWAschools come from the host countries but aretaught by Palestinian teachers, many of whomare graduates of UNRWA schools. During the1960s and 1970s, teaching Palestinian national-ism was a specific goal of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO). Schools, teachers’ unions,and youth organizations were targets for the PLOand its competitors such as the Muslim Brother-hood, which completely politicized these spaces.UNRWA and national governments also madefunds available for scholarship for higher educa-tion, which took place in both Western and So-

viet bloc institutions.14 Indeed, UNRWA’s de-fenders praise the agency’s position as a Pales-tinian national institution and emphasize the roleof education.15

UNRWA’s educational emphasis during the1970s coincided with the PLO’s 1974 adoption ofthe “phased approach” for Israel’s destruction,which included a commitment to the right of re-turn16—a euphemism for Israel’s demographic

Joffe: Refugee Resettlement

10 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960,UNGA A/4478, para. 13.11 Maya Rosenfeld, “From Emergency Relief Assistance toHuman Development and Back: UNRWA and the PalestinianRefugees, 1950-2009,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2-3 (2009):298-9.12 Benjamin N. Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation: UNAid to Palestinians (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995),p. 29, table 2.2; ibid., p. 302.13 “UNRWA Programmes: Education,” UNRWA website, Jan.1, 2012.

14 Jalal al-Husseini, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 2000,pp. 53-4, 56-7; Nadia Latif, “Space, Power and Identity in aPalestinian Refugee Camp,” REVUE Asylon(s), Sept. 2008.15 Riccardo Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: AHistory within History,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2-3 (2009):236, 239-40.16 “Political Program for the Present Stage Drawn Up by the12th PNC, Cairo, June 9, 1974,” Journal of Palestine Studies,Summer 1974, p. 224.

John H. Davis, director of UNRWA, addressesthe U.N. Special Political Committee, Nov.10, 1959, New York. By this time, Davis wasalready asserting that until the refugeesthemselves were satisfied, their plight wouldremain at the center of Middle East affairs.His was perhaps the first high level officialindication of UNRWA’s intention to keep therefugees’ claims front and center, reinforcingthe Palestinian narrative of dispossession.


subversion—as well as with the creation of theU.N. resolutions and infrastructure to support the“inalienable rights” of the Palestinian people. Withthe passage of time, textbooks in UNRWA, andlater Palestinian Authority (PA) schools, havecome under scathing criticism for articulatinganti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-peace themes, alongside advocacy of the rightof return.17

UNRWA’s educational turn also had unan-ticipated and ironic consequences. The Palestin-ians’ educational advantage aided their entry intothe professional classes of Arab states, whichshould have facilitated their reintegration and re-settlement. But these educational advantageswere mitigated by growing Arab investments intheir own educational systems. Rising educationalstandards in some Arab states, and the PLO’ssupport for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of

Kuwait, also re-sulted in Palestinianmarginalization andmass expulsion. Edu-cated Palestiniansreturning to the WestBank and Gaza re-lied yet again onUNRWA’s relief ser-vices.18 During andafter the years follow-ing the Oslo accords,UNRWA and UN-RWA-educated Pal-estinians took thelead in opposing thePLO’s negotiationswith Israel under theaegis of the “rights-based approach” andpreserving the right ofreturn.

WHO IS A REFUGEE?

One significant means of UNRWA’s perma-nent institutionalization and resistance to resettle-ment has been the expansion of its client basethrough redefinitions of who is a refugee.

The agency’s founding resolution 302 (IV)used the term refugee without offering any defini-tion. But the 1951 Convention relating to the Sta-tus of Refugees that established the United Na-tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)began to set parameters for the Palestine Arabrefugees and for UNRWA: “This Convention shallnot apply to persons who are at present receivingfrom organs or agencies of the United Nations otherthan the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees protection and assistance.”19

17 Aaron D. Pina, “Palestinian Education and the Debate overTextbooks,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.,RL32886, Apr. 27, 2005; Arnon Groiss, “Teaching ‘The Rightof Return’ in UNRWA Schools,” Center for Near East PolicyResearch, Jerusalem, 2011.

18 Rosenfeld, “From Emergency Relief,” pp. 316-7.19 Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,UNHCR, 1951 and 1967, UNGA res. 2198 (XXI), art. 1-D, p.16; see, also, “Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to PalestiniansRefugees,” UNHCR, Oct. 2, 2002.

As the need for housing and rations subsided, the agency reoriented itsmission to providing education and vocational skills as in this UNRWAsewing center in Amman, Jordan. Increasing access to education andraising educational levels are inherently unobjectionable, a fact thatUNRWA has traded on since the 1950s.

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The politics behind this decision were a re-sult of pressure from both Western and Arabstates. France, for example, had moved to excludethe Palestinian refugees from the UNHCR man-date on the grounds that a number of U.N. orga-nizations were already active in that arena. Arabdelegates supported the exclusion, arguing thata universal definition of refugees would “sub-merge in the general mass of refugees of certaingroups which were the particular concern of theGeneral Assembly and the right of which torepatriation had been recognized by GeneralAssembly resolutions.”20

Without a formal definition set by a supervi-sory body, UNRWA established its own series ofoperational definitions for refugees. In 1950, thefollowing definition was offered:

For working purposes, the Agency has de-cided that a refugee is a needy person, who,as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost hishome and his means of livelihood. … In somecircumstances, a family may have lost part orall of its land from which its living was se-cured, but it may still have a house to live in.Others may have lived on one side of theboundary but worked in what is now Israelmost of the year. Others, such as Bedouins,normally moved from one area of the countryto another, and some escaped with part or allof their goods but cannot return to the areawhere they formerly resided the greater partof the time.21

In 1954 a temporal qualification wasintroduced:

The definition of a person eligible for relief, asused by the Agency for some years, is onewhose normal residence was Palestine for aminimum period of two years preceding the

outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as aresult of this conflict, has lost both his homeand means of livelihood.22

The 1955 report of the UNRWA commis-sioner-general introduced an informal rationalefor including other claimants, namely PalestineArabs who were not displaced in 1948 but wholost some or all of their livelihoods:

There is only a difference of degree between,on the one hand, the situation of the man whosehome was on the Jordanside of the demarcationline but whose land isnow cut off in Israel, orwho worked in what isnow Israel[i] Jerusalem,or who sold his producein the coastal towns orexported it through Pal-estinian ports, and, onthe other hand, the situ-ation of the man whohas lost his home as wellas his means of liveli-hood. All of these havelost, in varying degrees, a place in which to workand a way of life. They have that in common.Yet in some cases, the family which continuesto reside in its former home, but whose nearbyfields are no longer in its possession, may be ina more serious plight. The very proximity of itsformer possessions—the situation in which theoriginal inhabitants must watch newcomers tilltheir former fields and harvest crops from theirformer groves—increases the tensions and thepsychological strain.23

This decision followed up on observationsmade since 1948 regarding the impoverished stateof those claimants. It also acknowledged the dif-ficulty of both distinguishing them from true refu-gees as well as the moral and practical difficultiesin refusing aid. Incorporating border villages intoUNRWA’s purview expanded its economic role in


Riots by refugeesand lack ofcooperation fromhost countriesunderminedefforts to reduceUNRWA’srefugee rolls.

20 Brenda Goddard, “UNHCR and the International Protectionof Palestinian Refugees,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2-3 (2009):475-510; Jalal al-Husseini and Riccardo Bocco, “The Status ofthe Palestinian Refugees in the Near East: The Right of Returnand UNRWA in Perspective,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2-3(2009): 260-85, for a discussion of “positive discrimination”against Palestine Arab refugees by Arab League states as a meansof preserving national identity and the right of return.21 Interim report of the director, UNRWA, Oct. 6, 1950, UNGAA/1451/Rev.1, para. 15.

22 Special report of the director, Advisory Commission of UN-RWA, June 30, 1954, UNGA A/2717/Add.1, para. 19.23 Special report of the director, UNRWA, Oct. 15, 1955, concern-ing other claimants for relief, UNGA A/2978/Add. 1, para. 20.


Gaza and Jordan and articulated a sociopsych-ological or therapeutic element that would be-come an important part of UNRWA’s mission inthe coming decades.

Throughout the 1950s, efforts were made torectify refugee roles. Fraud, duplicate enrollments,non-counting of deaths, and the holding of ra-tion cards by merchants were all well-known byUNRWA and the Western governments from 1949onward, but little was or could be done. Riots byrefugees, threats by merchants, and lack of coop-eration from host countries, who were economi-cally dependent on UNRWA, undermined effortsto reduce refugee rolls. Threats to reduce U.S.contributions to UNRWA amounted to little.24

In 1965, the definitionwas again revised:

Recently a new problemof eligibility has arisenwith the appearance of athird generation of refu-gees (i.e., the children ofpersons who were them-selves born after 14 May1948). On a literal inter-pretation of the definitionof eligibility as it nowstands, there may be somedoubt whether these per-sons are eligible for UN-RWA assistance. Underthe proposals set out …they would clearly be eli-gible … subject to theirbeing in need, and thiswould apply to subse-quent generations also.25

This new, expansivedefinition, which extendedUNRWA’s services to a

third generation of refugees, was apparently of-fered as part of a deal between UNRWA directorLaurence Michelmore and the Arab states, in ex-change for new refugee surveys that mollifiedWestern pressures.26

The 1967 Six-Day War and the influx of morerefugees into the UNRWA system from the WestBank offered the opportunity to establish a newbaseline, and by 1971, the refugee definition hadbeen expanded again with specifications regard-ing the inheritability of refugee status:

A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA’s workingdefinition, is a person whose normal residencewas Palestine for a minimum of two years pre-ceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a resultof this conflict, lost both his home and meansof livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in oneof the countries where UNRWA provides re-24 James G. Lindsay, “Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN’s

Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees,” WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Jan. 2009, pp.16-7; “Memorandum from the assistant secretary of state for NearEastern and South Asian affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of StateRusk: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967,” Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1964-1968, U.S. Department of State, para.73, June 15, 1964, attachment, “Possible U.S. Initiatives onArab-Israel Issues in 1964–65,” para. 4.

UNRWA’s educational emphasis during the 1970s coincided withthe PLO’s 1974 adoption of a “phased approach” for Israel’sdestruction. This still photograph, taken from a short documentary,displays Palestinian students from an UNRWA school singingrevolutionary songs. “The Palestinian curriculum taught atUNRWA schools is … a curriculum of delayed war against Israel,”said David Bedein, producer of the film and president of the Centerfor Near East Policy Research in Jerusalem.

25 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1964-June 30, 1965, UNGA A/6013, paras. 21, 25.26 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, pp. 53-4.

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lief. Refugees within this definition or the chil-dren or grandchildren of such refugees are eli-gible for agency assistance if they are (a) regis-tered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area ofUNRWA’s operations, and (c) in need.27

By 1994, this operational definition had beenfurther extended:

Under UNRWA’s operational definition, Pal-estine refugees are people whose normal placeof residence was Palestine between June 1946and May 1948, who lost both their homes andmeans of livelihood as a result of the 1948Arab-Israeli conflict.28

This version is still operative today. There areno qualifications regarding a refugee having beendisplaced to a country where UNRWA operates orwhether they have obtained another nationality.Nor does UNRWA require individual applicants tohave either endured all three criteria (residence,loss of homes, and loss of livelihood), or providedocumentation of these statuses. UNRWA requiresonly a self-declaration from applicants.29 The man-date is effectively global and the agency viewsitself as the “global advocate for the protectionand care of Palestine refugees.”30 This generatesa total client base of almost 5 million.

MANDATES AND THEQUESTION OF PROTECTIONS

Concurrent with the expansion of the defi-nition of a Palestine refugee has been the vastexpansion of UNRWA’s mandate from the origi-nal, concise role of “direct relief and worksprogrammes” to the ambitious endeavor

to contribute to the human development ofPalestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, the WestBank, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian ArabRepublic until a durable and just solution isfound to the refugee issue. … The Agency’svision is for every Palestine refugee to enjoythe best possible standards of human devel-opment, including attaining his or her fullpotential individually and as a family andcommunity member; being an active and pro-ductive participant in socioeconomic andcultural life; and feeling assured that his orher rights are being defended, protected, andpreserved.31

The agency’s imperative to maintain thisstandard of living indefinitely for an ever-expand-ing client base is perhaps the single greatest self-imposed impediment to resettlement.

Another form of mission creep has been theuse of international law to expand organizationalmandates to such fields as “education, health andrelief, and social services, microfinance, infrastruc-ture and camp improvement, and emergency as-sistance including food aid.”32 Moreover, by theearly 1980s, UNRWA’s mandate had expanded toinclude protection of the refugees’ legal and hu-man rights.33 In December 1982, for example, U.N.Secretary-general JavierPérez de Cuéllar askedUNRWA to consider“measures to guaranteethe safety and securityand the legal and humanrights of the Palestinianrefugees in the [Israeli]occupied territories.”34

Six years later he ex-plicitly articulated theseguarantees:


UNRWA viewsitself as “a globaladvocate for theprotection andcare of Palestinerefugees.”

27 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1971, UNGA A/8413, fn. 1.28 “Who Are Palestine Refugees?” UNRWA website, accessedJune 27, 2012.29 Gender discrimination does apply against registered refugeewomen who marry non-refugees and thereby lose their status. SeeChristine Cervenak, “Promoting Inequality: Gender-Based Dis-crimination in the UNRWA’s Approach to Palestine Refugee Sta-tus,” Human Rights Quarterly, May 1994, pp. 300-74.30 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, Jan. 1-Dec.31, 2007, UNGA A/64/13 (Supp. 13), July 31, 2008, para. 4.

31 Ibid., para. 2, 3.32 Lance Bartholomeusz, “The Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty,”Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2-3 (2009): 462.33 Scott Custer, Jr., “United Nations Relief and Works Agencyfor Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): Protection andAssistance to Palestine Refugees,” in Susan M. Akram, et al.,eds., International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ARights-based Approach to Middle East Peace (London: Routledge,2011), pp. 45-68.34 UNGA res. 37/120, Dec. 16, 1982, para. J-1.


(a) “Protection” can mean physical pro-tection, i.e., the provision of armed forcesto deter, and if necessary fight, any threatsto the safety of the protected persons;

(b) “Protection” can mean legal protec-tion, i.e., intervention with the securityand judicial authorities, as well as the po-litical instances, of the occupying Power,by an outside agency, in order to ensurejust treatment of an individual or groupof individuals;

(c) “Protection” can also take a less well-defined form, called in this report “generalassistance,” in which an outside agencyintervenes with the authorities of the oc-cupying Power to help individuals orgroups of individuals to resist violationsof their rights (e.g., land confiscations) andto cope with the day-to-day difficulties oflife under occupation, such as security re-strictions, curfews, harassment, bureau-cratic difficulties and so on;

(d) Finally, there isthe somewhat in-tangible “protec-tion” afforded byoutside agencies,including espe-cially the interna-tional media, whosemere presence andreadiness to pub-lish what they ob-serve may have abeneficial effect forall concerned; inthis report this typeof protection iscalled “protectionby publicity.”35

UNRWA’s protec-tion mandate was am-plified in 2007 by theGeneral Assembly,which stated that it wasaware “of the valuablework done by the

Agency in providing protection to the Palestin-ian people, in particular Palestine refugees.”36

This was further extended in 2008 with a GeneralAssembly direction to UNRWA regarding therights of women and children. Likewise, in 2007,the General Assembly approved the commis-sioner-general’s report that included the asser-tion that “UNRWA is a global advocate for theprotection and care of Palestine refugees,” andthe organization established a senior protectionpolicy advisor position.37 The influential 2008“Morris report,” compiled by a retired UNHCRstaff member, also recommended that it use theU.N.’s human rights system to expand UNRWA’sprotection for refugees and that the agency’s op-erations support officers in the West Bank and

35 Report submitted to the Security Council by the secretary-general, UNRWA, Jan. 21, 1988, UNSC S/19443, C-28.36 UNGA res. 62/104, Dec. 5, 2007.37 Bartholomeusz, “The Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty,” pp.466-7.

Even before adding descendents into their definition of a “refugee,”UNRWA had created problems by listing as eligible for relief persons“whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum period of twoyears preceding the outbreak of the conflict.” This would includethousands of Arab migrant workers attracted to the burgeoningeconomy of Mandate Palestine but whose roots lay well outside theterritory.

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the Gaza Strip act as “roving international protec-tion officers.”38

The scope of protections is potentially limit-less as illustrated by the demand that the refu-gees be given a voice in the quest for “a just anddurable solution” and be protected from the useof “disproportionate force” during this process.39

Indeed, the “Morris report” recommended thatthe commissioner-general “should engage withthose drawing up negotiating papers and pro-posing positions and policies in order to ensureto the extent possible that these take proper ac-count of the rights and interests of the refugeesand of UNRWA’s experience and knowledge.”40

That is: UNRWA should be directly involved inthe political process as representative of the Pal-estinian refugees, their rights, interests and de-sires, in direct competition with other Palestinianentities—hardly an inducement to resettlement.

DECOLONIZATIONAND RADICALIZATION OFTHE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

An important but largely overlooked factorregarding UNRWA is the context within which itoperates at the General Assembly where a stringof resolutions on decolonization and political in-dependence for colonial peoples and countriesset the stage for many specific resolutions deal-ing with the Palestinians. These also establisheda huge U.N. infrastructure outside UNRWA thatsupports the Palestinian national cause to thedetriment of resettlement.

Decolonization: The General Context. Apartial list of relevant General Assembly resolu-tions begins with resolution 1514 (XV), the “Dec-laration on the Granting of Independence to Co-

lonial Countries and Peoples” of December 14,1960.41 Among other things, the resolution statedthat “subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,domination, and exploitation constitutes a denialof fundamental human rights” and that “allpeoples have the right toself-determination,” de-manding an end to “allarmed action or repres-sive measures of all kindsdirected against depen-dent peoples.” This wasfollowed a day later byResolution 1515 (XV),which established thesovereign right of statesto dispose of their ownnatural resources and wealth.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.N. reso-lutions took a more strident tone. Resolution 2588(XXV) of December 15, 1969, followed up on the1968 International Conference on Human Rightsand reaffirmed “the right of all peoples undercolonial and foreign rule to liberation and self-determination.”42 It also expressed support for“liberation movements in southern Africa andelsewhere in their legitimate struggle for free-dom and independence.” Resolution 2649 (XXV)of November 30, 1970, took inalienable rights toanother level and specifically named the“peoples of southern Africa and Palestine,” not-ing the “legitimacy of the struggle of peoplesunder colonial and alien domination recognizedas being entitled to the right of self-determina-tion to restore to themselves that right by anymeans at their disposal.”43 This resolutionstands at the beginning of the apartheid chargeagainst Israel.

The “Inalienable Rights of the PalestinianPeople.” The 1970s saw the “question of Pales-tine” become a singular preoccupation of theUnited Nations. This in turn influenced UNRWAand its approach to resettlement.


38 Nicholas Morris, “What Protection Means for UNRWA inConcept and Practice,” Mar. 31, 2008, p. 4, 9.39 For the operational dimensions of UNRWA’s protections, seeMark Brailsford, “Incorporating Protection into UNRWA Opera-tions,” paper presented at the Policy and Governance in Palestin-ian Camps Conference, sponsored by UNRWA and the IssamFares Institute for International Affairs, American University ofBeirut, Oct. 8-9, 2010.40 Morris, “”What Protection Means,” p. 3.

41 UNGA res. 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960.42 UNGA res. 2588 (XXV), Dec. 15, 1969.43 UNGA res. 2649 (XXV), Nov. 30, 1970.

The U.N. systemhas becomethe foremostinternationalsetting for thedelegitimizationof Israel.


In 1969, General Assembly resolution 2535(XXIV) stated that it was “[d]esirous of givingeffect to its resolutions for relieving the plight ofthe displaced persons and the refugees” beforereaffirming “the inalienable rights of the peopleof Palestine.”44 The following year General As-sembly resolution 2672 stated that “the problemof the Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen fromthe denial of their inalienable rights under the Char-ter of the United Nations and the Universal Dec-laration of Human Rights.”45

The “Question of Palestine” was added tothe agenda of the twenty-ninth session of theU.N. in 1974 and has remained there ever since.Resolution 3210 (XXIX) invited the PLO to par-ticipate in General Assembly deliberations.Resolution 3236 (XXIX) recognized the “inalien-able national rights of the Palestinian people” andreaffirmed “the inalienable right of the Palestin-ians to return to their homes and property fromwhich they have been displaced and uprooted,and calls for their return.”46 This further codi-fied repatriation—not resettlement—as the goal

of the General Assemblyand gave implicit instruc-tions to UNRWA to op-pose resettlement.

Support for the Pal-estinian national projectalso became an explicitU.N. goal. In 1975, Gen-eral Assembly resolution3375 recognized the PLOas the “representative ofthe Palestinian people, toparticipate in all efforts,

deliberations, and conferences on the Middle Eastwhich are held under the auspices of the UnitedNations, on an equal footing with other parties.”47

The same day, resolution 3376 created the “Com-mittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights ofthe Palestinian People” to oversee “a programme

of implementation to enable the Palestinian peopleto exercise the rights” articulated in resolution3236, empowering it to “establish contact with,and to receive suggestions and proposals from,any State and intergovernmental regional organi-zation and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-tion.”48 Also passing that day was the infamousresolution 3379, which among other things, “De-termines that Zionism is a form of racism and ra-cial discrimination.”49

U.N. Institutions in Support of the Palestin-ians. As if to add insult to injury, the U.N. commit-ted a full range of institutional resources to thePalestinian national cause and against Israel. Ledby the Palestinians, the Arab League, and the Or-ganization of the Islamic Conference, and abet-ted by an array of nongovernmental organizations(NGO) and government-organized NGOs, the U.N.system has become the foremost internationalsetting for the delegitimization of Israel and theadvancement of a “one state” solution (i.e., anArab state in the whole of mandatory Palestine inwhich Jews would be reduced to a minority). UN-RWA activities and statements cannot be viewedin isolation from this institutional and cultural en-vironment. One prominent result has been the mis-representation of resolution 194 as solely aimedat repatriation and compensation to the total ex-clusion of resettlement.

In 1977, General Assembly resolution 3240created the Special Unit on Palestinian Rightswithin the U.N. Secretariat with the goal of the“greatest possible dissemination of informationon the inalienable rights of the Palestinian peopleand on the efforts of the United Nations to pro-mote the attainment of those rights.”50 Later re-named the Division of Palestinian Rights, this unitprovides support to the “Committee on the Exer-cise of the Inalienable Rights of the PalestinianPeople,” including international meetings, liaisonwith NGOs, creating and disseminating studiesand bulletins, and training programs for the Pal-estinian Authority.

44 UNGA res. 2535 (XXV), Dec. 8, 1970.45 UNGA res. 2672 (XXV), Dec. 8, 1970.46 UNGA res. 3236 (XXIX), Nov. 22, 1974.47 UNGA res. 3375 (XXX), Nov. 10, 1975.

48 UNGA res. 3376 (XXX), Nov. 10, 1975.49 UNGA res. 3379 (XXX), Nov. 10, 1975.50 UNGA res. 32/40 (A+B), Dec. 2, 1977.

Resolution 3236codifiedrepatriation andgave implicitinstructions toUNRWAto opposeresettlement.

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Beyond the Division of Palestinian Rights,the Palestinian refugee problem has been ad-dressed by the General Assembly’s FourthCommittee, or the Special Political andDecolonization Committee, which deals with“a variety of subjects which include those re-lated to decolonization, Palestinian refugeesand human rights, peacekeeping, mine action,outer space, public information, atomic radia-tion, and University for Peace.”51 At least halfof the Fourth Committee’s agenda relates tothe Palestinian refugees.

Support for the Palestinian cause is alsogiven through other U.N. organs, such as theUnited Nations Development Programme, andthrough specialized agencies such as UNESCO,which has served as an especially importantarena for anti-Israeli activities, as well as theWorld Health Organization and the Food andAgriculture Organization. Other U.N. entitieshave taken direct interest in the refugees andthe conflict, including UNICEF, which was ac-tive in refugee relief from 1948 onward. The Eco-nomic and Social Council admitted the PLO asan observer in 1975, and in 1977, made “assis-tance to the Palestinian people” a part of its man-date, along with human rights, and the rights ofwomen and children. There is also the SpecialCoordinator for the Middle East Peace Process,the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territo-ries, the various disengagement observer andtruce forces, the Human Rights Committee andthe Human Rights Council, the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Com-mittee on Jerusalem, the Register of Damagecaused by the Construction of the Wall, the Spe-cial Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, theSpecial Rapporteur on the situation of humanrights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, andothers— more than fifty in all, including the Con-ciliation Commission for Palestine, which, in itssixty-fifth report to the General Assembly in 2010“observes that it has nothing new to report.”52


UNRWA ANDTHE RIGHT OF RETURN

At the beginning of the 1960s, UNRWA’sview of resolution 194 and the right of returnwas clear. In his report for 1961, Director JohnDavis stated that it was not “surprising that therefugees still strongly demand the right of choicebetween repatriation and compensation held outto them by the United Nations under paragraph11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 (III)—a right which has never been implemented.”53

The late Yasser Arafat (right) and SouthAfrica’s Nelson Mandela join hands insolidarity. U.N. General Assembly resolution2649 of November 1970 took “inalienablerights” to another level and specificallynamed the “peoples of southern Africa andPalestine” as partners in a legitimatestruggle for self-determination. UNRWA’sactivities cannot be viewed in isolation froman institutional environment that has linkedthe Palestinian issue to decolonization,regardless of its applicability.

51 “Special Political and Decolonization,” UNGA, Fourth Com-mittee, accessed June 29, 2012.52 Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine,UNGA A 66/296, Aug. 12, 2011.


This juxtaposition is significant; resolution 194gave refugees a clear choice between repatria-tion and compensation.

By 1962, however, Davis had changed bothhis tone and approach. In his report, he notedthat UNRWA had been frustrated “in sponsoringworks projects to settle refugees” adding that

these undertakings havefailed because they havebeen unacceptable to thepeople (refugee andnon-refugee) indigenousto the region and to theGovernments whichrepresent them. It is theconsidered opinion ofthe Commissioner-General that these feel-ings of the Arab people

run as deep today as at any time in the past,and therefore that, at least for as long as thereis no substantial progress towards the imple-mentation of paragraph 11 of General As-sembly resolution 194 (III), UNRWA shouldnot again attempt works projects designed tosettle the refugees. From this experience oneshould not conclude that economic develop-ment is not wanted by the people of the re-gion. On the contrary, it is wanted and at anaccelerated rate but not in the context of refu-gee resettlement.54

Davis acknowledged that resettlement failedbecause of opposition from “the Arab people,”presumably the Arab states, but pointed to theirfrustration over non-implementation of paragraph11 of resolution 194 as the cause. This likely re-fers to the lack of repatriation. On this basis then,and with UNRWA’s reorientation toward educa-tion underway, Davis ended works projects as ameans of resettlement.

In the late 1960s, resolution 242 joined reso-lution 194 as one of UNRWA’s touchstones. Alsocritical was Security Council resolution 237, which

followed the 1967 Six-Day War and “[c]alls uponthe Government of Israel to ensure the safety,welfare, and security of the inhabitants of the ar-eas where military operations have taken placeand to facilitate the return of those inhabitantswho have fled the areas since the outbreak ofhostilities.”55 This demand for 1967 refugees tobe allowed to return was repeated in General As-sembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)56 while resolution2443 established a “Special Committee to Investi-gate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rightsof the Population of the Occupied Territories” andalso pointed to the “Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights regarding the right of everyone toreturn to his own country.”57 Though this refersonly to refugees who fled in 1967, it would be-come another foundation for the right of returnfor all refugees.

Indeed, during the 1970s, the concept ofinalienable rights and the right of return beganto influence UNRWA. One of the first appear-ances of the latter phrase is in the 1977 report byCommissioner-General Thomas McElhiney, whostated that since “1948, the General Assemblyhas annually recommended the return of the refu-gees to their original homes or the receipt ofcompensation in lieu thereof. The political sig-nificance of the mass displacement of humanbeings is obvious, particularly when the rightof return and the right to restoration of theirproperty are acknowledged by the internationalcommunity.”58

In the space of two sentences, McElhineyacknowledged the dichotomous meaning of reso-lution 194 and then discarded it. In his report forthe following year, he omitted reference to resolu-tion 194 altogether and stated: “The General As-sembly annually recommends the return of therefugees to their original homes or the receipt ofcompensation in lieu thereof. The political sig-nificance of the mass displacement of human be-

53 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1960-June 30, 1961, UNGA A/4861, para. 9.54 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1961-June 30, 1962, UNGA A/5214, para. 12.

55 U.N. Security Council res. 237, June 14, 1967.56 UNGA res. 2252 (ES-V), July 4, 1967.57 UNGA res. 2443 (XXIII), Dec. 16, 1968.58 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1976-June 30, 1977, UNGA A/32/13 (Supp), para. 2. Note McElhiney’scandor regarding UNRWA’s “quasi-governmental responsibili-ties,” para. 13.

The “rightof return” hasbecome anintegral partof UNRWAdoctrine.

/ 23Joffe: Refugee Resettlement

Rather than focus on its original mandate of resettlement, UNRWA has becomea politicized advocate for the Palestine cause of repatriation as seen in thissign from the UNRWA-established Dheisheh refugee camp in the West Bank.

ings, particularlywhen the right ofreturn and theright to restora-tion of their prop-erty are acknowl-edged by the in-ternational com-munity, is obvi-ous.”59 Curiously,the phrase neverreappears in anycommissioner-general report.

The right ofreturn has beenlargely sustainedby Palestinian andWestern intellectu-als since the late 1970s.60 During the Oslo accordsprocess, the PLO initially sought to deemphasizethe concept as a means of strengthening its inter-national standing, but it was dramatically reem-phasized after 2000.61 This coincided with the de-liberate shift within UNRWA from top-down man-agement to strategies of refugee consultation, par-ticipation, and political empowerment.62 During thisperiod, UNRWA also facilitated grassroots refu-gee committees, in opposition to the PLO, whichpursued complete repatriation in place of a negoti-

ated settlement.63 In conjunction with the work ofa new generation of Palestinian intellectuals, es-pecially lawyers, operating outside the region, theright of return was placed at the center of the new,rights-based political agenda. UNRWA’s policyof stakeholder participation and expanding man-dates meshed perfectly with the spread of therights-based approach. This, in turn, has influ-enced the agency itself, in terms of policy andrhetoric.

In structural terms as well, stakeholder par-ticipation and decentralization of planning, deci-sion-making, and responsibility, along with thereality of some 30,000 Palestinian employees anda half billion dollar annual budget funded by theWest, makes resettlement an unlikely prospect.64

UNRWA appears inextricably rooted in Palestin-ian society.

Small wonder, therefore, that in the first de-

59 Report of the commissioner-general, UNRWA, July 1, 1977-June 30, 1978, A/33/13 (Supp.), para. 3.60 See, for example, Kurt Rene Radley, “The Palestinian Refu-gees: The Right to Return in International Law,” American Jour-nal of International Law, July 1978, pp. 586-614; Donna E. Arztand Karen Zughaib, “Return to the Negotiated Lands: The Like-lihood and Legality of a Population Transfer between Israel and aFuture Palestinian State,” New York University Journal of Inter-national Law and Politics, 4 (1991–92): 1399-1513; John Ber-nard Quigley, “Repatriation of the Displaced Arabs of Palestine:The Legal Requirement as Seen from the United Nations,” OhioState public law working paper, no. 60, Moritz College of Law,Apr. 2006.61 Ghada Hashem Talhami, Palestinian Refugees: Pawns toPolitical Actors (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), pp.190-211; Jalal al-Husseini, “Visions palestiniennes du ‘droit auretour’ des réfugiés, sept ans après le début dela seconde Intifada(2000-2007),” a contrario, 1 (2008): 6-22.62 Terry Rempel, “UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees: AGenealogy of Participatory Development,” Refugee Survey Quar-terly, 2-3 (2009): 424-6.

63 See, for example, Jalal al-Husseini, “The Future of UNRWA:A Palestinian Perspective, in The Final Status Negotiations onthe Refugee Issue: Positions and Strategies (Ramallah: Depart-ment of Refugee Affairs, Palestine Liberation Organization, 2000),pp. 101–12; “Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemak-ing,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 22,Feb. 5, 2004.64 “Organisational Effectiveness Assessment, United NationsRelief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,”vol. 1, Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Net-work, Dec. 2011, p. 3.


cade of the twenty-first century, the right of re-turn has become an integral part of UNRWA doc-trine. In a 2008 press release, for example, VolkerSchimmel, UNRWA project officer for the NeirabRehabilitation Project in Syria, stated, “We wantto allow Palestinians to live in dignity … Choos-ing not to live in misery does not mean that theywill forfeit their right of return.”65 Filippo Grandi,UNRWA’s deputy commissioner-general, wasequally blunt when, with regard to the same hous-

ing project, he stated at aconference at Bir ZeitUniversity: “The projecthas broken many tradi-tional taboos: For the firsttime all stakeholders haveagreed that improving liv-ing conditions did notcompromise the right ofreturn.”66

In a 2011 interview,UNRWA spokesmanChris Gunness made thesame point: “Establishedprinciples and practice—

as well as realities on the ground—clearly refutethe argument that the right of return of Palestinerefugees would disappear or be abandoned ifUNHCR were responsible for these refugees.”67

The expression is also used in the UNRWA me-dium term strategy document.68 Leila Hilal, formerlegal advisor to the Palestinian Negotiations De-partment and the Palestinian negotiations teamat Annapolis and subsequently senior policy ad-visor to the UNRWA commissioner-general (nowon the staff of the New America Foundation),

opined that the right of return and the “principleof refugee choice” are absolute prerequisites, evenif situated within a “menu of permanent destina-tion choices” as envisioned by U.S. president BillClinton in a 2000 proposal to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.69

These and similar statements are significant;at one level, they reach the press and grassroots,reassuring the refugees of UNRWA’s commitmentto the right of return.70 At another, they reachPalestinian and Arab intellectuals who carry onthe nationalist project through education, NGOaction, and in international settings. Pressure onUNRWA from groups such as the Global Pales-tine Right of Return Coalition71 also put demandson the agency from the rights-based legal para-digm, as well as the right of return, and boycott,divestment, and sanctions paradigms.

UNRWA’s senior leadership has been coyer,if no less committed. In a 2008 lecture at OxfordUniversity, Commissioner-General Karen KoningAbuZayd claimed that on “questions such as theright of return, for example, there is fear that thepreference, if left to refugees, would be for a re-turn en masse. From my own experience with othergroups of refugees, I can say that refugees oftensurprise us with the wisdom of their choices—if,that is, we enable and empower them to choose.”Yet her assertion that “for sixty years, Palestinerefugees have been in exile from their ancestrallands” can only be interpreted as an endorse-ment of the right of return, whether in a broad orlimited sense.72

65 “UNRWA Embarks on Large-scale Camp Rehabilitationwith Support of UAE Red Crescent Society,” Refugee Stories,UNRWA, Aleppo, Apr. 2008.66 Filippo Grandi, deputy commissioner-general, UNRWA,“UNRWA: Present Dilemmas and Future Prospects,” Interna-tional Workshop, The Palestinian Refugees: A Comparative Ap-proach, Law Institute, Bir Zeit University, West Bank, Mar. 15,2008.67 Chris Gunness, UNRWA spokesman, “Exploding the myths:UNRWA, UNHCR and the Palestine refugees,” interview, Ma’anNews Agency, Jerusalem, June 27, 2011.68 UNRWA Medium Term Strategy 2010-2015, UNRWA, para.105, accessed June 29, 2012.

UNRWA’sexpandingmandates,operations,rhetoric, andinstitutionalculture all workagainstresettlement.

69 Leila Hilal, “Peace Prospects and Implications for UNRWA’sFuture: An International Law Perspective,” paper presented at thePolicy and Governance in Palestinian Camps conference, spon-sored by UNRWA and the Issam Fares Institute for InternationalAffairs, American University of Beirut, Oct. 8-9, 2010, p. 9.70 See Husseini and Bocco, “The Status of the PalestinianRefugees in the Near East,” pp. 275-6, fig. 1, 3; Riccardo Bocco,et al., Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Condi-tions, The Role of International and Local Aid during the Sec-ond Intifada, Report V (Geneva: Graduate Institute of Develop-ment Studies, University of Geneva, Dec. 2002), pp. 134-6, figs.6.20, 6.21.71 “Final Statement: Global Palestine Right of Return Coali-tion-10th Annual Meeting, Beirut, Dec. 5-11, 2010,” BADILResource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,Bethlehem.72 Karen Koning AbuZayd, “Palestine Refugees in Their 60thYear: Issues of Human Rights,” Public Policy and InternationalLaw Conference, Oxford University, Nov. 27, 2008.

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Commissioner-general Peter Hansen was lessequivocal when he argued in a 2004 lecture, re-garding the return of refugees to their homes inother conflict zones: “Rightly or wrongly, the Pal-estine refugees view this difference in approachas a double standard in the application of interna-tional law. This perception of a double standardmust end if international law is to retain its mean-ing and relevance in the Middle East as awhole.”73

CONCLUSIONS

UNRWA’s ever-expanding mandates, opera-tions and responsibilities, rhetoric, and institu-

tional culture all work against resettlement. As aresult, the right of return has been inculcated aspart of UNRWA’s culture at all levels and hasbeen rationalized through the rights-based ap-proach. UNRWA can thus be expected to opposeany negotiated settlement that does not containthe right of return in some explicit form, not leastsince only its parent organization, the General As-sembly, has “a permanent responsibility towardsthe question of Palestine until the question is re-solved in all its aspects in a satisfactory mannerin accordance with international legitimacy.”74

This arrogation represents another impedimentto the question of UNRWA and the fate of thePalestine Arab refugees as well as to peace as awhole.


73 Peter Hansen, “UNRWA’s Operational Environment and theRole of International Law,” Steinkraus-Cohen International LawLecture, London School of Economics, Apr. 28, 2004.

74 UNGA res. 57/107, Dec. 3, 2002.

Iran to Ban Chicken Eating on TVAs a last resort to fight soaring food prices, a top Iranian official has proposed a ban on images ofpeople eating chicken on television.

National Police Chief Esma’il Ahmadi Moghadam suggested that images of chicken should bebanned from state television, fearing that they may provoke attacks on affluent Iranians by theunderprivileged, reports the Mehr News Agency,

“Films are now the window to society, and some of those witnessing the class gap may say:‘We will take our knives and take our rights from the rich,’” said Moghadam.

The price of a kilo of chicken is now hovering at the $5 mark, compared to $2 before sanctionswere imposed by Western governments earlier this month as a cause of Iran’s continuing nuclearprogram.

The government has attempted to offer discounted chicken, which attracts queues of up to 14hours in some Iranian cities. A video posted on YouTube reportedly shows a rush to buy chicken ata state cooperative.

It was also reported that in a recent broadcast of a film first produced in 1986, where onecharacter mentions the price of clementines, the audio was dubbed in order to conceal the truth aboutinflation.

However, chicken has become the central symbol of the regime’s inability to provide affordablefood, with many people venting their anger on social media websites. One Iranian Internet activist,Vahid Online, sarcastically wrote: “This program may contain images of cooked chicken.”

Mehr News Agency (Tehran), July 18, 2012

unrwa resists resettlement · 18.07.2012 · unrwa resists resettlement by alex joffe t he...

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