towards a citizens militia - anarchist alternatives to nato and the warsaw pact

8/3/2019 Towards a Citizens Militia - Anarchist Alternatives to NATO and the Warsaw Pact

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TOWARDSACITIZENS'MILITIAANARCBlsT A L T E R N A T ~ E S

TO NATO 8JHEWARSAWPACI

IRSM 1STOFMAY GROUP


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Towards acitizens'militiaanarchist alternatives toNATO&theWarsaw Pact

Cienfuegos PressOver the Water Sanday Orkney KW17 UK


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British Library Cataloguing in PublicationInternational Revolutionary Solidarity Movement

First ofMay GroupTowards a citizens' militia1. Guerrilla warfareI. Title355.4'25 U240

ISBN 0-904564-33-9Towards a citizens' militiaanarchist alternatives to NATOand the Warsaw PactThe International Revolutionary Solidarity Movement, First of MayGroupPublished 1980 by Cienfuegos Press,Over the Water, Sanday, Orkney, KW17 2BL, UKDesigned & illustrated by Mark Ely-BarrattPrinted by Little @


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Part 1:Principles ofarmed resistance

Part 2:Organisation and conductof guerrilla warfare

Part 3:Organisation and operationof th e civilian resistancemovement

ContentsIntroduction 1

Organisation and libertarian authority 2Fundamentals of combat operations 3Objective mass economy ot torce e Manoeuvre unity of command. security. suprise simplicityThe functions of land combat 4intelligence. mobility. firepowerPurpose 6Organisation 6formation. organisational phase. weapons,ammunition & explosives.maintenance facilities food. medical. the populationTactics of guerrilla units 8early operations. operational security.general behaviour. march. rest. simplecommunications. road blocks. sabotage on theroads. ambush 0 f single vehicles surpriseattacks. surprise attack on a small post .attack on communication system. attack ona railnetwork. train traps. attacking thepower system. a fuel depot. attack on anairfieldTactics of theesecurity forces 77

Organisation 19functions of the civilian' resistance. recruitment activityOperation of security force terror 20Activities of the civilian resistance movement 20hiding weapons & explosives. illegalprinting.propaganda. security ofsafe houses.communications. behaviour during interrogation.behaviour in prison. action by civiliansThe last phase of resistance: the generaluprising 23Fighting techniques used by enemy whilesuppressing uprisings 25Entering towns in the area ofan uprising.seige;martial law sealing offan areaofunrest. the enemy assembly area. point ofpenetration ofadvance in the streets. eliminatingbarricades clearing largebuildings. clearingan open area. occupying the city. disarmamento searchesClosing remarks 28


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Read no more odes my son, read timetables:they're to the point. And roll the sea-charts outbefore it's too late. Be watchful, do not sing)for once again the day is clearty comingwhen they will brand refusers on the chestand nail up lists of names on people's doors.Learn how to go unknown, learn more than me:to change your face, your documents, your country.Become adept at every petty treason,the sly escape each day and any season.For lighting fires encyclicals are good:and the defenceless can always put to use,as butter-wrappers, party manifestoes,Anger and persistence will be requiredto blow into the lungs of power the dustchoking, insidious, ground out by those who,storing experience, stay scrupulous: by you.

Hans Magnus Enzenburger


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READ THIS FIRSTThis book ne ed s t o be p la ced i n con te xt b e cau se it s

subject matter is sure to encourage a react ion of cont r ivedhyster ia from ~ u t h o r i t a r i a n s of differing political colours.Tactics an d me thod s o f res is tance are explained here so thatl iber tar ians ca n sta r t to consider seriously a s i tua t ion whichis becoming l ess an d less hypothetical. Th e unrelenting greedo f t he industrialised nations is hastening the day when governments will ,DO longer be able to proffer an escapist diet ofmaterialism a s the anaesthe ti c to conceal th e cancerous stateof ou r society. -We have a l ready seen a sudden increase in th ebaying o f t he ' Law a nd Order ' lobby over th e last few yearsan d this is DO temporary p he nomen on . T he democrat ic facadeof th e Par l iamentary S ta te w il l s oo n be little more than acoat of flaking paint . It would b e n ai ve to be shocked at thisdevelopment because a look at t he w ay ou r ' democracy ' cameabout by be ing conceded i n g ra dua l do se s to stave of f ser iousunres t , demonst ra tes c lear ly that i t is no ' n a tu r a l r i gh t of trlleborn Engl ishmen ' . In fact th e great success of the whole exe r-ci sewas to conYinc:e the" l1Bjor ityof the popula tion that t hey hadevery th ing they needed , and that an y further concessions wouldon ly lead to ' anarchy ' (i n th e deroga to ry senae .of th e wordwhich they corrupted) . Bu t th e current has now turned andwith such subject ive t e rms as ' publ ic safety" and I common ' an d' nat ional in te rest , ' th e State is starting to haul th e l ine back in .

This book d oe s n ot and canno t at tempt to define atwhat pointdictatorship succeeds cosmetic democracy, or at what point al ibertatian i s morally obliged by his beliefs to take up arm s(o r other methods) an d res i s t totali tarianism in it s variousp ol it ic al f orms" wh et he r a domestic government or a foreigninvader . Al l it does is to r e cogn is e t h at s u ch a da y is no t fa ro ff and that we must be ready t o f igh t before the unend ingdarkness of aD all-powerful s ta te s e ts in . However, we mustn ot f al l into th e trap of two fatal fallacies. One bei ng a cr y of

IntroductionA nurd>er of book s deal ing w i th i rregular wa rf a re , a ls o

known as unconventional or guerr i l la warfare f have been written.),.bst of t he se we re writ ten by nil i tary men involved in suppress ionof insurrection in a colony, military men conce rned withinstigating insurrection in o ther peopl e s' colonies , conventionalcomnando tacticians or conventional mi l i ta ry l eade rs chosen toprepa re r e s is t ance among a popula tion faced with f a il ur e o fr egu la r mi l it a ry defence f rom a n invading foreign a rmy . In.a ll o f these cases , th e main problems to be solved were adaptionof conventional rralitary tactics to new and d if ficu lt circumstancesand training of chi l ians unused to military discupline or procedure . A s ide i ssue in some instances was rapid manufactur-e ofsmd l a rms an d ammunition to ar m th e par t i sans and effectiveus e of very young boys , men cons id e re d t oo o ld fo r militaryservice, women and girls as combatants .

For th e purpose o f t hi s b oo k w e can d i s ca rd th e experiencesof military leaders pr imar i ly involved in terroris ing native orpeasant populations (except as an example o f what a successfulguerril la may expe ct f rom h i s adve r sa r i e s) a nd t he experiencesof military men concerned with instigating insurrection insomeone e lse ' s c ol on ie s. T hi s book is aimed at people who,through social conscience or poli t ical bel ief , rms t t h emse lv e sre sist an authoritarian domestic government . Th e tasks of sucha freedom fighter are s ubs ta n ti al ly d i ff e re n t f rom tho se o f, f orexample, a pa r t is an r e si s ti ng a n i nv ad er i n th e n am e o f a nexiled government , or a n a ge nt o f a foreign government attempting to subvert th e order an d au thor ity o f an enemy coun try .

Tradi t ional ly , guerr i l la movements an d organisat ions haveachieved a rmrked degr e e of success when they were resistingand har r-assfng a foreign army on the i r own soi l , when supplywa s p l ~ n t i f u l from a powerful ally, on th e ev e of a rm.ssiveconventional invasion by t he i r a l li e s an d when th e domestic"puppet" government was t oo weak nationally to prevent th egue r ri l la s f rom usurp ing the act ivi t ies an d du t ie s the populacenortIBlly expected th e government to perform such as policefunctions, co -o rd ina tion of food, water an d medical supplies ,o rgan i sat ion of national ~ e c u r i t y f rom invas ion , etc.

Th e nature o f t he s oc ia l rrottvatton o r political ideology thatdr ives th e t rue f re e dom f igh te r may d i ct a te to some ex ten t the

desperation - lithe t ime is no t ye t r ipe, bu t it i s to o dangerousto wait". The other being th e t h eo r y t h at provoking the stateinto over- react ing will create a spontaneous resistance. Theserationales fo r engag ing in the armed s tr u gg l e immed i at el y rms tbe seen aga ins t t he obv ious and fundamen ta l Anarchis t objectiveof developing a l iber tar ian society . In fact it shou ld no t takelong to rea l i s e t ha t such a s oc ie ty c an ha rd l y come about wheni so la ted groups follow a policy of res is tance fo r th e sake ofresistance. Unles s we ca n f i r s t p rov e t h at Ana rch ism wo rk sthrough creating libertarian communit ies t th e crit ical levelof support that we need w il l never ma te r ia l i se f ~ th e mass ofworkers will otherwise continue to be in fluenced by authoritarianpropaganda. We ca n never ignore Kr(;potkin' s saying that noar-med action should be under taken un less it s purpose can beclearly understood by th e average worker .

Th e o ther r eason fo r developing a l iber tar ian social an dwork s tr u ct u re i s that i t is only ~ ; I l l w a r k against authoritariangroups when the upheaval comes . If we have no t y e learnt th elessons o f t he Russian and Spanish revolutions when th eComrrairri st s savagely at tacked th e f re e dom o f Ana rch ism, thenwe do no t deserve to survive as a movement . We start at asevere disadvantage vis a vi s our authori tarian ' comrades ' ,a nd t he y w il l easily de st r-rv us ag a in unless th e shoots ofl ibertarianism are already pushing th rough th e crumblingrerratns o f the o ld society.

One of th e fundamental ru les of gue r r il l a wa r fa r e is tospread th e struggle to eve ry p iece of terr i tory an d to everyf ac e t o f l ife. Unless th e seeds of Anarch is t f r eedom havealready been sown there , we are doomed to perish howevergood our mi l it a ry p repa r at i ons might be. "D1e authoritarianshave more in common with each other that with u s . Bu t ifwe are ready in every respect , a nd h av e s hown t he sor t of lifepeople ca n c'reatefor themselves, then we c an w in .

method s by which th e tasks of res is tance a re carried out.'I'his book is wr it t en by , an d directed to , ana rch is t s , l i ber t a ri ansocia l i s t s , revolutionary syndicalists an d a ll l o ve r s of freedoma nd f oe s o f tyranny and oppression.

It is n ot t he authors ' in ten t ion to tr y to justify anarchism inthis gook Much ha s already been written of anarchis t theoryand rtractice. The application of l iber tar ian principles oforganisat ion is a somdand intelligent manner by wh ich yo u ma yasserri>le your comrades to do th e wor k o f anarchis t revolution.Many te rror is t groups are mislabel led as anarchists . Th epeople who designate as ana rch i st au tho r it a ri an para-mil i tarygroups which espouse a belief in state socialism and- employkidnapping an d mass t er -ror as a vehicle to gain their endsdisplay the i r to ta l ignorance of our ideology an d the i r ownfear of l iberty.

I inplore al l who read th is book t o a vo id acts o r propagandawhich contribute to t il e myth of violence surrounding anarchismin th e minds of the uneduca ted p ub li c. T he dignity of ourstruggle mr st match th e importance an d in teg r i ty o f our creed.If we rru st us e "a rmed s t rugg le " , tha t euphemism fo r physicalf or ce , l et i t be in clear response to despicable action o n t hepar t of our oppressors a nd n ot fo r publicity an d notoriety orsomeones ' pecu li a r de s ir e fo r violence.

In an y case , physical fo rce is a coercive mean s o f obtainingan end. Hours o f d eb at e h av e le d us back to where we started a free society is unlikely to be bo rn f r om a coercive measure ,and, just as un li k ely to be born' of an oppress ive , authori tar ianregime. I f we choose physical f or ce , o ur obl iga t ion tosociety , and to ourse lves , becomes magnified a hundredfoldto maintain and advance a theory and practice of social organisation which will never ens lave , impr ison, conscript or tax .Our example mus t be of a na tu r e t h at leaves no personunconvinced of th e sincerity of ou r go al . That goal is asociety of freedom an d a wor ld o f true liberty.


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Part 1:Principles of armed resistance

Organisation and Iibertarian authorityAlthough th is book i s essen t i a l l y intended a s a t echnica l

lIBftual, the r e a re aspec t s o f a rm ed s t ru g g le , which cannotbe e l ass i f i ed a s technical .Wea r e bound by ou r social and poli t ic a l bel iefs to m od es o fworkiDg t h a t f u r th e r ou r goa l s . The mann er i n which we c a r r yout ou r t a sk i s as i r r :portant a s th e t a sk i t s e l f . Our meansc a nn o t, m u s t not. , be separa t ed from ou r end s . We n'I1st c r ea tea wo rk i ng mode l ot th e new soc i e ty .

The sna l le s t u n it o f tha t model is th e sma ll a f fi n it y group.Much a s a s ingle ce l l c on ta i ns t h e chrolTDsomes de t a il i ng t hel a r g e r animal , S" l must ou r g ro u p c on ta in t he sp i r i t and at t i tudesof f reedom which we .wish to l ive w it h s h ou ld ou r o pp re s so r sbe over th rown .

I t h a s become fashionabl


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a u t h o ri t a ri a n m i l i ta r y s t ruc tu res . L i b e rt a ri a n a u th o ri ty c om e sf r om th e r ank and f i l e , !2.. the de le g a te d c omba t l e ad e r s . Withou tt hi s f a ce t -of ana rch i s t c omba t o r g a n i s at i o n , i t wo ul d b e irrpot:Os ib le f or s m al l n umb e rs o f c omb at an t s to ef fec t th e l o s s e s t hey

do o n th e more c umbe r some , unmot iva t ed r e gu l ar s o ld i er .Techn ic a l p r o fi c ie n c y i s of u tmo s t impo r ta n c e h e r e , becausegue r r i l l a s mus t be no t only mor e dedica ted and mor e motivatedthan t h ei r a d v e r s ar i e s, they mus t a l so be more p r o fi c ie n t a tthe j ob . Anything l es s i s unaccep t ab l e .

Fundamentals of combat operationsMil i ta ry t a c t i c s a re m o ve s a nd p l ays th e m i l i ta r y un i t u se s

to ca r r y ou t wa r f a r e . 'I be y h av e b ee n c ha ng ed and adap t edsome t imes revolut ioni sed, by changes and advances int e chno logy , soc i a l s t r u c t u r e , and po l i t i c a l pbUosophy .Mi l i t a ry t ac t i c i ans ove r the a g e s have t r i ed to s e t t he s e bas i c sdown into a s e t of " r u l e s " . Some o f t he se " r u l e s " haver em a in e d c o ns ta n t f o r years..., some have been long f o rgo t t en .T he m a jo r p oin ts h av e b ee n r e f i ned and they a re -known a s th et P r i n c i ~ : ' 8 s o f Wa r . t

No ma t t e r wha t mode o r s ty le o f w a rf ar e i s be ing waged ,t he s e funct ions a re be ing cons ide red . "lhey a re modi f i ed ,di f ferent fo r l i be r t a r i an socia l o rgan i s a t i on t han fo r author i t a r ians o c Ia l o r g a n i s at i o n , b ut t he y s t i n mus t be cons ide red .

In addi t ion to th e P r in ci pl es o f Wa r, o ne s ho uld s tu dy th eFunc t i ons o f Land Comba t . F o r a deta i led , if somewhat a n t i q u ~ t -e d stu dy o f bo th o f these--t th e wr i t e r r e co rnnends Cl ausew i t z .He i s , if n o t t he f i r s t , ce r t a in ly , one of th e bes t produced byweste rn soc i e t y . He i s an au t ho r i t a r i an deluxe , but he i s ,neve r the l e ss t one of th e mo s t b r i ll i an t m i l i ta r y t a c ti c i an s .

The Pr inc ip l e s of Wa r i nc lu de t he ma j o r f a ct o rs whose p rop e rappl ica t ion i s e s s en t i a l to th e e x er ci s e o f c omba t a u t ho r it y andsucce s s fu l conduc t o f wa r f a r e . They a r e :O bje ctiv e O ffensive Mas s Economy of Fo r c eManoeuvre Uni ty of Command Secu r i t y Surp r i seSimpl ic i ty .

T h is d i sc u ss io n wil l be a n e x t rem e l y c u r s o ry t r ea tm en t o feach of t h e s e . A rm r e d e ta il ed s tudy i s highly r e commended .

ObjectiveA c l e a r objec t ive , whe the r phys ica l o r f igura t ive , i s

n e c e s s a r y fo r a n y e f fe c ti v e planning of ac t ion . F o r a n a r c h i s t s ,th e abil i ty to rapidly make a g r ou p d e ci si on ( e sp e c ia ll y u n d ers t r e s s ) i s c r u c i a l . A t a rge t mus t be chosen , an d th e r e a sonsfo r th e d e ci si on mu s t be c le a r ly unders tood by a l l . Thi s i smuch mor e d i ff i cu l t t h a n i t sounds . Th e o b je c ti v e mus t bec h os en f or i t s suitabi l i ty to t he g r ou p s 1 capabi l i ty and i t s valueto th e s t rugg le .

OffensiveGu e r ri ll a f o rc e s mu s t only at tack when they can ach i evet he i r ob jec t i ve and ge t away . Suicide a t t a cks a r e thea dm is s io n o f de f ea t . When th e uni t i s o n t he o ff en si ve , i t s f ight e r s mus t be r e so l u t e and conf iden t . Such a f o r ce a t t ack ingth e c o r r e c t objec t ive wil l cause many more casua l t ies than i twil l r e ce ive . G. terr i l la groups s ho ul d a lw a y s su f f e r l e s s t han10% dead o r wounded when th ey d o n ot viola te the pr i nc i p l e sgove rn ing t he i r conduc t of wa r f a r e . Th e unfo r e s een c i rcumstancet ha t cause s 5 0 casua l t ies c om es f rom a se r ious m-istake inthe f i r s t funct ion of comba t - i n t e l l i gence . A gue r r i l l a un i twhich i s forced onto th e de fens ive wil l immedia te ly b e gi n t or e ce i ve ca sua l t i e s .

MassAlway s c o n ce n tr a te t he m a in body o f y o ur a tt ac k o n o ne spo t .

a v e r s i o n s a re used to d raw the e n emy away f rom th e ma in f o rc e ,n e v e r a s an auxi l i a ry a tt ac k o n a d i ff e re n t o b je c ti ve . D i v er si o nsa re only t ha t . I f you al low your fo r ce to be spl i t by th e enemyyo u wil l have broken t h re e pr i nc i p i e s - e c on om y o f f o r ce ,uni ty o f command , and rm s s .

Economy of forceDon ' t u se .!!!.2!':.!. force than i s ne c e s s a r y fo r an a t t a ck .

Amrmni t i on wil l be wa s te d . c omb at an ts t h at could be held inr e s e r v e w! l1be t i r ed , l ives and suppl ies -and vehic les wil l beunnecessar i - ly j eopa rd i sed . On th e o the r _hand. i f you at tackwith a t o rc e uneQ.ual eo th e - task, t he re i s a _great ri-sk to l i ve sand mater ia l ' .

Manoeuvre.tvhny bat t les and wa r s h av e b ee n won by a sma l l e r , weake r

fo r ce which ou t -manoeuvr ed a s t r o ng e r e nemy , p la ci ng t hee ne my in s u ch j eo p ar d y t ha t a s u rr e nd e r, r a th e r than a s l augh twas ef fec ted . &s i c m i l it a ry m a n o eu v re s include pene t r a t i on ,enve l opmen t , doub le e-nvelopment , enc i r c l emen t an d ( the "Banzcha rge" ) f ronta l a t t a ck . Gene r a l l y , th e mo re c ru d e th e manoeuv r e , th e mo r e c os tl y in l i ve s . F ron ta l a t t a ck i s to be st r ic t lyavo ided in mos t i n s t ance s . Th e c l a s s i c mi l i t a ry manoeuvre i sth e doub le env e lopmen t ( out fl a nk i ng t h e enemy o n b ot h s i de s ofh is pos i t i on ) e x po s in g h im t o " e n fi la d e " o r "F l ank ing F i r e "fro-m tw o d i re c t ions . Manoeuvre i s th e c ruc ia l a spec t o fgu e r r i l l a w a rf ar e, a s one i s bound to be ou tgunned and ou t numbered if one t a r r i e s to o long. Good commun ic a ti o n s a ndsound opera t ional p l ann ing b e f o re h and a r e a n a b so l ut e nece ss i tySpeed i s o f t he e ss en ce ., and a n u nf it gue r r i l l a w il l s oo n be adead gue r r i l l a

Unityof commandAnarch i s t s a re l ikely to balk a t th is o ne . "Command" ofa mil i ta ry f o r ce by a commi t t e e i s not adv i s ab l e . Peop l e

e n ga g ed i n a rmed comba t h av e l i tt l e t ime fo r a surnrni t mee t i ng .Delega t ed c omman de rs s e le c te d f rom th e r a nk s r rus t ag ree befoh an d o n t a c t i c s a nd c ho os e t he bes t qua l if i e d among th em to a sscornrnand.

Howeve r t e rr .p o r a ry , t he re mus t be uni ty of command dur ingt h e e ng ag ement an d withdrawal . Ev e r y c omb a ta n t s h ou ld b ec le a r ly aware of h is o r h e r r o le d u ri ng th e e n ga g em e n t, a n dag r ee to ca r r y o ut t he nece ssa ry ac t i ons to br i ng i t to comple t ioTo achieve u ni ty o f c omm an d, r ad io cornrnunicat ions i s a ve ryva luab l e t oo l. S tr at eg ic uni ty of c omm a nd h ad en t i r e l ydi f ferent i rq > li ca ti on s . I t a f fe c ts r e g io n a l o r nat ional ope r a t i ons , and i s s omet h in g b e yo n d th e sc op e of t hi s w o rk , a s i tinvolves t h e u l tima t e goa l s of a l l the ana rch i s t s ove r a wide sp r ead a r e a . Tac t i c a l u ni ty o f c omm a nd rm s t b e e ff e ct e dwhi le a pa r t i cu l a r group (o r g ro up s) is engaged , and pe r t a in sto t he imm ed ia te s i tua t ion.

SecurityIn an ana rch i s t g ro up , s ec ur it y h as a spec i a l mean ing .

O b v io u sl y , a n ana rch i s t group mu s t m a in ta in a ce r t a in deg r ee oc l andes t i ne o p e ra t io n s j u st to su rv ive . Howeve r , if wed i spense w ith t he f o rm a l a u th o r it a ri a n c h ai n of c om rnand, t henth e need - to -know c re d o m u st be a l t e r e d . Gan eve ry membe r ofX group be t ru s t ed t o k ee p s ecu r i t y? If r e c ru i tmen t is beingca r r i ed ou t d i r ec t l y within a work ing group ( a n e x tr em e lyunadv i sab l e idea) th e a ns we r i s n o. There i s t he q u es ti on o fi n f o rme r s , of cou r s e t but rm r e r e l evan t in th e l ig ht o f t hed i s c l o su r e o f r e cen t pol ice prac t i c e s i s t he p o ss ib i li ty o far - res t an d to r tu r e . In a d di ti on t o th e d an g er of sirr.ple a r r e s tand impr i sonmen t i s th e poss ib i l i ty of ambush o r t r ap s .

The au tho r i t a r i an mode i s "Don ' t t e l l th e t r oops any th ing ,and th ey ' l l have n o th i ng t o c on f e s s , " bu t a ph i lo s ophy o ff reedom demands h i gh e r s ta n d ar d s o f pe r s on a l r e spons i b i l i t yt han o ne of t o t a l i t a r i an i sm. We mus t face up to th e f a ct t ha tth i s i s sue conf ronts us with a se r ious d i l emma and we mus tn e v e r lose s ig ht o f th e mat t e r .

SurpriseS u rp ri se i s .!!l!Le ssen t i a l ingredient to succe ss in gue r r i l l a

wa r f a r e . It is sole ly a produc t o f th e r i gh t offens ive plan beingt e amed with s ecu r i t y and good in te l l igence . I f on e l a ckss u r p r i s e , one l a c ks e v e r yt h in g . The main d ef en ce o f t heg roup ( tha t i s t he s af et y with which it ope ra t e s ) l i ve s in th efac t t ha t we have no : : s ta t i c pos i t i on aga i ns t which t he m i gh tyweapons of th e s ta te c an be b ro u gh t t o b e a r . Howeve r , if th es ta te c an be su re -w e wil l be somewhere a t a c e r ta l n t im e . ona c e rt a in d a te , we might a s well be s i t t ing .I n a foxhole s ome whe r e , wait ing fo r a bomb to fa ll o n u s .

I ! we l ack su rp r i se t we l ack t he s ole a dv an ta ge o f th e gue r r ifo r we a re weake r in numbe r s and ma t e r i a l .


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Sil11plicityThe ope r a t i ona l p lan f o r a pa r t i cu l a r ac t i on s ho u ld b e a s

s imple a s p o s s ib l e . In c om ba t, u n de r f i r e , corn rnun ica t ionsroay br eak down . Leade r s rrBy be wounded o r ki l l ed , th e p la nm ay be de l ayed o r d i s r uv t ed . T h e a c ti on s ta n ds a be t t e rchance o fb e i n g b r o ug h t t o a succe s s fu l c om p le t io n i f t he re a r e

f ewe r th ings to r em emb e r . The r e a r e ; obv ious ly , f ewe rt hi ng s t o go wrong , f ew e r mi s t a k e s to be m ad e w ith a l e s scorq. ;H.ca ted p lan . T h at d oe s n ot me an e v er y conce1.vableprob l em s ho ul d n ot b e cons i de r ed and d i s c u s s e d , b ut th e p la ni t se l f shou ld be kep t s imp l e . A s t he g ro up b ec om es rn:.>reexpe r i enced , and has be t t e r t r a i n i ng , weapon s , e t c . mor eco r rp l i ca t ed p l ans may be i n t r oduced .

The functions of land combatThe I tFunc ti o n s o f Land Comba t " pe r t a in to th e actual

app l i ca t i on o f c omb at p ow e r . They a re n o t u n b r ea k a b le ru l e sbu t handy ca tego r i e s f o r a r ra n g in g i nf o rm a t io n . Th ey i n cl u de :1) I nte llig en ce ; 2 ) M ob ility ; 3 ) F i r e powe r

IntelIigenceIn a arnakl g ro up , e ve ry m e m b er m ay be r e spons i b l e fo r

Lnt.e If i gemce func t i ons , supply and so on . Th i s i s a ques t i onfo r t he g ro u p i t se l f . Genera l l y , i t i s unw ise fo r one pe rson toknow a l l a spec t s o f th e g roup s ' o pe ra ti on , f or i f e ac h pe rsononly knows a ce r t a in am ou n t h e o r sh e can only be t r ay a ce r t a inamount .

In l a r g e r g r oup s , i n te l li g en c e f u nc ti o ns m a y be de s igna t edto c om r ad es in a pos i t ion to a cc om pl is h t he se t as k s e a si ly(such a s a po l ic e t y p i st o r c l e ri c a l w o r k er , co l l ec t i o n ag en cyo r s ecu r i t y and pa t r o l company ) o r by comrade s who holdsome o the r s p ec ia l p o si ti on i n t he c ommuni ty which make si n qu ir i es a c c e p t a b le . New r e c r u i t s and a l l o r ig in a l membe r sof th e g ro u p s ho ul d b e i nv e st ig a te d t ho ro u gh ly . I f someoneobjec t s to a ba ckg r ound i nv e s ti g a t io n it i s r ea ll y unl ikely tha tt hey m ay be t r u s t e d , a n d s h ou ld no t be a ll ow e d a n y fu r the rc o nt ac t w it h t he g ro u p d i re c t ly . It would b e w is e to w atc h th emin th e c ommun it y , h ow e ve r , and at terq>t to a sce r t a in whe the ro r not they a r e a po l i ce agen t . Any unexplained per iod in th eh i s t o ry of a po ten t i a l r e c r u i t s h ou ld b e ca r e fu l l y exam ined , a swell a s mil i t a ry s e r v i c e , a l l eged pr i son t ime o r hosp i t a l s t a y s .Ident i f ica t ion i s e as il y manufac t u r ed b y th e s t a te a u t ho r it ie s ,a s wel l a s l i fe h i s t o r i e s and r e f e r e n c e s . Be e s p e c ia l ly wa r yo f a ny on e ' wi th an unaccoun ted fo r o r u n u su a l i nc ome o r anyonewho t a k e s r e g u l a r absences , f r om t he g ro u p fo r a r epea t ednumbe r of day s . Seve r a l i n f il tr a t io n a g en ts i n th e U.S . werecaugh t when t he y b e ga n d i s appea r i ng a t weekends to v i s i tt he i r f ami l i e s .

Fa l s e i den t i f i ca t i on t ha t wil l pa s s inspect ion by a ca sua lp o l ic e c h e ck s h ou ld b e o b ta in e d f o r e ve ry m e m be r o f th e group ,e s p e c ia l ly t h o se who a re involved in th e pur chase o f muni t i ons ,r en t a l o f h o te l o r hous ing a ccorrio-da.tfcms , o r gene r a l l y anya c t iv i ty t h a t cou ld c omp r om i s e t h e i r i de n ti ty t o t he po l i c e .

Seve r a l me t hod s f o r obtaining il l a r e :Thef t - s to len il l i s th e mo s t r e l i ab l e ; a s eurn irig th e pe rson~ w h o m it w as s to l en . i sn ' t a c r im i n a l t o b eg in w i th .N e ve r u s e s to le n c re d it c a rd s o r cheques , a s th i s se t s in tomot ion a me t hod i c a l r e c o r d s ch e ck wh i ch can go on f o r m o nt hs ,a nd c ou ld r e s u l t in th e a r r e s t o f a comrade u s in g t h at 10 fo rs ome tbdzrg unr e l a t ed to th e e ssen t i a l s t r ugg l e . The AngryB r ig a de i n Br i t a in made t h is m i st a ke and were consequen t lya r r e s ted and imp r i s o n ed . *F a k e B i r th C e r ti fi c at e - al though th i s met ho d i s get t ing mor eand mor e d i f f i cu l t , i t i s s t il l p o s s ib l e to l oo k u p a d ea th in o ldob i tu a r y c o l umns and r e qu e s t a c o p y o f th e deceased pe rson t sb i r th ce r t i f i c a t e . Se lec t a pe r son who w as born within a fe wye a r s of yourse l f . Armed w it h t he ce r t i f i c a t e yo u m ay no wobtain a d r i v e r s ' l i c ence , a Soc i a l Secu r i t y c a r d , a banka c co u nt a n d o the r ~ o ident i f i ca t ions . Vo t e r r eg i s t r a t i onrece ip t s a re good p r o of o f " s ol id c i ti ze n s hi p . IIManufac tu r e - t h i s r e q u i r e s a go.od d ea l o f p ro f i c i ency inpho t ogr a phy and pr i n t i ng , but i s qu i cke r to o bta in , o nce th erou t i ne has been e s t ab l i shed , than e i the r s to l en o r f a l s i f i ed 1 0 .Tota l l y f or ge d i ll , f rom th e r i gh t c r a f t sman , c a n a c tu a l ly bebe t t e r t han s t a t e - i s sued ID . One group in New York used aPo l a ro i d c ame r a and a l a rge r ep roduc t i on of th e d r i v e r s 'l i cence f or m t o s ca le p eo p le s ' pho tos to s i z e . T he y t he n t yp edin th e in fo r rm t ion and s ea l ed th e pho to in p la s t i c . It l ooks nea r l yi den t i ca l to th e New York S ta t e d r i v e r s ' l i c ence . W r ite toEden P r e s s , PO Bax 8410 , Foun t a i n Val l ey , CA 92708 , fo rde t a i l s on i den t i f i ca t i on manufac t u r e .

Wri t t en r e c o r d s should nev e r be kep t . The mo s t i n cr im i n a t ing evidence pos s i b l e in c ou r t i s a d ia ry i n t he d ef en da nt " s ownhand . Neve r al low anyone to r e co rd ope r a t i ons in p h o to g r ap h s o ntape o r any o the r nEchan i ca l mean s . If f i nanc i a l r e c o r d s a reabso lu t e ly ne c e s s a r y , b lend them with some l e g it ima t e bu s i n e ssen te rp r i se to m ak e t he m mor e d i ff i c ul t t o r e c ogn i s e . Any l ega lp u r c h a s e s of a rm s o r ammuni t i on should b e d one in a manne r* S o ur ce o f funds . .More u r b a n gue r r i l l a s h av e b ee n c au g ht byf r aud inves t iga t ions t han a s a r e s u l t of of f ens ive ac t i ons .4

t h at c o n ce a ls t he i r ev ent u a l u s e , e i the r t h rough th e u se ofa l i a se s o r th e u se of a "b l i nd , " a pe r s on who b uy s th e i te m s f oa f e e , wi thou t knowing w h e re t he y a re go ing t o .

Safe house s , a r s e n a l s and commun ic a t io n me t hod s shou ld bkep t s t r i c t l y s e c u r e . Meet ings .. con f e r ences and ope r a t i ona lplanning se ss ions shou ld be he ld unde r s t r i c t s ecu r i t y a l s o .Do not l eave a pa t t e r n when mee t i ngs a re schedu led o r whe r ethey a re he l d . Once ope r a t i ons beg in , i t i s w is e to a vo idgather ing more t han tw o o r t h re e membe r s in one spo t a t anyone t ime , e x ce p t f o r ac tua l ope r a t i ons .

MobilityMobi l i ty i s a key a s p ec t o f g u e r ri l la w a r f a r e. Group

membe r s s h ou ld b e t r a i n e d i n b a si c a u tom ob il e a n d t ruck( l o r r y ) mechan i c s . Simple r ep a i r s and ad equa te d r i v in g sk i l la r e a m u st f or e ve ry memb e r . Advanced d r iv in g s k i ll s u n d ers t r e s s , a s wel l a s d i e s e l and gaso l i ne " semi - I td r ive r s shou ldbe sought fo r c om r ad e s employed a s t r a n spo r t d r i v e r s . Dr i v eshould a lw a y s h a ve app rop r i a t e fo rged l i c ences f o r th e veh i c l ethey a re ope r a t i ng . A ne twork o f s af e h o u se s , s ym p at hi se rs acon t ac t s in o the r c i t ies and coun t r i e s s ho u ld b e m ai nt ai ne d a ndnur t u r ed to enab l e th e sa f e t r a n spo r t o f wan t e d f ug i ti v e s a c r o scoun t r y and in ternat ional bo rd e r s if need b e . T r a n spo r tveh i c l e s d e si gn e d t o c o nc ea l heav ie r weapon s , such a s l i gh tmach ine -guns (LMG) , mor t a r s o r r ocke t l ~ u n c h e r s (RPG)shou ld be a v ai la b le i f s uc h ma te ri al i s l ike ly to be t r an spo r t edExp los i ve s should.!!.!.!:!.!: be t r an spo r t ed o n p u bl ic c o n ve y a nc e ssuch a s bu s e s o r t r a i n s . The r i s k o f an exp los ion in a c rowdedo r populated a r e a i s to b e a vo id ed w ith de t e rm i n ed v i g il a n c e.Auto t r a n spo r t shou ld be s t o l en , e i the r t aken a t gunpo in t sho r tbe fo r e th e act ion, o r l if te d o f f t h e s t r e e t a t th e mos t . l i ke lyoppor tun i t y . A veh i c l e with th e keys s t il l i n i t i s b es t, bu ta h o t-W ir ed v e h ic l e w i ll su f f i c e . Ea r l y mode l c a r s c anusual ly b e h o t-W ir ed u n de r t he dash with l i t t l e InOre than apa i r of wi r e c u tt er s a s t oo l s . Late mod e l c a r s w i th t hes t e e r i ng l oc k m a y be expropr ia ted with th e use o f a heavyharn rne r to knock th e keyway o ff t he s t e e r i ng c o lum n a nd t hei n s e r t i on of a l a rge sc rewdr ive r i nt o t he r e su l t i ng ape r tu reto m a n i p u l a t ~ ' the s t a r t e r sw i t ch . With po l i ce a b i li ty t o checkany v e hi cl e i n l e s s t han 30 s e c on d s t h ro u g h th e compu t e r a" l ega l " veh i c l e shou ld a lways be u se d w h er e po s s i b l e . Alsorn:>tor b ikes a re a use fu l a l t e rna t ive .

Mobi l i ty i s th e k ey to su rv i va l i n ' u r ban g u e r ri ll a w a r f a r e.I f th e p o li ce c an successful ly inhibi t you r a b il it y t o move f r omp la ce t o p l a c e , t hey can , by se lec t ive s e a r c h , even tua l l yna r row down th e a r e a which you a re in . In any c a s e , i t i s no ta. good idea to "ho l e Upil i n one s po t . In l ig h t o f th e f ac t t ha tin a s ta t i c offence - d ef e n ce s it u at io n t h e G o v er nm e nt w i lla.lways win t h rough g r e a t e r f i r epower and numbe r s , we mus tav o td such a s i t ua t i on a t a l l c o s t s , o r f ace cap t u r e o r dea t h .

The o the r s id e o f th i s co in i s th e g r oup tha t o p e r a t e s withsu c b e f fe c ti v e s e c u ri ty t h at t hey m ay ca r r y on p e rf e ct ly n o rm al. ives in th e d a y li g ht a n d ope r a t e a s g u e r r il l as dur ing p a r t ofh e n igh t . With p rop e r c o n ce a lm e n t o f w e a po n s t he se c om ra d esNiH be sa fe in e ven t o f su ch a s e a r c h , prov ided t he i r ident i t i esi r e unknown to th e po l i c e . Obviously t he se c om r ad es m u strvof.d any contac t s w i th w h at may be t e rmed th e lIabove g r ound ":-adical movemen t o r organ i s a t i on . They mus t r ema i nrb ao l u te l y above susp i c i on .

Mobil i ty a n d mo r a. le a re bo th a f fe c t ed by sus ta ined ca sua l t i er r anspo r t i ng a wounded c on r a d e i s a r e a l i t y which e v e r y~ u e r r i l l a should be p r e p a r e d to hand l e . No ca sua l t y s h ou ld b ee f t b eh in d u n le s s i t i s c l e a r t hey a re dead o r dy ing and-x t r'a.ctto n mean s ce r t a in cap t u r e o r d e a th f o r any r e scue p a r t y: : om r ad e s s houl d t r a in t hemse l ve s in comba t f i r st - ai d ( f ir s t -a io r wound s caused by bu l l e ts d i ff e rs . subs t an ti a l ly f r om the; : : ; tandard broken - l eg va r i e t y ) and pr ac t i c e t he i r t e chn iqueof ten . The fo r mu ta t o k ee p i n m in d i s " S to p t h e Bleed ing ,Res t o r e th e B r ea th i ng , & n d a ge th e Wound , Tre a t f or S h oc k ."Surv iva l o f the group and s u c c e s s o f t he opera t ion takepr io r i t y ove r e v ac u a ti o n o f ca sua l t i e s . Do no t a bo r t theope r a t i on and withdraw un l e s s th e group r e c ei v e s c a s u a lt ie s( t ha t could su rv i ve ) in e x c e s s of 40% o f th e c omba t a n t s . An yr e s e r v e s t ha t c ou ld b e commi t t ed should be i f t h e i r a s s i s ta n c ecould g iv e t he o r i gi n a l p a r t y enough grace to accompl i sh th emiss ion an d withdraw with t he w o u nd e d. If th e or i g i na l ob jec t i v


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cannot be accornpl i shed in any case, th e reserves should onlybe committed to protect th e re treat , such as ha rr a ss i ng actionson th e pursuit o r a diversion, such as tr iggering an explo sionin th e wake of th e withdrawal. To commit th e reserves todirect combat in th e c as e o f an aborted mission is unjustifiedjeopardisation of fighters and equipment.Abandoning a wounded comrade is a serious action. The

act of leaving one 's comrades is dern>ralising in itself , bu tthere is the addit ional consideration o f the wounded comradebeing murdered on the spot by police, or hi s evacuation to ahospital being delayed unti l he expires, or his being torturedfor information either promptly a f te r h i s capture or later ,a ft e r h is t ransfer to a jail or prison.Comrades sustaining massive head wounds , chest woundsinvolving the re spiratory system or abdominal wounds of anytype are unlikely to survive more than a n hou r or two withoutsurgery. Shock resul t ing from head or abdominal wounds islikely to be severe. Shock k il ls more often than the effectso f the wound itself . Treatment for shock include s (once thebleeding ha s been s topped and breathing assured) elevatingthe f ee t (i n th e instance of a head wound, elevate t he h ea d a ndupper torso) and cover ing with a blanket or some other clothing,and reassuring th e victim. The environment conducive tolessening shock is unl ikely to be found at the site of a guerrillaoperation, so evacuate th e wounded at the earliest possiblerroment , Decisions to transport wounded should be made withthe fol lowing things in mind:I} Is the comrade conscious?2) Can the comrade walk? With assistance?3) Ar e the wounds superficial or grossly traumatic?4) Is th e comrade in great pain or likely to be before aphysician can be obtained?

5) Is the comrade rrore likely to survive being evacuated orbeing left at the scene?Comrades sustaining any injury to t he spine are best left

unrmved, as any movemen t to an in jured spine is certain tore s ul t i n paralysi s if the original wound has no t already cau sedi t . The idea of sustained casualties should be in everyonesmind during operational planning. It is very l ikely that we willreceive casualt ies . The question is will t he g roup be a bl e t orra intain combat status in spite of them. I f th e possibility ofbeing wounded with no aid available bothers comrades to theextent their rrorale, and thus their combat effectiveness issubstantia lly reduced, then obviously some steps must be takento p rov ide that aid.

FirepowerFirepower determines to a great degree th e combat

capabilities and effectiveness of a guer ri l l a fo rce . Thesecuring of adequate arms and ammunition, and the correcttraining i n t he use of and application of those weapons is whatthe re st of ou r organising and planning leads up to and culm in ates in . Logistics and supply supports combat application.

What we de sire and plan fo r and what is actually accomplishedar e often two different things. We must se t goals and attemptt o mee t them. We cannot always do so , but t he a t tempt willrmke ou r overall accomplishment bet ter . Serre basics toconsider in a rming ourse lve s are:1) Standardise al l calibres and styles of weapons . This meanst ha t each group t r ies to obtain weapons tha t fire the exactsame cailbre ammunition f or e ac h weapon type. Exarrple : al lpistols to fire .4 5 ACP, al l carbines to be US .3 0 Ml calibre,

all rifle s to fire 7.62 NAT5D, all shotguns to fire 12 gauge. Inactual practice this rmy be difficult to arrange, especiallywhe re a rms are scarce or illegal. But, given a choice, obtainweapons that rre et your s tandardisat ion formula.2) Use Large Calibre Handguns.Tact i ca l ly , sma ll calibre handguns are inferior to large

calibre handguns. .SrnaIl calibre weapons to not h av e thetraumatic effect that large calibre weapons do . .32ACP isabout the smalle st acceptable ca li br e f o r mi li ta ry purpose s ,Some handgun calibres (i n order of desirability) are: .45ACP( 11.25 mm} , .3 8 Special or 357 Magnum, 9mm Parabellum,a lso fo r u se on sub-machine g un s, 9mmKur z (9mm short or .3.3 2 ACP (7 . 65mm). Weapons chambered fo r hard to obta incalibres or antique weapons are to be strictly avoided.3) Adapt Sporting and Legal Arms fo r Guerrilla Warfare.Legally obtainable arms should be purchased first . Many

sp?r t ing a rms may be adap ted to suit guerrilla need s , Barrelsrmy be short ened , s tocks cu t down, car ry ing s t r aps added toenable concealment under clothing. Th e US .3 0 Ml carbinei s part icu larly sui table for th is t yp e o f adaption. The sear anddissconnector in most semi-automatic self-loading weapons mabe altered to convert them to ful l-autormtic sub-machine gunsor SMG. Sporting versions of many a ss au lt ( or "automatic")rifles may be al tered s imilarly to convert them to full-autoas sau lt r if le s (AR). Cop ies o f military weapons for commerc icivilian sales usual ly accept th e larger capacity militaryrmgazine . Convers ion is no t simply a matter of filing of f th esear o f the weapon. Usually the sear and disconnector workin concert to provide a specific rate of fire fo r the weaponsdesign, and delay of the cartridges t ignition must be providedfo r unt i l the action is securely locked to insure safety inoperation. In addition to that, f il ing the sear may result ina "runaway" gun, which cannot be s topped until it jams orexhausts it s ammmitton supply. '4) Obtain Military Arms or Manufacture Your Own Weapons.Try to buy them first . If legal arms and ammunition are

unavailable, then either underground purchase or t he ft o fmilitary weapons and u se th em to o btain mor e weapons hasa lways been a major feature of resis tance rnovements ,The military capabi,lity of the g roup may be insuff icient

to mount a raid on a police arsenal or army outpost orvehicle so manufac ture i s th e rm re likely source fo r adequateweapons supply. The rro st s imple repeat ing weapon is theblow-back sub-machine gun. D esig n and manufacture of thisweapon has been effected by resis tance movements in Denrm.rk,Sweden, Norway, Russia, Cerrm.nyand China during the SecondWorld War. In more modern t imes workshop-made weaponsbased on the British Sten gun have been produced in Indonesia,Vietnam, Northern Ireland and various o ther coun t ries whererural and urban guerrilla wa r ha s been wag ed . O ve r twomillion British Stens were manufactured in 9mm, during thewar. Quite a few are s t i ll available in Europe.

I recommend two books, "Irrprovf sed Weapons o f t he Ameri cUnderground" by Deser t Publicat ions, P .O . Box 22005 , PhoeniAZ 85028 and "Herre Workshop Guns fo r Defence and Resistanceby Bill Holmes, P'aladin Press , Box 1307, Boulde r, Colorado .Both of these include exac t de ta il ed plans fo r manufacture."Improvised Weapons" has plans fo r a .45 calib re gun patternedafter th e Sten somewhat. "Home Workshop Guns" ha s plansfo r a 9rrnn version of t he S ten design, modelled af ter th e USlvf3Al "g rease gun. " Of the two, Holmes' book is the super ior ,but t he Desert Publications book ha s meri t and should be read.

5


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Part 2:Organisation and conductofguerrillawarfare

PurposeThe pu rpose of g u er ri ll a w a rf a re i s t o c on ti n ue r e s i s t an ce

in th e c i t i es and in th e count rys ide fo l lowing th e t akeove r of acount ry by a n e nem y o cc up yi ng fo rce , o r fo l lowing the b r eak down of c on s en s u s po l it ic s with a cor responding i n c rease inth e r ep r e s s i v e power s of t he S ta te a nd th e cr irni .nal isa t ion o fthe an t i - au tho r i t a r i an oppos i t i on .

Guer r i l l a de t a chmen t s cause f e a r a n d c o nf us io n b e hi ndnerny l i n es ; f o r c e th e e ne my to in i t i a t e compl i ca t ed s ecu r i t ymeasu r e s t h us w a s ti ng h i s s tr e ng th and inf l ic t l o s ses o n b othpe r sonne l an d mat e r i a l .

Tho s e a r e a s occup i ed b y th e .g u e r r-Ll l a un i t s mus t bep u sh e d i nt o a s ta te of cons tant un r e s t so t ha t none o f t hes ecu r i t y fo rces may mo ve a bo ut f r ee ly .

Th e f in a l phase wil l be a genera l , open i n su r rec t i on .Speci f ic t a rge t s wil l be :

OrganisationFormationWithout th e suppo r t o f th e c iv i l i an popu l a t i on , guer r i l l a

war f a r e wil l i n th e l ong run f a i l .The s e cu r it y f o r c e s will not i n it ia l ly c omm i t t h ei r s tr o n g es t

an d bes t p r ep a r ed un i t s aga ins t e a r ly g u e rr i ll a ac t i ons . Rather . ,they wi l l tend to unde r e s t ima t e th e ca l i b r e o f t he guer r i l l a uni t spa r t i a l l y compensa t i ng f o r w e a k ne s se s a t th e beginnir ig of th er e s i s t an ce . Howeve r , w it h th e g r ow th o f th e gu e r r il l a r e s i s tan ceth e s ecu r i t y fo rces wil l p r ep a r e spec i a l i s t groups t r a i ned inan t i - s ubve r s i ve t ac t i cs . Wi tn es s t he n um e ro us AID prograrnrnesin i t ia ted in Sou t h Amer i ca du r ing th e s ix t i es by th e United Sta testo t r a in l oca l s e c u r it y f o r c e s in coun t e r - i n su rgency s t r a t egy .

T he i de a b eh in d guer r i l l a war f a r e i s t o c on du ct l oc a l

1 T r a n sp o r ta t io n r o ut e s ( ro a d s an d r a ilway l i n es )2 . Commun i c a t io n s ( t el e phon e l i n e s above a n d b el ow g round ,

t e le p hone , r a d io and t e l ev is i on s t a t ion s ) 3 . P ow er sy stem s (e lec : t r ic i ty genera t ing s t a t i on s , coa l depots . ,nuc l e a r s i t e s ) .

4 . Vita l i ndus t r i a l ' p l an t s .5 . Repa i r shops and depo t s .6 . H e ad qu ar te rs and b a s e s ~ th e s ecu r i t y f o r c e s .7 . Tr anspo r t a t i on convoys .8 . C o ur ie rs , m es se ng er s and l i a i son o f f i ce r s .

Du r in g c onven ti o n al war f a r e opposing f o r c e s a r e suppl iedby th e fac tor ie s , warehouse s and supply depo t s ; guer r i l l aunits . , howeve r , l ive o n th e wa r .

Eve ry guer r i l l a un i t h a s a n i nc om pa ra b ly l a r g e r annun t ofautonomy and f reedom o f a ct io n t ha n i t would have a s a c oropcmenof a s t an d i ng a rmy dur ing a convent ional war .

r es i s t ance ope r a t i ons , par t i cu l a r ly s abo t age and coun te r p ropaganda . At the sa , e t ime , i t i s nece s s a r y to c r e a t ecer t a in l ibera ted a r e a s he ld by mobi le gu e r r i l la u n i t s.Howeve r , t h e s e a re as a re not to be held r ig id ly . They wil lbe c ha n ge d c o n st an t ly i n acco rdance w ith th e f o rem o s t r u le ofguer r i l l a war f a r e which s t a t es tha t "n o t e r r a in i s held p e rman -ent ly . "

As a r u l e , l ibera ted a r e a s can o nly b e held for a fe w week so r months , u n ti l t he secur i ty fo rces h a ve c o n ce n tr a te d s uf fi ci en tt r oops to ini t iate l a r g e - s c a le co un t e r- g u e r r il l a ope r a t i ons .

By mean s o f c ont in uous smal l - sca l e ope r a t i ons th e s ecu r i t yf o r ce s wil l be s ca t t e r ed and th e organi sa t ion and deve l opmen to f t he m o bi le guer r i l l a un i t s p ro t e c t ed .

6

Army, police

Airports,

TV, rad ioe tc .

Roads, railways .

Courts

Towns

Schools, universities

Strategic control

Factories, offices


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Organisational phaseTb es ecu r i t y fo rce s wil l l eave cer ta in a r e a s unoccup ied

b e ca u se o f ' their l a ck o f impor t ance o r b ec au se o f i n su f f i c i en tpe rsonne l .

Gue r r i l l a un i t s h av e t o move i nt o t h es e a r e a s . They m u s tr en a in inac t ive unt i l ell .ch un i t i s wel l organ i sed .

III Enemy controls towns and communications.GuenilJa units operate outside these areasA sh o r t t r a in i n g p e r io d i s e ssen t i a l . Thi s s e r v e s t o a ll ow

TI'lembers o f th e u nit to g et to know each o th e r . T r a in i ng a l sof ami l i a r i se s uni t m e m b e r s with th e bas i c t a c t i c s and t echniquesof g u e r ri l la w a r fa r e such a s l iv ing off the l a n d ; c o m m u n i ca t io n s ;secu r i ty ; r e conna i s ance ; t e ch n iq u e s o f s a bo t ag e a n d demol i t ionand w i th th e u se o f w e a po n s.

Th i s ~ t r a i n i n g m ay t ake up to one o r tw o m o n t h s . dependlngon whe the r the uni t i s s t i l l organis ing unmole s t ed . o r whe the ro p e ra ti o ns h a ve t o be conducted i mm e dia te ly . T he T u pa m ar osof U r u g u a y spen t a n u m b e r of y ea r s in t h i s o r g a n is a ti o n a l phase .The l onge r th e o r g a n is a t io n t a k e s th e g r ea t e r th e chances ofsucce ss a s t he re w il l b e f ewe r l o s s e s d u ri ng f ut ur e e n g ag e m e nt s.T h is in t u rn wi l l i nc rea se s e l f - con f i dence .

Reconna i s ance o f f u tu r e t a rge t s and s y s t e m a ti c o b s e r v a ti o no f t he s e c u r it y f o r c es can be c a r r i e d on concu r r en t l y withorgan i s a t i on and t r a in ing .

Weapons, ammunition& explosives

Storing weapons and explosives. They must b e kept dry and weD a i r ~ d as weD asbeing safe from discovery by enemy searches.

I m p r o v is e d , c o n c e nt r at e d cha rge s can be used to des t r oy f ixedob j ec t s ( r a il r o ad t r ac k s t power l ine p o le s , t r an s f o rm e r s , e t c )

An explosive is only effective if it is closely confined, fo r example by packing itinside a piece of scaffold pipe, solidly capped at either end. Systematic weakenio f t he pipe produces a vicious fragmentation grenade.

Cer ta in w e ap o ns , s u ch a s a i rguns , can b e o b ta in e dl eg i t ima te ly . Othe r weapons , howeve r , w i ll h a ve to beob ta ined e i the r f r om gun shops o r f rom the base s of th es e c u r it y f o r c e s by m e a n s of gue r r i l l a act ion d u ri n g t heo r g a n is a t io n a l p h a s e ( o r can be c o n s t ru c t e d r e l a ti v e ly e a s i lyin h o m e w o rk sh op s) . O th er weaporrs , such a s h a n d - g r e n a d e s ,mines , r o c k e t l a u n ch e r s , can b e o b ta in e d in the s a m e w a y .Exp los i ve s an d d e to n a to r s c a n b e o b ta in e d f rom q u a r r i e s .O t h e r f o rm s o f e x p lo s i ve s c an be manufactured by thegue r r i l l a u n it s t h em s e lve s

It i s m o s t i rr p o rt a n t, h o w e v e r, to cons t r uc t a camouf l agedweapons / ammuni t i on cache . Humid i ty i s th e grea t e s t enemy ofammuni t i on ; t he re fo re th e c ac he m u s t be careful ly cons t ruc t ed .Weapons whi ch w il l n ot immed i a t e l y b e n ee de d shou ld begrea sed and w r ap p ed i n a i r - t i gh t bags . Ammuni t i on , explos ivesand chemica l s should be careful ly w ra pp ed a nd p ut in boxe s ,Build a gra t e us ing boa rds and l ogs , so t ha t t he packages wil lnot l i e o n th e g ro un d.

Leave a n i n te r v al o f a bo ut t he w id th o f a h an d b et w ee n b o xe sand con t a i ne r s to a f fo rd a i r c i r cu l a t i on . If pos s i b l e , a i r th ecache b y r emov ing t he r o of in g pape r f r equen t !y

Using oi d antitank mines. Most have fusewell fo r insertion of fuse cap. I f no t at20 0 grams to outside of mine to ac t as primer.


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Ant i - t ank n ine s a r e exce l l en t , imp rov i sed , concent ra tedch a r g e s . Th e w e ig h t o f e xp lo s iv e con t a ined i s a lways t h reeto four k i l og r ams .

Ar t i ll e r y p r o j e c t il e s , mo r t a r r ounds an d ae r i a l bombs canbe used a s imp rov i sed , concent ra ted charges to d e st ro y h a r dt a rge t s .

I t i s b e s t to a t ~ a c h the projec t i l e to a board with wr r-e , Fo ra p r im e r , use a SI l 'Bl l cha rge which i s a lway s a t ta c h ed n e a r the..de t ona t o r .

Maintenance facilitiesUse contac t s in leg i t imate r e pa i r s ho p s t o help with

o rd i nance . O r , p refe rab ly , th e gu e r r i l l a un i t s h ou l d h a v eacce s s to a c landes t ine r e pa i r shop whe r e sma l l jo b s ( su ch a swe l di n g up l l 'Bkeshif t c h ar ge s ) c a n b e c a r r i e d ou t wi th th en i nim um o f e q ui pm e n t.

FoodGue r r i ll a u n i ts o r d in a r i ly l ive o f f t he l an d a s wel l a s f r om

r rBter ia l provided by th e popula t ion o r s to le n f rom s ho p s.The ques t ion o f food supp ly , a dif f icul t one to so lv e, h as

cons i de r ab l e . bea r i ng upon th e t ac t i cs o f gu e r r i ll a u n i t s.If t he u n it h a s h igh -g r ade and non -pe r i s hab l e food supp l i e s ,

keep them fo r th e dif f icul t t imes in win te r . These inc lude suchi t ems a s canned milk , chocola te , smoked mea t , bacon and hards au s ag e s . It i s advisable to s to re t h e s e in wel l -h idden depo t s .

F o od s u pp ly s ug ge st io ns : w h en t he u ni t i s being suppl ied byt h e popu la t io n i t should b e care fu l no t t o e xp os e i t sel f any longerthan n ece s aa r y . In surnrner t ime, pe r sonne l s ho u id b e sentout i n a dv an ce t o h av e t he p op ul at io n p r ep a r e t he f oo d . Thenhave i t picked u p , ~ d t ak en o ut o f th e vi l l age o r town so tha tthe u n it c a n ea t i n t he o pe n. In win te r t ime , wai t u n de r c o ve ran d only corne to th e h o us es t o e at in a wa rm p la ce when th efood is ac tua l ly r e ad y .

MedicalIt i s d i ff i cu l t t o s a y wh e th e r it i s a mis t ake to es tabl i sh

an e l a bo r a te med i ca l se rv i ce o r whe the r i t i s a pos i t iveadvantage . If th e guer r i l l a un i t s in th e count rys ide do n ot h av ea cen t r a l b as e o f opera t i on s , then i t would c l ea r ly be animpo s s ib i li ty b e c a u se of t he c o nt in u ou s mo vi ng f r ~ ~ place top l a ce . The b ase s et up by t h e B o li v ia n guer r i l l a movement in1967 was equ ip p e d w i th a sJTBl l f ie ld hosp i t a l , inc ludingop e ra t in g t a b le and a fu l l corrplernent o f s u r g ic a l i n s t rumen t s .But th i s c a nn o t b e t aken a s a genera l r e commenda t i on .

In mos t c i rc um s t a n c e s, t h e re fo re , provide only f i r s t a i d .Take wounded and s ic k p e r so nn e l to re l i ab le per sons among th ep op ul at io n. M e di ca l suppl ies and equ ipmen t should be p rocu redf rom:1 . d oc to rs ; 2 . ph arm ac ie s; 3 . h os pit als ; 4 . f i r s t aid s ta t ions

Tactics of guerrilla unitsEarly operations

I t i s impo r t an t tha t th e unit , ' s f i r s t ac t ions should have s implet a rge t s which can be mas t e r ed wi th ou t a ny di f f i cu l t i es . A goodexarrple i s th e d e st ru c ti on o f a n e l ec t r i c i t y pylon .

Only af t e r uni t conf idence h as been es tabl i shed with th ecorq>let ion o f a fe w s imp le op e r a ti o n s should l a rge r ac t ions beu n d er ta k en , s u ch a s assau l t s on b r idges , r a ilway s t at io n s o r anambush o f t he secu r i t y f or ces .

Operational securityThe secu r i t y o f guer r i l l a uni t s wi ll n o rma l ly be ca r r ied out

by sympath i se r s t h ro u gh e s pi o na g e a nd obse rva t i on . Rad i o andt e l ephone conve r s a t i ons can be mon it or ed ( th e Br i t i sh A rm y inNo r th e rn I re la n d we re su rp r i sed and a l a rmed to d i s cove r t ha tth e Prov i s i ona l r nA h ad ins ta l l ed taps on t h e i r te lephone sys tema t GH Q Li sbu rn ) ; r o ad s , r a i lways and a i rpor t s should be con s ta n tl y o b s e rv e d fo r the assembly of coun t e r - i n su rgency f or ces .I n f o rma t i on ga t he r ed should be r epo r t ed to th e ac t ive guer r i l l aun i t v ia r ad io t r an sm i t t e r o r me s s en g e r s should be used .

General behaviour1 . p ro ceed with s e c r e cy ca r e and cunn ing2 . u se fo rce only when th e guer r i l l a uni t h as s u p e r io r f o r c e s3 . a v oi d a n y ac t ion which migh t j eopa rd i s e th e exi s tence o f th e

uni t4 . th e mo s t i m p o rt an t safe ty rnea au r-e i s s e c r e cy

in l a r ge i n du st r ia l p l an t s j 5 . p ri va te homes ( sy s t ema t i c a l l ys c ro unge sma l l q u a nt it ie s ) j 6 . pharl'X"Bceutical i n du s tr ie s ( su c ha s s u rr e pt it io u s del ivery by th e popula t ion) .

The populationThe popu la t io n i s you r g r ea t e s t f r i end . Without t h e i r

syrq>athy and a c ti v e s u ppo r t th e guer r i l l a uni t w il l b e u na bl e toex i s t fo r extended pe r i ods of t ime . As a r e su l t , th e guer r i l l afo rces mus t take g r ea t ca r e n ot to a l i ena te them by unde r t ak ingac t ions which a re de t r imen t a l to t h e i r s a f e t y . Such provoca t ionshould n ev e r happen . The poss ib i l i ty ex i s t s tha t th e guer r i l l auni t s may be corn e a g r e a t e r evi l than th e secur i ty f o r c e s .

I f th e guer r i l l a un i t h as to ta ke anything i t should b e d on en o t w it h a t h rea t f rom a sub -mach i ne gun b ut by an ap pea l to th eco rnnon goa l .Because o f th e c i r cums t an ce s p ecu l ia r to gu e r r i ll a wa r f a ree ve ry m em b er o f t h e p o pu la ti on can cause g re a t h a rm t o th eun i t i f they wan t to o r , i f to o much ha s been r evea l ed to t h em ,t h rough i n t e r r oga t i on by th e secu r i t y f o r c e s . The guer r i l l a uni ti s to a l a rge extent , d e pe n de n t u p on t h e g oo d w il l o f t he populat ion .

Ini t ial ly, th ey w ill b e in t imida ted a n d w it ho u t mot iva t ion .With th e s t rengthening o f t he guer r i l l a un i t s t h ro ugh p r o lo ng edconf l ic t th i s wil l change .

An awakened , a roused popula t ion can h el p t he guer r i l l a uni tin m an y ways :Pas s i v e suppo r t :a . obse rve the s e cu r it y f o r c e s cont inuous ly an d sys temat ica l lyb . e sta bl is h an i nconsp i cuous secu r i t y net fo r guer r i l l a uni t sc . p rocu re suppl iesd . hide and ca r e fo r th e wounded .and s icke . concea l mater i a l and ammuni t ionf . s er ve a s guide s {o r guer r i l l a uni t sg . ac t a s a commun i ca t ions ne twork be tween th e guer r i l l a andt h e popul a ti o nh . provide safe house sAct ive suppor t :a . supply t e ch n ic i an s f o r guer r i l l a uni t sb . r ep l a ce wounded and ki l led pe r sonne lc . s abo t age communica t ionsd . place exp lo sv i e devices

Even if t h e p o pu la ti on s ho ul d ac t only h a l f- h e a rt e d ly f o r theguer r i l l a un i t s , t h e re wil l a lways be s orn eone who wil l a ct a so b s e r v e r , scout o r me s s en g e r .

Membe r s of th e guer r i l l a uni t making contac t with sympa th i s e r s amongs t t he p o pu la ti on s h ou ld be ex t r emely caut ious , eveni n t ho s e a r e a s und e r guer r i l l a con t r o l . The guer r i l l a un i t hasa lways to shif t i ts a re a o f a c t iv i ty , wh e r e a s those who have notyet joined i t a re r e s t r i c t ed to t h e i r l o ca l e . T o e xp os e t h e i r' c ove r ' would cer t a in ly me an t h e i r l iquida t ion .

... Informationsourcesr n:t. .bservation technical agent CollectionI interception penetration &J; I Transmissionradio,

messenger

collation usinginformation

analysis1action


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5 . ambushes an d r a ids a re th e un i t ' s main f ight ing weapons6 . n ev e r engage a st rong e n emy and n ev e r a cc ep t a n open f ight7 . when mee t i ng a s u p e ri o r f o rc e d iv i de i nt o sm a ll g r ou p s ,

avoid th e secu r i t y f or ces an d r e a s s emb l e l a t e r a t a p r e a r r an g ed poin t .I f an engagemen t with pu r su i ng f o r c e s c an no t b e a v oi de d , do

n o t e ng ag e in a decis ive f ight under any c i r cums tances . Ra the radop t delaying t ac t ic s and b r eak con t ac t with them a s quickly a spossib le - cer t a in ly no l a t e r t h an n i gh t im e which wil l concea l th egu e r ri l la u n i t' s movemen t s .

Once th e s e c u ri t y f o rc e s h a v e g a in e d r e l i e f by mean s o f asuccess fu l engagemen t and r e tu rned to t he ir b a se s, h a ra ss themaga in . Guer r i l l a un i t s should r e appea r f rom hiding o nc e t hesecu r i t y f or ces have d i s ap p ea r ed .

Simple cOl11rnunicationF r om t ime to t im e , th e guer r i l l a wil l have to en t e r cer t a in

t owns o r vi l l age s to :1 . r ep l en i sh food suppl ies2 . l eave w o un d ed a n d s ic k w it h s ympa t h i s e r s3 - use t h e t el ep hone o r p o st a l s y s temSimple mes s ag e s can be r e l ayed to th e guer r i l l a uni t by non comba t an t sympath i se r s by s ome o f t he following" s im p l e em t ho1 . opening o r c los ing p re-des igna t ed windows2 . hanging ou t c l o t he s3 . displaying o r concea li ng some th i ng p rominen t .' lhis ma t t e r i s r ea l l y one o f i nd iv id u al i m ag in a ti on , b u t e a chmethod "must be sa f e .

March RoadblocksAfte r a success fu l l a r ae opera t i on move to a new a r e a .

Be fo re m o v in . " es t ab l i sh con tac t with r e l i ab l e people in th ene w a r e a . A StnaU g roup should r econno i t r e th e a r e a t ho rough l y .

Avoid main r o a d . and vi l l age . o n th e m a rc h.No long p repara t i on s a r e neede4 ( s u ch as moving ammuni t ion

and food supp l i es o r l a rge - sca le r econna i sance) th e exac tl oc a ti on o f t he new a r e a should not be r ev ea l ed .

In o r d e r t o i n te r c ep t indiv idua l s who m ig ht i nf or m t hes e c u ri ty f o r ce s o f th e guer r i l l a un i t ' s p l a n. p a t ro l s s ho ul d b esen t out a fe w h o u rs b e f or e th e m ov e to a ct a s a ~ m b u s h e s fa ra he ad o n r o ad s anel s t r e e t s . Dur ing th e c r i t i ca l per iod theywil l de ta in a ll people p a ss in g b y . I f neces sa ry t t e l ephonec ommun i c at io n s s h oul d b e cut .

Nobody s ho uld b e a llo w ed to know wher e th e un i t comes fromo r wher e i t i s g oin g. T he n ex t operat ional a r e a s h ou ld b e kepts e c r e t f rom eve ryone not in th e un i t i t s e l f .

Deceive th e populat ion abou t t he u ni t I s s t r eng th . Alwaysc r ea te th e imp ress ion t h a t i t i s l a r g e r than it ac tua l ly i s ( i . e .th e r ema r k : II we a r e only a group f rom a l a r ge r uni t whichfol lows ove r t he r e . tI ) U poss ib l e , on ly t r ave l a t n ig ht t omin imise t he p o s si b il it y o f d i scovery .

Since t r ave l wil l have to be by f oo t, b ec au se o f th e n ee d t oavo id r oa d s, t he re wil l be a lo t o f mar ch i n g . Howev e r, a vo idunnecessa ry f o r c ed mar che s . Keep f r e sh and con s er v e s t ren g thfo r any opera t i on o r movemen t .If poss ib l e , ~ l w a y s mar ch in a c l o sed f o rma ti o n . Wheneverybody i s c l os e t og e th e r quick decis ions can be made andimp l emen t ed be t t e r and f a s t e r . P r ov i de f r on t and r e a rsecu r i t y wi th un it memb e r s sever a l hund r ed met res a h ea d a ndbeh i nd .

Rest

Fel l ed o r blasted t r e e s a re b es t su i ted f or r oa d b locks . Donot a t t emp t to d rop to o big a t r ee in th e hope of caus lng th es e cu r it y f o rc e s m o re w o rk . ' Ibis only was t e s a lo t o f t ime andexp lo s ive .

I f t he uni t c a n n o t ~ i n s t a l l booby - t r ap s with th e road b locks , al e a s t s imu la t e them. Separa t e , hal f -h idden wi r e s l e ad i ng f r omth e t r ee b ranches into th e ground s inu l a t e t r i p -w i r e s tohidden cha r ge s . L oo se a nd only p a r ti a ll y c o ve r ed p i ec e s ofe a r t h n ex t to th e r oa d s ug ge st t h a t th e road m ay a l so be mined .

Cover main road block with automatic fire. Block secondary routes and mine orbooby-trap these.

Move a t night and r e s t in woods dur ing th e day .Se l ec t woods fo r s he l t e r . When f or ce d t o camp o ut in th e

open u se high point s wh ic h w i ll provide good observa t ion .Secur i ty i s mos t ef fec t ive when guard s a r e p la c ed i n th evicinitv o f t he c amp .

I n st a ll r o ad b lo ck s o n o pe n p ieces of r o ad , wh er e t he secu r if o r c e s mu s t expose t h emse lves to f i re whi l e r emov ing t h em .Booby- t r ap s on improv i s ed road b locks a re th e mo s t im p or ta n tth ing a nd n ot th e t r e e s a s s u ch .

The s e c ur it y f o rc e s wil l n ot r em o ve th em b y h an d b ut w il lh au l th em awa y by veh ic l e . Where booby - t r ap s a re instal led( o r a t l e a s t seen to be) an a rmou r ed vehic le wil l be neces sa ryt o d o th e h au li ng o r spec i a l i s t s will have" to be cal led fo r todisa rm t h em . Wha te v er , a ll th is wil l t ake t ime .

I t s ho ul d b e n ot ed , h ow e ve r, t ha t road b locks on r o ad s a r el e s s e ff ec ti ve t ha n b lo c ks o n r a i l l i n es because they can beeas i l y bypas s ed by rerout ing t r a f f i c .

Dur ing th e d ay k ee p a watch fo r a i rc ra f t . At night , gua rde a ch l ik e ly avenue o f app roach .

If c amp ing a f te r night fa l l , k ee p th e uni t together a nd h av egua rd pos t s a t 50 o r a t th e most 100 me t r e s f rom th e c amp . Asvis ib i l i ty i n c r ea s e s a f te r dawn secu r i t y nu s t be inc r eased . Neve ruse th e s ame camp tw o night s in a r ow . Neve r spend t he n ig htin th e s am e p la c e a s th e day . Make s u r e t h e re i s an acknowledgedr a ll y in g po in t fo r s t r aggle r s o r fo r m emb e r s o f t he uni t who a rel o s t . T h i a . p p l i . a a lao fo r membe r s who a re s ta t ioned e lwbe r e . Many small roadblocks cause maximum annoyance. 'nley are easily avoided but_.t be cInncI ....taally.

Resting detachmentbservers


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Sabotage on the roadsDes t r oy 9 change o r r em o ve r oa d s ign s . P l a c e n a il s o n th e

r o ad . 011y ef fec t ive whe n used in l a rge q u an ti ti es . S y m p a th is e rscan be used in th i s ty pe o f opera t i on . A g ai n, t he objec t i s tow a st e t he secu r i t y f o r c e s ' t i m e . Co-ordina t ion of th i s ty pe o fopera t ion with ac t ions e l s ewhe r e i s i n di sp e n sa b le s in c e s u c hsabotage i s o nl y o f v al ue when th e secu r i t y force s have to u seth e r oad con t inua l ly .Vehic les t hemse l ve s can be s ab o ta ge d i n t he f o l ~ o w i n g ways :1 s ug a r i n th e pe t r o l tank2 . wa t e r in th e pe t ro l tank3 . 10Qsen o i l d r a in a g e sc rew4 . loosen sc r ew o n o il f i l t e r5 . l o os e n o i l p r e s s u r e l e ad .Sabotage in t h ese w a y s l ead s t o l en gt hy a nd compl ica ted r e pa i r s .On th e o ther hand , c a r s can s imp ly be des t r oyed b y o p en i ng th ep e tr o l c a p , t ip p i ng t h e c a r on i t s s ide and throwing a match intoth e spi l led pe t r o l . L a r ge r v e h ic le s c an be des t r oyed b y b u rn in gnew spaper s u n d e r t he b on n et o r b y s oa k in g r ag s in pe t r o l o roil an d throwing them l i t u n d e r t he b o n ne t. Of co u r s e ,explos ives ma ke a much b e t t e r job o f t h is t ha n p e tr o l- s oa k e dr ag s bu t why u se valuable explos ives when a much s imp le rmethod can do th e job?Meta l sp ikes to blow t y r e s can b e m ad e f r om a s m a l l p ieceo f s t e e l about 12 to 15 cen t imet res long an d 5 to 8 mi l l imet r esin d ia m ete r. F ile both ends to s h a r p p o i n ts . C u t b o th end swith a h a ck s aw a b ou t 3 to 5 cen t imet res a nd th e f ou r pa r t s( they a r e only h e ld t o g et h e r in th e midd l e s e c ti o n f o r abou t 5

, cen t imet res ) a re no w ben t ou twa rd . Though t he s pi ke m ay fa l lto t he g ro u nd in any pos i t ion one p o in t w i ll a lw a y s be u p . 'Thes t r eng t h o f th e sp ike a nd t he l ength of each po in t a r e suf f ic ientto p e ne tr at e e ve n th e heav i e s t of ty re s

Ambush of single vehiclesFi r e o n th e d r i v e r a nd a ny p a s s en g e r s with an a i r r i f l e .

With th i s type of weapon th e sho t can ha rd l y be heard .B y minimis ing no i se , t ime is. g ai ne d a nd mater i a l can be

re:rrJ:)ved f r om th e vehic le l e s s h u r ri e d ly . I f p o s si b le , d r iv et he v eh ic le t o a conceal ed l oca t ion . Dead secur i ty forcepe r sonne l m u s t b e r eI lD v e d and ' bur ied .

A col lec t ion sec t ion should fol low th e a s sa u lt t e am . Itshould r emove a ll usable i t ems a n d q u ic k ly r e t i r e to a p r e des i gna t ed po i n t , of ten before t he f ig ht is comp l e te l y f i n is hed .' lhus t h e w i t h dr a w a l o f th i s sec t ion i s cove r ed by t h e c o nt in u in gf i re f ight .

I n i ti a ll y t h e s e cu r it y f o r c e s wil l be u n ab le t o respondimmed i a t e l y to an act ion of t h is k in d . B ut s o m e form of r e sponsrms t be t aken in to cons i de r a t i on . >

Consequent ly , th e guer r i l l a uni t m u s t have a s a f e w i t hd r a w alr ou te , e it he r u s i ng d i ff i cu l t t e rr a in o r by sabotaging th e r o ad s .In moun ta inous t e r r a i n , r a i d s with l ight mach ine g m s , mach ineg un s a nd m or t a r s on t r an spo r t co l umns , m a rc hi ng c o lu m n s a n dt r a in s can be very succe s s f u l .

I t r ru st be m ad e c l e a r h o w ev e r, b e fo r e t he a c ti on how i t i sto be conducted . F o r i n s t ance , when f i r ing . is to be in i t i a t ed :1 . upon o r de r s2 . af t e r f i r e from one l ead weapon3 . au toma t i ca l l y , whe n t he h ea d of t h e c o lu r rn has r eached a

cer t a in point in th e t e r r a inho w t he l ea d vehic le i s to be s t opped :1 . by fe l l ing a t r ee2 . m in e s

Automatic fire

,. . Automatic fire

3 . by fi r ing upon it ;ho w t o d i st ri b ut e f ir e t h ro u g ho u t t h e co l umn :1 . who i s to f i re o n th e f r on t p o r ti o n2 . . who is


16/34

Attacking a small post

Machine gun post- ~ ortar

The r e a re va r i ous methods of sabo t ag ing a te lephone ne t ,an d v a ri o us t yp e s o f t e le phone oornmurrtca.tf.on have to becons ide red . F i r s t , t he re i s the i n t e r r up t i on o f u n d er g ro u n dcab le s .

Underg round c a b le s c o n si st of seve ra l wi r e s which a r einsula ted aga i ns t each o the r and aga i ns t d i r t .

The des t r uc t i on of underground cab l e s i s compl i ca t ed anddange rous , pa r t i cu l a r ly when t he c ab le s a re i n se r t ed in toi ro n p ip e s o r conc r e t e boxes fo r add i t i ona l pro t ec t i on . A holehas to be du g and cab l e s a re norma l ly l a id a longs ide the r oadsy s t em .

In o r d e r to ob ta in r e s u It s w h ic h a re to l a s t some t ime dot h e f o ll ow ing :a ) T h or ou gh procedur e - d ig u p th e cab l e which i s usual ly 80

c e n time tr e s und e rg r ound . Remove th e insula t ion an d cu tth e cable in tw o. R ep lace the insula t ion, fil l th e hole an de l im i n a te a ny t r a c e s of d igg ing .

b) Quick procedur e - d ig u p th e cable and cu t i t . P r i o r tofil l ing ho le la y ends of c ab le in su ch a m a nn er ( if ne c e s s a r y ,we ig h down with r ocks ) so t ha t they do n o t t ou c h each o t h e r .Cove r t he h ol e a nd c am o uf la ge t r a c e s o f d ig g in g . On th eave rage , s uc h a n in ter rupt ion wil l l a s t t h re e to f ou r days .

Divide th e gue r r i l l a u n it i nt o t h re e groups :a) 1 . f i re suppor t group

2 . a s s au l t group3 . t e ch n ic a l g r ou p ( w ir e c u tt in g , o b s ta c le d emol it io n ,

mine c l ea r i ng )b . de rm l i t i onc . rr.raterial gather ing group ( l ight mo t o r v e hi cl e s, a n im a l s , rucks a ck ) .

Surprise attackon a small post

With t he b eg in ni ng o f t he a t ta c k a l l c ommun ic a ti o n s b e tw e e n t hes e c u ri t y f o r c es and neighbour ing ins ta l l a t ions shou ld be in te r rupted so tha t no r e in f o rc emen ts c a n b e s ur n rn o ne d . i l i t a l lt e l ephone l imes ou t of th e ins ta l l a t ion o r cause a s h o rt c i rc u i t.Obvious ly , radio communicat ions canno t be i n t e r rup ted .At tempt t he re fo re , to put th e r ad i o s e t o r s ta t ion o u r of act ion.Reconna i s s ance s hou l d h av e d e te rm i ne d w h er e i t i s s i t ua t ed .

Attack on acommunications system

Sabotage element follows anddestroys enemy installations

Assault element subdues guards

. General) th e ob j ec t of th e at tack s ho u ld b e f ul ly r e cconno i t r ed ,

b inocu la r s , w ith th e a id o f pho tos , ma ps a nd drawingsd f r or n i n fo rmat i on ob t a in e d f rom wo rk e rs a t th e ins ta l l a t ion

( the mos t c r it i ca l t a rg e t s, to de t e rm ine the s i z e of an yexplos ive cha rge s , th e mo s t d e s ir a b le f i r ing posit . ions)

2. Ope ra t i ona l Plan) i t mus t be a s s imp l e a s poss ible) t he re should usual ly be t h re e g r oup s : a ra id ing pa r t y , tom i n a te gu a r d s o r a t l ea s t k ee p t hem p in ne d down; a t echnica l

r e s pon si b le f o r d emo li ti o n s; a r e s e r v e , t o i so la te t hecene of t he a c ti o n, to f i re on r e i n b r c emen t s f rom wel l prepa red

pos i t i ons .. . Imp lemen ta t i on) th e plan should not be r evea l ed to th e whole gue r r i ll a d e t a ch

unt i l sho r t l y b e fo re th e ope r a t i on) app roach t he o b je ct quickly dur ing th e night , avoiding roads

Security groups guard approach roadsand cover withdrawal of assault force

) occupy a wel l cove r ed pos i t i on nea r th e o bje ct to w ai t fo r th enight ( to a t ta c k )

) the rms t f av ou ra bl e t im e t o s t a r t th e ope r a t i on i s s ho r tl y a f te rse t s in . Each gue r r i l l a de t achmen t should be br iefed dur ing

Th e ope r a t i on wil l be conducted unde r th e c ov e r of da rknes s .e l a r g e s t por t ion o f th e n ig ht w ill t he n be ava i l ab l e fo r with- .

. Reconnai s sa n c e o f Se cu ri ty Sy s tem) de t e rm ine locat ion o f gua rd house) d e t ~ r m i n e when th e g u ar d i s c ha ng ed . O b se rv e c h an g in g o f the

dur ing t he d ay from a dis tance o r a t night f rom c lo se( r e n te d a p a r tmen t )

) de t e rm ine we apons empl acemen t .

Use iron bar or bluntside of ax e

Hi t obliquelybetween smallof backand loin

Hit be low neck.betweenshoulder blades

Disabling guardsquietly

attacks


17/34

To damage high t ens ion cab l e s s imp ly es t ab l i sh connec t i onwi th th e g round , if t h e re i s no t enough exp lo s ive t o d e s tr o y th et owe r s .

He r e , a wi r e i s needed a t o ne e nd o f wh ic h s ho ul d b e a t t achea r ock o r p i ece o f i r o n . The o ther end i s to be ' i n se r t ed in torm i s t e a r t h . Be su re to r e l e a s e th e wi r e immed ia t e l y a f te rt h r owing .

To p r e v e n t a c c id e n t s t make su re o f t he p r o p e r dis t inc t ionb e twe en t e le p hone l i n e s a n d h ig h t ens ion cab l e s . On th e f o rmeth e indiv idual wi r e s ru n para l l e l and o n th e l a t t e r they a r es t aggered .

The sy s t em can al so be damaged by shoot ing down th ei n su l a to r s . If poss ib l e , do t h i s on an open s t r e t ch a nd a wa yf rom s t a t i on s . The pu rpose of th is method i s to br ing downth e suppo r t wi r e s by des t roying t h e s u ppo rt in g insu latorso n to t h e suppo r t s t r u c t u r e '( i . e . t owe r ) . Main t a in a safedis tance (3 0 to 50 me t r e s ) . 0 1 dua l t r a ck s , both wi r e s mus tbe des t royed .2 . Sabotage o f th e t r ac k i ts e lf : knock off th e s cr ew heads .These come off r e l at i ve l y ea s i ly w ith t he help o f a s ledge h ammpar t i cu l a r ly when i t i s very co l d . Al though this w ill n ot dera i lt r a in s it wi l l t ak e ti me an d ene rgy to r e in s t al l t h em .Explos ives make a mor e eff icient job . On a n o pe n s c r-e cc na lways de s t r oy th e t r ack s on a cu r v e . Always b l a s t th e ou te rra i l . If th e d r i v e r h as not no t i c ed th e sabotage and en t e r s th ecu rve wi th out t a ki n g ac t ion , a piece of t r ack about 30 cen t ime t r ei s suf f ic ient ga p to dera i l th e t r a in . I f th e gap h a s b e en n o ti ce dhoweve r , th e t r a in can c r o s s g ap s o f up to 60 cen t ime t r e s .3 . Sabotage of th e t r acks by ' g r e a s i ng ' : g r ea s e on an inc l inewi th g r e a s e , o i l o r sof t soap . Always g r ea s e bo th r ai l, s fo r ad i st an c e o f a t l ea st 15 0 me t r e s , otherWise th e wheels o f th et r a in w il l s ki d ov e r th e place by mean s of i t s own momen t umo r s h o rt s t re t ch e s can b e s an d ed c l e a r .4 . Train t r aps : these a re hidden charges which a re detonatedth e rrro rn e nt the engine p a s s e s th e point wher e the charges a rep l aced .

Attackona railnehNork

Make circui t from overhead lines to earth via protective railing on overpass

1 . Damage e l e c tr i c w i r e s : f rom an ov e r p a s s , connec t th ep r o te c t iv e r a il i n g w i th t h e t r a ck b y m e an s of a s t r ong cable .Attach th e wi r e cable ( 5 - 8mm) a t th e protec t ive rai l ing an d ath e o ther end a t t ach a piece of i ron (ZOcrns) to ac t a s aweight . Throw th e cable o n to t he e l ec t r i c wi r e s f ro m th eov e r p a s s , let t ing go o f t he cable immed ia t e l y i t h a s beenth ro wn . U se only s t rong cab les s ince th in ones mel t a tonce caus ing only a s l ight vol tage r educ t i on .

T h is o p er at io n c an a ls o be ca r r ied ou t on an open s t r e t ch oft r a ck , by f i r s t a t t aching th e cable weighted a t .one end to th et r a ck an d then t hr ow in g t he w e ig ht ed e nd over th e wi r e above .The disadvantage with t h i s , of cou r s e , i s t h a t the ove rheadwi r e s 1lre usua l l y ins ta l l ed h igh , making i t d i ff ic u lt t o t hr owov'e r , Where p o ss ib l e, u s e an ov e r p a s s .

Breaking phone lines

Break phone lines by c\Jtting or blasting trees so they fall across th e lines.

Techn i ca ll y speak ing t th e be s t point s o f s a bo ta g e a re wher eth e cab l e s c r o s s a r i v e r . They a r e mos t l y moun ted next too r unde rnea t h a br idge and can eas i l y be cu t . The d i s advan t age , o f cou r s e t i s t ha t b r id g e s a r e of ten guarded o r a t l ea stin s uc h cons t an t use tha t i t i s diff icul t to c a r r y out th e s abo t age .

To d i s rup t th e t e l ephone net ove rhead , cu t o r b las t th e polesin s uc h a way tha t th e w i re s b r ea k . Cut o r b las t t r e e s so t h a tt he y f a ll a c r o s s th e wi r e s . Ins ta l l a fe w s ta k e m i n es a s wel la s an t i - pe r sonne l mines s o t ha t c l ea rance and r ep a i r a r e r radehaza rdous fo r the secu r i t y s e r v i c e s .

t --'-

Cu t long length fromfallen wire to makerepair difficult

A s imp l e method o f damaging t e l ephone l ines i s to a t t ach a-sho r t p ie ce o f metal o r r ock on a s t rong , l ong r ope and th rowi t ov e r th e w i re s . 'D1.e r ope wil l r ap r ou nd th e wi r e s and a ll i tn eeds i s a pul l to b reak t h em . It i s bes t to do th is in th e cent re ,b e tw e e n t h e po les , s ince th e wi r e wil l b r eak ea s i e s t t h e r e .

Breaking power lines. Use thick steel wire, well-earthed. Keep well awayf rom wire once thrown.

12


18/34

Secondary blast

+- Direction of travel6 . Des t ruc t i on o f s t e am e n g i n e s : by , t hrowing 'a c h a r ~ e o f o neo r tw o k i l o g r a m m e s in to th e f i r e -box , by des t roying th es t e e r i ng mechan i sm wi th a s l edge h a m m e r , by f i r ing i nt o t hebo i l e r with a l ig h t m a c h in e gun ( aim f or c en tr e th i rd of eng ine ,abou t 1 .5 m e tr es f r om cab ) 7 . S a bo ta g e o f r o ll in g s to c k : t h row a h a nd f ul o f s an d , a b ra s ivp o w d e r o r meta l shav ings into each g r ea s e box . No i rnrnedia ter e s u l t s wil l be s een bu t th e bea r i ng w il l s oo n w e a r ou t ..8 . Raiding a , r a il r o a d s t a ti o n : th e r a i l road s t a t i on con -s i s t s o f the fo l lowing t a r g e t s - s ta t ion bu i l d ing , t r a c k s ,ove rhead w i r e s , s i gna l s and a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s cen t r e .T he g u e r r i l l a u n it s h ou ld be divided into t h re e d e t ac h m e n t s.a ) ra id ing p a r t y , to i n t e r rup t commun i ca t i ons , keep r a i lway

an open s tr et ch you must d e st roy t ra ck s at a curve: bent tracks ar e more difficultreplace than s traight ones ; t rains derail more easily on a curve. Always blastou te r rail. Th e centrifugal force of an approaching train will derail it morean d will throw debris onto neighbouring track.

1.5Kg explosive on rail,sandbags around it

Main line poleSw i t ch house

Communications

Switches - - - _ ~ ~ - r . ,....... ~ - - - - - Signals

Lash grenade to rail, se tof f with fuse extension

y l oo s en i ng t h e r a i l s , th e t r a in c a n be d e r a i l ed . E i t h e r l oos enhe ti e moun t ings ( k e y , s c r e w , na i l s ) on e igh t succe s s i ve t i e s ,r r emove the f i sh-p la te o r a pp l y l eve r age and m ov e one r a i l

t he i ns id e an d j am th e f i s h - p l a t e i n b e tw e en .

Targets in assault on rail stationp e r so n n e l u n d e r c o nt ro l and e l im i n at e g u a rd s

b) demol i t ion p a r t y , to d e s t r o y t e ch n i ca l i n s ta l la t io n sc ) r e s e r v e , to i so la te the ob j ec t i ve , a mbus h r e i n f o r c e -

m e n t s and p r ov i de c o v e r d u ri ng w i th d ra w a l.If t h e r e i s on ly l im i t ed t i m e , f i r s t des t r oy th e swi t che swi th a k i l og r amrne cha rge a nd th e s igna l s b ox w it h a h a n d g r e n a d e . If t ime i s no t so c r u c i a l , a l so de s t r oy th e m a i nl ine po l e a s wel l a s o th er s ig na ls . C u t wi r e s to swi t che s ,s i gna l s and g a t e s .

. I : e s t r uc t i on o f e l e ct r ic e n g in e s : e i ther shoo t o f f t he in su l a t c r s ,r s m a s h th e i n s t r u m e n t s in th e cab with a s l edge h a m m e r , o r

th e t r an s f o rm e r o il con t a i ne r s o n t he e n gi ne bay ( knockin th e wa l l wi th a p i ck ax e a nd s e t f i r e to th e o il whi c hou t . )

n n - - - l ""-I I- . . JI I _..- - - - -- - ........ -U U ....... ....I ..... .....

1 Kg explosive. I f noexplosive available,destroy switch ba rwith sledgehammer

Switches

Sl ing cans packed withexplosive or plasticover axles. Slower bu tbetter, lash explosiveto axle

The main l in e p ol e can be de s t royed e i t he r by f i r i ng i n toth e o il i n su l a t o r o r by exp lo s ive ch a r g e .


19/34

When interrupting rail traffic make sure that pouible by-pass routes are a lso blas ted.Nuisance value can be increased by attackinl a line on subsequent days - adisruption a day fo r a week creates more problems for repair crews than severidisruptions on on e day.

It i s i r q > o r t a n t to c r e a t e c o n f u s i o n in t h e r a i l s y s t e m b ya b n o r m a l r a i l s c h e d u l e s a n d t o ' d el a y t r a f f i c f o r

l o n g p e r i o d s o f t i m e. T hi s c a n be d o n e byt h e m a i n te n a n ce o r g a n is a t io n s c o n t in u a l ly b u s y by

s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n e v er y d a y . Ove r' t he l on g r u n itm o r e d e m o r al is in g a n d n e rv e w r ac k in g f o r th e s e c u r i t y

to h a v e to m a k e n u m e r o u s s m a l l r e p a i r s w i t h o u tt h a n i n f r e q u e n t m a j o r o n e s ,

I t i s a m i st a ke t o d e s t r o y t r a c k o n f o u r d i ff e re n t l o c a ti o n sn th e s a m e d a y a n d d u r i n g t h e s am e o p e r a t i o n . T h e s e c u r i t y

s s i m p l y r e p a i r o n e p o in t a f te r a n o th e r .

I t is : m u c h m o r e e f f e c t i v e to i n t e r r u p t o n e l e n g t h o ft r a c k o n f o u r c o n se c u ti v e d a y s . T h e e n t i r e m a i n t e n a n c eo r g a n is a t io n h a s t o s t a r t a n e w e a c h t i m e . T h e t r a f f i cflow i s i m p e d e d o n f o u r d a y s . C o n f u s i o n i s t h u s g r e a t e r ,a nd t he t ot al p e ri o d o f i n t e r r u p t i o n i s a l m o s t t w i c e a s l o n g .

Train traps

Arranged rally pointknown to all an deasily found

_ Commander fires flare as sign that everyone is to break combat and re tu rindividually to a meeting point

Mortar

Fire section

.........- Rocket launcher

__ Demolition party (2-3 persons)-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Possible auxiliary train. Secondary blastsabou t 30 minutes after main explosion toprevent arrival of relief trains.About2krn

About2km.

Until reaching thispoint, everyonereturns singly

From this point,.detachment returnsin closed formation


20/34

A fuel depot

Staff quarters& office...." '7

Underground storage tanks

Filling point

Tank t ruck

Raiding party t>Demolition p ar ty - ..

Storage tank..."

of explos ive s which can be at tached with r o p e , wire o r hooksh a lfw ay b e tw e e n t he to p arrd ~ " l e b o tt om o f th e cool ing e lemen t .

If t he re i s su f f i c i en t tilTE, a l so d e s tr o y th e i n su la to r s .Since t he re a re l ot s o f t he se " th is wil l t ake a cons i de r ab l eamoun t of t ime . They a re made of porce l a in abou t 3 cen t i me t re s t h ic k . I::estroy them with sma l l a rm s f i r e , b lowsf r om a s l edge ha rnn e r o r by de tona t i ng 200 g ra rnm es o fexp los ive p la c ed b e tw e en e a c h i n su la to r d i s c .

If pos s i b l e a l so des t r oy th e sw i t ch i ns t a l la t i on a nd h ig ht en s i on wi r e s ca r ry ing the power o f th e en t i r e ins ta l l a t ionby de tona t i ng t h re e individual cha rge s of 1 k i lo g ramm e o f exp los ive f or e ac h s witc h.

Th i s appl ie s to fuel ins ta l l a t ions above ground . As a r u l e ,fuel depo t s a re l o ca te d i n th e v i ci n it y o f r a

towards a citizens militia - anarchist alternatives to nato and the warsaw pact

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