timothy anna - ultimos virreyes de america

7/30/2019 Timothy Anna - Ultimos Virreyes de America

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The Last Viceroys of New Spain and Peru: An AppraisalAuthor(s): Timothy E. Anna

Reviewed work(s):Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), pp. 38-65Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1863740 .

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The Last Viceroys f New Spain and Peru:AnAppraisalTIMOTHY E. ANNA

THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SpanishAmericanWars of Independence(I8IO-24) s, ounderstatehe bvious, ast.t s also, ndthis as pparentlynotbeen oobvious, nesided. t concentrateslmost ntirelyn therebels,on theAmericanide, n theirspirations,heirbjectives,ndtheirmilitaryandpoliticalampaigns.he iteraturenthe oyalistide s veryncomplete.Thereare,ofcourse,many aluable tudiesnwhatmight e calledthe"background"othemovementsorndependence,tudiesoncentratingnthe ighteenthenturyndonthe rogressiveecline f pain'sworldystem,on whatwaswrong ith hat ystemnd whyAmericanserceivedtto beunsuitedo them. hisbackgroundaterial, owever,eaves major ap nour understanding,or, lthought tells us what Spanish Americansthemselveshoughtobe grievancesnthe mperialystem,t doesnot, s issometimesssumed,utomaticallyellus how hat ystemollapsed.Muchlessdoes t tellus what heroyalistsere hinking,r theirbjectivesnthewar tself,rthemistakesheymade n thewar.Given he acthat,s HughM. Hamill, r.haspointedut nthe aseofMexico,hemajorityf panishAmericans erenot decided n thequestion f ndependence,lxclusiveconcentrationn the fundamentaleaknessesf theroyal ystemnd onAmericanbjectionso it, mportanthoughhesewere, oes not tellthewhole tory.tmay xplain,orxample, hy he oyalystemdeserved"obeoverthrownrwhyAmericanserceivedtto deservehat ate, ut tdoesnot xplain ow t was overthrown.imilarly,thousandtudies fmilitarycampaignsnly ellhowbattles erewon nd ost.Onemightven oso faras tosay hat thousandiographiesf imonBolivar,osede SanMartin,MiguelHidalgo, oseMariaMorelos,ndAgustine Iturbidenly ellhowtheywon, othow pain ost.As C. H. Haring ong gopointed ut, pain'simperialystemnAmericamaynothavebeen heworld's estgovernment,but t was not heworld'sworst.2tmaynothavemaderoom or rfulfilledthe spirationsfAmericans,ut t was no merehouseofcards.It is wellpast ime,hen,hat atinAmericanistorianspecializingntheThe researchgrant upport fthe Canada Councilis gratefullycknowledged.1Hugh M. Hamill,Jr., TheHidalgoRevolt: reludeo MexicanndependenceGainesville, 966), 51.

2 C. H. Haring,TheSpanishmpiren AmericaNew York,1947), 1:3.38


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 39emancipationfocus a proportionatemountof attention n the royalists.Furthermore,hat focus should be concentrated, ot in the eighteenthcentury,much less in the sixteenth,not at the time Spain's imperialinstitutions erecreated,or evenat themoment f theirmost mportantinstitutional eform nder the Bourbons,but duringthe Wars of Inde-pendence.3No matterhow widespreadthe radical ideas of the Frenchand NorthAmericanphilosopherswere,no matterhow corrodedSpain'sability o governmayhavebeen,theobvious nd automatic nswer owhatAmericans aw wrong n theempirewas not ndependence.t would havebeen, rather, eform,ccommodation,nd compromise. ven whentheup-risings ctually egan, s, for xample,n the ase of heHidalgo nsurrection,independencewas notthe ogicalorautomatic bjective. t was notuntil 813in Mexico, i8i6 in Rio de la Plata, and I82I in Lima that rebelsformallyproclaimedndependence. omethingmusthave got n theway,somethingmust have acted after 8io to convert he insurgentryof"Death to badgovernmentinto"'Long ive ndependence.'"One of he fundamental istakes hehistorian ould make nreviewingheroyalgovernmenturing heWarsof ndependencewould be tothink f t asfunctioninghewaythe aw required t to. It did not,because itcould not.Three centuries f restrictionsnd controls ver heexercise ftheCrown'spowerby ts agents n Americahad notprepared hem or he catastrophe fI8o8.During mostoftheWarsof ndependence heroyalpower nAmericafunctionedirtuallyn itsown,because from 8o8to I814themonarchwas acaptive nFrance nd from820 o 1823hewas a captive f he iberal panishConstitution.hus,while ntheorymajorpolicydecisions ame exclusivelyfrom pain-and manyof them did-in practicethroughouthis era anextraordinarymountofmajorpolicywas madebytheviceroys,nd almostin spiteoftheirnatural bsolutist nclinations. his is notto denythattheintransigencefpeninsular painon thequestion fAmericanutonomylsoplayeda great ole nprovokingmerican esires or otal eparation. ut thefocus hould first e on Lima and MexicoCity.THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE is thattheviceroyshemselves,nwittinglyndwithout ecognizingt, disproved he myths pon which Spanish imperialabsolutism was based. To put it anotherway, they proved Spanishimperialism nsuited o America.Actualcircumstances nd eventsforcedthemto contradict heir stated principles nd the principleson whichimperial olitical nstitutions eregrounded.And sincethiswas a complex

3See Hugh M. Hamill,Jr., RoyalistCounterinsurgencyn the MexicanWar of ndependence: heLessonsof i8i ," HispanicAmericanistoricaleview, 3 (1973): 470-89. wouldtakehis statementhatexcessive oncentrationnthe nsurgentstends to warpourunderstandingfwhatactuallyhappened"andapply tequally oexcessive oncentrationn Spanish overnmentnd imperial dministrativeeformsinthe entury efore heoutbreak f nsurrection,n thegrounds hat uchconcentrationends omakeusthinkwe havean explanation orAmericanndependencewhen, nfact, hatremains o be demonstratedbyspecific pplication.


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40 Timothy. Annatime not suitedto analysis by use of clear-cut xtremes, he readerwill bepresented second-and longoverdue-thesis: that the viceroyswere notincompetent,ut on the contrary,xtraordinarilyompetent oliticians ndmilitaryeaders.A myriad fforthrightctions nd forcefulecisions akenby the viceroys o solveactual problemsfacing hemultimately roved ouncommitted mericans hat panish mperialism as no onger alid, hat twas false authority.Mere inactioncould not have accomplished hat, norcould mererebel propaganda,norcould even theremarkably learheadedpolitical nalyses of Bolivarhimself.ndependencewas more than a coupd'etat,thoughtwas also somethingess than truerevolutionf hattermbetaken o require ocial, economic, nd even ntellectual evolution.t was therejection fa three-hundred-year-oldolitical radition nd of a previouslyheld identity. ppositionalone could nothaveproduced such a profoundpolitical hange; established uthoritymust first ave proved tself nvalid,and the viceroyswere theprincipal gents f established uthority.The subjects fthis rticle re the men who n their ole as "alterego," lit-erally"vice-king," fKing FerdinandVII, representedn theirpersons heauthority f the sovereign nd the imperialism f Spain in the two chiefAmericancolonies.For New Spain theywereFranciscoXavier Venegas,marquesde la Reunionde Nueva Espaina I810-13); Felix Maria Calleja delRey,conde de Calderon (I813-I6); and JuanRuiz de Apodaca, condedelVenadito (I816-2I). For Peru theywereJose Abascal, marques de laConcordia i8o6-i6); Joaquinde la Pezuela,marquesde Viluma I8I6-21);andJosede la Serna,condede los Andes I82 I-24).4 In order o view themproperlywe mustrememberhatemotionallynspired ntipathies ave ongobscuredthe recordof theirremarkable ccomplishments. ogethertheyprovided he strongesteadership he Americankingdomsverhad with heexception f hegreat ixteenth-centuryounder-viceroys.neveryenseof heword, hey ctually uledAmerica.Their trengthfpurpose nd loyalty elpexplain why independence ookso long to achieve and whyit cannot beassumed to have been inevitable.By definitionheywere imperialists,ytrainingbsolutists,nd as wartimeeaders heywereresponsible,s were herebel eaders, or hedestructionf hewars.Having aid this boutthem,wehavemerelyeaffirmedhat heywere ffectiveervants f heir overeign.t isno more valid to dismissCalleja from tudybecause he was viewedby hisenemies s a bloodybutcherhan twouldbe to gnoreHidalgobecauseof heatrocitiesommittedyhisfollowers.t isnomorevalid odismissAbascal asa merereactionaryhan twouldbe to forgethatBolivarwas nodemocrat.And yet, traditionallyn Latin Americanhistoriographyheyhave beenviewed s theblundering, loody-minded,nd unthinkinggentsofan out-moded despotism hat,as the cliche about the royal dynasty hey ervedwould have it, never earnedanythingnd neverforgot nything.5his is

4Each willbe referredo hereafter y family amesince somepossessedtheir itlewhile viceroy ndothers nly aftereaving heir osts.' The most ignificant ark f his s the tartlingearth fbiographiesftheviceroys; heyhavehardlybeenendowedwithhumanity. ne would think mericawas governedrom 810 o1824 yautomatons.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain nd Peru 4'surely disserviceohistory,or o viewthem s stereotypess,amongotherthings, o denythe full mpactofthemovement or ndependence nd tolessenthestature fthe Liberatorswhometand defeated hem n a contestwhose outcomewas by no meanspreordained. t is to ignore hepoliticalopinions fthatsignificantumber fSpanishAmericanswho did notwantindependence nd towhomtheviceroysweresaviors-it stillremains o bedemonstrated hetherheywerea minorityr a majority,or hevictoryfindependence oes notconstitute utomatic roof.Aboveall,thetraditionalviewof theviceroys eniesrationalityo Spain's imperial thos.How did the viceroys onceiveofthemselvesnd oftheirrole?Each, ofcourse,was very ifferent,nd thefrequentisagreementsmong hemwereonesource f heir ltimate ailure.What united hemwas chieflyhefact hattheyfacedthe task ofrevivifyingiceregal uthoritynthe faceofuniversalassault from othAmericaand Spain. All served heunworthyerdinandVII, who never ailed o reward hem each was granted istitle fnobilitynthe groundsof serviceas viceroy)but whose weakness and vacillationseriously ndercut heir uthority. he extent f their ove forFerdinandhimselfs impossible o discover nd not mportantnyway, s it was rathertotheking s a symbol hat heywere oyal.Althoughachwas a professionalservant ftheking, ndthereforeredisposedoward hedefense f heking'sprerogatives, hichwere also theviceroy's,achwas genuinely edicated owhat they ll conceived f s the onlypossible nd correct oundation or hestate-the absolutemonarchy s represented y Ferdinand'sgrandfatherCharles II (though heydisagreed n the extent owhichreform ithin hestructure as desirable). More than that,theywerealso dedicatedto theirdefinition f Spain and of its role in the world, to Hispanism. Theirproclamationseferringo thebrotherhoodfSpaniards nd the unity ftheempirewere notemptyrhetoric. hey believedthat thebrilliant ivilizingmissionof Spain in America was still alive. The noble titlesthey weresummary ibliographyntheviceroyshemselvess difficultecause muchofthemostusefulnformationis treated ndirectly. or an assessmentof Venegas, see, forexample,Hamill, "Royalist Counter-insurgency." or a treatment f thereactions o Calleja's policies, ee N. M. Farriss,CrownndClergyin (Colonial exico, 759-1821 (Oxford,1968).Lucas Alaman's Semblanzas ideario2d ed.; Mexico City,1939) ncludesbiographies ftheMexican viceroys. ess useful s Artemio e Valle-Arizpe'sVirreyesvirretnase Nueva spana 2d ed.; Mexico City, 1947).CarlosMaria Bustamante's ampahas elGeneral .FelixMariaCallejadel Rey Mexico City,1828) s a standard. t is interestinghatthere s a biography fCalleja's wife,whowas an American: eeJose de Nuiiezy Dominguez, a virreina exicana:oha MariaFranciscae a Gandara eCalleja Mexico City,1950). The latest tatement n Calleja is Carol Ferguson,"The SpanishTamerlaine?:Felix Maria Calleja, Viceroy fNew Spain, 1813-18i6"Ph.D. dissertation,Texas ChristianUniversity,973).ForthePeruvian iceroyshebestoverall iographies re nManueldeMendiburu, iccionarioist6ricoiogr4ficoelPeruLima, 1874-90),n which heviceroys retreatednshortoriginalmonographs. he well-knownmemoirs fAbascal and Pezuela are essential:JoseFernandodeAbascal, Memoriasegovierno,d. VicenteRodriguezCasado andJoseAntonio alderonQuijano (Seville,1944),and Joaquin de la Pezuela, Memoria elgobierno,d. VicenteRodriguezCasado and GuillermoLohmannVillena (Seville,1947).See also FernandoDiaz Venteo,Las campanzasilitareselVirreybascal(Seville,1948), ndJaimeEyzaguirre, a logia autarina otrosstudiosobrea independenciaBuenosAires,1973).La SernaandApodaca inparticular avebeen gnored. riginalmaterial nddocuments elatingotheviceroys, owever, rewidespread, ith he xception fLa Serna,whosepapers rebadly cattered.particular roblem s that by specialdispensation oneofthe sixviceroys ad a residencia,or did theseviceroyseave nstructionso their uccessors.


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42 Timothy. Annagranted-Concordia,Reunion-oftenreflectedhismission. hey embodiedSpain's imperial thos-absolutism, hesovereign,nd themission o spreadand preserverueChristianitynd truecivilization.

The readerwillalreadyhave scoffed, erhaps,wondering nwhat groundshe shall take theseviceroys eriouslyfthis was genuinely heir onceptoftheir ole nAmerica. urely hey ould see that t was a concept elonging othesixteenth entury; urely hey ould see the llogic n it. No, in fact, heydid not,oronlypartially t any rate,for hey tillgenuinely elieved t. Theywere, fter ll, imperialists, hoseworldview ncluded eliefntherationalityof heir ation'shistorynd their wn actions.Theycould notgrasp hepointofviewthatBolivarpersonified,he dea thatSpain'smissionnAmericawasover nd that hechildhad outgrownheparent.Atany rate, o assume thatin i8io, or even n 1820,mostAmericans ecognized he nvalidity f Spain'scivilizingmissionnAmerica stoanticipate. ts validity asproven, s Span-iards viewed t, by threehundredyears fhistory.6nertia, ime, pbringing,andtradition ere ll on theroyalists' ide. The rebelsdid notwinunanimousagreementwhentheydeclaredthatSpain's hourhad passed. It had to beproved, nd onlythe chief gentsofSpain couldprove t.Thatisexactlywhat hey id,for hefundamentalactor hatwoulddestroythem, factorheydidnotandcould notrecognize, as that hevaluesuponwhich their uthority nd theCrown's authoritywerebased wererapidlybecoming rrelevant. n a wider pectrum,f ourse,world vents isprovedthedivinityfthemonarchy,heNapoleonicwars showed hatSpainwas nolonger Europe's foremostpower, and North American independencesuggested hatAmerica could functionndependentlyf its founders. utwithin heempire tself ventswereshowing heviceroyso be, unknown othemselves,efendersf gloriousrrelevancy.he things hey laimedandthought hey epresentedolonger orrespondedo whatthey ctually epre-sentedntheminds fAmericans. he realitywas a kingwhohad overthrownhis own fatheritwas the firstimethishad happened n thehistoryftheunifiedmonarchy), war-tornpain either ubjected oNapoleonicrule ordividedbetween onstitutionalismnd absolutism,nd formanyAmericans,especially henonelite, very eal oppression.The Napoleonic conquestofSpain and thequestioning f he nation'sfundamentalraditionsxemplifiedbytheConstitutionfCadiz togetherontradictedrdisprovedhepolitical

6 For tudies llustratinghe extraordinarytaying ower fHispanism fter ndependence,ee MarkJ.Van Aken,Pan-Hispanism:ts Origin ndDevelopmento 866 (Berkeley, 959), nd, amongthemostrecent,FredrickB. Pike,Hispanismo,898-1936: Spanish onservativesnd Liberals nd TheirRelations ith panishAmericaNotreDame, 1971).The basic emotion,whichPike succinctly efines s "an unassailablefaith nthe existence fa transatlantic ispanic family, ommunity r raza (race)" (p. i), is not, after ll, verydifferentrom he fundamental rinciple f the BritishCommonwealth, ut its political, ocial, andphilosophicalmeanings re very ifferent.ince Hispanism s conservative,ntimodern,ntidemocratic,sometimes ltrareligious,nd sometimesnticapitalistic,orthAmericans ften ind t ncomprehensible.This does notalter he fact hat t is very eal and has answered he needsof ountless panishAmericanphilosophers ince independence. n the period under consideration ere it was just beginning o bechallenged. hroughoutheremainderf he nineteenthentury, ispanism nSpanishAmericawas at tsebb, owing o thebitternessausedbytheWars of ndependence, ut t revived fter 898when painwasno longer threat oAmerican afety.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 43valuesAmericans ad previouslyeentaught obelieve.The viceroysensedthiscrisis fconfidence nd responded o it n differentays,butthey everfully nderstood t. It was a fault n thesystem, ot nthemselves,uttheywere theagents f the system nd thereforef ts failure.JostABASCAL, WHO GOVERNED the Peruvian iceroyaltyor enyears,wasthemost bsolutisticnhisresponse o the rebellion. erhapshe best understoodthe uthorityhat heviceroy raditionallyersonified.e was convinced hatstanding irm, otmoving n inch,was the best defensegainst he criseshefaced on all sides. Indeed rebellionprovokedn himgreater dherence oabsolutism.n a report oSpain n185 heaccusedeven he Lima Inquisitionofweakening isauthorityy daring o criticize im.As a witness o therevo-lution, etestified,I know hatnothing as soprejudiced heking's auseasthe lack ofresolution,r the imbecility,f those who haveheldpower" inAmerica. n I814hehad a disagreement ithhisown audienciaroyal ourt),whichhe accused ofbeingtoo easy on a rebelsentfor rialfromArequipa.Whentheaudienciaeferredo their isagreements a "conflict,"heviceroyreplied, I urgeyounext ime o avoidusing heword conflict'withme,be-cause eitheryou do not understandts significance,r you forgetwherecomefromnd what represent.7To him conflict etween hetwo rmsofroyal authorityn Peru was a contradictionn terms.This was the toneadoptedbytheviceroys ho were noffice hen he nsurrectionsroke ut,formaintainingpain's imperial owerundiminished as theviceroys' p-pointed ask.Viceroy elixMaria Calleja ofMexicowas also a genuine bsolutistwho,unlike very therviceroy, poke nd wrotewith stunning ranknessbouttheroyalgovernment'sroubles.He came closest ounderstandinghatwasactuallyhappening.Followingthe nullification f the Constitution ponFerdinand's estorationn 1814,Calleja wrote remarkableettern whichheexplained o thepeninsula hat the ancient llusions" f heAmericansbouttheauthorityf heCrown nd itsagentshad received deathblowfrom heliberalizationnd confusionf uthorityhat heConstitutionntailed.Withremarkable oliticalperceptiveness e pointedoutthatwhatwas importantwas not so much the defeat of one or anotherrebel chieftain ut therestorationfwhat he franklyecognized o be thegreatmyths hathad ce-mentedthe state. The restoration f calm sufficiento allow a return onormality as alsovital, for ven f hearmsof herebelsproveunsuccessful... stillmisery, nd a growingonsumption, ill do thatwhichneither orcenor ntriguemay be able to effect."8Abascal and Calleja, then,had theclearest nd coldestunderstandingf

7Abascal tosecretary f he ndies,Lima, Mar. 29, i815;Abascal to minister fgrace nd ustice,Lima,Aug. 2, 1814, oth n ArchivoGeneral de Indias,Seville hereafter GI), Lima 749,748.8Calleja toministerfgrace and ustice,MexicoCity,Aug. i8, 1814, GI, Mexico 1482;thetranslationis fromHenryGeorgeWard,Mexico n1827 (London, 1828), 1: 512-22.


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44 Timothy. Annaauthoritynd itsemployment, hich s power.Almost s a direct djunct,theywere the most uccessfulf theviceroysnfightinghe nsurrection.nPeru,Abascal was able virtuallyo prevent he nsurrectionrom preadinginto the viceroyaltytself,while he raisedmoney nd dispatched roops o

Fig. i. Jose Abascal, viceroy fPeru, 8o6-i6. The six portraitsppear-ing throughouthe article re late nineteenth-centuryrawings akenfrom he official ortraitsmade ofeach viceroy uringhis reign.Eachwears the uniformf captain general nd personal decorations.helprestore oyalgovernmentsnMontevideo, pperPeru,Chile,andQuito.Calleja, themilitaryeniuswho tookoffice t thehighpoint frebelfortunesin Mexico,was able in threeyearsto break therebellion'sback,to captureMorelosanddestroy isforces,nd topacifylmost ll of hecountry,o thattheyear fterCalleja left ffice issuccessor,Apodaca, could claimthattherebellion n Mexico was over.9All thiswas accomplished ven though, sCalleja wrote, "The war strengthens nd propagates the desire forIndependence,holdingout a constanthope ofour destruction, longingdesirewhich .. is general mongst ll classes, nd haspenetratednto verycorner f hekingdom. He recognizedhehollownessfhismilitaryictoriesand insisted hat theonlysalvationfrom estruction as "to reanimate heauthorityf thegovernment.""

'Apodaca to minister f war, Mexico City,Oct. 31, i8i6, ArchivoGeneral de la Naci6n, Mexico(hereafter GN), Historia,vol. 152, no. 2.11Calleja toministerfgrace nd ustice,MexicoCity,Aug. i8, 1814.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 45Slightlyesscynical, utstillundeniablybsolutist,was FranciscoXavierVenegas,Calleja's predecessornMexico. twashe whohad to face he hockofHidalgo's uprisingn i8io, thebloodyfirst ound of the Mexicanwar.

Withindays afterhis reception n the capital in September 8Io, thereappeareda pasquinadeon thewalls oftheviceregal alace mocking isper-sonalappearance and style f dress. n typically irectfashion, e is said tohave ordered n answering asquinade to be affixed extto theoffendingoriginalwith hewords:My face s not hat fan Excellencynormy lothes f a Viceroy,but representheKing.Thissimple dviceI giveyouforwhat t s worth:The lawmust e thenorthtarthatguidesmy ctions.Lookoutfor reacheriesdone n this ourt.1'

It was Venegas's sagacity, speciallyhis ability o chooseextremelyom-petent fficersikeCalleja, who was commander fthearmyofthecenterand latermilitary overnor f the capital,that allowed himto resisttheterrifyingprising fthe ndian masses underHidalgo andtheguerrilla arunderMorelos thatfollowed.n i8i he faced wo direct lotsbydissidentsinthecapital tokidnaporassassinatehim. He organizednewmilitia roups,firmly esisted hemore radicalrequirementsftheConstitutionfter8I2,opened new sourcesof revenue n theface ofgenuinefinancial risis, ndended the dangerous ack ofdirection he government ad suffered romsince the shocksof i8o8. In i8io and i8i he created specialpolice forcefor hecapital city nd special tribunals o deal with reason nd rebellionthroughouthe nation. He deniedchargesby the citycouncilofMexicothattheseagencieswere ndistinguishablerom hose of theFrench yrantin Spain,"2 nd he ignored rdersfrom heCortes to disbandthem.The greatest anger,however, o theauthorityfall three f heseviceroyscamefrompain, notfrom heAmericannsurgents.n I812 the rosion f hefundamentalrinciples f he mpire eached tspeak n thepublicationf heConstitution rittenytheSpanishCortes fCadiz. The Constitution, hichtheviceroys ad todeclare nAmerica fonlybecause it was thework fthesingle ommonlyccepted egitimateovernment,owered heviceroyso thestatus f"superior olitical hiefs" ftheir ingdoms,reated lected rovincialdeputationsosharepowerwithviceroys,educed udienciaso mere ourts flaw, and established lected citygovernments. ost startling,t declarednational overeigntyested ntheCortesrather han he bsentking, direct

Quoted nJesusRomeroFlores,Mexico:Historia euna ran iudadMexicoCity,1953), 8112Venegas to MexicoCitycouncil,MexicoCity,Oct. 29, i8i1,Archivo el Ex-Ayuntamiento,exicoCity, Policiaen general, ol. 3629, xp. 176.


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46 Timothy. Annacontradictionf hefundamentalrinciple f heSpanishstate.For twoyearstheConstitutionemained neffect ntil herestorationfFerdinandnullifiedit, nd for woyearsViceroyAbascal inPeruandViceroysVenegasandCal-leja inMexicoagonizedover he delicate askofappearing oexecute tspro-

Fig. 2. FranciscoJavierVenegas,viceroy fNew Spain, 18 0-13.visionswhile gnoring hose hey erceived obe destructivef heir uthority.Theywere n thealtogetherxtraordinaryosition-and one which he trueabsolutistwould nothaveexpected o encounter-of erving metropolitangovernmenthatspoke for hekingbut thatwas controlled ya philosophyinimical, s theyviewed t,to thetrue nterestsftheking. n Peru,AbascalnullifiedheConstitution'srovision or hefreedom f thepress,paid onlynominal ttention o theprovincial eputations,nd struggledo neutralizethe revolutionaryffects f a freely lected Lima city council,which hethought epresented reole dissidents. n Mexico,Venegas faced thesameproblems,nullifyinglections that came too close to threatening oyalprerogativesnd firstmplementing,hennullifying,he freedomf hepress.Venegas and Calleja publicly quarreled overwhat Calleja viewedas theviceroy'snsufficientlyostile ttitude oward heConstitutionndhis unwill-ingnessto prosecute he war militarily.Mexican reactionaries ombarded


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 47Spainwith equests orVenegas'sreplacementy Calleja, and in March I8I3Calleja tookoffice. romising o implement he Constitutionullyn hisfirstproclamation o thepeopleas viceroy, alleja nonetheless ookno actiontoimplement hefree ress, ven nthefaceoffierceomplaints romveryevelofthe moderatefactionn thecountry.Chargesand countercharges eredispatched o Spain inbewilderingumbers.Allthree iceroys ad occasionto accuse dissidents f ngineeringocal elections,whileCreolesand liberalsin bothcountriesharged hemwith yrannynd illegal cts.'3ViceroyAbascal inPeru could afford o be lessheavyhanded nhiseffortsto neutralize heConstitution,argely ecause thekingdomwas not itselftheater fwarexcept n 1814, ollowingheuprisingtCuzco."4He attemptedinstead odirect he actions f hevarious onstitutionalgenciesbyactuallygiving heappearanceofparticipation. he Constitutionmade theviceroytitular eadorpresident f hecity ouncilofhiscapital and of heprovincialdeputation f thecapital-province,nd Abascal actuallyfilled hosechairs,somethinghis Mexican colleagues refused o do. In this way he couldsupervisethe actions of the councils. In the provincialdeputation,forexample, he personallyappointed the secretary,while a year later heintervenedn the electoralunta that was choosing CortesdelegatefromLima." In I8I3 hedisqualifiedheelector hosenbyLima from articipatingin the vote to elect the Cortesdelegateand provincialdeputation n thegroundsthatthe man chosen was a magistrate, nd yet he was actuallythought o be too welldisposed oward hedissidents.n I8I3 he disqualifiedoneof hemenchosen s a city ouncilor nLima.16He ordered heLima citycouncilto inform imwhenever t expectedto discussa matter fmajorimportance o thathecouldpreside ver hedebate, ndhe demanded hat tnot write irectly o thegovernmentnSpainwithout isapproval, lthoughitfirmlyefused o obey.'7He evenrefused o let thenewly lectedLima citycouncilfor 8I4 takethetraditionalaseo hroughhestreets n the dayof tsinauguration.'8bascal's realobjectwas to allowthe iberalprovisionsf heConstitutiono drawdissidents ut ntheopen so they ouldbe identified. searlyas mid-i8I3,meetings fhis unta of war wereable to discusswithremarkableccuracy he status fprominentitizens hroughouthecountry

'3Material ontheConstitutionnd its ffectssextensive,lthoughtconcentratesnMexico.The mostusefulrecentmaterial ncludes,forPeru,JamesLarryOdom, "ViceroyAbascal versus theCortesofCadiz" (Ph.D. dissertation,niversityfGeorgia,1968); nd, forMexico,NettieLee Benson, d.,Mexicoandthe panish ortes,8io-i822: Eight ssays Austin,1966);Benson,La diputaci6nrovincialelfederalismomexizcanoMexico City, 1955); Benson,"The ContestedMexican Electionof I812," HispanicAmericanHistorical eview, 6 (1946): 336-5o; and James F. King, "The Colored Castes and the AmericanRepresentationntheCortesofCadiz," Hispanic mericanistoricaleview, 3 (1953):33-64.14 AsJ.R. Fisherhas shown,however, heConstitutiontself ndAbascal's refusal o mplementtfullywerecentral auses of heCuzco uprising, hichwe nameafter ts ndian eader,Pumacahua.GovernmentandSocietynColonial eru:The ntendantystem,784-18i4 London, 1970), 27.15 PedroAlcantaraBruno oregency, ima,Mar. 13, 1814;MiguelTenorio nd others oCortes,Lima,May24, 1814, AGI,Lima799.16 Miguel de Eyzaguirreoregency, ima,Apr.3,1813,AGI, Lima799;Actas delCabildo, Lima, bk.43,Mar. 23,1813,BibliotecaMunicipalde Lima.17Abascal to secretary fUltramar, ima,May 31, 1813,AGI, Lima 745.18 Actas del Cabildo, Lima, bk.43,Jan. i, i814,BibliotecaMunicipal de Lima.


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48 Timothy. Annawho in theyearsahead would remain eaders oftheundergoundnfavor findependence. 9Venegas and Calleja were more direct in their opposition to theConstitutionnd consequently aused fargreater ublic reaction, ut they

Fig. 3. Felix Maria Calleja del Rey,viceroy fNew Spain, 1813-16.viewed theiropposition as necessary,for the years of the Constitutioncorrespondedwiththehigh pointofMorelos's campaign.Venegasactuallyannulledthe first lections hattookplace inMexico Cityon November 9,i8I2, claimingthey had been improperly onducted.20 he nightof theelections herewerewidespreadpopular demonstrationsf supportfor heConstitutionn thecapital,whichbothVenegasand GeneralCalleja calledriots ntheir eports o Spain.2"Afterllowing hefree ressprovisionogointoeffect or womonths, enegasannulled t as well,on thegrounds hat tgave coverto rebelpropaganda.The fact hat n a seriesofelectionsn thecapital cityhardly ny peninsular paniardswere everelectedconclusivelyshowedthe direction fpopularfeeling,nd itexplainsVenegas's hostility.

19Abascal to secretary fthe ndies, Lima, Mar. 27, 1815,AGI, Lima 749.20 Benson, ContestedMexican Electionof 1 12, " 336-50.21 Venegas to minister fstate,Mexico City, Dec. 27, 1812; Calleja to minister f grace and justice,Mexico City,June i6, 1813,AGI, Mexico 1322.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 49On March 4, I813, inthemidst f theconstitutionalra,Calleja becameviceroy. peakingwordsof sweetreasonableness,he permittedhe long-overdue lections fMexicoCity's ouncil and provincial eputation,uthe

delegatedthe reactionaryntendant-corregidorftheprovince o serve spresident fboth.Promisingverything,e simply eglected o do anythingaboutrestoringhefree ress, gnoringeveral irect rders romheCortes odo so. He, too, was able to draw out dissidentsby pretendingo permitconstitutionalrovisions. he electionswereperfectlyuited othatpurpose.At one pointhe evennegotiatedwiththefamousundergroundebelgroupcalled theGuadalupes as a meansofdiscoveringhe oyalties fprominentresidents fthecapital.The rebelsoftheGuadalupeswrote-toMorelosthedayafter alleja's assumptionfofficend paidhim he upreme omplimentofwarninghat heviceroy as their reatestpponent, or, hey aid,"he is agreatpolitician."22Calleja nowcommenced military,olitical, nd propagandacampaignagainst he nsurgentshat learly efines im s thefiercest, ost ompetent,mostruthless,nd,from heroyalists' ointofview, estviceroyf he ra.Hepublicly romised to dedicatemyselfxclusivelyo thedestructionfMore-los."23 n I814he swore o theking hathewould not et Mexicogowhileheremained n powereven fhe had to march t thehead ofthewholearmyacross thecountry,aying t waste withfire nd sworduntil very ebelwasdestroyed.24pecial courts-martialf hemostdubious egalitywere etup inthe provinces o deal withtreason, nd theywereorderedto ignoretheimmunityf lerics rom ivilprosecutionndtoexecute ebelpriestswithoutado. ByJune1814,evenbefore e had heardoftheking'snullificationftheConstitution,alleja was sufficientlyowerful o exult n a publicdecree,"Nothingcan now stand in the way oftheexecution fmy ideas."25Hereacted"withunspeakable oy," as he wrotehimself, pon hearing ftheking's restoration.26ith cyhauteurhe commanded hedissolution f thevariousconstitutionalodies as order fter rder rrived rom pain. Whentheconstitutionality ouncilofMexicowrotehimwhatheconsideredo bean insufficientlyarm etter fthanksgivingollowingnnouncement ftherestoration,eordered tto writehim gainwithin our oursmaking t clear"whether r not youare disposedto guard,obey,and executeon yourparteverythingouchedonby His Majesty nhis decree . . annulling heCortesand the Constitution.27 Several months later the king wrote Callejaapprovingof all his previousactions, includinghis refusal o obey the

22Los GuadalupestoMorelos,MexicoCity,Mar. 5, 1813,AGI, Mexico 1482.On theGuadalupes, eeWilbertH. Timmons, Los Guadalupes:A Secret ocietyntheMexicanRevolution orndependence,"HispanicAmericanistorical eview, 0 (1950): 453-99, nd Timmons,Morelos: riest,oldier,tatesmanfMexico El Paso, 1963).23 Proclamation fJune 2, 1814,quoted n Bustamante, ampaias elGeneralalleja, upp.,p. Io.24 Calleja toministerfgraceand ustice,MexicoCity,Aug. 18,1814.2 Proclamation fJune 2, 1814.26 Calleja toministerfgraceand ustice,MexicoCity,Aug. i8, 1814.27 Calleja toMexicoCity ouncil,Aug. 2, 1814,Archivo elEx-Ayuntamiento,istoria ngeneral, ol.2254.


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50 Timothy . AnnaConstitution,nd authorizing im to takewhatevermeasuresnecessary ostop the insurrection.28avingnow a fairly omplete ist of secret raitorsamongtheupperclassesof MexicoCity,throughout8I5 Calleja orderedseriesof rrests fprominent oblesandgentlemen,ity ouncilors,awyers,and priests,which virtually estroyed herebel fiftholumn n the capital.MeanwhileMoreloswas captured nd executed.Calleja was triumphant;isadmirers alledhimthe"Reconqueror," he "Second Cortes."THE CONSTITUTION WAS GONE. But bothAbascal and Calleja knewthat tseffectswere farmorewidespreadthan their ontemporaries,r even theirsuccessorsPezuela,La Serna,and Apodaca, suspected. he damagelay notinany temporarydvantage heCreolesor dissidents adachieved, ot ntheconfusion nd chaos that had reigned,not in the fury f liberals andmoderates like who had seen their pportunityor governmentf lawstrampledunderfoot y self-willedmen. The chiefdamage lay in what theConstitution ad done to the foundations pon which viceregal nd royalauthority ested.The Mexican audienciaalled it a loss ofSpain's "moralforce."29 In a letter dated August i8, I8I4, Calleja affirmedhat theConstitutionad removed rom heviceroyvery estige fauthoritye hadpossessed utside heuseofplainforce,nd it couldnever e recovered.Theinsurrections now so deeplyimpressed nd rooted n the heartof everyAmerican, he wrote,"that nothingbut the most energeticmeasures,supported yan imposing orce, an ever radicate t." The Constitutionadexposed the ministers nd magistrateso ridicule."They have lost theirprestige,nd eventheir espectability."twas now too ate;themeredefeat fthe insurgents, e said, would not end therebellion.This was so becausecontinuedwarfare acts against us in two ways: by open force, nd byincreasing istress; hefirst illalwaysbe repelled, he econdwillreduceusgradually o death's door."30 alleja, theSecond Cortes, hemost stute ndruthless f he astviceroys,ecognizedhathe was trapped, or heonlywayto retainpowerwas to useforce,nd force, e knew,was counterproductive.The morebattles painwonthefewerupportersthad,themorepower heviceroysmassedthe esstrueauthorityemained o theagentsofSpain.This replacement f authority y force was manifestn a remarkableexchangeof letters etweenCalleja and the liberalbishopof Puebla, Dr.AntonioJoaqufn Perez. The bishop wrote the viceroy n April i8i6,camplaining boutthecruelty froyaltroops nd thedestructivenessfthewar in general, nd Calleja repliedustifyingis government'snd army'sactions.Calleja didnotdeny he xcesses f heroyal roops ut ustifiedhembycitingthe excessesofthe rebels.Perezsaid farms nd factories fthose

28 See Francisco e Paula de Arrangoiz BerzAbal,Mejico esde808 hasta 867 (Madrid,1871), 1: 271.29 Mexican udienciaoCortes,Mexico City,Nov. 1 ,181 ,quoted nWard,Mexicon 827,1:497-509.30 Calleja to minister fgraceand ustice,MexicoCity,Aug. i8, 1814. ora modern estatementf hetheoretical rinciple hat Calleja clearlyunderstood,ee Ted RobertGurr, WhyMenRebel Princeton,1970), 232.


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 51suspected ftreasonweredestroyed eedlessly; alleja said thegovernmenthad been too soft. Perez accused royal troopsof demandingexcessivesupplies; Calleja replied t was the dutyof the countrysideo supplyamarchingrmy.Perezcomplained hat he rmywasguilty f apricious ndunwarrantedloodlettinghen apturingebel owns;Calleja replied hathecould not restrain uccessfulnd victoriousroops, he awsofwarpermittedevery xcess.Perezallegedtheroyalgovernmentadpublished alse ccountsofbattles;Calleja saidfalsifyingewsfromhebattlefields as ustifiednthegroundsof politicalexpediency.3'n all the history f colonial SpanishAmericathere s hardlyanother nstance,outside of the initialconquestphase, of so unashamed dependence nnakedforce. alleja knew hat nyother defenseof his actionswould be hypocritical.ndeed, to him evencompromisewas hypocritical.32In Peru,meanwhile,heagingAbascal also sensed heturning oint nthewarhad arrived.While heworldwitnessed oyal rmies weep riumphantlyacross theentire ontinent,o that by i8i6 all of South America xcept heRio de la Platawas again reduced oroyal ontrol, e sensed hat heer orcewas theonly hing eft, or uthority adevaporated.Whether erecognizedit clearlyor not, t was only a matter ftimebefore imple force ould nolonger ustain he regime.The viceroy eggedSpain to let himretire,whileSpanish ministrieswere flooded with complaintsagainst him and hisarbitrary se ofpower.33Most ofthe Peruvian omplainantswereunawarethat twas onlyAbascal and hisarbitraryse ofpower hathad stanched heflood frebellion.Simultaneously,owever,he practicalproblems f theroyal governmentwerebecoming cute. Contrary o tssilver-inspiredopular mage,Peruhadalwaysbeen poor,and itscost of ivinghad for enturies een one of thehighestntheworld-theresult, f ourse, f n excess f ilver nd a shortageofeverythinglse. Nowbreadwas selling or iftyents loaf ndwould riseto a dollarby I82 , while the governmenttaggered nderan unbearablecumulative eficit f12,000,000 pesos and a yearly eficit y 18I4 of ,500,000pesos, and 150,000 artisanswereout ofwork.34panisheconomicpreceptswererapidly eingdisproved s well. No exertion, o force, o intransigenceon theviceroy's artcould rescuePeru from his nexorable lungetowardbankruptcys longas rebellion xisted nywherenthecontinent. ut Perucould notdefeat he insurrectionverywhere.ts resourceswerebecomingoverstrained,nd itspopulation ould not bear suchexertionsmuch onger.

31 "Cuaderno de contestacionesntre l Virey e NuevaEspafiay el Obispode Puebla,"copiedJuly 2,8i6, AGI, Estado 31.32 Gurr xplains:"Regimesfacing rmedrebellion sually egard ompromise s evidence fweaknessand devote dditionalresources omilitary etaliation."WhyMenRebel,32.33 DomingoSanchez Revata to Infante . CarlosMaria, Lima,July 9, i8i6; MarianoTramarria oking,Lima,May i, 1816;AntonioArroniz oking,Lima,June28,1815;minutes fcouncilofthe ndies,Feb.-Nov. i8i6,AGI, Lima 773,1017. he most xtremehargewas thatAbascal was prolonginghewarforhis ownglory nd personalbenefit." Report fAbascaltoJuntadeArbitrios,ima,Apr. 28, 815;LAzarode Riberato PedrodeMacanaz,Lima, Feb. 3, 1815, GI, Lima 741, 73.A Peruvian ilver esowasequal to theUnited tatesdollar n i8io.


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52 Timothy. AnnaAnd all thesefinancialdifficultiesxisted prior to the finalrush to inde-pendenceof Peru'sneighbors.Is IT REALLY ANY WONDER, then, hatBolivar,writing rom xile nJamaica nI8I5 at the nadir of hiscareer, oulddeclare that lthough herebellion adbeen crushed lmost verywheren America, success willcrown urefforts,because thedestiny fAmerica has been irrevocably ecided; the tie thatboundhertoSpainhas beensevered. nlya conceptmaintainedhat ieandkept the partsofthat immensemonarchy ogether. hat which formerlyboundthem nowdividesthem."The tie that bound consisted,n his ownwords, f thehabitofobedience; communityf nterest,funderstanding,of religion;mutual goodwill; a tenderregardforthe birthplace nd goodname ofour forefathers."he concept hatmaintainedhattie was Spanishauthority. ll thathad disappeared, nd Spainwas nowreduced o "an agedserpent, entonlyon satisfyingts venomous age.""Thiswell-knownuotation ftheLiberator, eadand remembered y atergenerationswiththe most intense ffection nd pride,was certainly artprophecy.But it was also a foresightfwhatwas soon to be manifest. heLiberatorwas predictinghatthe back oftheroyalistause was broken,ndat theverymoment hatroyalpowerseemedmostascendant.How can thisapparent ontradictione explained?Simplybyrememberinghatthepos-session f erritoryyarmies, speciallyna civilwar, snot he ame thing sloyalty.n fact herewere wo warsgoing n: onea struggleor erritory,heseconda struggle ormen's minds.Whilethe first as important,hesecondwas decisive.The Spaniardswerewinning hefirst ut losingthe second.Bolivarknew, fonly ntuitively,hattheauthoritarianismfbothAbascaland Calleja and their ynical efusal o conformo theempire's undamentallawcodehad broken oth hechain of ffectionponwhich oyalty ependedand thehabitofobedience hatwas the foundationfroyalpower.The veryground ulesbywhich oyaltywasconceived ad beenaltered ytheviceroys'responsesto insurrection,onvertinghe delicate strandsof loyalty ntohatred. This is more than sayingsimplythat royal military perationsprovoked atred.That thoseoperationswereconductedbymen who in thename of loyalty efused o obey the fundamentalaw as set forthn theConstitution as thefact hatwas so critical. his convertedbsolutismntotrue yranny.panish political hilosophy adalwaysrecognized differencebetween bsolutism nd firm overnment,n the one hand,and tyrannyntheother.FerdinandVII himself,nhis decreeofMay 4, I814, annullingheConstitution,ould declare that he and his predecessorshad neverbeentyrants. ydefinitionheking ouldnotbe a tyrantecausebydefinitionereflectedndwastheultimate ulminationf hewishes ndaspirationsfhispeople. But in America that definitionwas now collapsing,for this

35 Sim6n Bolivar, Letter from amaica," in SelectedWritingsfBolivar, omp. VicenteLecuna, ed.HaroldA. Bierck, r., r. LewisBertrand New York, 1951),1: 103-22.


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 53government as notworking, hichmade it"bad government,"nd itdidnot adhere to the law, whichmade it tyranny. ven the mostapatheticSpanishAmericanwasbound to notice his ontradictionetween heoryndpractice ecause Spain andSpanishAmerica adalwaysworshipedhe aw.Whywere theroyalauthoritiesnable to build a newaffection, neworrevived abitofobedience, n the basis oftheirmilitaryictories? he chiefreason s that nceCalleja andAbascalhad madeunalterable ndimmovableauthoritarianismhefoundation froyalpower, uthoritarianismad to bemaintained.Anyattempt y their uccessors o diversifyhe foundationsfloyalty tood ittle hanceof success.Once the ronfistwas uncovered,nyattempt o glove t wouldappear to be eitherhypocrisyr weakness;bothwouldencouragefurtheresistance.Authority,nce corroded, an neverbere-established y force. t might,however, e maintained or n indefiniteperiodof timeby force,36ut that forcemustbe constant nd unremitting,and suchforcewouldrequireresources pain no longerhad at itsdisposal.Over and over again the nextviceroys ppealed to Spain fortroopsandwarships.One need only read the diaryof Pezuela in Peru, as he dailyassessed hechancesof his rthat xpedition einggatherednd making ttoLima, to witness an unparalleledexercise in frustration. nd besides,peninsularSpanish intransigenceoward any reformn theyears I8I6-2Iparalyzedtheseveralviceregalnitiativesowardcompromisehatwere at-tempted.37merican eform as stillpossible n this period fonlybecauseSpain once again controlledmost of the territoryfAmerica.But if theliberalswhowrote heConstitution nd governed pain amid thechaos ofI808-14 were unwillingto accept the reformsn trade, taxation, andgovernmentroposedbytheir upposedly qual American olleagues ntheCortes, hecouncilors f he ndieswhoreplaced hem n I814werecertainlyevenlesswelldisposed.After 820, when reform as onceagainfeasible nSpain's part, twas too late on America's. ndependence ecamethe ogicalanswer ecauseeither painrefusedoconsider eformrher gentsn Amer-ica madea mockery f t.38BothAbascaland Calleja retired rom heirAmerican iceroyaltiesn i8I6,officiallyailedas saviors, ositivelydoredbyconservatives,utdespisedbyradical and moderateAmericansalike. Calleja privately rgedSpain tomaintain he terrorn Mexico, for twas theonlymeans ofcompletinghedestructionf herebels,39nd in etterfteretter rittennretirementbas-cal urgedmaintenance fevery spectof heabsolutismn Peru. Butthenewviceroys everreceived his advicedirectly rom heirpredecessorsneitherAbascalnorCalleja left heusualdetailed nstructionsotheir uccessorshat

38 See CarlJ. Friedrich, raditionndAuthorityNewYork, 972), 12I. The definitionf uthoritysedthroughouts Friedrich's.37 For a resume of theway in whichpeninsular ntransigenceounteractedMorillo's attempts nVenezuela ither oreformheregime r tocrush herebelsutterly,ee StephenK. Stoan,PabloMorillondVenezuela,8I5-1820 (Columbus,1974).38Gurrexplainsthat"inflexible, epressive esponsesntensifyhehostilityfdissidents nd reducetheirhopes ofobtaining eformxceptthrough evolutionaryransformation." hyMenRebel, 36.39Calleja tomarques de Campo Sagrado,MexicoCity,Sept.6,1816,AGI, Mexico 1322.


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54 Timothy. Annaearlierviceroyswrote),and besides,as witnesses o the post-i8o8Spain,neither fthenewviceroyswould havebeeninclined o take t.Therewas acertain"time-lag" factor t work here in regardto successiveviceroys'attitudesowardmajorpolitical uestions.One of hefundamentalaradoxesofthe Warsof ndependences thatAbascal and Calleja,who governed ur-ing hefirstonstitutionalra,had left painto takeup foreignssignmentsntheperiodbefore hetraditionsf absolutism ad begun ocollapse.Reformwas to them nconceivable. ut the viceroyswho governednthe timeoftherestored Ost-1814bsolutism-Pezuela and Apodaca-had experienced heformative earsof their areersduring heNapoleonic strugglewhenSpainchanged at sucha dizzying ate that reformecame a wayof life,ndeed anecessity or efeat fthe usurper. hey werenot,unlike heir redecessors,terrifiedfreform,ven ftheydid not actively eek t.40Both"generations"were thus somewhatout of stepwith the politics theywere requiredtoenforce.IN NEW SPAIN, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, a naval commander,formerambassador oLondon, ndformeraptaingeneral fCuba, pursued policyof imitedmilitary ctivitynd widespreadgrantingfamnesties o formerrebels.He hopedto rebuildMexico by making seof hemilitary ainsofhispredecessor. ven nnorthernurope t was noted hatApodaca's policywasone of tryingo regainAmerican ffection ather hanone of governmentthrough ear.4'On several ccasionsApodaca criticized alleja forhis "fire-and-sword" olicy nd hisextraordinarypecialwartaxes. Between 8i6 andI820 herepealedfour undamentalaxesCalleja had created omeet hecostofthe war-a propertyax,a forced ontributionasedon incomes, forcedlottery all three had been new and nearly revolutionary hen firstintroduced), nd a groupof taxes on horses and carriages.Based on theassumption hatCalleja had broken he back ofrebelresistance, podaca'sprogramwas a conscious ttempt oingratiate imself o theMexicans. Butby sheercontrastt helpedto weaken thepublic imageof theregime, or,while Calleja had endedthemilitary spectofthe insurrection,e had notquashedthedesireforndependence.t was a time fhigh ntensityndgreatdrama-no lull at all, as existing istoriographyould have t-for it wouldshow whether policyofreason could solidifyhegainswonbyrelentlessforce,twould showwhether pain stillhad a right ogovern.

In Peru,Joaquinde la Pezuela,formerommander f thearmy n UpperPeru,becameviceroy. e, too,madeonly imited seof hemilitia nd armyhispredecessor ad builtup,eventhoughhe was very loseto thetroops nd40For example, othPezuelaand Apodacawerewilling ogive herestored onstitutionfair rial, ndboth,particularlyezuela,werewilling, owever rudgingly,oenter egotiations ith herebels.Pezuela,as we will see, actively ought ommercial eform. a Sernaalso gavethe Constitution trialrun,butbecauseof he ircumstancestwas never ullymplementedn theSierra.He entered egotiations ith herebelswhen forced o by either ebel ction or royal ommand.41 Manuel Palacio Fajardo, Outlinef heRevolutionnSpanish mericaLondon, i817), 43.


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 55staunchly efended heir ightsneveryway,as for nstance n hispolicy fgiving them preference n civil employment.42e, too, criticizedhispredecessorublicly ndprivately,nthis ase forAbascal'sauthoritarianismand hisrefusal o permit oreignraders o landon Peruvian hores.He, too,was moreflexible,more concernedwith stablishing opularsupport hanwithmaintaininghe ronfist. s inMexico, twas too ate. Confidenceouldnot be restored, nd flexibility ppeared to be weakness,encouragingdedicatedrebels ohold out for nother ay,while heextreme ight hafedat whatappeared to be viceregalnactivity.othPezuela and Apodaca gotcaught nthistrap, nd with dentical esults.When the historian ocuses n thechief gentsofSpain rather hanontheleadingrebelsoron therebelliontself,nefactor otpreviouslyoted boutthe WarsofIndependence egins o suggest tself.t maywellbe thati8i6was thetrue urning oint n themovement,hepoint twhich pain'spowerhad faltered eyond heability f tsagents orestore t. This was chieflye-cause those gents, nd indeedmostoftherebels,did notrecognize hat heloyaltiesofAmericans ould not necessarily e measuredby whicharmycontrolledwhich erritories.n i8i6 royal rmieswere verywhereictorious.Itmayhavebeen,therefore,lull ntherebels'fortunes,ut twas not lullinthestory f hedeteriorationfSpain's power, ecausethosevictories adcomeat an excessive rice.To reconquerAmericahadrequired estroyingtshaciendas, ommunications,actories,nd even someof ts cities. t led,ontheonehand,to suchprivationhat, s Calleja had predicted, he mperialsystem'sbility ofeed ndhouseAmericanswasdestroyed,nd ontheother,to a loss of confidence hat the mere presentation y the rebels of analternative o royalgovernmentould neverhaveaccomplished.As Bolivarsaid, Spain was reduced to an object of hatred,and its veryvictoriesaccomplished hat.The viceroyswhotookpower n i8i6 didnotunderstandthis,ust as their redecessors adnotrealizedhat heyhemselveseredoingit. To oversimplify,heequationwouldbe this: n the years 8io-i6, whenAmericamighthave been saved for pain bycompromise nd flexibility,twas governed yforce nd absolutism ontrary o thefundamentalaws; intheyears 8I6-2I, whenforce nd absolutism ad becometheonly ourceofstrength, mericawas governed y menwhosought lternatives.It maybe protestedhatwelloverhalf hestory as yet o be considered.Whatabouttheresurgenceftherebels, hevictoryfSan Martin nChile,theheroicgatheringogetherfBolivar'sforces nd themagnificentale oftheirstruggles, nd the reappearance of rebellion n Mexico undertheleadership fIturbide?The reply s that,ofcourse, hat s thesecondandgreater alf f he tory fhowtherebelswon,but tmayperhapsbe nomorethanthedenouement,lthoughwith few urprises,fhowtheSpanish ost.Precipitatinggentswerestillrequiredto beginthefinalprocess n eachcountry,nd theywerenot ong ncoming.n Peru twaseconomic onfusionand disintegration,hile n Mexico it was Dolitical onfusion.

42 Pezuela to secretary fHacienda, Lima, Nov. 30, 1818,AGI, Lima 761.


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56 Timothy. AnnaPEZUELA'S FINAL CRISIS was theresult ftheoverextensionf Peru'sresourcesthatwas already cute whenhe tookoffice. he countdown eganwith hefinal loss of Chile in I8I8 at the battle of Maypu. Pezuela's majorpreoccupation hereafter as his attempt o open Peru to free radewithEurope,NorthAmerica, nd Asia, an attempt hat ost him thesupport fPeruvianmerchants,he soldiers, nd the homeland.A remarkableetterfromManuel Vidaurre, ormerministerf theCuzco audiencia,larifiesheeconomic catastrophe hat was sweepingPeru and that made Pezuela'scommercial eforms ecessary.Writingn I8I 7, Vidaurre oldtheking, uitesimply, hatthe excessiveharshness fthe royalcommandersn Peruwasdriving the population to preferdeath. Endless oppression led tounwillingnessr inability o workthe land, and so to hunger. n Cuzcoprovincewheatwas then elling or wenty-sevenesosthefanega,t La Paz itwas fortyesos. Entire ownshad died ofhunger, e said. In Moqueguawartaxeson itschief roduct, randy,had quadrupled ts price; n La Paz wartaxeson itschief roduct, oca, had quadrupled tsprice; nLima wartaxeson breadand grains nd real estatehad the sameeffect; hile he oss oftheChileanwheat upply fter 8I7 forced hecapitaltodependon itsownpoorand unpopulated ountryside.When a man has nothing," oncludedVi-daurre,"then he becomes a rebel, because in orderto surviveno otherrecourseremains to him but a resort o arms."43 n May I8I8, Pezuelaconvoked juntaofprominentndividuals o findnew ources frevenue.Hetoldthem hat heyneeded nadditional 00,000 esos mmediatelyor rgentexpenses nd an additional I7,000pesoseverymonth o coverdeficits." hismoneyhad to comefrom oreign rade, inceno domestic ourcesremained,and so suddenan increase n customs evenuesnd indirect axes fromradecouldonlybe accomplished ythrowingimaopentoevery assingvesselnomatterwhat tsnationality.

That was the rub,for very ime Pezuela asked Spain forpermissionoallowfree rade, heConsulado,thechiefmonopoly fLima merchantshatcontrolledoreignrade, esisted,s didSpain itself. s early s i8I7 Pezuelawas making ccasionalrequests o Spain to allowindividual oreignhipstoland at Lima. By I8I9 he made a requestfor otalfreedom ftrade,evenproposingregulationsby which it would be controlled, nd in 1820 herepeatedthe request.45n opposition, he Consulado claimedthatforeigntrade, speciallyBritish, oulddestroy eru's ndustryndeconomy,whilereport rafted ytheformericeroyAbascal inSpain concurred, emindingthe kingthat the Englishneverwithdrew nce theygained a footholdnforeign ortsand thattheirpresencewas always "very dangerous."46 n

M3ManuelVidaurre o king, ima, Apr. , 1817, AGI, Indiferente568.Vidaurrehad been held ngreatsuspicionby Abascal, partly ecausehe had a habitofspeakinghismind.44 Pezuela to secretary fHacienda, Lima, June i6, i8i8, AGI, Lima 1550.45 Consuladoto minister fUltramar, ima,May 3, 1817;memorandum fHacienda to ministerfwar,Madrid,Dec. 25,1819; FranciscoXavierde Olarriatogovernment,adrid,July9, 1820, AGI, Indiferente313, Lima 1550, 1022.46Consuladoto king,Lima, Feb. 13,1819; Abascal to secretary fHacienda, Madrid,June 9, 1819,AGI, Lima 1550, 505.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpainandPeru 57another ccasionAbascal haddeclared hatfree rade would be tantamounttodecreeingheseparation f[America] rom he motherountryince,oncedirect rade withforeigners as established .. Spain would matter ittle othem."47The demandfor ree rade, ndeed,had longbeen a chief bjective f

.~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Fig. 4. Joaquinde la Pezuela,viceroy fPeru,1816-2.

therebels.The Consuladopromised o makeupthetreasury eficits utof tsownfunds, utfailed omakegood itspromise. n I820 the Crownpromisedtoappoint commission o study hematter, utmeantime ezuela allowedalmost very oreignhipthatpresentedtself oenter nddischargetscargoat Callao and even at the esserports.48Thus Peruvianswerepresentedwith heextraordinaryicture f herepre-sentative froyal uthorityublicly roclaiminghenecessityfrejectinghecommercialxclusivenesshathadbeenthefundamentalrinciple fSpanishAmerican conomics nd a major grievance ftheCreoles,whilea formerviceroynd the chiefmerchantspposedit. We cannotresist heconclusion

47 Abascal to secretary f war, Lima, May 23,1812,quoted in Fisher,GovernmentndSociety,54.48 Pezuela to secretary f Hacienda, Lima,Apr. 26, i8I7; Pezuela to Hacienda, Lima, Dec. i6, i817;Pezuela to Hacienda, Lima, Nov. 3, i8i8; palace memorandum,Madrid, May lo, 1819,AGI, Lima 756,758, 759, 1550. Pezuela talks about thisquestion at great ength n his Memoriawhich is actually adiario) nd makes clear his disappointment iththe Consulado. Memoria, 95,passim.


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58 Timothy. Annathat Pezuela was right, ut the nation'sgreatest conomicpowersput theirown interests irst.The Old Regime could not survivewhen the verycorporations pon which oyalpowerdependedperceived heir nterestso beopposed by the royal power. n the economic phere, oo, the royal system

_

Fig.5. Jos6de la Serna,viceroy fPeru, 182 1-24.was disprovingtself. yJ ly i81i9theroyal roops n Lima wereon half al-ary, and by mid-i820 Pezuela knew that San Marti'n and the Chileangovernmentad an expedition ftwenty-eighthipsand four housandmenreadyto embarkfor n assaultagainstPeru'scoasts.The neteffect f his economic risiswas that, ven before heSan Marti'nexpedition anded in Peru,Pezuela could predict ts success.,He wrote hepeninsula n i8i8 that herewas little onfidencentheroyalgovernmenteft,especially mongthe lowerclasses and troopsofthe militia.4" etween herebel victory t Maypu and the arrival of San Marti'n'sexpedition nSeptember 1820, Pezuela s governmentwas thoroughly iscredited, ndthrought, heroyal egime s a whole.Agents rom eru aterreportedothepeninsulathat "the personal opinionofeveryonewas that Peruwas beinglost,notthroughackof meansofdefense, otthroughhesuperiorityftheenemy,but through he wrong system nd lack of skill of oaqui'n de la

49 Pezuela to secretaryfstate,Lima, Nov. 12, i8M8, GI, Estado 74, doc. 3!.


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The Last ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 59Pezuela."50 The veteran royal army remained intact, however, anddesperately anted oconfrontheChileanexpeditionftert anded t Pisco.In theface ofwhatthearmy nterpreteds Pezuela's refusal ostrikegainsttherebels,nineteen f the chief fficersarrisoned ear Lima forced imtoresign nJanuary182I. The officershose Field MarshalJosede la Serna,general n chief fthearmies, o becomenewviceroy.5'La Serna's regime ould do nothing ut dependon military orce.Theincomparablyubtle and complexquestionof a peoplerejecting heir astheritage nd choosing new form fgovernment as now reducedto thearbitrary uestion fwhich rmywouldwinat battle. fSan Martin'sforceshad beenstrongern 182I, La Sernawouldhavebeendefeateduickly.nJuly1821 theviceroynd theroyal rmy bandoned Lima and fell ackupontheancient ourceofPeru'sstrength,heAndes.The weakness ndconfusion fthe ndependent epublic stablishedt Lima guaranteed everalmoreyearsof life to theroyalpowerin the highlands.52 a Serna claimedon manyoccasionsthathisabandonment fLima saved the rest f Peruand thatthenationsurelywouldhavebeen lost ifPezuela had remained n command.53But an army n themarchwas notthe amething s a royalgovernment,nddespite he valor nd skill fLa Serna and hiscommanders, heroyalforcesweredefeated nbattlebyBolivar'sforces n i824,completinghe process findependence. he La Sernaadministration,hen, houldbestbe viewed smerely "last ditchstand," even thoughthe combination fthe rebels'military eakness nd La Serna's inaccessibilitynthe highmountains er-mittedt tocontinue or ouryears.He mighthavebeen able toestablish nenclave, but to retake the coast would have requiredthe aid of massivereinforcementsfpeninsularroops ndthere-establishmentfSpanishnavalcontrol fthePacific, oth mpossible, nd wouldsimply aveconstitutedmilitaryonquest nyhow.IN MEXICO, VICEROY APODACA took office n i8i6. He was the mostadministrativelykilled f he astviceroys,hemostpersonable, ndthemostgenuinely opular n hiscapital city, hough s usualresidents fother artsof henationnever aw him.He frequentlypokeofhiswife ndfive hildren,one ofwhomwas blind. As a formermbassador he was attunedto theimportance f ommunicationnd sentmonthlyummaryeports nthe tateof thekingdomo Spain. The indexalone ofhislettersnd reports nofficeruns o sixty olumes.54ndoubtedly ismost trikingharacteristic as hisoptimism nd his belief hat therighteousnessnd truth f theroyalcause

50Marqu6s de Valleumbroso nd AntonioSeoane to conde de Casaflores,Rio de Janeiro, une 9,821, AGI, Indiferente 313; see also an anonymous letter,Lima, Apr. 30, i821, AGI, Indiferente 1570.51 La Sernatosecretaryfwar,Lima,Feb.9, 182 ,AGI, Indiferente13.52Fora fuller escription,eeTimothy . Anna,"EconomicCauses ofSan Martin'sFailure nLima,"HispanicAmerican istoricalReview,54 (1974): 657-81.5 La Serna tominister fgraceand ustice,Cuzco, Mar. 15,1824,AGI, Lima 762.54The manuscriptndexes re intheReal Academiade la Historia,Madrid.


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6o Timothy. Annawould prevailover he eaderlessbanditswho now made up the remnants fthe radical revolutionaries.He never foresaw the possibility hat hisgovernmentouldultimately e destroyed ot bythe Leftbut by the Right.This was notnecessarily aivete, orhisoptimism as thenatural esult fhispredecessor alleja's very uccess t driving herebellion nderground,herenotbeing pparent, twas more ubtle,esseasy tocombat, nd more ikely omanifesttself ater from differentuarter, inceits earlier oci had beendisrupted.WhentheConstitution as reinstatedn I820 Apodaca appearedtomake a genuine fforto implementt. In a sensehe had no choice n thematter, ut unlikehis predecessors e didnot attempt, ntil twas too ate, ointervenen and control heoperations f heconstitutionalystem. lectionswereheld regularlynd withoutntervention,hilefreedomfthepresswasimplemented or one full year, until afterthe Iturbideuprisingbegan.Apodaca reported o the Cortes that he thought he reimpositionf theConstitution ad caused no unrestwhatsoevernMexico.55But it was the Constitution,n fact,thatultimately estroyed panishauthorityn Mexico,notby provoking counterrevolution,s is sometimesalleged,butby proving oMexicansthe nvalidityf he mperial thos.Thestunning oyaldecreeofApril i, I820, in whichFerdinandVII apologized otheAmerican ingdoms or is errornannullingheConstitutionn 18I4 anddeclaredthattheancient bsolutismwas wrongwhilebegging issidents orememberhat"errors in udgment] re notcrimes,"56 avethe final ie tothe"tribalmyths" hathad permittedheSpanishsystem o function ndaroundwhichCalleja had anchoredhis restorationfroyalpower.If thethronewas not sacred, if it could give in so easilyto internal evolt ndoverthrowhe fundamentalaw toreplace twithwhat n I820 was Europe'smost radical government,hen nothingreally stood in the way of anintellectualnd philosophical cceptanceof independence. his is exactlywhatwas impliedn a remarkable eport o thepeninsula rom hecouncilorof theaudiencia,oseHipolito Odoardo, in October 820. Odoardo reportedthat the Cortes's radical legislation irected t restrictinghepoweroftheChurch, hemilitary,nd thearistocracyhroughoutheempirehad inonlysevenmonthsompletelyedirectedhe oyaltiesfMexicans, o thathe couldpredict hatsomenewuprisingwas imminent,houghhe could notforeseefromwhichdirection t would come, and that it would be successfulnoverthrowingheroyalregime.57he viceroy imself eceived similarpre-dictionfromthe city councilorFrancisco Manuel Sanchez de Tagle inJanuary 82 .58The longexpected vert hreat oroyaldominion inallyamefromAgustin Iturbide,a disaffected oyal officer,who in early I82 Iproclaimed n uprising hat,because it represented compromise f the

`5 Noticeofreceipt freport y Apodaca,Madrid, Oct. 17,820, AGN, Reales cedulas,vol.224, no. 93.56 Proclamation f he king o the overseas nhabitants, pr. i , 1820, AGN, Impresos oficiales, ol.43.57Fiscal Jose Hip6litoOdoardo to minister f grace and justice,Mexico, Oct. 24, 1820, quoted inArrangoiz,Mejicodesde808 hasta 867, 2: 12-16.58 FranciscoManuel Sanchez de Tagle, "Sobre que el sistema onstitucionalierde ada dia muchodesu valory eficacia,"AGN, Ayuntamientos,ol. 178.


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpainand Peru 6wishes fbothupper nd middle lass, mmediatelyainedthe upport ftheelite nd amnestied ebels like. n a mostunusualtwist fSpanishAmericanhistory,he viceroy owrepresentedeform hile he nsurgents epresenteda muchmoremoderate rogramhat hreatened o one's status r wealthbut

-II,

Fig. 6. Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, viceroy f New Spain, 1816-21.simultaneouslychieved national self-determination.turbideknew that aconfused oyalgovernmenthathad contradictedtsownprinciplesould notsurvive. e toldtheviceroy, Is there nyonewho can undothe opinion f nentirekingdom? . . . Any country s freethat wants to be free."59Apodaca had never reamtof uch a threat,nd in the faceof t he had nodefenseswhatsoever.Whenhe announced heuprisingo Spain he admittedthat"thisunexpected venthas filled hecapitalwith s muchsurprise ndconsternations it has me." He warned that Iturbidewas verydangerousbecause ofhis longassociationwithchiefofficersnd theCreole elite andbecausehisprogram f ndependence-thePlan of guala-would inevitably"seduce" manyof thewealthy,whileit was equally attractiveo genuinerebels.6"t is almost ncredible hatApodaca's onlyreply o turbide's reasonwas to offer imamnesty. y May I82I Apodaca reportedhat majority f

59 Iturbide oApodaca, Iguala, Feb. 24, 1821, GI, Mexico i68o.60 Apodaca tominister fUltramar,Mexico,Mar. 7, 1821, and May 29, 1821,AGI, Mexico i68o.


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62 Timothy. Annathe troops nd many fficers ad alreadydeserted nd that hekingdomwason the verge fbeing ost.As in Peru,royal uthority ad been defunct incei8i6 and the viceroy's pparent paralysisand inability o get his ordersobeyed ed the minorityfdie-hard eteran rmy fficerso viewhim as dis-pensable. Consequently,n an almost xactreplayof the Peruvian ncident,onJuly5, I821 Apodaca was forced o resign y his officersnd was replacedbya fieldmarshal,FranciscoNovella.8' turbide's ontrol f the nationwastoo faradvanced, however, o permitNovellato retrench n some interiorlocation as La Serna did in Peru, and independence riumphed nly twomonths ater. twas natural, or turbide enuinely mbodied t thatmomentthewishes f henation;he possessed, n otherwords, hegenuine uthority.In a poignant etter escribing heseevents fter e fled o Cuba, Apodacawrote, I had a feeling f presentimentboutthismisfortunen themiddle flast year, 820,but not about the terms n which t would come about or themeansbywhich twould be effected,ecause they re so extraordinaryhat twas not possiblefor nyone o imagine hem."62his was his confession hathe had sensedthe loss ofauthority hatwe have traced here but had notgrasped tssignificancer understoodt.There s no ndication hat nyotherroyalist verdid either, xceptperhapsAbascal,who had recognized s earlyas i8o8 that therewas some indefinableore,somenotquite explicableordemonstrablerinciple hatwas indanger fbeing ost fhegavethe lightesthint fweakening isgrip ver ll aspects fhiscountry,nd Calleja,whobyi8i6 knew t was already ost. That principlewas Spanish authority. nceweakened,no amountofeffortould have preserved he political nd socialinstitutionshatwerebased on it.THE INABILITY TO RECOGNIZE that Spain's authority n America haddisintegratedontinued ocharacterize heformeroyalmagistratesor earsafterward.heynever uite accepted hefact hat n event o unthinkableni8io had cometo pass onlya decade later.This lack ofacceptance s partof the reason forSpain's unnecessarilyong refusal o recognizethe in-dependenceof its formerolonies.Spain continued o imaginethatsomesortof restoration as possible. Significantly,woformericeroys, enegasand Apodaca,weremembers ftheSpanishcouncilof tatethat n 1828wasstill debatingmethodsby which to "pacify" the "rebellious Americanprovinces."03ndeed Spain as a whole never quite grasped what hadhappeneduntil heunforeseenhocksof I898 made its ntellectualsnd phi-losophers ware,with reatpainbe itremembered,hatnotonlydidtheynotpossessa great mpire, utthey ossessednoempire. ora nation o havethe

61Apodacato secretary fUltramar,Guanabacoa, Cuba, Nov. 17, 821,AGI, Mexico i68o.For moredetail on Novella, who should not be considered viceroy ecause he had no royal confirmation,eeTimothyE. Anna, "Francisco Novella and the Last Stand of the RoyalArmy n New Spain," HispanicAmericanistorical eview,1 (1971): 92-I II.62Apodaca to secretaryfUltramar, uanabacoa,Cuba, Nov. 17, 82 1.6'Council of tate,Madrid,May 29, 1828,AGI, Indiferente564.


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The Last ViceroysfNew Spain ndPeru 63things n which t genuinely elievesproved o be irrelevant,t least to theoutsiderstthoughttwas convincing,s a terrible iscovery. eforewe scornSpain for ts Quijotismon thisregard and this s also a partof theBlackLegendaboutSpain) we shouldrememberhat very thermperialistowerhas suffered he same delusion.The verythingsthat make imperialismpossible-the combinationof a once undeniablyfunctional conomic,governmental,nd philosophical ystemwiththemissionaryeal and self-righteousnesshatderive rom elusions fdivinenspiration-guaranteehatimperialists ill neverunderstandwhy subjectpeoplesreject heirpoliticaldominion.The greatest oss involvednthedisintegrationftheSpanishauthoritynAmerica,however,was that the independent tateshad no unanimouslyacceptedauthority o take its place. This was owingto the fact hat whenSpanish America found royal authority rrelevant-not ust wrong ormisguided utactually rrelevant,o longer uited o itsconditions-then talso found hetradition ponwhich hatauthority as based irrelevant,tleast insofar s it directlynvolved he political nstitutions.hat part, atleast, Spain had predicted.When theCortes sentpeace commissionersoSouthAmerica n I822 tonegotiateruces ndperhaps ven ettlements iththe nsurgentsnPeru,Rio de la Plata,and NewGranada,the ommissionerscarried a set of secret nstructionsemindinghem to tellAmericans hatindependencewouldmeanchaos,factionalism,oliticaldiscord, nd the ossof individualfreedomswhich the Cortessaid its own Constitutionwouldguarantee.The chiefproblemAmericanowfaced, hecommissioners ereinformed, as an absenceof uthority, or uthorityad beenreplacedby "athirstor ower,which s whatconstitutesheoverseasnsurrectionhusfar."In all thenewlyndependent ralmost ndependenttates,Madridpromised,the ackofauthorityhas toproduce errifyingvils."64t was a fit astwordofpaternal dvice,thoughno one listened.Spain lostAmericabecause t ost ts bility oprove tsright osovereignty,its ability to convince. In politics,economics, and religion t becameirrelevant.he Crown, he king,hisagents, nd Spaniardsthemselves ereno longer perceivedto be necessary.The decadence of Charles IV andFerdinandVII, thefather's orcedbdication, he son'sdetentionnFrance,the Napoleonic conquest,the emergence f self-made overnmentn theregency ndCortes, nd theConstitution,ll thesedidmore oweaken pan-ish authority,o make it-or prove it-false, than did all the rebels inAmerica, or heseevents ontradicted nddisproved hevalues uponwhichthe tatewas built.The forcesrrayed gainst heSpanishEmpirenAmericaweremighty, ut themostdecisive fthoseforceswere hose hat ame fromwithin, otfromwithout.Atthecenter f hisdilemmawere hewartime iceroys,hemenwhoboretheobligation fpreservingpanish power ven s Spainchanged o rapidly

64'Prevencionesmuyreservadas ue S. M. hace a los Comisionados,"Madrid, 1822, AGI, Indiferente1570.


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64 Timothy. Annathat the foundations pon which they attempted o anchor that powerdisappeared. n the onlyresponse hey ould conceive f to the undeniablethreatposed bytheoutbreak f nsurrection, bascal in Peru and Venegasand especiallyCalleja inMexico gearedtheir overnments,heir rmies, ndtheir upporters o a do-or-die truggle etween bsolutism, ntouched yany serious onsiderationfthe possibilityfreform,nd rebellion. ut thisviceregal espotism ccurred t theverymoment hat Spain claimed to bededicated o reform. his authoritarianismonverted he delicate trands floyalty, aithnthemonarch,nd senseofbrotherhoodfall Spaniards ntotyrannical overnmenty foreignersverAmericans. t enhanced hedesirefor independence.Then Apodaca in Mexico and Pezuela in Peru, notrecognizing heywere nowthe agentsof tyranny,ost the military ains oftheir redecessorshroughonfusionnd a well-intentionedttemptodiver-sify he foundationsfa system hathad becomedependent pon militaryforce.Ultimatelyn Peru,La Serna's governmenthatwas no governmentheld out inthemountains, rotected ntil 824 bythedisorganizationf tsenemies.The viceroys ould only operateon theunderstandingsfpoliticsand sovereigntyhatthey ossessed, fcourse.But sincetheywere he ivingsymbolsof the dominion nd majestyof Spain, theywerealso the livingsymbols f ts confusionnd, therefore,heagentsbywhich tproved tselfirrelevantoAmerica.American ries gainst he yrannyfSpain,whichn i8iowere heproductof lackofrestraintndpropagandisticnthusiasm, ecametrue nd deeplyfelt y I820 becausetheviceroysonverted systemhatwasmerely gedandin rare instances ctuallydecrepit nto genuinetyranny.What is perhapsworse,havingdone so they ould not sustain t,proving o Americans heinvalidityftheir ossession fpower.My contention,hen, ontradictoryhough tmay appear, s thatthewar-timeviceroyswere one of the active forces hat led Americansto rejecttheir ancient imperial heritage,while at the same time they are thehistoriographicalictims f hatrejection. t theveryeasttheywerenotthebloody-minded onpersons fmuchofSpanishAmerican istoriography.tthemost, hey ame close to preservingpain's control fAmerica.No onecan read Calleja's candid letters o Spain and fail to recognize n him apoliticaland military enius desperately trugglingwitha disintegratingsituation.No one can read Pezuela's diario nd fail to notice his genuineconcernforPeru or thepersonal agonieshe enduredwhenhe learnedthenews of Maypu, or heard of the loss of his son aboard the Maria Isabelcapturedbythe Chileannavy, r ofthe deathofhis son-in-lawMarianoOs-orio nCuba on hiswayhometoSpain ina desperate ttemptoexplain hefailure oreconquer hile. We havetoo ongconcentratednAbascal'smun-dane accomplishments-the ima surgicalcollege,the royal cemetery-atthe expenseof his greatestone-the preservationf Peru in the face ofrevolution rom ll sides.We haveonlyrecently egun o treat fVenegas nstudies fHidalgo.We have never reditedApodacawith herationalitynd


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TheLast ViceroysfNewSpain ndPeru 65administrativekillthathis contemporariesreetedwithsighsof relief. aSerna was theman who for ouryearsfoughtoheroicallyhathisconquerorAntonio osede Sucre treatedhimwithgenuine espect nd felt ealsadnessat hispersonalhumiliationtAyacucho.Havingrecognized heviceroyso bewellworth tudy,we can begin to becomeaware ofthecomplexity ftheirimpacton independence.

timothy anna - ultimos virreyes de america

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