Tuesday August 26 2003, 2.00 pm:

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, we have looked at the memo of 10th June 2003, CAB/18/49, which was Sir David

Omand's response to your minute of 9th June. Effectively, in paragraph 2, he appears to conclude that he was

attracted by the idea that someone working in consultation with other people would look at matters, effectively; is

that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Then we get a report from them on 9th July. Can I take you to CAB/18/51? We can see this is a memo from

someone at Head of Security Policy Division, to you, copied to Sir David Omand: "You asked me to do some initial

work on the reported leaks to the media about the Iraq WMD dossier." Then: "... an analysis of the published

accounts of the '45 minutes' leaks to Gilligan." Then if one continues over the page to paragraph 5, there is

reference to: "... full analysis of the press reports and FISC transcripts at Annex A and references to Gilligan's source

at annex B." Can I take you on to annex B, which is page 55, and ask you one question in relation to it. It is towards

the bottom of the page, at paragraph 4. You can see this is someone who appears to have done an analysis of

knowledge of matters; for example, we can see, if we go up to paragraph 3, the previous one is: "Gilligan's latest

meeting with source. "Gilligan initiated the latest meeting ..." He tells us where he got that from, the FAC transcript,

The Mail on Sunday article. Then if you go down to paragraph 4: "Source's knowledge of opposition to 45 minute

claim. "The source has first or second-hand knowledge of the opposition to inclusion of the 45-minute claim. He

stated the 45 minutes claim was included in the dossier against our wishes because it wasn't reliable." Then the

transcript is noted, and comment: "If source's claims concerning the double sourcing of most of the JIC items is

correct, it confirms a close knowledge of the intelligence used for the dossier." I am just wondering about the

heading "Source's knowledge of opposition to 45 minute claim." It appears to be written on the basis that there was

opposition to the 45 minute claim. Do you agree with that analysis of the document?

A. Well, no, I do not. I think it is an honest mistake. The purpose of this document was not to analyse whether or not

there was opposition to the 45 minute claim. The purpose of the document purely was to analyse the access of Mr

Gilligan's source.

Q. It is right, so far as Dr Kelly was concerned, that if he said to Mr Gilligan that the material was single sourced and

it was added late, both matters were in fact accurate?

A. Yes, they were correct.

Q. We now know more about Dr Kelly's involvement in the latter stages of the dossier.

A. Yes.

Q. Can I then take you to 15th June? We have looked at the 10th June memo. On 15th June there is an article by

The Observer about mobile trailers. After that, did you have any discussions with anyone about possible sources for

that story?

A. I had one brief discussion about that article with Martin Howard. It may have been on -- the beginning of the week

after the article had appeared, because there was a reference to a British official giving an opinion about the mobile

laboratories; and I asked Martin for his view. Martin Howard told me that there were only -- this description of the

British official could only be or could only apply to up to four people, probably four people; and one of those was Dr

Kelly. That was the first time that I had heard his name.

Q. I think we have heard from Mr Howard about the inquiries that he made. Were you any party to these further

enquiries?

A. I was not an active party. Mr Howard told me he had wondered whether Dr Kelly might not be the source for the

article; that Dr Kelly, as it happened, had rung him from abroad to volunteer, as far as Mr Howard was concerned,

that he was not the source of the article. Mr Howard said to me he wondered actually whether that was true, and we

took the conversation no further.

Q. 25th June, Mr Campbell gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. I think it is right that you had spoken

with him on 24th June, helping him prepare for his evidence; is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. FAC/2/287. If one goes down to question 1019, Mr Chidgey asks Mr Campbell: "You appreciate how important

this issue is. The accusation has been made that this document was adjusted, altered, sexed up -- whatever -- for a

particular political purpose so one has to be somewhat pedantic and get exactly to the bottom of how the process

worked. You said, and it is on the record elsewhere, that this process took many months to evolve. I think it would

be very helpful if, perhaps not today but shortly afterwards, you could let the Committee have information on the

suggestions that were made by you and your team as this document evolved. For example, it must be the case

surely that in this process, as the drafts were continuing or continuously upgraded or amended, copies of earlier

drafts would have been kept electronically within your Department, within your team. It would be very helpful if it

was possible for us to have copies of those earlier drafts so that we could satisfy ourselves that there were no

attempts to change the essence of the document in order to pursue a particular political point. Is that possible?" Mr

Campbell said this: "Can I say again on that the JIC would have to be content that they were willing to do that but

that is certainly something I can take back and ask them if they are." Did Mr Campbell in fact ask you whether he

could release copies of the dossier to the Foreign Affairs Committee?

A. It was mentioned, briefly, by him to me; and I replied that I was quite sure that my colleagues on the JIC would

not be happy for the drafts to be released to the FAC.

Q. And why is that?

A. Well, there were two reasons. The first was that discussion of the drafts and all the various questions which would

have arisen from the drafts, which would have quickly got into matters of intelligence because the drafts were very

closely linked to underlying intelligence and whether or not it could have been included in the changes that were

made and so on, was properly a matter for the ISC. And it is with the Intelligence and Security Committee that the

Government deals, as a Committee of Parliamentarians set up by statute on intelligence matters. That is the first

point. The second point was even leaving that matter aside, to pass over drafts, work in progress, advice which is

being formulated but is only being formulated and is not anything which has been sort of signed up to by the

officials working on it, is, as it were, revealing that process of formulation of advice by officials, as I say, for

Ministers. It falls directly into that domain. It is an area where certainly colleagues on the JIC I knew, but officials I

think more widely, feel strongly should remain confidential for the good conduct of Government business.

Q. We have heard from Mr Campbell, and indeed almost everyone else who has come from the Government to talk

about this claim, that this was the most serious of claims that could ever be made against the Government, how

important it was to set the record straight. Would this not have been a public way of setting the record straight?

A. It would have been. I have never been in any doubt myself that presentation, if you like, of the full drafts would

reveal that the whole process was one of integrity, and honest and rigorous and well founded. But that does not get

away from the fact that putting forward the drafts in the way suggested here would not have had the support of my

colleagues; and I would not have wanted to put it to them. I might add there that separately and later the drafts were

handed to the Intelligence and Security Committee, in response to their requests, and they are -- have been with the

Intelligence and Security Committee since then; but amongst my colleagues on the JIC, when that matter was being

discussed, the worries and concerns that I have just expressed to you were forcefully expressed to me.

Q. Can I now take you to your next involvement with Dr Kelly? You have had a discussion with Mr Howard in June,

after The Observer article. Do you have any other dealings in relation to Dr Kelly in June at all?

A. No.

Q. When is the first time, in July, that you are made aware that Dr Kelly is under discussion again?

A. It is on the evening of Friday 4th July. I can be precise; at a meeting with Sir David Omand at 17.30 or

thereabouts.

Q. Right. You have a meeting with Sir David Omand. What is discussed?

A. Well, I was due to meet him anyway, which is how I know, because it was in my diary. David said to me,

straightaway, that he wanted to tell me and seek my advice about a development which had been reported to him

by Sir Kevin Tebbit from the Ministry of Defence. As I understood it, and that was the case, it had been reported to

him by telephone. Briefly, somebody had come forward to the MoD to indicate that they might be the source for the

Gilligan story; and David gave me his name.

Q. So you, on the Friday evening, or early Friday evening know the name of Dr Kelly?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think you are joined, we have heard from Jonathan Powell and Sir David Manning, by them at about 6

o'clock, is that right?

A. No, not quite right. David Omand and I went -- arranged to go across to David Manning's office in No. 10, and at

our initiative, to brief him as a member of the Prime Minister's Office on this development.

LORD HUTTON: What did you think was the significance of this development? I mean, what went through your head

when you were told that someone had come forward and said he had had a meeting with Mr Gilligan, Mr Scarlett?

A. It did depend, of course, on what I actually knew about what this person said at this point, which was not very

much and was not paper based in any way, it was an oral briefing; but I was told, and David knew, that there had

been a meeting in a London hotel, that the question of 45 minutes had been discussed, no details, and that Alastair

Campbell's name had been mentioned. It was -- but there were other details which did not fit. I did not learn

immediately anything more about that. So what went through my head was that there was a serious chance that this

was indeed the source who was being quoted by Mr Gilligan.

LORD HUTTON: What went through your head then that you thought there was a serious chance this might be the

source? Did you have any further thoughts as to what that might lead to or what its significance might be, or not at

that stage? Can you help me with that?

A. It is always unwise to claim that one has all sorts of rational thoughts in retrospect which one does not have at the

time.

LORD HUTTON: Quite.

A. I was aware -- it was my view, as I have already stated, that Mr Gilligan's story was wrong.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And, therefore, either somebody had given him a wrong story or he had added to a story that he had been given -

-

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. -- by somebody, as it were, speaking genuinely, whatever his opinion or knowledge happened to be, partial

probably. So it was one or the other.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And that being the case, and I thought it was quite likely to be the second, when I heard that somebody had

come forward who did seem to have had some discussion with Mr Gilligan about this, was saying that it was not at

all the account that Mr Gilligan had broadcast, I clearly thought: well, this might be the answer to what has

happened. But I stress the word "might" because, of course, I have learned over many years to be careful in these

situations.

LORD HUTTON: But the answer to what? To what would it be the answer?

A. Well, my Lord, how this situation had arisen, what information had been genuinely passed to Mr Gilligan at the

initial meeting and that he had had with his source, and then whether or not he had added to it.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. That, to my mind, was a sort of critical issue at the centre of the affair, to explain how these allegations had arisen

and on what they were or were not based.

MR DINGEMANS: So you have the meeting then in No. 10 in I think Sir David Manning's office.

A. Indeed.

Q. You discussed the matters you have outlined to his Lordship, is that right?

A. Well, not exactly. We passed -- David Omand and I explained to David Manning what we had understood from

Kevin Tebbit. We gave him the name, mentioned the name; and I told him what I had already said to David Omand,

that I had one recollection of this name in relation to The Observer article.

Q. Yes. Was anything decided at that meeting?

A. Nothing was decided at that meeting. The meeting was joined by Jonathan Powell. It was noted that this was

relevant, this issue, to two big events which were due to happen very shortly: one was the publication of the FAC

report, due on the Monday morning -- since this was late Friday evening, this was virtually immediately; and the

meeting of the BBC governors, which I think had very shortly before been announced for the Sunday evening.

Q. Were there any conclusions reached at the meeting?

A. My only other memory of the meeting was this was something that might need to be dealt with as a disciplinary

matter and certainly would need to be dealt with as a personnel matter within the Ministry of Defence structures and

would have to be handled accordingly.

Q. Can I take you to CAB/19/2, which are some notes from minute books we have now been provided. It says:

"John Scarlett, 4/7/3." You can see from the top it is an extract from Sebastian Madden's minute book. It says:

"David Kelly. "-- MoD PACS. "(FCO secondee) "-- Not Gilligan's source but had met him in a hotel? "Next steps. "--

disciplinary offence. Not OS

A." I imagine that means "Official Secrets Act", does it?

A. That is right.

Q. Then Kevin Tebbit writing to, who is that?

A. Sir David Omand, Sir David Manning, John Scarlett, et cetera.

Q. "Line to take. "Saying no action being taken to make [it looks like] the name public."

A. "To make things public", yes.

Q. And: "SDO to warn Matthew/SDM." So Sir David Omand to warn?

A. Matthew Rycroft; that would be the private secretary in No. 10.

Q. And SDM?

A. Sir David Manning.

Q. That is a note of the meeting you appear to have had before you went over to No. 10.

A. Yes, it must have been because I do not recall Sebastian Madden coming with us when we went to No. 10.

Q. Then CAB/11/3. This is a document you produced after the event, but is described as an aide memoir, "Meetings

at which I was present". If we go to the bottom of CAB/11/4 you can see it is your document, John Scarlett, dated

21st July 2003. Going back to 4th July, this is your note of the meeting: "MoD official has come forward [name

given] sounds like Gilligan's source. Noted that normal MoD procedures must be followed and appropriate legal

advice taken." Did you know or did anyone tell you what the normal MoD personnel procedures were?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether or not any legal advice was taken at this stage?

A. No. That is a reference to David Manning, it was, at the meeting, who said that it might be necessary or we would

need to consider the question of legal advice, but there was no further discussion at that point.

Q. Then you can see the reference to BBC governors and the FAC, which you have told us about.

A. Yes.

Q. That is on 4th July. Do you actually see Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter?

A. Yes, I do, shortly before I go home.

Q. Which is at MoD/1/35. I am not sure we need to see that again unless there is anything you want to identify in

that.

A. No.

Q. On 5th July I think you are told about a second letter Sir Kevin Tebbit is going to write?

A. Yes.

Q. That is because he has read an article in The Times that morning and he has told us he came into work?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your discussions that weekend?

A. They were very brief. I was told by the Cabinet Office duty officer that we had a copy sent to me of Kevin Tebbit's

letter very briefly what with that was. I did not go into the office to look at it. I discussed it over the phone or I heard

about it over the phone. I then spent some time at home looking through the transcripts from the Foreign Affairs

Committee and the meeting with Andrew Gilligan, because I knew, although I could not remember all the details,

there had been discussion there about the precise nature and number of Andrew Gilligan's sources.

Q. You dictated, on Monday morning, a document. Can I take you to CAB/1/46?

A. Yes.

Q. Is this the document you put together, thinking about it over the weekend, as it were, and dictate up -- if you go

down to the bottom of the page you can see John Muir, 7th July.

A. Yes, that is my private secretary.

Q. You dictate the following that you: " ... agree with Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday that the finger points strongly

at David Kelly as Gilligan's source." That was your analysis, was it?

A. Yes, based on my reading of the transcripts and my knowledge of the affair generally, that was what I was

thinking very first thing on Monday morning.

Q. Then you attached two copies of the FAC transcript which you thought made that proposition good, as it were.

Then you say this: "If he could have referred to any corroborating information he would have done so. If this is true,

Kelly is not telling the whole story. "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single intelligence report item from

somewhere, presumably Kelly."

A. Yes.

Q. That is because you worked out that Mr Gilligan had said two things that were not known to the public, is that

right?

A. Yes.

Q. One, that the 45 minutes was late.

A. Yes.

Q. And two, that it was single source.

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. So those two things Mr Gilligan must have found out from someone?

A. Yes.

Q. If Dr Kelly is the single source, then it must have been through Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, if there was only one source -- and that was the meaning of the FAC transcripts, that there was only one

source. If there had been a conversation as described by Dr Kelly between himself and Mr Gilligan at that time, then

either it -- the chances of it also containing references or being the point at which Mr Gilligan learned these two

items of information or there being some other conversation with another source and that Mr Gilligan was not

regarding Dr Kelly as a source at all, those were the two possibilities. But if he was not regarding Dr Kelly as a

source at all, it sort of seemed to me extremely unlikely he would not have made some reference to him, the

existence of such a conversation, in his conversation with the FAC as corroboration on a point where he was under

some pressure to explain why he was placing so much reliance on one particular source.

Q. So you have worked out over the weekend that Dr Kelly has not given the full story to the Ministry of Defence or

probably not given the full story to the Ministry of Defence?

A. Well, as I understood it, on the basis of very partial knowledge of what had actually happened between Dr Kelly

and the MoD, because I had seen the letter giving a fairly brief summary of the interview between Dr Kelly and Mr

Hatfield and the MoD and conclusions, but it gave very few details actually about that interview. And also I heard a

brief oral account and I had seen or heard of Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday -- so I did not have a full

understanding of that. But on the basis of what I had been told, these important points about: where did Mr Gilligan

get the knowledge about the report arriving late and it being based on one intelligence report, where did he learn

that from?

Q. Because if we go back to MoD/1/34, which is the letter of 4th July that I think you said you saw on the Friday

night --

A. Yes.

Q. -- and go to the bottom of the page, second bullet as it were, you can see that: "On the issue of 45 minutes [this

is after Dr Kelly's interview on 4th July], raised by Gilligan, he said he did not know to what it refers (not having

access to the intelligence report)." That is the comment you considered at the least doubtful after what your analysis

had shown over the weekend?

A. Well, it seemed possible, maybe more than possible that it did not tell the full story.

Q. Going then back to CAB/1/46, that is why you recommend a "security style" interview. Do you want to explain

what you mean by that?

A. I made this comment very quickly on the Monday morning, before I went off to another meeting. I had tried to ring

David Omand just to make these points to him by telephone but he was engaged elsewhere. This note here I

therefore dictated to my private secretary. It was for David Omand only, it was not copied more widely, and it was

my advice to him. It was not an action document in any way. What I meant was that the interview that had taken

place so far seemed to me to leave important questions uncovered, these needed to be pursued, and so a further

interview was necessary. That interview would need to be thorough and forensic, and designed to reach as

satisfactory an answer as possible, one way or the other, to these outstanding questions. I thought and meant no

more than that.

Q. Right. Then I think on 7th July in the morning you go to --

LORD HUTTON: I think the suggestion has been that those words rather convey someone is to be quite seriously

grilled.

A. I thought, my Lord, no more than I have just said.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. That I thought there were some outstanding facts/points here which needed to be got clear, and that a further

interview was going to be necessary and it would need to be more thorough than was the impression I had of the

interview which had taken place on the Friday. I did not give it any more thought than that.

MR DINGEMANS: You then attend a meeting with the Prime Minister; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think there are two meetings, one at 9 o'clock and one at 9.30?

A. There is one shortly after 9 o'clock and then one at 9.30.

Q. They are mainly discussions about the Foreign Affairs Committee report.

A. Indeed.

Q. There is a brief discussion about Dr Kelly. What is said at that stage, at the first meeting?

A. At the first meeting, very briefly, the Prime Minister had asked to see me, so I had left a separate meeting I was

attending in Alastair Campbell's office about the Foreign Affairs Committee report. I went to see him. I was with him

for a very short while. Jonathan Powell was the only other person there. He wanted to know what the arrangements

were for discussing the Foreign Affairs Committee report. I told him what was planned, we would be coming along

at 9.30. Then there was a brief reference to the fact that somebody had come forward from the MoD and that we -- I

mean, I knew that he knew about it and he probably wanted to know whether I knew about it. I cannot quite

remember. And I recall that I mentioned Dr Kelly's name certainly at that meeting, but I am afraid I do not know

whether the Prime Minister already knew the name, and the Prime Minister commented that it was going to be

necessary to know more and to learn more; and that was it. I then rejoined the meeting in Alastair Campbell's office.

Q. Then, do you have a further meeting with the Prime Minister at about 9.30?

A. Well, I along with others who had been in Alastair Campbell's office went, as agreed, to the Prime Minister's

Office where a meeting was already in progress.

Q. And was anything said about Dr Kelly at that meeting?

A. Most of that meeting was on the FAC report and how to react to it.

Q. Yes.

A. There was a discussion, at the end, about Dr Kelly. Kevin Tebbit was at the meeting. There was, as I recall,

discussion as to whether he might or might not be Mr Gilligan's source. It was noted, I do remember Kevin Tebbit

saying that there were a number of points where his story importantly diverged from Mr Gilligan's. He also did say

that he had been explicit in saying he had not said anything about Alastair Campbell. It was sort of -- it was agreed,

at the end, that he could be the source. It was impossible to know, without knowing more. And there was consensus

around the meeting that he should be interviewed again.

Q. Can I take you to your note? We have looked at your note for 4th July. It is CAB/11/3. For 7th July this is a note

you make, scrolling down the page. First meeting: "Brief discussion of whether Dr Kelly should be the source. Prime

Minister states that it must be handled according to proper MoD and Civil Service procedures." Was there at that

stage any discussion about what those proper procedures were?

A. No, but the Prime Minister did state it.

Q. At the 9.30 meeting, again with the Prime Minister and others that you list, then you say this: "Brief discussion of

MoD source. If he appeared before a Committee, would he be likely to support or otherwise the Government

position? JSC"... That is you I imagine, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. "... to seek advice from MoD. Was he/was he not the source? No further decision possible without knowing more

about his contact with Gilligan." Why was it important or does it appear to have been important to find out whether

he supported or otherwise the Government position?

A. Whether or not it was important, it was not quite put like that. It was -- there was a discussion, a brief discussion,

as to whether -- if, at some point, Dr Kelly was questioned in public before a Committee, as mentioned here, if that

happened, what were his views on the question of Iraq and Iraqi WMD? Were these consistent with what the

Government itself had been saying and was saying or were they not? It was a recognition that this was a point on

which the Government, you know, could usefully be informed, should know what the situation was. It was no more

than that.

Q. No firm decisions were taken then because everything was awaiting the further interviews?

A. Yes.

Q. We know he was interviewed later on that day by Richard Hatfield, Martin Howard and Dr Wells was there.

A. Yes.

Q. And we have seen notes of that. Was any report made back to you after the meeting, after the interview?

A. Martin Howard telephoned me at the end of the day to give a brief verbal account of how the interview had gone.

It was very brief; and the points that I recall from that telephone conversation were, first, that Dr Kelly had repeated

the same points that he had made on Friday, and, in particular, had repeated his conviction that he could not be the

source for Mr Gilligan.

Q. Right.

A. But that he had seemed less sure, on this occasion, than he had before; and that in particular I quite clearly

remember Martin saying that he had begun to comment: well, he was not quite sure of what had been said on

particular points and that maybe it could be that Andrew Gilligan had led him on, but that was not defined further.

LORD HUTTON: Just going back to your note on the 9.30 meeting on 7th July and the passage Mr Dingemans has

referred you to: "Brief discussion of MoD source. If he appeared before a Committee, would he be likely to support

or otherwise the Government position?" That might be read as meaning that whether or not he would be produced

before a Committee might depend on whether he would be likely to support or otherwise the Government position.

A. It might be read like that, my Lord, but it is not my memory of the discussion. My memory was that if he appeared

before a Committee, whether or not the Government wanted it, what would he say? And there was interest in

knowing that in advance.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: So Mr Howard has reported to you now the second meeting. In relation to that, Mr Howard says: I

think he must be the single source.

A. Yes. I should add --

Q. For the reasons you have given.

A. He did say that as well.

Q. If he was the single source, then Dr Kelly must have said: the 45 minutes was single sourced and it was added

late. Did you say to Mr Howard: well, what did he say about these two points?

A. I do not think I did.

Q. Looking through the notes of interview, it does not look as if Dr Kelly was asked about that. Do you know

anything about that?

A. I am afraid I do not remember enough detail of the notes of the interview to answer that.

Q. Right. Was there any sort of understanding that: we would leave aside those difficult areas about what you have

actually said to Mr Gilligan if you are a person not able, as it were, to support the central thrust of Mr Gilligan's

report?

A. Not at all; no.

Q. You have had this discussion, then, with Mr Howard?

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Was there anything else that happened on the 7th July, the Monday, so far as you recall?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did you have any input into any draft press statements, at that stage, or discussions about draft press

statements?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Or defensive Q and A material?

A. No, I did not.

Q. On 8th July we know the Prime Minister is going off to a Liaison Committee meeting. I think you attend meetings

at Downing Street; is that right?

A. It is right.

Q. The first meeting is at what time?

A. About 8.15.

Q. What is discussed then in relation to Dr Kelly?

A. Only one point. The Prime Minister was concerned that he might be asked, at the Liaison Committee, whether, for

example, any leak inquiry was under way, whether there was a serious effort to identify the source, whether he had

any idea or the Government had any idea as to who the source might be.

Q. And we have heard that a form of holding answer was agreed.

A. Yes.

Q. That enquiries were under way; but as I understand it, he was not asked about that?

A. That is right.

Q. He comes back from that at about 11.30 or 11.45 on the Tuesday.

A. Yes.

Q. Are you present at a meeting then?

A. I was not present at the very beginning of a meeting but I joined it very quickly.

Q. What was discussed there?

A. Well, the basis of that meeting was the outcome of the second interview, which was reported to the meeting by

David Omand.

Q. Which you have already heard of briefly the night before.

A. Yes. I think David Omand gave some more detail; and he had it anyway officially from Kevin Tebbit, as I

understand. Kevin Tebbit was not present at that particular meeting, at that time, and so David Omand reported the

results. The conclusion of the second interview was that the chances of Dr Kelly being the single source for Mr

Gilligan were significantly higher than they had been before.

Q. And that was what prompted you to take -- everyone at the meeting to take a course of action?

A. Well, the subsequent discussion at that meeting was based on that assessment.

Q. That he was the single source?

A. Not that he was definitely, but that there was a much higher chance or that there was a very serious chance that

he was.

Q. I think it has been stressed that there should be Ministry of Defence personnel procedures followed?

A. Yes.

Q. What does the meeting conclude? What is the conclusion of that meeting at 11.30/11.45?

A. That meeting concluded that the ISC, Intelligence and Security Committee, should be informed, in a letter, that

someone had come forward who might be the source for the Andrew Gilligan report; that they should also be told

that there were important differences between this person's account of the conversation and Mr Gilligan's reported

account; and that that person would be available for interview by the ISC if the ISC so wanted; that that would be a

letter sent to the Chairman of the ISC; that it would be copied to the Foreign Affairs Committee, but it would be sent,

as it were, for action to the ISC; that it should not name the person concerned.

Q. All that is decided at the meeting; is that right?

A. That was the provisional decision, if you like, at that meeting; but it was dependent on further discussion, detailed

discussion, with the Ministry of Defence.

Q. Because I think you have stressed that everyone was keen that Ministry of Defence personnel procedures be

followed.

A. Yes.

Q. A provisional decision is reached at that meeting; and there is no-one from the Ministry of Defence there, is

there?

A. Yes, because we were waiting for Kevin Tebbit to arrive for the meeting.

Q. I think he has told us he was handing out medals for HMS Nottingham down in Portsmouth.

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Mr Scarlett, at that stage if the ISC was to be informed that a source had come

forward but the person was not to be named and the letter to the ISC was to be copied to the FAC, did it occur to

you that it was then probable that in some way or another the name would come out into the public domain?

A. The discussion, my Lord, that we had at that meeting was based on a sort of number of assessments or

assumptions. One of those was that the fact that somebody had come forward would, whatever the Government

did, become public knowledge quickly, possibly very quickly.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. Secondly, that Dr Kelly had been told that a public statement would probably be made and that he had accepted

that, and that he had also been told that it was very likely that at some point, it was not defined, to my knowledge,

his name would become known as the person who had come forward and that he knew that.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Why was it decided that his name should be sent to the ISC? What, they were at the present

time, investigating, what, the reasons for the war or ...

A. No, the ISC, my Lord, were in the early stages of an inquiry into the role of intelligence in Iraq.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. That they had been collecting documentation in support of this inquiry and that they were to begin having oral

sessions with witnesses the following morning. Indeed, I was due to be the first witness before them. So their inquiry

was, as it were, getting underway.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. That was the inquiry with which the Government were cooperating with all matters relating to intelligence. Indeed,

the inquiry was about the role of intelligence in Iraq.

LORD HUTTON: Why inform the ISC that this source had come forward? The reason may be obvious but I would

just like you to say.

A. No, it was our view and the view of the meeting, and this was a recommendation made to the meeting initially by

David Omand, that the ISC were the proper body to be investigating all aspects of the role of intelligence in Iraq,

including those aspects relating to the September public assessment and including the controversy which by then

existed around that assessment. So they were the right Committee to be dealing with it.

LORD HUTTON: We have heard that the ISC conduct their proceedings in private.

A. Yes, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: They report to the Prime Minister.

A. Yes, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: Do their reports ever become public or are they kept private?

A. No, all their reports become public, but they are subject to redaction by agreement between the Government and

the Committee; if that redaction is justified on national security grounds only.

LORD HUTTON: They are published by whom, by the Prime Minister's Office or by the ISC?

A. I think by the Government.

LORD HUTTON: They are made public in any event?

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Was anything said about Dr Kelly's continued cooperation at this stage, with the interviewing

process?

A. At that stage only what I have already said.

Q. Can I just take you to CAB/11/6? This is a note that I know you did not make but is dated 21st July and it is made

by Sir David Omand. If one goes to the top of the page, and this is in relation to the 7th July meeting, Kevin: "Kevin

Tebbit said the MoD were considering calling him back to talk to him again. He reiterated that Dr Kelly had come

forward of his own volition. As far as the MoD was concerned, no question of an offence under the Official Secrets

Act. Dr Kelly's continued cooperation was therefore essential."

A. Yes.

Q. Had anyone asked Dr Kelly whether he wanted to be sent off to the ISC?

A. My understanding was that he had been told that he would be likely -- he might very well be called before a

Committee if his name became public, and that he accepted that would happen.

Q. After the meeting you would go away to draft a letter?

A. Yes.

Q. Which I think we see at CAB/18/68 to 69.

A. Yes.

Q. This is a document that is not sent; is that right?

A. Yes, that is right. I should say that I was doing this because it had been agreed at the meeting that David Omand

would -- it was his suggestion that the ISC should be informed and that he should write to the Chairman of the

Committee. But David Omand was about to go on an official trip to Canada and literally had no choice but to leave

straightaway. So it was agreed I would take over from him and represent him and that I would draft a letter. This is

the draft which I put together after the end of that meeting and it was -- certainly it was never sent, but it was

produced as the basis for initial discussion at a meeting at 1330. And it reflected the provisional agreement and

discussion which I have just described. As you can see, it is entitled "Letter from Sir Kevin Tebbit..." Well, that is

what it says because that is what, you know, was recorded as the draft. My memory of the meeting certainly is that

it was agreed that David Omand should write, but there was some discussion as to whether the ISC should be

properly informed by the security intelligence coordinator or the Ministry of Defence, and probably what I drafted

reflected that discussion. I simply do not remember.

Q. Can I take you down to the third paragraph of that letter: "This individual is an expert on WMD but was not 'one

of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier'. He is not a member of the Intelligence Services. Nor is he

a member of the Senior Civil Service. He did not have access to the intelligence report on 45 minutes and was not

involved in discussions about whether or how this information should be used in the September dossier. He says

that he made no allegations or accusations about the issue related to the dossier, in particular that the 45 minute

intelligence had been inserted by Mr Campbell or Downing Street against the wishes of the intelligence community.

"He made no other comment about Alastair Campbell. When asked by Mr Gilligan why the 45 minute report was in

the dossier, he commented that 'it was probably for impact'." That letter appears to be written on the basis that Dr

Kelly knows nothing about all these things. Did you know, at this stage, that Dr Kelly was probably the source for Mr

Gilligan's accurate claims that the 45 minutes was added late and single sourced?

A. I did not know that, at that time.

Q. But you suspected it?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And yet, I mean, it is only a draft.

A. Yes.

Q. But it is fair to say this, is it not: there is not much hint of that suspicion in the draft letter?

A. Can you just go back to the earlier -- beginning?

Q. Yes.

A. What is written there answers the point as to whether he would have had the kind of access which would have

been necessary to have stood up the Andrew Gilligan report.

Q. But you are just looking at one part of the Andrew Gilligan report; and I have asked Mr Gilligan about all his

report, part of it in relation to claims that the Government knew it was false. And we asked whether or not there was

anything to support that. But part of the report was the 45 minutes was late; and part of the report was that the 45

minutes was single sourced. If that came from Dr Kelly, it rather suggests that Dr Kelly's access to intelligence was

slightly higher than you are putting it in this draft letter.

A. Well, I am not sure I would agree with that. Whoever it was who was Mr Gilligan's source was making his

statements many months after the fact of the compilation of the dossier; and so whoever it was might have been

hearing things from somebody who was involved.

Q. And did you, at this stage, think: we are now about to put him before the Intelligence and Security Committee, we

are going to write a letter, we had better find out what he actually did do in relation to the September dossier, or

were no enquiries made?

A. We did not discuss making any further interviews, as I recall, at that meeting.

Q. But you have decided he has to go away for what you call a "security style" interview, and you have explained

what you mean by that, and he has gone off for that interview. Surely another thing to chase down would be what he

actually did in relation to the September dossier? That would have been, one assumes, a fairly easy enquiry to

make.

A. At this particular stage, at this particular discussion, I had not seen a full account of the second interview. We had

heard the conclusions of the second interview, not the detail.

Q. Right. So you write this draft letter. But you get some further communications from the Intelligence and Security

Commission, is that right?

A. Committee, yes.

Q. Sorry, Committee.

A. Yes, we receive a message from them some time after 13.30, after a further meeting has convened.

Q. What are you told?

A. I should explain at the end of this meeting, and before going to Canada, Sir David Omand had communicated

with the Clerk of the Committee to tell him what was proposed, and the Clerk had then replied, reporting a comment

from the Chairman, that the Chairman did not wish to receive the letter that was proposed but would be content if

there were to be a public statement which would contain a reference to the fact that the person concerned would be

available for interview with the Intelligence and Security Committee. That was the message which came back from

the Clerk.

Q. So what did everyone decide to do, issue a public statement?

A. There was no decision to do anything; but the next step in the discussion in the 13.30 meeting was to put to one

side this draft here of a letter and to look at a possible draft for a public statement.

Q. Did you look at any drafts for public statements?

A. There was some initial drafting of the main points to be covered at that meeting in the Prime Minister's office, and

then the meeting came to an end.

Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/56, which is actually the press statement as is issued.

A. Yes.

Q. There are some various comments we have seen that have been made on it in the past. You do not appear to

have written anything on the press statement.

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you make any contribution to the drafting of it?

A. Not specifically. I was present at the discussion in the Prime Minister's office which initially set out the terms of

the press statement. And then I was present at a meeting in Godric Smith's office, where the press statement was

drafted in more detail.

Q. You can see here that if one looks at the end of the first paragraph: "The official has told us that he made no

allegations or accusations about the dossier and, in particular, did not suggest that any material had been added to

the dossier by Alastair Campbell or Downing~Street against the wishes of the intelligence community. He is not a

member of the Intelligence Services or the Defence Intelligence Staff." You have told us before the meeting at 11.30

you had not actually seen the notes of the second interview.

A. Hmm.

Q. We are now about to put out a press statement to the world at large, and everyone is obviously concerned not to

mislead anyone. Has anyone yet checked to see whether Dr Kelly had anything to do with the September drafting of

the dossier?

A. This statement, again, was drawn up -- in fact, it was drawn up in some detail in the presence of Kevin Tebbit,

who by that time had joined the meeting; but the whole subject was subject to agreement by the Ministry of

Defence, who were the people who held the details of the second interview.

Q. Well, had you checked --

A. I had not checked.

Q. And did anyone tell you that they had checked to see what Dr Kelly --

A. They did not.

Q. Did you not think that it was something that ought to be addressed?

A. I do not recall any discussion of that point in the meeting.

Q. We know on 8th July that Mr Howard is also writing to you -- this is CAB/1/77 -- about Dr Kelly's views of the

Iraqi WMD programme. If we scroll down we can see that in paragraph 1: "What reflects points made by David Kelly

in his letter [which we know to have been 30th June] and his interviews." Then he talks about his knowledge of

WMD programme: "No unease about the dossier." On the 45 minute deployment issue, at the bottom, he says his

standard view is he does not know the intelligence and is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons system. The only other

point, over the page, to note was that 30 per cent change of CW production capability, and he distinguishes

between production and possession.

A. Yes.

Q. Why is this letter being written to you?

A. Because I had asked for those views to be reported to me on 7th July. I had taken that away as an action which I

understood had been left with me after the early morning meeting on 7th July in the Prime Minister's Office.

Q. If we go back to CAB/1/77 and go to the top, we can see some handwriting. Whose handwriting is that?

A. Sadly it is mine.

Q. I think we have managed to work out some more of what it says: "See over the page and the attached extract

from Gilligan's evidence to the FAC."

A. Yes.

Q. "Note ..." You will have to help me with the second word?

A. "Also".

Q. "... that Kelly may state his view, if given the chance by the FAC, that the trailers are not for BW production. It is

not clear ..." "To me" is that?

A. Even I cannot read that. It seems to be "to me".

Q. "... how widely the FAC will go in their questioning." Was there concern that the FAC might go widely in their

questioning?

A. It was the same point that had been registered on the Monday, and I was writing this on the Thursday, that it

would be useful to know what he would or would not say at the -- for example, before the FAC. Useful in the sense

that it is just always useful to know points which have an impact of one kind or another on the position of the

Government, no more than that. So I am addressing that particular interest by writing this comment. The main

purpose of this manuscript note is to draw the attention of the addressees to what is over the page, the underlined

bit, which relates to his views on the likelihood of production and possession of weaponry, because that is very

closely similar to the views recorded by Andrew Gilligan as being held by his source. It is not identically the same;

and in my view that underlined strongly the chance that he was actually Mr Gilligan's source. That is why I sent that

note through to No. 10.

LORD HUTTON: Mr Scarlett, may I just ask you: are you able to make any comment on the penultimate line of the

first page of that letter, that Dr Kelly says that his standard view is that he does not know the intelligence and is not

familiar with an Iraqi weapons system that matches that sort of timescale? Now, I think that Dr Kelly had suggested

to someone else that the source for the 45 minutes reference might have confused it with some multiple barrelled

Iraqi weapon. Are you able to make any comment -- and if, for security reasons, you cannot please just say so, but

are you able to comment on that comment by Dr Kelly: he is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons system that matches

that sort of timescale?

A. I can only make a limited comment, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. Which, I think, may not be relevant; but certainly Andrew Gilligan, when quoting his source, said that the source

believed that the report was relating to warheads for missiles.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. Which, in fact, it was not; it related to munitions, which we had interpreted to mean battlefield mortar shells or

small calibre weaponry, quite different from missiles.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. So it is possible that Dr Kelly, who, as I still understand it, never did see or probably did not see the original

report, was in a state of genuine confusion about what the report actually said.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And that could explain that particular comment, but I am not sure.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: That is 8th July, Mr Howard's writing to you. Can I take you to CAB/11/134, because you get an

e-mail from Claire Sumner on 7th July to Alastair Campbell but copied to you and David Manning and Jonathan

Powell: " I am being chased by the Clerk on this -- what is the view?" There is a reply on behalf of David Manning: "I

see no reason for Alastair to do this. He has been exonerated by the FAC [obviously the report of 7th July]. ISC

should concentrate on intelligence issues, talking to heads of agencies and Chairman of JIC." Was that your view as

well, that it would really be appropriate for the ISC to concentrate on intelligence issues, the heads of agencies and

yourself, rather than speak to someone like Dr Kelly?

A. I did not have a strong view one way or the other on this, and I did not record one.

Q. On 8th July we know that the press statement is issued. There is also some defensive Q and A material that is

issued. Were you party to any discussions in relation to that?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Do you have any view on the propriety or otherwise of that defensive Q and A material?

A. No, I do not.

Q. If we turn to CAB/1/87, we can see a further exchange on 9th July, with you being copied in, from Claire Sumner

to Alastair Campbell confirming he is going to appear from 8.30 to 9.45 on 17th July and will have to leave promptly:

"I asked where they were with other interviews. "The ISC Clerk told me that the Committee were not interested in

interviewing Andrew G as he could not say anything more to them than the FAC. "He said that on the source they

were waiting for David Omand to write to them with correspondence. He implied that he did not believe it was the

source so could not see the point of ISC seeing him and said they were not interested in the BBC/AC row." Did you

see this e-mail?

A. I did.

Q. What was your view on it?

A. Well, my immediate view was that the Clerk had, for understandable reasons, sort of misunderstood the situation

because he was resting his view on the view which had been taken at the end of the week before by the -- that is

right, the end of the week before by the FAC, and that was a view which I thought was unlikely to be true and so the

other thought which went through my mind was that when the Committee -- if the Committee came to the view that

indeed he was the source, then they would take a different view.

Q. But one of the things that would convince them that he was the source was showing them he had actually made

the comments about the 45 minutes and --

A. I am sorry, can I just correct myself there? I am muddling that up. The FAC conclusion, of course, had not been

recorded at that stage. I am sorry, I am getting my dates wrong.

Q. On the --

A. In fact, he did not believe it was the source. That must be based -- the view of the Clerk of the ISC there must be

based on the fact that the source had said, you know, he was not the source.

Q. The Clerk of the ISC must have seen, by then, the Ministry of Defence press statement because that is issued on

8th July.

A. Yes.

Q. So it is obviously basing it on that.

A. Yes.

Q. But one reason the Clerk may have been muddled was because the press statement did not say: Mr Gilligan was

right about the 45 minutes being added late, he was right about it being single source. But that is not surprising

because Dr Kelly would have known that for this reason: namely his involvement in the drafting with the dossier in

September.

A. Sorry, can I ask you to repeat that? I am not quite sure I am following you.

Q. The MoD press statement, I have already asked you about whether or not that was accurate.

A. Yes.

Q. Because it did not tell anyone that Dr Kelly had an involvement in drafting the dossier in September, did it?

A. That was because at that stage, to be clear about this, I and the others involved did not know that he had had

any involvement, even of a minimal kind, in the drafting of the intelligence parts of the September dossier.

Q. But on 7th July you had noted in your note that Dr Kelly must or there was a strong probability that Dr Kelly was

not telling the whole truth about what he had said to Andrew Gilligan because he must have got the 45 minutes from

someone.

A. Yes, but he could have learned that from somebody who was involved in the drafting of the dossier.

Q. He is sent off or offered to the ISC on that basis, that it was assumed that he must have picked it up in general

conversations?

A. No, I do not think that is a fair representation of what happened at all. Whether or not he was the source for

Andrew Gilligan's knowledge about the 45 minute report coming in late and being based on one report, the

conversation which he reported as having had with Andrew Gilligan meant there was a very high chance that he was

Andrew Gilligan's single source.

Q. I have asked you about Mr Howard's letter to you. Can I just take you to another document, CAB/1/106, which is

a letter of 14th July which is from Colin Smith of the Counter Proliferation Strategy CPD, and he writes in 1(a): "DCDI

is to brief David Kelly this afternoon for his appearances tomorrow before the FAC and the ISC, and will strongly

recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier (but stick to what he told Gilligan). Kelly is

apparently feeling the pressure and does not appear to be handling it well." Were you party to any discussions about

what Dr Kelly should or should not be drawn on in front of any of the Committees?

A. Only very briefly, in the following sense: that I had a brief conversation, I cannot remember on which day, with

Martin Howard where I noted to him that it was going to be important that Dr Kelly had proper support before he

appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee and received a briefing. By that I meant, but I am not sure whether I

spelled it out, that if he was going to be appearing and might be asked about a range of questions, it was going to

be necessary for it to be clear that he was not speaking as a spokesman of Government policy for the Ministry of

Defence, that the views he might have on areas of expertise were his own particular views and other experts might

have other views. That was the issue that was in my mind. I recall Martin saying to me that he was giving him very

detailed support but of course he would be able to say what he liked before the Committee. That was the end of

that conversation.

Q. So do the terms of the letter slightly surprise you, that it is being recommended -- strongly recommended -- that

Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier?

A. (Pause). You know, at the time I had no particular, you know, thoughts about that point. I honestly cannot say that

I, you know, dwelt on it.

Q. I did not ask for your views at the time but now. Are you slightly surprised by the terms of that letter?

A. Not really.

Q. And why is that?

A. (Pause). I am not even completely sure that this is an accurate record of this discussion. This record is a note

made, I think, by somebody in the FCO who attended a meeting which I chaired on 14th July. I recall DCDI, Martin

Howard, talking about his briefing of David Kelly that afternoon. I do not recall particularly what he said. And I do

also recall him saying that Dr Kelly was beginning to show signs of feeling some pressure. So I do remember him

making these comments; but I am not sure that the rest of it is accurate. It is not an official record of the meeting, it

is an internal note within the FCO.

Q. Perhaps we can have the official record when you go back, if there are other records of this meeting.

A. Certainly, if there are.

Q. That is very kind.

LORD HUTTON: Did you make any comment or did you ever send any minute or e-mail to anyone about Dr Kelly

being under pressure if he went to give evidence before the FAC or the ISC?

A. No, I did not, my Lord. I would add that I saw the management of that to be a matter absolutely for the Ministry of

Defence, who were in possession of all the information and I was not.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I help you in relation to your last question. At CAB/11/4, Tuesday 8th July, and we know this

is a minute made after the event, if one scrolls down the page, 1330 meeting: "Discussion of how BBC will react (will

they be ready to discuss this in a business-like way). If Dr Kelly name becomes public will Government be criticised

for putting him under 'wider pressure'? PM repeats that MoD must remain in charge and follow their procedures."

That is all I have been able to see where you draft anything referring to pressure; is that right?

A. Yes. I recall that discussion. There was a brief conversation around: well, if his name does become public

following on from a public statement of the kind that the meeting had been discussed, would the Government be

criticised in any way and, if so, what for? I said: that, well, the Government would possibly be accused of putting

him under pressure to allow the public statement to have been made and there was no further discussion of that

point as I recall. I was just registering that point.

Q. Can I just ask you one further question in relation to the dossier before I ask you your final question. I am sorry, I

missed it this morning. It is CAB/11/77. This is an e-mail from Jonathan Powell to you on 17th September which is

the same date, at the bottom of the page, that Mr Campbell writes his memo if that helps to orientate you.

A. Yes.

Q. "The dossier is good and convincing for those who are prepared to be convinced. "I have only three points, none

of which affect the way the document is drafted or presented. "First the document does nothing to demonstrate a

threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam. On other words it shows he has the means but does not

demonstrate motive let alone the rest. We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim

that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat. The case we are making is that he has continued to develop

WMD since 1998, and is in breach of those resolutions." Going back to 77 and up the page, because that is how the

e-mails work, you respond saying: "We are now doing a note on Iraq and A

Q." Is that Al-Qaida?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. "The dossier mentions about eight sites." Then there is an intervention from Felicity Hatfield on behalf of Alastair

Campbell. Jonathan Powell, at the top, responds on those other points, but at the bottom of that says: "The threat

argument will be a major problem in the press Parliamentary assault after the dossier comes out. We need to flag up

in the point in the preface at publication and during the debate. We need to set the test for ourselves at a level we

can meet." We have also seen another e-mail in which he said that the dossier ought to make it clear there is no

current threat, I think as he put it. Can I take you to his actual words which is CAB/11/53, where he says that in the

penultimate paragraph: "You need to make it clear that Saddam could not attack us at the moment. The thesis is he

would be a threat to the UK in the future if we do not check him."

A. Sorry, which?

Q. This is the bottom of that page.

A. I see. Yes.

Q. You do not appear to have been copied into this e-mail?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Were you aware of these suggestions being made?

A. I was not aware of that e-mail and have not seen that before. On the other e-mail, which was either sent to me or

was copied to me --

Q. And you respond to?

A. Yes, and I respond to on the points which I saw as being relevant to me, I did not understand, and I still do not

understand, or take that memo to be a request or suggestion to me that the dossier and the text of it should be

changed in any way to reflect the point which Jonathan Powell was making. I took it to be a reference to what he

thought should be stated in a political statement, which -- whatever political statements were being made in relation

to the launching of the dossier. But in any case, even if he had asked for that to be, as it were, put into the dossier, I

am not sure I would have seen it as a statement which would have fitted easily into the way that the dossier was

construct. But he did not ask so it was not something I pursued.

Q. Is there anything else relating to Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

A. I do not think there is.

Q. And is there anything else that you wanted to say?

A. No, there is not.

LORD HUTTON: Could we just go back to CAB/11/4? Could we scroll down a bit. Thank you. That is it. Yes. Now,

Mr Scarlett, the note there: "If Doctor K name becomes public will Government be criticised for putting him under

'wider pressure'?" You say that is a point that you raised?

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: One might have expected there be some sort of response from someone at the meeting to the

effect that we have no option but to put him before the ISC or we may be accused of a cover-up if we do not reveal

his name. Do you recollect any comment? One would have thought there would be some sort of response to the

point that you made?

A. There was not, my Lord, and that may be because it was understood by everybody at the meeting to be the case

that Dr Kelly had been warned and was aware of the fact that his name, or rather that the public statement would be

made saying that somebody would come forward and that his name was very likely to come out and that he

accepted that. So that was part of the underlying assumption on I which the discussion was taking place. So I am

not sure I find it, even in retrospect, particularly surprising that no comment was made to my point, but as I recall no

comment was made.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Scarlett. Thank you. This would be a convenient time to rise, I

think.

3.15 pm: Short Break

3.20 pm: SIR DAVID OMAND (called) Examined by MR DINGEMANS

MR DINGEMANS: Can you give his Lordship your full name.

A. David Bruce Omand.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am the Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office.

Q. How long have you held that post for?

A. I took up that post last September, on the retirement of Sir Richard Wilson as Cabinet Secretary. I was appointed

by the Prime Minister to a new Permanent Secretary post as Security Intelligence Coordinator. In that post I have

day-to-day responsibility for a number of the functions traditionally associated with the Cabinet Secretary's post,

including accounting to Parliament for the Single Intelligence account and acting as line manager for the Chairman

of the Joint Intelligence Committee, as you have heard earlier today; and through him, the Cabinet Office

assessment staff and security policy division. My major responsibility, however, is overseeing cross-Government

work on civil contingencies and counter terrorism, often popularly referred to as "homeland security".

Q. Did you have any involvement in the drafting of the dossier?

A. As a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee I took my share of collective responsibility in --

Q. You were a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time, were you?

A. Yes, I had been, in previous jobs, a member of the JIC for a total of some five years. When I took up my new

position I decided to rejoin the Committee.

Q. Were you a member at the time that the dossier was being drafted from 5th September?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you on the drafting committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

A. No.

Q. I think we have heard that there were meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee itself on 5th and 9th

September, where assessments were considered in relation to the 45 minutes point, and various drafts of the

dossier were produced. Did you have any hand in producing those drafts of the dossiers or reviewing them?

A. I was part of that process; I attended those meetings and I did offer comments to John Scarlett on the handling of

the dossier.

Q. On the handling of the dossier. Were you aware or copied into the e-mails, we have seen some of them, for

example from persons in the Communications Department about the dossiers?

A. No, but John Scarlett kept me in touch. We meet very regularly and he kept me in touch with his work on the

dossier.

Q. Right. Did you, for example, see the memorandum that we have seen this morning from Alastair Campbell, dated

17th September, and Mr Scarlett's response of 18th September?

A. Yes, I did see those documents.

Q. You saw those. Were you aware of any general unhappiness with the fact that communications personnel were

assisting in presentational aspects of the dossier?

A. None whatever. And can I say that I do see John Scarlett very frequently; I have complete confidence in him and I

am sure he would have spoken to me immediately if he had felt there was any unease.

Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness lower down the scale, for example within the Defence Intelligence Staff?

A. Not at all.

LORD HUTTON: Not at -- I beg your pardon?

A. Not at all.

MR DINGEMANS: Meaning there might have been unhappiness and you were unaware of it or you knew that was

going on in the DIS?

A. That I was not at all aware of any unhappiness.

Q. You were not, for example, having contact with members of the DIS at this stage?

A. No. There are three members of the Joint Intelligence Committee from the Ministry of Defence: the Director

General for Policy, Chief of Defence Intelligence and the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence; and they participated

in our debates and discussions in the JIC. At no stage was any unease reported. Can I also add here that we did

debate, in the JIC, the decision to produce the dossier. We debated at length how we would protect sources and

methods; and I saw it as my particular responsibility to ensure that the whole exercise was conducted in a way that

did not endanger our intelligence.

Q. There had been press reports there were rows between yourself and Mr Campbell; are those reports true?

A. No.

Q. And that there were rows between a Mr Lander and Mr Campbell; are those reports true?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. You certainly did not see any?

A. No.

Q. And Mr Scarlett and Mr Campbell; you were not aware of any rows?

A. No, and I certainly would have been aware if there had been any disagreement over the handling of the dossier.

Q. You have seen, I think, because you were here earlier on, the conclusion that the FAC came to about the fact that

the dossier should have been in more traditional language, as they expressed it. First of all, do you accept that the

dossier was not in "traditional", whatever that might mean, intelligence language?

A. No, I do not accept that. I think the dossier was a faithful reflection of the underlying intelligence assessments

that the JIC had reached; and very great care was taken, throughout the process, to ensure that that was the case.

Q. We have seen an e-mail today, CAB/23/15. That e-mail is -- I think we were told by Mr Scarlett -- from someone

on the Joint Intelligence Committee back to, as it were, the agencies. It says: "Unsurprisingly they [as in No. 10]

have further questions and areas they would like expanded." Towards the bottom of the e-mail: "I appreciate

everyone, us included, has been around at least some of these buoys before, particularly item 4. But No. 10 through

the Chairman want the document to be a strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is

therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included." Were you aware

of the e-mail at the time?

A. No.

Q. It gives the impression that there is a bit of a sort of looking into cupboards to see if there is anything that has

been overlooked that might be put in the dossier. Would that be a fair assessment of the e-mail?

A. I think you have to remember the Joint Intelligence Committee itself was anxious to produce as strong a

document as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Q. Were you party to the final meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee that signed off the dossier?

A. Yes.

Q. And everyone assented to that?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Turning on to February 2003, we have heard that Mr Gilligan comes by a document, a secret document, relating

to the links between or absence of links between Al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein. I think we have also heard that

that did not come to Mr Gilligan from Dr Kelly, from Mr Gilligan's evidence. Were you aware of that leak?

A. Yes, and I was concerned by it.

Q. Were any steps taken?

A. I discussed with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, the possibility that there

could be a source of compromise of classified information within the Ministry of Defence, and he reassured me that

he too was taking steps to investigate whether that might be the case.

Q. And forwarding on then to 29th May, we have the broadcast by Mr Gilligan on Today. Did you in fact hear the

broadcast?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And your reaction to it?

A. Extreme surprise.

Q. Were you party to any action as a result of that?

A. No, although I did raise it with my office when I came in about 8 o'clock that morning to check that something

was being done and that the story would be responded to; and as far as I know the answer to that was: yes, it was

being handled by the No. 10 press office.

Q. We have seen documents with Mr Scarlett of 4th June about a leak inquiry and some reports up to you on 10th

June and your memos, and there is a final analysis on 9th July. If it is all right with you I will not take you through

those documents.

A. It is.

Q. But those suggest that attempts were being made to identify the source of the leak; is that right?

A. That is correct. It was difficult to pin down where this source or sources of compromise might be; and, therefore,

it did not seem justifiable to launch a formal leak investigation, which involves the appointment of an outside

investigator who would then conduct an extensive series of interviews with all those who would have seen the

relevant documents, not knowing where to start. That meant we had to try to narrow the field down, which is why we

asked the security policy division to see if they could undertake a preliminary investigation.

Q. We have seen the results of that. Did you hear of Dr Kelly's name at all during June?

A. No.

Q. Before your first involvement in July, had you heard of Dr Kelly before?

A. I had not.

Q. What was your involvement in relation to Dr Kelly?

A. When I was telephoned about 5.30 on the Friday, 4th July, by Sir Kevin Tebbit, who informed me that an

individual, Dr Kelly, had come forward.

Q. What discussion did you have with anyone as a result of that?

A. I discussed the situation with Kevin Tebbit. He told me he was going to write to me and seek my involvement, my

help, in ensuring the matter was handled properly and that there was proper interdepartmental coordination of what

clearly could be a difficult case to handle. I agreed to this; and he said he would write to me. I then spoke to John

Scarlett, as you have heard, and asked him if he knew of Dr Kelly and if Dr Kelly had been involved in the drawing up

of the dossier, since that clearly would be an important pointer as to whether or not this could be the source of the

stories.

Q. So you raised, on that Friday, the issue of whether or not Dr Kelly had actually been involved with drawing up the

dossier?

A. Yes, and I was assured by John Scarlett that he had not been part of John Scarlett's central assessment team's

work.

Q. He was not a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee or indeed the Assessment Committee for the Joint

Intelligence Committee.

A. Correct.

Q. Were any steps made to find out what involvement, if any, he had had with the final drafts of the dossier?

A. At that stage, no. My assumption was that that would indeed happen.

Q. Your assumption was that that would happen?

A. Yes, that this would be checked up on as part of the Ministry of Defence's investigation of Dr Kelly's involvement.

Q. Right. So you did not raise it expressly.

A. No.

Q. You assumed it would just be dealt with.

A. Yes.

Q. We have then heard you go over to No. 10, and there is a meeting at which you are joined by Mr Powell and Sir

David Manning; is that right?

A. Yes. I suggested to John Scarlett that we should try to speak to Sir David Manning as soon as possible, since he

was involved in the coordination of work on the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry which was due to report on the

Monday, and recall that I had been telephoned at 5.30 on a Friday afternoon and the report was due out on the

Monday. So there was very little time if anything was to be done in respect of that publication.

LORD HUTTON: I have asked at least one other witness, Sir David, as to the reason why these very senior officials,

including yourself, all assembled to discuss this report with Sir Kevin Tebbit. I mean, it does seem a galaxy gathering

to discuss this matter, if I may so put it. Do you have any comment on that?

A. I think the explanation lies in the front pages of the newspapers, that this was an issue which had dominated

political debate in the country for a considerable time and showed no signs of diminishing. It was a matter of intense

interest and concern to the Prime Minister, in view of the nature of the allegations which were being made. It was a

matter of concern to me, because it was directly challenging the integrity of a process for which I was responsible.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Was anything decided on 4th July?

A. Friday, 4th? We discussed, at the meeting, the likelihood of Dr Kelly being the single source to which Mr Gilligan

had referred. We came to the conclusion that we did not have enough information, at that stage, to take any action,

and that that would be our recommendation. This followed the advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit, particularly in view of

the discrepancies which they had noted between Dr Kelly's account and the account given by Mr Gilligan. We could

not be certain that Dr Kelly was, indeed, responsible for this story.

Q. So why was that not the end of the matter?

A. Simply because if it turned out, on further investigation, that there was more behind this, then it could represent

an explanation of the story which, as I have said, had been dominating political debate in the country.

Q. So what was decided to be done on that Friday evening?

A. To seek more information. Firstly, to await the arrival of Kevin Tebbit's letter to see exactly what terms he was

reporting this in to us and to urge the Ministry of Defence to see if they could clarify the inconsistencies which Kevin

Tebbit had told me of but only in the most general terms.

Q. Did you see Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter of 4th July to you that evening?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. I think we see it at MoD/1/34. You have heard my questioning of Mr Scarlett, so I need not go to the relevant

passages, but in that letter it is made perfectly clear that Dr Kelly is saying that he did not say anything about the 45

minutes or anything material about the 45 minutes to Mr Gilligan; in particular, he had not said that the information

was single source and he had not said that it was added late. Were you aware of that on 4th July?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you think of those, as it were, denials by Dr Kelly?

A. My thought was that there were a number of possibilities: that Dr Kelly might not have been, on this first interview,

revealing all that he could say on the matter, for quite understandable reasons; or that he was genuinely coming

forward to help the Ministry clear up a misunderstanding, and that he had been seriously misrepresented in the

reporting. There was, therefore, more than one possibility; and at that stage we really could not be certain what the

situation actually was. Therefore, my recommendation to the meeting was that we should take no action in respect

of the Foreign Affairs Committee, although their report was due imminently on the Monday. I was, at the same time,

anxious that the group of officials, senior officials as Lord Hutton has referred to us, should properly consider the

point about the Foreign Affairs Committee because we would be placed in a very false position if we had sat on

information which was very relevant to a report by a Parliamentary Select Committee, which was imminent.

LORD HUTTON: Sir David, I think it may be obvious again but I would just like to ask you: when you say that Dr

Kelly may not have revealed all "for understandable reasons", would you be good enough to spell out what those

understandable reasons are? It may well be obvious but I think it would be helpful if you would state them.

A. That Dr Kelly may have come forward in a genuine wish to clear matters up but he had minimised his participation

in the meeting with Mr Gilligan in order to protect himself from any action by the Ministry of Defence.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: You say there that one of the concerns was not to be in a false position of not cooperating, as it

were, fully with a Parliamentary Committee. But is it not right that the Foreign Affairs Committee had actually asked

for drafts of the dossiers as a way of sorting out this dispute between Mr Gilligan and Mr Campbell and they had not

been provided?

A. I think I would put the point the other way round, that the Foreign Affairs Committee was already, as they

eventually recorded in their report, annoyed with the Government at not, as they saw it, fully cooperating. For them

to have discovered we had been sitting on relevant information would have compounded the events.

Q. Why were not copies of the earlier drafts of the dossier disclosed? I mean, that would have assisted in making

the points that you make about the dossier.

A. For the reasons that Mr Scarlett has explained, that the process -- the close examination of the process of putting

together the dossier would reveal more about the nature of the intelligence underlying the assessments than we

thought would be safe.

Q. Is that how it ends on 4th July, with you having received a copy of Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter?

A. Yes. Having had the discussion, Jonathan Powell having said he would mention this to the Prime Minister, he then

rang me back to say he had mentioned it to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister agreed with our assessment

that no action should be taken until we had further information about what exactly all this was about. I relayed that

back to Kevin Tebbit by telephone.

Q. Then what happens on 5th July?

A. On 5th July I receive a second letter from Kevin Tebbit.

Q. Yes. We have seen that. It picks up an article by Mr Baldwin in The Times on 5th July.

A. That is right. And I speak to Kevin Tebbit more than once on the Saturday to discuss whether this sheds more

light on the possibility of it being the source. We agreed that prima facie it does that but there remain these

inconsistencies. Sir Kevin drew to my attention the fact that Richard Hatfield, the personnel director, believed, on the

basis of the first interview, that Dr Kelly was not the single source and therefore we were proceeding with some

caution on the matter. The other event on the Saturday was that I was rung by the resident Duty Clerk at the Foreign

Office, who passed on a message from the Foreign Secretary that in his view we did not have enough information, at

the moment, to warrant informing the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q. Did you have any contact with anyone on the Sunday?

A. Yes. I spoke to Sir Kevin Tebbit again; and I was rung by the Prime Minister, who was at Chequers.

Q. And he rang you in the morning or in the afternoon?

A. In the morning, about 11.30.

Q. What did you discuss with the Prime Minister?

A. I updated him on the basis of my conversations with Kevin Tebbit and on the basis of the second letter. We

discussed the options for informing the Foreign Affairs Committee, which effectively -- and you have had this

confirmed, I think, by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee -- might well have meant their postponing the

publication of their report. We discussed whether we knew enough to be certain to trigger such an action. And my

advice, which the Prime Minister endorsed, was that we should follow the recommendation of the Ministry of

Defence and await further information from the reinterview of Dr Kelly.

Q. So it is decided, or provisionally decided, over the weekend that Dr Kelly should be reinterviewed; is that right?

A. Yes. The Ministry of Defence were intending to do that. I discussed it with Kevin Tebbit. I made sure that the

Prime Minister was aware of that and that he agreed this was a sensible course to follow.

Q. We have seen a note that you prepared on 21st July, so it is after the event but obviously closer to it. It is

CAB/11/5, at the top from Sir David Omand, dated 21st July 2003. Going down to the bottom there is a review of

the weekend decision not to inform the FAC before the publication of the report that Dr Kelly had come forward:

"There was some questioning from the PM about what we knew about Dr Kelly, and whether we could find out more

about his views." It looks as if that is the only reference to the weekend discussions before you turn to 7th July; is

that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Was anything else said or did anything else happen on the weekend that is relevant to this Inquiry?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. I think you write a letter to Sir Kevin Tebbit at MoD/1/42. It appears to be dated 5th July. No doubt you can

confirm that is just a typo in the top?

A. It was typed on my laptop at home, which automatically inserts a date. The letter was started on the Saturday but

I reopened it and finished it on the Sunday without correcting the date.

Q. Right. so you started on the Saturday, finished off on the Sunday, and that is your response to Sir Kevin Tebbit.

That brings us up to the Monday morning, is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. What happens on the Monday morning?

A. On the Monday morning, the -- where are we? (Pause).

Q. Do you have a meeting with anyone?

A. Yes, I just -- if you will excuse me -- want to get my thoughts in order.

LORD HUTTON: Certainly. Take whatever time you wish, Sir David.

A. The first thing on the morning of the 7th was the receipt of the message from John Scarlett, to which I think you

have already referred.

MR DINGEMANS: Yes.

A. Giving John's assessment. I had conducted a parallel assessment over the weekend for my own purpose, looking

at the statements which had been made and trying to compare those, and had reached more or less the same

conclusion as John Scarlett.

Q. That?

A. That there was a prima facie case for believing this was the single source and that reinterview was the next step.

Can I also add, my interpretation -- I did not discuss this with John Scarlett -- of what was meant by a "security style

interview" is the kind of interview you are giving me, that is carefully prepared, determined to get to the truth, and

courteous.

Q. That is very kind of you. We have seen the note that Mr Scarlett made, and that is CAB/1/46. Did you produce

any similar note?

A. You have referred to the record that I made, which was after the event of the meetings that followed.

Q. Yes, but no contemporaneous note?

A. No contemporaneous note, no.

Q. Is this fair: your provisional view on 7th July is that Dr Kelly is likely to be Mr Gilligan's single source?

A. Likely to be, but still with a considerable uncertainty about the in