translating lessons learned into more resilient response · translating lessons learned into more...

Coastal Response Research Center

Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill:

Translating Lessons Learned into More Resilient Response

Nancy E. KinnerCivil/Environmental Engineering

University of New Hampshire

May 10, 2013

CCOM JHC Seminar Series

Coastal Response Research Center2

Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC)

• NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration (ORR)/UNH Spill Partnership in 2004

• THERE WILL BE ANOTHER MAJOR SPILL IN U.S.• Many Research Needs Exist Regarding Spill

Response, Recovery and Restoration• Expertise to Call Upon During a Spill

• Independent voice• Honest broker• No oil politics in NH


CRRC Mission

• Conduct and Oversee Basic and Applied Research and Outreach on Spill Response and Restoration

• Transform Research Results into Practice• Serve as Hub for Oil Spill R&D• Educate/Train Students Who will Pursue

Careers in Spill Response and Restoration


Center for Spills in the Environment (CSE)

• Parallel Center to CRRC• Accepts Funding from Non-NOAA Sources• Same Mission and Goals

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Today’s Topics

• U.S. Oil Spill Response System• Deepwater Horizon (DWH) Accident• DWH Spill Response• Key Issues of DWH Response• Resilient Response Going Forward


Phases of Oil Spill

• Emergency Response• Immediate to few years after

• Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA)• Determine damage to and compensation of

natural and human resources by responsible parties (RPs)

• Not civil suits

• Restoration/Recovery• Months to years funded by RPs

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Today’s Focus = Response

Not NRDA or Restoration

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U.S. Oil Spill Response(National Response System)

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Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA‘90)

• Within 1 Year of Exxon Valdez Tanker Accident in Alaska

• Mandates Spill Organization and R&D

• R&D Never Fully Funded

• Planning, Preparedness, Response, Damage Assessment and Restoration Systems Mandated

• Major Federal Agencies:

• Minerals Management Service (Leases and Safety/Environmental Regulation)

• Coast Guard, EPA, NOAA

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Oil Spill Classification Table

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An FOSC’s Guide to Environmental Response (USCG, Gulf Strike Team, 7/1/2008)

DWH = 200 Million Gallons


National Incident Management System: Standardized On-Scene Incident Management

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Unified Command:Management When Multiple Jurisdictions

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National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan (NCP)

• Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) • National Response Team (NRT)• Regional Response Teams (RRTs)• Local Area Committees

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NCP (cont’d)• Special Force Components• USCG Public Information Assist Team• US EPA Environmental Response Team• NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator

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Incident Management• Discovery & Notification• Preliminary Assessment• Initiation of Action

• Responsible party • Federal assets (e.g., Strike Force)

• Containment, Countermeasures, Cleanup, Disposal

• Documentation & Cost Recovery

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Spills of National Significance (SONS)

• Decided by Commandant of USCG• Size, severity, location, impact on public health &

welfare and environment, complexity

• SONS Drills Required• March 2010: Tanker accident Portland, Maine

• DWH was SONS!!!

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DWH Accident

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Coastal Response Research Center 18

Oil Wells in U.S. Waters of Gulf of Mexico


DWH


DWH Rig Facts• 33,000 Ton Drilling Rig on Pontoons (Built

2001 / $350M)• Derrick = 20 Stories Above Top Deck• Held in Position Using GPS Dynamic

Positioning Controlled Thrusters• Crew = 126• Owner: TransOcean• Oil Reservoir:

• 5,000 ft water• 13,000 ft strata

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DWH Blowout• April 20, 2010 – Explosion and Fire Onboard

Rig Killing 11 People• All rest onboard rescued

• April 22: Rig Sank Along with Drill Pipe• Turbidity in Water High Due to

Accident/Sinking• Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days

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DWH Blowout Causes

• Lots of Individual Mistakes• Several Excellent Sources of Information:

• Presidential Commission Report (www.oilspillcommission.gov) • Final Report to BOEMRE: Forensic Examination of DWH BOP• Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the

Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the DWH

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DWH Spill Response

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Priority #1 = Stop Fire, Search/Rescue, Human Health and

Safety Paramount


Priority #2 - Stop Source of Leak

•Start Relief Well•Install “Cap” to Stop Flow

•High ambient water pressure, cold and dark•2200 psi

•High exit pressure of oil, hot (212oF)•6500 psi

•Initially, leaks from several points along drill pipe•Then, just well head

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Priority #2 - Stop Source of Leak


• Crabs, Shrimp, Oysters, Blue Fin Tuna, Charismatic Marine Mammals

• Recreational Beaches

• Commercial Fishing• Subsistence Fishing

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Priority #3 – Identify Natural Resources at Risk

Shorelines on ESI maps are color-coded by sensitivity to oil. Symbols mark localized areas for biological and human-use resources.


• Purpose of Response Technology

• Key Is Select Most Appropriate Response Techniques

• Unique to Each Spill and Each Day of Spill• Weather

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Priority #4 – Minimize Damage to Natural Resources


• 200 million gallons of oil released over 87 Days

• Oil was in patches, not one continuous slick• Oil plumes were on surface and at depth• Most oil spills are finite source

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DWH Response:


Natural Weathering


Response: Sorbents


Response: Booms and Skimmers

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Capture and Concentrate Oil, Deflect Oil from Critical Areas


Use of Dispersants & Other Alternate Response Technologies

• Pre-authorization Plans• Regional or local contingency plans

• No Pre-authorization Plans• FOSC gains concurrence from EPA rep on RRT

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Response: In Situ Burning


Response: Chemical Dispersants

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Surface Application


Sub-Surface ApplicationResponse: Chemical Dispersants


• Rarely used in U.S.• Common in the rest of the

world• Surfactant that lowers surface

tension allowing formation of small droplets

• Waves Mix Dispersant with Oil• Dispersant Breaks Up into

microscopic oil droplets• Droplets Stay Suspended in

Water• Oil Biodegradation

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Surface Oil Dispersal


Response: Biodegradation

• Every Year, ~ 20 Million Gallons of Oil Enter GOM from Natural Seeps

• Naturally Occurring Bacteria Live in GOM Degrade Oil Constituents to Inorganic Carbon

• Data Suggest Fairly Rapid Biodegradation, Even at Low Temperatures

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Why Use Chemical Dispersants?

• Wind and Waves Often Too High to Allow Mechanical Removal (Booms & Skimmers) or Burning

• Kept Oil Out of Nearshore Waters and Marshes• Organisms breeding, larvae/juveniles present• Marshes/shallows hard to clean if repeatedly

fouled with oil

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Chemical Dispersant Controversy

• Exposure/Toxicity of Dispersants to Marine Life, Humans, Seafood

• Exposure of Marine Organisms Below Surface to Dispersed Oil

• Proprietary Mixture• Where Did Oil Go?


NOAA Oil Budget Calculator


Key Issues During DWH

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Failure = Engineering Breakthroughs

Concept Recognized in Engineering

(e.g., H. Petroski, 1982 )

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Initial Mistakes = Lack of Trust

• Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days• Turbidity and debris in water

• Estimates of Leak Poor• Multiple leaks along pipe and at well head

• No Blowout Spill Contingency Plan for High Flow• Never required as part of drilling

permit

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Facing the Reality:

--200 MILLION GALLON SPILL WILL CAUSE DAMAGE--

(Exxon Valdez Spill = 11 Million gallons)

--RESPONSE MINIMIZES DAMAGE, BUT THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE!!!—

Public Perception DWH: Poor responseResponders’ Perception DWH: Successful

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The ImbroglioPublic’s Limited

Scientific and

Engineering Literacy

24/7 Information

Can we believe it?

Explosion of Science and Engineering Complexity

PoliticsLocal, State,

Federal

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Scientific Research

+Response

Efforts+

NRDA Data


imbroglio \im-BROHL-yoh\, noun:

1. A complicated and embarrassing state of things.2. A confused or complicated disagreement or misunderstanding.3. An intricate, complicated plot, as of a drama or work of fiction.4. A confused mass; a tangle.

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• Oil spill scientists/engineers • Very small & underfunded community• Different publication approach

• Oceanographers & ocean engineers• Little knowledge of oil spill response

issues • Safety and response protocols at spill

site• Misunderstandings resulted between

two groups

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Scientific / Engineering Complexity


• Complex response & science concepts to convey

• Sometimes answers unknown• Literacy issue for public,

government officials and reporters• Responders and scientists are not

always best “teachers”• “River of oil in subsurface”

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Science/Engineering Literacy


• Experts everywhere in the spotlight• Some data reported before QA/QC• What gets reported?

• Seconds of interview used (from minutes of taping)

• Is what reported true?• Credentials of bloggers• Misunderstanding by reporters

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24/7 Information(Is it True?)


A Model Misunderstood

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pE-1G_476nA


• Survey of GOM coastal residents• Public does not trust government or industry• Public trusts scientists (especially those who

report data that supports THEIR world view)• Hurricanes Katrina/Rita aftermath

• Skepticism and discontent towards gov’t• Politicians exploit the DWH situation

• Louisiana berms• Congressional intervention: “U.S. can never have

another major oil spill! ”• Legislation can’t prevent human error

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Politics


• Continuing Deepwater Drilling in GOM, Brazil, Africa

• Other U.S. Coastal Waters• Ultradeep GOM

• Cuba?• Oil Sands Products• Arctic: Russia, Norway,

Canada, Alaska?

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Will DWH Really Change Anything?


• Harsh environment (cold and very dark)• Oil in & under ice• Minimal response equipment or personnel• Fragile/Unknown natural resources/ecosystem• Indigenous subsistence and cultural practices• Desire to drill vs. environmental preservation• R&D underway, but contentious

• Industry, NGOs, Academia

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Will DWH Really Change Anything?Arctic Drilling


• Federal legislation = BOEM/BSEE created from MMS

• Improved command structure• More drills and exercises• Industry liability increased• Better on site capping and blowout

prevention equipment developed• $1+ Billion Industry Effort

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• R&D “Flash in the Pan” effect for Exxon Valdez

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$ t $oekt

R&D Funding vs. Time


• Post DWH R&D funding • Much higher • More prolonged

• BP = $500M over 10 years to GOMRI

• NAS = $500M over 30 years

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Resilient Spill Response Going Forward:

Recommendations

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Who Produces Oil?

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Data Source: CIA World Factbook, 2010


Where does the US Get our Oil From?

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Data Source: DOE Oil Production Report, 2010

• US Produces > 40%Domestically

• < 25% From OPEC Countries


How Does DWH Compare?

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Millions of Gallons Released


Recommendations: Response • Broader Involvement of Scientists/Engineers

in Spill Contingency Planning • Especially in areas with high spill potential (e.g.,

Arctic, GOM)

• Develop Strategies for Co-Operation of Response and Science Activities at Spill Sites

• Update Response/Recovery Based on DWH Experience• Revise guidance documents/protocols• Response affects recovery

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Recommendations: Risk Communication• Strengthen risk communication skills of:

• Journalists/Correspondents (AAAS Awards)• Scientists/Engineers• Gov’t Officials

• Explain tradeoffs of response• Can’t do it all; minimize risks to most

vulnerable; human health and safety

• Directly admit when answer is unknown• Avoid pre-releasing data• “Common Operating Picture” Tools

• DWH = ERMA® /Geoplatform

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Recommendations: Education

• Educate public, especially in spill-vulnerable regions, about response• Response management, scale and tradeoffs

during disasters

• Convey concept that “We don’t know yet”

≠ disaster

• Educate next generation of scientists & engineers in spill response and restoration

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Recommendations: Politics• Minimize potential for political interference

during spill response• Can this be done?

• Overcome misconceptions/unrealistic perceptions• “When the next big spill occurs…..”: It already

has• “We must be ready for the next spill…..”:

Unlikely to be DWH repeat• “They should have done that…..”: Victim,

perpetrator, rescuer paradigm not helpful during spill

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Recommendations: R&D• Numerous R&D activities in wake of DWH• Human dimensions focus should not be

overlooked (e.g., social & health impacts)• Little coordination among granting entities

and consortia • Industry, gov’t, NGOs, academia,

national/international

• Model for multi- stakeholder design teams• Including controlled field release

• Translate R&D into practice

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