time and communal life, an applied phenomenology

H U M AN STU DIES 2, 247 -258 (1979)

Time and Communal Ufe, an Applied Phenomenology*

JOHN R. HALL Department of Sociology

University of Missouri, Columbia

Every morning, with six-wheeled precision, at the same hour, at the same minute, we wake up, millions of us at once.

At the very same hour, millions like one, we begin our work, and millions like one, we finish it.

United into a single body with a million hands, at the very same second, designated by the Tables, we carry the spoons to our mouths;

at the same second we all go out to walk, go to the auditorium, to the halls for the Taylor exercises, and then to bed. (Zamiatin, 1924)

The rise of industrial capitalism as a mode of production is inextricably linked with the rationalization of time, legitimized under a rhetoric of progress. In the rat ional structuring of work situations, and in the constitution in personal consciousness of a disciplined and ascetic "inner clock," diachronic--that is, linear--time has permeated the established order. But in a curious way, history as progress becomes subsumed in an abstract and bureaucratically anticipated repetition of events. What have come to be experienced as "changes" are often simply modifications in style which in fact bear the stamp of the same mode of production. For utopianists, true history in the established order has ceased and only its illusion persists.

The new wave of utopianists who came into their own beginning in the 1960s are not alone in this view. The German sociologist Arnold Gehlen (1963, p. 323, cited by Schluchter, 1972, p. 213) similarly poses a concept of "post-histoire" in which the history of ideas comes to an end with the rise of scientific civilization; the world is "without surprise" since the "alternatives are known." Recently, certain American social theorists, for example, Bell

*This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1977 meetings of the American Sociological Association. It draws on aspects of a more extensive study of communal groups (Hall, 1978). Field work was financially supported in part by a research grant from the National Institutes of Mental Health, administered at the Department of Sociology, University of Washington.

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(1976b) and Tiryakian (1977), have observed in similar fashion that we seem to exist at the end of an era. But if certain utopian and secular "seers" are already sounding the apocalyptic knell to mark the end of enchantment with the temporal notion of progress, still it seems that most of us are too far from the threshold of the New Age to discern its portents. Bell (1976a, pp. 126ff.) assures us that the pre-industrial world is one ofdurke, or unfolding, present- centered, unrationalized time, and, like Lewis Mumford, he is confident that the time of the industrial age is "machine time." But the nature of temporality in Bell's "post-industrial" society remains ambiguous.

And rightfully so. For social time is in large degree a cognitive phenomenon. The prophetic marking of an apocalyptic juncture necessarily points to a dialectic between ideology and various competing utopias--a dialectic between those who would preserve the status quo and those who would replace i t with one or another new order of social relations. Under circumstances of such cognitive conflict, it is both more informative and more realistic to explore the phenomenon than to predict the outcome.

Because any social order's articulation of time is a moral vehicle and behavioral standard of social control, those who would replace that order are compelled to reject that order's orientations toward time (cf. Zerubavel, 1977). Thus, those who would replace capitalism's Age of Progress seek to treat linear history as ideological myth (cf. Althusser, 1970, pp. 93ff.). In its place they set forth a situationally new articulation of time. Transcendent utopias thus can be understood only by "stepping outside" of any culturally bounded conception of time. As Mannheim remarked,

The form in which events are ordered and the unconsciously emphatic rhythm, which the individual in his spontaneous observation of events imposes on the flux of time, appears in the utopia as an immediately perceptible picture, or at least a directly intelligible set of meanings. The innermost structure of a group can never be as clearly grasped as when we attempt to understand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings and purposes. (1936, p. 209)

Secular social prophets can only imagine what the future will be like, for the academies and institutes are firmly ensconced as bastions of modernity. Utopian communal groups, on the other hand, are sites of collective deviance: Communalists live in post-modern places where the "illusion" of progress has been displaced and "the future is now."

"Living in the future" differs not only from secular prophecy and social scientific "forecasting"; it also exists beyond the utopian "wishes"--the idealizations or mentalistic imageries which Mannheim analyzed in Ideology and Utopia 0936). As Mannheim recognized, people situated in core arenas of an established order may maintain utopian wishes as " tempora l mentalities." New communal groups, on the other hand, represent arenas in which both the lived experience of time and the temporal organization of

TIME AND COMMUNAL LIFE, AN APPLIED PHENOMENOLOGY 249

social action may be radically modified beyond the bounds of the old order. In this respect, collective deviance gives the basis for constituting an alternative social reality (el. Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 106). Furthermore, as Max Weber (1977), p. 507) noted, innovations often come from the fringes of an established order. Contemporary communal groups thus bear comparison with the monastic and millenarian groups of medieval times: Such groups were constituted beyond the bounds of"officiar' secular society. Millenarian chiliasts represented occasional political threats to the existing order, while the monasteries were sources both of temporal rationalization of production and of new social orientations toward time. Monastic temporal innovations later achieved economic significance in the secular organization of capitalism (Hall, 1978, p. 40ff.). Given the subsequent importance of peripheral medieval groups' innovative orientations toward time, it is not unreasonable to examine contemporary communal groups as lived utopias which may bear portents of temporal things to come in society-at-large.

II

In order to analyze orientations toward time in contemporary communal groups, I employed a method of "applied phenomenology" (Hall, 1977). Following Husserl (1964; of. Bergson, 1960), I used a phenomenological method to examine the essential nature of time as given in the Ego's internal stream of consciousness; in other words, I examined the nature of subjective time. Husserl has described this sort of investigation in detail: It moves from the subjectively intended Now-- the primordial domain of the Ego's awareness--to retention (primary remembrance), reproduction (secondary remembrance), and anticipation of "the future." Thus, by intentional Acts, the Ego can inject into the Now Objects of attention which are not immediately available to perception in the Now, either because they exist only as abstractions, as memories of previous perceptions, or as intentions or expectations about things to come.

I used this sort of investigation as a basis for examining personal lived time in relation to social possibilities in the lifeworld (Dilthey, 1976, pp. 208-245; Schutz, 1967). Here it is a matter of recognizing that the individual in the course of a biography can participate in a "social vivid present" as well as "world social times" constituted by social convention in various social arenas--all of these, of course, transpiring within local physical temporal phenomena, such as night and day, the seasons, and so forth (Hall, 1978, pp. 43-51; Zerubavel, 1976). Thus, the individual gears into the lifeworld through a complex series of Acts of consciousness which accentuate one or another possibility within the phenomenologically established a priori limits of the temporal character of consciousness. By these Acts, the individual constitutes many "levels" of temporality, including, for example, "timeless" fantasy,

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participation in an unfolding intersubjective referral of meaning, orientation toward an unfolding stream of intersubjective activity, remembrance of one or another conventionally established frame of social time, scheduling and anticipation of events, and so on. In short, with respect to social life, the a priori possibilities of the subjective stream of consciousness become articulated in the lifeworld in terms of social biography at tuned to intersubjective and socially objectivated considerations, which typically have a taken-for-granted quality.

The analysis of lifeworld possibilities suggests three ideal typical ways in which acts in the individual's consciousness may link the individual up with projects in the world and social interaction. First, diachronic or linear time of rationalized physical duration may be imposed as a scheme for the coordination of collective life. Second, synchronic time may de-emphasize past and future in favor of the Here and Now as the arena for the resolution of individual and collective concerns. Finally, time may be construed in an apocalyptic fashion. In this case, the last days of the old order are seen as giving way to a new world with a new time.

On the basis of participant observation, I have examined the constitution of time at specific moments in a diverse sample of over twenty-five communal groups, including communes, spiritual communities, revolutionary and religious sects, intentional communities, and mystic associations. The constitution of time in these groups may be understood by examining them as approximations to the ideal types just described.

In communal groups approaching a diachronic orientation, an objective standard of physical duration is used as the calculus in terms of which the work and life of participants is coordinated. Twin Oaks, the intentional community in Virginia, is the most developed contemporary case. At Twin Oaks, above all else, time is labor; each participant is to earn a quota of labor credits each week, either on the basis of hours worked at specified rates of labor credit "renumeration," on the basis of labor credit piece rates, or on the basis of participation in work crews which have been allocated budgets of labor credits to perform specific tasks. Labor credit input to the communal economy thus becomes both a calculable factor of production and a basis for assessing equity of contr ibution among participants. Of course the contemporary established order contains diachronic elements similar to those of Twin Oaks, but at Twin Oaks, the suggestion is that the society at large still contains nonrational temporal elements which should be eliminated. Thus, at Twin Oaks, Sunday is not a holiday, nor is there any demarcation of"sacred time." At many of the group's job slots, a person can work at any hour of the day or night. Participants also may build up labor credit "overages" and either take vacations or "hang out" while others are working to meet their quotas. Both labor budget planners and other workers thus treat time as a peculiar kind of commodity, as something which can be invested, saved,


accumulated and spent. People make statements to the effect t h a t " . . . I want things to be as efficient as possible, because it means more free time . . . . "and "People only have so much time in a given day . . . . "P lanners can treat time as something which can be saved th rough alterations in the rationalized organization of work. Workers coordinate with the social organizat ion of work by remembering their personal schedules and planning to appear at certain places at specified times. In terms of work then, remembrance o f past commitments and anticipation o f future obligations contextualize, frame, and interrupt the Here and Now. For participants at Twin Oaks these interruptions are a small cost for obvious benefits: The highly rationalized diachronic order provides a means by which each individual may contribute to the progressively more and more efficient satisfaction of collective wants through an equitable and universalistic nexus o f social commerce. Beyond the bounds of that nexus, people acting in terms of diachronic time find personal freedom in the availability o f free time devoid o f moral prescriptions.

In contrast to diachronic time, synchronic time is based on the coordination and l e g i t i m a t i o n o f g r o u p life t h r o u g h the d i r ec t and i m m e d i a t e intersubjectivity of the Here and Now. The nature of intersubjectivity in the Here and Now, however, is articulated through the cognitive orientations of those who participate in it. I t is therefore worthwhile to analytically distinguish three alternative "modes of enactment ," each with its own orientation to intersubjectivity. First, in the naturalapproach to enactment of the Here and Now, it is assumed by participants that "multiple realities" coexist with each other; no single "universe o f discourse" prevails. Second, in a produced enactment, the Here and Now is heralded as the social arena within a collectively defined and ethically specified single and encompassing reality. Third, in a transcendental enactment, the Here and Now exists prior to symbolization and the referral of meaning, and attention itself makes manifest the phenomena of absolute presentness.

IThe modes of enactment are inspired in part by Husserl's (1931) and Schutz's (1967) treatments of the natural attitude and the transcendental reduction. A third possibility, the produced enactment, has been included to typify the persistent utopian thrust of"true belief." More generally, it seems to me possible to typify numerous cognitive orientations to the lifeworld, drawing on concepts such as those developed by Husserl, and by Schutz and Luckmann (1973). The use of the term "transcendental," for example, parallels Husserl's (1931, p. 114) "transcendental consciousness," i.e., "pure~' consciousness with belief in the outer world suspended. As Husserl noted, bracketing or suspension may involve various steps; it may be more or less complete. In my usage, the term "transcendental" is not held to strictly philosophical domains; the Husserlian phenomenological program which draws on a transcendental method is taken to be one of many possible approaches to transcendence. Alternatives might include transcendence as a way of meditation, as a source of"religious" insight, or as a social organizing principle.

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The natural enactment of the Here and Now involves a pluralistic approach to synchronic time. In communal groups which approach this ideal typical configuration, participants do not embrace a unified collective representation of social world time. Instead, various imageries remain in play with one another. At one moment participants may sound an opportune call to "seize the time" for revolutionary change; at other times people may speak of "stopping time," of ritual as a way of transcending time, and so forth. If the multiple approaches to time are subsumed under any collective conception of time, it is of the Here and Now, of the moment which encompasses those people present at a given point. Commitment to the moment as a practically self-contained unity would seem to derive from an understanding that each individual has a path to follow. To interfere with the flux of social intercourse in an attempt to routinize the availability of the magical "now" would only "bring down bad karma, 'cause you can't fight the changes."The nature of the Here and Now is thus ephemeral. At one communal group, "the Revolution" was redefined continuously. As one person put it, "It's whatever we come together on whenever we come together on it." Since different individuals may hold different orientations toward time, at any point, these multiple realities may collide with one another. At one communal group, a conversation went like this:

K: Do you think your attitude will change with time? T: Time! There is no time. It's either happening now or it isn't. L: But we began here knowing we weren't where we wanted to be, and we

keep working towards it, and I think we are making progress. C: Becoming. We are in a state of becoming. T: Yeah, I can dig that, as long as the becoming is now.

Here, one person challenges a structured and historical conception of time with an episodic orientation. Another person retorts with a claim for "progress," and a fourth person seeks to reconcile differences with the idea of "becoming." Different concepts of time remain in play with one another, and lived time is enacted as a sort of happenstance, "only when people make it happen." The Here and Now is the locus of group existence and, as such, it serves to bridge individuals" streams of personal activity, but collective episodes of the group ebb and flow according to personal sentiments. In the natural approach to synchronic time, a balance is struck between freedom in personal agendas and the collective search for a transitory communion of the moment.

Produced synchronic time involves the subsumption of the individual in an ongoing, intersubjective Here and Now. The Farm, a Tennessee spiritual community of over 1100 persons started by Stephen Gaskin and those who accepted him as a teacher, is one of the most successful communal groups


approximating a produced synchronic orientation toward time. At The Farm, we are told to learn the lessons of living in "this world," "not in some fantastic time and space." The Here and Now is viewed as the only moment in which we really exist. What are referred to as "future trips" and "rear view mirrors" ("watching where you've been instead of where you're going") are held to be ego constructions which allow the individual to"pass through" the Here and Now without really being"plugged in'(i .e., related to or involved in what is happening at a given moment). The shared and ongoing Here and Now is a source of communion, and, thus, of salvation. It is therefore important to minimize the "backstage" of personally held but socially untested viewpoints. This is achieved through the involvement of each individual in "group heads"(i.e., arenas ofintersubjectivity) where personally held viewpoints can be aired in the light of collectively negotiated ethical precepts. The attempt is to achieve a situation in which personal identity does not hinge on ego, but on involvement in the social communion of the Here and Now. Significantly, the arena of communion is not restricted to a specially demarcated "sacred time." Instead, work itself is organized and carried out in crews which depend upon the Here and Now as the locus of coordination. In an advancement on the Protestant ethic, work serves not only as a sign of devotion to God, but as a source of spiritual communion in itself. In The Farm's produced enactment of synchronic time, an ethically maintained intersubjective vivid present is posed as the synthesis of individual and group, work and play.

In the transcendental enactment of synchronicity, the world is experienced prior to "the word," that is, prior to any socially constructed account of the world. The Here and Now thus involves neither intersecting multiple subjective realities nor a single, ethically prescribed intersubjective reality. Instead, in the transcendental enactment, the world may be experienced intersubjectively in all its complexity as a manifold set of phenomenal possibilities. Thus, time is synchronic in its presentness, and the experience of that presentness--in any of diverse possibilities--has a primacy prior to any account of it. Indeed, attention to the immediate givenness of that which appears to consciousness would seem to be the distinctive mark of the transcendental enactment. Ecstasy is achieved through direct experience of absolute presentness. Thus at one communal group centered around a "mystagogue,'~ participants achieved a shifting rhythm of collective life, created out of spontaneous unfolding of their interaction. At some points the interaction would rise to rapid paced juxtapositions of activity such that

2According to Max Weber, the mystagogue "... performs sacraments, i.e., magical actions that contain the boons of salvation. Throughout the entire world there have been saviors of this type whose differcnee from the average magician is only one of degree, the extent of which is determined by the formation of a special congregation around him" (1978, pp. 446--447).

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"time flew," and at other points, long periods of simultaneous silence would yield a sensation of the "stoppage of time." The participants actually played with shifts in rhythm and syncopation of interaction. They explored the ever- unfolding vivid present as the entry point of insight into the essential nature of an uninterpreted life world, one where all social conventions of perception had been abandoned in favor of the antinomian grace to explore human possibility.

Synchronic time, no matter what its cognitive enactment, represents an orientation toward the Here and Now which verges on the ahistorical. On the other hand, those who hold to an apocalyptic temporal orientation seek to mark a decisive change in history. Communal groups where a strong apocalyptic ideology holds tend to exist as boundaried sects. The apocalyptic shift in history is paralleled in these sects by the metanoia (Weber, 1978, p. 1117), or change based on cognition, which their converts undergo. The new reality is either that of charismatic apocalyptic war leading to the dawn of a new age or of a post-apocalyptic other-worldly salvation away from the hell of a declining order. Whether warring or other-worldly, apocalyptic sects are composed of individuals who have wiped out their personal biographies and become "new" people, typically with new names, new beliefs, and new activities.

In the case of apocalyptic war, it is Karl Marx and Frederick Engels who most comprehensively formulated the utopian (albeit "scientific") account. In "The German Ideology," they suggested (1967, pp. 429-430,460-463) that the proletariate can lead a worldwide revolution to free human society from history as domination. Whereas in bourgeois soc ie ty ," . . , the past dominates the present, in communist society, the present dominates the past" (1959, p. 22). Achievement of classless society requires revolution of people whose activity transcends their own predetermined lives and becomes directly engaged in events of world history. As Lenin and Stalin saw it,

Insurrection must rely on the crucial moment in the history of the growing revolution, when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height and when the vacillations in the ranks of the enemies and in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are strongest. (Selznick, 1960, p. 253)

In the warring apocalyptic vision, the eschatology of a radical break from history, as domination becomes translated, for practical purposes, into a struggle in event centered time between ruling interests and revolutionary insurgents.

Warring sectarians seek to precipitate this struggle by pulling recruits out of the quiescent masses to act in historical significance far out of proportion of their actual numbers. The Symbionese Liberation Army, though it differed

• from other radical underground groups on certain issues, is an illuminating


example which shows the temporal orientations required of such a warring apocalyptic group. The surviving participants demonstrated in interviews after they had been apprehended that they had a strong sense of the strategic timing and coordination necessary for"pulling a job"(Harris & Harris, 1976, p. 2I). Where the SLA failed, by its participants' standards, was not in this moment-to-moment coordination of planned activity, but in the unfolding time of history. Thus the retrospective analysis of apprehended SLA members dealt with issues such as the historical timing of terrorism and its relation to the momentum of spontaneous revolutionary opposition (Harris & Harris, 1976; Harris et al., 1976).

Apocalyptic warriors seek to bring about the dawn of a new world historical epoch by contributing to the momentum of a rising revolutionary tide. Other-worldly sectarian communalists, by way of contrast, have already found personal salvation in a new world; they are "reborn" into an eternal heaven on earth, even while the old world persists. The transition to an other- worldly grace may take numerous directions, each with its own implications for economic and other ethics of daily life. But in each case, the ultimate union with the Holy is regarded as involving an eternal kind of synchronicity, one in which worldly cares are left behind. In one contemporary other-worldly sect, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the eternal can only be achieved through the strict regulation of mundane time. Thus, the devotee's day's activities are strictly laid out according to a diachronic schedule. Within this controlled passage of clock time, the chanting of the Krishna mantra is employed as a device to speed up the subjective experience of time to a feverish pace in which the individual presumably merges with the eternal. As one devotee described his stay at a Krishna temple: "Everything was just flashing by, zoom, zoom. And it was bliss, absolute bliss."

In another post-apocalyptic sect, a primitive Christian group called The Love Family, rebirth into "heaven" is more sudden than in the Krishna society, and the eternal is cast within an ethical framework of the interplay of virtues. Thus, we are told, following the Bible (John 11:25, in Church of Armageddon, 1971, p. 34): "He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die." Love Family members believe that, "Our former names of the past [sic] were fictitious. Our real names are eternal gifts from God, and are the virtues of Christ . . . . " Thus the reborn, with names like Meekness, Humility, Love, Patience and Honesty, live in a world where they have "ceased to age," where they no longer act in terms of personal careers and biographies, instead becoming "the unified body of Christ" by acting out virtues signified by their names. From this heavenly plateau of virtue, they try to wake the people of the old world from the path of.the "walking dead"; their parents, on the other hand, often try to coax them away from heaven in order to "deprogram" tkem. A chasm of intentional misunderstanding separates each side from the other side of the apocalypse.

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III

The new communal groups may be understood as arenas of collective utopian deviance, based on altered ways of experiencing and organizing time. Some groups would seek to promote and harness an upsurge of revolutionary momentum in a struggle for the direction of history; others exploit yearnings for personal salvation by serving up eternal union with the Holy; still others engage in the antinomian ecstasy of the unconventionalized moment. These apocalyptic and mystical possibilities cannot be discounted. In certain situations in the past, each tendency has become influential.

But look for a moment to the temporal possibilities of a post-apocalyptic society. Both Robert Heilbroner (1976, p. 119) and Daniel Bell (1976b, p. 29) argue that some sort of collectivist order is the likely replacement for an order based materially on mass consumption and morally on individual self- fulfillment. They both suggest--as does Tiryakian (1977), in describing the equilibrium society--that the vehicle of transformation will be an ethical reorganization of everyday life, that is, a radical alteration in the ways that people be in the world. Yet what is the substance of the new ethic of association? The diachronic and synchronic approaches toward time would seem to represent polar alternatives. In the diachronic frame, production is organized via the intersection of personal schedules, and an ethic of individual duty and individual rights is carried out within a collectively forecasted and planned world. In its most positive formation, the new diachronic age would be one of increased rationality, justice, and advances in the technical organization and social coordination of production, all enhancing greater individual freedom and leisure. In the synchronic frame, on the other hand, face to face interaction organizes relations of production and of social life in general. The world is to be based on a shared interest--of the many who act as one--ra ther than on institutionalized equity. The search is for communion rather than for individual freedom, and collective witnessing of truth rather than justice under codified law is to serve as the vehicle to these ends.

It remains to be seen whether the further diachronic rationalization of social life in a forecasted future will be supplanted or subverted by a more synchronic immersion in the Here and Now. But it is the participants in communal groups beginning in the 1960s who have begun to explore new ethics of association which others have only more recently begun to recognize.

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time and communal life, an applied phenomenology

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