understanding governance and networks: eu–us interactions and the regulation of genetically...

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Geoforum 36 (2005) 593–606

Understanding governance and networks: EU–US interactionsand the regulation of genetically modified organisms

Joseph Murphy a,*, Helen Yanacopulos b

a ESRC Genomics Policy and Research Forum, The University of Edinburgh, St John’s Land, Holyrood Road, Edinburgh,

EH8 8AQ, United Kingdomb Development Policy and Practice, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keyner, MK7 6AA, United Kingdom

Received 1 August 2003; received in revised form 5 October 2004

Abstract

EU–US (European Union–United States) interactions in relation to the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)

have been examined in detail in recent years. To do this scholars have tended to focus on a small number of high profile processes,

such as the formal complaint of the US to the World Trade Organisation regarding the regulation of GMOs in the Europe. It is

important to analyse developments of this kind but overemphasis on them has also lead to a distorted view of the case and a failure

to appreciate the significance of other, less visible, types of interaction. In this paper we focus instead on trying to understand the

roles played by various EU–US transnational networks—The Transatlantic Business Dialogue, The Transatlantic Economic Part-

nership, The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue and the EU–US Consultative Forum

on Biotechnology. These networks have been trying to shape the regulation of GMOs in both jurisdictions since the mid 1990s.

By analysing them through a �governance lens� we find that we can better understand EU–US interactions and the dynamics andinfluences around the regulation of GMOs. This gives us valuable insights into processes of contemporary governance.

� 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Governance; Meta-governance; Governance failure; Transnational networks; European Union; United States; Genetically modified

organisms

1. Introduction

EU–US (European Union–United States) interac-tions in relation to the regulation of GMOs (genetically

modified organisms) have been analysed in detail in re-

cent years. High profile political and economic proc-

esses, often also being reported in the popular press,

have attracted the most attention. For example, Buttel

(2000) commented as follows after agreement was

reached on the United Nations (Cartegena) Protocol

on Biosafety:

0016-7185/$ - see front matter � 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.10.001

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Murphy).

In all likelihood it will be the case a decade or sohence that observers will look back to the passageof the ‘‘Cartegena Protocol’’ as being one of themost critical forks in the road with respect to thecourse taken by the globalization regime and withrespect to the commercialization of agriculturalbiotechnology products. (Buttel, 2000, p. 16)

He was moved to make this claim in part because the

Protocol appears to support the EU�s approach to regu-lating GMOs in opposition to that being implemented

by the US. More recently commentators have been

focussing on developments at the World Trade Organi-

sation, particularly following the formal complaint of

the US against the EU in May 2003.

mailto:[email protected]

594 J. Murphy, H. Yanacopulos / Geoforum 36 (2005) 593–606

Analysis of such developments is important, but

focussing too much on them has produced a distorted

view of EU–US interactions around GMOs. The roles

played by transatlantic networks of various kinds are

perhaps the most important aspect of EU–US interac-

tions that current research fails to appreciate. They areless visible than the high profile processes and clashes

mentioned above. Nevertheless, any account of EU–

US interactions in relation to GMOs is incomplete if

these networks are not discussed because they have been

attempting to shape the regulation of GMOs in both

jurisdictions since the mid-1990s. In an effort to address

this problem the empirical sections of this paper describe

the activities of five transatlantic networks in this area—The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), The

Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), the Trans-

atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), The Transatlantic

Environmental Dialogue (TAED) and the EU–US Con-

sultative Forum on Biotechnology (The Forum).

Understanding the roles played by networks of this

kind in policy-making is difficult. In this paper we find

that a governance �lens� is a useful starting point. Thegovernance literature is particularly helpful in situa-

tions where no single authority, particularly govern-

ment, is able to impose an outcome on others. Policy

making under such circumstances differs from that

which takes place within countries. Valuable ways of

understanding and explaining the involvement of non-

state actors in policy making are also found in the gov-

ernance literature. In the theoretical discussion thatfollows, and in the analysis in the latter part of the

paper, we use a number of specific concepts from the

governance literature, including �norm-setting�, �fram-ing�, �steering�, �transnational advocacy networks� and�meta-governance�.

1 In this paper we refer in general terms to networks and include

coalitions and alliances in this category. Others have defined these

more specifically as different things. However, where differences

between different types of networks are important, these have been

pointed out in the text.

2. A governance approach to policy analysis

2.1. What is governance?

Auseful starting point in any discussion of governance

is to recognise that the debate has two distinct aspects—

�governance as purposive activity� and �governance as anexplanatory framework�. Pierre (2000, p. 3) outlines the�dual meaning� of governance, when he argues:

. . .on the one hand it refers to the empirical man-ifestations of state adaptation to its external envi-ronment as it emerges in the late twentieth century.On the other hand, governance also denotes a con-ceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordina-tion of social systems and, for the most part, therole of the state in that process.

In this paper we are concerned with governance inboth senses.

A central concern of governance is the difference

between coercion and influence. This can be related to

the distinction between government and governance.

As ideas, both government and governance include

goal-oriented behaviour and purposive systems of rule.

However, as Czempiel (1992, p. 250) points out, ulti-mately governments can rule by coercion whereas

governance involves power in the form of influence:

‘‘governance is how actors get things done without

legal competence to command . . . ’’ Or, alternatively, asKooiman (1993, p. 2) states, governance includes ‘‘all

those activities of social, political and administrative

actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide,

steer, control or manage societies’’.Therefore, ‘‘governance is a more encompassing phe-

nomenon than government’’ (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 4–5).

While citizens might not accept the rules of their govern-

ments, they will typically comply with these rules out of

fear of force and coercion. In contrast, governance is

only effective as a system of rule if the majority accepts

it. Where a government may still be able to function in

the face of widespread opposition to its actions, it is ar-gued that governance is sustained by shared goals that

may or may not be derived from formally prescribed

responsibilities (Rosenau, 1992, p. 5). From this per-

spective, and in the absence of a global government,

the international system is a system of governance,

where shared goals of state and non-state actors become

increasingly important (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 3–6). Indeed

the idea of governance is perhaps applied least problem-atically at the international level because governments

have always been involved in governance type activities

and as a result the government-governance boundary is

somewhat blurred at the domestic level.

The emphasis on influence rather than coercion in the

governance approach draws attention to the importance

of networks, coalitions or alliances of a diverse range of

actors. 1 These play a central role in efforts to influenceothers. Increased communication and information shar-

ing are common elements of networks but there are

additional—�value-added�—aspects that result from

sharing resources and decreasing costs through speciali-

sation. These value-added aspects of networks help to

explain why groups join them. Huxham (1996, p. 141)

describes this in the following statement:

. . . something usually creative is produced – per-haps an objective is met – that no organisationcould have produced on its own and that eachorganisation, through the collaboration, is able

J. Murphy, H. Yanacopulos / Geoforum 36 (2005) 593–606 595

to achieve its own objectives better than it couldalone. It may also be possible to achieve somethingfor wider society that is beyond the remit of any ofthe participating organisations themselves.

Huxham also suggests that networks can bring about

the transformation of power relations and that this ena-

bles the less powerful elements of society to have a voice

in the policy process (Huxham, 1996, p. 16).

2.2. The mechanics of governance: framing, steering and

norm-setting

Our introduction to governance suggests that this ap-

proach is particularly helpful in transnational and inter-

national decision-making situations. Such situations are

often characterised by the lack of a single authority with

the power to impose a particular decision on others.

Below we make it clear that this is the situation withrespect to EU–US interactions and the regulation of

GMOs. The above outline also suggests that networks

and influence are key issues for governance. Networks,

of state and non-state actors, will attempt to influence

policy-making processes to achieve their objectives.

What mechanisms do network members use in order

to influence policy-making processes? A preliminary an-

swer to this question is offered here by focussing on�framing�, �steering� and �norm-setting� (see Kooiman(1993)).

The �framing� of issues occurs before decisions aremade. It plays a central role in setting the policy agenda

and shaping key decisions. At the international level,

United Nations conferences are examples of �governanceevents� where problems are defined and re-defined and�framing� takes place. Both state and non-state actorsmake declarations at these conferences and use them

to influence the media in an effort to determine the

way in which an issue is understood. As an example,

Young (1997) gives a compelling account of how envi-

ronmental issues are framed and how agendas are set

during the �prepcoms� (pre-conference meetings) attransnational environmental conferences. He states that

‘‘agenda setting is a process in which state actors, inter-national organisations, and non-state actors struggle to

decide whether an issue deserves a prominent place on

the political agenda’’ (Young, 1997, p. 101).

�Steering� involves the attempts by actors and net-works to influence the choices of decision makers during

the policy making process. It is a dynamic process, a pri-

mary aspect of governance and part of its purposive nat-

ure. However, the idea of steering is complicatedbecause more generally governance is ‘‘the process

where an organisation or society steers itself’’ (Rosenau

quoted in Sewell and Salter, 1995, p. 376). This perspec-

tive suggests that the ability of any single actor or net-

work to steer a debate is likely to be limited, perhaps

particularly so at the international level where there is

no single obvious target to try to influence.

In addition to describing governance as a process of

influencing actors directly, many theorists have also ob-

served that it involves the more indirect process of

�norm-setting�. Norms are widely shared sets of beliefs,and it is generally believed that when actors behave in

a consistent way in broadly similar situations, they are

more than likely being influenced by norms (Pfeffer

and Salancik, 1978, p. 149). Pfeffer and Salancik

(1978, p. 149) maintain that:

. . .although it is possible to be sanctioned by a sin-gle social actor, it is only when most social actorssanction the behaviour that we can say a normexists . . . . Adherence to norms is, then, in part anunintentional result of the acceptance of a largersocial system as a frame of reference.

Norms are constantly being negotiated as part of

governance processes.

2.3. Transnational networks and meta-governance

Our understanding of governance and networks oper-

ating transnationally has improved dramatically since

Keck and Sikkink�s (1998) seminal work on the subject.Keck and Sikkink focus on transnational advocacy net-

works—advocacy being a call for change (see also Flio-

rini, 1999; Khagram et al., 2002; Higgott et al., 2000).

They (1998, pp. 2–3) define such networks as formations

comprised of actors working ‘‘internationally on anissue, who are bound together by shared values, a com-

mon discourse, and dense exchanges of information and

services.’’ They argue that information is central to the

formation of these networks and that networks mobilize

information strategically to achieve leverage over pow-

erful organisations and governments.

Networks of this kind have become pivotal when

examining governance processes at the transnationaland international levels. Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp.

2–3) argue that that transnational advocacy networks

must be understood as political spaces where ‘‘differ-

ently situated actors negotiate—formally or infor-

mally—the social, cultural, and political meanings of

their joint enterprise’’. Thus, action and change can be

seen to take place not only in familiar, or traditionally

defined political spaces (or territories) such as states,but also in other emerging transnational or even �global�spaces created through these transnational networks

(Yanacopulos, 2001, p. 208). Ultimately, Keck and Sik-

kink argue, ‘‘Activists in networks try not only to influ-

ence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and

nature of the debate’’ (1998, pp. 2–3).

The concept of transnational advocacy networks will

help us to analyse some of the EU–US interactions dis-cussed below. However, before going further we must


re-visit the role of government in governance. We began

this discussion by distinguishing government from gov-

ernance but one of the risks associated with doing this

is that it gives the impression that actors and networks

involved in governance are not guided at all. This is

not the case. Indeed, the nature of governance itselfand the risk of governance failure (intellectually related

to market failure and state failure), appears to demand

an ongoing effort on the part of government to manage

decision making processes. Therefore, although govern-

ance involves self-organisation, some scholars have also

identified an increasing effort on the part of govern-

ments to establish the ground rules for governance.

Jessop (1998, 2004) has captured this somewhatambiguous role of government in relation to governance

using the concept of �meta-governance�. One definitionhe provides is:

It involves . . . the design of institutions and gener-ation of visions which can facilitate not only self-organization in different fields but also the relativecoherence of the diverse objectives, spatial andtemporal horizons, actions, and outcomes of vari-ous self-organizing arrangements. (1998, p. 42)

He suggests that it involves shaping the context with-

in which networks form, rather than developing specific

strategies or initiatives for them. For government, there-

fore, meta-governance involves seeking to manage com-

plexity, plurality and interactions.

3. A brief history of the EU–US conflict over GMOs

The first generation of transgenic crops began to be

commercialised in the early 1990s. As is still the case

today, insect resistance and herbicide tolerance were

the main traits. In the US, where commercialisation oc-

curred first, these crops (and their food uses) generated

relatively little concern. However, as has been docu-mented elsewhere, the reaction in Europe in the late

1990s was very different. In the EU there was an unprec-

edented public debate and backlash against the technol-

ogy. Pressure groups (environment, consumer and

development groups) raised a wide variety of concerns

including problems like unknown risks to the environ-

ment and human health and the spectre of corporate

control of the food chain. In response a number of largeEuropean food retailers committed to keeping their own

brand products GM free (for an account of this period

see Levidow et al., 1999).

By the late 1990s it was clear that regulators and

policy makers in the European Union had lost control

of the GMO debate. Agri-food biotechnology had

emerged as one of the EU�s biggest regulatory prob-lems. In response, at the end of June 1999, politiciansin the EU�s Environment Council took the decision

to impose a moratorium on the authorisation of new

GM crops and foods, at least until the perceived weak-

nesses in the EU�s regulatory framework could be dealtwith. A group of countries including France, Ger-

many and Austria formed a coalition to block further

authorisations. Those countries that were more enthu-siastic about GMOs, including the UK, could not pro-

ceed even if they wanted to. This blocking coalition

made it clear that there would be no further authorisa-

tions until revised and new legislation was in place

(FoEE, 1999).

The list of required changes to EU legislation drawn

up at this time was extensive. It included, for example,

more demanding risk assessment procedures (for cropsand foods) to increase consumer confidence in product

safety. In addition, traceability and labelling legislation

was called for to make it possible for consumers to

choose GM free products. Looking further ahead some

saw a need for liability legislation (possibly with manda-

tory insurance) to make producers financially responsi-

ble for future adverse effects (for some of the

complexities of the case see Levidow et al., 1999; Levi-dow and Marris, 2001). Changes in many of these areas

have been made in recent years.

Perhaps the most significant problem the EU faced

from the late 1990s onwards as a result of the morato-

rium on GMOs was a trade conflict with the US (for

an overview see PEW, 2003). GMOs joined an increas-

ingly long list of trade issues that were causing tension

between the world�s biggest trading partners e.g. hor-mone treated beef and bananas. As time passed US pol-

iticians and officials became more strident in their

criticisms of the EU, particularly following the election

of President Bush in 2000. They argued that there was

no sign that the EU was ever going to lift the morato-

rium. The EU responded by arguing that developing

and implementing new legislation in Europe was the

key to unlocking the approvals process. In practice thiswas little comfort because many in the US were appalled

by the new developments, particularly traceability and

labelling.

What is the nature of the dispute more precisely?

Most concretely, it relates to transatlantic trade in maize

(corn), although the US is clearly concerned about the

wider implications (and wider adoption) of regulatory

developments in the EU. Before 1997 the US exported1.75 million tons of corn annually to Spain and Portu-

gal. This amount filled a tariff free quota that was agreed

when Spain and Portugal joined the EU. Before the

conflict this amount was 4% of total US corn exports.

However, following the implementation of the EU mor-

atorium, this figure dropped to less than 0.1% in 2002

(PEW, 2003). The US stopped exporting maize to Spain

and Portugal (or, depending on your perspective, Spainand Portugal stopped importing maize from the US).

The American Farm Bureau Federation estimates that


US exporters have been losing approximately $300 mil-

lion per year.

For many observers, the lowest point in the conflict

came in 2002 when food shortages and famine in south-

ern Africa were drawn into the dispute between the EU

and the US. The problem emerged when the US gaveGM maize to the region as part of its food aid pro-

gramme. Critics then accused the US of exploiting food

shortages to achieve its political and economic goals in

the area of agri-food biotechnology. They pointed to a

long history of �conditionality� associated with US foodaid and argued that this shows how the US uses aid to

achieve its wider political and economic objectives. Crit-

ics also pointed out that US food aid is essentially a sub-sidy to US agriculture and that this form of relief aid is

bad practice because it disrupts local markets. In return

advocates of biotechnology and US politicians accused

Europe of consigning people to death when food which

Americans eat everyday was available free.

In May 2003 the United States Government made a

formal complaint to the World Trade Organisation

regarding the regulation of genetically modified organ-isms in the European Union. The complaint came after

nearly 5 years of tension and threats. The main aspects

of the case were outlined in a letter by Ambassador Lin-

net Deily of the US Permanent Mission to the WTO.

She identified two main problems: (1) the European

Commission�s suspension of a procedure for consideringapplications for approval of biotech products; (2) na-

tional marketing and import bans being maintained bysome EU member states. The US claims that the EU

is in violation of a number of agreements of the World

Trade Organisation. Amongst other things the US gov-

ernment is requesting compensation for lost exports but

it is widely accepted that the US also made the com-

plaint to the WTO in order to discourage other coun-

tries from adopting the EU�s approach to regulatingGMOs.

4. EU–US transnational networks and GMOs

In this section we focus on five EU–US networks

which have been trying to shape the regulation of genet-

ically modified organisms over the past ten years—

Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), The Transat-lantic Economic Partnership (TEP), the Transatlantic

Consumer Dialogue (TACD), The Transatlantic Envi-

ronmental Dialogue and the EU–US Consultative For-

um on Biotechnology (The Forum).

4.1. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) and

GMOs

The EU and the US account for approximately one-

fifth of each other�s trade in goods and one-third of their

trade in services. They also account for approximately

half of each other�s foreign direct investment. This is al-ready the world�s largest trading relationship (TEP,1998a). Not surprisingly, however, there have been calls

to develop this relationship further through progressive

trade liberalisation. For advocates of this position theultimate aim is the creation of a single transatlantic mar-

ket, with no tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade. The

Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) is one of the

most important networks campaigning for this.

The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) was

created in 1995 at the invitation of the EU and US gov-

ernments. It is a business-to-business network whose

aim is:

to boost transatlantic trade and investment oppor-tunities through the removal of barriers – includ-ing costly inefficiencies caused by excessiveregulation, duplication and differences in the EUand U.S. regulatory systems and procedures.(TABD web-sit—accessed 28 October 2002)

The TABD is active in most areas of transatlantictrade. With respect to products its aim is captured in

the phrase �approved once, accepted everywhere�. Thisphrase first appeared in a TABD document in 1996. It

has been restated in most publications since then with

a request that the EU and US Governments officially en-

dorse the principle. The more strategic TABD goal is the

creation of the �new transatlantic marketplace� whichwill be realised when the EU and the US exist as a singlemarket. With these objectives in mind the TABD has

lobbied on various issues, including centralised decision

making procedures in various areas of regulation; mu-

tual recognition agreements where regulatory processes

can not be centralised; common technical standards

and an early warning system to identify possible sources

of future trade conflict between the EU and the US.

The formation of a TABD Working Group on Agri-food Biotechnology was announced at the TABD�sCEO—Chief Executive Officer—Conference in Chicago

in 1996. The agri-food sector is one of many that the

TABD deals with as part of its work on standards and

regulatory policy. The working group began with a ser-

ies of industry consultations and industry-government

workshops in order to identify areas where recommen-

dations could be made. Specific proposals in the areaof agri-food biotechnology began to emerge in 1997.

The Rome Communique from the 1997 CEO Conference

states (TABD, 1997, p. 4):

. . . future trade barriers can be avoided if the finalsafety assessment criteria are fully shared amongthe authorities and mutually accepted by politicaldecision-makers. Industry concludes that the ulti-mate goal should be to arrive at compatible regu-latory requirements leading to full consensus on


and mutual recognition of safety assessments. Toget action in the short term, the industry recom-mends formation of a joint EU-U.S. Industryand Government group to work on predictableand transparent regulatory requirements andmutual sharing of safety data and assessments.

The joint EU–US industry and government group

mentioned met for the first time in April 1997 and

focused its attention on sharing information aboutapproval procedures and safety assessment.

By 1998 TABD work in the area of agri-food biotech-

nology had progressed further, although it was still fo-

cused solely on pre-market safety assessment. General

calls for greater transparency in the regulatory process

and the need for ‘‘science based’’ decision making were

combined with more specific proposals. The Statement

of Conclusions from the CEO Conference in Charlottestates (TABD, 1998, p. 6):

. . .U.S. and EU authorities are invited (1) to definethe terms of reference of a review of their respec-tive risk assessment and data requirements in early1999 and (2) to develop terms of reference to con-duct a pilot project to review risk assessments forone or more products. Industry will identify prod-ucts for possible inclusion in the study. The goal ofthe review and pilot project are to identify oppor-tunities for possible U.S. EU regulatorycooperation

Drawing on this brief history a number of important

points can be made. It is important to note, first of all,

that the TABD began to develop its position on trade

in agri-food biotechnology products before the publiccontroversy surrounding GMOs emerged in Europe

around 1998. Consistent with its broader position some

members wanted to ensure that the US and the EU

developed compatible (if not centralised) regulatory pro-

cedures so that mutual recognition of safety assessments

would be possible. It is implicit in TABD documents,

because no other issues are discussed, that the only reg-

ulatory problem is pre-market safety assessment.Although other stakeholders would seek to broaden

the regulatory debate to include such things as traceabil-

ity, labelling and liability, particularly after 1998/99, the

TABD does not mention these issues. Also, the TABD

addresses itself almost exclusively to the governments

concerned.

Interestingly, from 1999, and in the context of the

backlash against GMOs in Europe, the TABD beganto pay much less attention to the regulation of GMOs.

There are various reasons for this. For TABD the back-

lash in Europe was problematic because various Euro-

pean retailers began to reject GMOs. This introduced

a commercial dimension that potentially undermined

the business case for GMOs that TABD discussions

had assumed. Later it became increasingly difficult to

generate consensus positions within TABD as divisions

opened up between EU and US businesses and different

businesses within the US on the regulation of GMOs. A

particularly significant example of this is the tension be-tween agricultural interests—farmers and grain traders

and shippers—and biotechnology companies who want

to develop pharmaceutical crops. Some businesses have

identified these products as a threat to the agri-food sys-

tem. The main trade association for the US biotechnol-

ogy industry—BIO—has found it difficult to deal with

divisions of this kind even outside of the context of

TABD. Ultimately, the TABD as a transatlantic net-work able to work on GMOs faltered, and some US

members formed a new US network called the AgBio-

tech Planning Committee to lobby in Washington

instead.

4.2. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP)

and GMOs

In 1995 the EU and the US agreed on the New Trans-

atlantic Agenda (NTA). This was their effort to redefine

the EU–US relationship in the post Cold War era.

Trade liberalisation and the building of transatlantic

networks like TABD were identified as two of the key

goals. In the late 1990s advocates of EU–US trade liber-

alisation were further encouraged by the creation of the

Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). The TEP isa government-to-government network that aims to

intensify EU–US cooperation in the areas of trade and

investment (TEP, 1998a). A wide range of government

officials are involved but DG (Directorate General)

Trade of the European Commission and the Office of

the US Trade Representative (USTR) are responsible

for the initiative. The creation of the TEP was an-

nounced at the EU–US Summit in May 1998 (London)and a TEP Action Plan (TEP, 1998b) was agreed in

November 1998.

The TEP is a novel initiative in many ways, particu-

larly as it involves direct and structured talks between

trade officials and regulatory officials in the EU and

the US. It is an attempt to deal with the problem of reg-

ulatory barriers to trade by bringing all the officials con-

cerned together. An EU trade official involved with theTEP Environment Working Group described the situa-

tion before the TEP as follows:

It was less structured in any given field and notstructured at all between fields. On environment,for example, our environment people talked toEPA [US Environmental Protection Agency] fromtime to time. Trade people talked to USTR fromtime to time. But we [DG Trade] never talked to


EPA and our environment people seldom talked toUSTR. So the missing link was the joining up ofthinking between policy areas. (Personal interviewconducted 2 April 2003, Brussels)

The need for this kind of structured dialogue is often

given as an explanation for the creation of the TEP, but

more instrumental goals related to trade liberalisation—

market opening and regulatory convergence—were also

important.

From the outset GMOs were one of the TEP�s areasof activity. The TEP declaration mentions biotechnol-

ogy specifically and this ensured that it was part of the

TEP Action Plan. The specific commitments identified

in the TEP Action Plan are the establishment of an

�over-arching group� whose mandate is:

to monitor progress of the dialogue on the varioustechnical issues carried out in existing groups, andto take into account their potential trade effectswith the objective of reducing unnecessary barriersto trade;

to seek to increase and enhance scientific and reg-ulatory cooperation and information exchangeand promote transparency and information ofconsumers [sic] (TEP, 1998b, § 3.5.2(a)).

However, the most concrete action in the area of bio-

technology identified in the TEP Action Plan is:

An early step towards accelerating the regulatoryprocess would be to encourage simultaneous appli-cations for scientific assessments in the US and in aMember State; the possibility of a pilot project tothis effect is under consideration (TEP, 1998b, §3.5.2(b)).

For this specific action the target date given is �assoon as an appropriate new application is in preparation

by industry�.A TEP Biotechnology Working Group was formed to

implement the TEP Action Plan in the area of GMOs at

the end of the 1990s. It was led by trade officials but it

also included government officials from other interested

departments and agencies. On the EU side, amongst

others, DG Consumer Affairs, DG Research and DG

Environment were represented. On the US side repre-

sentatives of the Department of Agriculture and theEnvironmental Protection Agency accompanied the

trade officials. The approaches of different members

were described as follows:

I would say that on both sides the technicians wereopen to the idea but the policy officials were reluc-tant. People with a stake in the TEP process add-ing value, which I would describe as DG Tradeand DG Relex [External Relations], had to push

the officials in charge of regulatory policy to allowthe technicians to do cooperative work . . . They�rehonest seekers after scientific knowledge and effi-cient ways of doing things. They were keen toshare their work and talk. Then you�ve got thepeople who have a stake in making TEP workand resolving and avoiding disputes. In this casethey were more on the side of technicians. (Per-sonal interview conducted 2 April 2003, Brussels)

However, almost immediately the work of the TEPBiotechnology Working Group was thrown into disar-

ray by the decision of the EU Environment Council in

June 1999 to implement a de facto moratorium on the

authorisation of GMOs in the EU. From the outset this

made it impossible to pursue much of the TEP Action

Plan in this area e.g. the idea of a pilot project on simul-

taneous scientific assessment of a GM product in the EU

and the US. Also, in addition to pre-market safetyassessment, other regulatory issues emerged for the

TEP as a result of the backlash against GMOs in Eur-

ope, and the political response to it. Traceability and

labelling of GMOs were the most important.

These events help to explain why the TEP Biotech-

nology Working Group has had few concrete successes.

They also explain why in practice it has been less ambi-

tious than it might otherwise have been. Progress on apilot project on simultaneous scientific assessment, for

example, came to a halt when the elements of a common

data set for such an assessment were agreed. In an inter-

view an EU trade official downplayed the original aim

and stated:

We agreed on the data set. We were never trying toagree what the regulatory authorities should dowith it. We were simply trying to arrive at a singleset of papers for American and Community regu-lators. (Personal interview conducted 2 April 2003,Brussels)

In this way, in the face of developments at the polit-

ical level, the TEP Biotechnology Working Group mod-

ified its agenda.

At the same time the TEP Biotechnology WorkingGroup found that it had to engage with new and unfore-

seen problems related to the EU moratorium on GMOs.

The most important and sensitive of these was the bar-

rier to US maize exports to Spain and Portugal. This

trade barrier emerged because the EU was not authoris-

ing new varieties of GM maize and US production sys-

tems were not set up to segregate maize that could or

could not legally be imported into the EU. A TEP Steer-ing Group report from 2000 indicates that some pro-

gress was being made at this stage (TEP, 2000, pp. 1–2):

Regarding discussion within the framework of theTEP Working Group on biotechnology, U.S. and


EU officials have made good progress towardsagreement on issues affecting U.S. corn exportsto Spain and Portugal. Since the last Summit, theexperts in sampling and testing methods fromU.S, EU and Member State agencies have madesignificant progress in identifying reliable andconsistent approaches to verification. Parallel dis-cussions on the administrative aspects are alsomaking progress. Discussion continues on theissue of obtaining access to the data and referencematerial needed for tests on new GMO events.This access is currently being pursued on the basisof confidentiality undertakings with testinglaboratories.

However, ultimately the TEP Biotechnology Work-

ing Group found it impossible to address this problem.

Through the TEP Biotechnology Working Group the

EU made a proposal in 2002 which could have led toUS maize, verified as non-GM, entering the EU. How-

ever, this proposal was rejected by the US (and the US

corn industry). It was then agreed that the TEP Biotech-

nology Working Group had no outstanding issues on

the agenda and it entered an extended period of

inactivity.

4.3. The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD)

and GMOs

The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) was

launched in September 1998—three years after the

Transatlantic Business Dialogue—in the context of a

commitment by the EU and the US to increase the

involvement of civil society in transatlantic policy mak-

ing. The TACD is a network of consumer groups whichaims to influence policy in the interests of consumers. It

is comprised of approximately 60 consumer organisa-

tions from 16 countries. These are supported directly

by 10 million members but the TACD claims to speak

for the interests of 600 million consumers in total

(TACD, 1999a).

TACD�s work in the area of agri-food biotechnologyhas mainly involved the development of key position pa-pers. They have used these in their attempts to influence

policy. The first paper on GMOs was released in 1999

(TACD, 1999b), with the subsequent and more compre-

hensive paper �Consumer Concerns about Biotechnol-ogy and Genetically Modified Organisms� released in2000 (TACD, 2000). In this paper TACD makes the

claim that the main consumer concern with respect to

GMOs is safety (human health and environmental).This claim underpins a call for rigorous and mandatory

pre-market safety assessment. With respect to the safety

of GM foods, TACD raise concerns about allergenicity,

antibiotic resistance, toxicity and nutritional changes.

They also raise the problem of unintended effects of

genetic modification and this underpins a demand for

post-market monitoring.

Beyond pre-market safety assessment and post-mar-

ket monitoring the TACD argue that consumers have

a �right to know and right to choose�. On this basis theydemand that �all GM food, including food producedfrom GM ingredients which do not remain detectable

in the final product, should be labelled.� They also statethat:

[the] right to choose is being undermined by themixing of GM products (namely soya and maize)with conventional varieties . . . Consumers con-sider that labeling of the final product shoulddepend on the presence of GMOs in the raw mate-rials from which the product is made. (TACD,2000, p. 3)

In this way TACD underpin a demand for traceabil-

ity in association with labelling and they expand the reg-

ulatory debate still further by linking the problem of

unintended effects to rules on corporate liability and

mandatory insurance.

The TACD has tried to promote this policy agenda invarious ways. At TACD annual meetings they have used

direct contact with officials from the US and the EU at

plenary sessions. Before these meetings TACD members

as a whole agree on their key campaigning issues and

GMOs have regularly been on the list. Between meet-

ings, and based on the established TACD positions,

the Secretariat have written letters to key policy makers

and issued press releases. They have done this particu-larly at times when key debates have been taking place

in EU or US government institutions. At EU–US sum-

mits, TACD representatives have requested and been

given substantive discussions with senior policy officials

as part of the pre-summit programme.

Despite some success, however, it is important to

note that various TACD members have reservations

about the process they are involved in. There is a wide-spread belief, for example, that the TABD has more

resources, access and influence on EU–US policy. The

TEP process is often given as a concrete example of

where TABD has more impact. Some TACD members

also fear that the TACD is simply a mechanism that is

designed to co-opt them into the political and policy

process. This is particularly the case with some of the

more radical US consumer groups like Public Citizen.Comments made by a US Government official based

at the US Mission to the EU in Brussels suggest they

are right to be concerned. In an interview (8 October

2001) it was pointed out that to begin with meetings

between TACD and government officials were confron-

tational. Also, the various consumer organisations put

forward different views. However, later on the consumer

groups began to agree common positions and meetingsbecame less confrontational. The government official


argued �The TACD forced them to put on a governancehat�.Why does the TACD continue to operate despite the

reservations of some of its members? This question can

be answered in a number of ways. First, TACD is an

opportunity to interact in a network. A representativeof a European consumer organisation stated:

[It is a way of having] greater contact. We�vealways worked closely with European consumergroups, and with some of the US consumer groupsthat are members of Consumers International, butthere is a wider range of consumer organisationsinvolved in TACD . . . it�s an opportunity to dis-cuss issues. On some issues that US is moreadvanced and on others the EU is . . . it�s partlythe exchange and sharing of information . . . (Per-sonal interview 11 October 2002, London)

Such sharing of information in the context of TACD

has been important in the area of GMOs.

I think the GM issue is a good example. And theprecautionary principle. Because there are obviousdisagreements between the EU and the US. TheUS fails to recognise that the precautionary princi-ple exists. In that context it is useful to learn fromthe experience of American NGOs who will beable to give practical examples of where the pre-cautionary principle has already been used in USlegislation. (Personal interview 11 October 2002,London)

However, beyond the ability to influence policy and

the opportunity to share information it is also important

to note that the consumer groups involved share a com-

mon perspective on consumer issues. This also helps to

explain the existence of the TACD:

I have just been surprised at how we have reachedagreement on lots of issues . . . where there havebeen things that people don�t agree on, they havetended to be quite specific issues rather than thebroader principles. People tend to agree on theprinciples . . . The basis of what we do is still, eventhough it is not done explicitly, the core consumerprinciples that Kennedy came up with in the 1960s.That is where a lot of the issues come from—safety, choice, quality, redress, right to be heard.I think they are still at the heart of a lot of theway consumer organisations approach issues.(Personal interview 11 October 2002, London)

4.4. The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue

(TAED) and GMOs

Consumer groups, such as the members of TACD,

contested the introduction of GM crops and foods

throughout the mid to late 1990s. They are still vocal

critics and continue to argue that major changes need

to be made to regulatory frameworks of the EU and

the US. On the whole, however, they do not campaign

for a complete ban on GMOs. Instead, drawing on the

idea of consumer rights, they campaign for legislationon such things as traceability, labelling, insurance and

liability. This approach can be contrasted with that of

environmental pressure groups, many of which have de-

manded a complete ban on all uses of GMOs. In this

section we focus on the creation of the Transatlantic

Environment Dialogue (TAED) and the contribution

it made to the EU–US debate on GMOs.

The European Commission invited the EuropeanEnvironmental Bureau (EEB) to organise the TAED

in 1998. It was an invitation for environmental pressure

groups to contribute their perspective on a variety of

policy issues to the New Transatlantic Agenda and

Transatlantic Economic Partnership processes. The

TAED was eventually launched on 3 May 1999. A press

release issued by EEB at the time outlines the starting

point:

European and U.S. non-governmental organisa-tions meeting here today established the Transat-lantic Environment Dialogue (TAED) to protectand benefit the environment and to integrate envi-ronmental protection into all aspects of EU-U.S.relations. The launching of the TAED is inresponse to bilateral governmental initiativesunder the EU-U.S. New Transatlantic Agenda,but it is in no way intended to legitimise theseprocesses.

This statement clearly shows that the TAED faced a

difficult problem from the outset. Many of its members

were unhappy with the idea of contributing to the trans-

atlantic trade liberalisation process at all because they

believed that it should be abandoned altogether.Sir Leon Brittan represented the European Com-

mission at the launch of TAED and in his speech he

felt that it was necessary to defend the transatlantic

trade liberalisation process from the criticisms of those

who were present. He argued that the environment

was already at the heart of activities, regardless of

what the critics might be saying, and that there is

no conflict between trade liberalisation and environ-mental protection. He went on to address another

concern directly:

It�s natural that you should view the TransAtlanticBusiness Dialogue with a degree of envy: they arevery much part of the process of co-operation.They weren�t like that to begin with, but they wereable to get together and come to conclusions whichthey shared, and these conclusions carried weightfor two reasons: because they were shared, and


because they were well argued and carriedconviction.

For the assembled, the two reasons outlined by Brit-

tan failed to cover what they perceived to be the real rea-

sons why TABD is influential—resources, networks and

the fact that TABD members share the same vision of

trade liberalisation as the trade officials who oversee

the TEP process.

Despite these reservations, however, TAED was

launched. The members identified a number of coretasks: (1) to monitor all EU–US negotiations and seek

to make sustainable development their overall objective;

(2) to promote the highest environmental standards and

regulations in the EU and the US; (3) to campaign for

transparency and accountability of EU–US negotiations

and increase public participation in them; and (4) to in-

crease the amount of dialogue between environmental

NGOs in the EU and the US. However, at the outsetenvironmental groups explicitly stated their belief that

trade liberalisation processes tended to lead to the

downward harmonisation of environmental standards

and regulations. To pursue their work, the TAED estab-

lished five working groups—agriculture, biodiversity,

climate, industry, trade. The agriculture group devel-

oped the TAED�s position on GMOs.The TAED working group on agriculture met on

May 2 1999 and agreed an outline of their concerns

regarding GMOs; 16 NGOs from 10 countries partici-

pated in the meeting. The group stated its concern that

the governments were making trade-related interests

the priority in how they develop policy for regulating

and managing genetic engineering and GMOs. They ex-

plained this by drawing attention to the impact of busi-

ness on trade negotiations. They argued that a widerrange of issues—social, environmental, health and ethi-

cal—should inform biotechnology policy and that the

full participation of civil society was necessary to

achieve this. The group also voiced concern about the

concentration of corporate control over the food system

and the need to ensure that countries had the power to

decide how to regulate GMOs according to their own

choices.One of the aims of the TAED agriculture working

group in relation to GMOs was to prevent the use of

GMOs in agriculture as long as there is no convincing

evidence of harmlessness to people and nature. This

can be contrasted with the demand of TACD that

GMOs should bring benefits to consumers. By asking

for evidence of �harmlessness� the environmental groupswere in part seeking to change the burden of proof. Theyrejected the view that it was their role to prove that

GMOs are harmful. Instead, they argued that support-

ers of the technology should prove it is harmless. This

reflects the belief of many environmental groups, which

had led them to spearhead the public campaign in Eur-

ope against GMOs, that GMOs should be banned

altogether, particularly because of unknown and unfore-

seeable risks to the environment.

This view of GMOs continues to be the one adopted

by large numbers of environmental groups today but

TAED itself had a very limited lifespan. On November21 2000 the European Environmental Bureau issued a

press release confirming the suspension of TAED activ-

ities. John Hontelez, Secretary General of EEB and a

member of TAED Steering Committee, explained the

decision as follows:

We have to stop our activities because the US gov-ernment has not been able to provide its part ofthe necessary finances to run this dialogue. It hasfaced opposition in the Senate, and apparently itis not giving it enough priority. The US govern-ment has always pretended the TAED is of greatimportance to them. This failure does not confirmthis.

Although there were financial problems associated

with running the TAED this decision is also explained

by underlying scepticism amongst the groups regardingtheir involvement in the transatlantic dialogue process.

4.5. EU–US Consultative Forum on Biotechnology (the

Forum) and GMOs

The final network involved in this issue is the EU–US

Consultative Forum on Biotechnology (the Forum)

which was launched at the EU–US Summit in May2000. The Forum was a joint time-limited initiative of

President Prodi of the European Commission and Pres-

ident Clinton of the US. It was a direct response to the

backlash against GMOs in Europe and the emerging

conflict between the EU and the US. To a large extent

it was separate from the transatlantic dialogue process

described above but it was comprised of 20 expert mem-

bers including representatives from TABD and TACD.The brief was �[to] consider the full range of issues ofconcern in biotechnology in the United States and the

European Union, most of which relate to . . . foodand agriculture� (EU–US Biotechnology ConsultativeForum, 2000, p. 4).

A number of the issues raised by the Forum in their

final report are relevant here. The Forum report notes

that one purpose of regulation is to produce public con-fidence and for this reason alone it may be necessary to

tighten EU and US regulatory standards in the area of

GMOs:

. . . regulatory processes must be sufficiently strongto ensure public confidence. This may necessitatestrengthening existing regulatory systems for agri-cultural biotechnology products in some respects.(p. 8)

2 Even if the case currently before the WTO is judged in favour of

the US the EU does not need to comply with this decision. It can

decide to pay compensation instead.


Significantly, however, the Forum went further than

simply making broad statements about �strengthening�regulatory systems. The final report also includes a de-

tailed list of actions which the Forum agreed were nec-

essary for policy makers to take. The list includes such

things as:

• mandatory pre-market assessment of all products;

• traceability and monitoring are essential for liability

and the judging of claims made in favour of GM

products;

• time-limited licences should be used to ensure moni-

toring is carried out;

• the EU and the US should develop rules in the areasof liability and redress;

• assessments should not be made just against conven-

tional agriculture but also against other possible

approaches to agriculture.

The report also draws attention to the gaps that exist

in knowledge which make risk assessment difficult and

the growing public perception that science cannot offeran independent authoritative contribution to the GMO

debate.

Opinions on the process and the output of the Forum

are mixed. Those involved in the process have generally

been positive and have drawn attention to the novel nat-

ure of the exercise. One participant summarised the

experience as follows:

It was a fascinating thing to be involved with. Itwas a really interesting way of doing it. There werereally different views on the subject and I think thereport that came out of it was amazing. And thatpeople all agreed to it. I thought it went a lot fur-ther on a lot of issues than I would have expectedgiven some of the views that people had to startwith. I think it just shows how useful it was tohave people sitting down in a room and actuallydiscussing issues. Working together and actuallytrying to understand each others perspectives.(Personal interview 11 October 2002, London)

However, the timing of the Forum�s work was unfor-tunate as it came at the end of the Clinton administration

and the start of the Bush administration. This fact, com-bined with the content of the report, which was generally

seen as being more supportive of the emerging EU ap-

proach to regulating GMOs and antagonistic towards

the prevailing US one, helps to explain why the report

gained little momentum after publication (for official re-

sponses by the EU and the US see EC (2001) and USDS

(2000)). A representative of a European consumer organ-

isation working on the regulation of GMOs stated:

. . . it just disappeared with the Bush administra-tion. We raised it repeatedly at TACD meetings.

The EU gave a progress report on the recommen-dations. The US acknowledged the recommenda-tions but it�s never been clear what they did tofollow them up. (Personal interview 11 October2002, London).

A US official working on biotechnology issues and

based at the US Mission to the EU commented:

My understanding is that the US wasn�t sure whatmore could be done on that. I think if there weresome great ideas then the US would be happy tolook at those. But I don�t think right now that theythink that is the case. (Interview 11 October 2002)

5. Understanding EU–US networks and the regulation

of GMOs

Does the concept of governance help us to under-

stand the EU–US interactions discussed above? A good

starting point is the distinction between governance and

government. At the outset we linked the former to situ-

ations where actors and institutions are unable to simply

impose decisions on others. This requires them to be-

come part of a process in order to have an influence.

This is the case between the EU and the US in relationto trade liberalisation in general and trade in GMOs

more specifically. No actor (state or non-state) is in a

position to impose decisions or outcomes on others. 2

Drawing on the above it is clear that in the case of

GMOs the governance nature of the interactions became

increasingly apparent over time as different types of

stakeholders became involved in the process. From a

largely inter-governmental starting point in the mid1990s, which included an input from business in the

form of TABD, consumer groups and environmental

groups began to engage in the process of transatlantic

trade liberalisation towards the end of the 1990s.

These preliminary observations clearly establish that

governance is an appropriate concept to be using in this

case and we can move on to focus more specifically on

the networks concerned. From a governance perspectiveTABD, TACD and TAED are particularly interesting.

It is clear that to some extent information and other re-

sources have been exchanged by members and as a result

their �success� should not be judged in purely instrumen-tal ways. That said, however, and drawing on Huxham

(1996), the possibility of influencing policy is a key

�value-added� element which ultimately helps to explaintheir existence. The fact that the TABD and the TACDhave operated over a long period suggests some level of


satisfaction on the part of their members. The TABD

played a significant role at the outset of the EU–US

trade liberalisation process in the mid-1990s and contin-

ues to be committed to it. The TACD, on the other

hand, has exploited opportunities in key areas, such

as GMOs, in an effort to reframe debates with somesuccess. Also, its members have not been prevented

from campaigning outside to the �transatlantic dialogue�process should they want to.

The departure of TAED from the transatlantic dia-

logue process, however, raises important issues.

Although lack of funding has been offered as an expla-

nation for why TAED was disbanded, in practice it

was a combination of scepticism about the EU–UStrade liberalisation process and the fact that TAED

members perceived few opportunities to influence policy

as part of that process. Their more radical critique of

GMOs, for example, would not be adopted, particularly

while consumer groups were offering a more measured

and acceptable critique which could be turned into pol-

icy. For environmental groups this left the TAED with

little or no purpose, given that other more organic trans-atlantic networks existed anyway. Huxham (1996) ar-

gues that one of the strengths of networks is their

ability to influence existing power relations. This analy-

sis suggests that as a network environmental groups per-

ceived TAED as offering few possibilities of doing this. 3

The concepts of framing and steering can be used to

identify more specifically the tactics used by these net-

works. From 1995 onwards the TABD argued that riskwas the key (and perhaps the only) regulatory problem

associated with GMOs. They argued that �sound science�was the solution to the problem and that the EU and the

US should focus on ensuring that they both adopt the

same regulatory standards. However, in the late 1990s,

the TACD began to reframe this risk and regulatory

harmonisation perspective in two ways. First, they ar-

gued that �sound science� was inadequate because ofpotential unknown problems associated with genetic

modification. To deal with this, they argued in favour

of the precautionary principle. Second, TACD argued

that the regulation of GMOs should be approached

from a consumer rights perspective rather than a

producer (trade) one.

Following Young (1997), such reframing can be

understood as TACD�s effort to change the terms underwhich the policy agenda was being set. Their precau-

3 The creation of the AgBiotech Planning Committee in the US is

similar. In the mid to late 1990s companies who wanted to promote

transatlantic trade in agricultural biotechnology worked within the

context of the TABD. However, following the rejection of GMOs in

Europe the TABD became less useful for this purpose. US agricultural

biotechnology interests then created the AgBiotech Planning Com-

mittee to lobby in Washington, particularly regarding what they

perceived to be the unreasonable blocking of GM products in Europe.

tion and consumer rights framing was set against the

sound science and regulatory harmonisation framing

of TABD. At least in Europe this had significant impli-

cations for regulation where the displacement of the

TABD�s framing was assisted by the backlash againstGMOs and the problem this caused for politicians andpolicy makers. For a short period TAED also tried to

reframe the GMO debate by casting GMOs as a threat

to sustainable agriculture and by trying to link them

to undesirable aspects of globalisation e.g. corporate

control of the food chain. However, ultimately environ-

mental groups decided that there were few opportunities

to do this as part of the policy process so TAED was dis-

banded and the associated groups continued to cam-paign in more public and confrontational ways. For

consumer groups it is clear that a more general goal is

norm-setting in relation to the idea of consumer rights.

The concept of steering focuses attention particularly

on the TEP and the Forum. The evidence suggests that

the TEP was initially a proposal from TABD. More spe-

cifically, when it was created, in the area of regulating

GMOs, the TEP essentially adopted the TABD�s agen-da. Here we see the considerable impact of TABD on

steering the process of transatlantic trade liberalisation

in the mid 1990s. The TACD, in contrast, has had rela-

tively little impact on the TEP agenda directly, in

general or in relation to GMOs more specifically. How-

ever, the public backlash in Europe, encouraged by civil

society groups, essentially derailed TEP discussions in

the area of GMOs. This was a significant indirect effect.The TACD then attempted to steer policy through new

or alternative structures such as the Consultative Forum

and more directly focussed its attention on EU institu-

tions. TACD members also became active at other levels

of governance, particularly the recent negotiations of the

Codex Alimentarius Commission on global standards

for GM food safety.

Finally, following Keck and Sikkink (1998), we canconsider if TABD, TACD and TAED are examples of

transnational advocacy networks. Undoubtedly there

are some similarities. For example, these networks do

transcend national boundaries and their members do

share values and similar practical aims. This was true

of TAED, despite the fact that in this case the members

decided that this network could not serve their purposes.

The exchange of information and other resources arealso important and as networks they are, to some extent,

single issue focussed. TACD�s interest in consumerrights, for example, is similar to the international cam-

paign for human rights. However, there are also impor-

tant differences. For example, membership is restricted

to organisations of a similar type whereas advocacy net-

works often involve a rainbow coalition of organisations

and individuals. The transatlantic dialogues are alsoconstrained by geography in a way that transnational

advocacy networks are not. Their focus is regulation


in the EU and the US, although members are free to

focus elsewhere if they want to.

These networks, therefore, are ambiguous in govern-

ance terms; they appear to be hybrids of some kind. The

differences appear to be linked to the fact that each of

these networks owes its existence to the over-archingagenda of transatlantic trade liberalisation. With this

in mind only TABD in any real sense is an organic

network. TACD and TAED formed instead at the invi-

tation of governments and in relation to the transatlan-

tic trade liberalisation agenda which had already

gathered considerable momentum by the end of the

1990s. For both TACD and TAED, tension was and

is inherent in this hybridity. Within TACD groups likePublic Citizen are highly skeptical of the transatlantic

dialogue process, viewing it as a way of co-opting pres-

sure groups into the policy process. For TAED the ten-

sion was too great and the opportunities to influence

policy too few and as a result the network disbanded it-

self soon after it was created. By taking the work on

transnational advocacy networks as our starting point

the hybrid and problematic nature of the transatlanticdialogues is brought into view.

Drawing on the discussion at the start of this paper

the idea of meta-governance can help to clarify the nat-

ure of these networks further. Jessop (1998) describes

meta-governance as �the organization of self-organi-zation� involving, amongst other things, the design ofinstitutions and mechanisms that can facilitate this.

Governments have a primary role here because of theirambiguous position as just one more actor in a govern-

ance process but at the same time one which is expected

to secure coordination and integration of disparate ele-

ments. From this perspective the TABD, TACD, TAED

all appear to be meta-governance mechanisms, pro-

moted by governments, to organise the contributions

of non-state actors to the process of building closer links

between the EU and the US, in particular through trans-atlantic trade liberalisation. The business community

embraced the idea enthusiastically, consumer groups

did so with reservations and environmental groups did

so for a short period before opting-out of the transatlan-

tic dialogue process.

Drawing on Jessop further we can extend the analysis

by focusing on the idea of governance failure, which is a

�failure to redefine objectives in the face of continuingdisagreement about whether they are still valid for the

various partners involved� (1998, p. 38). The case ofGMOs appears to be an excellent example of this. In this

case governance failure happened despite (and perhaps

to some extent because of) the efforts at meta-govern-

ance by the EU and the US described and analysed

above. Even the dedicated mechanism of the EU–US

Consultative Forum on Biotechnology ultimately failedto deliver an acceptable compromise between the EU

and the US. Although there is no space here to under-

take a comprehensive analysis of this case as an example

of a governance failure it suggests a considerable gap

between the (meta) governance processes in the form

of the transatlantic dialogues and more organic govern-

ance processes elsewhere which ultimately fed into

and encouraged the backlash against GMOs in theEuropean Union.

6. Conclusions

The EU–US interactions examined above deepen our

understanding of the current tension over GMOs and

provide new insights into processes of contemporarygovernance. For the case of GMOs this paper has con-

tributed a new level of detail. It goes some way to

addressing the imbalance that is caused by focussing

only on the high profile interactions such as those that

have taken place in association with the negotiation of

the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety and the formal

complaint to the Word Trade Organisation. This detail

is particularly useful because it draws attention to theadvanced stage that efforts to achieve regulatory harmo-

nisation in relation to GMOs had reached in the late

1990s. It also shows how pressure groups, particularly

consumer groups, capitalised on the backlash in Europe

against GMOs to reshape the regulatory agenda. The

reframing of the GMO issue as a consumer rights issue

has had important implications for the trajectory of the

regulation of GMOs in the EU.For understanding governance, this case is particularly

important. It improves our understanding of transna-

tional networks and their role in governance. However,

more importantly, it highlights the emergence of an unu-

sual hybrid form of transnational network—the transat-

lantic dialogues. These networks are best understood as

examples of meta-governance mechanisms, through

which governments have tried to steer the contributionof non-state actors to a range of policy areas in relation

to transatlantic trade liberalisation. However, the case

of GMOs more specifically is important as an example

of governance failure. This is particularly important

because, as Jessop (1998, p. 38) points out:

whilst there are already extensive literatures onmarket failure and state failure, there is far lessdirect, explicit and focused concern with govern-ance failure. Yet, if both market and state failureare recognized in social science, we should alsothematize governance failure.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the support

of the ESRC (Grant number: R000239460) and the

input of other members of the project team, particularly


Les Levidow, Simon Bromley, Dave Wield and Susan

Carr. Versions of this paper have been presented at sem-

inars in Cambridge and Edinburgh and we are grateful

for the input of people who attended. Thanks also to

the anonymous referees for their valuable contribution.

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