understanding: the mutual regulation of cognition and … · understanding: the mutual regulation...

118 Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Understanding: The Mutual Regulation of Cognition and Culture

“Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. – For that is the expression which confuses you.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosoph-ical Investigations, § 154)

he concept of understanding has a Janus-like nature.

1

Its shows faces in two differ-ent, not to say opposite, directions: first, itoffers a psychic or mental face. Understand-ing appears as a cognitive process or mentaloperation ending up with some recognition,insight, knowledge or discovery. At the sametime, however, the concept of understandingshows its social and interactional nature whenit comes to learning and to the evaluation ofknowledge, competences or abilities. Some“authority” – be it mother nature in the caseof the experiments of scientists or a schoolteacher in the case of examinations – selectsthe viable from all the offered and tested solu-tions.

As indicated by the history of hermeneu-tics and by the cognitivist tendency to avoidthe use of “understanding” (and instead say

“comprehension” or “information process-ing”), the double nature of understanding,despite more than 2000 years of theorizing,still seems to be misunderstood or, eventually,not understood at all. The following reflec-tions on the semantics of understanding, thehistory of hermeneutics and constructivistconcepts of understanding try to demonstratethat cognitive and social approaches towardsunderstanding do not at all oppose but ratherthey complement each other. Both faces ofunderstanding match pretty well and togethermake up an important part of the big pictureof the mutual regulation of cognition and cul-ture. The following lines essentially proposeto take understanding as both at the sametime: a special kind of social regulation as it isconstrained by the cognitive autonomy ofactors (i.e., regulation at the social levelthrough the conditions of cognitive auton-omy of actors), and as a special kind of cogni-tive regulation (i.e., regulation at the level ofcognition through social conditions of act-ing), a social selection of cognitive concepts

and operations, styles and preferences as it isconstrained by the cultural environment,especially by the partners and counterparts ininteractions and communication. The phe-nomena of understanding, thus, instance theunderlying setting of cognitive

and

socialconditions of communicating, acting andinteracting. Understanding is the way thatcognitive autonomous individuals com-mune.

The semantics of understanding

Two dominant meanings of understandingcan be observed in ordinary language use: (i) “Understanding” in the sense of compre-hend, access mentally, realize the meaning ofsomething, have the ability or know how to dosomething, have a good command of some-thing, have learned something.

This field of meanings characterizesunderstanding as a psychic process or anintellectual ability (what the mind does). Thequality of understanding, thus, directlydepends upon the quality of mental presup-positions and talents, the quality of cogni-tions from perception and recognition up tomemory and reasoning.

(ii) “Understanding” in the sense of corre-spond with someone, congenial thinking andacting, get along well with someone, havesimilar interests or aims, not take somethingamiss.

Here, understanding refers to states orqualities of social relations, a parallel or com-plementary way of looking at things, a famil-iarity of reasoning, thinking and acting, akind of empathy or closeness originatingfrom the idea of knowing the points of view,the motives or the affections of the other.

While the first group of meanings clearlyfocuses upon cognitive processes and theirrespective qualities the meanings of the sec-

Gebhard Rusch

A

Siegen University (Germany) <[email protected]>

T

Purpose: Demonstrate that cognitive and social approaches towards understanding do not at all oppose but rather they complement each other. Constructivist concepts of understanding paved the way to conceive of understanding as a cognitive-social “mecha-nism” which mutually regulates processes of social structuration and, at the same time, cognitive constructions and processing. Findings: Constructivist approaches bridge the gap between the cognitive and the social faces of understanding. They demonstrate how comprehension and cultivation, cognition and cultural reproduction are mutually linked to each other by the cognitive-social “mechanism” of understanding. As a consequence, the unavoidable immunisation against communicative demands from others jeopardizes the achievements of our communicative culture. Practical implications: Communicators are even more responsible for success or failure of communication than recipients. Moreover, as educators they are responsible for both cultural reproduction and the reinforcement of creativity and innovation. This double bind can only be managed with strong and resistant personal relations. All construction of meaning and all interpretation should be conceived of as a pro-construction, a hypothetical provisional reading made for the tough going of public or scholarly discourse. Original value: Concept of understanding integrating philosophi-cal, psychological and sociological approaches within a constructivist theory of communi-cation and reception. Key words: Understanding, communication, reception, cognition, structuration, hermeneutics.

cognitive-psychological, sociological

radical constructivism

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ond field arrange along the social dimensionsof understanding. Unlike the first set of mean-ings, which is provided with its own concept,namely “comprehension,” the second groupcrystallizes comparably in a term covering therange of social meanings of understanding.This asymmetry, again, may indicate a lack ofattention paid to the social dimension as anecessary complement. Instead, the socialdimension is subsumed under the cognitiveas a special kind of process or operation,namely the supposition, imagination or men-tal simulation of being in the place of theother, the role-taking (as the interactionistsput it), the change of perspectives or the kindof mental immersion into the person of theother (Sich-Hineinversetzen in

den anderen

).This is exactly the methodological credo of W.Dilthey’s hermeneutics. He proposed differ-entiating the humanities from the sciences,because nature other than human action, lit-erature and art, history and politics, etc. doesnot follow human intelligence and affection.

The double faces of understanding are nonew achievement. They can already be foundin history. Etymologically, the Grimm Dictio-nary for older German proves the concept ofunderstanding (“verstehen”) to have meantboth, “perceive, recognize” and, most inter-estingly here, “take somebody else’s place,substitute somebody else” (Grimm & Grimm1956, Sp. 1660–1701). The Oxford EnglishDictionary, too, points to some German rootsof the English “understân” and presents evi-dence for the meaning of “taking a risk.” Sincethe 15th century the common meaning of“comprehend,” “to be familiar with,” “toapprehend the character or nature of a per-son” is accompanied by a social reading,handed down by a text from the 18th century:“1745 J. Mason

Self-Knowledge

I.iii. (1758), 32Nothing is more common than to say, when aPerson does not behave with due Decencytowards his Superiors, such a one does notunderstand himself” (Oxford English Dictio-nary, p. 984). “Understanding” is used here inthe sense of “to know one’s place, or how toconduct oneself properly” (Oxford EnglishDictionary, p. 984). The social reading is alsosupported by “to give heed, attend to” from10th to 14th century, and “to stand under,” “tosupport or assist; to prop up” from the 12thup to the 17th century (Oxford English Dic-tionary, p. 985). Most instructive, however,with regard to the sociogenetic function of

understanding is a meaning from the 16thcentury: “to receive intelligence,” and anexample from the 12/13th century: “to be sub-ject

to

one” (op.cit., 986).Summing this up we come to conclude

that the term understanding covers a seem-ingly inconsistent semantic field includingsuch different, not to say: contradictory itemsas “risk,” “familiarity,” “subordination,”“apprehension,” “comprehension,” “knowl-edge,” “support,” “intelligence” or “attention.”

A spotlight at the history of hermeneuticswill show that most of that theorizing con-tributed to this confusion instead of offeringsubstantial clarification.

A short history of hermeneutics as theory of understanding

Hermeneutics as the theory of understandingor – in other words – as the

art of interpreta-tion

(ars interpretandi) initially originatesfrom the problem of how to handle writtentexts adequately. While in the oral culture thespeaker was the authority who decided onunderstanding, the initial source of words andphrases was no longer present in the case ofwriting. The literal culture misses the refer-ence to some evidence for the assigned mean-ings usually present in face-to-face communi-cation in the person of a speaker or author.

Therefore, the ancient ars interpretandican be regarded as an immediate reaction tothe rise and distribution of writing, especiallywith respect to the asymmetry of the distribu-tion of literacy among the people: the social(i.e., religious, political, aesthetical) elites forcenturies kept and cultivated the secret ofwriting almost exclusively; they learned to usewriting and scripture to stabilize their powerand govern the illiterate mass of people bytelling and teaching them what was encodedin the scripture.

The principles of interpretation had beena matter of debate from the beginning: (i) theAlexandrine School (e.g., Eratosthenes,Aristarchos from Samothrake) preferred agrammatical, rhetorical and etymologicalinterpretation aiming at the intention of theauthor. On the other hand, (ii) the PergamonSchool (e.g., Krates from Mallos) taught anallegorical interpretation, transferring the lit-

eral sense of a text into other contexts (i.e., fig-urative sense).

These two positions were the very firstwhich – in principle – marked the two possi-ble poles of the interpretation-debate: (i) The

intentionalist

position, which may be charac-terized as conservative because it sticks to theprinciples of oral communication, and (ii)the

allegorist

, or “modern” position, takingthe openness or under-determination of themeaning of written text as a legitimation for amore creative reading. Both positions, how-ever, share the view, that writing cannot andwill never be able to stand for itself, but is inneed of interpretation, comment or explana-tion.

The conflict between these two positionsalso dominated the further development ofhermeneutics in the Middle Ages. Mostimportant are the works of Origines andAugustine, namely their doctrines of the

mul-tiple senses

of the written. Origines distin-guished three senses of the written: (i) thesomatic – literal, historical-grammatical, (ii)the psychic – moral, and (iii) the pneumatic –allegorical, mystical sense. Augustine evendifferentiated four senses of the written: (i)the sensus litteralis, the literal sense, (ii) thesensus allegorius, the figurative sense, (iii) thesensus moralis, the moral, ethical sense, and(iv) the sensus anagogicus, the sense withinthe history of salvation. Actually, these doc-trines were designed to function as strategiesto cope with the increasingly obvious fact ofsemantic openness and under-determinationof pragmatically decontextualized writings.While the number of literate people slowlyincreased, the barriers between the tradi-tional social classes became more and morefragile, trade and crafts slowly developed themiddle classes, and writing became a socialtechnique present in all domains of humanaction – private and professional. The propo-nents of the multiple-sense-doctrines – andthat was a kind of trick – at the same timeaccepted the semantic openness of writingand restricted or controlled it by formal crite-ria. Therefore, the main advantages of thesedoctrines were: (i) to harmonize (or neutral-ize) the extremes of the intentionalist and theallegorist position by integrating them into amore abstract position as formal andmethodical principles; (ii) and the mostimportant aspect: a certain type of relationbetween the different senses, namely, congru-

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ity, correspondence, accordance, consistency,etc. represents an abstract, formal, seeminglylogical and controllable criterion for theappropriateness of interpretations. This stepfinally emancipated the ars interpretandifrom the culture of oral communication.From then on all kinds of interpretations of allkinds of texts (spoken or written) could beargued for by formal correctness or adequacy.The authority of the authors had finallybecome totally superfluous. The interpreters,the commentators, the teachers, etc. – fromthen on – presumed this authority.

The doctrine of the consistency of literal,allegorical, grammatical, etc. dimensions ofreadings dominated the hermeneutical the-ory throughout the Middle Ages. It was prac-tised as a hermeneutics of problematic pas-sages of texts, hardly recognizable phrases,unknown words and terms. It was the socalled hermeneutics of text pieces (Stellen-hermeneutik).

Actually, this is still the dominating para-digm of interpretation courses everywhere inschools and universities – independent fromthe changing fashions and so-called methodsof interpretation, e.g., Close Reading, Historyof Ideas, Psychoanalysis, Structuralism, NewCriticism, History of Mentalities, Feminism,Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction.Despite all their differences all theseapproaches set out from the basic assumptionof the coherence of readings of literary texts.And they must do so, because their plausibil-ity and persuasive power depends on coher-ence in the first place. A tour along the lines ofhermeneutical traditions will illustrate this.

At the beginning 19th century FriedrichSchleiermacher picked up general hermeneu-tical ideas of the enlightenment period

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andinvestigated the problem of understandingfrom a philosophical point of view – therebystrongly influenced by Immanuel Kant’s ide-alism. In his famous works

Hermeneutik undKritik

(1838) and

Über den Begriff der Herme-neutik, mit Bezug auf F. A. Wolfs Andeutungenund Asts Lehrbuch

(1829) he realised andemphasized that: (i) understanding writtentexts (written language) is not in principledifferent from understanding people (spokenlanguage); (ii) understanding written or spo-ken text always and unavoidably is a matter of– as it were –

lucky guesses

, a matter of hypoth-eses about the meaning, which in the ongoingcommunication or reading process may (or

may not) turn out as suitable, consistent,fruitful or just personally satisfying; Schleier-macher pointed out that (iii) because onenever knows for sure whether one under-stands correctly or truly,

misunderstanding

has to be taken as the usual (and not as theexceptional) case; From this he concludedthat, although (iv) working on a text and itscontexts may then reduce the degrees of mis-understanding, one will never really knowwhen this work is finished. It is only given upafter some time, mostly for pragmatic rea-sons.

So, Schleiermacher: (i) generalizedhermeneutics as a theory of understanding ofall kinds of texts; and (ii) universalized mis-understanding as the natural basis and out-come of communication.

Almost a hundred years later, WilhelmDilthey elaborated on the psychologicaldimensions of understanding. Like Schleier-macher, he conceptualized the process ofunderstanding as a

reconstructive creation

ofthe author’s situation, motives, intentionsand actions. Like Schleiermacher, Diltheygeneralized this concept of understanding tocover all types of communication. But, unlikeSchleiermacher, Dilthey believed in

trueunderstanding

among all human beingsacross the borders of space, time, history andculture. This belief, finally, paved the way forDiltheys most influential – and most disas-trous – idea: the opposition of the humanities(Geisteswissenschaften) and the sciences(Naturwissenschaften). For Dilthey, under-standing in the sense of going deeply into thethoughts and actions of the other was the onlyadequate way to treat human utterances (ver-bal or non-verbal). So understanding as theprocess of interpretation became the rationalprocedure for the explication of humanaction, whereas explanation as a kind of syllo-gistic procedure on the basis of observed reg-ularities or natural laws (e.g., in the sense ofthe Hempel and Oppenheim Scheme)became the rational tool for explicating allother natural phenomena.

Martin Heidegger with his existentialistapproach again widened or further universal-ized the concept of understanding. Hedefined “understanding” as a basic and neces-sary task of human beings in order to realizeher/his own identity as well as the identity ofthe environment around him/her. In thissense, understanding becomes the

elementary

operation

one has to perform as a cognitivebeing that is thrown into existence. Under-standing texts, then, is only part of the com-plex and lifelong process of creating an under-standing of the world. This view includes allcognitive activity within the frame of under-standing. Actually, this is Heidegger’s contri-bution to universalizing, i.e., existentializing,the concept of understanding.

Hans Georg Gadamer follows Heideggerin universalizing hermeneutics. He takesunderstanding as a

constituent of human sociallife

. Interpretation, then, has to reflect criti-cally the

historical conditions

of understand-ing and, thereby, has to fuse the

intellectualhorizons

(Horizontverschmelzung) ofauthors and readers across all historical andcultural borders. This idea is based upon two– contradictory – assumptions, (i) that histor-ical conditions of text production are contin-gent and unique, and (ii) that the interpreter,who is aware of this, will be able to fullyunderstand ancient sources by clarifying suchpresuppositions. But historical relativism onthe one hand and hermeneutical optimism onthe other hand do not match very well. There-fore, Gadamer was heavily criticized for thisand other inconsistencies in his work, espe-cially by Hans Albert.

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Similarly, Albert’s cri-tique also holds for other conceptions gener-alizing or universalizing hermeneutics eitheras the very basis of the humanities (e.g., PaulRicoeur) or as their fundamental method-ological principle (e.g., Emilio Betti).

The critical-theory approach to under-standing, as represented by Karl Otto Apeland Jürgen Habermas (following H. Marcuseand Th. Adorno), aims at a better, more egal-itarian and more satisfying social life. Onestep to attain this goal is supposed to be a bet-ter understanding of each other. This, how-ever, was thought to be achieved by a criticalhermeneutics and symmetrical communica-tion (i.e., no asymmetry in power, status,authority etc. among communicants) withinan

ideal communicative situation

.The phenomenological and reception-

aesthetics approach in the line of EdmundHusserl, Roman Ingarden, Wolfgang Iser andHans Robert Jauß appears to be a radicalreduction of hermeneutics (i) to the reader’sor recipient’s perspective and (ii) to the psy-chological dimension of the reading process.The author and her/his intentions and mean-ings are further marginalized. The

construc-

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tion of meaning by readers

(in past andpresent) becomes the central aspect. But thisapproach only seemingly answers the ques-tion of the proper meaning of texts. Historical(collections of) documents of reading are,without any doubt, interesting material. But,recalling Schleiermacher, we must realize thatthese readings are at best lucky guesses. And,remembering Gadamer, we have to considerthe historical relativity of these readings, too.Altogether, this means that the basic herme-neutical problem of understanding anotherperson or her/his utterances has been compli-cated even more by reception aestheticsinstead of being solved.

One of the latest developments, decon-structionism, celebrates a simple sign-theo-retical insight, namely, that “meaning of asign” presupposes the difference betweensigns and the difference between sign and des-ignation. Because of these differences, how-ever, Jacque Derrida’s sign-philosophy endsup with the assertion that an understandingof signs must be absolutely impossible. In thisrespect Derrida’s position meets the latestdevelopments of the German systems-philos-ophy as it was created by the theoretical soci-ologist Niklas Luhmann. From his point ofview, successful communication is improba-ble because of the closure and operationalautonomy of the systems involved (i.e., firstand foremost the difference between con-sciousness and communication). Positionslike these mark the one pole of a kind ofunderstanding-possibility scale running fromimpossible (e.g., post-modern positions)along several degrees of probability (e.g.,hermeneutics, interactionism, cognitive sci-ence) towards the mostly unreflected evi-dence of true understanding (e.g., in naiveeveryday hermeneutics).

Summing up this brief overview we cometo assume that Schleiermacher was one ofthe first who realized the full complexity ofthe communicative problem hermeneuticswas once invented to solve. Since thenhermeneutics has developed in differentdirections, mainly philosophical, psycholog-ical and historiographical approaches tounderstanding. This also secretly trans-formed hermeneutics into a philosophy ofordinary language, psychology of readingand a history of text-production and –recep-tion. These frames of thinking paved the wayfor a more and more independent develop-

ment of the branches in the study of under-standing, the psychological and linguistic onthe one hand and the philosophical and lit-erary-historical branch on the other hand.While the former slowly mutated to cogni-tion theory and artificial intelligenceresearch (i.e., the information-processingparadigm), it not only generated a largenumber of models and theories of text pro-duction, perception and reception but alsoproduced some new disciplines such as psy-cholinguistics and cognitive sciences. Thiscould hardly be explained without the fun-damental idea of understanding as a mental,intellectual operation. At the same time, thedivergence of the two worlds of research inunderstanding seems to reach its peak at thisstage of development. It must be an irony offate that it was Wilhelm Dilthey himself whopromoted this development with his separa-tion of the humanities and the sciences.

The information-processing approach to understanding

The following presents only a very brief char-acterization of what here is called the “infor-mation-processing approach.” This is only toindicate that special frame of thinking and torecall some of the major representatives andconcepts of this paradigm.

(i) One of the most significant features oftext-processing approaches is – by and large –the avoidance of the term “understanding.”Instead, they generally employ the terms“comprehension” and “processing.” One mayspeculate that these concepts are taken as sub-stitutes for “understanding” because of theirdifferent (i.e., non-hermeneutical) connota-tions. While “understanding” is supposed tobe an object of thinking for philosophers, phi-lologists and literary scholars, terms like“comprehension” and “information process-ing” promise to designate more seriousobjects of inquiry and research as done bypsychologists, linguists, neuroscientists etc.This terminological demarcation no longerindicates a sub-differentiation of the conceptof understanding but completely differentapproaches or paradigms.

(ii) The tradition most of the proponentsof the comprehension-approaches may feel

related to directly refers to Immanuel Kant,the German idealist, who was the first tointroduce – besides his basic categories – theterm “schema” (Schemate) for mental or cog-nitive structures (scenes) which let the thingsappear in our perception (on the stage of con-sciousness). Then, H. Ebbinghaus introducedthe idea of an active, creative memory. AndF. C. Bartlett investigated the constructivenature of remembering. G.A. Miller exploredthe breadth and functioning of workingmemory and reported his findings in hisfamous “Magical Number 7”-article. M. Min-sky, T. Winograd, D. E. Rumelhart, P. H. Lind-say, D. A. Norman, R. Schank, W. Kintch, T. A.van Dijk, P. N. Johnson-Laird and many oth-ers developed models of semantic memory,the concepts of frames and scripts, proposi-tional representations of discourse, story-grammars, the concept of macrostructures,the theory of mental models etc. This wholeenterprise is to work out theories, models andmachines that conceptualize, represent orgenerate what human information processorsdo – starting from sensory perceptions andending up with related behavioural outputs.

(iii) The present state of affairs may besummed up as follows: information process-ing is viewed as an interactive process betweene.g., text and reader. This process is directedby top-down and bottom-up operations.Information processing requires an organizedmultidimensional knowledge base which issupposed to be kept in memory (short-termand long-term memory). As a cognitive pro-cess, information processing is generative,constructive and creative, synthetical (asUlric Neisser put it) rather than analytical orreconstructive. Information processing is ahierarchical and sequential process tendingtowards the creation of coherent and subjec-tively satisfying or appropriate structures andfunctioning. At the same time this processshows some tolerance for ambiguities andinconsistencies. Information processing,however, is socially contextualized or embed-ded. That is to say, there is some impact ofsocial and situational factors on cognitiveoperations. Remarkably, this aspect has beenreinvented by cognitive scholars like TerryWinograd:

“My current work is moving in the direc-tion of a fourth domain for understandinglanguage (besides linguistic structure,relation of linguistic structure and world,


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cognitive processes, G.R.):

The domain ofhuman action and interaction

. In thisdomain the relevant regularities are in thenetwork of actions and interactions withina human society. An utterance is a linguis-tic

act

that has consequences for the partic-ipants, leading to other immediate actionsand to commitments for future action.”(Winograd 1980, p. 233). Finally, those insights brought about some

cognitive situation-models. Also, “social cog-nition” has been investigated in terms of con-cepts for social partners, social relations andsocial institutions. All this, however, onlydemonstrates that the dominant view of theinformation processing approaches never-theless by and large remained cognitivistic,psychological or neuro-physiological.

With this in mind we come to concludethat from the information processing point ofview understanding is conceptualized only asa certain type of cognitive operation or pro-cess associated with conceptual coherence,problem solving and affective or emotionaleffects.

From a constructivist cognitive-social per-spective – as will be outlined in the next sec-tions – there is no need to reduce the phenom-ena of understanding to cognitive activity.Instead, understanding can be treated in itsfull complexity.

Constructivist approaches to understanding

Do constructivist approaches to language,communication and understanding reallyenable a more complex view integrating boththe faces of understanding? Turning to thewritings of the most prominent proponentsof the constructivist paradigm, Ernst vonGlasersfeld und Heinz von Forster, we learnsome elementary lessons. Ernst von Glasers-feld’s concept of understanding may be char-acterized as the

construction of viable inter-pretations.

Heinz von Foerster’s positionseems a bit more systemic and intrinsic inputting forward a concept of understandingas the

creation of eigen-values

of cognitivesystems.

“To put it as simply as possible. To ‘under-stand’ what someone has said or written

implies no less but also no more than tohave built up a conceptual structure froman exchange of language, and, in the givencontext, this structure is deemed to becompatible with what the speaker appearsto have had in mind. This compatibility,however, cannot be tested by a directcomparison – it manifests itself in noother way than that the speaker subse-quently says and does nothing that con-travenes the expectations the listenerderives from his or her interpretation.”(Glasersfeld 1995, p. 143)This quote from the chapter “To under-

stand understanding” already shows themain traits of a constructivist approach.First, understanding is taken as a cognitiveoperation, namely: “building a conceptualstructure.” Second, understanding is taken asan operation performed by a listener, readeror observer. Third, the constructed “concep-tual structure” has to meet certain require-ments. It has to correspond with future expe-riences and with expectations the listener hasestablished with respect to the speaker.

Heinz von Foerster explicated cognitionwithin the frame of a biological and systemicapproach. He proposed the idea of modellingthe functioning of cognitive systems alongsome mathematical metaphors as a complexprocess of calculation – if not to say: comput-ing. The cognitive construction of a reality(Wirklichkeit) thus becomes a process of cal-culations within a self-referential, opera-tionally closed and self-organising neuronalsystem. The self-referential mode of operat-ing, furthermore, implies a self-referentialkind of calculation. This, however, is bestrepresented by so called eigen-value func-tions.

“This finding (or solution) helps us tounderstand the organism which in a recur-sive way continually prepares its behaviour(acting on its own motor activity), namely,in accordance with restricting conditionsand as long as a stable behaviour isachieved.” (Foerster 1993, p. 279, mytranslation)This approach, then, allowed for a new

explication of the concept of objects in termsof cognitive calculation.

“An observer watching the whole processand having no access to the sensations ofthe organism as they are restricting itsmovements will recognize that the organ-

ism has learned to cope successfully with acertain ‘resistance’, a certain

object

. Theorganism itself may believe that it now

understands

that object (or has learnedhow to handle it). Because, though, theorganism can only know its own behaviordue to the nervous activity these ‘objects’strictly speaking are signs for the various‘eigen-behavior’ of the organism.” (Foer-ster 1993, p. 279, my translation)Here, Heinz von Foerster offers a kind of

definition for understanding as constructionof eigen-values or eigen-behavior respec-tively. For the organism this means to under-stand in the sense of

knowing how to behave

oroperate. At first sight, this explication clearlyfavours the cognitive process view of under-standing. And like Glasersfeld, Foersteremphasises the aspect of – at least a limited –stability or invariance of the objects or inter-pretations constructed.

Apparently, this approach so far does notdiffer significantly from hermeneutic or cog-nitivist conceptions in both (i) postulating akind of cognitive operation as a basic processof comprehension or information processingand (ii) demanding certain qualities for thatprocess or its results respectively. It differs,though, in the kind of quality demanded ofthe conceptual structure. It is not a formalcondition like the coherence of the listener’sinterpretation or the correspondence of themultiple senses of the speaker’s words.Instead, the conceptual structure has to meetsome pragmatic or operational requirementslike the correspondence with future observa-tions or the coherence of the interpretation ofthe speaker’s utterances and the expectationsderived from that. Here, the social and inter-actional dimension of understanding appearsto be a necessary complement of the cognitivefunctioning.

Because there is no direct transfer ofmeaning from one head into another (cf. Gla-sersfeld 1996, p. 230), because of the cognitiveautonomy of the individual, the constructionof subjective readings, meanings or interpre-tations is the only and unavoidable way toact.

4

Moreover, the interpretations andexpectations of the listener – as conceptualstructures – do share the destiny of andunderlie the same constraints as any othercognitive construction (process pattern orstructure). They may survive, as long as they

fit

into the overall conceptual framework, the

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situational, discursive and opera-tional context of an individual’sacting and communicating (cf.op.cit., 232). It needs no further explanationhere, that

fit

does imply neither identity orequality nor any similarity of the conceptualstructures held by speaker and listener. It doesnot imply any accor-dance of content ofwhat the speaker hassaid and meant andwhat the listener hasheard and realised asher/his interpretation.

Fit

does only meancompatible, reconcil-able, co-existentialwithout conflict.Accordingly, as long asand in the way interpre-tations, ascriptions ofmeanings andderived construc-tions fit or survivewithin an ever changing con-ceptual environment, and as long as and inthe way they prove as viable constructions,understanding is possible despite the “intrin-sic uncertainty” of interaction and communi-cation. To put it more precisely:

understand-ing is the only possible way to cope with thisintrinsic uncertainty

. Understanding is possi-ble because it does not and cannot depend onthe equality or accordance of the content asexpressed by the speaker’s words and asascribed to the words perceived by the lis-tener. Instead, it is grounded upon first theinstantaneous and then the later experiencesof successful and fluent continuation of inter-action, cooperation or communication which– if it comes to reasons – itself rests uponworking (sic) hypotheses about the orienta-tions, attitudes, knowledge or intentions ofthe respective other.

We may now question the consequencesFriedrich Schleiermacher drew from hisinsights. The unavoidability of guessing(erraten) what a speaker means, does not inprinciple exclude understanding. Misunder-standing, by far, is not the regular case. Wemust, however, realise – and this is implied bythe viability-principle – that the number ofalternative compatible interpretations may belarge. Many variants of understanding of aspeaker’s words may be possible even far

beyond all the well knownlexical and contextual ambi-

guities. In addition, we have toaccount for the pragmatics

of the evaluation ofeveryday interactionand communication.While in science, falsi-fication (sensu Pop-per) may be or hasbeen a guiding meth-

odological principle,

the ordinarypractice in everyday interaction and commu-nication is not after awkward and long-winded testing of reliability, trustworthinessor truth. Instead, a kind of hermeneutic good-will-principle (Prinzip des hermeneutischenWohlwollens

5

) usually governs communica-tion. It leads people – by and large – to insin-uate or assume that the other is not wilfullylying or cheating, is in good order cognitivelyand physically, etc. Those insinuations on theone hand and a lack of opportunity, time andinterest to intensively check for possiblefuture incompatibility of interpretations onthe other hand make possible that (i) manyalternative interpretations may co-exist, and(ii) a majority of cases of potential misunder-standings will never be recognized. But, allthose undetected misunderstandings simplydo not make any difference to anybody.Understanding may later turn out to be anillusion. But until then and as long as theinterpretations fit into the syntheses of actionand communication, as long as they show thisoperational validity and prove to be viablethey meet all the pragmatic and operationalrequirements. There is nothing more tounderstand, at that very moment. Under-standing – we come to conclude – not onlydepends on the subjective personal concep-

tual inventories of interpreters, on contextsand the proper perceived messages, but alsoon time, namely: the future.

6

So far, following the major constructivist

authorities, we have taken the perspective ofthe recipient as is usually the case in herme-neutics. But what about the speaker and her/his view at the communication process?

There is a piece from Ernst von Glasersfeldon this topic in one of his writings aboutteaching and learning:

“Ein Trainer braucht nur das Verhalten sei-ner Schüler zu beobachten, um festzustel-len, ob sie das gelernt haben, wofür sieabgerichtet werden sollten. Ein Lehrer hin-gegen kann nur

erschließen

, ob sie verstan-den haben, was sie verstehen lernen sollten.Die Schlußfolgerungen des Lehrers sinddarum nicht nur in der Praxis unsicher, siesind

prinzipiell

unsicher, denn die Gedan-ken und Ideen eines Menschen können nieunmittelbar mit denen eines anderen ver-glichen werden. […] Lehrer können daherannehmen, dass ihre Schüler verstandenhaben, wenn die Weise, in der sie handelnund reagieren mit dem Verständnis desLehrers vereinbar erscheint.” (Glasersfeld1997, pp. 204f: A trainer just has to observethe behaviour of his subjects to decidewhether they have learned what they weretrained to do. A teacher, however, can only

derive

, whether the students have under-stood or not, what they should learn tounderstand. Therefore, the teacher’s con-clusions are uncertain not only in practicebut also

in principle

because the thoughtsand ideas a person holds can never be com-pared directly with those of any other per-son. . […] Therefore teachers may supposethat their students have understood whenthe way they act and react seems compati-ble with their own understanding. Mytranslation)Looking at communication from the point

of view of the communicator, i.e., the speaker,writer or performer, it is obvious that – inprinciple – the speaker has to “understand”the listener’s reactions in a way analogous tothe listener’s interpretation of the speaker’swords. Naturally, the speaker, like any otherperson, has no privileged access to the lis-tener’s mind. However, and at this point welightly touch the field of human semiosis, thespeaker’s

intention

to work on the recipient inorder to bring about a certain re-action (overt


CONCEPTS



behaviour or intellectual move) makes all thedifference. As already pointed out by Hum-berto Maturana in his

Biology of Cognition

communicating is essentially the

orientation

of others. The speaker, because of his inten-tion, knows – or at least, to be taken seriously,should know – what he is after: he expects cer-tain behaviour of the listener when uttering acertain phrase. Accordingly, the request toopen a window is accompanied by the expec-tation to see the addressee go and open a win-dow. And this expectation

7

or wish, the idea ofthe expected or desired re-action then servesas a kind of functional value within thespeaker’s current action and orientationscheme. The speaker – so to speak – makes bestuse of his having moved first, i.e., with his ini-tial communicative approach he sets the con-ditions and defines the overall criteria for suc-cess or failure within that communicativeepisode. Therefore, a teacher cannot but eval-uate his observations of the students’ behav-iour – as re-action to his own communicativeapproaches towards them – in the light of hisown expectations and understanding. Like ateacher, the speaker has to decide and, more-over, is in the only position to decide whetherthe observed re-action matches his intentionsand expectations.

Picking up Heinz von Foerster’s eigen-value metaphor, the speaker – with his inten-tion and as first mover – defines the eigen-value of the whole communication episode.He first brings in his communicative aims as akind of interactional value or attractor leadinghis own action towards the listener. Then, thelistener unavoidably gets involved in that pro-cess as the addressee or “victim” of externaldemands. The more aesthetically seducing,the more impressive, persuasive, forceful orlasting the approach towards the recipient, theless ignorable it is. Less ignorable, however, arethe speaker’s interventions in terms of pertur-bating, modulating or changing the self-refer-ential and cognitively autonomous operationof the listener as a cognitive system, the stron-ger the impact on his cognition. Moreover, thespeaker’s work on the gradual adjustment ortuning of the listener to perform the inten-tionally desired behaviour is also usuallyactively reinforced by the listener through hisaffective disposition to keep social contact andnot be rejected, to be a good sport, to showinterest in the other and cooperate. It is not bychance that this reminds us of the hermeneu-

tic principle of good will. Usually such a com-municative episode ends when the speaker haseither succeeded in orienting the other the wayhe intended or when he has given up becauseof too much negative feedback e.g., noobserved reaction, permanent errors finallycausing aggression or resignation, etc.

Success of communication, though, alwaysmeans that the speaker realises his intentions– at least to some acceptable degree. And it isin this sense that the speaker’s intention gov-erns the whole communication as a kind ofepisodic eigen-value.

Heinz von Foerster himself suggested theapplication of the mathematical model of

bistable functions

to the process of interactionor communication.

“… zwei Subjekte, die miteinander rekur-siv interagieren,

nolens volens

stabile Eigen-verhaltensweisen ausbilden” (Foerster1993, p. 279; Two subjects interactingrecursively

nolens volens

each produce sta-ble eigen-behaviour. My translation).In this case a bistable function converges

towards two stable eigen-values each generat-ing the other as output. This kind of correla-tion, though, seems to come close to purefunctional dependency. Therefore, we have toquestion bistable functions as a model forcommunication of cognitive, namely, non-trivial systems. Functional dependency andnon-triviality of systems clearly contradicteach other.

Recalling the question put forward at thebeginning of this paragraph now – after hav-ing examined the positions of the two mostinfluential constructivists to some extent –allows for a first positive but careful answer:besides the dominant view of understandingas a cognitive process, constructivist authorsalso open a perspective on the interactionaland communicative dimension of under-standing. They assume a functional role eitheras a kind of referential instance or as an ele-ment in the value range of eigen-value func-tions as represented by the cognitive operationof each of the participants. Nevertheless, theconstructivist approach to understanding asexplicated so far still seems to be kind of stuckin hermeneutic coining. The last chapter,therefore, tries to further think in the directionas indicated by von Glasersfeld and von Foer-ster, but at same time unchain constructivistthinking from hermeneutic predispositions.Let’s see what happens.

Understanding as cultivation: Cognitive operation under social control

8

Following the path shown by von Glasersfeldand von Foerster we may now put the piecestogether.

(i) A communicator (speaker, writer, etc.)tries to attain her/his goals by performing ver-bal and non-verbal behaviour respectively.Vocal or verbal action is successful when theactor observes the desired or intended effects.“Translating” this into the semantics ofunderstanding we may say that the communi-cator

means

something with his utterancesonly with regard to the related expectations,wishes or intentions. The meaning of theutterances, therefore, is nothing else than thecommunicative expectations held by thecommunicator himself. Only if these expecta-tions match with the observed effects ofaction, the actor/communicator may statethat the recipient or addressee did under-stand. “

Understanding

,” we may concludefrom this, means “

to meet the expectations of acommunicator

.”(ii) It is most important to realize that the

communicator is the only instance or author-ity to decide whether the communicativeexpectations are met or not. The communica-tor, however, is not alone able to

decide aboutthe understanding

of the partner. Moreover,he cannot even avoid showing some evalua-tive reaction (e.g., confirmation, disappoint-ment, paraphrasing, commenting, explicat-ing, etc.) in view of the recipient’s behaviourbecause this is part of his current actionscheme of orientation. Finally, such feedbackeven becomes a kind of social obligation. Andthis is the case because the recipient on theother hand does not have any access to thecommunicator’s intentions or expectations.The recipient learns about the operationalvalue and the social adequacy or appropriate-ness of his responses only by observing andexperiencing the action of the speaker. If thespeaker finds his intentions realized throughthe responses of the listener this usually in oneway or another is emphasised and confirmedby either explicitly stating that the other hasunderstood or by rewarding the communica-tive success with all kinds reinforcing positive

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 125

CONCEPTS



feedback like praise, attention, little gifts,pleasant affections, etc. In many cases therecipient – especially as a child – may even besurprised by experiencing such positive feed-back and by learning that it was understand-ing what she/he did. Such positive experi-ences will easily be connected to theperformed behaviour which in turn, thus,becomes reinforced and kept in memoryready to be reproduced in similar situations.Apparently, and here we think of the godJanus again, this is at the very beginning of thecognitive construction of expectations andexpectations of expectations, a process whichbasically enables social coordination andcooperation through the interlocking ofactions and expectations. This, exactly, iswhat David Lewis (1975) called

convention

.

9

Understanding, then, turns out to besomething like a

state or, better, a quality in asocial relation

based upon the ascription or

attribution

of understanding to a recipient (alistener, reader or viewer). Eventually, this iswhat Kenneth J. Gergen had in mind when hewrote:

“Understanding is not contained withinme or within you, but is that which we gen-erate together in our form of relatedness.… understanding … is a social achieve-ment.” (Gergen 1988, pp. 46f). At this point we also have to recall the

quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963)which serves as the motto for this article:

“§154. But wait – if ‘Now I understand theprinciple’ does not mean the same as ‘theformula … occurs to me’ (or ‘I say the for-mula,’ ‘I write it down,’ etc.) -does it followfrom this that I employ the sentence ‘NowI understand …’ or ‘Now I can go on’ as adescription of a process occurring behindor side by side with that of saying the for-mula?If there has to be anything ‘behind theutterance of the formula’ it is

particular cir-cumstances

, which justify me in saying I cango on – when the formula occurs to me.Try not to think of understanding as a‘mental process’ at all. – For

that

is theexpression which confuses you. But askyourself: in what short case, in what kind ofcircumstances, do we say. ‘Now I Knowhow to go on,’ when, what it is, the formula

has

occurred to me?In the sense in which there are processes(including mental processes) which are

characteristic of understanding, under-standing is not a mental process.(A pain’s growing more or less; the hearingof a tune or a sentence: these are mentalprocesses.)”

10

Here, we do not think of understanding asa mental but as a cognitive-social process.And from that we learn about the transcate-gorial logic of understanding. This is a logic ofcognitively autonomous systems interactingand mutually orientating each other. The“mechanism” of understanding underlies allinteraction and linguistic exchange from twosides at the same time: cognition and socialstructuring, speaker and listener. At the levelof this cognitive-social interplay we may reallylearn what it means to

speak

and

understand

alanguage. A similar insight might already havedriven John Austin (1962) to come up with histheory of speech acts. Speaking, for Austin, isaction. And this includes constative as well asperformative utterances. Considering, thus,Austin’s illocutionary forces, again we meetthe speaker’s intentions as governing anddefining the whole communicative episode,especially, the

relation

to the addressee (e.g.,criteria for success and failure, the actual illo-cutionary role of an utterance, and, therefore,the selection of locutionary acts). At thispoint, finally, we should also call anotherprominent witness and pioneer of radicalconstructivism, Paul Watzlawick, to empha-sise the determining role of the

relation aspect

.In the famous “Pragmatics of Human Com-munication” the second of the “tentative axi-oms” says: “Every communication has a con-tent and relationship aspect such that

thelatter classifies the former

and is therefore ametacommunication” (Watzlawick, Beavin,Jackson 1967, p. 54; my italics). However,from the point of view of the attribution the-ory of understanding, communication hasmore than a “relationship aspect.” Muchmore, and essentially, it is or makes up a socialrelation which is established in the initialphase through the approaches of a communi-cator who, thereby, relates her-/himself to anaddressee.

(iii) The instances of understanding inhuman interaction and communication areboth cognitively and socially emphasised.This is because understanding means successfor both the communicator and the recipient.The speaker realises her/his communicativegoals while the recipient is rewarded with

praise, attention or positive emotional feed-back. The most important effect of this two-fold and double emphasis is the reinforce-ment and social coding of the respectiveactions. Conventionalization, as a principle ofsocial coding, self-regulation and self-organ-isation among cognitively autonomous sub-jects, is but one result of the intersection ofcognitive and social processes. It brings aboutstrong rational and emotional ties betweenthe participants. And this, finally, means cre-ating a

community

. (iv) The interactional logic of understand-

ing also demands that attention is paid to therole changes of communicator and recipientduring their interaction. As already pointedout with regard to the interlocking of expec-tations and effects of communicative inter-ventions the changing of roles reinforces thematch of a communicator’s intentions and arecipient’s action. During e.g., languageacquisition, the learner

is pushed

(if noturged) to autonomously create or find a wayto perform the requested, desired, appropri-ate or adequate behaviour. Having learned toconnect auditions with (socially) appropriatebehaviour the student may himself

push oth-ers

by vocally reproducing such auditions.Remembering the third of Paul Watzlawick’saxioms, this may also be, to some extent, amatter of punctuation. Anyway, at this point,the subject – so to speak – emancipates from“standing under” and (re-)gains its ownsocial integrity or authority through theacquisition of linguistic competences. Experi-ences like these, then, help to establish andfoster knowledge about linguistic action,about the meaning of (the use of) phrases andtheir illocutionary forces. This knowledge,however, is not only knowledge about how topush others but knowledge about own mentaland overt operation. Pushes from others,thus, become

pulls

or requests. Own (re-)action becomes dispositional. This alsobrings about the competence to

pull

for com-municative intervention, to put another per-son on the spot by addressing her or him com-municatively, e.g., to begin a

dialog

and keepit running.

(v) The attribution of understandingbrings about even more essential conse-quences. Most important is the fact, that theascription of understanding means a

social orcultural selection of cognitive operations

. Fromthe operational point of view of the recipient,


CONCEPTS



however, there is ex ante no internal criteriondistinguishing cognitions followed by attri-butions of understanding and others.Impressed or disturbed by the approaches ofa communicator the recipient goes on to gen-erate behaviour autonomously following hisown rationality and affections. His cognitionsex ante do not show any special internal dif-ference in quality or function as to contributeto understanding or not. Cognition rathergains special quality only ex post when under-standing has been attributed. The ascriptionitself together with the correlated feedbackturns the attention of the recipient to the pre-ceding mental and motor behaviour, andthereby accentuates and emphasises it.

As mentioned above the etymology of“understanding” shows a meaning from the16th century which seems to grasp the point.Understanding as “reception of intelligence”comes quite close to understanding as socialselection of cognition. There are two forcesdriving this selection: first the reinforcementof cognitions through understanding, andsecond the inhibition of those which are notfollowed by understanding attributions. Thisis how understanding

selects socially and cul-turally compatible eigen-behaviour

of cogni-tive systems. Incompatible behaviour isinhibited by negative sanctions. This socialchannelling of cognition, i.e., the “mecha-nism” of understanding, thus, turns out to beone of the

basic principles of social and culturalreproduction

.(vi) The two dominant ordinary meanings

of understanding as explicated in the first sec-tion of this article, namely,

“Understanding

”in the sense of

“comprehend, access mentally,have the know how to do something, etc. “

and

“Understanding”

in the sense of

“correspondwith someone, congenial thinking and acting,etc.”

go together

with the attributionapproach pretty well. Usually, the attributionof understanding is associated with theascription of intelligence, of intellectual per-formance and capacity. Someone who under-stands is considered to be at least as smart asthe one who gave something to understand.At the same time, the close personal relationestablished through the performance of adesired response and the following positivefeedback and confirmation does indeed pro-mote the assumption of correspondence,

accordance or even congeniality. It is not bychance that the border between civilizationand barbarism, psychological health anddeviance or illness runs along a line markedby success and failure of understanding. Afterall, the two faces of understanding turn out tobe the two sides of the same coin: social inter-action under the conditions of cognitiveautonomy.

(vii) The attribution approach to under-standing also clarifies and reassigns the

responsibilities for success or failure in under-standing. It can no longer be only a defective,poor or stupid cognition of a recipient caus-ing failure but also – and in many cases – itactually is the incompetence of the communi-cator in helping the addressee to find her/hiseigen-way to understanding. Understandingis far from being a matter of course. The com-municator must try hard to achieve it. Teach-ers do know about this. It is their professionto guide and moderate the students’ attemptsto come up with an appropriate, and at bestan excellent response.

(viii) Communicative experiences (activeand passive) gathered over the years of onto-genetic cognitive development teach peopleto employ hypotheses about the communica-tors’ intentions. Such hypotheses, then, guidethe syntheses of behaviour which may be –with a certain probability – expected, ade-quate, appropriate or right. But these hypoth-eses not only serve to accelerate and improveunderstanding. At the same time, they allowfor a self-attribution of understanding. In theend, and if supported by specific political andlegal conditions (e.g., democracy, powerfulindividualism, personal rights, distributionof power, free expression of opinion, etc.), thismay give rise to immunisations from commu-nicative demands (in conversation, educa-tion, interpretation) and, thereby, cause seri-ous problems for social relations, teachingand learning. People who immunize them-selves against communicative demands nolonger feel obliged to listen or try to modify orextend their cognitive inventory by learning.The simple self-ascription of understandingindependently of any feedback by a commu-nicator is substantially supported by thedevelopment of a culture of media receptionas is the case in our societies since the readingrevolution of the 18th century. Here, commu-

nication and understanding suffer from thecognitive refinement of their own prerequi-sites.

Conclusion

Constructivist approaches bridge the gapbetween the cognitive and the social faces ofunderstanding. They demonstrate how com-prehension and cultivation, cognition andcultural reproduction are mutually linked toeach other by the cognitive-social “mecha-nism” of understanding. With Schleierma-cher, Heidegger and Gadamer, constructivistapproaches share the view that understandingis a universal basis and tool of social and cul-tural being. Other than the authorities ofhermeneutics, constructivist positionsemphasise the social and cultural impregna-tion of cognition and – at the same time – thecognitive “nature” of culture and society.

Interpretation – to finally come to theend – in a constructivist hermeneutics cannotbe taken as a kind of re-construction of anoriginal or true meaning of a text. Instead,interpretation should be conceived of as a pro-construction, a hypothetical provisional read-ing made for the tough going of public orscholarly discourse. At best those construc-tions prove to be viable – at least for someshort period of time.

Gebhard Rusch, born in 1954 in Magde-burg, Germany; studied linguistics, compar-ative literature, history and philosophy at the universities of Bielefeld and Siegen, Pro-motion in 1985, habilitation in media studies in 1998, since then guest professorship at the university of Innsbruck, Austria; since 2004 professor at the institute of media research at Siegen University. Numerous publications, books and articles, on commu-nication and media theory, systems analysis, organisational communication, epistemol-ogy, philosophy of science, theory of history and the dynamics of cultural systems. Co-editor of the constructivist journal DELFIN (1983–2001), Co-editor of the media stud-ies journal SPIEL.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 127

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cognitive-psychological, sociological radical constructivism

Notes1. “Janus is the Roman god known as the cus-

todian of the universe. He is the god of be-ginnings and the guardian of gates anddoors … Two heads back to back representJanus, each looking in opposite directions… Janus also represents the transition be-tween primitive life and civilization, be-tween rural and urban existence. He alsomaintains the balance between peace andwar and youth and old age … He intro-duced money, cultivation of the fields andthe law. He was considered the protector ofRome.” (Brinker 2004, my italics).

2. This period gave birth to the hermeneuticsof e.g., Johann Conrad Dannhauer and hisIdea Boni Interpretis (1630) and Herme-neutica Sacra (1654), Johann Clauberg andLogica Vetus et Nova (1654), Johann Mar-tin Chladenius with his Einleitung zur rich-tigen Auslegung vernünfftiger Reden undSchriften (1742), Georg Friedrich Meierand his Versuch einer Allgemeinen Ausle-gungskunst (1757), Alexander GottliebBaumgarten and his Acroasis Logica (1761)as well as Johann August Ernesti and his In-stitutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti (1761).

3. See also Abel (1948/1949) for a similar butearlier critical approach to hermeneutics.

4. We may also call these readings, interpre-tations and constructions of meaning“radical” in the sense of Donald David-son’s (1984) concept of radical interpreta-tion. As pointed out by Matthias Günther(2002, p. 195, with reference to Davidson1986) the concept of radical interpretationgenerally holds for all cases of linguisticunderstanding.

5. “Die hermeneutische Billigkeit (aequitashermeneutica) ist die Neigung eines Aus-legers, diejenigen Bedeutungen fürhermeneutisch wahr zu halten, welche mitden Vollkommenheiten (Verständlich-keit, Wahrheit, Klugheit; G.R.) desUrhebers der Zeichen am besten überein-stimmen, bis das Gegenteil erwiesenwird.” (Meier 1757, § 39).

6. As pointed out in Rusch (2003) the epi-sodic structure of communication clearlyseparates four different phases: initializa-tion, performance, controlling and evalu-ation. These phases follow an underlyingbasic operational principle of sensory-motor coordination and learning, namely,the coupling of (self-) observation and

motor activity which – together with thedevelopment of a concept of causality – re-sults in action schemata (i.e., knowledgeand ability to do or bring about s.th. inten-tionally. (cf. Piaget 1937). As we may learnfrom Jung (1995) who takes communica-tion as (social) control of the ability to act– through internalization (self-control)and institutionalization (conventions) – iteven paves the way for the conceptualiza-tion of the communicator as a self (per-sonally and socially).

7. Expectations work like the phantasma inKarl Bühler’s Theorie of Language or as akind of mental model (Kenneth Craik; PhilJohnson-Laird) kept ready for compari-sons and inferences related to ongoingperception.

8. Basic ideas of the following have been pre-sented in a number of German-languagepublications; cf. Rusch (1986, 1987, 1990,1992, 2000, 2003).

9. Clearly, this also allows for institualizationand social structuring, e.g., in the sense ofA. Giddens (1984).

10.Cf. also Wittgenstein (1963), §§ 153, 155,182.

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Received: 20 September 2006Accepted: 17 February 2007

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